1847.
SCOTT AT PUEBLA--TAMPICO AND ORIZABA TAKEN--SCOTT's
ADVANCE--TOPOGRAPHY OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO--ROUTES TO THE
CAPITAL--EL PEÑON--MEXICALZINGO--TEZCOCO--CHALCO--OUTER AND INNER
LINES AROUND THE CITY--SCOTT'S ADVANCE BY CHALCO--THE AMERICAN
ARMY AT SAN AGUSTIN.
The American forces, as we have stated, had concentrated at Puebla on
the main road to the city of Mexico, but their numbers had been
thinned by desertion, disease and the return of many volunteers whose
term of service was over or nearly completed. Meanwhile the Mexican
army was increased by the arrival of General Valencia from San Luis
with five thousand troops and thirty-six pieces of artillery, and
General Alvarez with his Pinto Indians from the south and south-west,
all of which, added to the regiments in the city and its immediate
vicinity, swelled the numbers of the Mexican combatants to at least
twenty-five or thirty thousand. It was discovered that General Taylor
would not advance towards the south, and consequently the presence of
Valencia's men was of more importance at the point where the vital
blow would probably be struck.
Whilst the events we have related were occurring in the interior,
Commodore Perry had swept down the coast and captured Tobasco, which,
however, owing to its unhealthiness, was not long retained by the
Americans. But every other important port in the Gulf, from the Rio
Grande to Yucatan, was in our possession, while an active blockade was
maintained before those in the Pacific. Colonel Bankhead subsequently,
occupied Orizaba, and seized a large quantity of valuable public
property. It had been the desire of the American authorities, from the
earliest period of the war, to draw a large portion of the means for
its support from Mexico, but the commanding Generals finding the
system not only annoying to themselves but exasperating to the people
and difficult of accomplishment, refrained from the exercise of a
right which invaders have generally used in other countries. Our
officers, accordingly, paid for the supplies obtained from the
natives. Nor did they confine this principle of action to the
operations of the military authorities alone whilst acting for the
army at large, but, wherever it was possible, restrained that spirit
of private plunder and destruction which too commonly characterizes
the common soldier when flushed with victory over a weak but opulent
foe. When the ports of Mexico, however, had fallen into _our
possession_ and the blockade was raised, they were at once opened to
the trade of all nations upon the payment of duties more moderate than
those which had been collected by Mexico. The revenue, thus levied in
the form of a military contribution from Mexican citizens upon
articles they consumed, was devoted to the use of our army and navy.
It was, in effect, the seizure of Mexican commercial duties and their
application to our necessary purposes, and thus far, only, was the
nation compelled to contribute towards the expense of the war it had
provoked.
* * * * *
Early in August, General Scott had been reinforced by the arrival of
new regiments at Puebla, and on the 7th of that month, he resolved to
march upon the capital. Leaving a competent garrison in that city,
under the command of Colonel Childs, and a large number of sick and
enfeebled men in the hospitals, he departed with about ten thousand
eager soldiers towards the renowned Valley of Mexico.
In the same month, three hundred and twenty-eight years before,
Hernando Cortéz and his slender military train, departed from the
eastern coasts of Mexico, on the splendid errand of Indian conquest.
After fighting two battles, with the Tlascalans who then dwelt in the
neighborhood of Puebla, and with the Cholulans whose solitary
pyramid,--a grand and solemn monument of the past,--still rises
majestically from the beautiful plain, he slowly toiled across the
steeps of the grand volcanic sierra which divides the valleys and hems
in the plain of Mexico. Patiently winding up its wooded sides and
passing the forests of its summit, the same grand panoramic scene lay
spread out in sunshine at the feet of the American General that three
centuries before had greeted the eager and longing eyes of the
greatest Castilian soldier who ever trod the shores of America.
In order to comprehend the military movements which ended the drama of
the Mexican war, it will be necessary for us to describe the
topography of the valley with some minuteness, although it is not
designed to recount, in detail, all the events and personal heroism of
the battles that ensued. This would require infinitely more room than
we can afford, and we are, accordingly, spared the discussion of many
circumstances which concern the merits, the opinions, and the acts of
various commanders.
* * * * *
Looking downward towards the west from the shoulders of the lofty
elevations which border the feet of the volcano of Popocatepetl, the
spectator beholds a remarkable and perfect basin, enclosed on every
side by mountains whose height varies from two hundred to ten thousand
feet from its bottom. The form of this basin may be considered nearly
circular, the diameter being about fifty miles. As the eye descends to
the levels below, it beholds every variety of scenery. Ten extinct
volcanoes rear their ancient cones and craters in the southern part of
the valley, multitudes of lesser hills and elevations break the
evenness of the plain, while, interspersed among its eight hundred and
thirty square miles of arable land and along the shores of its six
lakes of Chalco, Xochimilco, Tezcoco, San Cristoval, Xaltocan and
Zumpango, stretching across the valley from north to south, are seen
the white walls of ten populous cities and towns. In front of the
observer, about forty miles to the west, is the capital of the
Republic, while the main road thither descends rapidly from the last
mountain slopes, at the Venta de Cordova, until it is lost in the
plain on the margin of Lake Chalco near the Hacienda of Buena Vista.
From thence to the town of Ayotla it sweeps along the plain between a
moderate elevation on the north and the lake of Chalco on the south.
On the 11th of August, General Scott, after crossing the mountains,
concentrated his forces in the valley. General Twiggs encamped with
his division in advance, on the direct road, at Ayotla, near the
northern shore of Lake Chalco; General Quitman was stationed with his
troops a short distance in the rear; General Worth occupied the town
of Chalco on the western shore of its lake, while General Pillow
brought up the rear by an encampment near Worth.
This position of the army commanded four routes to the capital whose
capture was the coveted prize. The first of these, as well as the
shortest and most direct, was the main post road which reaches the
city by the gate or _garita_ of San Lazaro on the east. After passing
Ayotla this road winds round the foot of an extinct volcanic hill for
five miles when it approaches the sedgy shores and marshes of Lake
Tezcoco on the north, thence it passes over a causeway built across an
arm of Tezcoco for two miles, and, by another causeway of seven miles
finally strikes the city. The road is good, level, perfectly open and
comfortable for ordinary travelling, but the narrow land between the
lakes of Chalco and Tezcoco, compressed still more by broken hills and
rocks, admits the most perfect military defence. At the end of the
first causeway over the arm of Tezcoco which we have just described,
is the abrupt oblong volcanic hill styled El Peñon, four hundred and
fifty feet above the level of the lake, its top accessible in the
direction of Ayotla at only one point, and surrounded by water except
on the west towards Mexico. It is a natural fortress; yet Santa Anna
had not neglected to add to its original strength, and to seize it as
the eastern key of his defences. Three lines of works were thrown up,
at the base, at the brow, and on the summit of the eminence. The works
at the base, completely encircling El Peñon, consisted of a ditch
fifteen feet wide, four and a half feet deep, and a parapet fifteen
feet thick whose slope was raised eight and a half feet above the
bottom of the ditch. Ample breastworks formed the other two lines of
the bristling tiara. In addition to this, the causeway across the arm
of Tezcoco, immediately in front, had been cut and was defended by a
battery of two guns, while the fire from all the works, mounting about
sixty pieces, swept the whole length of the causeway.
The second road to the capital was by Mexicalzingo. After leaving
Ayotla the highway continues along the main post road for six or seven
miles and then deflects southwardly towards the village of Santa
Maria, whence it pursues its way westwardly towards Istapalapan, but,
just before reaching Mexicalzingo, it crosses a marsh formed by the
waters of Lake Xochimilco, on a causeway nearly a mile long. This
approach, dangerous as it was by its natural impediments, was also
protected by extensive field works which made it almost as perilous
for assault as the Peñon.
The third route lay through Tezcoco. Leaving Chalco and the Hacienda
of Buena Vista, it strikes off from the main route directly north, and
passing through the town of Tezcoco, it sweeps westwardly around the
shores of the lake of that name until it crosses the stone dyke of San
Cristoval, near the lake and town of that name; thence, by a road
leading almost directly south for fifteen miles, through the sacred
town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, it enters the capital. It is an agreeable
route through a beautiful country, yet extremely circuitous though
free from all natural or artificial obstacles, until it reaches
Santiago Zacualco within two miles of Guadalupe. But at the period of
Scott's invasion of the valley, General Valencia, with the troops that
were afterwards convened at Contreras, was stationed at Tezcoco,
either for the purpose of observation, or to induce an attack in that
quarter, and thus to draw our forces into a snare on the northern
route, or to fall on the rear of the American commander if he attacked
El Peñon, or advanced by the way of Mexicalzingo. At Santiago
Zacualco, west of the lake and on the route, formidable works were
thrown up to defend the entire space between the western shore of lake
Tezcoco and the mountains; while on the road to Querétaro, at the
mountain pass north of Tenepantla, other defences were erected, so as
to screen the country on all sides of the group of hills which lies
west of the lakes of Tezcoco and San Cristoval and north of the town
of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
The fourth and last advance to the city was that which turned to the
south from the Hacienda of Buena Vista, and passing by the town of
Chalco, led along the narrow land intervening between the shores of
lake Chalco and the first steeps of the mountains forming the southern
rim of the valley, until it fell at right angles, at Tlalpam or San
Agustin de las Cuevas, into the main road from the city of Mexico
towards the southern States of the Republic.
All these routes were boldly reconnoitred by the brave engineers
accompanying the American army, and, where they could not extend their
personal observations, the officers obtained from the people of the
country, information upon which subsequent events proved that they were
justified in relying. From the knowledge thus gained as to the route
south of the lake of Chalco, they were induced to believe, although it
was rough, untravelled, difficult, and narrowly hemmed in between the
lake and the mountains, yet that the long and narrow defile, which was
open to resistance at many points, was not sufficiently obstructed or
fortified to prevent our passage. All the routes on the lower lands, it
should also be remembered, were liable to increased difficulties from
the deluging rains prevailing at this season on the highlands of Mexico,
and which sometimes convert the highways and their borders, for many
leagues, into almost impassable lagunes.
Santa Anna and his engineers had probably supposed that this southern
route would not be adopted, but a reasonable explanation of his
conduct is given by one of the most competent commentators upon the
valley of Mexico and the march of the American army.[69] "When an
enemy is in front of El Peñon, the communication between it and troops
on the other routes _is only by way of the city of Mexico itself_; in
other words, the American troops being at Ayotla, General Santa Anna's
forces at El Peñon were one day's march distant from those at
Mexicalzingo, three from those under General Valencia, and would have
been about four days' march from troops thrown forward on the Chalco
route. Fords on these different routes were by no means within
supporting distances of each other. Holding the position that General
Scott then did, it would have required, of an equal enemy, four times
his own force, to have opposed successfully his further advance. The
Mexican forces were not numerically equal to this, and, accordingly,
they were concentrated at the threatened point. It is evident that as
long as the American troops were in front of El Peñon, the enemy
_necessarily_ held to their position. In moving off, the former could
gain one day the start. This brought the only difficult parts of the
Chalco route actually nearer General Scott than the Mexican chief. If
to this we add the delay necessary in moving heavy artillery and
breaking up from a fortified position, it would seem that, instead of
oversight, it was rather impossible for General Santa Anna to meet our
forces sooner than he did."
The description of the various routes to the capital has necessarily
acquainted the reader with the important Mexican defences on the
north, the east, and the north-east of the capital, both by military
works hastily thrown up after Santa Anna's retreat from Cerro Gordo,
and by the encampment of large bodies of soldiery. We thus, already
know a part of the external line of defences at El Peñon,
Mexicalzingo, Tezcoco, Santiago Zacualco, and the Pass north of
Tenepantla. But in addition to these, there are others that must be
noticed on the south and west of the capital, which it should always
be recollected is situated in the lap of the valley, but near the
western edge of the gigantic rim of mountains.
Along the Chalco route there were no more fortifications, but west of
lakes Chalco and Xochimilco, a line of entrenchments had been
commenced, connecting the fortified _hacienda_, or massive stone
plantation house of San Antonio, about six miles south of the city,
with the town of Mexicalzingo. West of this _hacienda_, the Pedregal,
a vast, broken field of lava, spread out along the edge of the main
road, and skirting it to San Agustin, extended high upon the mountain
slopes still further west near San Angel and Contreras, whose
neighboring fields were cut into deep ravines and barrancas by the
wash from the declivities. The Pedregal was a most formidable obstacle
in the march or man[oe]uvres of an army. But few levels of arable land
were found among its rocky wastes. It admitted the passage of troops
at but few points, and was entirely impracticable for cavalry or
artillery, except by a single mule-path.[70] North of San Angel and
the edge of the Pedregal, at the distance of about four miles, rose
the solitary hill and castle of Chapultepec, which had been amply
prepared for defence; and still further north on the same line,
frowned the stern ridges of the _sierra_, cut by barrancas and
profound dells, until the ring of the outer series of military works
was thus finally united at the pass beyond Tenepantla. But inside of
this formidable barrier of outworks, nearer the city, another line of
fortifications had been prepared to dispute the American march. The
first, and perhaps the most important of these, was at Churubusco, a
scattered village lying midway between San Agustin and the city of
Mexico, directly on the road, at a spot where the stream or rivulet of
Churubusco runs eastwardly from a point on the road from San Angel to
the capital, towards the lake of Xochimilco. The sides of the water
course were planted with the prickly maguey, and one of the most
western buildings in the village was a strong massive stone convent,
whose walls had been cut for musketry, and whose parapets, azotéas or
flat roofs, and windows, all afforded suitable positions for soldiery.
Large quantities of ammunition were stored within the edifice. The
enclosure of the church and convent was defended by about two thousand
men, and mounted seven guns, while, towards the east was a beautiful,
solid and scientifically constructed tête de pont which covered the
bridge over the stream by which the road led to the capital. In this
work three heavy guns were mounted, while the neighborhood is said to
have swarmed with troops.
We have already mentioned the garita or gate of San Lazaro, which was
the entrance to the city by the main road from the east, passing the
hill and fortification of El Peñon. This garita was strengthened by
strong works on the road, with platforms and embrasures for heavy
cannon, which would have swept the path, while the marshes on the
south were protected by redoubts and lunettes extending to the garita
or entrance of La Candelaria on the canal from Xochimilco. North of
San Lazaro strong works hemmed in the city to the garita of
Peralvillo, and connected with defences and fortified houses reaching
to the garita of Santiago. Other advanced works were begun in that
quarter, while the ground in front of the main line was cut into
_troux de loups_.
On the west of the city are the garitas of San Cosmé and Belen. "Works
had been commenced to connect that of San Cosmé, the most northerly of
the two, with that of Santiago, and the nature of the country and of
the buildings, formed obstructions to any advance between San Cosmé
and Belen. Belen was defended principally by the citadel of Mexico, a
square bastioned work with wet ditches, immediately inside the garita.
Barricades had also been commenced; but the great obstacle to an
entrance by either garita, was presented in the rock and castle of
Chapultepec, two miles south-west of the city. From this hill two
aqueducts extend to the capital, the one, north-east, in a direct line
to Belen, and the other, north, to the suburb of San Cosmé, where,
turning at right angles, it continued onward and entered at the
garita. The roads from the west ran along the sides of the aqueducts.
Two roads enter the city from the south, between the garita of San
Antonio and Belen, one at Belen and the other at the garita of El niño
Perdido, neither of these roads have branches to the Acapulco road
south of the Pedregal and the Hacienda of San Antonio, and, therefore,
had been left comparatively unfortified."[71]
These defences, overlooked by the lofty sierras and the barrancas
which broke their feet, hemmed in the capital, and the Mexicans
readily imagined that they could not be turned by an army marching
from the east, so as to reach the city on the west, except by a
tedious circuit which would allow them time to complete their
protective works in that quarter. The east had claimed their chief and
most natural attention, and thus the south and the west became
unquestionably their weakest points.
* * * * *
Such were the Mexican lines, natural and artificial, around the
capital in the valley in the middle of August, 1847, and such was the
position of the American troops in front of them. The Mexicans
numbered then, with all their levies, probably more than thirty
thousand fighting men, while the Americans did not count more than ten
thousand--under arms at all points. The invaders had prepared as well
as circumstances admitted, and their _materiel_ for assault or siege
had been gathered carefully, and transported slowly into the interior,
through the country intervening between Vera Cruz and Puebla, every
train being usually attacked by guerillas, and fighting its way boldly
through the most dangerous passes.
The equipments of the Mexicans, except the weapons saved from the
wreck of former battles, had been chiefly prepared at the cannon
foundries and powder factories of the country, and it is quite amazing
to notice how completely a great exigency brought forth the latent
energies of the people, teaching them what they might ordinarily
effect, if guided by a spirit of industry and progress. Under the most
disheartening depression, but fired by the stimulus of despair, by an
overpowering sense of patriotic duty, and by religious enthusiasm
which had been excited by the crusading address of the clergy of San
Luis Potosi, issued in the month of April, they manifested in their
last moments, a degree of zeal, calmness, and foresight that will
forever redound to their credit on the page of history.
* * * * *
The Mexican preparations for defence were not, of course, as completely
known to the Americans as we now describe them. Through spies, scouts
and reconnoisances of our engineers, some of the exterior, and even of
the interior lines were ascertained with tolerable accuracy; but
sufficient was known to satisfy General Scott that of all the
approaching routes to the capital, that which led along the southern
shores of lake Chalco was the only one he ought to adopt.[72]
Accordingly, on the 15th of August, the movement was commenced in the
reverse order from that in which the army had entered the valley from
Puebla. Worth's division passing Pillow's, led the advance, Pillow and
Quitman followed, while Twiggs' brought up the rear. Scott took his
position with Pillow, so as to communicate easily with all parts of
the army. Water transportation, to some extent, had been obtained by
General Worth at Chalco, by the siezure of market boats which plied
between that place and the capital. When Twiggs moved he was assailed
by Alvarez and his Pintos, but soon drove them off, while the advance
columns, after passing San Gregorio, were frequently assailed by the
enemy's light troops in their front, and harassed and impeded by
ditches that had been hastily cut across the road, or by rocks rolled
down from the mountains. These obstacles necessarily consumed time,
but the simple-minded Indians of the neighborhood, who had just been
compelled by the Mexicans to throw the impediments in the Americans'
way, were perhaps more easily induced to aid in clearing the path for
the invaders, than their ancestors had been in the days of Cortéz. On
the afternoon of the 17th, Worth, with the advance, reached San
Agustin, at the foot of the mountains, and at the intersection of the
southern road from Mexico to Cuernavaca and Acapulco--a point whose
topography we have already described;--and, on the 18th, the rear
division entered the town.
As soon as Santa Anna discovered Scott's advance by the Chalco route,
and that the attack on Mexico would be made from the south instead of
the east, he at once perceived that it was useless to attack the
American rear, whilst passing the defiles between the lake and the
mountains even if he could possibly come up with it, and consequently,
that it was best for him to quit his head quarters at El Peñon, while
he also recalled General Valencia with the most of the troops at
Tezcoco and at Mexicalzingo, which were no longer menaced by the foe.
Santa Anna himself, established his quarters at the fortified hacienda
of San Antonio, and ordered Valencia to march his whole division,
cavalry, infantry and artillery, to the town of San Angel and
Coyoacan, so as to cover the whole west and centre of the valley in
front of Mexico.
[Footnote 69: See the admirable Map and Memoir of Lieutenant M. L.
Smith, and Brevet Captain E. L. F. Hardcastle, published in the Senate
Document, No. 11 of the first session of the 31st Congress: 1849 '50.]
[Footnote 70: Ripley's War with Mexico, vol. 2, 181.]
[Footnote 71: Ripley, 2d vol., 182.]
[Footnote 72: General Scott had set his heart, even at Puebla, on the
Chalco route, but he resolved not to be obstinate, if, on a closer
examination of the ground, a better route was presented. The last
information of his spies and officers, _in the valley_, satisfied him
as to the propriety of advancing by Chalco.]
[Illustration: PLAIN OF MEXICO. P LOOMIS, SC.]