1847.
MILITARY POSITION OF THE AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE
ARMISTICE--MEXICAN DEFENCES--PLAN OF ATTACK--RECONNOISSANCES OF
SCOTT AND MASON--IMPORTANCE OF MEXICAN POSITION AT MOLINO DEL
REY--SCOTT'S SCHEME OF CAPTURING THE CITY--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL
REY--REFLECTIONS AND CRITICISM ON THIS BATTLE--PREPARATIONS TO
ATTACK CHAPULTEPEC--STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC AND OF THE CITY GATES
OF SAN COSMÉ AND BELEN--RETREAT OF THE MEXICAN ARMY AND
GOVERNMENT--AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE CITY OF MEXICO.
At the termination of the armistice the position of the American
forces was greatly changed from what it had been on the morning of the
20th of August. The occupation of San Agustin had been followed by
that of Contreras, San Angel, Coyoacan and Churubusco in the course of
that day, and on the next, Mixcoac and Tacubaya were taken possession
of. Thus the whole southern and south-western portion of the valley,
in front of Mexico, were now held by the Americans; and this
disposition of their forces, commanding most of the principal
approaches to the capital, enabled them, for the first time to select
their point of attack.
In reconnoitering the chief outworks of the Mexicans by which he was
still opposed, General Scott found that there were several of great
importance. Directly north of his headquarters at Tacubaya, and
distant about a mile, arose the lofty, isolated hill of Chapultepec,
surrounded by its massive edifice, half castle, half palace, crowned
with cannon. This point, it was known, had been strongly fortified to
maintain the road leading from Tacubaya to the _garita_ of San Cosmé
on the west of the city. Westwardly, beyond the hill of Chapultepec,
whose southern side and feet are surrounded by a dense grove of
cypresses, and on a rising ground within the military works designed
to strengthen the castle, was the Molino del Rey, or King's Mill,
which was represented to be a cannon foundry to which large quantities
of church bells had been sent to be cast into guns. Still further
west, but near the Molino or Mill, was the fortified Casa Mata,
containing a large deposit of powder.
These,--together with the strong citadel, lying near the _garita_ of
Belen in the south-western corner of the city,--were the principal
external defences still remaining beyond the immediate limits of the
capital. The city itself stands on a slight swell between lake Tezcoco
and the western edge of the valley, and, throughout its greater
extent, is girdled by a ditch or navigable canal extremely difficult
to bridge in the face of an enemy, which serves the Mexicans not only
as a military defence but for drainage and protection of their
customs. Each of the eight strong city gates were protected by works
of various character and merit. Outside and within the cross fires of
these gates there were other obstacles scarcely less formidable
towards the _south_. The main approaches to the city across the flat
lands of the basin are raised on causeways flanked by wide and deep
ditches designed for their protection and drainage. These causeways,
as well as the minor cross roads which are similarly built, were cut
in many places and had their bridges destroyed so as to impede the
American's advance and to form an entangling net work; while the
adjacent meadows were in this rainy season either filled with water in
many places or liable to be immediately flooded by a tropical storm.
With these fields for his theatre of action, and these defences still
in front of him, it was an important and responsible question, whether
General Scott should attack Mexico on the west or on the south.
There can be hardly a doubt that the capture of the hill and castle of
Chapultepec, before assaulting the city, was imperatively demanded by
good generalship. If the capital were taken _first_, the Mexicans
instead of retreating towards Guadalupe and the north, when we
attacked and captured from the _south_, would of course retire to the
avoided stronghold of Chapultepec; and, if our slender forces were
subsequently obliged to leave the city in order to take the fortress,
our sick, wounded and thinned regiments would be left to the mercy of
the mob and the _leperos_. Chapultepec would thus become the nucleus
and garrison of the whole Mexican army, and we might be compelled to
fight two battles at the same time,--one _in_ the city, and the other
at the castle. But, by capturing the castle first, and seizing the
road northward beyond it, we possessed all the most important outworks
in the lap of the valley, and cut off the retreat of the Mexicans from
the city either to the west, to the castle, or towards our rear in the
valley. We obtained, moreover, absolute command of two of the most
important entrances to the capital, inasmuch as from the eastern foot
of the hill of Chapultepec two causeways, and aqueducts raised on
lofty arches, diverged northeastwardly and eastwardly towards the
city. The northernmost of these entered Mexico by the _garita_ of San
Cosmé, while the other reached it by that of Belen near the citadel.
In attacking Chapultepec, it was important to consider the value of
the Molino del Rey or King's Mill, and Casa Mata, both of which, as we
noticed, lie on rising ground within the works designed to protect
Chapultepec. Upon examination it will be found that the Molino del
Rey, or King's Mill, bears the relation of a very strong western
outwork both to the castle of Chapultepec and its approaches by the
inclined plain which serves to ascend its summit. As the Molino del
Rey is commanded and defended by the castle, so it reciprocally,
commands and defends the only good approach to the latter.[74] As long
as the Molino was held by the Mexicans, it would of course, form an
important stronghold easily reached from the city around the rear of
Chapultepec; so that if Scott attacked the castle and hill from the
south, where the road that ascends it commenced, he would be in danger
of an attack on his left flank from the Mexicans in the defences at
Molino and Casa Mata.
If the King's Mill fell, the result to the enemy would be that, in
addition to the loss of an important outwork and the consequent
weakening of the main work, its occupants or defenders would be driven
from a high position above the roads and fields into the low grounds
at the base of Chapultepec, which were completely commanded from the
Molino, and thus the Mexicans would be unable to prevent the American
siege pieces from taking up the most favorable position for battering
the castle. It was important, therefore, not only that the foundry
should be destroyed, but, in a stratagetic view, it was almost
indispensable in relation to future operations that the position
should be taken. It is undeniable, as following events showed, that
the Mexicans regarded it as one of their formidable military points.
The capture of Chapultepec and the destruction of the post at Molino
del Rey were, accordingly, determined on as preliminary to the final
assault upon the city.
* * * * *
As soon as the armistice was terminated bold reconnoissances were made
by our engineers in the direction of Chapultepec and the Molino or
King's Mill and Casa Mata. On the 7th of September Santa Anna's answer
to Scott's despatch was received, and on the same day the
Commander-in-Chief and General Worth examined the enemy's formidable
dispositions near and around the castle-crowned hill. The Mexican
array was found to consist of an extended line of cavalry and
infantry, sustained by a field battery of four guns, either occupying
directly or supporting a system of defences collateral to the castle
and summit; _but as the lines were skilfully masked a very inadequate
idea of the extent of the forces was obtained_. Captain Mason's
reconnoissance on the morning of the same day, represented the enemy's
left as resting on and occupying the group of strong stone buildings
at the Molino adjacent to the grove at the foot of Chapultepec and
directly under the castle's guns. The right of his line rested on the
Casa Mata, at the foot of the ridge sloping gradually to the plain
below from the heights above Tacubaya; while, midway between these
buildings, were the field battery and infantry forces disposed on
either side to support it. This reconnoissance indicated that the
_centre_ was the weak point of the position, and that its left flank
was the strongest. In the Mill or Molino, on the left, was the brigade
of General Leon, reinforced by the brigade of General Rangel; in the
Casa Mata, on the right, was the brigade of General Perez; and on the
intermediate ground was the brigade of General Ramirez, with several
pieces of artillery. The Mexican reserve was composed of the 1st and
3d light, stationed in the groves of Chapultepec, while the cavalry
consisting of 4,000 men, rested at the hacienda of Morales, not very
far from the field. Such was the arrangement of the Mexican forces
made by Santa Anna in person on the 7th of September, though it has
been alleged by Mexican writers that it was somewhat changed during
the following night. The wily chief had not allowed the time to pass
during the negotiation between Trist and the Commissioners in
political discussion alone. Regarding the failure of the treaty as
most probable, he had striven to strengthen once more the military arm
of his nation, and the first result of this effort was demonstrated in
his disposition of troops at El Molino del Rey. The Americans' attack
upon Chapultepec, as commanding the nearest and most important access
to the city had been foreseen by him as soon as the armistice ended,
and as a military man, he well knew that the isolated hill and castle
could not be protected by the defenders within its walls alone or by
troops stationed either immediately at its base or on the sloping road
along its sides.
General Scott's plan of assault upon the city seems now to have been
matured, though it required several days for full development
according to the reconnoissances of his engineers. He designed to make
the main assault on the west and not on the south of the city.
Possessing himself suddenly of the Molino del Rey and the adjacent
grounds he was to _retire_ after the capture _without carrying
Chapultepec_, the key of the roads to the western _garitas_ of San
Cosmé and Belen. The immediate capture of Chapultepec would have been
a signal to Santa Anna to throw his whole force into the western
defence of the city; but by retiring, after the fall of the Molino or
King's Mill, and by playing off skilfully on the south of the city in
the direction of the garita of San Antonio Abad, Scott would
effectually divert the attention of the Mexicans to that quarter and
thus induce them to weaken the western defences and strengthen the
southern. At length, at the proper moment, by a rapid inversion of his
forces from the south to the west, he intended to storm the
castle-crowned hill, and rush along the causeways to the capital
before the enemy could recover his position.
* * * * *
In pursuance of this plan, an attack upon El Molino del Rey and La
Casa Mata was the first great work to be accomplished, and as soon as
Santa Anna's reply closing the armistice was received on the 7th the
advance towards that place was ordered for the following morning. This
important work was entrusted to General Worth, whose division was
reinforced by three squadrons of dragoons; one command of 270 mounted
riflemen under Major Sumner; three field pieces under Captain Drum;
two twenty-four pounders under Captain Huger, and Cadwallader's
brigade 784 strong. The reconnoissances had been completed; at three
o'clock in the morning of the 8th of September the several columns
were put in motion on as many different routes, and when the gray dawn
enabled them to be seen they were as accurately posted as if in midday
for review. Colonel Duncan was charged with the general disposition of
the artillery, while the cavalry were under Major Sumner.
At the first glimmer of day Huger's powerful guns saluted the walls of
El Molino and continued to play in that quarter until this point of
the enemy's line became sensibly shaken. At that moment the assaulting
party, commanded by Wright of the 8th Infantry, dashed forward to
assault the centre. Musketry and cannister were showered upon them by
the aroused enemy, but on they rushed, driving infantry and
artillerists at the point of the bayonet, capturing the field pieces
and trailing them on the flying foe, until the Mexicans perceiving
that they had been assailed by a mere handful of men suddenly rallied
and reformed. In an instant the reassured and gallant foe opened upon
the Americans a terrific fire of musketry, striking down eleven out
of the fourteen officers who composed the command, and, for the time,
staggering the staunch assailants. But this paralysis continued for an
instant only. A light battalion which had been held to cover Huger's
battery, commanded by Captain E. Kirby Smith, rushed forward to
support, and executing its bloody task amid horrible carnage, finally
succeeded in carrying the line and occupying it with our troops. In
the meanwhile Garland's brigade, sustained by Drum's artillery
assaulted the enemy's left near the Molino, and after an obstinate
contest drove him from his position under the protecting guns of
Chapultepec. Drum's section and Huger's battering guns advanced to the
enemy's position, and his captured pieces were now opened on the
retreating force. While these efforts were successfully making on the
Mexican centre and left, Duncan's battery blazed on the right, and
Colonel Mackintosh was ordered to assault that point. The advance of
his brigade soon brought it between the enemy and Duncan's guns, and
their fire was of course discontinued. Onwards sternly and steadily
moved the troops towards the Casa Mata, which, as it was approached,
proved to be a massive stone work surrounded with bastioned
entrenchments and deep ditches, whence a deadly fire was delivered and
kept up without intermission upon our advancing troops until they
reached the very slope of the parapet surrounding the citadel. The
havoc was dreadful. A large proportion of the command was either
killed or wounded; but still the ceaseless fire from the Casa Mata
continued its deadly work, until the maimed and broken band of gallant
assailants was withdrawn to the left of Duncan's battery where its
remnants rallied. Duncan and Sumner had meanwhile been hotly engaged
in repelling a charge of Mexican cavalry on the left, and having just
completed the work, the brave Colonel found his countrymen retired
from before the Casa Mata and the field again open for his terrible
weapons. Directing them at once upon the fatal fort he battered the
Mexicans from its walls, and as they fled from its protecting
enclosure he continued to play upon the fugitives as relentlessly as
they had recently done upon Mackintosh and his doomed brigade.
The Mexicans were now driven from the field at every point. La Casa
Mata was blown up by the conquerors. Captured ammunition and cannon
moulds in El Molino were destroyed. And the Americans, according to
Scott's order previous to the battle, returned to Tacubaya, with three
of the enemy's guns, (a fourth being spiked and useless,) eight
hundred prisoners including fifty-two commissioned officers, and a
large quantity of small arms, with gun and musket ammunition. Three
thousand two hundred and fifty-one Americans, had on this day, driven
four times their number from a selected field; but they had paid a
large and noble tribute to death for the victory. Nine officers were
included in the one hundred and sixteen of our killed, and forty-nine
officers in the six hundred and sixty-five of our wounded. The
Mexicans suffered greatly in wounded and slain, while the gallant
General Leon and Colonel Balderas fell fighting bravely on the field
of battle.[75]
* * * * *
The battle was over by nine o'clock in the morning. The Americans,
after collecting their dead and wounded, retired from the bloody
field, but they were not allowed to mourn over their painful losses.
They had suffered severely, yet the battle had been most disastrous to
the Mexicans. The fine commands of Generals Perez and Leon and of
Colonel Balderas, were broken up; the position once destroyed, could
not serve for a second defence, and the _morale_ of the soldiers had
suffered. The Mexicans were beginning to believe that mere formidable
masses, if not directed by skilful chiefs, were, in truth, but
harmless things, and not to be relied on very confidently for national
defence. The new levies, the old regular army, and the volunteers of
the city, had all been repeatedly beaten in the valley both before and
since the armistice. Nevertheless, Santa Anna, in spite of all these
defeats and disasters at the Molino and Casa Mata, caused the bells of
the city to be merrily rung for a victory, and sent forth
proclamations by extraordinary couriers, in every direction,
announcing the triumph of Mexican valor and arms!
On the morning of the 11th, Scott proceeded to carry out the remainder
of his projected capture of the capital. His troops had been already
for some time hovering around the southern gates, and he now surveyed
them closely covered by General Pillow's division and Riley's brigade
of Twigg's command, and then ordered Quitman from Coyoacan to join
Pillow by _daylight_, before the southern gates. _By night_ however,
the two Generals with their commands were to pass the two intervening
miles between their position and Tacubaya where they would unite with
Worth's division, while General Twiggs was left, with Riley, Captain
Taylor and Steptoe, in front of the gates to man[oe]uvre, threaten, or
make false attacks so as to occupy and deceive the enemy. General
Smith's brigade was halted in supporting distance at San Angel, in the
rear, till the morning of the 13th, so as to support our general depot
at Mixcoac. This stratagem against the south was admirably executed
throughout the 12th and until the afternoon of the 13th, when it was
too late for Santa Anna to recover from his delusion.
In the meanwhile preparations had been duly made for the operations on
the west by the capture of Chapultepec. Heavy batteries were
established and the bombardment and cannonade under Captain Huger,
were commenced early on the morning of the 12th. Pillow and Quitman
had been in position, as ordered, since early on the night of the
11th, and Worth was now commanded to hold his division in reserve near
the foundry to support Pillow, while Smith was summoned to sustain
Quitman. Twiggs still continued to inform us with his guns that he
held the Mexicans on the defensive in that quarter and kept Santa Anna
in constant anxiety. Scott's positions and strategy perfectly
disconcerted him. One moment on the south--the next at Tacubaya--then
reconnoitering the south again--and, at last, concentrating his forces
so that they might be easily moved northward to Chapultepec or
southward to the gate of San Antonio Abad. These movements rendered
him constantly sensible of every hour's importance, yet he would not
agree with the veteran Bravo who commanded Chapultepec and was
convinced that the hill and castle would be the points assailed.
During the whole of the 12th the American pieces, strengthened by the
captured guns, poured an incessant shower of shot into the fortress
until nightfall, when the assailants slept upon their arms, to be in
position for an early renewal on the 13th.
At half-past five in the morning the American guns recommenced upon
Chapultepec; but still Santa Anna clung to the southern gates while
Scott was silently preparing for the final assault according to a
preconcerted signal. About 8 o'clock, judging that the missiles had
done the work, the heavy batteries suddenly ceased firing, and
instantaneously Pillow's division rushed forward from the conquered
Molino del Rey, and overbearing all obstacles, and rapidly clambering
up the steep acclivities, raised their scaling ladders and poured over
the walls.[76]
Quitman, supported by Generals Shields and Smith, was meanwhile
advancing rapidly towards the south-east of the works, over a causeway
with cuts and batteries defended by an army strongly posted outside
the works towards the east. But nothing could resist the impulse of
the storming division, though staunchly opposed and long held at bay,
and whilst it rushed to complete the work, the New York, South
Carolina, and Pennsylvania volunteers, under Shields, crossed the
meadows in front amid a heavy fire, and entered the outer enclosure of
Chapultepec in time to join the enterprise from the west. The castle
was now possessed at every point. The onslaught had been so rapid and
resistless, that the Mexicans stood appalled as the human tide foamed
and burst over their battlements. Men who had been stationed to fire
the mines either fled or were shot down. Officers fell at their posts,
and the brave old Bravo, fighting to the last, was taken prisoner with
a thousand combatants.
Santa Anna was at last undeceived. He detached at once the greater
portion of his troops from near the garita of San Antonio Abad; but it
was too late;--the key to the roads of San Cosmé and Belen had fallen;
the advance works were weak, and the routed troops of Chapultepec fled
rapidly along the causeways and over the meadows. Still as they
retreated they fought courageously, and as our men approached the
walls, the fresh troops in the neighborhood poured their volleys from
behind parapets, windows and steeples. Nevertheless, Santa Anna dared
not withdraw all his forces in the presence of Twigg's threatening
division on the south.
Meanwhile Worth had seized the causeway and aqueduct of San Cosmé,
while Quitman advanced by the other towards the garita of Belen. The
double roads on each side of these aqueducts which rested on open
arches spanning massive pillars, afforded fine points for attack and
defence. Both the American Generals were prompt in pursuing the
retreating foe, while Scott, who had ascended the battlements of
Chapultepec and beheld the field spread out beneath him like a map,
hastened onward all the stragglers and detachments to join the flushed
victors in the final assault.
Worth speedily reached the street of San Cosmé and became engaged in
desperate conflict with the enemy from the houses and defences.
Ordering forward Cadwallader's brigade with mountain howitzers,
preceded by skirmishers and pioneers with pick-axes and crow bars to
force windows and doors and to burrow through the walls, he rapidly
attained an equality of position with the enemy; and by 8 o'clock in
the evening, after carrying two batteries in this suburb, he planted a
heavy mortar and piece of artillery from which he might throw shot and
shells into the city during the night. Having posted guards and
sentinels and sheltered his weary men, he at length found himself with
no obstacle but the gate of San Cosmé between his gallant band and the
great square of Mexico.
The pursuit by Quitman on the road to the gate of Belen had been
equally hot and successful. Scott originally designed that this
General should only man[oe]uvre and threaten the point so as to favor
Worth's more dangerous enterprise by San Cosmé. But the brave and
impetuous Quitman, seconded by the eager spirits of his division,
longing for the distinction of which they had been hitherto deprived,
heeded neither the external defences nor the more dangerous power of
the neighboring citadel. Onward he pressed his men under flank and
direct fires;--seized an intermediate battery of two guns;--carried
the gate of Belen,--and thus, before two o'clock, was the first to
enter the city and maintain his position with a loss proportionate to
the steady firmness of his desperate assault. After nightfall, he
added several new defences to the point he had won so gloriously, and
sheltering his men as well as he was able, awaited the return of
daylight under the guns of the formidable and unsubdued citadel.
So ended the battles of the 13th of September, 1847, and so, in fact,
ended the great contests of the war. Santa Anna had been again
"disconcerted" in his plan of battle, by Scott, as he had previously
been thwarted by Valencia's disobedience and wilfulness. Scott would
not attack the south of the city where he expected him, and
consequently the American chief conquered the point where he had not
expected him!
When darkness fell upon the city a council of disheartened officers
assembled in the Mexican citadel. After the customary crimination and
recrimination had been exhausted between Santa Anna and other
officers, it was acknowledged that the time had come to decide upon
future movements. Beaten in every battle, they now saw one American
General already within the city gate, while another was preparing to
enter on the following morning, and kept the city sleepless by the
loud discharges of his heavy cannon or bursting bombs as they fell in
the centre of the capital. General Carrera believed the demoralization
of his army complete. Lombardini, Alcorta and Perez coincided in his
opinion, and Santa Anna at length closed the panic stricken council by
declaring that Mexico must be evacuated during the night and by naming
Lombardini General-in-Chief, and General Perez second in command.
Between eight and nine o'clock Señor Trigueros called at the citadel
with his coach, and bore away the luckless military President to the
sacred town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, three miles north of the capital.
The retreat of the Mexican army began at midnight, and not long after,
a deputation from the Ayuntamiento, or City Council, waited upon
General Scott with the information that the federal government and
troops had fled from the capital. The haggard visitors demanded terms
of capitulation in favor of the church, the citizens and the municipal
authorities. Scott refused the ill-timed request, and promising no
terms that were not self imposed, sent word to Quitman and Worth to
advance as soon as possible on the following morning, and, guarding
carefully against treachery, to occupy the city's strongest and most
commanding points. Worth was halted at the Alameda, a few squares west
of the Plaza, but Quitman was allowed the honor of advancing to the
great square, and hoisting the American flag on the National Palace.
At 9 o'clock the Commander-in-Chief, attended by his brilliant staff,
rode into the vast area in front of the venerable Cathedral and
Palace, amid the shouts of the exulting army to whose triumphs his
prudence and genius had so greatly contributed. It was a proud moment
for Scott, and he might well have flushed with excitement as he
ascended the Palace stairs and sat down in the saloon which had been
occupied by so many Viceroys, Ministers, Presidents and Generals, to
write the brief order announcing his occupation of the capital of
Mexico. Yet the elation was but momentary. The cares of conquest were
now exchanged for those of preservation. He was allowed no interval of
repose from anxiety. His last victories had entirely disorganized the
Republic. There was no longer a national government, a competent
municipal authority, or even a police force which could be relied on
to regulate the fallen city. Having accomplished the work of
destruction, the responsibility of reconstruction was now imposed upon
him; and first among his duties was the task of providing for the
safety and subordination of that slender band which had been so
suddenly forced into a vast and turbulent capital.
NOTE.--We shall record as very interesting historical facts, the
numbers with which General Scott achieved his victories in the
valley.
FORCES.
He left Puebla with 10,738 rank and file.
At Contreras and Churubusco, there were 8,497 engaged.
At El Molino del Rey and La Casa Mata, 3,251 "
On 12th and 13th September, at Chapultepec, &c., 7,180 "
Final attack on city, after deducting killed, }
wounded, garrison of Mixcoac and Chapultepec,} 6,000
LOSSES.
At Contreras and Churubusco, 137 killed. 877 wounded. 38 missing.
At El Molino, &c., 116 " 665 " 18 "
September 12th, 13th, and 14th, 130 " 703 " 29 "
Grand total of losses, 2,703.
"On the other hand," says Scott in his despatch of 18th September,
1847, "this small force has beaten on the same occasions, in view
of the capital, the whole Mexican army, composed, at the
beginning, of thirty odd thousand men, posted always in chosen
positions, behind entrenchments or more formidable defences of
nature and art;--killed or wounded of that number more than 7,000
officers and men,--taken 3,730 prisoners, one-seventh officers,
including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been Presidents of this
Republic;--captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces
of ordnance, besides 57 wall pieces, 20,000 small arms, and an
immense quantity of shot, shells and powder." See Ex. Doc. No. 1
Senate, 30th Congress, 1st Session, p. 384.
[Footnote 74: See Lieut. Smith's Memoir, ut antea, p. 8.]
[Footnote 75: This was a great but a _rash_ victory. The American
infantry relying chiefly on the bayonet and expecting to effect its
object by surprise and even at an earlier hour of the morning,
advanced with portions of the three thousand two hundred and fifty-one
men to attack at least eleven or twelve thousand Mexicans upon a field
selected by themselves, protected by stone walls and ditches,
commanded by the fortress of Chapultepec and the ground swept by
artillery, while four thousand cavalry threatened an overwhelming
charge! We have no criticism to make as to inequality of numbers, but
although we believe that our officers did not anticipate so strong a
resistance, we are satisfied that it would have been better to rely at
_first_ upon the fatal work of mortars and _siege_ pieces, of which we
had abundance, and, _then_, to have permitted the bayonet to complete
the task the battering train had begun. If the difficulty of moving
rapidly to the scene of action in the night, prevented a _night_
attack and surprise, it would probably have been better to change the
plan of battle even at a late hour. In the end, Duncan's great guns,
effectually destroyed a post which had been the slaughter house of
many a noble American soldier. The Mexican cavalry behaved shamefully.
In Colonel Ramsey's notes on the translation of the Mexican _Apuntes
para la historia de la Guerra_, &c., p. 347, he says: "it is _now
known_ in Mexico that Santa Anna was in possession of General Scott's
order to attack the Molino del Rey in a few hours after it was
written, and during the whole of the 7th, troops were taking up their
positions on that ground. It is believed further that Santa Anna knew
the precise force that was to attack. When, therefore, Scott supposed
that Worth would surprise the Mills and Casa Mata, he was met by what?
Shall the veil be raised a little further? There was a traitor among
the list of high ranking officers in the Mexican army, and for gold he
told the Mexican force. Scott had been betrayed by one not an
American, not an officer or soldier, but Santa Anna was betrayed by
one of his own officers and a Mexican. Santa Anna believed the
information he received and acted on it. General Scott did _not_
believe what he learned at night, and--the victory was won!"]
[Footnote 76: The importance of the _previous_ capture of El Molino
del Rey was proved in this assault upon Chapultepec, for Pillow's
division started from this very Mill, from within the enemy's work,
and found itself on an equality with the foe up to the very moment of
scaling the walls at the crest of the mount, whereas the other
assaulting column under Quitman taking the only remaining road to the
castle, a causeway leading from Tacubaya, was successfully held at bay
by the outworks defending this road at the base of the hill, until
after the castle was taken, and the opposing force was taken in rear
by troops passing through and around Chapultepec. Had El Molino still
been held by the Mexicans, the siege pieces would not have been
allowed to play uninterruptedly, nor would the assaulting parties been
able to take position or attack with impunity. See Lieut. Smith's
Memoir, ut antea p. 8.]