for hours, plunged in profound meditation; then he would start up,
convulsively, and with an ejaculation, fancying he heard his name, he
would exclaim, "Who calls me?" Then rising, and walking about with
hurried steps, he at length added, "No! beyond a doubt, nothing is yet
sufficiently matured round me, even in my own family, to admit of so
distant a war. It must be delayed for three years!" And he gave orders
that the summary which reminded him of the dangers of his position
should be constantly left on his table. It was his frequent subject of
consultation, and every time he did so, he approved and repeated his
first conclusions.
It is not known what dictated so salutary an inspiration; but it is
certain, that about that epoch (the 25th of March, 1812), Czernicheff
was the bearer of new proposals to his sovereign. Napoleon offered to
make a declaration that he would contribute, neither directly nor
indirectly, to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland; and to
come to an understanding about the other subjects in dispute.
At a later period, (on the 17th of April,) the Duke of Bassano proposed
to Lord Castlereagh an arrangement relative to the Peninsula, and the
kingdom of the Two Sicilies; and in other respects offered to negotiate
on the basis, that each of the two powers should keep all that war could
not wrest from it. But Castlereagh replied, that the engagements of good
faith would not permit England to treat without making the recognition
of Ferdinand VII. as king of Spain a preliminary of the negotiation.
On the 25th of April, Maret, in apprising Count Romanzoff of this
communication, recapitulated a portion of the complaints which Napoleon
made against Russia;--firstly, the ukase of the 31st of December, 1810,
which prohibited the entry into Russia of the greater part of French
productions, and destroyed the continental system; secondly, the protest
of Alexander against the union of the duchy of Oldenburg; and thirdly,
the armaments of Russia.
This minister referred to the fact of Napoleon having offered to grant
an indemnity to the Duke of Oldenburg, and to enter into a formal
engagement not to concur in any undertaking for the re-establishment of
Poland; that, in 1811, he had proposed to Alexander, to give Prince
Kourakin the requisite powers to treat with the duke of Bassano
respecting all matters in dispute; but that the Russian emperor had
eluded the overture, by promising to send Nesselrode to Paris; a promise
which was never fulfilled.
The Russian ambassador, almost at the same time, transmitted the emperor
Alexander's ultimatum, which required the entire evacuation of Prussia;
that of Swedish Pomerania; a reduction of the garrison of Dantzic. On
the other hand, he offered to accept an indemnity for the duchy of
Oldenburg; he was willing to enter into commercial arrangements with
France; and finally promised empty modifications of the ukase of the
31st December, 1810.
But it was too late: besides, at the point to which both parties were
now arrived, that ultimatum necessarily led to war. Napoleon was too
proud, both of himself and of France, he was too much overruled by his
position, to yield to a menacing negotiator, to leave Prussia at liberty
to throw herself into the open arms of Russia, and thus to abandon
Poland. He was too far advanced; he would be obliged to retrograde, in
order to find a resting point; and in his situation, Napoleon considered
every retrograde step as the incipient point of a complete downfall.
CHAP. V.
His wishes for delay being thus frustrated, he surveyed the enormous
volume of his military strength; the recollections of Tilsit and Erfurt
were revived; he received with complacency delusive information
respecting the character of his rival. At one time, he hoped that
Alexander would give way at the approach of so menacing an invasion; at
another, he gave the reins to his conquering imagination; he indulgently
allowed it to deploy its masses from Cadiz to Cazan, and to cover the
whole of Europe. In the next moment his fancy rioted in the pleasure of
being at Moscow. That city was eight hundred leagues from him, and
already he was collecting information with respect to it, as if he was
on the eve of occupying it. A French physician having recently arrived
from that capital, he sent for, and interrogated him as to the diseases
there prevalent; he even went back to the plague which had formerly
desolated it; he was anxious to learn its origin, progress, and
termination. The answers of this physician were so satisfactory, that
he immediately attached him to his service.
Fully impressed, however, with a sense of the peril in which he was
about to embark, he sought to surround himself with all his friends.
Even Talleyrand was recalled; he was to have been sent to Warsaw, but
the jealousy of a rival and an intrigue again involved him in disgrace;
Napoleon, deluded by a calumny, adroitly circulated, believed that he
had been betrayed by him. His anger was extreme; its expression
terrible. Savary made vain efforts to undeceive him, which were
prolonged up to the epoch of our entry into Wilna; there that minister
again sent a letter of Talleyrand to the emperor; it depicted the
influence of Turkey and Sweden on the Russian war, and made an offer of
employing his most zealous efforts in negotiating with those two powers.
But Napoleon only replied to it by an exclamation of contempt: "Does
that man believe himself to be so necessary? Does he expect to teach
me?" He then compelled his secretary to send that letter to the very
minister who stood most in dread of Talleyrand's influence.
It would not be correct to say, that all those about Napoleon beheld the
war with an anxious eye. Inside the palace, as well as without it, many
military men were found who entered with ardour into the policy of their
chief. The greater part agreed as to the possibility of the conquest of
Russia, either because their hopes discerned in it a means of acquiring
something, according to their position, from the lowest distinction up
to a throne; or that they suffered themselves to participate in the
enthusiasm of the Poles; or that the expedition, if conducted with
prudence, might fairly look to success; or, to sum up all, because they
conceived every thing possible to Napoleon.
Among the ministers of the emperor, several disapproved it; the greater
number preserved silence: one alone was accused of flattery, and that
without any ground. It is true he was heard to repeat, "That the emperor
was not sufficiently great; that it was necessary for him to become
greater still, in order to be able to stop." But that minister was, in
reality, what so many courtiers wished to appear; he had a real and
absolute faith in the genius and fortune of his sovereign.
In other respects, it is wrong to impute to his counsels a large portion
of our misfortunes. Napoleon was not a man to be influenced. So soon as
his object was marked out, and he had made advances towards its
acquisition, he admitted of no farther contradiction. He then appeared
as if he would hear nothing but what flattered his determination; he
repelled with ill-humour, and even with apparent incredulity, all
disagreeable intelligence, as if he feared to be shaken by it. This mode
of acting changed its name according to his fortune; when fortunate, it
was called force of character; when unfortunate, it was designated as
infatuation.
The knowledge of such a disposition induced some subalterns to make
false reports to him. Even a minister himself felt occasionally
compelled to maintain a dangerous silence. The former inflated his hopes
of success, in order to imitate the proud confidence of their chief, and
in order, by their countenance, to stamp upon his mind the impression of
a happy omen; the second sometimes declined communicating bad news, in
order, as he said, to avoid the harsh rebuffs which he had then to
encounter.
But this fear, which did not restrain Caulaincourt and several others,
had as little influence upon Duroc, Daru, Lobau, Rapp, Lauriston, and
sometimes even Berthier. These ministers and generals, each in his
sphere, did not spare the emperor when the truth was to be told. If it
so happened that he was enraged by it, Duroc, without yielding, assumed
an air of indifference; Lobau resisted with roughness; Berthier sighed,
and retired with tears in his eyes; Caulaincourt and Daru, the one
turning pale, the other reddening with anger, repelled the vehement
contradictions of the emperor; the first with impetuous obstinacy, and
the second with short and dry determination.
It should, however, be added here, that these warm discussions were
never productive of bad consequences; good temper was restored
immediately after, apparently without leaving any other impression than
redoubled esteem on the part of Napoleon, for the noble frankness which
they had displayed.
I have entered into these details, because they are either not known, or
imperfectly known; because Napoleon in his closet was quite different
from the emperor in public; and because this portion of the palace has
hitherto remained secret; for, in that new and serious court, there was
little conversation: all were rigorously classed, so that one _salon_
knew not what passed in another; finally, because it is difficult to
comprehend the great events of history, without a perfect knowledge of
the character and manners of the principal personages.
Meantime a famine threatened France. The universal panic quickly
aggravated the evil, by the precautions which it suggested. Avarice,
always prompt in seizing the means of enriching itself, monopolized the
corn while at a low price, and waited till hunger should repurchase it
at an exorbitant rate. The alarm then became general. Napoleon was
compelled to suspend his departure; he impatiently urged his council;
but the steps to be taken were important, his presence necessary; and
that war, in which the loss of every hour was irreparable, was delayed
for two months longer.
The emperor did not give way to this obstacle; the delay, besides, gave
the new harvests of the Russians time to grow. These would supply his
cavalry; his army would require fewer transports in its train: its
progress being lightened, would be more rapid; he would sooner reach the
enemy; and this great expedition, like so many others, would be
terminated by a battle.
Such were his anticipations; for, without deceiving himself as to his
good fortune, he reckoned on its influence upon others; it entered into
his estimate of his forces. It was for this reason that he always
pushed it forward where other things failed, making up by that whatever
was deficient in his means, without fearing to wear it out by constant
use, in the conviction that his enemies would place even more faith in
it than himself. However, it will be seen in the sequel of this
expedition, that he placed too much reliance on its power, and that
Alexander was able to evade it.
Such was Napoleon! Superior to the passions of men by his native
greatness, and also by the circumstance of being controlled by a still
greater passion! for when, indeed, are these masters of the world ever
entirely masters of themselves? Meantime blood was again about to flow;
and thus, in their great career, the founders of empires press forward
to their object, like Fate, whose ministers they seem, (and whose march
neither wars nor earthquakes, nor all the scourges which Providence
permits, ever arrest,) without deigning to make the utility of their
purposes comprehensible to their victims.
BOOK III.
CHAP. I.
The time for deliberation had passed, and that for action at last
arrived. On the 9th of May, 1812, Napoleon, hitherto always triumphant,
quitted a palace which he was destined never again to enter victorious.
From Paris to Dresden his march was a continued triumph. The east of
France, which he first traversed, was a part of the empire entirely
devoted to him; very different from the west and the south, she was only
acquainted with him by means of benefits and victories. Numerous and
brilliant armies, attracted by the fertility of Germany, and which
imagined themselves marching to a prompt and certain glory, proudly
traversed those countries, scattering their money among them, and
consuming their productions. War, in that quarter, always bore the
semblance of justice.
At a later period, when our victorious bulletins reached them, the
imagination, astonished to see itself surpassed by the reality, caught
fire; enthusiasm possessed these people, as in the times of Austerlitz
and Jena; numerous groups collected round the couriers, whose tidings
were listened to with avidity; and the inhabitants, in a transport of
joy, never separated without exclamations of "Long live the emperor!
Long live our brave army!"
It is, besides, well known, that this portion of France has been warlike
from time immemorial. It is frontier ground; its inhabitants are nursed
amidst the din of arms; and arms are, consequently, held there in
honour. It was the common conversation in that quarter, that this war
would liberate Poland, so much attached to France; that the barbarians
of Asia, with whom Europe was threatened, would be driven back into
their native deserts; that Napoleon would once more return, loaded with
all the fruits of victory. Would not the eastern departments profit most
by that event? Up to that time, were they not indebted for their wealth
to war, which caused all the commerce of France with Europe to pass
through their hands? Blockaded, in fact, in every other quarter, the
empire only breathed and received its supplies through its eastern
provinces.
For ten years, their roads had been covered with travellers of all
ranks, hastening to admire the great nation, its daily embellished
metropolis, the _chefs-d'oeuvre_ of all the arts, and of all ages,
which victory had there assembled; and especially that extraordinary man
who seemed destined to carry the national glory beyond every degree of
glory hitherto known. Gratified in their interests, flattered in their
vanity, the people of the east of France owed every thing to victory.
Neither were they ungrateful; they followed the emperor with their
warmest wishes: on all sides were acclamations and triumphal arches; on
all sides the same intensity of devotion.
In Germany, there was less affection, but, perhaps, more homage.
Conquered and subjected, the Germans, either as soothing to their
vanity, or from habitual inclination for the marvellous, were tempted to
consider Napoleon as a supernatural being. Astonished, beside
themselves, and carried along by the universal impulse, these worthy
people exerted themselves to _be_, sincerely, all that it was requisite
to _seem_.
They hurried forward to line both sides of the long road by which the
emperor passed. Their princes quitted their capitals, and thronged the
towns, where the great arbiter of their destiny was to pass a few short
moments of his journey. The empress, and a numerous court, followed
Napoleon; he proceeded to confront the terrible risks of a distant and
perilous war, as if he were returning victorious and triumphant. This
was not the mode in which he was formerly accustomed to meet a conflict.
He had expressed a wish that the Emperor of Austria, several kings, and
a crowd of princes, should meet him at Dresden on his way: his desire
was fulfilled; all thronged to meet him--some led by hope, others
prompted by fear: for himself, his motives were to make sure of his
power, to exhibit and to enjoy it.
In this approximation with the ancient house of Austria, his ambition
delighted in exhibiting to Germany a family meeting. He imagined that
so brilliant an assemblage of sovereigns would advantageously contrast
with the isolated state of the Russian monarch; and that he would
probably be alarmed by so general a desertion. In fact, this assembly of
coalesced monarchs seemed to announce that this war with Russia was
European.
He was then in the centre of Germany, exhibiting to it his consort, the
daughter of its emperors, sitting by his side. Whole nations had quitted
their homes to throng his path; rich and poor, nobles and plebeians,
friends and enemies, all hurried to the scene. Their curious and anxious
groups were seen crowding together in the streets, the roads, and the
public places; they passed whole days and nights with their eyes fixed
on the door and windows of his palace. It was not his crown, his rank,
the luxury of his court, but him only, on whom they desired to feast
their eyes; it was a memento of his features which they were anxious to
obtain: they wished to be able to tell their less fortunate countrymen
and posterity, that they had seen Napoleon.
On the stage, poets so far degraded themselves as to make him a
divinity. It was in this manner that whole nations became his
flatterers.
There was, in fact, little difference between kings and people in the
homage of admiration; no one waited for the example of imitation; the
agreement was unanimous. Nevertheless, the inward sentiments were very
different.
At this important interview, we were attentive in observing the
different degrees of zeal which these princes exhibited, and the various
shades of our chieftain's pride. We had hoped that his prudence, or the
worn-out feeling of displaying his power, would prevent him from abusing
it; but was it to be expected that he, who, while yet an inferior, never
spoke, even to his superiors, but in the language of command, now that
he was the conqueror and master of them all, could submit to tedious and
minute details of ceremony? He, however, displayed moderation, and even
tried to make himself agreeable; but it was obviously an effort, and not
without allowing the fatigue it gave him to be perceived. Among these
princes, he had rather the air of receiving them, than of being by them
received.
As to them, it might be said, that, knowing his pride, and become
hopeless of subduing him, except by means of himself, these monarchs and
their people only humbled themselves before him, in order to aggravate
the disproportion of his elevation, and by so doing, to dazzle his moral
vision. In their assemblies, their attitude, their words, even the tone
of their voice, attested his ascendancy over them. All were assembled
there for his sake alone! They scarcely hazarded an objection, so
impressed were they with the full conviction of that superiority, of
which he was himself too well aware. A feudal lord could not have
exacted more of his vassal chiefs.
His levee presented a still more remarkable spectacle! Sovereign princes
came to it in order to wait for an audience of the conqueror of Europe.
They were so intermingled with his officers, that the latter were
frequently warning each other to take care, and not to crowd upon these
new courtiers, who were confounded with them. It was thus that the
presence of Napoleon made distinctions disappear; he was as much their
chief as ours. This common dependency appeared to put all around him on
a level. It is probable that, even then, the ill-disguised military
pride of several French generals gave offence to these princes, with
whom they conceived themselves raised to an equality; and, in fact,
whatever may be the noble blood and rank of the vanquished, his victor
becomes his equal.
The more prudent among us, however, began to be alarmed; they said, but
in an under-tone, that a man must fancy himself more than human to
denaturalize and displace every thing in this manner, without fearing to
involve himself in the universal confusion. They saw these monarchs
quitting the palace of Napoleon with their eyes inflamed, and their
bosoms swoln with the most poignant resentment. They pictured them,
during the night, when alone with their ministers, giving vent to the
heartfelt chagrin by which they were devoured. Every thing was
calculated to render their suffering more acute! How importunate was the
crowd which it was necessary to pass through, in order to reach the gate
of their proud master, while their own remained deserted! Indeed, all
things, even their own people, appeared to betray them. While boasting
of his good fortune, was it not evident that he was insulting their
misfortunes? They had, therefore, come to Dresden in order to swell the
pomp of Napoleon's triumph--for it was over them that he thus triumphed:
each cry of admiration offered to him was a cry of reproach to them; his
grandeur was their humiliation, his victory their defeat.
Doubtless they, in this manner, gave vent to their bitter feelings; and
hatred, day after day, sank more deeply into their hearts. One prince
was first observed to withdraw precipitately from this painful position.
The Empress of Austria, whose ancestors General Buonaparte had
dispossessed in Italy, made herself remarked by her aversion, which she
vainly endeavoured to disguise; it escaped from her by an involuntary
impulse, which Napoleon instantly detected, and subdued by a smile: but
she employed her understanding and attraction in gently winning hearts
to her opinion, in order to sow them afterwards with the seeds of her
hatred.
The Empress of France unintentionally aggravated this fatal disposition.
She was observed to eclipse her mother-in-law by the superior
magnificence of her costume: if Napoleon required more reserve, she
resisted, and even wept, till the emperor, either through affection,
fatigue, or absence of mind, was induced to give way. It is also
asserted that notwithstanding her origin, remarks calculated to wound
German pride escaped that princess, in extravagant comparisons between
her native and her adopted country. Napoleon rebuked her for this, but
gently; he was pleased with a patriotism which he had himself inspired;
and he fancied he repaired her imprudent language by the munificence of
his presents.
This assemblage, therefore, could not fail of irritating a variety of
feelings: the vanity of many was wounded by the collision. Napoleon,
however, having exerted himself to please, thought that he had given
general satisfaction: while waiting at Dresden the result of the marches
of his army, the numerous columns of which were still traversing the
territories of his allies, he more especially occupied himself with his
political arrangements.
General Lauriston, ambassador from France at Petersburgh, received
orders to apply for the Russian emperor's permission to proceed to
Wilna, in order to communicate definitive proposals to him. General
Narbonne, aid-de-camp of Napoleon, departed for the imperial
head-quarters of Alexander, in order to assure that prince of the
pacific intentions of France, and to invite him to Dresden. The
archbishop of Malines was despatched in order to direct the impulses of
Polish patriotism. The King of Saxony made up his mind to the loss of
the grand duchy; but he was flattered with the hope of a more
substantial indemnity.
Meantime, ever since the first days of meeting, surprise was expressed
at the absence of the King of Prussia from the imperial court; but it
was soon understood that he was prohibited from coming. This prince was
the more alarmed in proportion as he had less deserved such treatment.
His presence would have been embarrassing. Nevertheless, encouraged by
Narbonne, he resolved on making his appearance. When his arrival was
announced to the emperor, the latter grew angry, and at first refused to
see him:--"What did this prince want of him? Was not the constant
importunity of his letters, and his continual solicitations sufficient?
Why did he come again to persecute him with his presence? What need had
he of him?" But Duroc insisted; he reminded Napoleon of the want that he
would experience of Prussia, in a war with Russia; and the doors of the
emperor were opened to the monarch. He was received with the respect due
to his superior rank. His renewed assurances of fidelity, of which he
gave numerous proofs, were accepted.
It was reported at that time, that this monarch was led to expect the
possession of the Russo-German provinces, which his troops were to be
commissioned to invade. It is even affirmed that, after their conquest,
he demanded their investiture from Napoleon. It has been added, but in
vague terms, that Napoleon allowed the Prince-Royal of Prussia to aspire
to the hand of one of his nieces. This was to be the remuneration for
the services which Prussia was to render him in this new war. He
promised, so he expressed himself, that he would go and sound her. It
was thus that Frederick, by becoming the relation of Napoleon, would be
enabled to preserve his diminished power; but proofs are wanting, to
show that the idea of this marriage seduced the King of Prussia, as the
hope of a similar alliance had seduced the Prince of Spain.
Such at that time was the submission of sovereigns to the power of
Napoleon. It offers a striking example of the empire of necessity over
all persons, and shows to what lengths the prospect of gain and the fear
of loss will lead princes as well as private persons.
Meanwhile, Napoleon still waited the result of the negotiations of
Lauriston and of Narbonne. He hoped to vanquish Alexander by the mere
aspect of his united army, and, above all, by the menacing splendour of
his residence at Dresden. He himself expressed this opinion, when, some
days after, at Posen, he said to General Dessolles, "The assemblage at
Dresden not having persuaded Alexander to make peace, it was now solely
to be expected from war."
On that day he talked of nothing but his former victories. It seemed as
if, doubtful of the future, he recurred to the past, and that he found
it necessary to arm himself with all his most glorious recollections, in
order to confront a peril of so great a magnitude. In fact, then, as
since, he felt the necessity of deluding himself with the alleged
weakness of his rival's character. As the period of so great an invasion
approached, he hesitated in considering it as certain; for he no longer
possessed the consciousness of his infallibility, nor that warlike
assurance which the fire and energy of youth impart, nor that feeling of
success which makes it certain.
In other respects, these parleys were not only attempts to preserve
peace, but an additional _ruse de guerre_. By them he hoped to render
the Russians either sufficiently negligent, to let themselves be
surprised, dispersed, or, if united, sufficiently presumptuous to
venture to wait his approach. In either case, the war would be finished
by a _coup-de-main_, or by a victory. But Lauriston was not received.
Narbonne, when he returned, stated, "that he had found the Russians in a
state of mind as remote from dejection as from boasting. From their
emperor's reply to him, it appeared that they preferred war to a
dishonourable peace; that they would take care not to expose themselves
to the hazards of a battle against too formidable an enemy; and that, in
short, they were resolved on making every sacrifice, in order to spin
out the war, and to baffle Napoleon."
This answer, which reached the emperor in the midst of the greatest
display of his glory, was treated with contempt. To say the truth, I
must add, that a great Russian nobleman had contributed to deceive him:
either from mistaken views, or from artifice, this Muscovite had
persuaded him, that his own sovereign would recede at the sight of
difficulties, and be easily discouraged by reverses. Unfortunately, the
remembrance of Alexander's obsequiousness to him at Tilsit and at Erfurt
confirmed the French emperor in that fallacious opinion.
He remained till the 29th of May at Dresden, proud of the homage which
he knew how to appreciate, exhibiting to Europe princes and kings,
sprung from the most ancient families of Germany, forming a numerous
court round a prince deriving all distinction from himself. He appeared
to take a pleasure in multiplying the chances of the great game of
fortune, as if to encircle with them, and render less extraordinary,
that which placed him on the throne, and thus to accustom others as well
as himself to them.
CHAP. II.
At length, impatient to conquer the Russians, and escape from the homage
of the Germans, Napoleon quitted Dresden. He only remained at Posen long
enough to satisfy the Poles. He neglected Warsaw, whither the war did
not imperiously call him, and where he would have again been involved in
politics. He stopped at Thorn, in order to inspect his fortifications,
his magazines, and his troops. There the complaints of the Poles, whom
our allies pillaged without mercy, and insulted, reached him. Napoleon
addressed severe reproaches, and even threats, to the King of
Westphalia: but it is well known that these were thrown away; that their
effect was lost in the midst of too rapid a movement; that, besides, his
fits of anger, like all other fits, were followed by exhaustion; that
then, with the return of his natural good humour, he regretted, and
frequently tried, to soften the pain he had occasioned; that, finally,
he might reproach himself as the cause of the disorders which provoked
him; for, from the Oder to the Vistula, and even to the Niemen, if
provisions were abundant and properly stationed, the less portable
foraging supplies were deficient. Our cavalry were already forced to cut
the green rye, and to strip the houses of their thatch, in order to feed
their horses. It is true, that all did not stop at that; but when one
disorder is authorized, how can others be forbidden?
The evil augmented on the other side of the Niemen. The emperor had
calculated upon a multitude of light cars and heavy waggons, each
destined to carry several thousand pounds weight, through a sandy
region, which carts, with no greater weight than some quintals, with
difficulty traversed. These conveyances were organized in battalions and
squadrons. Each battalion of light cars, called _comtoises_, consisted
of six hundred, and might carry six thousand quintals of flour. The
battalion of heavy vehicles, drawn by oxen, carried four thousand eight
hundred quintals. There were besides twenty-six squadrons of waggons,
loaded with military equipages; a great quantity of waggons with tools
of all kinds, as well as thousands of artillery and hospital waggons,
one siege and six bridge equipages.
The provision-waggons were to take in their loading at the magazines
established on the Vistula. When the army passed that river, it was
ordered to provide itself, without halting, with provisions for
twenty-five days, but not to use them till they were beyond the Niemen.
In conclusion, the greater part of these means of transport failed,
either because the organization of soldiers, to act as conductors of
military convoys, was essentially vicious, the motives of honour and
ambition not being called into action to maintain proper discipline; or
chiefly because these vehicles were too heavy for the soil, the
distances too considerable, and the privations and fatigues too great;
certain it is that the greater number of them scarcely reached the
Vistula.
The army, therefore, provisioned itself on its match. The country being
fertile, waggons, cattle, and provisions of all kinds, were swept off;
every thing was taken, even to such of the inhabitants as were necessary
to conduct these convoys. Some days after, at the Niemen, the
embarrassment of the passage, and the celerity of the first hostile
marches, caused all the fruits of these requisitions to be abandoned
with an indifference only equalled by the violence with which they had
been seized.
The importance of the object, however, was such as might excuse the
irregularity of these proceedings. That object was to surprise the
Russian army, either collected or dispersed; in short, to make a
_coup-de-main_ with 400,000 men. War, the worst of all scourges, would
thus have been shortened in its duration. Our long and heavy
baggage-waggons would have encumbered our march. It was much more
convenient to live on the supplies of the country, as we should be able
to indemnify the loss afterwards. But superfluous wrong was committed as
well as necessary wrong, for who can stop midway in the commission of
evil? What chief could be responsible for the crowd of officers and
soldiers who were scattered through the country in order to collect its
resources? To whom were complaints to be addressed? Who was to punish?
All was done in the course of a rapid march; there was neither time to
try, nor even to find out the guilty. Between the affair of the day
before, and that of the following day, how many others had sprung up!
for at that time the business of a month was crowded into a single day.
Moreover, some of the leaders set the example; there was a positive
emulation in evil. In that respect, many of our allies surpassed the
French. We were their teachers in every thing; but in copying our
qualities, they caricatured our defects. Their gross and brutal plunder
was perfectly revolting.
But the emperor was desirous to have order kept in the middle of
disorder. Pressed by the accusing reproaches of two allied nations, two
names were more especially distinguished by his indignation. In his
letters are found these words; "I have suspended generals ---- and ----. I
have suppressed the brigade ----; I have cashiered it in the face of the
army, that is to say, of Europe.--I have written to ----, informing him
that he ran great risks of being broke, if he did not take care." Some
days after he met this ----, at the head of his troops, and still
indignant, he called to him, "You disgrace yourself; you set the example
of plunder. Be silent, or go back to your father; I do not want your
services any further."
From Thorn, Napoleon descended the Vistula. Graudentz belonged to
Prussia; he avoided passing it; but as that fortress was important to
the safety of the army, an officer of artillery and some fireworkers
were sent thither, with the ostensible motive of making cartridges; the
real motive remained a secret; the Prussian garrison, however, was
numerous, and stood on its guard, and the emperor, who had proceeded
onward, thought no more of it.
It was at Marienburg that the emperor again met Davoust. That marshal,
whether through pride, natural or acquired, was not well pleased to
recognize as his leader any other individual than the master of Europe.
His character, besides, was despotic, obstinate, and tenacious; and as
little inclined to yield to circumstances as to men. In 1809, Berthier
was his commander for some days, during which Davoust gained a battle,
and saved the army, by disobeying him. Hence arose a terrible hatred
between them: during the peace it augmented, but secretly; for they
lived at a wide distance from each other, Berthier at Paris, Davoust at
Hamburgh; but this Russian war again brought them together.
Berthier was getting enfeebled. Ever since 1805, war had become
completely odious to him. His talent especially lay in his activity and
his memory. He could receive and transmit, at all hours of the day and
night, the most multiplied intelligence and orders; but on this occasion
he had conceived himself entitled to give orders himself. These orders
displeased Davoust. Their first interview was a scene of violent
altercation; it occurred at Marienburg, where the emperor had just
arrived, and in his presence.
Davoust expressed himself harshly, and even went so far as to accuse
Berthier of incapacity or treachery. They both threatened each other,
and when Berthier was gone, Napoleon, influenced by the naturally
suspicious character of the marshal, exclaimed, "It sometimes happens
that I entertain doubts of the fidelity of my oldest companions in arms;
but at such times my head turns round with chagrin, and I do my utmost
to banish so heart-rending a suspicion."
While Davoust was probably enjoying the dangerous pleasure of having
humbled his enemy, the emperor proceeded to Dantzic, and Berthier, stung
by resentment, followed him there. From that time, the zeal, the glory
of Davoust, the exertions he had made for this new expedition, all that
ought to have availed him, began to be looked upon unfavourably. The
emperor had written to him "that as the war was about to be carried into
a barren territory, where the enemy would destroy every thing, it was
requisite to prepare for such a state of things, by providing every
thing within ourselves:" Davoust had replied to this by an enumeration
of his preparations--"He had 70,000 men, who were completely organized;
they carried with them twenty-five days' provisions. Each company
comprised swimmers, masons, bakers, tailors, shoemakers, armourers, and
workmen of every class. They carried every thing they required with
them; his army was like a colony; hand-mills followed. He had
anticipated every want; all means of supplying them were ready."
Such great exertions ought to have pleased; they, however, displeased;
they were misrepresented. Insidious observations were overheard by the
emperor. "This marshal," said they to him, "wishes to have it thought
that he has foreseen, arranged, and executed every thing. Is the
emperor, then, to be no more than a spectator of this expedition? Must
the glory of it devolve on Davoust?"--"In fact," exclaimed the emperor,
"one would think it was he that commanded the army."
They even went further, and awakened some of his dormant fears: "Was it
not Davoust who, after the victory of Jena, drew the emperor into
Poland? Is it not he who is now anxious for this new Polish war?--He who
already possesses such large property in that country, whose accurate
and severe probity has won over the Poles, and who is suspected of
aspiring to their throne?"
It is not easy to say whether the pride of Napoleon was shocked by
seeing that of his lieutenants encroaching so much on his own; or
whether, in the course of this irregular war, he felt himself thwarted
more and more by the methodical genius of Davoust; certain it is, the
unfavourable impression against him struck deeper; it was productive of
fatal consequences; it removed from his confidence a bold, tenacious and
prudent warrior, and favoured his predilection for Murat, whose rashness
was much more flattering to his ambitious hopes. In other respects,
these dissensions between his great officers did not displease Napoleon;
they gave him information; their harmony would have made him uneasy.
From Dantzic the emperor proceeded, on the 12th of June, to Königsberg.
At that place ended the inspection of his immense magazines, and of the
second resting-point and pivot of his line of operations. Immense
quantities of provisions, adequate to the immensity of the undertaking,
were there accumulated. No detail had been neglected. The active and
impassioned genius of Napoleon was then entirely directed towards that
most important and difficult department of his expedition. In that he
was profuse of exhortations, orders, and even money, of which his
letters are a proof. His days were occupied in dictating instructions on
that subject; at night he frequently rose to repeat them again. One
general received, on a single day, six despatches from him, all
distinguished by the same solicitude.
In one, these words were remarked, "For masses like these, if
precautions be not taken, the grain of no country can suffice." In
another, "It will be requisite for all the provision-waggons to be
loaded with flour, bread, rice, vegetables, and brandy, besides what is
necessary for the hospital service. The result of all my movements will
assemble 400,000 men on a single point. There will be nothing then to
expect from the country, and it will be necessary to have every thing
within ourselves." But, on the one hand, the means of transport were
badly calculated; and, on the other, he allowed himself to be hurried on
as soon as he was put in motion.
CHAP. III.
From Königsberg to Gumbinnen, he reviewed several of his armies;
conversing with the soldiers in a gay, frank, and often abrupt style;
well aware that, with such unsophisticated and hardy characters,
abruptness is looked upon as frankness, rudeness as force, haughtiness
as true nobility; and that the delicacy and graces which some officers
bring with them from the salons are in their eyes no better than
weakness and pusillanimity; that these appear to them like a foreign
language, which they do not understand, and the accents of which strike
them as ridiculous.
According to his usual custom, he promenaded before the ranks. Knowing
in which of his wars each regiment had been with him, at the sight of
the oldest soldiers he occasionally halted; to one he recalled the
battle of the Pyramids; another he reminded of Marengo, Austerlitz,
Jena, or Friedland, and always by a single word, accompanied by a
familiar caress. The veteran who believed himself personally recognized
by his emperor, rose in consequence in the estimation of his junior
companions, who regarded him as an object of envy.
Napoleon, in this manner, continued his inspection; he overlooked not
even the youngest soldiers: it seemed as if every thing which concerned
them was to him matter of deep interest; their least wants seemed known
to him. He interrogated them: Did their captains take care of them? had
they received their pay? were they in want of any requisite? he wished
to see their knapsacks.
At length he stopped at the centre of the regiment; there being apprised
of the places that were vacant, he required aloud the names of the most
meritorious in the ranks; he called those who were so designated before
him, and questioned them. How many years' service? how many campaigns?
what wounds? what exploits? He then appointed them officers, and caused
them to be immediately installed, himself prescribing the forms;--all
particularities which delighted the soldier! They told each other how
this great emperor, the judge of nations in the mass, occupied himself
with them in their minutest details; that they composed his oldest and
his real family! Thus it was that he instilled into them the love of
war, of glory and himself.
The army, meantime, marched from the Vistula to the Niemen. This last
river, from Grodno as far as Kowno, runs parallel with the Vistula. The
river Pregel, which unites the two, was loaded with provisions: 220,000
men repaired thither from four different points; there they found bread
and some foraging provisions. These provisions ascended that river with
them, as far as its direction would allow.
When the army was obliged to quit the flotilla, its select corps took
with them sufficient provisions to reach and cross the Niemen, to
prepare for a victory, and to arrive at Wilna. There, the emperor
calculated on the magazines of the inhabitants, on those of the enemy
and on his own, which he had ordered to be brought from Dantzic, by the
Frischhaff, the Pregel, the Deine, the canal Frederic, and the Vilia.
We were upon the verge of the Russian frontier; from right to left, or
from south to north, the army was disposed in the following manner, in
front of the Niemen. In the first place, on the extreme right, and
issuing from Gallicia, on Drogiczin, Prince Schwartzenberg and 34,000
Austrians; on their left, coming from Warsaw, and marching on Bialystok
and Grodno, the King of Westphalia, at the head of 79,200 Westphalians,
Saxons, and Poles; by the side of them was the Viceroy of Italy, who had
just effected the junction, near Marienpol and Pilony, of 79,500
Bavarians, Italians and French; next, the emperor, with 220,000 men,
commanded by the King of Naples, the Prince of Eckmühl, the Dukes of
Dantzic, Istria, Reggio, and Elchingen. They advanced from Thorn,
Marienwerder, and Elbing, and, on the 23d of June, had assembled in a
single mass near Nogarisky, a league above Kowno. Finally, in front of
Tilsit, was Macdonald, and 32,500 Prussians, Bavarians, and Poles,
composing the extreme left of the grand army.
Every thing was now ready. From the banks of the Guadalquivir, and the
shores of the Calabrian sea, to the Vistula, were assembled 617,000 men,
of whom 480,000 were already present; one siege and six bridge
equipages, thousands of provision-waggons, innumerable herds of oxen,
1372 pieces of cannon, and thousands of artillery and hospital-waggons,
had been directed, assembled, and stationed at a short distance from the
Russian frontier river. The greatest part of the provision-waggons were
alone behind.
Sixty thousand Austrians, Prussians, and Spaniards, were preparing to
shed their blood for the conqueror of Wagram, of Jena, and of Madrid;
for the man who had four times beaten down the power of Austria, who had
humbled Prussia, and invaded Spain. And yet all were faithful to him.
When it was considered that one-third of the army of Napoleon was either
foreign to him or hostile, one hardly knew at which most to be
astonished,--the audacity of one party, or the resignation of the other.
It was in this manner that Rome made her conquests contribute to her
future means for conquering.
As to us Frenchmen, he found us all full of ardour. Habit, curiosity,
and the pleasure of exhibiting themselves in the character of masters in
new countries, actuated the soldiers; vanity was the great stimulant of
the younger ones, who thirsted to acquire some glory which they might
recount, with the attractive quackery peculiar to soldiers; these
inflated and pompous narratives of their exploits being moreover
indispensable to their relaxation when no longer under arms. To this
must certainly be added, the hope of plunder; for the exacting ambition
of Napoleon had as often disgusted his soldiers, as the disorders of the
latter tarnished his glory. A compromise was necessary: ever since 1805,
there was a sort of mutual understanding, on his part to wink at their
plunder--on theirs, to suffer his ambition.
This plunder, however, or rather, this marauding system, was generally
confined to provisions, which, in default of supplies, were exacted of
the inhabitants, but often too extravagantly. The most culpable
plunderers were the stragglers, who are always numerous in frequent
forced marches. These disorders, indeed, were never tolerated. In order
to repress them, Napoleon left _gendarmes_ and flying columns on the
track of the army; and when these stragglers subsequently rejoined their
corps, their knapsacks were examined by their officers; or, as was the
case at Austerlitz, by their comrades; and strict justice was then
executed among themselves.
The last levies were certainly too young and too feeble; but the army
had still a stock of brave and experienced men, used to critical
situations, and whom nothing could intimidate. They were recognizable at
the first glance by their martial countenances, and by their
conversation; they had no other past nor future but war; and they could
talk of nothing else. Their officers were worthy of them, or at least
were becoming so; for, in order to preserve the due authority of their
rank over such men, it was necessary for them to have wounds to show,
and to be able to appeal to their own exploits.
Such was, at that period, the life of those men; all was action within
its sphere, even to words. They often boasted too much, but even that
had its advantage; for as they were incessantly put to the proof, it was
then necessary for them to be what they wished to appear. Such
especially is the character of the Poles; they boast in the first
instance of being more than they have been, but not more than they are
capable of being. Poland in fact is a nation of heroes! pawning their
words for exploits beyond the truth, but subsequently redeeming them
with honour, in order to verify what at first was neither true nor even
probable.
As to the old generals, some of them were no longer the hardy and simple
warriors of the republic; honours, hard service, age, and the emperor
particularly, had contributed to soften many of them down. Napoleon
compelled them to adopt a luxurious style of living by his example and
his orders; according to him, it was a means of influencing the
multitude. It might be also, that such habits prevented them from
accumulating property, which might have made them independent; for,
being himself the source of riches, he was glad to to keep up the
necessity of repairing to it, and in this manner to bring them back
within his influence. He had, therefore, pushed his generals into a
circle from which it was difficult to escape; forcing them to pass
incessantly from want to prodigality, and from prodigality to want,
which he alone was able to relieve.
Several had nothing but their appointments, which accustomed them to an
ease of living with which they could no longer dispense. If he made them
grants of land, it was out of his conquests, which were exposed to
insecurity by war, and which war only could preserve.
But in order to retain them in dependence, glory, which with some was a
habit, with others a passion, with all a want, was the all-sufficient
stimulant; and Napoleon, absolute master as he was of his own century,
and even dictating to history, was the distributor of that glory. Though
he fixed it at a high price, there was no rejecting his conditions; one
would have felt ashamed to confess one's weakness in presence of his
strength, and to stop short before a man whose ambition was still
mounting, great as was the elevation which he had already attained.
Besides, the renown of so great an expedition was full of charm; its
success seemed certain; it promised to be nothing but a military march
to Petersburgh and Moscow. With this last effort his wars would probably
be terminated. It was a last opportunity, which one would repent to have
let escape; one would be annoyed by the glorious narratives which others
would give of it. The victory of to-day would make that of yesterday so
old! And who would wish to grow old with it?
And then, when war was kindled in all quarters, how was it possible to
avoid it? The scenes of action were not indifferent; here Napoleon would
command in person; elsewhere, though the cause might be the same, the
contest would be carried on under a different commander. The renown
shared with the latter would be foreign to Napoleon, on whom,
nevertheless, depended glory, fortune, every thing; and it was well
known, whether from preference or policy, that he was only profuse in
his favours to those whose glory was identified with his glory; and that
he rewarded less generously such exploits as were not his. It was
requisite, therefore, to serve in the army which he commanded; hence the
anxiety of young and old to fill its ranks. What chief had ever before
so many means of power? There was no hope which he could not flatter,
excite, or satiate.
Finally, we loved him as the companion of our labours; as the chief who
had conducted us to renown. The astonishment and admiration which he
inspired flattered our self-love; for all these we shared in common with
him.
With respect to that youthful _élite_, which in those times of glory
filled our camps, its enthusiasm was natural. Who is there amongst us
who, in his early years, has not been fired by the perusal of the
warlike exploits of the ancients and of our ancestors? Should we not
have all desired, at that time, to be the heroes whose real or
fictitious history we were perusing? During that state of enthusiasm, if
those recollections had been suddenly realized before us; if our eyes,
instead of reading, had witnessed the performance of those wonders; if
we had felt their sphere of action within our reach, and if employments
had been offered to us by the side of those brave paladins, whose
adventurous lives and brilliant renown our young and vivid imaginations
had so much envied; which of us would have hesitated? Who is there that
would not have rushed forward, replete with joy and hope, and disdaining
an odious and scandalous repose?
Such were the rising generations of that day. At that period every one
was free to be ambitious! a period of intoxication and prosperity,
during which the French soldier, lord of all things by victory,
considered himself greater than the nobleman, or even the sovereign,
whose states he traversed! To him it appeared as if the kings of Europe
only reigned by permission of his chief and of his arms.
Thus it was that habit attracted some, disgust at camp service others;
novelty prompted the greater part, and especially the thirst of glory:
but all were stimulated by emulation. In fine, confidence in a chief who
had been always fortunate, and hope of an early victory, which would
terminate the war at a blow, and restore us to our firesides; for a war,
to the entire army of Napoleon (as it was to some volunteers of the
court of Louis XIV.) was often no more than a single battle, or a short
and brilliant journey.
We were now about to reach the extremity of Europe, where never European
army had been before! We were about to erect new columns of Hercules.
The grandeur of the enterprise; the agitation of co-operating Europe;
the imposing spectacle of an army of 400,000 foot and 80,000 horse: so
many warlike reports and martial clamours, kindled the minds of veterans
themselves. It was impossible for the coldest to remain unmoved amid the
general impulse; to escape from the universal attraction.
In conclusion;--independent of all these motives for animation, the
composition of the army was good, and every good army is desirous of
war.
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
Napoleon, satisfied with his preparations, at length declared himself.
"Soldiers," said he, "the second Polish war is commenced. The first was
concluded at Friedland and at Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia swore eternal
alliance with France, and war with England. She now violates her oaths.
She will give no explanation of her capricious conduct, until the French
eagles have repassed the Rhine; by that means leaving our allies at her
mercy. Russia is hurried away by fatality; her destiny must be
accomplished. Does she then believe us to be degenerated? Are we not
still the soldiers of Austerlitz? She places us between war and
dishonour; the choice cannot be doubtful. Let us advance, then; let us
pass the Niemen, and carry the war into her territory! The second Polish
war will be as glorious for the French arms as the first; but the peace
we shall this time conclude will carry with it its own guarantee; it
will put an end to the fatal influence which Russia for the last fifty
years has exercised over the affairs of Europe."
This tone, which was at that time deemed prophetic, befitted an
expedition of an almost fabulous character. It was quite necessary to
invoke Destiny, and give credit to its empire, when the fate of so many
human beings, and so much glory, were about to be consigned to its
mercy.
The Emperor Alexander also harangued his army, but in a very different
manner. The difference between the two nations, the two sovereigns, and
their reciprocal position, were remarked in these proclamations. In
fact, the one which was defensive was unadorned and moderate; the other,
offensive, was replete with audacity and the confidence of victory. The
first sought support in religion, the other in fatality; the one in love
of country, the other in love of glory; but neither of them referred to
the liberation of Poland, which was the real cause of contention.
We marched towards the east, with our left towards the north, and our
right towards the south. On our right, Volhynia invoked us with all her
prayers; in the centre, were Wilna, Minsk, and the whole of Lithuania,
and Samogitia; in front of our left, Courland and Livonia awaited their
fate in silence.
The army of Alexander, composed of 300,000 men, kept those provinces in
awe. From the banks of the Vistula, from Dresden, from Paris itself,
Napoleon had critically surveyed it. He had ascertained that its centre,
commanded by Barclay, extended from Wilna and Kowno to Lida and Grodno,
resting its right on Vilia, and its left on the Niemen.
That river protected the Russian front by the deviation which it makes
from Grodno to Kowno; for it was only in the interval between these two
cities, that the Niemen, running toward the north, intersected the line
of our attack, and served as a frontier to Lithuania. Before reaching
Grodno, and on quitting Kowno, it flows westward.
To the south of Grodno was Bagration, with 65,000 men, in the direction
of Wolkowisk; to the north of Kowno, at Rossiana and Keydani,
Wittgenstein, with 26,000 men, substituted their bayonets for that
natural frontier.
At the same time, another army of 50,000 men, called the reserve, was
assembled at Lutsk, in Volhynia, in order to keep that province in
check, and observe Schwartzenberg; it was confided to Tormasof, till the
treaty about to be signed at Bucharest permitted Tchitchakof, and the
greater part of the army in Moldavia, to unite with it.
Alexander, and, under him, his minister of war, Barclay de Tolly,
directed all these forces. They were divided into three armies, called,
the first western army, under Barclay; the second western army, under
Bagration; and the army of reserve, under Tormasof. Two other corps were
forming; one at Mozyr, in the environs of Bobruisk; and the other at
Riga and Dünabourg. The reserves were at Wilna and Swentziany. In
conclusion, a vast entrenched camp was erected before Drissa, within an
elbow of the Düna.
The French emperor's opinion was, that this position behind the Niemen
was neither offensive nor defensive, and that the Russian army was no
better off for the purpose of effecting a retreat; that this army, being
so much scattered over a line of sixty leagues, might be surprised and
dispersed, as actually happened to it; that, with still more certainty,
the left of Barclay, and the entire army of Bagration, being stationed
at Lida and at Wolkowisk, in front of the marshes of the Berezina, which
they covered, instead of being covered by them, might be thrown back on
them and taken; or, at least, that an abrupt and direct attack on Kowno
and Wilna would cut them off from their line of operation, indicated by
Swentziany and the entrenched camp at Drissa.
In fact, Doctorof and Bagration were already separated from that line;
for, instead of remaining in mass with Alexander, in front of the roads
leading to the Düna, to defend them and profit by them, they were
stationed forty leagues to the right.
For this reason it was that Napoleon separated his forces into five
armies. While Schwartzenberg, advancing from Gallicia with his 30,000
Austrians, (whose numbers he had orders to exaggerate,) would keep
Tormasof in check, and draw the attention of Bagration towards the
south; while the King of Westphalia, with his 80,000 men, would employ
that general in front, towards Grodno, without pressing him too
vehemently at first; and while the Viceroy of Italy, in the direction of
Pilony, would be in readiness to interpose between the same Bagration
and Barclay; in fine, while at the extreme left, Macdonald, debouching
from Tilsit, would invade the north of Lithuania, and fall on the right
of Wittgenstein; Napoleon himself, with his 200,000 men, was to
precipitate himself on Kowno, on Wilna, and on his rival, and destroy
him at the first shock.
Should the Emperor of Russia give way, he would press him hard, and
throw him back upon Drissa, and as far as the commencement of his line
of operations; then, all at once, propelling his detachments to the
right, he would surround Bagration, and the whole of the corps of the
Russian left, which, by this rapid irruption, would be separated from
their right.
I will shortly sketch a brief and rapid summary of the history of our
two wings, being anxious to return to the centre, and to be enabled
uninterruptedly to exhibit the great scenes which were enacted there.
Macdonald commanded the left wing; his invasion, supported by the
Baltic, overcame the right wing of the Russians; it threatened Revel
first, next Riga, and even Petersburgh. He soon reached Riga. The war
became stationary under its walls; although of little importance, it was
conducted by Macdonald with prudence, science, and glory, even in his
retreat, to which he was neither compelled by the winter nor by the
enemy, but solely by Napoleon's orders.
With regard to his right wing, the emperor had counted on the support of
Turkey, which failed him. He had inferred that the Russian army of
Volhynia would follow the general movement of Alexander's retreat; but,
on the contrary, Tormasof advanced upon our rear. The French army was
thus uncovered, and menaced with being turned on those vast plains.
Nature not supplying it in that quarter with any support, as she did on
the left wing, it was necessarily compelled to rely entirely on itself.
Forty thousand Saxons, Austrians, and Poles, remained there in
observation.
Tormasof was beaten; but another army, rendered available by the treaty
of Bucharest, arrived and formed a junction with the remnant of the
first. From that moment, the war upon that point became defensive. It
was carried on feebly, as was to be expected, notwithstanding some
Polish troops and a French general were left with the Austrian army.
That general had been long and strenuously cried up for ability,
although he had met with reverses, and his reputation was not
undeserved.
No decisive advantage was gained on either side. But the position of
this corps, almost entirely Austrian, became more and more important, as
the grand army retreated upon it. It will be seen whether Schwartzenberg
deceived its confidence,--whether he left us to be surrounded on the
Berezina,--and whether it be true, that he seemed on that occasion to
aspire to no other character than that of an armed witness to the great
dispute.
CHAP. II.
Between these two wings, the grand army marched to the Niemen, in three
separate masses. The king of Westphalia, with 80,000 men, moved upon
Grodno; the viceroy of Italy, with 75,000 men, upon Pilony; Napoleon,
with 220,000 men, upon Nogaraiski, a farm situated three leagues beyond
Kowno. The 23d of June, before daylight, the imperial column reached the
Niemen, but without seeing it. The borders of the great Prussian forest
of Pilwisky, and the hills which line the river, concealed the great
army, which was about to cross it.
Napoleon, who had travelled in a carriage as far as that, mounted his
horse at two o'clock in the morning. He reconnoitred the Russian river,
without disguising himself, as has been falsely asserted, but under
cover of the night crossing this frontier, which five months afterwards
he was only enabled to repass under cover of the same obscurity. When he
came up to the bank, his horse suddenly stumbled, and threw him on the
sand. A voice exclaimed, "This is a bad omen; a Roman would recoil!" It
is not known whether it was himself, or one of his retinue, who
pronounced these words.
His task of reconnoitring concluded, he gave orders that, at the close
of the following day, three bridges should be thrown over the river,
near the village of Poniémen; he then retired to his head-quarters,
where he passed the whole day, sometimes in his tent, sometimes in a
Polish house, listlessly reclined, in the midst of a breathless
atmosphere, and a suffocating heat, vainly courting repose.
On the return of night, he again made his approaches to the river. The
first who crossed it were a few sappers in a small boat. They approached
the Russian side with some degree of apprehension, but found no obstacle
to oppose their landing. There they found peace; the war was entirely on
their own side; all was tranquil on that foreign soil, which had been
described to them as so menacing. A single officer of cossacks, however,
on patrole, presented himself to their view. He was alone, and appeared
to consider himself in full peace, and to be ignorant that the whole of
Europe in arms was at hand. He inquired of the strangers who they
were?--"Frenchmen!" they replied.--"What do you want?" rejoined the
officer; "and wherefore do you come into Russia?"--A sapper briskly
replied, "To make war upon you; to take Wilna; to deliver Poland."--The
cossack then withdrew; he disappeared in the woods, into which three of
our soldiers, giving vent to their ardour, and with a view to sound the
forest, discharged their fire-arms.
Thus it was, that the feeble report of three muskets, to which there was
no reply, apprised us of the opening of a new campaign, and the
commencement of a great invasion.
Either from a feeling of prudence, or from presentiment, this first
signal of war threw the emperor into a state of violent irritation.
Three hundred voltigeurs immediately passed the river, in order to cover
the erection of the bridges.
The whole of the French columns then began to issue from the valleys and
the forest. They advanced in silence to the river, under cover of thick
darkness. It was necessary to touch them in order to recognize their
presence. Fires, even to sparks, were forbidden; they slept with arms in
their hands, as if in the presence of an enemy. The crops of green rye,
moistened with a profuse dew, served as beds to the men, and provender
to the horses.
The night, its coolness preventing sleep, its obscurity prolonging the
hours, and augmenting wants; finally, the dangers of the following day,
every thing combined to give solemnity to this position. But the
expectation of a great battle supported our spirits. The proclamation of
Napoleon had just been read; the most remarkable passages of it were
repeated in a whisper, and the genius of conquest kindled our
imagination.
Before us was the Russian frontier. Our ardent gaze already sought to
invade the promised land of our glory athwart the shades of night. We
seemed to hear the joyful acclamations of the Lithuanians, at the
approach of their deliverers. We pictured to ourselves the banks of the
river lined with their supplicating hands. Here, we were in want of
every thing; there, every thing would be lavished upon us! The
Lithuanians would hasten to supply our wants; we were about to be
encircled by love and gratitude. What signified one unpleasant night?
The day would shortly appear, and with it its warmth and all its
illusions. The day did appear! and it revealed to us dry and desert
sands, and dark and gloomy forests. Our eyes then reverted sadly upon
ourselves, and we were again inspired by pride and hope, on observing
the imposing spectacle of our united army.
[Illustration: Passage of the Niemen]
Three hundred yards from the river, on the most elevated height, the
tent of the emperor was visible. Around it the hills, their slopes, and
the subjacent valleys, were covered with men and horses. As soon as the
earth exhibited to the sun those moving masses, clothed with glittering
arms, the signal was given, and instantly the multitude began to defile
off in three columns, towards the three bridges. They were observed to
take a winding direction, as they descended the narrow plain which
separated them from the Niemen, to approach it, to reach the three
passages, to compress and prolong their columns, in order to traverse
them, and at last reach that foreign soil, which they were about to
devastate, and which they were soon destined to cover with their own
enormous fragments.
So great was their ardour, that two divisions of the advanced guard
disputed for the honour of being the first to pass, and were near coming
to blows; and some exertions were necessary to quiet them. Napoleon
hastened to plant his foot on the Russian territory. He took this first
step towards his ruin without hesitation. At first, he stationed
himself near the bridge, encouraging the soldiers with his looks. The
latter all saluted him with their accustomed acclamations. They
appeared, indeed, more animated than he was; whether it was that he felt
oppressed by the weight of so great an aggression, or that his enfeebled
frame could not support the effect of the excessive heat, or that he was
already intimidated by finding nothing to conquer.
At length he became impatient; all at once he dashed across the country
into the forest which girt the sides of the river. He put his horse to
the extremity of his speed; he appeared on fire to come singly in
contact with the enemy. He rode more than a league in the same
direction, surrounded throughout by the same solitude; upon which he
found it necessary to return in the vicinity of the bridges, whence he
re-descended the river with his guard towards Kowno.
Some thought they heard the distant report of cannon. As we marched, we
endeavoured to distinguish on which side the battle was going on. But,
with the exception of some troops of cossacks on that, as well as the
ensuing days, the atmosphere alone displayed itself in the character of
an enemy. In fact, the emperor had scarcely passed the river, when a
rumbling sound began to agitate the air. In a short time the day became
overcast, the wind rose, and brought with it the inauspicious mutterings
of a thunder-storm. That menacing sky and unsheltered country filled us
with melancholy impressions. There were even some amongst us, who,
enthusiastic as they had lately been, were terrified at what they
conceived to be a fatal presage. To them it appeared that those
combustible vapours were collecting over our heads, and that they would
descend upon the territory we approached, in order to prevent us from
entering it.
It is quite certain, that the storm in question was as great as the
enterprise in which we were engaged. During several hours, its black and
heavy masses accumulated and hung upon the whole army: from right to
left, over a space of fifty leagues, it was completely threatened by its
lightnings, and overwhelmed by its torrents: the roads and fields were
inundated; the insupportable heat of the atmosphere was suddenly changed
to a disagreeable chillness. Ten thousand horses perished on the march,
and more especially in the bivouacs which followed. A large quantity of
equipages remained abandoned on the sands; and great numbers of men
subsequently died.
A convent served to shelter the emperor against the first fury of the
tempest. From hence he shortly departed for Kowno, where the greatest
disorder prevailed. The claps of thunder were no longer noticed; those
menacing reports, which still murmured over our heads, appeared
forgotten. For, though this common phenomenon of the season might have
shaken the firmness of some few minds, with the majority the time of
omens had passed away. A scepticism, ingenious on the part of some,
thoughtless or coarse on the part of others, earth-born passions and
imperious wants, have diverted the souls of men from that heaven whence
they are derived, and to which they should return. The army, therefore,
recognized nothing but a natural and unseasonable accident in this
disaster; and far from interpreting it as the voice of reprobation
against so great an aggression, for which, moreover, it was not
responsible, found in it nothing but a motive of indignation against
fortune or the skies, which whether by chance, or otherwise, offered it
so terrible a presage.
That very day, a particular calamity was added to this general disaster.
At Kowno, Napoleon was exasperated, because the bridge over the Vilia
had been thrown down by the cossacks, and opposed the passage of
Oudinot. He affected to despise it, like every thing else that opposed
him, and ordered a squadron of his Polish guard to swim the river. These
fine fellows threw themselves into it without hesitation. At first, they
proceeded in good order, and when out of their depth redoubled their
exertions. They soon reached the middle of the river by swimming. But
there, the increased rapidity of the current broke their order. Their
horses then became frightened, quitted their ranks, and were carried
away by the violence of the waves. They no longer swam, but floated
about in scattered groups. Their riders struggled, and made vain
efforts; their strength gave way, and they, at last, resigned themselves
to their fate. Their destruction was certain; but it was for their
country; it was in her presence, and for the sake of their deliverer,
that they had devoted themselves; and even when on the point of being
engulphed for ever, they suspended their unavailing struggles, turned
their faces toward Napoleon, and exclaimed, "_Vive l'Empereur!_" Three
of them were especially remarked, who, with their heads still above the
billows, repeated this cry and perished instantly. The army was struck
with mingled horror and admiration.
As to Napoleon, he prescribed with anxiety and precision the measures
necessary to save the greater number, but without appearing affected:
either from the habit of subduing his feelings; from considering the
ordinary emotions of the heart as weaknesses in times of war, of which
it was not for him to set the example, and therefore necessary to
suppress; or finally, that he anticipated much greater misfortunes,
compared with which the present was a mere trifle.
A bridge thrown over this river conveyed Marshal Oudinot and the second
corps to Keydani. During that time, the rest of the army was still
passing the Niemen. The passage took up three entire days. The army of
Italy did not pass it till the 29th, in front of Pilony. The army of the
king of Westphalia did not enter Grodno till the 30th.
From Kowno Napoleon proceeded in two days as far as the defiles which
defend the plain of Wilna. He waited, in order to make his appearance
there, for news from his advanced posts. He was in hopes that Alexander
would contest with him the possession of that capital. The report,
indeed, of some musketry, encouraged him in that hope; when intelligence
was brought him that the city was undefended. Thither he advanced,
ruminating and dissatisfied. He accused his generals of the advanced
guard of suffering the Russian army to escape. It was the most active of
them, Montbrun, whom he reproached, and against whom his anger rose to
the point of menace. A menace without effect, a violence without result!
and less blameable than remarkable, in a warrior, because they
contributed to prove all the importance which he attached to an
immediate victory.
In the midst of his anger, he displayed address in his dispositions for
entering Wilna. He caused himself to be preceded and followed by Polish
regiments. But more occupied by the retreat of the Russians than the
grateful and admiring acclamations of the Lithuanians, he rapidly passed
through the city, and hurried to the advanced posts. Several of the best
hussars of the 8th, having ventured themselves in a wood, without proper
support, had just perished in an action with the Russian guard;
Segur[16], who commanded them, after a desperate defence, had fallen,
covered with wounds.
[Footnote 16: Brother of the Author.]
The enemy had burnt his bridges and his magazines, and was flying by
different roads, but all in the direction of Drissa. Napoleon ordered
all which the fire had spared to be collected, and restored the
communications. He sent forward Murat and his cavalry, to follow the
track of Alexander: and after throwing Ney upon his left, in order to
support Oudinot, who had that day driven back the lines of
Wittgenstein, from Deweltowo as far as Wilkomir, he returned to occupy
the place of Alexander at Wilna. There, his unfolded maps, military
reports, and a crowd of officers requiring his orders, awaited his
arrival. He was now on the theatre of war, and at the moment of its most
animated operations; he had prompt and urgent decisions to make; orders
of march to give; hospitals, magazines, and lines of operations, to
establish.
It was necessary to interrogate, to read, and then compare; and at last
to discover and grasp the truth, which always appeared to fly and
conceal itself in the midst of a thousand contradictory answers and
reports.
This was not all: Napoleon, at Wilna, had a new empire to organize; the
politics of Europe, the war of Spain, and the government of France, to
direct. His political, military, and administrative correspondence,
which he had suffered to accumulate for some days, imperiously demanded
his attention. Such, indeed, was his custom, on the eve of a great
event, as that would necessarily decide the character of many of his
replies, and impart a colouring to all. He therefore established himself
at his quarters, and in the first instance threw himself on a bed, less
for the sake of sleep than of quiet meditation; whence, abruptly
starting up shortly after, he rapidly dictated the orders which he had
conceived.
Intelligence was just then brought him from Warsaw and the Austrian
army. The discourse at the opening of the Polish diet displeased the
emperor; and he exclaimed, as he threw it from him, "This is French! It
ought to be Polish!" As to the Austrians, it was never dissembled to him
that, in their whole army, there was no one on whom he could depend but
its commander. The certainty of that seemed sufficient for him.
CHAP. III.
Meantime, every thing was rekindling at the bottom of the hearts of the
Lithuanians a patriotism which was still burning, though almost
extinguished. On one side, the precipitate retreat of the Russians, and
the presence of Napoleon; on the other, the cry of independence emitted
by Warsaw, and more especially the sight of those Polish heroes, who
returned with liberty to the soil whence they had been expelled along
with her. The first days, therefore, were entirely devoted to joy: the
happiness appeared general--the display of feeling universal.
The same sentiments were thought to be traceable everywhere; in the
interior of the houses, as well as at the windows, and in the public
places. The people congratulated and embraced each other on the
high-roads; the old men once more resumed their ancient costume,
reviving ideas of glory and independence. They wept with joy at the
sight of the national banners which had been just re-erected; an
immense crowd followed them, rending the air with their acclamations.
But this enthusiasm, unreflecting in some, and the mere effect of
excitement in others, was but of short duration.
On their side, the Poles of the grand duchy were always animated by the
noblest enthusiasm: they were worthy of liberty, and sacrificed to it
that property for which liberty is sacrificed by the greater part of
mankind. Nor did they belie themselves on this occasion: the diet of
Warsaw constituted itself into a general confederation, and declared the
kingdom of Poland restored; it convened the dietins; invited all Poland
to unite; summoned all the Poles in the Russian army to quit Russia;
caused itself to be represented by a general council; maintained the
established order; and, finally, sent a deputation to the king of
Saxony, and an address to Napoleon.
The senator Wibicki presented this address to him at Wilna. He told him
"that the Poles had neither been subjected by peace nor by war, but by
treason; that they were therefore free _de jure_, before God and man;
that being so now _de facto_, that right became a duty; that they
claimed the independence of their brethren, the Lithuanians, who were
still slaves; that they offered themselves to the entire Polish nation
as the centre of a general union; but that it was to him who dictated
his history to the age, in whom resided the force of Providence, they
looked to support the efforts which he could not but approve; that on
that account they came to solicit Napoleon the Great to pronounce these
few words, "_Let the kingdom of Poland exist!_" and that it then would
exist; that all the Poles would devote themselves to the orders of the
founder of the fourth French dynasty, to whom ages were but as a moment,
and space no more than a point."
Napoleon replied: "Gentlemen deputies of the confederation of Poland, I
have listened with deep interest to what you have just told me. Were I a
Pole, I should think and act like you; I should have voted with you in
the assembly of Warsaw: the love of his country is the first duty of
civilized man.
"In my position, I have many interests to reconcile, and many duties to
fulfil. Had I reigned during the first, second, or third partition of
Poland, I would have armed my people in her defence. When victory
supplied me with the means of re-establishing your ancient laws, in your
capital, and a portion of your provinces, I did so without seeking to
prolong the war, which might have continued to waste the blood of my
subjects.
"I love your nation! For sixteen years I have found your soldiers by my
side on the plains of Italy and Spain. I applaud what you have done; I
authorize your future efforts; I will do all which depends on me to
second your resolutions. If your efforts be unanimous, you may cherish
the hope of compelling your enemies to recognize your rights; but in
countries so distant and extensive, it must be entirely on the exertions
of the population which inhabits them, that you can justly ground hopes
of success.
"From the first moment of my entering Poland, I have used the same
language to you. To this it is my duty to add, that I have guaranteed to
the emperor of Austria the integrity of his dominions, and that I cannot
sanction any manoeuvre, or the least movement, tending to disturb the
peaceable possession of what remains to him of the Polish provinces.
"Only provide that Lithuania, Samogitia, Witepsk, Polotsk, Mohilef,
Volhynia, the Ukraine, Podolia, be animated by the same spirit which I
have witnessed in the Greater Poland; and Providence will crown your
good cause with success. I will recompense that devotion of your
provinces which renders you so interesting, and has acquired you so many
claims to my esteem and protection, by every means that can, under the
circumstances, depend upon me."
The Poles had imagined that they were addressing the sovereign arbiter
of the world, whose every word was a law, and whom no political
compromise was capable of arresting. They were unable to comprehend the
cause of the circumspection of this reply. They began to doubt the
intentions of Napoleon; the zeal of some was cooled; the lukewarmness of
others confirmed; all were intimidated. Even those around him asked each
other what could be the motives of a prudence which appeared so
unseasonable, and with him so unusual. "What, then, was the object of
this war? Was he afraid of Austria? Had the retreat of the Russians
disconcerted him? Did he doubt his good fortune, or was he unwilling to
contract, in the face of Europe, engagements which he was not sure of
being able to fulfil?
"Had the coldness of the Lithuanians infected him? or rather, did he
dread the explosion of a patriotism which he might not be able to
master? Was he still undecided as to the destiny he should bestow upon
them?"
Whatever were his motives, it was obviously his wish that the
Lithuanians should appear to liberate themselves; but as, at the same
time, he created a government for them, and gave a direction to their
public feeling, that circumstance placed him, as well as them, in a
false position, wherein every thing terminated in errors,
contradictions, and half measures. There was no reciprocal understanding
between the parties; a mutual distrust was the result. The Poles desired
some positive guarantees in return for the many sacrifices they were
called upon to make. But their union in a single kingdom not having been
pronounced, the alarm which is common at the moment of great decisions
increased, and the confidence which they had just lost in him, they also
lost in themselves. It was then that he nominated seven Lithuanians to
the task of composing the new government. This choice was unlucky in
some points; it displeased the jealous pride of an aristocracy at all
times difficult to satisfy.
The four Lithuanian provinces of Wilna, Minsk, Grodno, and Bialystok,
had each a government commission and national sub-prefects. Each commune
was to have its municipality; but Lithuania was, in reality, governed by
an imperial commissioner, and by four French auditors, with the title of
intendants.
In short, from these, perhaps inevitable, faults, and from the disorders
of an army placed between the alternative of famishing, or plundering
its allies, there resulted a universal coolness. The emperor could not
remain blind to it; he had calculated on four millions of Lithuanians; a
few thousands were all that joined him! Their pospolite, which he had
estimated at more than 100,000 men, had decreed him a guard of honour;
only three horsemen attended him! The population of Volhynia remained
immoveable, and Napoleon again appealed from them to victory. When
fortunate, this coolness did not disturb him sufficiently; when
unfortunate, whether through pride or justice, he did not complain of
it.
As for us, ever confident in him and in ourselves, the disposition of
the Lithuanians at first affected us very little; but when our forces
diminished, we looked about us, and our attention was awakened by our
danger. Three Lithuanian generals, distinguished by their names, their
property, and their sentiments, followed the emperor. The French
generals at last reproached them with the coolness of their countrymen.
The ardour of the people of Warsaw, in 1806, was held out to them as an
example. The warm discussion which ensued, passed, like several others
similar, which it is necessary to record, at Napoleon's quarters, near
the spot where he was employed; and as there was truth on both sides;
as, in these conversations, the opposite allegations contended without
destroying each other; and as the first and last causes of the coolness
of the Lithuanians were therein revealed, it is impossible to omit them.
These generals then replied, "That they considered they had received
becomingly the liberty which we brought them; that, moreover, every one
expressed regard according to his habitual character; that the
Lithuanians were more cold in their manner than the Poles, and
consequently less communicative; that, after all, the sentiment might be
the same, though the expression was different.
"That, besides, there was no similarity in the cases; that in 1806, it
was after having conquered the Prussians, that the French had delivered
Poland; that now, on the contrary, if they delivered Lithuania from the
Russian yoke, it was before they had subjugated Russia. That, in this
manner, it was natural for the first to receive a victorious and certain
freedom with transport; and equally natural for the last to receive an
uncertain and dangerous liberty with gravity; that a benefit was not
purchased with the same air as if it were gratuitously accepted; that
six years back, at Warsaw, there was nothing to be done but to prepare
festivals; while at Wilna, where the whole power of Russia had just been
exhibited, where its army was known to be untouched, and the motives of
its retreat understood, it was for battles that preparation was to be
made.
"And with what means? Why was not that liberty offered to them in 1807?
Lithuania was then rich and populous. Since that time the continental
system, by sealing up the only vent for its productions, had
impoverished it, while Russian foresight had depopulated it of recruits,
and more recently of a multitude of nobles, peasants, waggons, and
cattle, which the Russian army had carried away with it."
To these causes they added "the famine resulting from the severity of
the season in 1811, and the damage to which the over-rich wheats of
those countries are subject. But why not make an appeal to the provinces
of the south? In that quarter there were men, horses, and provisions of
all kinds. They had nothing to do but to drive away Tormasof and his
army from them. Schwartzenberg was, perhaps, marching in that direction;
but was it to the Austrians, the uneasy usurpers of Gallicia, that they
ought to confide the liberation of Volhynia? Would they station liberty
so near slavery? Why did not they send Frenchmen and Poles there? But
then it would be necessary to halt, to carry on a more methodical war,
and allow time for organization; while Napoleon, doubtless urged by his
distance from his own territory, by the daily expense of provisioning
his immense army, depending on that alone, and hurrying after victory,
sacrificed every thing to the hope of finishing the war at a single
blow."
Here the speakers were interrupted: these reasons, though true,
appeared insufficient excuses. "They concealed the most powerful cause
of the immobility of their countrymen; it was to be discovered in the
interested attachment of their grandees to the crafty policy of Russia,
which flattered their self-love, respected their customs, and secured
their right over the peasants, whom the French came to set free.
Doubtless, national independence appeared too dear a purchase at such a
price."
This reproach was well founded, and although it was not personal, the
Lithuanian generals became irritated at it. One of them exclaimed, "You
talk of our independence; but it must be in great peril, since you, at
the head of 400,000 men, are afraid to commit yourselves by its
recognition; indeed, you have not recognized it either by your words or
actions. You have placed auditors, men quite new, at the head of an
administration equally new, to govern our provinces. They levy heavy
contributions, but they forget to inform us for whom it is that we make
such sacrifices, as are only made for our country. They exhibit to us
the emperor everywhere, but the republic hitherto nowhere. You have held
out no object to set us in motion, and you complain of our being
unsteady. Persons whom we do not respect as our countrymen, you set over
us as our chiefs. Notwithstanding our entreaties, Wilna remains
separated from Warsaw; disunited as we thus are, you require of us that
confidence in our strength which union alone can give. The soldiers you
expect from us are offered you; 30,000 would be now ready; but you have
refused them arms, clothing, and the money in which we are deficient."
All these imputations might still have been combated; but he added:
"True, we do not market for liberty, but we find that in fact it is not
disinterestedly offered. Wherever you go, the report of your disorders
precedes your march; nor are they partial, since your army marches upon
a line of fifty leagues in front. Even at Wilna, notwithstanding the
multiplied orders of your emperor, the suburbs have been pillaged, and
it is natural that a liberty which brings such licence with it should be
mistrusted.
"What then do you expect from our zeal? A happy countenance,
acclamations of joy, accents of gratitude?--when every day each of us is
apprised that his villages and granaries are devastated; for the little
which the Russians did not carry away with them, your famishing columns
have devoured. In their rapid marches, a multitude of marauders of all
nations, against whom it is necessary to keep on the watch, detach
themselves from their wings.
"What do you require more? that our countrymen should throng your
passage; bring you their grain and cattle; that they should offer
themselves completely armed and ready to follow you? Alas! what have
they to give you? Your pillagers take all; there is not even time for
them to make you the offer. Turn your eyes round towards the entrance of
the imperial head-quarters. Do you see that man? He is all but naked; he
groans and extends towards you a hand of supplication. That unhappy man
who excites your pity, is one of those very nobles whose assistance you
look for: yesterday, he was hurrying to meet you, full of ardour, with
his daughter, his vassals, and his wealth; he was coming to present
himself to your emperor; but he met with some Wurtemberg pillagers on
his way, and was robbed of every thing; he is no longer a father,--he is
scarcely a man."
Every one shuddered, and hurried to assist him; Frenchmen, Germans,
Lithuanians, all agreed in deploring those disorders, for which no one
could suggest a remedy. How, in fact, was it possible to restore
discipline among such immense masses, so precipitately propelled,
conducted by so many leaders of different manners, characters, and
countries, and forced to resort to plunder for subsistence?
In Prussia, the emperor had only caused the army to supply itself with
provisions for twenty days. This was as much as was necessary for the
purpose of gaining Wilna by a battle. Victory was to have done the rest,
but that victory was postponed by the retreat of the enemy. The emperor
might have waited for his convoys; but as by surprising the Russians he
had separated them, he did not wish to forego his grasp and lose his
advantage. He, therefore, pushed forward on their track 400,000 men,
with twenty days' provisions, into a country which was incapable of
feeding the 20,000 Swedes of Charles XII.
It was not for want of foresight; for immense convoys of oxen followed
the army, either in herds, or attached to the provision cars. Their
drivers had been organized into battalions. It is true that the latter,
wearied with the slow pace of these heavy animals, either slaughtered
them, or suffered them to die of want. A great number, however, got as
far as Wilna and Minsk; some reached Smolensk, but too late; they could
only be of service to the recruits and reinforcements which followed us.
On the other hand, Dantzic contained so much corn, that she alone might
have fed the whole army; she also supplied Königsberg. Its provisions
had ascended the Pregel in large barges up to Vehlau, and in lighter
craft as far as Insterburg. The other convoys went by land-carriage from
Königsberg to Labiau, and from thence, by means of the Niemen and the
Vilia, to Kowno and Wilna. But the water of the Vilia having shrunk so
much through drought as to be incapable of floating these transports, it
became necessary to find other means of conveyance.
Napoleon hated jobbers. It was his wish that the administration of the
army should organize the Lithuanian waggons; 500 were assembled, but the
appearance of them disgusted him. He then permitted contracts to be made
with the Jews, who are the only traders in the country; and the
provisions stopped at Kowno at last arrived at Wilna, but the army had
already left it.
CHAP. IV.
It was the largest column, that of the centre, which suffered most; it
followed the road which the Russians had ruined, and of which the French
advanced guard had just completed the spoliation. The columns which
proceeded by lateral routes found necessaries there, but were not
sufficiently careful in collecting and in economizing them.
The responsibility of the calamities which this rapid march occasioned
ought not, therefore, to be laid entirely on Napoleon, for order and
discipline were maintained in the army of Davoust; it suffered less from
dearth: it was nearly the same with that of Prince Eugene. When pillage
was resorted to in these two corps, it was always with method, and
nothing but necessary injury was inflicted; the soldiers were obliged to
carry several days' provisions, and prevented from wasting them. The
same precautions should have been taken elsewhere; but, whether it was
owing to the habit of making war in fertile countries, or to habitual
ardour of constitution, many of the other chiefs thought much less of
administering than of fighting.
On that account, Napoleon was frequently compelled to shut his eyes to a
system of plunder which he vainly prohibited: too well aware, also, of
the attraction which that mode of subsistence had for the soldier; that
it made him love war, because it enriched him; that it pleased him, in
consequence of the authority which it frequently gave him over classes
superior to his own; that in his eyes it had all the charm of a war of
the poor against the rich; finally, that the pleasure of being, and
proving that he was the strongest, was under such circumstances
incessantly repeated and brought home to him.
Napoleon, however, grew indignant at the intelligence of these excesses.
He issued a threatening proclamation, and he directed moveable columns
of French and Lithuanians to see to its execution. We, who were
irritated at the sight of the pillagers, were eager to pursue and punish
them; but when we had stripped them of the bread, or of the cattle which
they had been robbing, and when we saw them, slowly retiring, sometimes
eyeing us with a look of condensed despair, sometimes bursting into
tears; and when we heard them murmuring, that, "not content with giving
them nothing, we wrested every thing from them, and that, consequently,
our intention must be to let them perish of hunger;" We, then, in our
turn, accusing ourselves of barbarity to our own people, called them
back, and restored their prey to them. Indeed, it was imperious
necessity which impelled to plunder. The officers themselves had no
other means of subsistence than the share which the soldiers allowed
them.
A position of so much excess engendered fresh excesses. These rude men,
with arms in their hands, when assailed by so many immoderate wants,
could not remain moderate. When they arrived near any habitations, they
were famished; at first they asked, but, either for want of being
understood, or from the refusal or impossibility of the inhabitants to
satisfy their demands, and of their inability to wait, altercations
generally arose; then, as they became more and more exasperated with
hunger, they became furious, and after tumbling either cottage or palace
topsy-turvy, without finding the subsistence they were in quest of,
they, in the violence of their despair, accused the inhabitants of being
their enemies, and revenged themselves on the proprietors by destroying
their property.
There were some who actually destroyed themselves, rather than proceed
to such extremities; others did the same after having done so: these
were the youngest. They placed their foreheads on their muskets, and
blew out their brains in the middle of the high-road. But many became
hardened; one excess led them to another, as people often grow angry
with the blows which they inflict. Among the latter, some vagabonds took
vengeance of their distresses upon persons; in the midst of so
inauspicious an aspect of nature, they became denaturalized; abandoned
to themselves at so great a distance from home, they imagined that every
thing was allowed them, and that their own sufferings authorized them in
making others suffer.
In an army so numerous, and composed of so many nations, it was natural
also to find more malefactors than in smaller ones: the causes of so
many evils induced fresh ones; already enfeebled by famine, it was
necessary to make forced marches in order to escape from it, and to
reach the enemy. At night when they halted, the soldiers thronged into
the houses; there, worn out with fatigue and want, they threw themselves
upon the first dirty straw they met with.
The most robust had barely spirits left to knead the flour which they
found, and to light the ovens with which all those wooden houses were
supplied; others had scarcely strength to go a few paces in order to
make the fires necessary to cook some food; their officers, exhausted
like themselves, feebly gave orders to take more care, and neglected to
see that their orders were obeyed. A piece of burnt wood, at such times
escaping from an oven, or a spark from the fire of the bivouacs, was
sufficient to set fire to a castle or a whole village, and to cause the
deaths of many unfortunate soldiers who had taken refuge in them. In
other respects, these disorders were very rare in Lithuania.
The emperor was not ignorant of these details, but he had committed
himself too far. Even at Wilna, all these disorders had taken place; the
Duke of Treviso, among others, informed him, "that he had seen, from the
Niemen to the Vilia, nothing but ruined habitations, and baggage and
provision-waggons abandoned; they were found dispersed on the highways
and in the fields, overturned, broke open, and their contents scattered
here and there, and pillaged, as if they had been taken by the enemy: he
should have imagined himself following a defeated army. Ten thousand
horses had been killed by the cold rains of the great storm, and by the
unripe rye, which had become their new and only food. Their carcases
were lying encumbering the road: they sent forth a mephitic smell
impossible to breathe: it was a new scourge, which some compared to
famine, but much more terrible: several soldiers of the young guard had
already perished of hunger."
Up to that point Napoleon listened with calmness, but here he abruptly
interrupted the speaker. Wishing to escape from distress by incredulity,
he exclaimed, "It is impossible! where are their twenty days' provisions?
Soldiers well commanded never die of hunger."
A general, the author of this last report, was present. Napoleon turned
towards him; appealed to him, and pressed him with questions; and that
general, either from weakness or uncertainty, replied, "that the
individuals referred to had not died of hunger, but of intoxication."
The emperor then remained convinced that the privations of the soldiers
had been exaggerated to him. As to the rest, he exclaimed, "The loss of
the horses must be borne with; of some equipages, and even some
habitations; it was a torrent that rolled away: it was the worst side of
the picture of war; an evil exchanged for a good; to misery her share
must be given; his treasures, his benefits would repair the loss: one
great result would make amends for all; he only required a single
victory; if sufficient means remained for accomplishing that, he should
be satisfied."
The duke remarked, that a victory might be overtaken by a more
methodical march, followed by the magazines; but he was not listened to.
Those to whom this marshal (who had just returned from Spain,)
complained, replied to him, "That, in fact the emperor grew angry at the
account of evils, which he considered irremediable, his policy imposing
on him the necessity of a prompt and decisive victory."
They added, "that they saw too clearly that the health of their leader
was impaired; and that being compelled, notwithstanding, to throw
himself into positions more and more critical, he could not survey,
without ill temper, the difficulties which he passed by, and suffered to
accumulate behind him; difficulties which he then affected to treat with
contempt, in order to disguise their importance, and preserve the energy
of mind which he himself required to surmount them. This was the reason
that, being already disturbed and fatigued by the new and critical
situation into which he had thrown himself, and impatient to escape from
it, he kept marching on, always pushing his army forward, in order to
bring matters sooner to a termination."
Thus it was that Napoleon was constrained to shut his eyes to facts. It
is well known that the greater part of his ministers were not
flatterers. Both facts and men spoke sufficiently; but what could they
teach him? Of what was he ignorant? Had not all his preparations been
dictated by the most clear-sighted foresight? What could be said to him,
which he had not himself said and written a hundred times? It was after
having anticipated the minutest details; having prepared for every
inconvenience, having provided every thing for a slow and methodical
war, that he divested himself of all these precautions, that he
abandoned all these preparations, and suffered himself to be hurried
away by habit, by the necessity of short wars, of rapid victories, and
sudden treaties of peace.
CHAP. V.
It was in the midst of these grave circumstances that Balachoff, a
minister of the Russian emperor, presented himself with a flag of truce
at the French advanced posts. He was received, and the army, now become
less ardent, indulged anticipations of peace.
He brought this message from Alexander to Napoleon, "That it was not yet
too late to negotiate; a war which the soil, the climate, and the
character of Russia, rendered interminable, was begun; but all
reconciliation was not become impossible, and from one bank of the
Niemen to the other they might yet come to an understanding." He,
moreover, added, "that his master declared, in the face of Europe, that
he was not the aggressor; that his ambassador at Paris, in demanding his
passports, did not consider himself as having broken the peace; that
thus, the French had entered Russia without a declaration of war." There
were, however, no fresh overtures, either verbal or written, presented
by Balachoff.
The choice of this flag of truce had been remarked; he was the minister
of the Russian police; that office required an observant spirit, and it
was thought that he was sent to exercise it amongst us. What rendered us
more mistrustful of the character of the negotiator was, that the
negotiation appeared to have no character, unless it were that of great
moderation, which, under the actual circumstances, was taken for
weakness.
Napoleon did not hesitate. He would not stop at Paris; how could he then
retreat at Wilna? What would Europe think? What result could he exhibit
to the French and allied armies as a motive for so many fatigues; for
such vast movements; for such enormous individual and national
expenditure: it would be confessing himself vanquished. Besides, his
language before so many princes, since his departure from Paris, had
pledged him as much as his actions; so that, in fact, he found himself
as much compromised on the score of his allies as of his enemies. Even
then, it is said, the warmth of conversation with Balachoff hurried him
away. "What had brought him to Wilna? What did the Emperor of Russia
want with him? Did he pretend to resist him? He was only a parade
general. As to himself, his head was his counsellor; from that every
thing proceeded. But as to Alexander,--who was there to counsel him?
Whom had he to oppose to him? He had only three generals,--Kutusof, whom
he did not like, because he was a Russian; Beningsen, superannuated six
years ago, and now in his second childhood; and Barclay: the last could
certainly manoeuvre; he was brave; he understood war; but he was a
general only good for a retreat." And he added, "You all believe
yourselves to understand the art of war, because you have read Jomini;
but if his book could have taught it you, do you think that I should
have allowed it to be published?" In this conversation, of which the
above is the Russian version, it is certain that he added, "that,
however, the Emperor Alexander had friends even in the imperial
head-quarters." Then, pointing out Caulaincourt to the Russian minister,
"There," said he, "is a knight of your emperor; he is a Russian in the
French camp."
Probably Caulaincourt did not sufficiently comprehend, that by that
expression Napoleon only wished to point him out as a negotiator who
would be agreeable to Alexander; for as soon as Balachoff was gone, he
advanced towards the emperor, and in an angry tone, asked him why he had
insulted him? exclaiming, "that he was a Frenchman! a true Frenchman!
that he had proved it already; and would prove it again by repeating,
that this war was impolitic and dangerous; that it would destroy his
army, France, and himself. That, as to the rest, as he had just insulted
him, he should quit him; that all that he asked of him was a division in
Spain, where nobody wished to serve, and the furthest from his presence
possible." The emperor attempted to appease him; but not being able to
obtain a hearing, he withdrew, Caulaincourt still pursuing him with his
reproaches. Berthier, who was present at this scene, interposed without
effect. Bessières, more in the back-ground, had vainly tried to detain
Caulaincourt by holding him by the coat.
The next day, Napoleon was unable to bring his grand equerry into his
presence, without formal and repeated orders. At length he appeased him
by caresses, and by the expression of an esteem and attachment which
Caulaincourt well deserved. But he dismissed Balachoff with verbal and
inadmissible proposals.
Alexander made no reply to them; the full importance of the step he had
just taken was not at the time properly comprehended. It was his
determination neither to address nor even answer Napoleon any more. It
was a last word before an irreparable breach; and that circumstance
rendered it remarkable.
Meantime, Murat pursued the flying steps of that victory which was so
much coveted; he commanded the cavalry of the advanced guard; he at last
reached the enemy on the road to Swentziani, and drove him in the
direction of Druïa. Every morning, the Russian rear-guard appeared to
have escaped him; every evening he overtook it again, and attacked it,
but always in a strong position, after a long march, too late, and
before his men had taken any refreshment; there were, consequently,
every day fresh combats, producing no important results.
Other chiefs, by other routes, followed the same direction. Oudinot had
passed the Vilia beyond Kowno, and already in Samogitia, to the north of
Wilna, at Deweltowo, and at Vilkomir, had fallen in with the enemy, whom
he drove before him towards Dünabourg. In this manner he marched on, to
the left of Ney and the King of Naples, whose right was flanked by
Nansouty. From the 15th of July, the river Düna, from Disna to
Dünabourg, had been approached by Murat, Montbrun, Sebastiani, and
Nansouty, by Oudinot and Ney, and by three divisions of the 1st corps,
placed under the orders of the Count de Lobau.
It was Oudinot who presented himself before Dünabourg: he made an
attempt on that town, which the Russians had vainly attempted to
fortify. This too eccentric march of Oudinot displeased Napoleon. The
river separated the two armies. Oudinot re-ascended it in order to put
himself in communication with Murat; and Wittgenstein, in order to form
a junction with Barclay. Dünabourg remained without assailants and
without defenders.
On his march, Wittgenstein had a view, from the right bank, of Druïa,
and a vanguard of French cavalry, which occupied that town with too
negligent a security. Encouraged by the approach of night, he made one
of his corps pass the river, and on the 15th, in the morning, the
advanced posts of one of our brigades were surprised, sabred, and
carried off. After this, Wittgenstein recalled his people to the right
bank, and pursued his way with his prisoners, among whom was a French
general. This _coup-de-main_ gave Napoleon reason to hope for a battle:
believing that Barclay was resuming the offensive, he suspended, for a
short time, his march upon Witepsk, in order to concentrate his troops
and direct them according to circumstances. This hope, however, was of
short duration.
During these events, Davoust, at Osmiana, to the south of Wilna, had got
sight of some scouts of Bagration, who was already anxiously seeking an
outlet towards the north. Up to that time, short of a victory, the plan
of the campaign adopted at Paris had completely succeeded. Aware that
the enemy was extended over too long a defensive line, Napoleon had
broken it by briskly attacking it in one direction, and by so doing had
thrown it back and pursued its largest mass upon the Düna; while
Bagration, whom he had not brought into contact till five days later,
was still upon the Niemen. During an interval of several days, and over
a front of eighty leagues, the manoeuvre was the same as that which
Frederic the Second had often employed upon a line of two leagues, and
during an interval of some few hours.
Already Doctorof, and several scattered divisions of each of these two
separated masses had only escaped by favour of the extent of the
country, of chance, and of the usual causes of that ignorance, which
always exists during war, as to what passes close at hand in the ranks
of an enemy.
Several persons have pretended that there was too much circumspection or
too much negligence in the first operations of the invasion; that from
the Vistula, the assailing army had received orders to march with all
the precaution of one attacked; that the aggression once commenced, and
Alexander having fled, the advanced guard of Napoleon ought to have
re-ascended the two banks of the Vilia with more celerity and more in
advance, and that the army of Italy should have followed this movement
more closely. Perhaps Doctorof, who commanded the left wing of Barclay,
being forced to cross our line of attack, in order to fly from Lida
toward Swentziany, might then have been made prisoner. Pajol repulsed
him at Osmiana; but he escaped by Smorgony. Nothing but his baggage was
taken; and Napoleon laid the blame of his escape on Prince Eugene,
although he had himself prescribed to him every one of his movements.
But the army of Italy, the Bavarian army, the 1st corps and the guard,
very soon occupied and surrounded Wilna. There it was that, stretched
out over his maps (which he was obliged to examine in that manner, on
account of his short sight, which he shared with Alexander the Great and
Frederic the Second), Napoleon followed the course of the Russian army;
it was divided into two unequal masses: one with its emperor towards
Drissa, the other with Bagration, who was still in the direction of Myr.
Eighty leagues in front of Wilna, the Düna and the Boristhenes separate
Lithuania from old Russia. At first, these two rivers run parallel to
each other from east to west, leaving between them an interval of about
twenty-five leagues of an unequal, woody, and marshy soil. They arrive
in that manner from the interior of Russia, on its frontiers; at this
point, at the same time, and as if in concert, they turn off; the one
abruptly at Orcha towards the south; the other, near Witepsk, towards
the north-west. It is in that new direction that their course traces the
frontiers of Lithuania and old Russia.