1847.
WHY THE CITY WAS NOT ENTERED ON THE 20TH--CONDITION OF THE
CITY--DELIBERATION OF THE MEXICAN CABINET AND PROPOSALS--REASONS
WHY GENERAL SCOTT PROPOSED AND GRANTED THE ARMISTICE--DELIBERATIONS
OF COMMISSIONERS--PARTIES AGAINST SANTA ANNA--FAILURE OF THE
NEGOTIATION--MEXICAN DESIRE TO DESTROY SANTA ANNA.
It was late in the day when the battles ended. One army was wearied
with fighting and victory; the other equally oppressed by labor and
defeat. The conquered Mexicans fled to their eastern defences or took
refuge within the gates of their city. There was, for the moment,
utter disorganization among the discomfited, while the jaded band of a
few thousand invaders had to be rallied and reformed in their ranks
and regiments after the desperate conflicts of the day over so wide a
field. It surely was not a proper moment for an unconcentrated army,
almost cut off from support, three hundred miles in the interior of an
enemy's country, and altogether ignorant of the localities of a great
capital containing nearly two hundred thousand inhabitants, to rush
madly, at night fall, into the midst of that city. Mexico, too, was
not an ordinary town with wide thoroughfares and houses like those in
which the invaders had been accustomed to dwell. Spanish houses are
almost castles in architectural strength and plan, while from their
level and embattled roofs, a mob, when aroused by the spirit of
revenge or despair, may do the service of a disciplined army. Nor was
it known whether the metropolis had been defended by works along its
streets,--by barricades, impediments and batteries,--among which the
entangled assailants might be butchered with impunity in the narrow
passages during the darkness and before they could concentrate upon
any central or commanding spot. Repose and daylight were required
before a prudent General would venture to risk the lives of his men
and the success of his whole mission upon such a die.
Accordingly the army was halted; the dispersed recalled, the wounded
succored, the dead prepared for burial, and the tired troops ordered
to bivouack on the ground they had wrested from the enemy.
[Illustration: VIEW OF THE VOLCANOES FROM TACUBAYA.]
Meanwhile the greatest consternation prevailed within the city. When
Santa Anna reached the Palace, he hastily assembled the Ministers of
State and other eminent citizens, and, after reviewing the disasters
of the day and their causes, he proclaimed the indispensable necessity
of recurring to a truce in order to take a long respite. There was a
difference of opinion upon this subject; but it was finally agreed
that a suspension of arms should be negotiated through the Spanish
Minister and the British Consul General. Señor Pacheco, the Minister
of Foreign Relations, accordingly addressed Messrs. Mackintosh and
Bermudez de Castro, entreating them to effect this desired result.
During the night the British Consul General visited the American camp,
and was naturally anxious to spare the effusion of blood and the
assault by an army on a city in which his country had so deep an
interest. On the morning of the 21st, when General Scott was about to
take up battering or assaulting positions, to authorize him to summon
the capital to surrender or to sign an armistice with a pledge to
enter at once into negotiations for peace, he was met by General Mora
y Villamil and Señor Arrangoiz, with proposals for an armistice in
order to bury the dead, but without reference to a treaty. Scott had
already determined to offer the alternative of assault or armistice
and treaty to the Mexican government, and this resolution had been
long cherished by him. Accordingly he at once rejected the Mexican
proposal, and, without summoning the city to surrender, despatched a
note to Santa Anna, expressing his willingness to sign, on reasonable
terms, a short armistice, in order that the American Commissioner and
the Mexican Government, might amicably and honorably settle the
international differences, and thus close an unnatural war in which
too much blood had already been shed. This frank proposal, coming
generously from the victorious chief, was promptly accepted.
Commissioners were appointed by the commanders of the two armies on
the 22d; the armistice was signed on the 23d, and ratifications
exchanged on the 24th; and thus, the dispute was for a while
transferred once more from the camp to the council chamber. On the
morning of the 21st, the American army was posted in the different
villages in the vicinity. Worth's division occupied Tacubaya. Pillow's
Mixcoac, Twiggs's San Angel, while Quitman's remained still at San
Agustin, where it had served during the battles of the 19th and 20th
in protecting the rear and the trains of the army. Tacubaya became the
residence of General Scott, and the headquarters of the
commander-in-chief were established in the Bishop's Palace.
There are critics and politicians who are never satisfied with
results, and, whilst their prophecies are usually dated after the
events which they claim to have foreseen, they unfortunately find too
much favor with the mass of readers who are not in the habit of
ascertaining precisely what was known and what was not known at the
period of the occurrences which they seek to condemn. General Scott
has fallen under the heavy censure of these writers for offering the
armistice and avoiding the immediate capture of the capital, the
practicability of which they _now_ consider as demonstrated. We
propose to examine this question, but we believe that the
practicability or impracticability of that event does not become one
of the primary or even early elements of the discussion.
If we understand the spirit of this age correctly, we must believe
that mankind, purified by the progressive blessings of Christianity
and modern civilization, desires the mitigation rather than the
increase of the evils of war. It does not seek merely to avert danger
or disaster from the forces of one party in the strife, but strives to
produce _peace_ with as little harm as possible to all who are engaged
in warfare. It is not the mission of a soldier to kill, because his
profession is that of arms. It is ever the imperative duty of a
commander to stop the flow of human blood as soon as he perceives the
slightest chance of peace; and if his honorable efforts fail entirely,
through the folly or obstinacy of the foe, he will be more fully
justified in the subsequent and stringent measures of coercion.
The Mexican masses, mistaking vanity for true national pride, had
hitherto persevered in resisting every effort to settle the
international difficulties. Diplomacy, with such a nation, is
extremely delicate. If we exhibited symptoms of leniency, she became
presumptuous;--if we pushed hostilities to the extreme, she grew
doggedly obstinate. On the 21st of August her capital was in Scott's
power. His victorious army was at her gates. Two terrible battles had
been fought, and the combatants on both sides had shown courage, skill
and endurance. The Mexican army was routed, but not entirely dispersed
or destroyed. At this moment it doubtless occurred to General Scott,
and to all who were calm spectators of the scene, that before the last
and fatal move was made, it was his duty to allow Mexico to save her
point of honor by negotiating, ere the city was entered, and while she
could yet proclaim to her citizens and the world, that her capital had
never been seized by the enemy. This assuaged national vanity, and
preserved the last vantage ground upon which the nation might stand
with pride if not with perfect confidence. It still left something to
the conquered people which was not necessary or valuable to us.
There are other matters, unquestionably, that weighed much in the very
responsible deliberations of General Scott. If our army entered the
city triumphantly, or took it by assault, the frail elements of
government still lingering at that period of disorganization, would
either fly or be utterly destroyed. All who were in power, in that
nation of jealous politicians and wily intriguers would be eager to
shun the last responsibility. If Santa Anna should be utterly beaten,
the disgrace would blot out the last traces of his remaining prestige.
If so fatal a disaster occurred, as subsequent events proved, the
Americans would be most unfortunately situated in relation to peace,
for there would be no government to negotiate with! Santa Anna's
government was the only _constitutional_ one that had existed in
Mexico for a long period, and with such a legalized national authority
peace must be concluded. It was not our duty to destroy a government
and then gather the fragments to reconstruct another with which we
might treat. If a revolutionary, or _provisional_ authority existed,
what prospect had we of enduring pacification? What guaranty did we
hold in a treaty celebrated with a military despot, a temporary chief,
or a sudden usurper, that such a treaty could be maintained before the
nation? What constitutional or legal right would an American general
or commissioner have, to enter into such a compact? Was it not,
therefore, Scott's duty to act with such tender caution as not to
endanger the fate of the only man who might still keep himself at the
head of his rallied people?
Besides these political considerations, there are others, of a
military character, that will commend themselves to the prudent and
the just. The unacclimated American army had marched from Puebla to
the valley of Mexico during the rainy season, in a tropical zone, when
the earth is saturated with water, and no one travels who can avoid
exposure. Our men were forced to undergo the hardships of such a
campaign, to make roads, to travel over broken ground, to wade
marshes, to bivouack on the damp soil with scarce a shelter from the
storm, to march day and night, and finally, without an interval of
repose, to fight two of the sharpest actions of the war. The seven or
eight thousand survivors of these actions,--many of whom were new
levies--demanded care and zealous husbanding for future events. They
were distant from the coast and cut off from support or immediate
succor. The enemy's present or prospective weakness was not to be
relied on. Wisdom required that what was in the rear should be thought
of as well as what was in advance.
May it not then be justly said that it was a proper moment for a heroic
general to pause in front of a national capital containing two hundred
thousand people, and to allow the civil arm to assume, for a moment of
trial, the place of the military? Like a truly brave man, he despised
the eclat of entering the capital as Cortéz had done on nearly the same
day of the same month, three hundred and twenty-six years before. Like a
wise man, he considered the history and condition of the enemy, instead
of his personal glory, and laid aside the false ambition of a soldier,
to exhibit the forbearance of a christian statesman.[73]
* * * * *
The American Commissioner unquestionably entered upon the negotiations
in good faith, and it is probable that Santa Anna was personally quite
as well disposed for peace. He, however, had a delicate game to play
with the politicians of his own country, and was obliged to study
carefully the posture of parties as well as the momentary strength of
his friends and enemies. Well acquainted as he was with the value of
men and the intrigues of the time, he would have been mad not to guard
against the risk of ruin, and, accordingly, his first efforts were
directed rather towards obtaining the _ultimatum_ of the United
States, than to pledging his own government in any project which might
prove either presently unpopular or destroy his future influence. The
instructions, therefore, that were given to General José J. de
Herrera, Bernardo Couto, Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Miguel Atristain,
the Mexican commissioners, were couched in such extreme terms, that
much could be yielded before there was a likelihood of approaching the
American demands. In the meanwhile, as negotiations progressed, Mexico
obtained time to rally her soldiers, to appease those who were
discontented with the proposed peace, and to abjure the project if it
should be found either inadmissible or impossible of accomplishment
without loss of popularity.
For several days consultations took place between Mr. Trist and the
commissioners, but it was soon found that the American pretensions in
regard to the position of Texas, the boundary of the Rio Grande and
the cession of New Mexico and Upper California, were of such a
character that the Mexicans would not yield to them at the present
moment. The popular feeling, stimulated by the rivals of Santa Anna,
his enemies, and the demagogues, was entirely opposed to the surrender
of territory. Sensible as the President was, that the true national
interests demanded instantaneous peace, he was dissuaded by his
confidential advisers from presenting a counter projét, which would
have resulted in a treaty. Congress, moreover, had virtually dissolved
by the precipitate departure of most of its members after the battles
of the 20th.
All the party leaders labored diligently at this crisis, but none of
them with cordiality for Santa Anna, in whose negotiations of a
successful peace with the United States, they either foresaw or feared
the permanent consolidation of his power. The _puros_, or democrats,
still clung to their admiration of the constitution of our Union; to
their opposition to the standing army; to their desire for modifying
the power and position of the church and its ministers, and to their
united hostility against the President. They were loud in their
exhortations to continue the war, while Olaguibel, one of their ablest
men and most devoted lovers of American institutions, issued a strong
manifesto against the projected treaty. This was the party which, it
is asserted, in fact desired the prolongation of the war until the
destroyed nationality of Mexico took refuge from domestic intrigues,
misgovernment and anarchy, in annexation to the United States.
The _monarquistas_, who still adhered to the church and the army,
proclaimed their belief in the total failure of the republican system.
Revolutions and incessant turmoils, according to their opinions, could
only be suppressed by the strong arm of power, and in their ranks had
again appeared General Mariano Paredes y Arrellaga, who, returning
from exile, landed in disguise at Vera Cruz, and passing secretly
through the American lines, proceeded to Mexico to continue his
machinations against Santa Anna, whom he cordially hated.
The _moderados_ formed a middle party equally opposed to the ultraisms
of monarchy and democracy. They counted among their number, many of
the purest and wisest men in the republic, and although they were not
as inimical to the United States as the _monarquistas_, or as many of
the _puros_ pretended to be, yet they cordially desired or hoped to
preserve the nationality and progressive republicanism of Mexico. In
this junto Santa Anna found a few partizans who adhered to him more
from policy than principle, for all classes had learned to distrust a
person who played so many parts in the national drama of intrigue,
war, and government. As a party, they were doubtless unwilling to risk
their strength and prospects upon a peace which might be made under
his auspices.
In this crisis the President had no elements of strength still firmly
attached to him but the army, whose favor, amid all his reverses, he
generally contrived to retain or to win. But that army was now much
disorganized, and the national finances were so low that he was
scarcely able to maintain it from day to day. The mob, composed of the
lower classes, and the beastly _leperos_, knowing nothing of the
principles of the war, and heedless of its consequences,--plied
moreover by the demagogues of all the parties,--shouted loudly for its
continuance, and thus the president was finally forced to yield to the
external pressure, and to be governed by an impulse which he was
either too timid or too weak to control.
The armistice provided that the Americans should receive supplies from
the city, and that no additional fortifications should be undertaken
during its continuance; nevertheless the American trains were assailed
by the populace of the city, and, it is alleged, that Santa Anna
disregarded the provision forbidding fortifications. When it became
evident to the American commissioner and General Scott, that the
Mexicans were merely trifling and temporizing,--that the prolongation
of the armistice would be advantageous to the enemy, without affording
any correspondent benefits to us,--and when their supplies had been
increased so as to afford ample support for the army during the
anticipated attack on the city,--it was promptly resolved to renew the
appeal to arms. Accordingly, on the 6th of September, General Scott
addressed Santa Anna, calling his attention to the infractions of the
compact, and declaring that unless satisfaction was made for the
breaches of faith before noon of the following day, he would consider
the armistice terminated from that hour. Santa Anna returned an answer
of false recriminations, and threw off the mask. He asserted his
willingness to rely on arms;--he issued a bombastic appeal to the
people, in which he announced that the demands of the Americans would
have converted the nation into a colony of our Union. He improved upon
the pretended patriotic zeal of all the parties--puros, moderados,
monarquistas and mob--who had proclaimed themselves in favor of the
war. Instead of opposing or arguing the question, he caught the war
strain of the hour, and sent it forth to the multitude in trumpet
tones. He was determined not to be hedged or entrapped by those who
intrigued to destroy him, and resolved that if he must fall, his
opponents should share the political disaster. Nor was he alone in
his electioneering gasconade, for General Herrera--a man who had been
notoriously the advocate of peace, both before and since the
rupture,--addressed the clergy and the people, craving their aid by
prayer, money, fire and sword, to exterminate the invaders! All
classes were, thus, placed in a false and uncandid position.
This is a sad picture of political hypocrisy based upon the misnamed
popular will of a country which had for twenty years been demoralized
by the very chieftain who was about to reap the direful harvest he had
sown in the hearts of his people. Every man, every party,
acknowledged, privately, the impolicy of continued hostilities, yet
all men and all parties were resolved that _Santa Anna_ should not
make the peace whilst an American army remained in the country to
sustain it, or an American government dispensed millions to pay for
the ceded territory. Distrusting his honesty and patriotism, they
believed that the money would only be squandered among his parasites,
or used for the prolonged corruption and disorganization of their
country. With gold and an army they believed him omnipotent; but,
stripped of these elements of power in Mexico, the great magician
dwindled into a haggard and harmless witch.
Combinations arose readily and bravely against the man whose sway was
irresistible _as long as he dealt with his countrymen alone_ or
preserved a loyal army and dependant church, whose strength and wealth
were mutual supports. The sky was dark and lowering around him, and he
must have acknowledged secretly, that the political parties of his
country, if not his countrymen universally, were more anxious to
destroy him than the Americans. The army of the invaders, they hoped,
might perform a task in this drama, which the Mexicans themselves
could not achieve; and there are multitudes who would have been glad
to see its end become tragic by the death of one whom they feared in
prosperity, and despised in adversity.
[Footnote 73: It will be remembered that even Cortéz had paused in the
precincts of the ancient capital of the Aztecs, in order to give them
a chance of escape before striking the fatal blow. See Prescott, vol.
3, p. 199. It is a little remarkable also, that the dates of Scott's
and Cortéz's victories coincide so closely. Cortéz's victory was on
the 13th of August, 1521, Scott's on the 20th of August, 1847. The
date of Cortéz's achievement is given according to the Old Style, but
if we add ten days to bring it up to New Style, it will be corrected
to the 23d of August!]