GENERAL LOW'S ADVANCE
From the time that Lord Roberts made his famous march from Kabul to
Kandahar, the Indian Army had hitherto taken part in no campaign so
rapid, brilliant, and successful as the operations which resulted
in the relief of the sorely pressed garrison of Chitral. No element
was wanting to call forth the keenest instincts of the soldier, or
to arouse the anxious interest of those who watched with breathless
suspense the keen struggle, as the columns pushed forward over high
mountain passes, girth deep in snow, across rivers broad and deep,
swollen with rain and melting snow, and fiercely opposed by the
desperate bravery of mountain warriors born and bred to the sword. When
therefore within three short weeks the welcome news was flashed down
the wire that Chitral was relieved, and that the British agent and his
escort had been snatched from a horrible fate, there was perhaps hardly
a corner of the British Empire which did not feel proud of the hardy
leaders and brave men who had so signally upheld the proud standard of
British resource, pluck, and endurance.
The general plan of operations was this. The 1st Division of all arms,
some 15,000 strong, belonging to the 1st Army Corps was to mobilise at
Peshawur, and moving from a southerly position as rapidly as possible,
was to pass through Swat and Dir, falling on the rear of Umra Khan. At
the same time a small column some 400 strong was to move from Chilas
and taking the wide circuit through Gilgit and Mastuj, was to endeavour
to force its way to Chitral from a north-easterly direction.
Before the opening of the campaign, our knowledge of that portion of
the theatre of operations which lies between the Peshawur Valley and
Chitral territory was limited almost entirely to such information
as had been collated from the reports of natives. This information
though defective in accuracy of detail, yet described with sufficient
exactness, the main physical difficulties to be overcome. Speaking
generally, the theatre of war was crossed transversely by ranges of
high mountains and rapid rivers, each in itself a formidable obstacle,
culminating in the lofty range through which a pass 10,450 feet high
alone gave access to Chitral. Of the country which lies between Chilas
and Chitral, by the route followed by Colonel Kelly's column, we had
accurate knowledge, the route having been frequently traversed by
troops and an accurate survey made. The stupendous task placed before
Colonel Kelly, moving at this time of year, could therefore be fairly
gauged beforehand.
With the fuller knowledge we now possess it is possible to give more
in detail the physical features of the country through which the
Relief column of Peshawur passed. Skirting the broad open plain in
which Peshawur is situated is a range of mountains varying from 3,000
feet to 6,000 feet in height, and known locally and collectively as
the "border hills," for, generally speaking, the British border runs
along the foot of this range. Beyond the border range lies the richly
cultivated Swat Valley, varying in width from two miles to three miles,
and having an extent of some thirty-six miles lengthways. Down this
valley flows the Swat River, a considerable stream at all times of the
year, but after the snows begin to melt, and the summer rains burst, a
large and rapid river. Some estimate of the size of the river may be
gained by noting that at the point first bridged by our troops, it is
about half-a-mile wide from bank to bank, being split up into seven
channels each requiring a separate bridge. The north side of the Swat
Valley is formed by the Laram range of mountains varying from 5,000
feet to 6,000 feet in height. Beyond the Laram range we come to the
southern extremity of the Principality of Dir, down the main valley of
which flows the formidable and treacherous Panjkora River. This river
which one day is fordable may the next be found a roaring torrent, many
feet deep; indeed on one occasion it rose fourteen feet within a few
hours, with little or no warning. The Panjkora Valley throughout its
length is narrow, with steep rocky spurs constantly running down to the
water's edge, and except in the depth of winter when the water is at
its lowest, was not suitable, without extensive road making, for the
passage of troops.
Lying to the east of the Panjkora Valley, and separated from it by high
ranges, we find the broad, open, fertile valleys of Jandul and Bajaur,
the former of these being the original home and limited territory of
the chief Umra Khan, against whose power the British expedition was
mainly directed. Skirting the north end of the Jandul Valley comes
the Janbatai range, varying from 6,000 feet to 10,000 feet in height,
crossing which we drop into a series of narrow, rocky valleys which
betoken the approaches to some great mountain range. Such are the
Baraul and Upper Dir Valleys, with no room for cultivation on any
scale, and barely capable of supporting a miserably poor and backward
race. Running transversely across the north corner of Dir territory we
come to the mighty range of mountains, from 10,000 feet to 20,000 feet
in height, over which the Lowarai Pass alone gives military access to
the Chitral Valley. The Chitral Valley is itself very narrow and rocky,
much on a par with the Panjkora Valley, and was, till a track was cut,
very difficult for the passage of troops.
Briefly it may be stated that four high ranges of mountains, and three
considerable rivers, besides mountain torrents, had to be crossed by
the Southern column of the Relief Force.
The country through which the small Northern column under Colonel
Kelly had to pass was still more rough and rugged. Moreover he was
practically isolated and had to depend entirely on his own resources
for those necessities which are requisite for pushing an armed force
through a difficult country under the most unfavourable climatic
conditions. The highest pass which was crossed by this column was over
12,000 feet, the account of the passage of which will appear when the
heroic struggle of this column is dealt with in detail.
Speaking generally then, the theatre of war may be described as a mass
of mountains, amidst which wind deep and rapid torrents, whilst here
and there may be found small open valleys with sufficient supplies only
to maintain the inhabitants.
[Illustration: THE LOWARAI PASS IN MAY.]
As mentioned before, incidentally, the plan of operations for the
Relief of Chitral consisted of a combined movement from north and
south, the Southern column being a strong force capable of holding
its own against any combination that might arise, whilst the Northern
column consisted of a mere handful of men lightly equipped, whose
errand it was to arrive as soon as possible, and by the moral effect of
their arrival more than by actual force of arms, to prolong the siege
sufficiently for the arrival of the main relief force. The Southern
force was based on Nowshera (near Peshawur) whilst the Northern column
was based on Gilgit.
The enemy's main base of operations was Jandul, the home of the ruling
spirit in the camp of the besiegers of Chitral. Hence Umra Khan
drew the pick of his men, his treasure lay here, and such arms and
ammunition as he possessed were drawn from here. If we look at Jandul
on the map and examine its relative position to Chitral and Peshawur
we shall at once see that a decisive blow struck from the direction of
Peshawur must inevitably jeopardize Umra Khan's base of operations,
with the probable result that he would be compelled to leave Chitral
and retreat hastily to defend his own country. The Peshawur column
in fact by the nature of its march must take him directly in rear,
and he must either abandon his own country to the invader in the hope
of first striking a decisive blow at Chitral, afterwards turning on
his tracks to meet Sir Robert Low, or else he must perforce abandon
the siege and concentrate his forces to meet the British before they
could gain a footing in his territory. The relative position of the
belligerents being thus, it is apparent that the first objective of the
main column of the Relief Force was Jandul. But though at first sight
the advantage of position lay with the British, yet one important item
entered into the problem which made the balance even, and that was the
consideration of time. It was calculated that the Chitral garrison
was only provisioned up to the end of April, and therefore to effect
its relief a decisive blow must be struck before that date. Such a
possibility Umra Khan and his lieutenant Sher Afzul were inclined to
discountenance. An organised army moves slowly, immense physical
difficulties stood in its way, and the inveterate animosity of 30,000
tribesmen could infallibly be counted upon. In a matter which depended
upon days and even hours here lay a distinct advantage on the side of
the besiegers.
Orders were issued for the mobilisation at Peshawur of the 1st Division
of the 1st Army Corps on March 19th, the base being afterwards shifted
to Nowshera as more convenient. This being the first occasion on which
a serious mobilisation of any part of the army had been attempted,
the experiment was watched with much interest by military critics. It
must be remembered that to mobilise a force on the Indian frontier is
a far more complicated and difficult problem than to mobilise a force
at Metz or Strasburg. In Europe many railways lead to important points
of concentration, the distances are comparatively short, and countries
which are likely to become the theatre of war are intersected by
numerous railways as well as roads suitable for heavy wheeled traffic.
Large towns and flourishing villages are to be found at the end of
every march, and the country invaded is capable of supplying to a very
great extent the wants of the invaders in the matter of commissariat
and transport. Far differently situated is a force on the Indian
frontier destined to penetrate into the inhospitable mountains which
frown along its whole length from the Bay of Bengal to the deserts of
Beluchistan. For such a force in addition to food for the men, nearly
all the grain, and much even of the hay for the animals, has to be
carried up to the most advanced troops from the base in India, and
carried not along macadamised roads in capacious carts, but by mountain
paths where pack transport is alone possible.
There is a popular error that the impedimenta of an Indian Division
is enormous; indeed, it has been gravely stated by a serious military
critic that it is no uncommon thing for regiments in India to take
their mahogany mess tables on service with them. Of course only
ignorance of the country and its ways, with a hazy recollection of
Chillianwallah and the historic mess table of the 24th Foot, could
be responsible for such an erroneous statement. As a matter of fact
during this campaign the allowance per man for everything was 10
lbs., and per officer 40 lbs., and no tents were allowed. When we
consider that an ordinary soldier's blanket weighs 4 or 5 lbs., an
allowance of 10 lbs. need not be called extravagant in a country where
snow and ice, heavy rain, and the fiery heat of the sun had in turns
to be encountered. Yet marching thus light 28,000 pack animals had
to be collected to feed and maintain the force. It will be apparent,
then, that the problem of mobilisation on the Indian frontier is
very materially complicated by the conditions that exist. Not only
the troops and their stores have to be concentrated, but also many
thousands of pack animals, and the food for the entire force, man and
beast, for as long as the campaign lasts. Add to this that units had
in some cases to come immense distances, that the line of railway was
a single one, and that the detraining station was a small roadside
station without platforms, or conveniences, for disembarking troops,
animals, and stores, and we have a compendium of difficulties which
would try severely the most perfectly organised scheme of mobilisation.
It was therefore a source of gratifica[1]n to the military authorities
that the scheme and the railway stood so well the severe test
applied to them. On the 1st of April the Division, fully equipped
and provisioned, made the first march of the campaign. The force
consisted of three Infantry Brigades, each of four regiments, two of
which were British and two native; the Divisional troops consisted
of two regiments of cavalry, four batteries of Mountain Artillery,
one[1] regiment of Pioneers, and three[1] companies of Sappers and
Miners. In addition, three regiments of infantry were told off as
lines of communication troops. The command of the force was given to
Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low, K.C.B., with Brigadier-General
Bindon Blood, C.B., Royal Engineers, as his chief staff officer. The
three brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals A. A. Kinloch,
C.B., H. G. Waterfield, and W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O.; whilst the lines of
communication were entrusted to Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C.,
C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
The column under Colonel Kelly will be dealt with separately in a later
chapter.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Afterwards increased.