1847.
GENERAL SCOTT AT LOBOS--LANDING AT AND SIEGE OF VERA
CRUZ--CAPITULATION AND CONDITION OF VERA CRUZ--CONDITION OF
MEXICO--ALVARADO, ETC., CAPTURED--SCOTT'S ADVANCE--DESCRIPTION OF
CERRO GORDO--MEXICAN DEFENCES AND MILITARY DISPOSAL THERE--BATTLE
OF CERRO GORDO.--PEROTÉ AND PUEBLA YIELD--SANTA ANNA
RETURNS--CONSTITUTION OF 1824 READOPTED--MEXICAN POLITICS OF THE
DAY--WAR SPIRIT--GUERILLAS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS--TRIST--SANTA
ANNA'S SECRET NEGOTIATIONS.
The extraordinary genius of Santa Anna, and the influence he possessed
over his countrymen were perhaps never more powerfully manifested than
in the manner in which, amid all these disasters, he maintained his
reputation and popularity, and gathered a new army to defend the
eastern frontier of Mexico. But whilst he was engaged preparing in the
interior, we must return to the scene of General Scott's operations on
the coast. The small island of Lobos, about a hundred and twenty-five
miles from Vera Cruz, had been selected for the rendezvous of the
several corps which were to compose the American invading army; and
the magnitude of the enterprize may be estimated from the fact, that
one hundred and sixty-three vessels were employed as transports. On
the seventh of March, Scott embarked his troops in the squadron under
Commodore Connor, and on the ninth, landed the army upon the coast
below the island of Sacrificios without the loss of a man, and without
opposition from the neighboring city of Vera Cruz, which he summoned
in vain to surrender. Having planted his batteries, and placed them
under the command of Colonel Bankhead, as Chief of Artillery, he
commenced a vigorous bombardment of the city on the eighteenth, aided,
afloat and on shore, by the guns of the fleet which had been
transferred from Commodore Connor to the command of Commodore Perry.
The town was thus invested by land and water, and although the Mexican
castle, city walls and forts, were but poorly garrisoned and provided,
they held out bravely during the terrible siege, which nearly
converted Vera Cruz into a slaughter-house. On the morning of the
twenty-sixth, when no hope remained for the Mexicans, General
Landero, the commander, made overtures for a capitulation, which being
satisfactorily arranged, the principal commercial port, and the most
renowned fortress in Mexico were surrendered, together with four
hundred guns, five thousand stand of arms and as many prisoners who
were released on parole.
General Scott had endeavored to mitigate the dangers of this terrific
attack upon Vera Cruz by the employment of such a force as would
honorably satisfy the inefficient garrison of the town and castle that
it was in truth unable to cope with the American forces. He delayed
opening his batteries to allow the escape of non-combatants; he
refrained, moreover, from storming the town, a mode of assault in
which multitudes would have fallen on both sides in the indiscriminate
slaughter which always occurs when an enemy's town is invaded in hot
blood and with a reckless spirit of conquest and carnage. Yet, weak
and badly provided as was the garrison of both strongholds, the walls
of the city, its batteries and its guardian castle held out for
sixteen days, during which time it is estimated that our army and
navy, threw into the town about six thousand shot and shells, weighing
upwards of 463,000 pounds. On the side of the Mexicans the slaughter
was exceedingly great. Nearly a thousand fell victims during the
siege; and, among the slain, numerous unfortunate citizens, women and
children, were found to have perished by the bombs or paixhan shot
which destroyed the public and private edifices, and ruined many
important portions of the city.
When this new disaster was reported in the capital and among the
highlands of Mexico, it spread consternation among the more secluded
masses who now began to believe that the heart of the country was
seriously menaced. They had doubtless trusted to the traditionary,
proverbial strength of San Juan de Ulua, and believed that the danger
of disease and storm on the coast would serve to protect Vera Cruz
from the attack of unacclimated strangers, during a season of
hurricanes. Indeed, it was fortunate that our troops were landed from
the transports and men-of-war as early as they were in March, for
almost immediately afterwards, and during the siege, one of the most
violent _northers_ that ever ravaged these shores raged incessantly,
destroying many of the vessels whose warlike freight of men and
munitions had been so recently disembarked.
But if the people were ignorant of the true condition and strength of
Vera Cruz or its castle, such was not the case with the military men and
national authorities. They had made but little effort to guard it
against Scott, of whose designed attack they had been long apprised,
and they were probably prevented from doing so chiefly by the plans of
Santa Anna, who supposed that Taylor would fall an easy prey to the
large Mexican forces in the field at Buena Vista, especially as the
American army had been weakened by the abstraction of its regulars for
the operations at Vera Cruz. Victorious at Buena Vista, he could have
hastened, by forced marches, to attack the invaders on the eastern
coast, and under the dismay of his anticipated victory in the north, he
unquestionably imagined that they too would have fallen at once into his
grasp. Besides these military miscalculations, Mexico was so embarrassed
in its pecuniary affairs, and disorganized in its Central Civil
Government, that the proper directing power in the capital,--warned as
it was,--had neither men nor means at hand to dispose along the coast of
the Gulf, or to station at points in its neighborhood whence they might
quickly be thrown into positions which were menaced.
It was at this juncture that Santa Anna's voice was again heard in the
council and the field. At the conclusion of the last chapter we left
him hastening to the new scene of action; and when he announced the
capitulation of the vaunted castle and sea port of the Republic, he
declared in his proclamation, that although "chance might decree the
fall of the capital of the Aztec empire under the power of the proud
American host, yet the _Nation_ shall not perish." "I swear,"
continues he, "that if my wishes are seconded by a sincere and
unanimous effort, Mexico shall triumph! A thousand times fortunate for
the nation will the fall of Vera Cruz prove, if the disaster shall
awaken in Mexican bosoms, the dignified enthusiasm, and generous ardor
of true patriotism!" This was the tone of appeal and encouragement in
which he rallied the credulous and vain masses, the disheartened
country, the dispersed troops of the north, and reanimated the broken
fragments of the army which still continued in the field.
Meanwhile, General Scott placed Vera Cruz under the command of General
Worth; opened the port to the long abandoned commerce which had
languished during the blockade; established a moderate tariff, and
together with the forces of the navy took possession of the ports of
Alvarado and Tlacotlalpam on the south, and directed the future capture
of Tuspan on the north of Vera Cruz. All his arrangements being
completed, and these captures made and projected, he marched a large
portion of his twelve thousand victorious troops towards the capital.
[Illustration: VERA CRUZ.]
When the road to the interior leaves Vera Cruz, it runs for a mile or
two along the low, sandy, sea-beaten shore, and then strikes off,
nearly at a right angle, in a gap among the sand-hills towards the
west. For many miles it winds slowly and heavily through the deep and
shifting soil, until, as the traveller approaches the river Antigua,
the country begins to rise and fall by gentle elevations like the
first heavy swells of the ocean. Passing this river at Puente Nacional
over the noble and renowned bridge of that name, the aspect of the
territory becomes suddenly changed. The nearer elevations are steeper
and more frequent, the road firmer and more rocky, while, in the
western distance, the tall slopes of the Sierras rise rapidly in bold
and wooded masses. All the features of nature are still strictly
tropical, and wherever a scant and thriftless cultivation has
displaced the thick vines, the rich flowers, and the dense foliage of
the forest, indolent natives may be seen idling about their cane-built
huts, or lazily performing only the most necessary duties of life.
Further on, at Plan del Rio the geological features of the coast
assume another aspect. Here the road again crosses a small streamlet,
and then suddenly strikes boldly into the side of the mountain which
is to be ascended. About seven leagues from Jalapa the edge of one of
the table lands of the Cordillera sweeps down from the west abruptly
into this pass of the river Plan. On both sides of this precipitous
elevation the mountains tower majestically. The road winds slowly and
roughly along the scant sides which have been notched to receive it.
When the summit of the pass is attained one side of the road is found
to be overlooked by the Hill of the Telegraph, while on the other side
the streamlet runs in an immensely deep and rugged ravine, several
hundred feet below the level of the table land. Between the road and
the river many ridges of the neighboring hills unite and plunge
downwards into the impassable abyss. At the foot of the Hill of the
Telegraph, rises another eminence known as that of Atalaya, which is
hemmed in by other wooded heights rising from below, and forming, in
front of the position a boundary of rocks and forests beyond which the
sight cannot penetrate.
When Don Manuel Robles left Vera Cruz, after its fall, he was desired
by General Canalizo to examine the site of Cerro Gordo. After a full
reconnoissance it was his opinion that it afforded a favorable spot in
which the invaders might be at least injured or checked, but that was
not the proper point to dispute their passage to the capital by a
decisive victory. The most favorable position for resistance he
believed to be at Corral Falso.
These views, however, did not accord with the opinions of the
commander-in-chief, who when the ground was explored under his own
eye, resolved to fortify it for the reception of the Americans. The
brigades of General Pinzon and Ranjel; the companies of Jalapa and
Coatepec, commanded by Mata; and the veterans of the division of
Angostura arrived also about this period, and their last sections
reached the ground on the 12th. Meanwhile all was activity in the work
of hasty fortification. Robles constructed a parapet at the edge of
the three hills, but failing to obtain all requisite materials for
such a work, his erection merely served to mark the line of the
Mexican operations, and to form a breast-work whence the artillery and
infantry might command the ground over which, as the defenders
supposed, the Americans would be obliged to advance. Colonel Cano had
already cut off the access by the road at the point where it turned on
the right slope of the Telegraph, by placing a heavy battery. He also
formed a covered way leading to the positions on the right, while
General Alcorta constructed a circular work on the summit of the
eminence and established within it a battery of four guns. In the
centre of this the national flag was hoisted, and off to the left
nothing was seen but thick, thorny dells and barrancas, which were
regarded by Santa Anna as impassable.
Such was the Mexican line of defences extending on the brink of these
precipices for nearly a mile, and, throughout it, the commander-in-chief
hastened to distribute his forces. The extreme right was placed under
the command of General Pinzon, the next position under the naval
captain, Buenaventura Aranjo, the next under Colonel Badillo, the next
under General Jarero, the next post, at the road, under General La Vega,
and finally the extreme left, at the Telegraph, under Generals Vazquez,
Uraga and Colonel Palacios. The forces thus in position, according to
the Mexican account, amounted to three thousand three hundred and
seventy men with fifty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre. The
remainder of the army, with the exception of the cavalry, which remained
at Corral Falso until the 15th, was encamped on the sides of the road at
the _rancheria_ of Cerro Gordo, situated in the rear of the position. In
this neighborhood was placed the reserve, composed of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th light infantry, comprising 1,700 men; and the 1st and 11th
regiments of the line, with 780 men, together with their artillery. It
is said that the army was badly provided with food and suffered greatly
from the climate and the innumerable insects which infest the region.
As Scott advanced against this position the dangers of his enterprize
became manifest, and he caused a series of bold reconnoissances to be
made by Lieutenant Beaurgard and Captain Lee, of the engineers. He
found that the deep rocky ravine of the river protected the right
flank of the Mexican position, while abrupt and seemingly impassable
mountains and ridges covered the left. Between these points, for
nearly two miles, a succession of fortified summits bristled with
every kind of available defence, while the top of Cerro Gordo
commanded the road on a gentle slope, like a _glacis_, for nearly a
mile. An attack in front, therefore, would have been fatal to the
American army, and Scott resolved, accordingly, to cut a road to the
right of his position so as to turn the left flank of the Mexicans. To
cover his flank movements, on the 17th of April, he ordered General
Twiggs to advance against the fort on the steep ascent, in front, and
slightly to the left of the Cerro. Colonel Harney, with the rifles and
some detachments of infantry and artillery, carried this position
under a heavy fire, and, having secured it, elevated a large gun to
the summit of the eminence, and made a demonstration against a strong
fort in the rear. Early on the 18th, the columns moved to the general
attack. General Pillow's brigade assaulted the right of the Mexican
entrenchments, and although compelled to retire, produced a powerful
impression on that part of the enemy's line. General Twigg's division
stormed the vital part of Cerro Gordo, pierced the centre, gained
command of the fortifications and cut them off from support; while
Colonel Riley's brigade of infantry rushed on against the main body of
the foe, turned the guns of their own fort against them, and compelled
the panic stricken crowd to fly in utter confusion. Shields' brigade,
meanwhile, assaulted the left, and carrying the rear battery, aided
materially in completing the rout of the enemy. The whole American
force, in action and reserve, was 8,500. Three thousand prisoners,
four or five thousand stand of arms, and forty-three pieces of
artillery, fell into Scott's hands. In the two days of conflict our
loss amounted to 33 officers and 398 men, of whom 63 were killed. The
enemy's loss was computed at 1,000 at least, while among the prisoners
no less than two hundred and eighty officers and five generals were
included. Santa Anna, and General Ampudia who was in the action,
escaped with difficulty; and the commander-in-chief, accompanied by a
few friends and a small escort, finally reached Orizaba in safety,
after encountering numerous dangers amid the mountains and lonely
paths through which he was obliged to pass.
This very decisive victory opened the path for the American army to
the highlands of the upper _plateau_ of Mexico, and, accordingly, our
forces immediately pushed on to Jalapa and Peroté, both of which
places were abandoned by the Mexicans without firing a gun. General
Worth took possession of Peroté on the 22d of April, and received from
Colonel Velasquez, who had been left in charge of the fortress or
castle of San Carlos de Peroté by his retreating countrymen, 54 guns
and mortars of iron and bronze, 11,065 cannon balls, 14,300 bombs and
hand grenades, and 500 muskets. On capturing the post he learned that
the rout at Cerro Gordo had been complete. Three thousand cavalry
passed the strong hold of Peroté in deplorable plight, while not more
than two thousand disarmed and famishing infantry had returned towards
their homes in the central regions of Mexico. From Peroté Worth
advanced towards Puebla on the direct road to the capital.
Thus was Mexico again reduced to extreme distress by the loss of two
important battles, the destruction of her third army raised for this
war, and the capture of her most valuable artillery and munitions. But
the national spirit of resistance was not subdued. If the government
could no longer restrain the invaders by organized armies, it resolved
to imitate the example of the mother country during Napoleon's invasion,
and to rouse the people to the formation of guerilla bands under daring
and reckless officers. Bold as was this effort of patriotic despair, and
cruelly successful as it subsequently proved against individuals or
detached parties of the Americans, it could effect nothing material
against the great body of the consolidated army. Meanwhile the master
spirit of the nation--Santa Anna--had not been idle in the midst of his
disheartening reverses. In little more than two weeks, he gathered
nearly three thousand men from the fragments of his broken army, and
marched to Puebla, where he received notice of Worth's advance from
Peroté. Sallying forth immediately with his force, he attacked the
American general at Amozoque, but, finding himself unable to check his
career, returned with a loss of nearly ninety killed and wounded. On the
22d of May, Puebla yielded submissively to General Worth, and Santa Anna
retreated in the direction of the national capital, halting at San
Martin Tesmalucan, and again at Ayotla, about twenty miles from Mexico.
Here he learned that the city was in double fear of the immediate
assault of the victorious Americans and of his supposed intention to
defend it within its own walls, a project which the people believed
would only result, in the present disastrous condition of affairs, in
the slaughter of its citizens and ruin of their property. The
commander-in-chief halted therefore at Ayotla, and playing dexterously
on the hopes and fears of the people in a long despatch addressed to the
minister of war, he at length received the Presidential and popular
sanction of his return to Mexico.
In truth, the nation at large had no one but Santa Anna, at that
moment of utter despair, in whose prestige and talents--in spite of
all his misfortunes and defeats--it could rely for even the hope of
escape from destruction, if not of ultimate victory.
Whilst the Mexican nation had been thus sorely vexed by intestinal
commotions and foreign invasion an Extraordinary Constituent
Congress--_Congreso Extraordinario Constituyente_--had been summoned
and met in the capital, chiefly to revise the Constitution, or the
"Bases of Political Organization," of 1843, which had been superseded
by the temporary adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1824,
according to the edict issued by Salas, under the direction of Santa
Anna soon after that personage's return from exile. This Extraordinary
Congress readopted the old Federal Constitution of 1824 without
altering its terms, principles, or phraseology, and made such slight
changes as were deemed needful by an _Acta Constitutiva y de
Reformas_, containing thirty articles, which was sanctioned on the
18th, and proclaimed on the 21st of May by Santa Anna, who had
reassumed the Presidency. By this approval of the Federal System the
Executive entirely abandoned the Central policy for which he had so
long contended, but which, as we have seen in the 11th chapter, he no
longer believed, or feigned to believe, suitable for the nation.
Notwithstanding this submission to popular will, and apparent desire
to deprive the Central Government of its most despotic prerogatives,
the conduct of Santa Anna did not save him entirely from the
machinations of his rivals or of intriguers. Much discontent was
expressed publicly and privately, and the President, accordingly
tendered his resignation to Congress, intimating a desire to hasten
into private life! This stratagetic resignation was followed by the
retiracy of General Rincon and General Bravo, who commanded the troops
in the city. Acts of such vital significance upon the part of the
ablest men in the Republic, in an hour of exceeding danger, at once
recalled Congress and the people to their senses; and if they were
designed, as they probably were, merely to throw the anarchists on
their own resources and to show them their inefficiency at such an
epoch, they seem to have produced the desired effect, for they placed
Santa Anna and his partizans more firmly in power. Congress refused to
accept his resignation. Unfortunate as he had been, it perhaps saw in
him the only commander who was capable in the exigency of controlling
the Mexican elements of resistance to the invaders, and he was thus
enabled to form his plans, to collect men, means and munitions, and to
commence the system of fortifications around the capital. "War to the
knife," was still the rallying cry of the nation. The Congressional
resolutions which had been passed on the 20th of April, immediately
after the battle of Cerro Gordo, proclaimed "every individual a
traitor, let him be private person or public functionary, who should
enter into treaties with the United States!" Parties in the capital
were, nevertheless, not unanimous upon this subject. There were wise
men and patriots who foresaw the issue, and counselled the leaders to
come to honorable terms before the capital was assaulted. Others
craved the continuance of the war with the hope that its disasters
would destroy the individuals who conducted it to an unfortunate
issue; and, among these, they saw that Santa Anna was finally pledged
to abide that issue for weal or woe. Nor were politicians wanting in
the Republic who honestly looked to the prolongation of the conflict
as a blessing to Mexico, believing that it would result in the
complete subjugation of the whole country by American arms and its
final annexation to our Union.
In June a coalition was formed at Lagos by deputies from Jalisco, San
Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Mexico and Querétaro, in which these States
combined for mutual defence; but, while they opposed peace, they
resolved to act independently of the General Government. Many other
parts of the republic looked on the scene with apathy. There was no
longer a revenue from foreign commerce. The products of the mines were
smuggled from the west coast in British vessels. Disorder and
uncertainty prevailed every where in regard to the collection of the
national income from internal resources. Individuals, and not States,
corporations or municipalities, were now to be relied on for support;
and, as the most important parts of the nation on the north and east
were virtually in the enemy's hands, the whole effort of the frail
authorities was confined to the protection of the capital. In the
midst of all this complication of confusion Santa Anna found that the
election for President, which was held by the States on the 15th of
May, had resulted unfavorably to his pretensions, and, by an adroit
movement, he prevailed on Congress to postpone the counting of the
votes from the 15th of June until January of the following year! All
who opposed his schemes of defence or resistance, were disposed of by
banishment, persecution or imprisonment, nor did he fail to establish
so severe a censorship of the press, that, in July, it is believed,
but one paper was allowed to be issued in the capital, and that one,
of course, entirely under his control. Throwing himself, like a true
military demagogue, publicly, if not at heart, at the head of popular
feeling in regard to the war with the United States, he adopted every
measure and availed himself of every resource in his power to place
the city in a state of defence, and to fan the flame of resistance. In
the meanwhile the _guerilla_ forces, organized on the eastern coast,
chiefly under a recreant clergyman named Jarauta, harassed every
American train and detachment on their way to the interior, and
rendered the country insecure, until a fearful war of extermination
was adopted by our garrisons on the line.
The government of the United States had, during the whole of this
unfortunate contest, availed itself of every supposed suitable
occasion to sound Mexico in relation to peace. In July, 1846, and in
January 1847, overtures were made to the national authorities and
rejected; and again, early in the spring of 1847, as soon as the news
of the defeat at Cerro Gordo reached Washington, Mr. Nicholas P. Trist
was despatched by the President upon a mission which it was hoped
would result in the restoration of international amity. The
commissioner reached Vera Cruz while the American army was advancing
towards the interior, but it was not until the forces reached Puebla,
and General Scott had established his head quarters in that capital,
that he was enabled, through the intervention of the British Minister,
to communicate with the Mexican government. The stringent terms of the
decree to which we have already alluded, of course, prevented Santa
Anna, powerful as he was, from entertaining the proposals in the
existing state of the public mind, and, accordingly, he referred the
subject to Congress, a quorum of whose members was, with difficulty,
organized. On the 13th of July, seventy-four assembled, and voted to
strip themselves of the responsibility by a resolution that it was the
Executive's duty to receive ministers, and to make treaties of peace
and alliance, and that their functions were confined to the approval
or disapproval of those treaties or alliances when submitted in due
form under the constitution. But Santa Anna, still adhering to the
letter of the mandatory decree passed after the battle of Cerro Gordo
in April, alleged his legal incapacity to treat, and recommended the
repeal of the order, inasmuch as the American commissioner's letter
was courteous, and the dignity of Mexico required the return of a
suitable reply. Before the appeal could reach Congress, its members
had dispersed, foreseeing probably, the delicacy, if not danger, of
the dilemma in which they were about to be placed. Without a
constitution tribunal to relieve him from his position, the President
finally referred the matter to a council of general officers of the
army. This body, however, was quite as timorous as Congress, and
dismissed the project by declaring that "it was inexpedient to enter
into negotiations for peace, until another opportunity had been
afforded Mexico to retrieve her fortunes in the field."
These were the negotiations that met the public eye, and are reported
in the military and diplomatic despatches of the day; but there was a
secret correspondence, also, which denotes either the duplicity or
strategy of Santa Anna, and must be faithfully recorded. It seems that
the Mexican President, about the time that the public answer was
proclaimed, sent private communications to the American head quarters
at Puebla, intimating that if a million of dollars were placed at his
disposal, to be paid upon the conclusion of a treaty of peace, and ten
thousand dollars were paid forthwith, he would appoint commissioners
to negotiate! The proposal was received and discussed by General
Scott, Mr. Trist, and the leading officers, and being agreed to,
though not unanimously, the ten thousand dollars were disbursed from
the secret service money which Scott had at his disposal, and
communications were opened in cypher, the key of which had been sent
from Mexico. Intimations soon reached Puebla, from Santa Anna, that it
would be also necessary for the American army to advance and threaten
the Capital;--and, finally, another message was received, urging Scott
to penetrate the valley and carry one of the outworks of the Mexican
line of defences, in order to enable him to negotiate![68]
The sincerity of these proposals from the Mexican President, is very
questionable, and we are still in doubt whether he designed merely to
procrastinate and feel the temper of the Americans, or whether he was
in reality angling for the splendid bribe of a million which he might
appropriate privately, in the event of playing successfully upon the
feelings or fears of the masses. The attempt, however, proved
abortive; and although both General Scott and Mr. Trist deemed it
proper to entertain the proposal, the commander-in-chief never for a
moment delayed his military preparations for an advance with all the
force he could gather. Thus were the last efforts of the American
authorities in Mexico and Washington repulsed in the same demagogue
spirit that hastened the rupture between the nations in the spring of
1846, and nothing remained but to try again whether the sword was
mightier than the pen.
[Footnote 68: See Major Ripley's History of the War with Mexico, p.
148. et. seq.]
[Illustration: (MAP OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO WITH A PLAN OF THE MEXICAN
DEFENCE And Line of U. S. ARMY'S OPERATIONS)]