THE RELIEF OF CHITRAL
Truly on this thirteenth of April the outlook was not a bright one;
but here came in one of those flashes of genius which go to win
campaigns and undoubtedly helped to win this one. It occurred to
those responsible for the conduct of the campaign that though it was
impossible to convey a large force to Chitral in the given time, yet
it was quite feasible to push through a small number of men who,
falling on the rear of Sher Afzul, the general left by Umra Khan in
charge of the siege, might form a welcome diversion. At first it was
contemplated sending a mixed force of regulars and levies, but after
careful deliberation it was decided that regulars would impede the rate
of march, and that the effect being chiefly a moral one could be almost
as surely gained by levies alone. The plan therefore was for the main
force to cross the Panjkora, and to fight a decisive battle with Umra
Khan, whilst our ally the Khan of Dir, covered by this movement, was
despatched up the left bank of the Panjkora River, with orders to cross
the Lowarai Pass, 10,450 feet high, to descend into the Chitral Valley,
and to give out far and wide that he was merely the advanced guard
of the force, which had conquered Swat and Bajour, and had heavily
defeated the hitherto invincible general Umra Khan.
[Illustration: DIR FORT.]
In pursuance of this plan the Khan of Dir was ordered to move forward
with 1,000 men and to cross the Lowarai Pass, and immediately the
bridge over the Panjkora River was completed, General Blood moved
rapidly forward in charge of a cavalry reconnaissance towards Umra
Khan's stronghold at Munda. Advancing with a squadron of the Guides
Cavalry, General Blood moved up the Jandul River till the large and
important village of Miankila was in sight. Here a peasant was met who
entered freely into conversation. The General asked him where Umra Khan
was. He said, "Over there in that fort," pointing to Munda, just over
the brow of a rise in the ground. "Will you take him a note and bring
an answer?" asked the General. "Certainly," said the peasant, "I will
be back in half an hour." So calling to his assistance the linguistic
proficiency of Captain Nixon, of the Intelligence Department, a polite
and cordial note was written to Umra Khan, asking him to come out into
the open and have a talk with the General, in all good fellowship,
and "without prejudice." The answer came back before long, and was to
the following effect: "After greetings, I should greatly like to meet
your excellency, and to have a quiet talk with you, whereby the whole
affair might be easily settled. But unfortunately I am surrounded by
about 3,000 Ghazis, and these bad men will not hear of my going out to
see. You too I notice are accompanied by warriors. Assuredly no quiet
conversation can take place under these circumstances. Now I propose
that you send away your army and I will send away mine, and then you
and I can have our conference alone in the field." This was all very
nice and friendly; but meanwhile dense columns of the enemy began to
issue from Miankila and Munda, and moving with astonishing rapidity,
occupied both banks of the river, which is here easily fordable
everywhere, and began to press on the cavalry. The reconnoitring
party moved back quietly, till the head of the infantry column became
visible, hastening up. This was the 3rd Infantry Brigade under General
Gatacre, accompanied by the 11th Bengal Lancers and the Derajat
Mountain Battery.
The battery opened fire at once, and the cavalry moved up the river
bed, here very broad and open, whilst the infantry advanced to the
attack up the right bank of the stream. But from the first moment,
though Umra Khan was present in person, it was quite evident that the
enemy did not mean "business." The severe lessons of former battles had
begun to tell upon them, and their resistance was only half-hearted.
The 3rd Brigade pushed home their advantage, and the enemy retired
before them, losing only a few men, till towards evening their whole
force was to be seen in full retreat up the distant valley into
Nawagai. The troops bivouacked in the forward position they had gained,
and the 2nd Brigade was ordered up in the expectation that the enemy
would make a determined stand on the morrow. But the morrow showed
nothing but deserted positions and deserted forts, and thus easily had
been fought and won the final engagement which decided the campaign,
and sent Umra Khan, the victor in a hundred fights, ruined and broken
to exile, and premature death in Kabul.
When we say ruined, however, let us understand the word in a moral
sense. Pecuniarily Umra Khan is anything but ruined, for one of our
spies counted eleven mule loads of treasure leaving Munda fort one
night under a strong escort. Each mule would carry Rs.6,000 in silver,
or Rs.120,000 in gold, or any sum one likes to mention in jewels.
Taking a rough average between silver and gold, and leaving jewels out
of consideration, we shall be able to calculate that eleven mule loads
of treasure would keep Umra Khan and his family very comfortably for
the rest of their days.
Some weeks after, when escorting Sher Afzul to India, I heard many
stories of Umra Khan. Like a wise man, knowing the uncertain tenor of
an Eastern monarch's reign, he had taken care to feather his nest
whilst his power lasted. He exacted a tithe of their profits from
all, merchants or agriculturists, and the money thus accumulated, he
changed into gold at a rate of exchange fixed by himself. Thus if the
real value of a Russian gold coin was Rs.20, by royal edict, and for
the benefit of the royal purchaser, it became Rs.18. Gold is very
scarce in Asia, but a certain number of Russian coins filter across,
and gold ornaments are to be found here and there. All these Umra Khan
assiduously collected, so that at the time of his flight he probably
had a goodly treasure.
One evening before the British advance began, after attending evening
prayers on the praying platform in the clump of chenars below Munda
fort, Umra Khan, turning to his followers, said: "I have just received
a letter from Gholam Hyder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan
army. His proposal is that I shall invade the Peshawur Valley by way
of the Malakand with 30,000 men, and that he will co-operate through
the Khyber Pass with 10,000 men. What say you, my brave warriors?"
Whereupon the whole assembly arose with a mighty shout, "To Peshawur!"
travestying a somewhat more celebrated cry which was heard in Europe in
1870. Whether such a letter had been received or not, and whether, if
it had been, it was anything more than one of those neighbourly acts by
which, in the East, one friend lures another to certain destruction,
it is not necessary here to discuss. The anecdote is merely told as
showing the immense confidence Umra Khan had in his own powers, and
the faith his followers had in his skill. Years of conquest, and years
of unchequered success, had led the petty border chieftain into half
thinking that he could withstand the power of a mighty empire. It was a
thousand pities that this chief took up the attitude he did. If he had
chosen to be the friend of the British, he might now be despotic ruler
of all the country which lies between Chitral and Peshawur Valley, with
the firm alliance of the British Government at his back.
When the cavalry, riding on rapidly, captured the abandoned fort of
Munda, every trace of a rapid flight was apparent. Books and grain
were strewn about, dismounted cannon lay at the gate, everything was
topsy-turvey and turned inside out, and the sole occupant was a poor,
deformed idiot. Amongst the papers found lying about were some of
considerable interest. One was from a certain _mullah_[2] who, before
the battle, wrote from the summit of the Malakand Pass. He said: "We
see the infidels, the sons of pigs, encamped down in the plains below
us. There are very few of them, and we shall easily send them all to
Hell. On our side we have twelve or fifteen thousand Ghazis, and the
place is well fortified with sangars. To-morrow or next day I shall
have the honour of informing your Excellency that the infidels have
been extirpated"; and so on. It is highly probable that the worthy
_mullah_ spent the next few days in breaking the record towards Upper
Swat, or else, perchance, his bones now lie on the Malakand.
Another literary curiosity found in Munda fort was a letter from a
Scotch firm in Bombay offering to provide Umra Khan with every luxury
in the way of arms and ammunition, from Maxim guns at Rs.3,700 each,
down to revolvers at Rs.34 a piece. Luckily the benevolent intentions
of this patriotic firm had been frustrated by the astute intervention
of Major Deane, at that time Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur. The firm
in question has found it expedient to transfer itself, and the benefits
to humanity which it provides, to Cairo. Many other letters too lay
about showing how wide was the influence of the departed chief; offers
of help, spontaneous and otherwise, showed that the total resources at
his command were not much under 30,000 men, all armed in some fashion
or another, with a good sprinkling of breech-loading rifles, lately the
property of Her Majesty the Queen of England.
It was on the 17th day of April that Umra Khan made his last stand
and disappeared permanently from the theatre of operations. On the
very same day the garrison of Chitral made the splendid sortie led
by Lieutenant Harley of the 14th Sikhs, a full account of which will
appear in a future chapter, and on the night of the 18th of April the
siege was raised, and Sher Afzul and his whole force fled to the hills.
Here the general with 1,500 of his men, were cleverly captured and
brought in prisoners to Dir.
The history of our recent wars does not furnish an example of a more
signal and sweeping success. In the space of exactly one month from the
day on which the mobilisation of the Relief Force was ordered, the main
object of the campaign was obtained, the whole of the enemy's numerous
and ubiquitous forces were defeated and dispersed, and every one of the
important chiefs was a prisoner in our hands, or in those of our ally
the Amir. Setting aside the superiority in armament and organisation
which were undoubtedly on our side--though in passing it may be noted
that the Soudan and the Cape furnish instances where both availed not
against determined savages--it may be well to examine the chief causes
which led to this signal success. The result may be described briefly
as due to three main causes: To the rapid and successful mobilisation
of the Relief Force; to the crushing defeat of the enemy in Swat, on
the Panjkora, and in the Jandul Valley; and to the hardy and determined
advance of Colonel Kelly's small column from the north. Nor must we
forget the stout resistance of the garrison placed perforce in an
almost untenable position against overwhelming odds, which thoroughly
damped the ardour of the besiegers and paved the way for the effective
result obtained by the approach of the relief columns. It was in fact
the game of war played on sound principles, and with a fine all-round
combination which commanded success.
[Illustration: HEAD-QUARTER CAMP.]
How nice this calculation had to be will be appreciated by the
military student, when he considers how far divergent were the bases
from which the two columns had to start, and what immense physical
difficulties had to be overcome by each. It does not require much
imagination to show that Umra Khan, acting, as he was, on interior
lines as against exterior lines, might, if less skilfully assailed,
have first thrown his whole force on Colonel Kelly's weak column,
entangled in almost impossible defiles; next, with troops elated with
victory, have swamped the small garrison of Chitral, already hard
pressed and short of food, and then, with a dozen tribes at his back,
stirred up to the highest pitch of Mohammedan fanaticism, have turned
and assailed the main column under Sir Robert Low. The final result of
the campaign must undoubtedly have gone against Umra Khan, but he would
have had some signal successes to show in return. It happened to be
one of the writer's duties to escort Sher Afzul to India as a prisoner
of war, and from conversation held with him it appeared that such in
fact had been, in the main, the plan of campaign which Umra Khan had
contemplated, and he was frustrated only by the superior combination
and strategic skill which directed the march of the relieving columns.
All need for any hurry was now over. Colonel Kelly reached Chitral
unopposed on April 20th, and was the first to shake hands with the
brave defenders. Sir Robert Low's leading brigade, under General
Gatacre, set to work to construct a mule road over the Lowaria Pass,
still deep in snow, and a few troops were marched up the Chitral
Valley just to show themselves without straining unnecessarily the
difficult task of feeding large bodies of troops so far from their
base. The campaign ended with one of those gracious messages with
which Her Majesty Queen Victoria never failed to acknowledge the
gallantry of her Army; whilst in the hearty and soldierly message
of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George White, every man of the Force
felt that his services had been appreciated by one who knew well the
difficulties that had been overcome, and the stern hardships that had
been cheerfully borne.
The British soldier, and his friend and comrade of the Indian army, are
accustomed to serve in every degree of climate, and in every nature of
country, for an empire of the vast dimensions of the British Empire
must needs embrace every variety of climate and country. In the brief
and brilliant campaign just concluded perhaps these various conditions
were as numerously represented as is possible. There was fierce heat
and piercing cold, deluges of rain and blinding storms of snow and
hail; the highest mountain system in the world to be climbed, rivers,
deep and wide and astonishing in their treacherous strength, to be
crossed. With his greatcoat and a blanket for his baggage, the sturdy
British soldier and his strapping Indian war comrade, face these many
hardships with the cheerful alacrity of men ready and accustomed to
overcome unusual difficulties, and to face tremendous odds by land and
sea.
It is seldom, too, that a British campaign does not produce its men of
mark and those who have done heroic deeds, nor is this one an exception
to the rule, for the names of Sir Robert Low, General Bindon Blood,
and General Waterfield stand high in the historic roll of successful
generals, whilst Colonel Kelly's brilliant feat of arms has made him
famous for ever. But perhaps the deed of all others which appeals most
to the soldier's heart was the desperate and successful sortie from
Chitral, made by the brave and gallant Harley and his Sikhs on the 17th
day of April, 1895.
[Illustration: SIR R. LOW AND STAFF ON THE JANBATAI PASS.]
FOOTNOTE:
[2] A priest, often of the sporting-parson type of Joshua of old.