1847.
DIFFICULTIES OF THE ADVANCE--THE PEDREGAL--SAN
ANTONIO--HACIENDA--RELATIVE POSITION OF AMERICAN AND MEXICAN
ARMIES--PATH OVER THE PEDREGAL TO CONTRERAS--VALENCIA DISCONCERTS
SANTA ANNA'S PLAN OF BATTLE--AMERICAN ADVANCE AND VICTORY AT
CONTRERAS--SAN ANTONIO TURNED BY WORTH--BATTLE OF
CHURUBUSCO--BATTLE AT THE CONVENT AND TETE DE PONT--THEIR
CAPTURE--FLIGHT OF THE MEXICANS.
In order to understand the ensuing military movements, it will be
proper for the reader to study the map of the valley, and acquaint
himself fully with the relative posture of both parties. The plans of
both generals in chief were well made; but the blunders and obstinacy
of the Mexican second in command disconcerted Santa Anna's desired
combination, and ultimately opened the ground to the American advance
with more ease than was anticipated.
We will sketch rapidly the military value of the arena upon which the
combatants stood on the 18th of August, 1847.
Let us imagine ourselves beside General Scott, standing on one of the
elevations above the town of San Agustin de las Cuevas, at the base of
the southern mountain barrier of the valley, and looking northward
towards the capital. Directly in front, leading to the city, is the
main road, the left or western side of which, even from the gate of
San Agustin to the Hacienda of San Antonio, and thence westwardly to
San Angel, forms, together with the bases of the southern and western
mountains about St. Geronimo and Contreras, a vast basin, ten or
twelve square miles in extent, covered with the Pedregal or the field
of broken lava which we have already mentioned. This mass of jagged
volcanic matter, we must remember, was at that time barely passable
with difficulty for infantry, and altogether impassable for cavalry or
artillery, save by a single mule path. North, beyond the fortified
_hacienda_ and headquarters of Santa Anna at San Antonio, the country
opened. A line of field works, the lake of Xochimilco, a few
cultivated farms, and vast flooded meadows, were on its right to the
east, but from the _hacienda_, a road branches off to the west,
leading around the northern edge of the _Pedregal_ or lava field
through Coyoacan and San Angel, whence it deflects southwardly to
Contreras. The main road, however, continues onward, northwardly, from
the hacienda of San Antonio, until it crosses the Churubusco river at
the strong fortification we have described. Beyond Churubusco the
highway leads straight to the gate of San Antonio Abad, whence a work
had been thrown north-westwardly towards the citadel. The city of
Mexico, built on the bed of an ancient lake, was on a perfect level,
nor were there any commanding or protecting elevations of importance
around it within two or three miles, and the first of these, beyond
this limit, were chiefly on the north and west.
Thus, General Santa Anna, in front, on the main road to the city, at
the massive fortified _hacienda_ of San Antonio, blocked up the
highway in that direction, protected on his right by the barrier of
the Pedregal; and by the lake of Xochimilco, the field works, and the
flooded country on his left. General Valencia had been placed by him
with his troops at San Angel, on the western edge of the valley, and
at the village of Coyoacan, a little further east in the lap of the
valley, on roads communicating easily with his position at San
Antonio, while they commanded the approaches to the city by the
circuitous path of the Pedregal around the edge of the valley from San
Agustin de las Cuevas, through Contreras or Padierna. Valencia and
Santa Anna were consequently within supporting distance of each other;
and in their rear, in front of the city, were the fortifications of
Churubusco. General Scott, with the whole American army was,
therefore, apparently hemmed in between the lakes and the Pedregal on
his flanks; the Mexican fortifications and army in front; and the
steep mountains towards Cuernavaca in his rear. He was obliged,
accordingly, either to retreat by the defiles through which he had
advanced from Chalco,--to climb the steeps behind him and pass them to
the _tierra caliente_,--to force the position in front at the hacienda
of San Antonio,--or to burst the barrier of the Pedregal on his left,
and, sweeping round the rim of the valley, to advance towards the
capital through the village of San Angel. Such were some of the
dangers and difficulties that menaced Scott on his arrival at San
Agustin. He was in the heart of the enemy's country, in front of a
capital aroused by pride, patriotism and despair, and possessing all
the advantages of an accurate knowledge of the ground on which it
stood, or by which it was surrounded. Scott, on the other hand, like
the mariner in storm on a lee shore, was obliged to feel his way along
the dangerous coast with the lead, and could not advance with that
perfect confidence which is ever the surest harbinger of success.
The reconnoissances of the American engineers which had been pushed
boldly, in front, on the main road, to the north, by the hacienda of
San Antonio, soon disclosed the difficulty in that direction. But
among the mass of information which the American General received at
Puebla, his engineers learned that _there was_ a pathway through this
Pedregal whose route had been indicated by the spies with sufficient
distinctness and certainty to justify a hope that he might be able to
render it practicable for his whole army, and, thus, enable him to
turn the right flank of the Mexicans' strongest positions. There is no
doubt, as subsequent events demonstrated, that the ground in the
neighborhood of Contreras, where the road descends from the mountains
and barrancas towards San Angel was of great importance to the
Mexicans in the defence of the various modes of access to the city,
and it is unquestionable that a strong post should have been placed in
that quarter to cripple the American advance. It is stated by Mexican
writers, that General Mendoza, with two members of his topographical
corps had reconnoitred this route and pass, and pronounced it
"absolutely indefensible." It is probable, therefore, that no general
action, involving the fortunes of a division, or of a large mass of
the Mexican army, should have been risked among the ravines between
the mountains and the Pedregal near Contreras; yet we do not believe
that it should have been left by Santa Anna without a force capable of
making a staunch resistance.
We are now acquainted with the ground, and with the positions of the two
armies. Scott's plan was to force a passage by either or both of the two
adits to the levels of the valley in front of the city, while Santa
Anna's, according to his manifesto dated _subsequently_ on the 23d of
August, was to have made a concerted retrograde movement with his
troops, and to have staked the fortunes of the capital on a great
battle, in which all his fresh, enthusiastic, and unharmed troops would
have been brought into a general action against the comparatively small
American army, upon an open ground where he would have had full
opportunity to use and man[oe]uvre infantry, cavalry and artillery.
But this plan was disconcerted at first, and probably destroyed, both
in its _materiel_ and _morale_, by the gross disobedience of General
Valencia, who forgot as a soldier, that there can never be two
commanders in the field. Valencia, apparently resolving to seize the
first opportunity to attack the Americans, in spite of the reported
untenable character of the ground about Padierna or Contreras, left
his quarters at Coyoacan and San Angel, and advanced, without
consulting his commander, to Contreras, upon whose heights he threw up
an entrenched camp! As soon as Santa Anna learned this fact, he
ordered the vain and reckless officer to retire, but finding him
obstinately resolute in his insubordination, the commander-in-chief
suffered him, in direct opposition to his own opinion, to remain and
to charge himself with the whole responsibility of the consequences.
Thus, if Scott advanced upon the main road, he would meet only Santa
Anna in front, and the efficiency of Valencia's force, on his left
flank, would be comparatively destroyed. If he conquered Valencia,
however, at Contreras, after passing the Pedregal, he would rout a
whole division of the veterans of the north--the remnants of San Luis
and Angostura,--while the remainder of the army, composed of recent
levies and raw troops, disciplined for the occasion, would, in all
likelihood, fall an easy prey to the eager Americans.
The reconnoissances of the American army were now completed both towards
San Antonio over the main northern road, and towards Padierna or
Contreras over the southern and south-western edge of the Pedregal. That
brave and accomplished engineer, Captain--now Colonel Robert E. Lee--had
done the work on the American left across the fields of broken lava, and
being convinced that a road could be opened, if needed, for the whole
army and its trains, Scott resolved forthwith to advance.
On the 19th of August, General Pillow's division was commanded to open
the way, and advancing carefully, bravely and laboriously over the
worst portion of the pass,--cutting its road as it moved onward,--it
arrived about one o'clock in the afternoon at a point amid the ravines
and barrancas near Padierna or Contreras where the new road could only
be continued under the direct fire of twenty-two pieces of Mexican
artillery, most of which were of large calibre. These guns were in a
strong entrenched camp, surrounded by every advantage of ground and by
large bodies of infantry and cavalry, reinforced from the city, over
an excellent road beyond the volcanic field. Pillow's and Twiggs's
force, with all its officers on foot, picking a way along the Mexican
front and extending towards the road from the city and the enemy's
left, advanced to dislodge the foe. Captain Magruder's field battery
of twelve and six-pounders, and Lieut. Callender's battery of mountain
howitzers and rockets, were also pushed forward with great difficulty
within range of the Mexican fortifications, and, thus, a stationary
battle raged until night fell drearily on the combatants amid a cold
rain which descended in torrents. Wet, chilled, hungry and sleepless,
both armies passed a weary time of watching until early the next
morning, when a movement was made by the Americans which resulted in a
total rout of Valencia's forces. Firing at a long distance against an
entrenched camp was worse than useless on such a ground, and although
General Smith's and Colonel Riley's brigades, supported by Generals
Pierce's and Cadwallader's, had been under a heavy fire of artillery
and musketry for more than three hours along the almost impassable
ravine in front and to the left of the Mexican camp, yet so little had
been effected in destroying the position that the main reliance for
success was correctly judged to be in an assault at close quarters.
The plan had been arranged in the night by Brigadier General Persifer
F. Smith, and was sanctioned by General Scott, to whom it was
communicated through the indefatigable diligence of Captain Lee, of
the Engineers.
At 3 o'clock A. M. of the 20th August, the movement commenced on the
rear of the enemy's camp, led by Colonel Riley and followed
successively by Cadwallader's and Smith's brigades, the whole force
being commanded by General Smith.
The march was rendered tedious by rain, mud and darkness; but, about
sun rise, Riley reached an elevation behind the Mexicans, whence he
threw his men upon the works, and, storming the entrenchments, planted
his flag upon them in seventeen minutes. Meanwhile Cadwallader brought
on the general assault by crossing the deep ravine in front and
pouring into the work and upon the fugitives, frequent volleys of
destructive musketry. Smith's own brigade under the temporary command
of Major Dimick, discovered, opposite and outside the work, a long
line of Mexican cavalry drawn up in support, and by a charge against
the flank, routed the horse completely, while General Shields held
masses of cavalry, supported by artillery, in check below him, and
captured multitudes who fled from above.
It was a rapid and brilliant feat of arms. Scott,--the skilful and
experienced General of the field,--doubts in his despatch whether a
more brilliant or decisive victory is to be found on record, when the
disparity of numbers, the nature of the ground, the artificial
defences, and the fact that the Americans accomplished their end
without artillery or cavalry, are duly and honestly considered. All
our forces did not number more than 4,500 rank and file, while the
Mexicans maintained, at least, six thousand on the field, and double
that number in reserve under Santa Anna, who had advanced to support
but probably seeing that it was not a spot for his theory of a general
action, and that an American force intervened, declined aiding his
disobedient officer. The Mexicans lost about 700 killed, 813
prisoners, including 4 Generals among 88 officers. Twenty-two pieces
of brass ordnance, thousands of small arms and accoutrements, many
colors and standards, large stores of ammunition, 700 pack mules, and
numbers of horses fell into the hands of the victors.
The rage of Santa Anna against Valencia knew no bounds. He ordered him
to be shot wherever found; but the defeated chief fled precipitately
towards the west beyond the mountains, and for a long time lay in
concealment until the storm of private and public indignation had
passed. The effect of this battle, resulting in the loss of the
veterans of the north, was disastrous not only in the city, but to the
_morale_ of the remaining troops of the main division under Santa
Anna. It certainly demonstrated the importance of Padierna or
Contreras as a military point of defence; but it unquestionably proved
that the works designed to maintain it should have been differently
planned and placed at a much earlier day, after mature deliberation by
skilful engineers. The hasty decision and work of Valencia, made
without preconcert or sanction of the General-in-chief, and in total
violation of his order of battle, followed by the complete destruction
of the entire division of the northern army, could only result in
final disaster.
Whilst the battle of Contreras was raging early in the day, brigades
from Worth's and Quitman's divisions had been advanced to support the
combatants; but before they arrived on the field the post was
captured, and they were, accordingly, ordered to return to their late
positions. Worth, advanced from San Agustin, in front of San Antonio,
was now in better position, for a road to the rear of the _hacienda_
had been opened by forcing the pass of Contreras. Moving from
Contreras or Padierna through San Angel and Coyoacan, Pillow's and
Twiggs's divisions would speedily be able to attack it from the north,
while Worth, advancing from the south, might unquestionably force the
position. Accordingly while Pillow and Twiggs were advanced, General
Scott reached Coyoacan, about two miles, by a cross road, in the rear
of the hacienda of San Antonio. From Coyoacan he despatched Pillow to
attack the rear of San Antonio, while a reconnoissance was made of
Churubusco, on the main road, and an attack of the place ordered to be
effected by Twiggs with one of his brigades and Captain Taylor's field
battery.
General Pierce was next despatched, under the guidance of Captain Lee,
by a road to the left, to attack the enemy's right and rear in order
to favor the movement on the Convent of Churubusco and cut off retreat
to the capital. And, finally, Shields, with the New York and South
Carolina volunteers, was ordered to follow Pierce and to command the
left wing. The battle now raged from the right to the left of our
whole line. All the movements had been made with the greatest
rapidity and enthusiasm. Not a moment was lost in pressing the victory
after the fall of Contreras. Shouting Americans and rallying Mexicans
were spread over every field. Every one was employed; and, in truth,
there was ample work to do, for even the commander-in-chief of our
forces was left without a reserve or an escort, and had to advance for
safety close in Twiggs's rear.
Meanwhile, about an hour earlier, Worth, by a skilful and daring
movement upon the enemy's front and right at the hacienda of San
Antonio, had turned and forced that formidable point whose garrison no
doubt was panic struck by the victory of Contreras. The enterprise was
nobly achieved. Colonel Clarke's brigade, conducted by the engineers
Mason and Hardcastle, found a practicable path through the Pedregal
west of the road, and, by a wide sweep, came out upon the main
causeway to the capital. At this point the three thousand men of the
Mexican garrison at San Antonio, were met in retreat, and cut by
Clarke in their very centre;--one portion being driven off towards
Dolores on the right, and the other upon Churubusco in the direct line
of the active operations of the Americans. Whilst this brave feat of
out-flanking was performed, Colonel Garland, Major Galt, Colonel
Belton, and Lieutenant Colonel Duncan advanced to the front attack of
San Antonio, and rushing rapidly on the flying enemy, took one General
prisoner, and seized a large quantity of public property, ammunition
and the five deserted guns.
Thus fell the two main keys of the valley, and thus did all the
divisions of the American army at length reach the open and
comparatively unobstructed plains of the valley.
Worth soon reunited his division on the main straight road to the
capital, and was joined by General Pillow, who, advancing from Coyoacan
to attack the rear of San Antonio, as we have already related, soon
perceived that the hacienda had fallen, and immediately turned to the
left, through a broken country of swamps and ditches, in order to share
in the attack on CHURUBUSCO. And here, it was felt on all sides, that
the last stand must be made by Mexico in front of her capital.
The hamlet or scattered houses of Churubusco, formed a strong military
position on the borders of the stream which crosses the highway, and,
besides the fortified and massive convent of San Pablo, it was guarded
by a _tête de pont_ with regular bastions and curtains at the head of
a bridge over which the road passes from the _hacienda_ of San Antonio
to the city. The stream was a defence;--the nature of the adjacent
country was a defence;--and here the fragments of the Mexican
army,--cavalry, artillery and infantry, had been collected from every
quarter,--panic stricken, it is true,--yet apparently resolved to
contest the passage of the last outwork of importance in front of the
_garita_ of San Antonio Abad.
When Worth and Pillow reached this point, Twiggs had already been
sometime hotly engaged in attacking the embattled convent. The two
advancing Generals immediately began to man[oe]uvre closely upon the
_tête de pont_, which was about four hundred and fifty yards east of
the convent, where Twiggs still earnestly plied the enemy. Various
brigades and regiments under Cadwallader, Lieutenant Colonel Smith,
Garland, Clark, Major White and Lieutenant Colonel Scott continued to
press onward towards the _tête de pont_, until by gradual
encroachments under a tremendous fire, they attained a position which
enabled them to assault and carry the formidable work by the bayonet.
But the convent still held out. Twenty minutes after the _tête de
pont_ had been taken, and after a desperate battle of two hours and a
half, that stronghold threw out the white flag. Yet it is probable
that even then the conflict would not have ended, had not the 3d
infantry under Captains Alexander, J. M. Smith, and Lieutenant O. L.
Shepherd, cleared the way by fire and the bayonet to enter the work.
Whilst this gallant task was being performed in front of the Mexican
defences, Generals Pierce and Shields had been engaged on our left, in
turning the enemy's works so as to prevent the escape of the
garrisons, and to oppose the extension of numerous corps from the
rear, upon and around our left. By a winding march of a mile around to
the right, this division under the command of Shields, found itself on
the edge of an open, wet meadow, near the main road to the capital, in
the presence of nearly four thousand of the enemy's infantry, a little
in the rear of Churubusco. Shields posted his right at a strong
edifice, and extended his left wing parallel to the road, to outflank
the enemy towards the capital. But the Mexicans extended their right
more rapidly, and were supported by several regiments of cavalry, on
better ground. Shields, accordingly, concentrated his division about a
hamlet, and attacked in front. The battle was long and bravely
sustained with varied success, but finally resulted in crowning with
victory the zeal and courage of the American commander and his gallant
troops. Shields took 380 prisoners, including officers; while at
Churubusco seven field pieces, some ammunition, one standard, three
Generals, and 1261 prisoners, including other officers, were the
fruits of the sharply contested victory.
This was the last conquest on that day of conquests. As soon as the
_tête de pont_ fell, Worth's and Pillow's divisions rushed onward by
the highway towards the city, which now rose in full sight before
them, at the distance of four miles. Bounding onward, flushed and
exultant, they encountered Shields' division, now also victorious, and
all combined in the headlong pursuit of the flying foe. At length the
columns parted, and a small part of Harney's cavalry, led by Captain
Kearney of the 1st dragoons, dashed to the front and charged the
retreating Mexicans up to the very gates of the city.
Thus terminated the first series of American victories in the valley
of Mexico.
NOTE.--It is ungracious to criticize unfavorably the conduct of a
conquered foe, but there are some things in Santa Anna's behavior
at Contreras and Churubusco, which must not be passed silently. At
Contreras, he came with aid, by a short and fine highway, to the
field at a late period, when the Americans, moving slowly over an
unknown and broken country, had already outflanked with a strong
force, Valencia's left, and he then made no effort whatever, with
his _large support_, to relieve the beleagured general. If he did
not design doing any thing, why did he come at all; and, if as he
says, he believed Valencia could, during the night, withdraw all
his forces, after spiking his guns, by a secret path of which he
apprised him, why did he not take the same path to aid him? Did he
believe that it was best to lose Valencia and his division only,
without risking the loss of the large support under his own
command? In the _morning_ of the 20th it was certainly too late
for action, but Santa Anna must have been convinced, when he
_ordered the retreat_ from the Hacienda of San Antonio, and thus
voluntarily opened a gate for Worth's advance, that now, if ever,
had arrived the moment for a general action in front of the city,
the key of which, on the main road, was the convent of Churubusco
and the adjacent works. The loss of Valencia's army and _materiel_
was undoubtedly disheartening, but, according to his own account,
Santa Anna had been prepared for an event which he _foresaw_. This
should not have destroyed his self-possession if he sincerely
desired victory. When Contreras fell, he had, in reality, only
lost a division consisting of five or six thousand men. The whole
centre and left wing of his army were untouched, and these must
have numbered at least 20,000. Yet, if we admit the brave
resistance of the garrison, only hastily thrown into the convent
and works at Churubusco, it may then be asked what masterly effort
Santa Anna made (at the moment when he had actually drawn the
American army into the valley) to bring on a _general action_ with
all the fresh troops either under his own command or under that of
obedient, brave, skilful, and patriotic officers? The Mexican
accounts of these actions, and in fact, his own despatch from
Tehuacan, dated 19th Nov. 1847, exhibit no able man[oe]uvres on
the last field with which he was perfectly and personally
familiar. The Americans stormed a single point,--and the battle
was over, though bravely fought by those who were under cover and
by the traitor battalion of San Patricio, formed of renegades from
our army. The despatches of Santa Anna, like most of the Mexican
despatches after military or political disaster, seem rather
designed to criminate others, and to throw the whole blame of
_ultimate_ complete defeat on Valencia, than to point out the
causes of conquest in spite of able generalship _after the fall of
Contreras_. See Santa Anna's despatches, Mexico 23 Aug. 1847; and
Tehuacan, 19 Nov. 1847, in Pillow's Court Martial, pp. 532 and
540. See also _Apuntes para la historia de la guerra_, &c., &c.,
chapters XVII-XVIII-XIX, and Ripley's History of the War, vol. 2,
p. 256; "_No part of the Mexican force was ready for battle_,
except Rincon's command," says this writer.