CHAPTER II

CAPTAIN ROSS AND LIEUTENANT EDWARDES

On the 1st of March, while Mr. Robertson with his escort was in Chitral

and active hostilities had not yet commenced, a native officer had

started from Mastuj with forty men and sixty boxes of ammunition for

Chitral. He had proceeded for a couple of marches and had reached Buni,

when he found the road broken and rumours reached him that he was to be

attacked. He accordingly wrote to Lieutenant Moberly, the special duty

officer with the Kashmir troops in Mastuj, telling him of the state of

affairs and asking for instructions. Rumours had by now reached Mastuj

that Sher Afzul had entered Chitral territory and that large numbers

of the Chitralis had joined him. But he was said to have friendly

intentions towards the British and all the local head men reported to

Lieutenant Moberly that no organised attack upon a party of troops was

at all likely.

Still there was evidently a feeling of unrest abroad, and as a

detachment of the 14th Sikhs under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Jones

were now at Laspur, two marches on the Gilgit side of Mastuj, on their

way up, Lieutenant Moberly wrote to ask Captain Ross to come on into

Mastuj in a single march instead of two. This Captain Ross did, and on

the evening of the 4th of March he started from Mastuj with fifty men

to reinforce the Subadar, who was blocked at Buni. On the same day a

detachment of twenty Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant J. S. Fowler,

R.E., accompanied by Lieutenant S. M. Edwardes also arrived in Mastuj.

The party were on their way to Chitral with engineering stores, and

without halting at Mastuj they left on the following morning, March

5th, with the intention of overtaking the Subadar at Buni and with the

combined party continuing the march to Chitral.

That evening Captain Ross returned to Mastuj reporting that everything

was quiet at Buni, and that Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were to

leave Buni on the 6th for Chitral with the ammunition escort. On the

evening of March 6th Lieutenant Moberly received a note from Lieutenant

Edwardes dated noon of the same day from Koragh, a small hamlet a few

miles below Buni, saying that he heard he was to be attacked near

Reshun, the first stage beyond Buni. Upon hearing of this Captain Ross

at once moved from Mastuj, and also wrote to the officer commanding at

Ghizr, the nearest post on the Gilgit side of the Shandur Pass, asking

him to send up as many men as he could possibly spare to reinforce

Mastuj. The strength of Captain Ross's party was

2 British Officers

1 Native Officer

6 Havildars (sergeants)

3 Naiks (corporals)

2 Buglers

82 Sepoys

1 Hospital-Assistant

8 Hospital followers

2 Cooks

2 Water-carriers

1 Lascar

1 Sweeper

2 Dhobis

Nine days' rations and 140 rounds of ammunition per man were carried.

Leaving Mastuj on the morning of March 7th, Captain Ross reached

Buni, eighteen miles distant, at 11 P.M. the same day. Here he left

one native officer with thirty-three rank and file, while with the

rest he and his subaltern, Lieutenant Jones, started for Reshun, the

place, about thirteen miles lower down the valley, in which Lieutenant

Edwardes' party were detained. Captain Ross's men took with them three

days' cooked rations, and at about 1 P.M. the party reached the small

hamlet of Koragh, about half way to Reshun, and a short halt was made

here. What occurred after that may best be told in Lieutenant Jones's

own words.

About half-a-mile after leaving Koragh [he says] the road enters a

narrow defile. The hills on the left bank consist of a succession

of large stone shoots, with precipitous spurs in between; the road

at the entrance to the defile for about one hundred yards runs

quite close to the river; after that it lies along a narrow maidan,

some thirty or forty yards in width, and is on the top of the river

bank, which is here a cliff; this continues for about half-a-mile;

then at the Reshun end it ascends a steep spur. When the advanced

party reached about half way up this spur, it was fired on from a

sangar which is across the road, and at the same time men appeared

on all the mountain tops and ridges, and stones were rolled down

all the shoots. Captain Ross, who was with the advanced guard,

recalled the point of the advanced guard and fell back, on the main

body, with which I was. All our coolies dropped their loads and

bolted as soon as the first shot was fired. Captain Ross, after

looking at the enemy's position, decided to fall back upon Koragh,

as it would have been useless to go on to Reshun, leaving an enemy

in such a position behind us. With this object in view Captain Ross

ordered me back with ten men to seize the Koragh end of the defile,

to cover his retirement. By the time that I had reached within

about one hundred yards of the sangar at this end I had only two

sepoys left with me unwounded, and it was therefore impossible for

me to proceed any further. I sent back and informed Captain Ross

accordingly. Captain Ross in the meantime had occupied two caves in

the river bank, and he ordered me to come back to him, which I did.

Captain Ross then informed me that it was his intention to wait

till the moon rose, and that he would then try and force his way

out. We stayed in the caves till about 8 P.M., and then we started

to try and force our way out to Koragh.

[Illustration: DIAGRAMMATIC SKETCH OF THE KORAGH DEFILE]

When Captain Ross had got about half way across the stone shoot

under the sangars at the Koragh end he decided to retire, as there

was such a torrent of rocks coming down the shoot, that he thought

that his party would be annihilated if he attempted to go on.

Thereupon we again retired to the caves mentioned above. After

reaching here, Captain Ross thought that he would try and get

to the top of the mountain above us, and we started up the spur

nearest above the caves. We had got some way up, when our road was

completely barred by a precipice, and we could get no further, as

we had no native of the country to guide us, and the ground was

extremely dangerous. One of the sepoys, falling here, was killed.

After looking about in vain for a path, Captain Ross again decided

to retire to the caves, and we reached them about 3 A.M. As every

one was now tired out, Captain Ross decided to remain here for

the present. We remained in the caves all the day of the 9th. The

enemy, meanwhile, did not molest us further than firing a few shots

into the cave, and, as we had built up breastworks there, they

could not do us much damage. During the 9th Captain Ross and myself

both agreed that the only thing remaining for us to do was to cut

our way out back to Koragh at all costs, and we decided to make the

attempt about 2 A.M. On the 10th, when we thought that the enemy

would least expect it, we started accordingly, and we attacked

their sangars and drove them out of them; they retired a short

distance up the hill and kept up a brisk fire from behind rocks.

There was also a heavy fire kept on us from the sangars on the

right bank of the river. A large number of sepoys were killed, or

so severely wounded as not to be able to move, by the stones down

the shoot which ran right into the river, and Captain Ross himself

was killed in front of one of the sangars. I and seventeen rank and

file reached the maidan on the Koragh side of the defile in safety,

and when I got there I halted and re-formed the men, and stayed

there some ten minutes, keeping up a heavy fire on the sangars on

both banks of the river, in order to help any more of the men who

could get through. While halting there, two bodies of the enemy's

swordsmen attempted to charge us, but were checked by volleys and

losing heavily. As the enemy now showed signs of again cutting

our line of retreat, I considered that it was time to retire,

especially as two more of my party were killed, and one mortally

wounded, while I had been waiting here. Of the remaining fifteen,

I myself and nine sepoys were wounded. We retired slowly to Buni,

where we arrived about 6 A.M. It was quite impossible to bring any

wounded men who were unable to walk with us, and it was equally

impossible to bring their rifles, etc. Therefore a certain number,

about forty of these, fell into the hands of the enemy. I estimate

the enemy's numbers at about 1,000, and think that they must have

lost heavily. I spent from the 10th to the 17th March at Buni,

having occupied a house there and put it into a state of defence.

On the 17th he was relieved by Lieutenant Moberly, as will be

subsequently told.

In concluding his report, Lieutenant Jones says that he cannot speak

too highly of the steadiness and gallantry shown by the men of the

detachment, whose behaviour throughout he considers above praise.

We now have to follow the fortunes of the party under Lieutenants

Edwardes and Fowler, to whose assistance Captain Ross had set out.

This party, as will be remembered, had marched from Mastuj on the 5th

of March before any news of an outbreak of hostilities had reached

that place. They were escorting ammunition and engineering stores for

the troops at Chitral, and their party consisted of twenty Bengal

Sappers and Miners, forty-two Kashmir Infantry, an orderly, three

officers' servants, and two followers. On the 6th they reached Reshun,

a large, but straggling village situated on a sloping plain between

the left bank of the Chitral river and the steep mountain sides which

rose behind. The houses are detached and dotted over the plain, each

surrounded by an orchard. On the edge of a cliff which overhangs the

river was a sangar, which the detachment now occupied, and here they

stored their kit and ammunition, while a small party consisting of

Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler with twenty Bengal Sappers and Miners,

and ten Kashmir Infantry started out to repair a break in the road

a few miles below Reshun. Immediately after leaving the village the

road to Chitral ascends a spur to a height of about 1,000 feet, and

descending again to the level of the river passes for half-a-mile or so

over a plain, and then enters a narrow defile with the unfordable river

on one hand and inaccessible cliffs on the other.

The British officers were unaware, though the siege of Chitral had

commenced three days ago, that the Chitralis had risen in arms against

the British, but they saw sufficient evidence of a hostile spirit to

induce them to take every precaution on entering this defile. All the

hill-sides were carefully examined with telescopes, and, as some

sangars were observed, Lieutenant Fowler was sent to scale the heights

on the left bank so as from there to be able to look down into the

sangars on the opposite bank. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Edwardes remained

with the rest of the party close outside the defile. Lieutenant Fowler

with some difficulty found a way up the hill-side, and was engaged in

examining the opposite cliffs, when suddenly a shot came from them, and

about two hundred men rushed out from a village where they had been

concealed and began swarming into the sangars. Lieutenant Fowler kept

up a heavy fire on them, as he was well above the sangars, and did

considerable execution.

But the enemy had now begun climbing the hill-sides behind him so as to

cut him off from Lieutenant Edwardes, and he was forced to retire. His

position indeed was now a very precarious one, for the Chitralis had

succeeded in getting above him, and were hurling down stones upon his

party, besides firing upon them. Lieutenant Fowler himself was wounded

in the back of the shoulder, the corporal of the party was also shot,

and two other men wounded. Scrambling and jumping down he succeeded,

however, in bringing his party with the wounded men down the hill-side

again and on to the plain where Lieutenant Edwardes with the main body

was covering his retreat. The Chitralis with Lieutenant Edwardes had

been trying to induce him to enter the defile, in which case he would

without doubt have suffered as Captain Ross's ill-fated party had

done. But Edwardes had prudently waited till Fowler could report the

hill-sides clear, and then, finding that instead of their being clear

the enemy were now swarming on to them, he saw that his only plan was

to retire to Reshun; and this, when Lieutenant Fowler had rejoined him,

he accordingly did.

But they were nearly two miles from the village: they had an open plain

to cross and the spur nearly a thousand feet high to climb. One British

officer and several men were wounded, and the enemy were gaining ground

along the hill-sides. Disaster seemed imminent, but by holding the

crest of the spur, and by firing steadily on the enemy to keep them at

a distance, the retirement was effected without serious loss, and the

sangar near the village of Reshun, where the rest of the party had been

left, was reached before the enemy could cut them off.

There is one little incident in this retirement which merits a very

special mention. It has been said that Lieutenant Fowler was wounded.

Now his pony was awaiting him in the plain at the foot of the hill-side

up which he had been climbing; and as a steep hill, a thousand feet in

height, had to be ascended on the way back to Reshun, it might have

been supposed that Fowler would have mounted his pony and ridden up the

hill. But there were also some sepoys wounded; and these in Fowler's

opinion had to be looked after first. So he mounted a sepoy on his

pony, and walked himself. It is not to be wondered at that when the

native soldiers see their officers ready to make such sacrifices for

them, they should be willing to follow them anywhere, and stand by them

to the last, as indeed these very soldiers were now called upon to do.

For now the first blood was drawn the people rose excitedly and

surrounded the little British party in the quarters they were

occupying. The British officers found it impossible to hold the

original sangar on the cliff by the river, for it was exposed to

fire from the opposite bank, and had no head-cover. They therefore

decided upon occupying some houses by the polo ground, the very spot

where Mr. George Curzon and myself had camped without a single man as

escort, only five months previously. In this batch of houses, cover and

fire-wood could be obtained, and a certain amount of supplies also. The

only drawback in occupying them was that they were more than a hundred

yards from the river, and consequently there was considerable risk of

their water supply being cut off. The officers hoped, however, to be

able to keep the road to the river open by their fire.

Immediately upon returning to Reshun, the officers set to work to make

the position defensible, and the following account of their brave

resistance against overpowering numbers of the enemy is compiled

from the report they subsequently submitted to Government. The first

work to be done was the construction of sangars on the roofs of the

houses (the houses being flat-roofed), the loopholing of the walls,

blocking up entrances, and knocking out passages of communication.

The materials available for making the sangars were the mud bricks of

which the houses were built, roof timbers and other pieces of timber

lying about, and boxes, grain bins, etc. An attack was fully expected

that same night, and every possible precaution had to be taken before

darkness set in. Before dusk the ammunition and the wounded had to be

transported from the sangar near the river to the house. Some Kashmir

sepoys volunteered for this work, and though they had to run the

gauntlet of a heavy fire in crossing the space of a hundred yards which

separated the sangar from the end of the garden-wall round the house,

they carried it out without losing a single man. "Already dead tired,

these men behaved splendidly," say the British officers in their report.

The enemy had been firing all day upon the party while they were at

work, but at sunset their fire slackened and they went off to eat the

evening meal, for this was the month of the Ramzan when Mohammedans

have to fast all day and eat nothing between sunrise and sunset.

Every man on the defending side was now posted in his place, and told

to strengthen his cover for himself. And so the first night fell on

the little party, now at bay, in the heart of an enemy's country, with

their retreat cut off, and impossible defiles on either side of them.

Out of the sixty-two men, they had already lost one corporal killed,

two men mortally and eight others less severely wounded, and one of

the two British officers was also wounded. The men had had hard work

the whole day long, they had had no food and little water, and now at

night they could take no rest, for the enemy commenced firing again,

and the defenders had to expect a rush from the houses and garden walls

close by at any moment. The defenders' position was indeed surrounded

by these houses, walls, and trees, which gave ample cover to the

enemy; and the demolition of these was undoubtedly a matter of the

first importance. But beyond those immediately around the house, there

was more cover occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters, and the British

officers considered that it would have been too risky to have taken

men from their places to demolish these, and so expose them where

they might have been cut off at any moment. There was a difficulty,

too, about burning the houses, for large quantities of kindling wood

would have been required for the purpose, and from whichever side the

defenders should burn fires, the enemy would attack from the other, and

thus have them between themselves and the light.

All night long the garrison remained at their posts, and when day

dawned on the morning of the 8th they were all utterly exhausted. But

the fear of immediate attack being over, half the men were brought down

from their posts, and a meal was cooked from the flour which had been

found in the houses. Water, which had of course to be now carefully

husbanded, was also served out; and after the men had refreshed

themselves, they were allowed to sleep in turns. During the day the

enemy kept up a continuous fire from sangars which they had thrown up

on the hill-sides. At twilight the remainder of the baggage was brought

in from the sangar, and the garrison then had to think of replenishing

the water supply. Two large earthenware vessels were lashed on poles,

and Lieutenant Fowler with the volunteers and a bhisti (water-carrier)

set out for the river. The men carried water-bottles and the bhisti his

mussuck (skin). Fortunately no enemy were met with, and the party were

able to make two trips, and so fill up all the storage vessels at the

disposal of the garrison.

That night, as on the previous one, the defenders stood to their posts

expecting an assault at any moment; but the night passed by quietly

until just before dawn on the morning of the 9th, when the moon had

gone down and night was at its darkest. The enemy then charged down

through the houses, and got behind the garden wall in large numbers.

Lieutenant Edwardes and his party at once opened fire at about twenty

yards range, while the enemy were shouting and urging each other on

to the assault. There was a tremendous din of tom-toms as they were

beaten furiously to encourage the assailants, but none of the men could

approach to within twenty yards of the deadly fire poured out by the

defenders, and as the dim light of early dawn grew clearer, it became

evident to the garrison that the enemy had no stomach for further

assault. Some Pathans among the assailants were still seen urging on

the Chitralis and hurling abuse at the defenders, but at about 9 A.M.

they all retired, and contented themselves for the rest of the day with

beating tom-toms and howling in the village. During the attack the

native soldiers of the defence showed the utmost steadiness, but four

of them were killed and six others wounded. On account of the darkness,

it was impossible to estimate the number of the enemy or their losses.

But there must have been several hundreds, and a very large portion

were armed with Snider and Martini-Henry rifles.

After the assault had been thus successfully repulsed water was served

out, a meal was cooked, and the men allowed to sleep in turns. In the

evening it was seen that the enemy had barred the road down to the

water. At dusk the defenders still further strengthened their sangars,

and fully expecting another attack, kept up a vigilant outlook. But

"we and the men were terribly weary," say the officers, "and it was

very difficult to keep the sentries awake, although they were posted

double."

The night passed off quietly, however, and in the morning it was seen

that the enemy had cleared off the hills, though sharpshooters still

surrounded the defenders in sangars from fifty to two hundred yards

distant. Lieutenant Edwardes dressed the wounded, who had so far only

been bandaged. "Never a groan or complaint was heard," says the report,

though there were no medical appliances, and though not sufficient

water was available with which to thoroughly wash the wounds. Bandages,

crutches, and splints had to be improvised, and the officers used a

weak solution of carbolic and carbolic tooth-powder for the purpose of

dressing the wounds. The corpses of the six dead men were also brought

out and prepared for burning. At dusk an attempt was made to procure

water again, and Lieutenant Fowler with twenty sepoys started down

towards the river. But the enemy had now built and occupied sangars

along the cliff at the river's edge, and the work of getting down to

the river was one of extreme risk. Lieutenant Fowler succeeded in

getting to within ten yards of the first sangar and within five yards

of the sentry without being observed. About twenty men could be seen

sitting round a fire in the interior with their rifles lying by their

sides. A volley was poured into these men, and then Lieutenant Fowler

charged down on the top of them. A few men only succeeded in escaping

down the cliff to the river bed. Meanwhile the enemy in a second

sangar, roused by the firing, lined the walls and began firing to their

front. But Fowler had got round them behind a wall on their flank, and

he now charged right up the wall, poured a second volley into these men

over the fires, also knocked over about six of them, then bayoneted

a few more, while the remainder fled. And so successful had Fowler

been in surprising these parties, that not a single man of his was

scratched. The way down to the water was open, but Fowler now heard

heavy firing and the Pathan cry of attack in the direction of the post.

So having collected his men, he retired at once to rejoin Lieutenant

Edwardes. The enemy's attack was repulsed by this latter officer before

Fowler's return, but the attempt to obtain water had to be abandoned

for the night.

On the following day nothing of importance occurred, and that night the

defenders succeeded in reaching the river and bringing back water, the

supply of which was still further replenished by collecting the rain in

waterproof sheets. A well was sunk to a depth of twelve feet, but as

rock was then struck, the attempt to procure water in that manner had

to be abandoned.

On the morning of the 13th a white flag was shown by the enemy, and a

Pathan shouted out "Cease firing!" The defenders also hoisted a white

flag, and sent out Jemadar Lal Khan to parley with the Pathan while

every man stood to his post. After some talk, the Jemadar returned

with the report that Mohamed Isa, Sher Afzul's right-hand man, had

just arrived from Chitral with a following to stop the fighting and

speak with the British officers. Lieutenant Edwardes sent word in reply

that if Mohamed Isa would come to the defenders' side of a gap in the

wall of the polo ground, situated only sixty yards from the wall of

the houses held by the British officers, and entirely under fire from

the defenders, one of the British officers would go out and meet him.

Mohamed Isa agreed to do this: he came to the gap, and Lieutenant

Edwardes then went out to talk with him, while Lieutenant Fowler

remained inside the post with his men standing ready to arms in case of

treachery.

When Lieutenant Edwardes met Mohamed Isa, that prince informed him

that he had just arrived from Chitral, where Sher Afzul and Dr.

Robertson were corresponding with a view to the former being recognised

as Mehtar. Mohamed Isa said that all fighting had ceased, and that

he was most anxious to be friends with the Indian Government. After

some talk between the British officer and the Chitral prince, the

conditions of an armistice were arranged, and it was stipulated that

the British force should remain within their walls, that no firing

should take place, that no Chitralis were to approach the walls, that

water-carriers were to be allowed to go down to the river, and that

supplies were to be provided by the Chitralis. Lieutenant Edwardes

also wrote a letter to Dr. Robertson in Chitral, and to the officer

commanding at Mastuj, stating in English that an armistice had

been arranged, and adding in French what his losses had been, and

expressing very great doubt of his being able to beat off any further

assault. Having arranged these conditions, Lieutenant Edwardes returned

to the post.

The bhistis were sent down to fetch water, and supplies were brought to

the fort wall by the Chitralis. The night following passed in quiet,

but vigilance was not relaxed. Rain fell heavily during the night,

and a quantity of water was collected in waterproof sheets. In the

afternoon of the 14th of March a further parley was asked for, and

on the arrival of Mohamed Isa, accompanied now by another Chitrali

prince named Yadgar Beg, at the former place of meeting, Lieutenant

Edwardes again went out to confer with him, while Lieutenant Fowler

remained, as before, inside the fortified post. Yadgar Beg confirmed to

Lieutenant Edwardes the story previously told by Mohamed Isa, and both

the princes were full of protestations of friendship. Yadgar Beg said

he had a large following who desired to be friends, and not enemies, of

the British. The same afternoon the bhistis were again sent to bring

in water, and having to go some distance through the village, they

reported that the houses were full of Pathans. They were not, however,

ill-treated in any way, and Mohamed Isa sent in a sheep and other

supplies to the British officers. Lieutenant Edwardes sent another

letter to inform Dr. Robertson of the presumed strengthening of the

enemy, and to let him know that the rations would not last beyond the

17th of March, _i.e._ three days hence.

So far the relations between the British officers and the Chitralis

had been conducted upon an apparently friendly footing, the aim of the

Chitralis being to lull the British into a sense of security. On the

afternoon of the following day, the 15th of March, occurred that act

of treachery by which the two officers were captured, and the greater

number of their men lost their lives. In the afternoon, Mohamed Isa

sent in word that now peace was restored, he and his men wished to

amuse themselves, and he asked permission to play polo on the ground

immediately outside the post which the British party were occupying. It

seemed to the British officers that there could be no harm in granting

this permission, for no man riding on the polo ground could escape

their fire, and they therefore decided to grant Mohamed Isa's request.

The Chitrali prince then sent to ask that both officers would come

and look on, as so far he had only seen Lieutenant Edwardes. He also

offered to lend the officers ponies on which to play polo. The British

officers considered that as they had trusted the Chitralis so far,

they might trust them further; so when Mohamed Isa and his men arrived

upon the polo ground, both Lieutenant Fowler and Edwardes, having

previously ordered their men to their posts which commanded the entire

polo ground, went out to meet the Chitralis. A bedstead was placed in

the gap in the wall of the polo ground, on the spot where the former

meetings had taken place, and Mohamed Isa sat next to the officers

until the men were ready to begin the game. The British officers were

asked to play polo, but refused. Mohamed Isa, however, joined in the

game, while Yadgar Beg sat with Edwardes and Fowler. A third arrival

from Chitral, speaking to the British officers, confirmed the story

of Mohamed Isa and Yadgar Beg, that peace between the British and the

Chitralis had been made.

The polo ground at Reshun is about fifty yards broad and one hundred

and twenty yards long, and slopes away from the post occupied by the

British, the further side of the ground not being covered by the fire

of the British garrison. Lieutenant Edwardes asked Mohamed Isa to order

the men, who numbered about one hundred and fifty, and who were armed

with rifles and swords, to go to the further side of the ground. The

officers had some tea made and brought out for the Chitralis to drink.

After the polo was over, Mohamed Isa asked if the men might dance, as

is the custom of the country at the conclusion of a game. The British

officers consented, and the dance began. Then under the excuse that

there was a wet place in front of the officers, the bedstead on which

they were seated was moved to the right, bringing it under cover

of the end of the wall and the polo ground. The officers found it

difficult to object to this, as it seemed impossible that any attempt

at treachery could be unattended by heavy loss to the Chitralis. As

the dance proceeded, more men began to collect and to press forward

in a ring round the dancers, and the officers observed that a number

had come over to the wall side of the polo ground. At a pause in the

dance the officers stood up and said that they were tired, and would

now go back to their post. On this Mohamed Isa himself suddenly seized

the British officers, and a rush of men was made upon them, and they

were dragged under cover of the wall. A volley was immediately fired

by the British garrison; but the Chitralis kept under the wall, and

none of them seemed to have been hit. Firing then became general for

a short time, till it gradually died down into single shots fired at

intervals. The officers in the meantime had their feet and hands bound,

and were dragged by the legs along the ground away from the gap. All

their buttons, badges, etc., were violently torn off and their pockets

rifled, and Fowler's boots and stockings were taken off. In about half

an hour the officers saw the enemy carry off some of their dead and

wounded, and men came out laden with loot. They also saw at least one

Kashmir sepoy being driven along with a load. With their arms still

bound, the officers were taken off to the house in which Mohamed Isa

lived, where they were seated in a verandah. What happened to the

garrison of the post they could not at the time ascertain; but they

subsequently met twelve of their men in Chitral, and it appears that

the Chitralis rushed the place, killed numbers of the men, and carried

these few off as prisoners.

In remarking upon the defence, the British officers say they had

frequently considered the question of destroying a portion of the

ammunition in their charge. This ammunition had now fallen into the

hands of the enemy, and was a great advantage to them. It would have

been well, therefore, if the British officers could have managed to

have destroyed it; but they say that in the hurry of improvising the

defence on the first night of the siege, they had been compelled to

build the ammunition boxes up into a rude parapet, to afford a cover

to their men. Subsequently these boxes had been covered up with beams,

bricks, kits, and _débris_, and it was consequently very difficult

to get them out without pulling down the cover so much needed. The

moonlight nights, too, had rendered the removal of them very risky, as

the long beams necessitated making large gaps, and any noise inside the

post immediately drew the fire from the enemy, which was very effective

in the moonlight. Moreover, the ammunition was intended for the use of

local levies who were expected from Gilgit, and these levies without

the ammunition would have been perfectly useless.

The British officers determined therefore to keep it till they could

hold out no longer, and to then destroy it. Lieutenant Edwardes had

also to consider the advisability of making sorties; but though he

could have doubtless driven off the enemy for a time by such sorties,

yet he recognised that he would have lost men in doing so, and with the

small number at his disposal he could not afford to lose a single man.

The subsequent adventures of the two officers form a thrilling tale.

After passing the night bound at Reshun, with a man holding on to a

rope fastened to each of them, Lieutenant Fowler was sent towards

Chitral, led at the end of a rope and under the escort of two Pathans

and two Chitralis. On the following day Lieutenant Edwardes, who was at

first to have been sent to Mastuj, was sent to join Lieutenant Fowler.

On the way there they were met by a sergeant and ten men of Umra Khan,

who, after quarrelling with the Chitralis, insisted upon taking them

on as their prisoners. On the 19th of March the two officers reached

Chitral, and were met there by a colonel and about a hundred men of

Umra Khan's army. They were led into the presence of Majid Khan, Umra

Khan's representative and half-brother, and now his successor in the

rule of the Jandul State. The two officers were received civilly, and

the Janduli prince expressed regret at the course of events, and of the

treachery which had been practised on the British officers. He assured

them of good treatment, and after a short interview the officers were

marched with an escort of forty men to see Sher Afzul, the claimant

to the throne of Chitral. The escort accompanied the British officers

into the room in which they found Sher Afzul sitting, surrounded by

a strong escort, and with a loaded rifle in his lap. He received the

British officers civilly, and gave them tea and cakes. He also talked

to them at great length of the negotiations which had taken place

between him and Dr. Robertson. He further expressed sorrow at the

treachery which had been used to them, and said that he would see to

their comfort, and arrange supplies as far as possible, though supplies

were difficult to obtain, as everything had been taken into the fort.

Both Sher Afzul and Majid Khan, at the earnest request of Lieutenant

Edwardes, promised to make strict search for all men of their party who

might still be alive. The two officers were permitted to communicate

with the British garrison besieged in the fort, but were not allowed

to visit them. It was the object of the besiegers to let the defenders

know, without doubt, the disaster which had befallen the British

detachment, in order to depress as far as possible the spirit of the

defence.

On the evening of March 20th, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler saw the

native clerk of the political agent, who had been allowed to come out

from the fort for the purpose of communicating with the officers, but

all conversation had to be carried on in the presence of the Pathans

and Chitralis. No talk in English was permitted, and the officers were

only allowed to ask in Hindustani for clothing, plates, knives, forks,

etc.

On the 21st of March the officers received from their beleaguered

comrades in the fort some clothing and necessaries, and they again saw

the political agent's native clerk in the presence of Sher Afzul and

Majid Khan and others. These princes explained to the British officers

their view of the situation, which was that they did not wish to fight

the British if they would retire to Gilgit or Peshawur, and they asked

Lieutenant Edwardes to ask one of the officers in the fort to come up

and meet them. A letter was accordingly written to Lieutenant Gurdon

inside the fort, telling him that if he met them under the walls of

the fort they would give him some useful information. But no reply

was received from Lieutenant Gurdon, and there is no doubt that the

only object of the besiegers was to capture the other officers of the

garrison in as treacherous a way as they had seized Lieutenants Fowler

and Edwardes.

On the 24th of March the two captured British officers were sent

towards Drosh to meet Umra Khan, the Pathan chief. Here on the

following day they had a long interview with this important ruler.

Umra Khan they found to be of a tall and manly appearance, with a

straightforward, commanding manner of speaking, and with a great

influence over his men. On these, and on all other occasions, he

treated his captives with civility and consideration. He now gave them

a choice of returning to Chitral, or of going with him to his native

country of Jandul, some seven or eight marches to the south. As the

chief would not allow the sepoys to go with the British officers to

Chitral, they decided upon accepting the alternative of accompanying

Umra Khan to Jandul, and started for that place on the following day.

Umra Khan had given orders that everything that could be obtained

should be given to them before himself, but his followers did not carry

out these orders, and the officers suffered much from bad food and

bad quarters on the way. From the Chitral fort they had obtained a bag

of sugar and a pound of tea, which they considered great luxuries, and

they cooked food with the assistance of the sepoys who from Chitral

onwards were accompanying them. The officers were never in any way

threatened, but they knew that they were always liable to be killed by

some fanatic who might have a blood feud against the British. A strong

guard, armed with loaded rifles, accompanied them, however, and never

for a moment allowed them to go more than a few yards from them, and

this was doubtless as much for their protection as to prevent their

escape. The guard always had in it some men who had served in our

Indian army, and although many of them were extremely ruffian-like in

appearance, and probably were thorough scoundrels, yet they mostly

treated the officers in an easy and friendly manner, and were always

willing to share with them the scanty rations they obtained on the

march. The officers on the way occupied the ordinary country houses,

which were very dark and dirty, and full of smoke and insects. The

guard of ten men or more always slept and lived in the same room as

the officers, and as most of them had colds and coughs, and were

incessantly spitting on the floor, the prisoners had little quiet. The

sepoy prisoners were given the same food as was served out to Umra

Khan's men. But this ration on the march was a very small one.

The three Hindu prisoners were made to learn the Kalin, and their

hair was cut; but they were not made to publicly declare themselves

Mussulmans, and they never really changed their faith. No attempt was

ever made to induce the officers to become Mohammedans, nor was any

fanatical feeling displayed by the people whom they met. The men would

eat the officers' bread, and gave them some of theirs. The Pathans

would often ask the officers how they managed to exist without wine,

and while in Chitral the officers were offered the contents of all

the medicine bottles taken in the hospital outside the fort as a

substitute. This delicate attention was however declined.

The prisoners were naturally an object of great curiosity to the

people, and crowds gathered to see them. These people specially

delighted to see the officers eat with knife and fork, and laughed at

their attempts to eat with their fingers. This curiosity on the part

of the populace the British officers found to be somewhat annoying,

and the guard soon discovering that they did not like visitors at meal

times, kept them off while the officers were eating; but at other times

the prisoners received the public, and sat to be inspected whilst

conversing with the people through interpreters. Umra Khan himself, as

has been said, always treated his captives with civility, and was much

interested in talking with them, and as long as he was with them and

had leisure sent for them every day. He twice took them out hawking,

and asked them to walk alongside him. The officers were not allowed

to communicate with any one, except through the chief, nor were they

allowed any writing materials, but they had obtained some paper and a

pencil in Chitral and managed to keep a short diary of each day hid in

their clothes. They were allowed to purchase materials with which to

make clothes for themselves and their sepoys, and the traders gave

them credit on their written acknowledgment.

Marching towards Jandul, the party on the 28th of March reached the

Lowarai Pass, 10,000 feet in height, and now covered deep in snow.

Leaving Ashreth, the last Chitrali village on the north side of the

Pass, they ascended the deep narrow rocky valley to the Pass. At four

miles from the summit they had to send back their ponies as the snow

was now too soft to allow of their being taken over. They then had a

very stiff pull up on foot, and on the top were caught in a violent

storm of hail and snow. The wind was bitterly cold, and they were

almost blinded by the driven snow. On the other side one of their

sepoys complained of pain in the stomach, and he was left behind

with another sepoy to look after him, but he died at night. Soon

after dark the officers reached Dir, having marched twenty-four miles

and crossed a difficult pass. Here at Dir, however, they were given

better quarters and better food. On the 30th of March they marched to

Barwa, Umra Khan's chief fort, crossing the Jhanbatai Pass, 7,000 feet

high, from which they could obtain a view over the Pathan chief's own

native valley. On the summit of the Pass, Umra Khan seated the British

officers beside him, and, giving them food and sweetmeats, asked them

how they liked his country. For a long time he sat there with the

officers at his side gazing over his native valley stretched out at his

feet, and then proceeding down the hill-side he was met by crowds of

men on horseback and on foot as he marched into Barwa.

[Illustration: THE LOWARAI PASS.]

The officers remained here about a fortnight; but on the 1st of April

the Mussulman sepoys were told that they could consider themselves

at liberty, and the guard over them was removed. A native officer

accordingly left and proceeded to Peshawur, where he brought the news

of the disaster to his party.

News now began to come in of the fighting between General Low's force

and the Pathan tribes, and great excitement prevailed. Numbers of men

began clearing out, taking all their goods with them to hide on the

hill-sides. It is a remarkable point that as the panic increased,

the officers received greater attention, and at the approach of our

troops they were supplied with two fowls, flour, rice, butter and

milk daily. On the 12th of April both of the officers were taken to

Munda, Umra Khan's strongest fort. There they met a native political

officer who had been sent by the British authorities to treat with

Umra Khan. A long conversation took place between Umra Khan and the

native official, the upshot of which was that Lieutenant Edwardes was

made the bearer of two letters to the British General, and given his

release. Umra Khan explained to him his views at great length, and

under an escort he left at midnight. Taking a circuitous route to avoid

a collection of ruffians in the valley, he arrived at 10 A.M. at Sadoo,

the head-quarters of the British forces now advancing to the relief

of Chitral. Umra Khan hoped by delivering up the British officer to

stave off the punishment which the British forces were now at hand

to inflict upon him. But General Low did not stay his advance for a

moment. He pushed steadily on towards Umra Khan's stronghold at Munda,

and on April the 16th Umra Khan played his second card, and released

Lieutenant Fowler. But still General Low pressed on as will presently

be described.

Both officers had now unexpectedly obtained their release. They had

suffered the greatest hardships, and lived in daily peril of their

lives, but they spoke with something like enthusiasm of the good

treatment they had received at Umra Khan's hands. It was sometimes no

easy matter for that chief to keep off those who had wished to injure

the British officers; and on one occasion after Lieutenant Edwardes

had left, Fowler had had an anxious time owing to the presence of many

fanatics from outside striving to gain an entrance into the fort. There

had nearly been a pitched fight between Umra Khan's men and these wild

ruffians, and a few days afterwards when I stood with him in Umra

Khan's fort, Lieutenant Fowler, standing in the doorway of the house

he had occupied as a prisoner only three days before, had shown me the

spot where these fanatics came clamouring round his guard, and trying

to obtain access to him. But Umra Khan succeeded in protecting him

throughout. He gave back to Lieutenant Edwardes his own sword which had

been seized at Reshun, and which Umra Khan had received as a present

from Chitral; and he promised to obtain Lieutenant Fowler's also, if it

could be found. "We both consider," say the British officers, at the

close of their report, "that Umra Khan treated us very well indeed, and

that he never intended to be the direct cause of injury to us under any

circumstance."

So ended the wonderful adventures of these two British subalterns. When

they were holding out at Reshun, and making their last stand in a mere

village house against overwhelming numbers of the enemy; and again,

when they were treacherously captured by a deceitful foe; and lastly,

when they were in the hands of men in the fever-heat of rebellion

against the British, no one would have supposed that they could ever

have escaped alive. But they had survived every peril, and were now

once more in safety among their fellow-countrymen.

How General Low advanced to the Relief has now to be related.

The Relief of Chitral · 第 2 / 7 章