ACTIONS AT THE MALAKAND AND PANJKORA
If we look at the map of the country we shall see that the frontier at
this point is crossed by three main passes, all leading into the Swat
Valley. These passes, in order from east to west, are the Mora Pass,
the Shahkot Pass, and the Malakand Pass. All were reported equally
difficult and each about 3,500 feet high, with a rough footpath,
possible for laden animals, leading over each. From reasons of
policy it was decided not to use the Mora Pass, with the idea of not
disturbing unnecessarily possibly hostile tribes on that flank. There
remained the Shahkot and Malakand Passes. A proclamation was sent on
in advance to the people of Swat, saying that the British Government
had no hostile intentions against them, but merely asked for right
of way through their territory; such a concession being liberally
paid for. Had the people of Swat elected to accept these pacific
terms a simultaneous advance would have been made by both passes; but
intelligence was received that all the passes were strongly held, and
especially so the Shahkot Pass. Sir Robert Low therefore decided to
merely threaten the Shahkot and Mora Passes, whilst his real attack
was made on the Malakand Pass. With this plan in view the 1st Brigade
bivouacked at Lundkwar in full sight of, and directly threatening, the
Shahkot Pass; whilst a strong cavalry reconnaissance was made towards
the Mora Pass to stir up dust and to distract the enemy's attention
from the true point of attack. The passes are, roughly speaking, about
seven miles apart, and as soon as it was found that the enemy was
irrevocably committed to defend all those passes, Sir Robert Low issued
orders to concentrate on his left, and with his whole force stormed the
Malakand Pass.
[Illustration: The Malakand Pass.]
The battle took place on April 3rd, on the very day that Colonel
Kelly's column crossed the Shandur Pass far away to the north, the
2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Waterfield leading, supported
by the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Kinloch, whilst the 3rd
Brigade under Brigadier-General Gatacre was held in reserve. The
enemy's position extended along the crest of the pass, holding the
heights on either flank, whilst a series of breastworks built of stone,
each commanding the one below, were pushed down the main spurs. The
position was of extraordinary strength, and one which in the hands of
an organised enemy would have taken a week to capture. The enemy's
numbers were afterwards found to be about 12,000, about half of whom
were armed, whilst the remainder were occupied in carrying off the
killed and wounded, fetching water, and bowling down huge rocks on the
assaulting columns. The extent of the position may be put down at one
and a half miles. The regiments chiefly engaged were the King's Own
Scottish Borderers, the Gordon Highlanders, the Guides, and the 4th
Sikhs, all of the 2nd Brigade; and the Bedfordshire Regiment, the 60th
Rifles, the 15th Sikhs, and the 37th Dogras composing the 1st Brigade.
Three mountain batteries massed under Major Dacres Cunningham also
took a conspicuous part in the fight, whilst three Maxim guns also did
their share towards defeating the enemy.
The plan of attack was as follows. The Guides supported later by the
4th Sikhs, were to scale the precipitous height on the extreme right
of the enemy's position, then turning inwards the two regiments were
to sweep along the crest, taking the enemy in flank whilst the frontal
attack was pushed home. It was calculated that the Guides would take
three hours to reach the crest, but so stern was the resistance, and
so jagged and perpendicular the ascent, that it took these practised
mountaineers five hours before they had captured the last sangar
and crowned the heights. Meanwhile as the day was drawing on it was
considered inadvisable to delay longer the frontal attack, for the
enemy had been now under a most searching and accurate shell fire
from three batteries for the space of upwards of three hours and were
naturally much shaken by it, whilst the action of the Guides had made
itself well felt on his right flank; orders were therefore given for
the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders to
advance to the attack, each being directed up a separate spur.
It was a fine and stirring sight to see the splendid dash with which
the two Scotch regiments took the hill. From valley to crest at this
point the height varies from 1,000 to 1,500 feet and the slope looks
for the most part almost perpendicular. It was this very steepness
which partly accounted for the comparatively small loss suffered from
the enemy's fire and the showers of huge boulders which were hurled
upon the assailants; but the chief reason for this happy immunity was
the wonderfully spirited manner in which the men rushed breastwork
after breastwork, and arrived just beneath the final ridge before the
enemy had time to realise that the assaulting columns were at their
very feet.
When the whole of the 2nd Brigade had thus got well under way orders
were given for the 1st Brigade to support them, the 60th Rifles,
followed by the 15th Sikhs, being sent up a re-entrant, which
intervened between the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Guides,
whilst the Bedfordshire Regiment and 37th Dogras, heading on up the
valley passed across the front of the enemy's position, and, circling
round the rear of the Gordon Highlanders, attacked the enemy's extreme
left, overlapping it considerably. The 60th Rifles after ascending
some way suddenly came across an old Buddhist road, and turning sharp
to their right along this soon found themselves level with the leading
companies of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The whole line now
took a moment's breathing time, to collect the men still struggling up
in small groups, and to get into wind for the final rush. As soon as
all was ready bayonets were fixed, the bugle's cheery call to advance
was sounded, and with a great shout the position which from below
appears almost impregnable was carried at the point of the bayonet; the
three British regiments reaching the crest at almost the same moment.
Meanwhile the Guides and 4th Sikhs had stormed the lofty peak away
on our left, and were ready to move inwards if such support had been
necessary; whilst the Bedfordshire Regiment and 37th Dogras scaling the
heights before them dashed down the far valley in hot pursuit of the
enemy, only halting when they reached the large walled village of Khar
on the Swat River.
Thus brilliantly was an exceptionally strong position carried, and
the first obstacle which lay in the path of the Southern column of
the Relief Force brushed away. The action lasted five hours, and it
is difficult to praise too highly the dash and determination with
which the pass was carried. Nor is it possible to forget the sterling
bravery of the enemy, who for five hours withstood a most searching and
splendidly-directed shell fire from three batteries, and yet were still
firm enough to stand up to a bayonet charge at the end of it. Their
loss was computed by themselves at 500 killed, and the general average
of battles would make their wounded probably reach a total of 1,000,
or, say, a total loss of from 1,250 to 1,500. The British loss was
under seventy killed and wounded.
Several curious cases of the vitality of the wounded was furnished by
both sides. A man of the Guides, hit in the region of the stomach,
climbed down to the foot of the pass, and walked five miles back to
the Field Hospital, supported by a comrade. One of the enemy on the
other hand, with no less than six bullets through him, walked all the
way to Chakdara, nine miles off, and was afterwards treated by our
surgeons, and, strange to say, made a rapid recovery. There is no doubt
that Asiatics can stand wounds inflicted by sword or bullet infinitely
better than Europeans can. Wounds that would kill a European, or at
any rate lay him up for months, affect these hardy and abstemious
mountaineers in a very much less severe manner. Imagine, for instance,
having the whole lock of an exploded gun blown into one's shoulder, and
going about as if nothing in particular had happened! Yet such a lock
was cut out of a man's shoulder months after the occurrence by one of
our surgeons. Marvellous cases of recovery, without number, might be
told, but perhaps the case of quite a young boy is as typical as any.
Like boys in any other part of the world, hearing that a fight was
going to take place hard by, he naturally determined to go and look on.
Whilst he was thoroughly enjoying himself in all the excitement of the
fight, and probably throwing stones vigorously, a stray bullet hit
him in the arm, passing through it in several places and splintering
it badly. When the pass was taken he was found lying wounded, and his
wound was examined. The doctors decided that he must have his arm cut
off, or mortification would certainly set in, and they gave the boy the
choice between death or the amputation of his arm. He chose the former,
but in a few days instead of being dead he was better, and in a few
days more was out and about again.
Concealed amongst the rocks, boulders, and bushes, the enemy formed
a most difficult mark to hit; whilst the same causes, combined with
the steepness of the ground, saved our troops from severer loss. The
admirable control under which our infantry fire was kept may be gauged
by the fact that the average expenditure of ammunition was under seven
rounds per man throughout the day.
Of the enemy's bravery it is difficult to speak too highly, and
individual cases were conspicuous. One leader, carrying a large red
and white banner, called on his men to charge the Scottish Borderers
when they were half way up the hill. The charge was made, but all
his followers gradually fell, till the leader alone was left. Nothing
daunted he held steadily on, now and again falling, heavily hit, but
up and on again without a moment's delay, till at last he was shot
dead close to the British line. More desperate courage than this is
difficult to imagine. Again, one of the enemy's drummers, not content
with taking his fair share of risks, persisted in mounting on to the
roof of a hut, where he showed up clear and conspicuous against the sky
line, and thence cheered on his comrades. Every now and again a bullet
would find him out, and he would drop to dress his wounds, and then
again mounting recommenced beating his drum. At last a bullet got him
through the heart, and he fell headlong a hundred yards down the cliff,
and there lay stark dead, but with his drum round his neck, and his
arms ready raised to strike it. No doubt the great Mahomed will find a
place for him in the ranks of the Mussulman Paradise.
On the night after the battle, the crest of the pass was held by
the 1st Brigade, with two regiments pushed down as far as Khar,
whilst the 2nd Brigade bivouacked at the south entrance of the pass.
On the following morning commenced the stupendous task of pushing
over the pass the ammunition, baggage, and supplies of the advanced
brigades. The only available path was a single track very steep and
much encumbered with boulders, which had been hastily improved by
working parties of Sappers and Pioneers. Up this, from dawn to dusk,
toiled batch after batch of laden mules, and yet at the end of the
day small progress had been made. At this highly opportune moment
it was discovered that the old Buddhist road, hit off by the 60th
Rifles during the assault, led down by a good gradient to the plains.
Every available man was immediately employed in improving this relic
of a civilisation 2,000 years old, with the result that in another
twenty-four hours the brigades were ready to move. Had it not been for
this Buddhist road, the very existence of which appeared to have been
forgotten by the present inhabitants, it would have taken many days to
get the division across the Malakand Pass.
Whilst the work on the pass was going on, the 1st Brigade moved down
into the Swat Valley, and was fiercely assailed by several thousand
of the enemy, who, finding the Shahkot and Mora Passes turned, came
streaming westward, determined on a fight. These large bodies of men
appeared on the spurs which flanked the advance of the 1st Brigade,
and it became necessary to hold them in check till the brigade with
its baggage could get clear into the open valley. This duty was
successfully performed by the 37th Dogras, who crowned a neighbouring
spur, as well as by the Mountain Artillery, which kept the enemy's
crest well swept. Towards evening, however, the enemy, mistaking the
defensive attitude of our troops, who were merely covering the advance
of the remainder, were reported to be boldly issuing into the plain
to the number of 2,000, making as if to sweep round the foot of the
spur where it meets the plain, with a view to charging on to the head
and flank of the advancing column. Receiving warning of this movement,
orders were immediately given for the mere handful of cavalry which had
been able so far to struggle over the pass to trot round the spur, and
to watch for a chance of falling on the enemy in the open. This small
body consisted of fifty sabres of the Guides Cavalry under Captain R.
B. Adams and Lieutenant G. M. Baldwin, who, on reconnoitring round the
spur, found the enemy in the open, but, like all mountaineers, hugging
the foothills. Seeing his chance, Captain Adams, with great promptness
and boldness, charged, doing great execution, and driving the whole
mass of the enemy headlong into the hills. Not only was the charge
brilliant and effective, but the moral effect was enormous. The enemy
had not the remotest notion that any cavalry had crossed the pass, and
like all nations unaccustomed to horses, they had exaggerated notions
of the power of cavalry. When, therefore, they saw their worst fears
more than realised, and fifty sabres without a moment's hesitation
charging a couple of thousand foot soldiers and completely altering the
aspect of the fight, the ascendency of the cavalry arm was established
for the campaign. Even Fowler and Edwardes, in their far-off captivity,
heard nothing reiterated so much as this dread of cavalry. The
immediate result was that the enemy began to melt away even from the
hill tops, and by next morning not a vestige of them was to be seen.
Our losses on this day were slight, including seven or eight in the
cavalry, whilst the enemy suffered severely, at least 250 being killed.
On the 5th and 6th of April, reconnaissances under the Chief Staff
Officer, General Blood, were pushed up the valley to search for fords
across the Swat River, and to keep in touch with the enemy, who could
be seen in considerable force beyond Thana. Suitable points of passage
having been found, the duty of forcing the passage was entrusted to
General Waterfield and the 2nd Brigade. The enemy now left Thana and
crossing the river were reinforced by a body of riflemen sent down by
Umra Khan under the command of his brother. In all about 4,500 men were
posted in a naturally strong position to oppose the passage of the
British force. On the enemy's bank small rocky hills at the water's
edge, completely commanded the perfectly level and open southern bank,
from which the attack had to be delivered. Naturally a frontal attack
would have been very costly, but General Waterfield's smart tactical
instinct showed him the way to gain his end with but slight loss.
Engaging the enemy heavily at long ranges with his artillery and the
main body of his Infantry, he sent the Guides Cavalry and 11th Bengal
Lancers up the river with orders to cross by a little-known ford, and
to fall briskly on the flank and rear of the enemy. To support the
cavalry he sent the 15th Sikh Infantry. The effect was instantaneous;
the defenders of the passage the moment they saw the dreaded Lancers,
half swimming, half wading, across the river, a mile or so up stream,
began to lose heart; and what at first was a retirement gradually
degenerated into a flight, headed by Umra Khan's brother and the body
of horsemen escorting him. But the Lancers and Guides were not to be
denied, and falling on the demoralised foe, left the green crops strewn
with their dead. The enemy's total loss was about 400 killed, of whom
about one hundred fell to the cavalry. Holding the north bank with two
battalions, fords were rapidly marked out, and the infantry, aided by
inflated skins, and the skilled watermen of the country impressed for
the service, struggled across with only two or three casualties from
drowning. The work was an anxious one, for armpit deep in the rushing
torrent a man washed off his legs was lost for ever.
During the cavalry pursuit one of the squadrons of the 11th Bengal
Lancers narrowly missed capturing Umra Khan's brother, which at the
time would have been a great _coup_. For it must be remembered that
two British officers, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, were all this
time prisoners in Umra Khan's hands, and entirely at his mercy. It
may be said that the halter was round their necks, and every blow our
forces struck served but to tighten the knot. With Umra Khan's brother
in our hands the situation would have been reciprocated, and we could
then have afforded to treat on equal terms for an exchange. During
this same pursuit a curious incident occurred. One or two of the enemy
made a stand close to a tree in the plain; at them charged a trooper,
lance well down, as hard as he could gallop; whether he hit his man
or not history does not relate, but the next second he found himself
and his horse at the bottom of a well, which without side walls stood
behind the tree. His horse was killed, but he himself escaped with a
bad shaking. If one may hark so far back a similar accident met an
uncle of the author's, Lieutenant George Younghusband, of the 5th
Punjab Cavalry, in the Mutiny. He was charging with his squadron with
Greathead's column, on their march to the relief of Agra, when he came
across a blind well, down which he fell, with his mounted orderly on
top of him. His orderly and the two horses were killed, and he alone
came out alive, but alas! only to be killed in another charge shortly
afterwards.
In the village of Chakdara, which lies near the main ford on the north
bank, many arms were found, and amongst others a straight officer's
sword, cavalry pattern, by Wilkinson, of London. As the number was on
the sword, application was made to Messrs. Wilkinson to find out from
their books the name of the original owner of the sword. It turned out
to be an officer of the name of Bellew. This proved to be Lieutenant
Bellew of the 10th Hussars, who served in Afghanistan in 1878-79, with
his regiment. This sword he had lent to Lieutenant Harford, who was
drowned with a troop of the 10th Hussars in the Kabul River. We had
here evidence of the immense strength of the class of stone fort built
by Umra Khan. The fort is called Ramora, and lay east of Chakdara,
being Umra Khan's advanced fort, with which he practically dominated
the entire Swat Valley. This was captured after a short resistance, and
sentenced to be blown up by the Sappers. But sentence was one thing,
and execution another. A heavy charge was placed at the foot of one
of the towers, the train lighted, and the spectators stood afar off,
expecting to see the whole structure lifted sky high. There was a very
loud report indeed, but that was all, for the tower stood perfectly
unmoved. On further examination it was found that the base of each
tower was perfectly solid masonry from the foundation to fifteen feet
above ground line, whilst the walls above were of immense thickness.
All the forts built by Umra Khan were of the same pattern, that is,
four-cornered, with one of these strong towers at each corner, and
with high walls of great thickness and carefully loopholed forming
the four sides. Our artillery could make no impression on these
forts. The sites chosen in the open valleys are very good; but in the
narrow valleys they are perforce much commanded by the neighbouring
precipitous hills. On the Swat River, the enemy's position, with the
fort of Ramora on one flank, rocky hills well prepared for defence on
the other, the village of Chakdara in the centre, with much swampy
ground restricting the advance of an enemy even after the passage of
the river to a few well-defined paths, combined to make the position if
scientifically held a remarkably strong one.
Directly the passage of the Swat River had been effected the Sappers
were set to work to construct a trestle and pier bridge, whilst strong
reconnaissances were sent forward to keep in touch with the enemy.
These found the Katgola Pass over the Laram Range unoccupied, and the
cavalry pushing on descended on to the Panjkora River, some twenty
miles ahead. Here was found the most formidable obstacle which the
force had yet encountered. On April 9th, the river was fordable for
horses and, with difficulty, also for infantry; on the 11th, it was
barely fordable for horses, and not at all for Infantry; but from
that time onwards it became a mighty torrent totally unfordable,
impracticable also for cavalry swimming, though the Indian trooper and
his horse are like ducks in the water. It became necessary therefore to
build a bridge.
The only materials immediately at hand were the heavy logs of wood,
parts of great trees which are annually floated down from these regions
to India, for sale. With these, and using telegraph wire to anchor
the piers, a rough footbridge was with great difficulty and danger
constructed, and floated into position. On the night of April 12th,
the Guides were pushed across, and strongly entrenched, so as to
cover the bridge head. The night passed quietly, but towards morning
a freshet came down bearing great logs and washed the bridge away,
leaving the Guides on the far side. The position was undoubtedly an
awkward one, for cavalry reconnaissances had reported that the enemy
in some strength, calculated at 9,000 by the local people, lay only
about seven miles westward, and the news of the bridge breaking would
immediately be reported by their outlooks. However it never does
in fighting these people to hesitate or appear to be in the least
discomposed, happen what may. Colonel Battye, who was commanding the
Guides on this occasion, therefore adhered to the orders received
overnight, when the bridge was intact. These orders were to turn the
enemy's sharpshooters out of the positions from which they had been
annoying our working parties, and to burn such villages near at hand
as had been furnishing armed parties to fire across the river by night
and day. The bold offensive thus taken by the Guides undoubtedly had a
good effect. They started early in the morning, and making a wide sweep
drove out all parties of the enemy concealed amongst the rocks, and
burnt such villages as were actively hostile. All this was easy work
for troops highly skilled in hill warfare, though the climbing was very
stiff; but the really stern trial came when the hour arrived to retire
to the bridge head. It requires the very best and steadiest of troops
to carry out a retirement in the face of great odds, and it requires
still greater nerve to do so in the presence of brave and fanatical
foes who count life as nothing, who with matchless courage charge right
up to the muzzle of a breech-loader, and who give no quarter and ask
for none.
In retiring before such an enemy an almost exaggerated deliberation
is required, for the least appearance of hurry, much more so of
confusion, will open the sluice gates and let in such a stormy torrent
of warriors, that science must perforce give way to weight of numbers.
The story of the day's fighting may thus be briefly told. The Guides
had completed their mission on which they had been despatched, and
were now retiring down the spurs of a lofty hill which forms the
angle where the Jandul River flows into the Panjkora River. This hill
is to the south of the Jandul River, whilst the bridge head was to
the north of it. Thus, to reach their entrenched position the Guides
had to retire down the mountain they were on and to cross the Jandul
River. At about noon two dense columns of the enemy were seen coming
down the Jandul Valley, one column keeping to the right bank, and
the other to the left bank of the Jandul River. The first column,
breasting the mountain out of range of the Guides and mostly hidden
from them by an intervening spur, reached the summit and attacked the
regiment strongly as it retired. The second column sweeping down the
valley prepared to assail the Guides in flank and rear, hoping to
completely cut off their retreat. Foot by foot--to the spectators it
seemed almost inch by inch--the different companies retired alternately
down the ridges they occupied, fiercely assailed on all hands yet
coolly firing volley after volley, relinquishing quietly and almost
imperceptibly one strong position only to take up another a few yards
back, the splendidly-directed fire of the Derajat Mountain Battery
doing invaluable service. So good indeed was the fire discipline of
the troops engaged under these trying circumstances that not a shot
was fired except by word of command. Meanwhile two companies of the
regiment, which had been left to hold the bridge head, moved out
to check the advance of the enemy's second column, which, making a
detour, was moving with determination into the flank and rear of the
retreating force. The whole of the 2nd Brigade, a battery of artillery,
and a Maxim gun, were now ordered out and placed in a strong position
on the east bank of the Panjkora (the Guides being on the west bank),
whence in the later stages of the retirement their fire could be of
material assistance. Owing to the very broken nature of the mountain
sides, and the excellent cover afforded to skilled skirmishers, our
loss was exceedingly small till the foot of the hill was reached. Here
the regiment had to cross several hundred yards of level ground, on
which the green barley was standing waist high, and then cross the
Jandul River, here about three feet deep, to make its way through more
fields to the bridge head. Unhappily, just as the regiment left the
last spur, the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye was
mortally wounded, dying, as he would perhaps most wish to, at the head
of his regiment, after a quarter of a century of distinguished service
with it.
It was in crossing this open ground that the extraordinary bravery
of the enemy became more brilliantly evident. Standard-bearers with
reckless gallantry could be seen rushing to certain destruction,
falling perhaps within ten yards of the invincible line of the Guides.
Nay, sometimes men, devoid of all fear, and having used up the whole
of their ammunition, rushed forward with large rocks and hurled these
at the soldiers, courting instant death. They were like hounds on
their prey. Nothing could damp their ardour or check the fury of their
assaults. Even after the Guides had crossed the Jandul stream, and
the enemy were under a severe flank fire from the Gordon Highlanders
and the King's Own Scottish Borderers, they dashed into the stream,
where each one stood out as clear as a bull's eye on a target, and
attempted to close again. But not a man got across, so steady and
well directed was the flank fire of the British regiments. The fight
was now practically over for the day; fire slackened all round, and
the entrenched position was rapidly occupied, and strengthened where
necessary. During the day the enemy, who numbered 5,000, lost from 500
to 600 men; the Guides' total loss was only about twenty, a result due
to the skilful manner in which the retirement was effected, as well as
to the fine cover afforded by the broken ground on the mountain side.
It was now evening, and preparations had to be made to meet a night
attack, for the enemy, several thousand strong, were still close round
hidden behind the low hills. As a reinforcement a couple of companies
of the 4th Sikhs and some extra British officers were sent across
on rafts, also a Maxim gun; whilst the near bank, which commanded
the bridge head entrenchment at 800 yards' range, was occupied by a
mountain battery, and the troops of the 2nd Brigade. The position of
the enemy being such as it was, the night was one of some anxiety, for
a determined rush might be expected at any moment. Such an attack was
planned and on the eve of being executed, when the unexpected, and as
it seemed to the enemy, magical, appearance of a star shell completely
dumfounded the hitherto dauntless foe, and the attack was not
delivered. From the information of spies it appeared afterwards that
2,000 chosen warriors, sword in hand, lay concealed in the standing
corn just outside the picquets, merely awaiting the signal for assault,
when this happy contrivance of civilisation staved off a fight, which
could only have been attended with enormous loss on both sides. Before
the enemy finally drew off, however, the force sustained a serious
loss in the death of Captain Peebles, in charge of the Maxim gun. This
officer's services had proved invaluable from his intimate knowledge of
the working of the Maxim, a gun which in inexpert hands is apt, like
other pieces of mechanism, to get out of order. The working of Captain
Peebles's gun had been the admiration of the whole force throughout the
campaign.
It had become sufficiently apparent now that no floating bridge could
hope to stand the current in the Panjkora River, and it was therefore
decided to throw across a suspension bridge at a point somewhat lower
down. Curiously enough at this point, where the rocky hills shut in
the river till it is like a mill race only 100 feet or so across, were
found bridging materials collected by Umra Khan, who had evidently
ordered a cantilever bridge to be built here. The work was entrusted
to Major Aylmer, V.C., R.E., who had had much experience in this branch
of his art up in the Gilgit direction. The available materials were
telegraph wire and beams from dismantled houses. With these, within
forty-eight hours, Major Aylmer constructed a suspension bridge of 100
feet span, capable of bearing even loaded camels, cavalry, and mountain
artillery.
During the construction a very prompt and plucky act on Major Aylmer's
part saved the life of a soldier. About a mile up stream, where the
first floating bridge had been constructed, a flying bridge and rafts
were still working backwards and forwards, to supply the Guides with
their wants on the other bank. One of these rafts, on which were two
men of the Devonshire Regiment Maxim Gun Detachment, got accidentally
overturned, and the boatmen and oars were washed away. The two soldiers
managed to climb on to the raft and were carried down stream at a great
pace. General Gatacre, seeing the accident, immediately galloped down
to the site of the new bridge to give warning, in the hopes of saving
the men. Meanwhile one man had made an attempt to jump on shore, and
had been swept away and drowned, and the survivor on the raft came
flying down the torrent. With the greatest presence of mind and pluck
Major Aylmer immediately slipped down a slack wire that was across
the river, and just managed to grab the soldier as he shot past. The
raft was immediately after dashed to pieces on the rocks below. With
considerable difficulty the soldier and his preserver were hauled on
shore, and it was then found that the Major was badly bruised and cut
by the wire. The Royal Humane Society's medal has been given for many a
less distinguished act of bravery, yet I do not think that in the stir
of passing events it actually occurred to any of the spectators to send
the recommendation home.
[Illustration: CONSTRUCTING SUSPENSION BRIDGE OVER PANJKORA RIVER.]
Certain news came in about now that Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler,
the two officers who had fallen into Umra Khan's hands, were at Barwa,
a small fort only about eighteen miles distant, on the other side of
the Panjkora. This rather complicated matters, for according to all
precedent and our former experiences of Pathan warfare these officers'
lives were not worth an hour's purchase in any case, and their murder
in cold blood might be calculated on as a moral certainty if we were
to attack. The following note was received from the officers, written
from Barwa:--"Fowler R.E. and Edwardes 2nd Bombay Grenadiers are shut
in Barwa can you get us out. Give bearers Rs.100. 7.4.94 (_sic_) P.S.
Shall we try and bolt people here panic." A hasty scrawl written on the
leaf of a note-book.
The title "Political" officers is one of ill omen in the Indian Army,
but in Major Deane the force had a guide, philosopher, and friend
whose services throughout were simply invaluable. Added to an intimate
knowledge of the country, its people, and language, he added a shrewd
knowledge of how to deal with them. To Major Deane's diplomatic skill
Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes in all human probability owe their
lives, and their release freed the General's arm to strike, unhampered
by the thought that his action might sound the death-knell of the two
young officers. In meeting Major Deane half way in these diplomatic
overtures Umra Khan displayed an enlightened and civilised advancement
which is far ahead of his surroundings. Without demanding any _quid
pro quo_, he, when they were asked for, returned the prisoners in all
honour, having treated them thoroughly well throughout.
Whilst the Sappers are busy building their bridge over the Panjkora
this would be a not altogether unfavourable moment to epitomise the
campaign in so far as it had conduced to the relief of the beleaguered
garrison up to this date. Every effort had failed to get news from the
besieged, nor had it been found possible by any device--for many were
tried--to throw news of the coming succour into the fort. But so far
great results had been gained; the commander-in-chief, the soul and
body of the siege, Umra Khan himself, with one thousand of his picked
men, mostly armed with breech-loaders, had been compelled to abandon
the siege, and to hasten back southwards and to organise resistance
to and raise the tribes against our advance. On this same date, April
13th, Colonel Kelly and his handful of men were at Mastuj, having
accomplished their celebrated passage of the Shandur Pass. His advance
so far had been but slightly opposed. From reliable information it was
supposed that the garrison of Chitral had supplies to last them only up
to April 22nd. A week therefore only remained, and before the Southern
force lay Umra Khan with 9,000 men and two mighty ranges of mountains,
whilst the Northern force, under Colonel Kelly, though within sixty
miles of Chitral, had before it a narrow and difficult route, at any
point in which the enemy might be found strongly posted.