BOOK XII.

CHAP. I.--Napoleon's journey from Smorgony to Paris--Impression

produced in the army by his departure--Dreadful effects of the increased

cold 339

II.--Picture of the sufferings of the army from the cold and the climate

346

III.--Arrival at Wilna--Consternation of the inhabitants--Fatal effects

of not distributing the provisions collected among the troops--State of

the wounded in the hospitals--Arrival of the Russians--Flight of

Murat--Evacuation of Wilna--Immense losses which that occasioned--Disaster

at Ponari 353

IV.--Details of Ney's mode of retreat--Losses occasioned to the Russians

by the severity of the winter--Arrival at Kowno--Ney's defence and

evacuation of that place 364

V.--First symptoms of Murat's defection--Arrival at Königsberg 372

VI. VII. VIII. IX.--Marshal Macdonald's retreat from Riga--Details of

the defection of the Prussian Army under Yorck 377

X.--Conduct of Schwartzenberg and defection of the Austrians--Atrocities

committed on the French prisoners at Wilna and Königsberg 396

XI.--Defection of Murat 401

XII.--Conclusion 403

DIRECTIONS FOR PLACING THE PLATES.

I. Portrait of Napoleon to face Title, Vol. I.

II. Map of the countries between Paris and Moscow page 1

III. Passage of the Niemen 124

IV. Portrait of Murat, King of Naples 311

V. Portrait of the Emperor Alexander to face Title, Vol. II.

VI. Conflagration of Moscow 48

VII. Portrait of Marshal Ney 268

VIII. Passage of the Berezina 315

[Illustration: Map of the countries between Paris and Moscow]

HISTORY

OF

NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION

TO

RUSSIA.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Ever since 1807, when the space between the Rhine and the Niemen had

been overrun, the two great empires of which these rivers were the

boundaries had become rivals. By his concessions at Tilsit, at the

expense of Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, Napoleon had only satisfied

Alexander. That treaty was the result of the defeat of Russia, and the

date of her submission to the continental system. Among the Russians, it

was regarded by some as attacking their honour; and by all it was felt

to be ruinous to their interests.

By the continental system Napoleon had declared eternal war against the

English; to that system he attached his honour, his political existence,

and that of the nation under his sway. That system banished from the

Continent all merchandise which was English, or had paid duty in any

shape to England. He could not succeed in establishing it but by the

unanimous consent of the continental nations, and that consent could not

be hoped for but under a single and universal dominion.

France had besides alienated the nations of Europe from her by her

conquests, and the monarchs by her revolution and her new dynasty.

Henceforward she could no longer look forward to have either friends or

rivals, but merely subjects; for the first would have been false, and

the second implacable: it followed that all must be subject to her, or

she to all.

With feelings of this kind, her leader, influenced by his position, and

urged on by his enterprising character, filled his imagination with the

vast project of becoming the sole master of Europe, by overwhelming

Russia, and wresting Poland from her dominion. He had so much difficulty

in concealing this project, that hints of it began to escape him in all

directions. The immense preparations which so distant an enterprise

required, the enormous quantities of provisions and ammunition

collecting, the noise of arms, of carriages, and the march of such

numbers of soldiers--the universal movement the majestic and terrible

course of all the forces of the West against the East--every thing

announced to Europe that her two colossuses were about to measure their

strength with each other.

But, to get within reach of Russia, it was necessary to go beyond

Austria, to cross Prussia, and to march between Sweden and Turkey; an

offensive alliance with these four powers was therefore indispensable.

Austria was as much subject to the influence of Napoleon as Prussia was

to his arms: to them he had only to declare his intentions; Austria

voluntarily and eagerly entered into his plans, and Prussia he easily

prevailed on to join him.

Austria, however, did not act blindly. Situated between the two great

colossuses of the North and the West, she was not displeased to see them

at war: she looked to their mutually weakening each other, and to the

increase of her own strength by their exhaustion. On the 14th of March,

1812, she promised France 30,000 men; but she prepared prudent secret

instructions for them. She obtained a vague promise of an increase of

territory, as an indemnity for her share of the expenses of the war, and

the possession of Gallicia was guaranteed to her. She admitted, however,

the future possibility of a cession of part of that province to the

kingdom of Poland; but in exchange for that she would have received the

Illyrian provinces. The sixth article of the secret treaty establishes

that fact.

The success of the war, therefore, in no degree depended on the cession

of Gallicia, or the difficulties arising from the Austrian jealousy of

that possession. Napoleon, consequently, might on his entrance into

Wilna, have publicly proclaimed the liberation of the whole of Poland,

instead of betraying the expectations of her people, astonishing and

rendering them indifferent by expressions of wavering import.

This, however, was one of those prominent points, which in politics as

well as in war are decisive, with which every thing is connected, and

from which nothing ought to have made him swerve. But whether it was

that Napoleon reckoned too much on the ascendancy of his genius, or the

strength of his army, and the weakness of Alexander; or that,

considering what he left behind him, he felt it too dangerous to carry

on so distant a war slowly and methodically; or whether, as we shall

presently be told by himself, he had doubts of the success of his

undertaking; certain it is, that he either neglected, or could not yet

determine to proclaim the liberation of that country whose freedom he

had come to restore.

And yet he had sent an ambassador to her Diet. When this inconsistency

was remarked to him, he replied, that "that nomination was an act of

war, which only bound him during the war, while by his words he would be

bound both in war and peace." Thus it was, that he made no other reply

to the enthusiasm of the Lithuanians than evasive expressions, at the

very time he was following up his attack on Alexander to the very

capital of his empire.

He even neglected to clear the southern Polish provinces of the feeble

hostile armies which kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in check,

and to secure, by strongly organizing their insurrection, a solid basis

of operation. Accustomed to short methods, and to rapid attacks, he

wished to imitate himself, in spite of the difference of places and

circumstances; for such is the weakness of man, that he is always led

by imitation, either of others, or of himself, which in the latter case,

that of great men, is habit; for habit is nothing more than the

imitation of one's self. So true it is, that by their strongest side

these extraordinary men are undone!

The one in question committed himself to the fortune of battles. Having

prepared an army of six hundred and fifty thousand men, he fancied that

that was doing sufficient to secure victory, from which he expected

every thing. Instead of sacrificing every thing to obtain victory, it

was by that he looked to obtain every thing; he made use of it as a

_means_, when it ought to have been his _end_. In this manner he made it

too necessary; it was already rather too much so. But he confided so

much of futurity to it, he overloaded it with so much responsibility,

that it became urgent and indispensable to him. Hence his precipitation

to get within reach of it, in order to extricate himself from so

critical a position.

But we must not be too hasty in condemning a genius so great and

universal; we shall shortly hear from himself by what urgent necessity

he was hurried on; and even admitting that the rapidity of his

expedition was only equalled by its rashness, success would have

probably crowned it, if the premature decline of his health had left the

physical constitution of this great man all the vigour which his mind

still retained.

CHAP. II.

As to Prussia, of which Napoleon was completely master, it is not known

whether it was from his uncertainty as to the fate which he reserved for

her, or as to the period at which he should commence the war, that he

refused, in 1811, to contract the alliance which she herself proposed to

him, and of which he dictated the conditions, in 1812.

His aversion to Frederick William was remarkable. Napoleon had been

frequently heard to speak reproachfully of the cabinet of Prussia for

its treaties with the French republic. He said, "It was a desertion of

the cause of kings; that the negotiations of the court of Berlin with

the Directory displayed a timid, selfish, and ignoble policy, which

sacrificed its dignity, and the general cause of monarchs, to petty

aggrandizements." Whenever he followed with his finger the traces of the

Prussian frontiers upon the map, he seemed to be angry at seeing them

still so extensive, and exclaimed, "Is it possible that I have left this

man so large a territory?"

This dislike to a mild and pacific monarch was surprising. As there is

nothing in the character of Napoleon unworthy of historical remembrance,

it is worth while to examine the cause of it. Some persons trace back

the origin of it to the rejection which he experienced, when First

Consul, from Louis XVIII. of the propositions which he made to him

through the medium of the king of Prussia; and they suppose that

Napoleon laid the blame of this refusal upon the mediator. Others

attribute it to the seizure of Rumbold, the English agent at Hamburgh,

by the orders of Napoleon, and to his being compelled to give him up by

Frederick, as protector of the neutrality of the north of Germany.

Before that time, Frederick and Napoleon had carried on a secret

correspondence, which was of so intimate a nature, that they used to

confide to each other even the details of their household; that

circumstance, it is said, put an end to it.

At the beginning of 1805, however, Russia, Austria, and England, made

ineffectual attempts to engage Frederick in their third coalition

against France. The court of Berlin, the queen, the princes, the

minister Hardenberg, and all the young Prussian military, excited by the

ardour of displaying the inheritance of glory which had been left them

by the great Frederick, or by the wish of blotting out the disgrace of

the campaign of 1792, entered heartily into the views of the allied

powers; but the pacific policy of the king, and of his minister

Haugwitz, resisted them, until the violation of the Prussian territory,

near Anspach, by the march of a corps of French troops, exasperated the

passions of the Prussians to such a degree, that their cry for immediate

war prevailed.

Alexander was then in Poland; he was invited to Potsdam, and repaired

thither immediately; and on the 3d of November, 1805, he engaged

Frederick in the third coalition. The Prussian array was immediately

withdrawn from the Russian frontiers, and M. de Haugwitz repaired to

Brünn to threaten Napoleon with it. But the battle of Austerlitz shut

his mouth; and within a fortnight after, the wily minister, having

quickly turned round to the side of the conqueror, signed with him the

participation of the fruits of victory.

Napoleon, however, dissembled his displeasure; for he had his army to

re-organize, to give the grand duchy of Berg to Murat, his

brother-in-law, Neufchatel to Berthier, to conquer Naples for his

brother Joseph, to mediatize Switzerland, to dissolve the Germanic body,

and to create the Rhenish confederation, of which he declared himself

protector; to change the republic of Holland into a kingdom, and to give

it to his brother Louis. These were the reasons which induced him, on

the 15th of December, to cede Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for

Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel.

The possession of Hanover at first tempted Frederick, but when the

treaty was to be signed, he appeared to feel ashamed, and to hesitate;

he wished only to accept it by halves, and to retain it merely as a

deposit. Napoleon had no idea of such timid policy. "What!" said he,

"does this monarch dare neither to make peace nor war? Does he prefer

the English to me? Is there another coalition preparing? Does he despise

my alliance?" Indignant at the idea, by a fresh treaty, on the 8th of

March, 1806, he compelled Frederick to declare war against England, to

take possession of Hanover, and to admit French garrisons into _Wesel_

and _Hameln_.

The king of Prussia alone submitted; his court and his subjects were

exasperated; they reproached him with allowing himself to be vanquished

without attempting to fight; and elevating themselves on the remembrance

of their past glory, they fancied that for them alone was reserved the

honour of triumphing over the conqueror of Europe. In their impatience

they insulted the minister of Napoleon; they sharpened their swords on

the threshold of his gate. Napoleon himself they loaded with abuse. Even

the queen, so distinguished by her graces and attractions, put on a

warlike attitude. Their princes, one of them particularly (whose

carriage and features, spirit and intrepidity, seemed to promise them a

hero), offered to be their leaders. A chivalrous ardour and fury

animated the minds of all.

It is asserted, that at the same time there were persons, either

treacherous or deceived, who persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was

obliged to show himself pacific, that that warrior was averse to war;

they added, that he was perfidiously treating for peace with England, on

the terms of restoring Hanover, which he was to take back from Prussia.

Drawn in at last by the general feeling, the king allowed all these

passions to burst forth. His army advanced, and threatened Napoleon;

fifteen days afterwards he had neither army nor kingdom; he fled alone;

and Napoleon dated from Berlin his decrees against England.

Humbled and conquered as Prussia thus was, it was impossible for

Napoleon to abandon his hold of her; she would have immediately rallied,

under the cannon of the Russians. Finding it impossible to gain her to

his interests, like Saxony, by a great act of generosity, the next plan

was to divide her; and yet, either from compassion, or the effect of

Alexander's presence, he could not resolve to dismember her. This was a

mistaken policy, like most of those where we stop half-way; and Napoleon

was not long before he became sensible of it. When he exclaimed,

therefore, "Is it possible that I have left this man so large a

territory?" it is probable that he did not forgive Prussia the

protection of Alexander; he hated her, because he felt that she hated

him.

In fact, the sparks of a jealous and impatient hatred escaped from the

youth of Prussia, whose ideas were exalted by a system of education,

national, liberal, and mystical. It was among them that a formidable

power arose in opposition to that of Napoleon. It included all whom his

victories had humbled or offended; it had all the strength of the weak

and the oppressed, the law of nature, mystery, fanaticism, and revenge!

Wanting support on earth, it looked up for aid to Heaven, and its moral

forces were wholly out of the reach of the material power of Napoleon.

Animated by the devoted and indefatigable spirit of an ardent sect, it

watched the slightest movements and weakest points of its enemy,

insinuated itself into all the interstices of his power, and holding

itself ready to strike at every opportunity, it waited quietly with the

patience and phlegm which are the peculiar characteristics of the

Germans, which were the causes of their defeat, and against which our

victory wore itself out.

This vast conspiracy was that of the _Tugendbund_[1], or _Friends of

Virtue_. Its head, in other words, the person who first gave a precise

and definite direction to its views, was _Stein_. Napoleon perhaps might

have gained him over to his interests, but preferred punishing him. His

plan happened to be discovered by one of those chances to which the

police owes the best part of its miracles; but when conspiracies enter

into the interests, passions, and even the consciences of men, it is

impossible to seize their ramifications: every one understands without

communicating; or rather, all is communication--a general and

simultaneous sympathy.

[Footnote 1: In 1808, several literary men at Königsberg, afflicted with

the evils which desolated their country, ascribed it to the general

corruption of manners. According to these philosophers, it had stifled

true patriotism in the citizens, discipline in the army, and courage in

the people. Good men therefore were bound to unite to regenerate the

nation, by setting the example of every sacrifice. An association was in

consequence formed by them, which took the title of _Moral and

Scientific Union_. The government approved of it, merely interdicting it

from political discussions. This resolution, noble as it was, would

probably have been lost, like many others, in the vagueness of German

metaphysics; but about that time William, Duke of Brunswick, who had

been stripped of his duchy, had retired to his principality of Oels in

Silesia. In the bosom of this retreat he is said to have observed the

first progress of the _Moral Union_ among the Prussians. He became a

member of it; and his heart swelling with hatred and revenge, he formed

the idea of another association, which was to consist of men resolved to

overthrow the confederation of the Rhine, and to drive the French

entirely out of Germany. This society, whose object was more real and

positive than that of the first, soon swallowed up the other; and from

these two was formed that of the _Tugendbund_, or _Friends of Virtue_.

About the end of May, 1809, three enterprises--those of Katt, Dörnberg,

and Schill--had already given proofs of its existence. That of Duke

William began on the 14th of May. He was at first supported by the

Austrians. After a variety of adventures, this leader, abandoned to his

own resources in the midst of subjugated Europe, and left with only 2000

men to combat with the whole power of Napoleon, refused to yield: he

stood his ground, and threw himself into Saxony and Hanover; but finding

it impossible to raise them into insurrection, he cut his way through

several French corps, which he defeated, to Elsfleth, where he found an

English vessel waiting to receive and to convey him to England, with the

laurels he had acquired.]

This focus spread its fires and gained new partizans every day; it

attacked the power of Napoleon in the opinion of all Germany, extended

itself into Italy, and threatened its complete overthrow. It was already

easy to see that, if circumstances became unfavourable to us, there

would be no want of men to take advantage of them. In 1809, even before

the disaster of Esslingen, the first who had ventured to raise the

standard of independence against Napoleon were Prussians. He sent them

to the galleys; so important did he feel it to smother that cry of

revolt, which seemed to echo that of the Spaniards, and might become

general.

Independently of all these causes of hatred, the position of Prussia,

between France and Russia, compelled Napoleon to remain her master; he

could not reign there but by force--he could not be strong there but by

her weakness.

He ruined the country, although he must have known well that poverty

creates audacity; that the hope of gain becomes the moving principle of

those who have nothing more to lose; and finally, that in leaving them

nothing but the sword, he in a manner obliged them to turn it against

himself. In consequence, on the approach of the year 1812, and of the

terrible struggle which it was to produce, Frederick, uneasy and tired

of his subservient position, was determined to extricate himself from

it, either by an alliance or by war. In March, 1811, he offered himself

to Napoleon as an auxiliary in the expedition which he was preparing. In

the month of May, and again in the month of August, he repeated that

offer; and as he received no satisfactory answer, he declared, that as

the great military movements which surrounded, crossed, or drained his

kingdom, were such as to excite his apprehension that his entire

destruction was meditated, "he took up arms, because circumstances

imperiously called upon him to do so, deeming it far preferable to die

sword in hand than to fall with disgrace."

It was said at the same time, that Frederick secretly offered to

Alexander to give him possession of Graudentz, and his magazines, and

to put himself at the head of his insurgent subjects, if the Russian

army should advance into Silesia. If the same authorities are to be

believed, Alexander received this proposition, very favourably. He

immediately sent to Bagration and Wittgenstein sealed marching orders.

They were instructed not to open them until they received another letter

from their sovereign, which he never wrote, having changed his

resolution. A variety of causes might have dictated that change; 1st, a

wish not to be the first to commence so great a war, and his anxiety to

have divine justice and the opinion of mankind on his side, by not

appearing the aggressor; 2d, that Frederick, becoming less uneasy as to

the plans of Napoleon, had resolved to follow his fortunes. It is

probable, after all, that the noble sentiments which Alexander expressed

in his reply to the king were his only motives: we are assured that he

wrote to him, "That in a war which might begin by reverses, and in which

perseverance was required, he only felt courageous for himself, and that

the misfortunes of an ally might shake his resolution; that it would

grieve him to chain Prussia to his fortune if it was bad; that if it was

good he should always be ready to share it with her, whatever line of

conduct necessity might oblige her to pursue."

These details have been certified to us by a witness, although an

inferior one. However, whether this counsel proceeded from the

generosity or the policy of Alexander, or Frederick was determined

solely by the necessity of the case, it is certain that it was high

time for him to come to a decision; for in February, 1812, these

communications with Alexander, _if there were such_, or the hope of

obtaining better terms from France having made him hesitate in replying

to the definitive propositions of Napoleon, the latter, becoming

impatient, sent additional forces to Dantzic, and made Davoust enter

Pomerania. His orders for this invasion of a Swedish province were

repeated and pressing; they were grounded on the illicit commerce

carried on by the Pomeranians with the English, and subsequently on the

necessity of compelling Prussia to accede to his terms. The Prince of

Eckmühl even received orders to hold himself in readiness to take

immediate possession of that kingdom, and to seize the person of her

sovereign, if within eight days from the date of these orders the latter

had not concluded the offensive alliance dictated to him by France; but

while the marshal was tracing the few marches necessary for this

operation, he received intelligence that the treaty of the 21st of

February, 1812, had been ratified.

This submission did not altogether satisfy Napoleon. To his strength he

added artifice; his suspicions still led him to covet the occupation of

the fortresses, which he was ashamed not to leave in Frederick's hands;

he required the king to keep only 50 or 80 invalids in some, and desired

that some French officers should be admitted into others; all of whom

were to send their reports to him, and to follow his orders. His

solicitude extended to every thing. "Spandau," said he, in his letters

to Davoust, "is the citadel of Berlin, as Pillau is that of Königsberg;"

and French troops had orders to be ready to introduce themselves at the

first signal: the manner he himself pointed out. At Potsdam, which the

king had reserved for himself, and which our troops were interdicted

from entering, his orders were, that the French officers should

frequently show themselves, in order to observe, and to accustom the

people to the sight of them. He recommended every degree of respect to

be shown, both to the king and his subjects; but at the same time he

required that every sort of arms should be taken from the latter, which

might be of use to them in an insurrection; and he pointed out every

thing of the kind, even to the smallest weapon. Anticipating the

possibility of the loss of a battle, and the chances of Prussian

_vespers_, he ordered that his troops should be either put into barracks

or encampments, with a thousand other precautions of the minutest

description. As a final security, in case of the English making a

descent between the Elbe and the Vistula, although Victor, and

subsequently Augereau, were to occupy Prussia with 50,000 men, he

engaged by treaty the assistance of 10,000 Danes.

All these precautions were still insufficient to remove his distrust;

when the Prince of Hatzfeld came to require of him a subsidy of 25

millions of francs to meet the expenses of the war which was preparing,

his reply to Daru was, "that he would take especial care not to furnish

an enemy with arms against himself." In this manner did Frederick,

entangled as it were in a net of iron, which surrounded and held him

tight in every part, put between 20 and 30,000 of his troops, and his

principal fortresses and magazines, at the disposal of Napoleon[2].

[Footnote 2: By this treaty, Prussia agreed to furnish two hundred

thousand quintals of rye, twenty-four thousand of rice, two million

bottles of beer, four hundred thousand quintals of wheat, six hundred

and fifty thousand of straw, three hundred and fifty thousand of hay,

six million bushels of oats, forty-four thousand oxen, fifteen thousand

horses, three thousand six hundred waggons, with harness and drivers,

each carrying a load of fifteen hundred weight; and finally, hospitals

provided with every thing necessary for twenty thousand sick. It is

true, that all these supplies were to be allowed in deduction of the

remainder of the taxes imposed by the conquest.]

CHAP. III.

These two treaties opened the road to Russia to Napoleon; but in order

to penetrate into the interior of that empire, it was necessary to make

sure of Sweden and Turkey.

Military combinations were then so much aggrandized, that in order to

sketch a plan of warfare, it was no longer necessary to study the

configuration of a province, or of a chain of mountains, or the course

of a river. When monarchs, such as Alexander and Napoleon, were

contending for the dominion of Europe, it was necessary to regard the

general and relative position of every state with a universal _coup

d'oeil_; it was no longer on single maps, but on that of the whole

globe, that their policy had to trace its plans of hostility.

Russia is mistress of the heights of Europe; her flanks are supported by

the seas of the north and south. Her government can only with great

difficulty be driven into a straight, and forced to submit, in a space

almost beyond the imagination to conceive: the conquest of which would

require long campaigns, to which her climate is completely opposed. From

this, it follows, that without the concurrence of Turkey and Sweden,

Russia is less vulnerable. The assistance of these two powers was

therefore requisite in order to surprise her, to strike her to the heart

in her modern capital, and to turn at a distance, in the rear of its

left, her grand army of the Niemen,--and not merely to precipitate

attacks on a part of her front, in plains where the extent of space

prevented confusion, and left a thousand roads open to the retreat of

that army.

The meanest soldier in our ranks, therefore, expected to hear of the

combined march of the Grand Vizir towards Kief, and of Bernadotte

against Finland. Eight sovereigns were already enlisted under the

banners of Napoleon; but the two who had the greatest interest in the

quarrel were still deaf to his call. It was an idea worthy of the great

emperor to put all the governments and all the religions of Europe in

motion for the accomplishment of his great designs: their triumph would

have been then secured; and if the voice of another Homer had been

wanting to this king of so many kings, the voice of the nineteenth

century, the great century, would have supplied it; and the cry of

astonishment of a whole age, penetrating and piercing through futurity,

would have echoed from generation to generation, to the latest

posterity!

So much glory was not in reserve for us.

Which of us, in the French army, can ever forget his astonishment, in

the midst of the Russian plains, on hearing the news of the fatal

treaties of the Turks and Swedes with Alexander; and how anxiously our

looks were turned towards our right uncovered, towards our left

enfeebled, and upon our retreat menaced? _Then_ we only looked at the

fatal effects of the peace between our allies and our enemy; _now_ we

feel desirous of knowing the causes of it.

The treaties concluded about the end of the last century, had subjected

the weak sultan of the Turks to Russia; the Egyptian expedition had

armed him against us. But ever since Napoleon had assumed the reins of

power, a well-understood common interest, and the intimacy of a

mysterious correspondence, had reconciled Selim with the first consul: a

close connexion was established between these two princes, and they had

exchanged portraits with each other. Selim attempted to effect a great

revolution in the Turkish customs. Napoleon encouraged him, and was

assisting him in introducing the European discipline into the Ottoman

army, when the victory of Jena, the war of Poland, and the influence of

Sebastiani, determined the sultan to throw off the yoke of Alexander.

The English made hasty attempts to oppose this, but they were driven

from the sea of Constantinople. Then it was that Napoleon wrote the

following letter to Selim.

"_Osterode, April_ 3, 1807.

"My ambassador informs me of the bravery and good conduct of the

Mussulmans against our common enemies. Thou hast shown thyself the

worthy descendant of the Selims and the Solimans. Thou hast asked me for

some officers; I send them to thee. I regretted that thou hadst not

required of me some thousand men,--thou hast only asked for five

hundred; I have given orders for their immediate departure. It is my

intention that they shall be paid and clothed at my expense, and that

thou shalt be reimbursed the expenses which they may occasion thee. I

have given orders to the commander of my troops in Dalmatia to send thee

the arms, ammunition, and every thing thou shalt require of me. I have

given the same orders at Naples; and artillery has been already placed

at the disposal of the pasha of Janina. Generals, officers, arms of

every description, even money--I place all at thy disposal. Thou hast

only to ask: do so in a distinct manner, and all which thou shalt

require I will send thee on the instant. Arrange matters with the shah

of Persia, who is also the enemy of the Russians; encourage him to stand

fast, and to attack warmly the common enemy. I have beaten the Russians

in a great battle; I have taken from them seventy-five pieces of cannon,

sixteen standards, and a great number of prisoners. I am at the distance

of eighty leagues beyond Warsaw, and am about to take advantage of the

fifteen days' repose which I have given to my army, to repair thither,

and there to receive thy ambassador. I am sensible of the want thou hast

of artillerymen and troops; I have offered both to thy ambassador; but

he has declined them, from a fear of alarming the delicacy of the

Mussulmans. Confide to me all thy wants; I am sufficiently powerful, and

sufficiently interested in thy prosperity, both from friendship and

policy, to have nothing to refuse thee. Peace has been proposed to me

here. I have been offered all the advantages which I could desire; but

they wished that I should ratify the state of things established

between the Porte and Russia by the treaty of Sistowa, and I refused. My

answer was, _that it was necessary that the Porte should be secured in

complete independence; and that all the treaties extorted from her,

during the time that France was asleep, should be revoked_."

This letter of Napoleon had been preceded and followed by verbal but

formal assurances, that he would not sheath the sword, until the Crimea

was restored to the dominion of the crescent. He had even authorized

Sebastiani to give the divan a copy of his instructions, which contained

these promises.

Such were his words, with which his actions at first corresponded.

Sebastiani demanded a passage through Turkey for an army of 25,000

French, which he was to command, and which was to join the Ottoman army.

An unforeseen circumstance, it is true, deranged this plan; but Napoleon

then made Selim the promise of an auxiliary force of 9000 French,

including 5000 artillerymen, who were to be conveyed in eleven vessels

of the line to Constantinople. The Turkish ambassador was at the same

time treated with the greatest distinction in the French camp; he

accompanied Napoleon in all his reviews: the most flattering attentions

were paid to him, and the grand-equerry (Caulaincourt,) was already

treating with him for an alliance, offensive and defensive, when a

sudden attack by the Russians interrupted the negotiation.

The ambassador returned to Warsaw, where the same respect continued to

be shown him, up to the day of the decisive victory of Friedland. But

on the following day his illusion was dissipated; he saw himself

neglected; for it was no longer Selim whom he represented. A revolution

had just hurled from the throne the monarch who had been the friend of

Napoleon, and with him all hope of giving the Turks a regular army, upon

which he could depend. Napoleon, therefore, judging that he could no

longer reckon upon the assistance of these barbarians, changed his

system. Henceforward it was Alexander whom he wished to gain; and as his

was a genius which never hesitated, he was already prepared to abandon

the empire of the East to that monarch, in order that he might be left

at liberty to possess himself of that of the West.

As his great object was the extension of the continental system, and to

make it surround Europe, the co-operation of Russia would complete its

development. Alexander would shut out the English from the North, and

compel Sweden to go to war with them; the French would expel them from

the centre, from the south, and from the west of Europe. Napoleon was

already meditating the expedition to Portugal, if that kingdom would not

join his coalition. With these ideas floating in his brain, Turkey was

now only an accessary in his plans, and he agreed to the armistice, and

to the conferences at Tilsit.

But a deputation had just come from Wilna, soliciting the restoration of

their national independence, and professing the same devotion to his

cause as had been shown by Warsaw; Berthier, whose ambition was

satisfied, and who began to be tired of war, dismissed these envoys

rudely, styling them traitors to their sovereign. The Prince of Eckmühl,

on the contrary, favoured their object, and presented them to Napoleon,

who was irritated with Berthier for his treatment of these Lithuanians,

and received them graciously, without, however, promising them his

support. In vain did Davoust represent to him that the opportunity was

favourable, owing to the destruction of the Russian army; Napoleon's

reply was, "that Sweden had just declared her armistice to him; that

Austria offered her mediation between France and Russia, which he looked

upon as a hostile step; that the Prussians, seeing him at such a

distance from France, might recover from their intimidation; and

finally, that Selim, his faithful ally, had just been dethroned, and his

place filled by Mustapha IV., of whose dispositions he knew nothing."

The emperor of France continued, therefore, to negotiate with Russia;

and the Turkish ambassador, neglected and forgotten, wandered about our

camp, without being summoned to take any part in the negotiations which

terminated the war; he returned to Constantinople soon after, in great

displeasure. Neither the Crimea, nor even Moldavia and Wallachia, were

restored to that barbarous court by the treaty of Tilsit; the

restitution of the two latter provinces was only stipulated by an

armistice, the conditions of which were never meant to be executed. But

as Napoleon professed to be the mediator between Mustapha and Alexander,

the ministers of the two powers repaired to Paris. But there, during

the long continuance of that feigned mediation, the Turkish

plenipotentiaries were never admitted to his presence.

If we must even tell the whole truth, it is asserted, that at the

interview at Tilsit, and subsequently, a treaty for the partition of

Turkey was under discussion. It was proposed to Russia to take

possession of Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, and a part of Mount Hemus.

Austria was to have Servia and a part of Bosnia; France the other part

of that province, Albania, Macedonia, and all Greece as far as

Thessalonica: Constantinople, Adrianople, and Thrace, were to be left to

the Turks.

Whether the conferences respecting this partition were really of a

serious nature, or merely the communication of a great idea, is

uncertain; so much is certain, that shortly after the interview at

Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated. The

suggestions of prudence had shown him the danger of substituting for the

ignorant, infatuated, and feeble Turkey, an active, powerful, and

unaccommodating neighbour. In his conversations on the subject at that

time, he remarked, "that he had already too much desert country; that he

knew too well, by the occupation of the Crimea, which was still

depopulated, the value of conquest over foreign and hostile religions

and manners; that besides, France and Russia were too strong to become

such near neighbours; that two such powerful bodies coming into

immediate contact, would be sure to jostle; and that it was much better

to leave intermediate powers between them."

On the other side, the French emperor urged the matter no further; the

Spanish insurrection diverted his attention, and imperiously required

his presence with all his forces. Even previous to the interview at

Erfurt, after Sebastiani's return from Constantinople, although Napoleon

still seemed to adhere to the idea of dismembering Turkey in Europe, he

had admitted the correctness of his ambassador's reasoning: "That in

this partition, the advantages would be all against him; that Russia and

Austria would acquire contiguous provinces, which would make their

dominions more complete, while we should be obliged to keep 80,000 men

continually in Greece to retain it in subjection; that such an army,

from the distance and losses it would sustain from long marches, and the

novelty and unhealthiness of the climate, would require 30,000 recruits

annually, a number which would quite drain France: that a line of

operation extending from Athens to Paris, was out of all proportion;

that besides, it was strangled in its passage at Trieste, at which point

only two marches would enable the Austrians to place themselves across

it, and thereby cut off our army of observation in Greece from all

communication with Italy and France."

Here Napoleon exclaimed, "that Austria certainly complicated every

thing; that she was there like a dead weight; that she must be got rid

off; and Europe must be divided into two empires: that the Danube, from

the Black Sea to Passau, the mountains of Bohemia to Königsgratz, and

the Elbe to the Baltic, should be their lines of demarcation. Alexander

should become the emperor of the north, and he of the south of Europe."

Abandoning, subsequently, these lofty ideas, and reverting to

Sebastiani's observations on the partition of European Turkey, he

terminated the conferences, which had lasted three days, with these

words: "You are right, and no answer can be given to that! I give it up.

Besides, that accords with my views on Spain, which I am going to unite

to France."--"What do I hear?" exclaimed Sebastiani, astonished, "unite

it! And your brother!"--"What signifies my brother?" retorted Napoleon;

"does one give away a kingdom like Spain? I am determined to unite it to

France. I will give that nation a great national representation. I will

make the emperor Alexander consent to it, by allowing him to take

possession of Turkey to the Danube, and I will evacuate Berlin. As to

Joseph, I will indemnify him."

The congress at Erfurt took place just after this. He could have no

motive at that time for supporting the rights of the Turks. The French

army, which had advanced imprudently into the very heart of Spain, had

met with reverses. The presence of its leader, and that of his armies of

the Rhine and the Elbe, became there every day more and more necessary,

and Austria had availed herself of the opportunity to take up arms.

Uneasy respecting the state of Germany, Napoleon was therefore anxious

to make sure of the dispositions of Alexander, to conclude an alliance

offensive and defensive with him, and even to engage him in a war. Such

were the reasons which induced him to abandon Turkey as far as the

Danube to that emperor.

The Porte therefore had very soon reason to reproach us for the war

which was renewed between it and Russia. Notwithstanding, in July, 1808,

when Mustapha was dethroned, and succeeded by Mahmoud, the latter

announced his accession to the French emperor; but Napoleon had then to

keep upon terms with Alexander, and felt too much regret at the death of

Selim, detestation of the barbarity of the Mussulmans, and contempt for

their unstable government, to allow him to notice the communication. For

three years he had returned no reply to the sultan, and his silence

might be interpreted into a refusal to acknowledge him.

He was in this ambiguous position with the Turks, when all of a sudden,

on the 21st of March, 1812, only six weeks before the war with Russia

commenced, he solicited an alliance with Mahmoud: he demanded that,

within five days from the period of the communication, all negotiation

between the Turks and Russians should be broken off; and that an army of

100,000 men, commanded by the sultan himself, should march to the Danube

within nine days. The return which he proposed to make for this

assistance was, to put the Porte in possession of the very same Moldavia

and Wallachia, which, under the circumstances, the Russians were but too

happy to restore as the price of a speedy peace; and the promise of

procuring the restoration of the Crimea, which he had made six years

before to Selim, was again renewed.

We know not whether the time which this despatch would take to arrive at

Constantinople had been badly calculated, whether Napoleon believed the

Turkish army to be stronger than it really was, or whether he had

flattered himself with surprising and captivating the determination of

the divan by so sudden and advantageous a proposition. It can hardly be

supposed that he was ignorant of the long invariable custom of the

Mussulmans, which prevented the grand signor from ever appearing in

person at the head of his army.

It appears as if the genius of Napoleon could not stoop so low as to

impute to the divan the brutish ignorance which it exhibited of its real

interests. After the manner in which he had abandoned the interests of

Turkey in 1807, perhaps he did not make sufficient allowance for the

distrust which the Mussulmans were likely to entertain of his new

promises; he forgot that they were too ignorant to appreciate the change

which recent circumstances had effected in his political views; and that

barbarians like them could still less comprehend the feelings of dislike

with which they had inspired him, by their deposition and murder of

Selim, to whom he was attached, and in conjunction with whom he had

hoped to make European Turkey a military power capable of coping with

Russia.

Perhaps he might still have gained over Mahmoud to his cause, if he had

sooner made use of more potent arguments; but, as he has since expressed

himself, it revolted his pride to make use of corruption. We shall

besides shortly see him hesitating about beginning a war with Alexander,

or laying too much stress on the alarm with which his immense

preparations would inspire that monarch. It is also possible, that the

last propositions which he made to the Turks, being tantamount to a

declaration of war against the Russians, were delayed for the express

purpose of deceiving the Czar as to the period of his invasion. Finally,

whether it was from all these causes, from a confidence founded on the

mutual hatred of the two nations, and on his treaty of alliance with

Austria, which had just guaranteed Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks,

he detained the ambassador whom he sent to them on his road, and waited,

as we have just seen, to the very last moment.

But the divan was surrounded by the Russian, English, Austrian, and

Swedish envoys, who with one voice represented to it, "that the Turks

were indebted for their existence in Europe solely to the divisions

which existed among the Christian monarchs; that the moment these were

united under one influence, the Mahometans in Europe would be

overwhelmed; and that as the French emperor was advancing rapidly to the

attainment of universal empire, it was him whom the Turks had most

reason to dread."

To these representations were added the intrigues of the two Greek

princes Morozi. They were of the same religion with Alexander, and they

looked to him for the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Grown rich

by his favours and by the gold of England, these dragomans enlightened

the unsuspecting ignorance of the Turks, as to the occupation and

military surveys of the Ottoman frontiers by the French. They did a

great deal more; the first of them influenced the dispositions of the

divan and the capital, and the second those of the grand vizir and the

army; and as the proud Mahmoud resisted, and would only accept an

honourable peace, these treacherous Greeks contrived to disband his

army, and compelled him, by insurrections, to sign the degrading treaty

of Bucharest with the Russians.

Such is the power of intrigue in the seraglio; two Greeks whom the Turks

despised, there decided the fate of Turkey, in spite of the sultan

himself. As the latter depended for his existence on the intrigues of

his palace, he was, like all despots who shut themselves up in them,

obliged to yield: the Morozi carried the day; but afterwards he had them

both beheaded.

CHAP. IV.

In this manner did we lose the support of Turkey; but Sweden still

remained to us; her monarch had sprung from our ranks; a soldier of our

army, it was to that he owed his glory and his throne: was it likely

that he would desert our cause on the first opportunity he had of

showing his gratitude? It was impossible to anticipate such ingratitude;

still less, that he would sacrifice the real and permanent interests of

Sweden to his former jealousy of Napoleon, and perhaps to a weakness too

common among the upstart favourites of fortune; unless it be that the

submission of men who have newly attained to greatness to those who

boast of a transmitted rank, is a necessity of their position rather

than an error of their self-love.

In this great contest between aristocracy and democracy, the ranks of

the former had been joined by one of its most determined enemies.

Bernadotte being thrown almost singly among the ancient courts and

nobility, did every thing to merit his adoption by them, and succeeded.

But his success must have cost him dear, as in order to obtain it, he

was first obliged to abandon his old companions, and the authors of his

glory, in the hour of peril. At a later period he did more; he was seen

marching over their bleeding corses, joining with all their, and

formerly his, enemies, to overwhelm the country of his birth, and

thereby lay that of his adoption at the mercy of the first czar who

should be ambitious of reigning over the Baltic.

On the other hand, it would appear that the character of Bernadotte, and

the importance of Sweden in the decisive struggle which was about to

commence, were not sufficiently weighed in the political balance of

Napoleon. His ardent and exclusive genius hazarded too much; he

overloaded a solid foundation so much that he sank it. Thus it was, that

after justly appreciating the Swedish interests as naturally bound up

with his, the moment he wished to weaken the power of Russia, he fancied

that he could exact every thing from the Swedes without promising them

any thing in return: his pride did not make any allowance for theirs,

judging that they were too much interested in the success of his cause,

for them ever to think of separating themselves from it.

We must, however, take up the history a little earlier; facts will prove

that the defection of Sweden was as much attributable to the jealous

ambition of Bernadotte as to the unbending pride of Napoleon. It will be

seen that her new monarch assumed to himself a great part of the

responsibility of the rupture, by offering his alliance at the price of

an act of treachery.

When Napoleon returned from Egypt, he did not become the chief of his

equals with all their concurrence. Such of them as were already jealous

of his glory then became still more envious of his power. As they could

not dispute the first, they attempted to refuse obedience to the second.

Moreau, and several other generals, either by persuasion or surprise,

had co-operated in the revolution of the 18th Brumaire: they afterwards

repented having done so. Bernadotte had refused all participation in it.

Alone, during the night, in Napoleon's own residence, amidst a thousand

devoted officers, waiting only for the conqueror's orders, Bernadotte,

then a strenuous republican, was daring enough to oppose his arguments,

to refuse the second place in the republic, and to retort upon his anger

by threats. Napoleon saw him depart, bearing himself proudly, and pass

through the midst of his partizans, carrying with him his secrets, and

declaring himself his enemy, and even his denouncer. Either from respect

to his brother, to whom Bernadotte was allied by marriage, from

moderation, the usual companion of strength, or from astonishment, he

suffered him to depart quietly.

In the course of the same night, a conventicle, consisting of ten

deputies of the Council of Five Hundred, met at the house of S----;

thither Bernadotte repaired. They settled, that at nine o'clock next

morning the Council should hold a sitting, to which those only should be

invited who were of the same way of thinking; that there a decree should

be passed, that in imitation of the Council of Ancients, which had

prudently named Bonaparte general of its guard, the Council of Five

Hundred had appointed Bernadotte to command theirs; and that the latter,

properly armed, should be in readiness to be summoned to it. It was at

S----'s house that this plan was formed. S---- himself immediately

afterwards ran to Napoleon, and disclosed the whole to him. A threat

from the latter was quite sufficient to keep the conspirators in order;

not one of them dared show his face at the Council, and the next day the

revolution of the 18th Brumaire was completed.

Bernadotte was prudent enough afterwards to feign submission, but

Napoleon had not forgotten his opposition. He kept a watchful eye on all

his movements. Not long after, he suspected his being at the head of a

republican conspiracy which had been forming against him in the west. A

premature proclamation discovered it; an officer who had been arrested

for other causes, and an accomplice of Bernadotte, denounced the

authors. On that occasion Bernadotte's ruin would have been sealed, if

Napoleon had been able to convict him of it.

He was satisfied with banishing him to America, under the title of

minister of the Republic. But fortune favoured Bernadotte, who was

already at Rochefort, by delaying his embarkation until the war with

England was renewed. He then refused to go, and Napoleon could no longer

compel him.

All the relations between them had thus been those of hatred; and this

check only served to aggravate them. Soon after, Napoleon was heard

reproaching Bernadotte with his envious and treacherous inaction during

the battle of Auerstadt, and his order of the day at Wagram, in which

he had assumed the honour of that victory. He also spoke reproachfully

of his character, as being much more ambitious than patriotic; and

perhaps of the fascination of his manners,--all of them things

considered dangerous to a recently established government; and yet he

had showered rank, titles, and distinctions upon him, while Bernadotte,

always ungrateful, seemed to accept them merely as in justice due to his

merits, or to the want which was felt of him. These complaints of

Napoleon were not without foundation.

Bernadotte, on his side, abusing the emperor's moderation and desire to

keep on terms with him, gradually incurred an increase of his

displeasure, which his ambition was pleased to call enmity. He demanded

why Napoleon had placed him in such a dangerous and false position at

Wagram? why the report of that victory had been so unfavourable to him?

to what was he to attribute the jealous anxiety to weaken his eulogium

in the journals by artful notes? Up to that time, however, the obscure

and underhand opposition of this general to his emperor had been of no

importance; but a much wider field was then opened to their

misunderstanding.

By the treaty of Tilsit, Sweden, as well as Turkey, had been sacrificed

to Russia and the continental system. The mistaken or mad politics of

Gustavus IV. had been the cause of this. Ever since 1804 that monarch

appeared to have enlisted himself in the pay of England; it was he also

who had been the first to break the ancient alliance between France and

Sweden. He had obstinately persevered in that false policy to such an

extent at first, as to contend against France when she was victorious

over Russia, and afterwards with Russia and France united. The loss of

Pomerania, in 1807, and even that of Finland and the islands of Aland,

which were united to Russia in 1808, were not sufficient to shake his

obstinacy.

It was then that his irritated subjects resumed that power which had

been wrested from them, in 1772 and 1788, by Gustavus III., and of which

his successor made so bad a use. Gustavus Adolphus IV. was imprisoned

and dethroned; his lineal descendants were excluded from the throne; his

uncle was put in his place, and the prince of Holstein-Augustenburg

elected hereditary prince of Sweden. As the war had been the cause of

this revolution peace was the result of it; it was concluded with Russia

in 1809; but the newly-elected hereditary prince then died suddenly.

In the beginning of 1810, France restored Pomerania and the Island of

Rugen to Sweden, as the price of her accession to the continental

system. The Swedes, worn out, impoverished, and become almost islanders,

in consequence of the loss of Finland, were very loath to break with

England, and yet they had no remedy; on the other side they stood in awe

of the neighbouring and powerful government of Russia. Finding

themselves weak and isolated, they looked round for support.

Bernadotte had just been appointed to the command of the French army

which took possession of Pomerania; his military reputation, and still

more that of his nation and its sovereign, his fascinating mildness, his

generosity, and his flattering attentions to the Swedes, with whom he

had to treat, induced several of them to cast their eyes upon him. They

appeared to know nothing of the misunderstanding between this marshal

and the emperor; they fancied that by electing him for their prince,

they should not only obtain an able and experienced general, but also a

powerful mediator between France and Sweden, and a certain protector in

the emperor: it happened quite the contrary.

During the intrigues to which this circumstance gave rise, Bernadotte

fancied that to his previous complaints against Napoleon he had to add

others. When, in opposition to the king, and the majority of the members

of the diet, he was proposed as successor to the crown of Sweden; when

his pretensions were supported by Charles's prime minister, (a man of no

family, who owed, like him, all his illustration to himself,) and the

count de Wrede, the only member of the diet who had reserved his vote

for him; when he came to solicit Napoleon's interference, why did he,

when Charles XIII. desired to know his wishes, exhibit so much

indifference? Why did he prefer the union of the three northern crowns

on the head of a prince of Denmark? If he, Bernadotte, succeeded in the

enterprise, he was not at all indebted for it to the emperor of France;

he owed it to the pretensions of the king of Denmark, which

counteracted those of the duke of Augustenburg[3], his most dangerous

rival; to the grateful audacity of the baron de Moerner, who was the

first to come to him, and offer to put him on the lists, and to the

aversion of the Swedes to the Danes; above all he owed it to a passport

which had been adroitly obtained by his agent from Napoleon's minister.

It was said that this document was audaciously produced by Bernadotte's

secret emissary, as a proof of an autograph mission with which he

pretended to be charged, and of the formal desire of the French emperor

to see one of his lieutenants, and the relation of his brother, placed

upon the throne of Sweden.

[Footnote 3: Brother of the deceased prince of that name.]

Bernadotte also felt that he owed this crown to the chance, which

brought him in communication with the Swedes, and made them acquainted

with his characteristic qualities; to the birth of his son, which

secured the heredity succession; to the address of his agents, who,

either with or without his authority, dazzled the poverty of the

Scandinavians with the promise of fourteen millions with which his

election was to enrich their treasury; and finally to his flattering

attentions, which had gained him the voices of several Swedish officers

who had been his prisoners. But as to Napoleon, what did he owe to him?

What was his reply to the news of the offer of several Swedes, when he

himself waited upon him to inform him of it? "I am at too great a

distance from Sweden, to mix myself up in her affairs. You must not

reckon upon my support." At the same time it is true, that either from

necessity, from his dreading the election of the duke of Oldenburg; or

finally from respect for the wishes of fortune, Napoleon declared that

he would leave it to her to decide: and Bernadotte was in consequence

elected crown prince of Sweden.

The newly-elected prince immediately paid his respects to the emperor,

who received him frankly. "As you are offered the crown of Sweden, I

permit you to accept it. I had another wish, as you know; but, in short,

it is your sword which has made you a king, and you are sensible that it

is not for me to stand in the way of your good fortune." He then entered

very fully with him into the whole plan of his policy, in which

Bernadotte appeared entirely to concur; every day he attended the

emperor's levee together with his son, mixing with the other courtiers.

By such marks of deference, he completely gained the heart of Napoleon.

He was about to depart, poor. Unwilling that he should present himself

to the Swedish throne in that necessitous state, like a mere adventurer,

the emperor generously gave him two millions out of his own treasury; he

even granted to his family the dotations which as a foreign prince he

could no longer retain himself; and they parted on apparent terms of

mutual satisfaction.

It was natural that the expectations of Napoleon as to the alliance with

Sweden should be heightened by this election, and by the favours which

he had bestowed. At first Bernadotte's correspondence with him was that

of a grateful inferior, but the very moment he was fairly out of France,

feeling himself as it were relieved from a state of long and painful

constraint, it is said that his hatred to Napoleon vented itself in

threatening expressions, which, whether true or false, were reported to

the emperor.

On his side, that monarch, forced to be absolute in his continental

system, cramped the commerce of Sweden; he wished her even to exclude

American vessels from her ports; and at last he declared that he would

only regard as friends the enemies of Great Britain. Bernadotte was

obliged to make his election; the winter and the sea separated him from

the assistance, or protected him from the attacks, of the English; the

French were close to his ports; a war with France therefore would be

real and effective; a war with England would be merely on paper. The

prince of Sweden adopted the latter alternative.

Napoleon, however, being as much a conqueror in peace as in war, and

suspecting the intentions of Bernadotte, had demanded from Sweden

several supplies of rigging for his Brest fleet, and the despatch of a

body of troops, which were to be in his pay; in this manner weakening

his allies to subdue his enemies, so as to allow him to be the master of

both. He also required that colonial produce should be subjected in

Sweden, the same as in France, to a duty of five per cent. It is even

affirmed that he applied to Bernadotte to allow French custom-house

officers to be placed at Gottenburg. These demands were eluded.

Soon after, Napoleon proposed an alliance between Sweden, Denmark, and

the grand duchy of Warsaw; a northern confederation, of which he would

have declared himself protector, like that of the Rhine. The answer of

Bernadotte, without being absolutely negative, had the same effect; it

was the same with the offensive and defensive treaty which Napoleon

again proposed to him. Bernadotte has since declared, that in four

successive letters written with his own hand, he had frankly stated the

impossibility he was under of complying with his wishes, and repeated

his protestations of attachment to his former sovereign, but that the

latter never deigned to give him any reply. This impolitic silence (if

the fact be true,) can only be attributed to the pride of Napoleon,

which was piqued at Bernadotte's refusals. No doubt he considered his

protestations as too false to deserve any answer.

The irritation increased; the communications became disagreeable; they

were interrupted by the recall of Alquier, the French minister in

Sweden. As the pretended declaration of war by Bernadotte against

England remained a dead letter, Napoleon, who was not to be denied or

deceived with impunity, carried on a sharp war against the Swedish

commerce by means of his privateers. By them, and the invasion of

Swedish Pomerania on the 27th of January, 1812, he punished Bernadotte

for his deviations from the continental system, and obtained as

prisoners several thousand Swedish soldiers and sailors, whom he had in

vain demanded as auxiliaries.

Then also our communications with Russia were broken off. Napoleon

immediately addressed himself to the prince of Sweden; his notes were

couched in the style of a lord paramount who fancies he speaks in the

interest of his vassal, who feels the claims he has upon his gratitude

or submission, and who calculates upon his obedience. He demanded that

Bernadotte should declare a real war against England, shut her out from

the Baltic, and send an army of 40,000 Swedes against Russia. In return

for this, he promised him his protection, the restoration of Finland,

and twenty millions, in return for an equal amount of colonial produce,

which the Swedes were first to deliver. Austria undertook to support

this proposition; but Bernadotte, already feeling himself settled on the

throne, answered like an independent monarch. Ostensibly he declared

himself neutral, opened his ports to all nations, proclaimed his rights

and his grievances, appealed to humanity, recommended peace, and offered

himself as a mediator; secretly, he offered himself to Napoleon at the

price of Norway, Finland, and a subsidy.

At the reading of a letter conceived in this new and unexpected style,

Bonaparte was seized with rage and astonishment. He saw in it, and not

without reason, a premeditated defection on the part of Bernadotte, a

secret agreement with his enemies! He was filled with indignation; he

exclaimed, striking violently on the letter, and the table on which it

lay open: "He! the rascal! he presume to give me advice! to dictate the

law to me! to dare propose such an infamous act[4] to me! And this from

a man who owes every thing to my bounty! What ingratitude!" Then, pacing

the room with rapid strides, at intervals he gave vent to such

expressions as these: "I ought to have expected it! he has always

sacrificed every thing to his interests! This is the same man, who,

during his short ministry, attempted the resurrection of the infamous

Jacobins! When he looked only to gain by disorder, he opposed the 18th

Brumaire! He it was who was conspiring in the west against the

re-establishment of law and religion! Has not his envious and perfidious

inaction already betrayed the French army at Auerstadt? How many times,

from regard to Joseph, have I pardoned his intrigues and concealed his

faults! And yet I have made him general-in-chief, marshal, duke, prince,

and finally king! But see how all these favours and the pardon of so

many injuries, are thrown away on a man like this! If Sweden, half

devoured by Russia, for a century past, has retained her independence,

she owes it to the support of France. But it matters not; Bernadotte

requires the baptism of the ancient aristocracy! a baptism of blood, and

of French blood! and you will soon see, that to satisfy his envy and

ambition, he will betray both his native and adopted country."

[Footnote 4: Napoleon no doubt spoke of the proposal which Bernadotte

made to him to take Norway from Denmark, his faithful ally, in order by

this act of treachery to purchase the assistance of Sweden.]

In vain did they attempt to calm him. They represented the difficulties

which Bernadotte's new situation had imposed on him; that the cession of

Finland to Russia had separated Sweden from the continent, almost made

an island of that country, and thereby enlisted her in the English

system.--In such critical circumstances, all the need which he had of

this ally was unable to vanquish his pride, which revolted at a

proposition which he regarded as insulting; perhaps also in the new

prince of Sweden he still saw the same Bernadotte who was lately his

subject, and his military inferior, and who at last affected to have cut

out for himself a destiny independent of his. From that moment his

instructions to his minister bore the impress of that disposition; the

latter, it is true, softened the bitterness of them, but a rupture

became inevitable.

It is uncertain which contributed most to it, the pride of Napoleon, or

the ancient jealousy of Bernadotte; it is certain that on the part of

the former the motives of it were honourable. "Denmark" he said, "was

his most faithful ally; her attachment to France had cost her the loss

of her fleet and the burning of her capital. Must he repay a fidelity

which had been so cruelly tried, by an act of treachery such as that of

taking Norway from her to give to Sweden?"

As to the subsidy which Sweden required of him, he answered, as he had

done to Turkey, "that if the war was to be carried on with money,

England would always be sure to outbid him;" and above all, "that there

was weakness and baseness in triumphing by corruption." Reverting by

this to his wounded pride, he terminated the conference by exclaiming,

"Bernadotte impose conditions on me! Does he fancy then that I have need

of him? I will soon bind him to my victorious career, and compel him to

follow my sovereign impulse."

But the active and speculative English, who were out of his reach, made

a judicious estimate of the weak points of his system, and found the

Russians ready to act upon their suggestions. They it was who had been

endeavouring for the last three years to draw the forces of Napoleon

into the defiles of Spain, and to exhaust them; it was they also who

were on the watch to take advantage of the vindictive enmity of the

prince of Sweden.

Knowing that the active and restless vanity of men newly risen from

obscurity is always uneasy and susceptible, in the presence of ancient

_parvenus_, George and Alexander were lavish of their promises and

flattery, in order to cajole Bernadotte. It was thus that they caressed

him, at the time that the irritated Napoleon was threatening him; they

promised him Norway and a subsidy, when the other, forced to refuse him

that province of a faithful ally, took possession of Pomerania. While

Napoleon, a monarch deriving his elevation from himself, relying on the

faith of treaties, on the remembrance of past benefits, and on the real

interests of Sweden, required succours from Bernadotte, the hereditary

monarchs of London and Petersburgh required his opinion with deference,

and submitted themselves by anticipation to the counsels of his

experience. Finally, while the genius of Napoleon, the grandeur of his

elevation, the importance of his enterprise, and the habit of their

former relations, still classed Bernadotte as his lieutenant, these

monarchs appeared already to treat him as their general. How was it

possible for him not to seek to escape on the one hand from this sense

of inferiority, and on the other to resist a mode of treatment, and

promises so seductive? Thus the future prospects of Sweden were

sacrificed, and her independence for ever laid at the mercy of Russian

faith by the treaty of Petersburgh, which Bernadotte signed on the 24th

of March, 1812. That of Bucharest, between Alexander and Mahmoud, was

concluded on the 28th of May.--Thus did we lose the support of our two

wings.

Nevertheless, the emperor of the French, at the head of more than six

hundred thousand men, and already too far advanced to think of

retreating, flattered himself that his strength would decide every

thing; that a victory on the Niemen would cut the knot of all these

diplomatic difficulties, which he despised, probably too much; that

then all the monarchs of Europe, compelled to acknowledge his

ascendancy, would be eager to return into his system, and that all those

satellites would be drawn into its vortex.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon meanwhile was still at Paris, in the midst of his great

officers, who were alarmed by the terrible encounter which was

preparing. The latter had nothing more to acquire, but much to preserve;

their personal interest, therefore, was united with the general desire

of nations, which were fatigued with war; and without disputing the

utility of this expedition, they dreaded its approach. But they only

confessed this to each other in secret, either from fear of giving

umbrage, of impairing the confidence of nations, or of being proved

wrong by the result. For that reason, in Napoleon's presence they

remained silent, and even appeared to be uninformed as to a war, which

for a considerable time had furnished a subject of conversation to the

whole of Europe.

But at length this respectful taciturnity, which he himself had taken

pains to impose, became disagreeable; he suspected that it proceeded

more from disapprobation than reserve. Obedience was not sufficient for

him; it was his wish to combine it with conviction: that was like

another conquest. Besides, no one was more convinced than himself of

the power of public opinion, which, according to him, _created or

destroyed sovereigns_. In short, whether through policy or self-love, it

was his desire to persuade.

Such were the dispositions of Napoleon and of the grandees who

surrounded him, when the veil being about to be rent, and war evident,

their silence towards him assumed a greater appearance of indiscretion

than hazarding a few timely words. Some of them, therefore, commenced

the task, and the emperor anticipated the others.

A show was made[5] at first of comprehending all the emergencies of his

position. "It was necessary to complete what had been begun; it was

impossible to stop in the midst of so rapid an acclivity, and so near

the summit. The empire of Europe was adapted to his genius; France would

become its centre and its base; great and entire, she would perceive

around her none but states so feeble and so divided, that all coalition

among them would become contemptible or impossible; but with such an

object why did he not commence the task by subjecting and partitioning

the states immediately around him?"

[Footnote 5: The arch-chancellor.]

To this objection Napoleon replied, "That such had been his project in

1809, in the war with Austria, but that the misfortune of Esslingen had

deranged his plan; that that event, and the doubtful dispositions which

Russia had since exhibited, had led him to marry an Austrian princess,

and strengthen himself by an alliance with the Austrian against the

Russian emperor.

"That he did not create circumstances, but that he would not allow them

to escape him; that he comprehended them all, and held himself in as

much readiness as possible for their appearance; that in order to

accomplish his designs, he was fully aware that twelve years were

necessary, but that he could not afford to wait so long.

"That besides, he had not provoked this war; that he had been faithful

to his engagements with Alexander; proofs of which were to be found in

the coldness of his relations with Turkey and Sweden, which had been

delivered up to Russia, one almost entirely, the other shorn of Finland,

and even of the Isle of Aland, which was so near Stockholm. That he had

only replied to the distressed appeal of the Swedes, by advising them to

make the cession.

"That, nevertheless, since 1809, the Russian army destined to act in

concert with Poniatowski in Austrian Gallicia had come forward too late,

was too weak, and had acted perfidiously; that since that time,

Alexander, by his ukase of the 31st of December, 1810, had abandoned the

continental system, and by his prohibitions declared an actual war

against French commerce; that he was quite aware that the interest and

national spirit of the Russians might have compelled him to that, but

that he had then communicated to their emperor that he was aware of his

position, and would enter into every kind of arrangement which his

repose required; in spite of which, Alexander, instead of modifying his

ukase, had assembled 80,000 men, under pretence of supporting his

custom-house officers; that he had suffered himself to be seduced by

England; that, lastly, he even now refused to recognize the

thirty-second military division, and demanded the evacuation of Prussia

by the French; which was equivalent to a declaration of war."

Through all these complaints, some persons thought they perceived that

the pride of Napoleon was wounded by the independent attitude which

Russia was daily resuming. The dispossession of the Russian Princess of

Oldenburg of her duchy led to other conjectures; it was said that hints

had been given both at Tilsit and Erfurt about a divorce, after which a

closer alliance might be contracted with Russia; that these hints had

not been encouraged, and that Napoleon retained a resentful remembrance

of it. This fact is affirmed by some, and denied by others.

But all those passions which so despotically govern other men, possessed

but a feeble influence over a genius so firm and vast as his: at the

utmost, they may have imparted the first momentum which impelled him

into action earlier than he would have wished; but without penetrating

so deeply beneath the folds of his great mind, a single idea, an obvious

fact, was enough to hurry him, sooner or later, into that decisive

struggle,--that was, the existence of an empire, which rivalled his own

in greatness, but was still young, like its prince, and growing every

day; while the French empire, already mature, like its emperor, could

scarcely anticipate any thing but its decrease.

Whatever was the height to which Napoleon had raised the throne of the

south and west of Europe, he perceived the northern throne of Alexander

ever ready to overshadow him by its eternally menacing position. On

those icy summits of Europe, whence, in former times, so many floods of

barbarians had rushed forth, he perceived all the elements of a new

inundation collecting and maturing. Till then, Austria and Prussia had

opposed sufficient barriers; but these he himself had humbled and

overthrown: he stood, therefore, single, front to front with what he

feared; he alone remained the champion of the civilization, the riches,

and the enjoyments of the nations of the south, against the rude

ignorance, and the fierce cupidity, of the poorer people of the north,

and against the ambition of their emperor and his nobility.

It was obvious, that war alone could decide this great

arbitrament,--this great and eternal struggle between the poor and the

rich; and, nevertheless, this war, with reference to us, was neither

European, nor even national. Europe entered into it against her

inclination, because the object of the expedition was to add to the

strength of her conqueror. France was exhausted, and anxious for repose;

her grandees, who formed the court of Napoleon, were alarmed at the

double-headed character of the war, at the dispersion of our armies from

Cadiz to Moscow; and even when admitting the _eventual_ necessity of the

struggle, its _immediate_ urgency did not appear to them so

legitimately proved.

They knew that it was more especially by an appeal to his political

interest that they had any chance of shaking the resolution of a prince,

whose principle was, "that there exist individuals whose conduct can but

rarely be regulated by their private sentiments, but always by

surrounding circumstances." In this persuasion, one of his ministers[6]

said to him, "that his finances required tranquillity;" but he replied,

"On the contrary, they are embarrassed, and require war." Another[7]

added, "that the state of his revenues never, in fact, had been more

flourishing; that, independent of a furnished account of from three to

four millions, it was really wonderful to find France unencumbered with

any urgent debts; but that this prosperous condition was approaching its

termination, since it appeared that with the year 1812 a ruinous

campaign was to commence; that hitherto, war had been made to support

the expense of war; that we had every where found the table laid out;

but that, in future, we could no longer live at the expense of Germany,

since she had become our ally; but, on the contrary, it would be

necessary to support her contingents, and that without any hope of

remuneration, whatever the result might be; that we should have to pay

at Paris for every ration of bread which would be consumed at Moscow, as

the new scenes of action offered us no harvest to reap, independent of

glory, but cordage, pitch, and shipping-tackle, which would certainly go

but a small way towards the discharge of the expenses of a continental

war. That France was not in a condition to subsidize all Europe in this

manner, especially at a moment when her resources were drained by the

war in Spain; that it was like lighting a fire at both ends at once,

which, gaining ground upon the centre, exhausted by so many

efforts,--would probably end in consuming ourselves."

[Footnote 6: Count Mollien.]

[Footnote 7: The Duke of Gaeta.]

This minister was listened to; the emperor surveyed him with a smiling

air, accompanied with one of his familiar caresses. He imagined that he

had secured conviction, but Napoleon said to him,--"So you think that I

shall not be able to find a paymaster to discharge the expenses of the

war?" The duke endeavoured to learn upon whom the burden was to fall,

when the emperor, by a single word, disclosing all the grandeur of his

designs, closed the lips of his astonished minister.

He estimated, however, but too accurately all the difficulties of his

enterprise. It was that, perhaps, which drew upon him the reproach of

availing himself of a method which he had rejected in the Austrian war,

and of which the celebrated Pitt had set the example in 1793.

Towards the end of 1811, the prefect of police at Paris learnt, it was

said, that a printer was secretly counterfeiting Russian bank-bills; he

ordered him to be arrested; the printer resisted; but in the result his

house was broken into, and himself taken before the magistrate, whom he

astonished by his assurance, and still more by his appeal from the

minister of police. This printer was instantly released: it has even

been added, that he continued his counterfeiting employment; and that,

from the moment of our first advance into Lithuania, we propagated the

report that we had gained possession at Wilna of several millions of

Russian bank-bills in the military chests of the hostile army.

Whatever may have been the origin of this counterfeit money, Napoleon

contemplated it with extreme repugnance; it is even unknown whether he

resolved on making any use of it; at least, it is certain that during

the period of our retreat, and when we abandoned Wilna, the greater part

of these bills were found there untouched, and burnt by his orders.

CHAP. II.

Prince Poniatowski, however, to whom this expedition appeared to hold

out the prospect of a throne, generously united his exertions with those

of the emperor's ministers in the attempt to demonstrate its danger.

Love of country was in this Polish prince a great and noble passion; his

life and death have proved it; but it never infatuated him. He depicted

Lithuania as an impracticable desert; its nobility as already become

half Russian; the character of its inhabitants as cold and backward:

but the impatient emperor interrupted him; he required information for

the sake of conducting the enterprise, and not to be deterred from it.

It is true that the greater part of these objections were but a feeble

repetition of all those which, for a long time past, had presented

themselves to his own mind. People were not aware of the extent to which

he had appreciated the danger; of his multiplied exertions, from the

30th of December 1810, to ascertain the nature of the territory which,

sooner or later, was destined to become the theatre of a decisive war;

how many emissaries he had despatched for the purpose of survey; the

multitude of memorials which he caused to be prepared for him respecting

the roads to Petersburgh and Moscow; respecting the dispositions of the

inhabitants, especially of the mercantile class; and, finally, the

resources of every kind which the country was enabled to supply. If he

persevered, it was because, far from deceiving himself as to the extent

of his force, he did not share in that confidence which, perhaps,

precluded others from perceiving of how much consequence the humiliation

of Russia was to the future existence of the great French empire.

In this spirit, he once more addressed himself to three[8] of his great

officers, whose well-known services and attachment authorized a tone of

frankness. All three, in the capacity of ministers, envoys, and

ambassadors, had become acquainted with Russia at different epochs. He

exerted himself to convince them of the utility, justice, and necessity

of this war; but one[9] of them, in particular, often interrupted him

with impatience; for when a discussion had once commenced, Napoleon

submitted to all its little breaches of decorum.

[Footnote 8: The Duke of Frioul, the Count de Segur, (the author's

father,) the Duke of Vicenza.]

[Footnote 9: The Duke of Vicenza.]

That great officer, yielding to the inflexible and impetuous frankness

which he derived from his character, from his military education, and,

perhaps, from the province which gave him birth, exclaimed, "That it was

useless to deceive himself, or pretend to deceive others; that after

possessing himself of the Continent, and even of the states belonging to

the family of his ally, that ally could not be accused of abandoning the

continental system. While the French armies covered all Europe, how

could the Russians be reproached for increasing their army? Did it

become the ambition of Napoleon to denounce the ambition of Alexander?

"That, in addition to this, the determination of that prince was made

up; that, Russia once invaded, no peace could be expected, while a

single Frenchman remained upon her soil; that, in that respect, the

national and obstinate pride of the Russians was in perfect harmony with

that of their emperor.

"That, it was true, his subjects accused Alexander of weakness, but very

erroneously; that he was not to be judged of by the complacency which,

at Tilsit and at Erfurt, his admiration, his inexperience, and some

tincture of ambition, had extorted from him. That this prince loved

justice; that he was anxious to have right on his side, and he might,

indeed, hesitate till he thought it was so, but then he became

inflexible; that, finally, looking to his position with reference to his

subjects, he incurred more danger by making a disgraceful peace, than by

sustaining an unfortunate war.

"How was it possible, moreover, to avoid seeing that in this war every

thing was to be feared, even our allies? Did not Napoleon hear their

discontented kings murmuring that they were only his prefects? When

they, all of them, only waited a suitable occasion in order to turn

against him, why run the risk of giving that occasion birth?"

At the same time, supported by his two colleagues, the duke added, "that

since 1805 a system of war which compelled the most disciplined soldier

to plunder, had sown the seeds of hatred throughout the whole of that

Germany, which the emperor now designed to traverse. Was he then going

to precipitate himself and his army beyond all those nations whose

wounds, for which they were indebted to us, were not yet healed? What an

accumulation of enmity and revenge would he not, by so doing, interpose

between himself and France!

"And upon whom did he call, to be his _points d'appui_?--on Prussia,

whom for five years we had been devouring, and whose alliance was hollow

and compulsive? He was about, therefore, to trace the longest line of

military operations ever drawn, through countries whose fear was

taciturn, supple, and perfidious, and which, like the ashes of

volcanoes, hid terrific flames, the eruption of which might be provoked

by the smallest collision[10].

[Footnote 10: The Duke of Vicenza, the Count de Segur.]

"To sum up all[11], what would be the result of so many conquests? To

substitute lieutenants for kings, who, more ambitious than those of

Alexander, would, perhaps, imitate their example, without, like them,

waiting for the death of their sovereign,--a death, moreover, which he

would inevitably meet among so many fields of battle; and that, before

the consolidation of his labours, each war reviving in the interior of

France the hopes of all kinds of parties, and reviving discussions which

had been regarded as at an end.

[Footnote 11: The Count de Segur.]

"Did he wish to know the opinion of the army? That opinion pronounced

that his best soldiers were then in Spain; that the regiments, being too

often recruited, wanted unity; that they were not reciprocally

acquainted; that each was uncertain whether, in case of danger, it could

depend upon the other; that the front rank vainly concealed the weakness

of the two others; that already, from youth and weakness, many of them

sank in their first march beneath the single burden of their knapsacks

and their arms.

"And, nevertheless, in this expedition, it was not so much the war

which was disliked, as the country where it was to be carried on[12].

The Lithuanians, it was said, desired our presence; but on what a soil?

in what a climate? in the midst of what peculiar manners? The campaign

of 1806 had made those circumstances too well known! Where could they

ever halt, in the midst of these level plains, divested of every species

of position fortified by nature or by art?

[Footnote 12: The Duke of Frioul, the Count de Segur, the Duke of

Vicenza.]

"Was it not notorious, that all the elements protected these countries

from the first of October to the first of June? that, at any other time

than the short interval comprised between these two epochs, an army

engaged in those deserts of mud and ice might perish there entirely, and

ingloriously?" And, they added, "that Lithuania was much more Asiatic

than Spain was African; and that the French army, already all but

banished from France by a perpetual war, wished at least to preserve its

European character.

"Finally, when face to face with the enemy in these deserts, what

different motives must actuate the different armies! On the side of the

Russians were country, independence, every description of interest,

private and public, even to the secret good wishes of our allies! On our

side, and in the teeth of so many obstacles, glory alone, unassociated

even with that desire of gain, to which the frightful poverty of these

countries offered no attraction.

"And what is the end of so many exertions? The French already no longer

recognized each other, in the midst of a country now uncircumscribed by

any natural frontier; and in which the diversity was so great in

manners, persons, and languages." On this particular point, the

eldest[13] of these great officers added, "That such an extension was

never made without proportionate exhaustion; that it was blotting out

France to merge it in Europe; for, in fact, when France should become

Europe, it would be France no longer. Would not the meditated departure

leave her solitary, deserted, without a ruler, without an army,

accessible to every diversion? Who then was there to defend her?" "_My

renown!_" exclaimed the emperor: "_I leave my name behind me, and the

fear inspired by a nation in arms._"

[Footnote 13: M. de Segur.]

And, without appearing in the least shaken by so many objections, he

announced "that he was about to organize the empire into cohorts of

_Ban_ and _Arrière Ban_; and without mistrust to leave to Frenchmen the

protection of France, of his crown, and of his glory.

"That as to Prussia, he had secured her tranquillity by the

impossibility in which he had placed her of moving, even in case of his

defeat, or of a descent of the English on the coasts of the North Sea,

and in our rear; that he held in his hands the civil and military power

of that kingdom; that he was master of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Torgau,

Spandau, and Magdeburg; that he would post some clear-sighted officers

at Colberg, and an army at Berlin; and that with these means, and

supported by the fidelity of Saxony, he had nothing to fear from

Prussian hatred.

"That as for the rest of Germany, an ancient system of policy, as well

as the recent intermarriages with Baden, Bavaria, and Austria, attached

her to the interest of France; that he made sure of such of her kings as

were indebted to him for their new titles: that after having suppressed

anarchy, and ranged himself on the side of kings, strong as he was, the

latter could not attack him without inciting their people by the

principles of democracy; but that it was scarcely probable that

sovereigns would ally themselves with that natural enemy of thrones--an

enemy, which, had it not been for him, would have overthrown them, and

against which he alone was capable of defending them.

"That, besides, the Germans were a tardy and methodical people, and that

in dealing with them he should always have time on his side; that he

commanded all the fortresses of Prussia; that Dantzic was a second

Gibraltar." This was incorrect, especially in winter. "That Russia ought

to excite the apprehension of all Europe, by her military and conquering

government, as well as by her savage population, already so numerous,

and which augmented annually in the proportion of half a million. Had

not her armies been seen in all parts of Italy, in Germany, and even on

the Rhine? That by demanding the evacuation of Prussia, she required an

impossible concession; since to abandon Prussia, morally ulcerated as

she was, was to surrender her into the hands of Russia, in order to be

turned against ourselves."

Proceeding afterwards with more animation, he exclaimed, "Why menace my

absence with the different parties still alleged to exist in the

interior of the empire? Where are they? I see but a single one against

me; that of a few royalists, the principal part of the ancient

_noblesse_, superannuated and inexperienced. But they dread my downfall

more than they desire it. This is what I told them in Normandy. I am

cried up as a great captain, as an able politician, but I am scarcely

mentioned as an administrator: that which I have, however, accomplished,

of the most difficult and most beneficial description, is the stemming

the revolutionary torrent; it would have swallowed up every thing,

Europe and yourselves. I have united the most opposite parties,

amalgamated rival classes, and yet there exist among you some obstinate

nobles who resist; they refuse my places! Very well! what is that to me?

It is for your advantage, for your security, that I offer them to you.

What would you do singly by yourselves, and without me? You are a mere

handful opposed to masses. Do you not see that it is necessary to put an

end to the struggle between the _tiers-état_ and the _noblesse_, by a

complete fusion of all that is best worth preservation in the two

classes? I offer you the hand of amity, and you reject it! but what need

have I of you? While I support you, I do myself an injury in the eyes of

the people; for what am I but the king of the _tiers-état_: is not that

sufficient?"

Passing more calmly to another question: "He was quite aware," he said,

"of the ambition of his generals; but it was diverted by war, and would

never be sanctioned in its excesses by French soldiers, who were too

proud of, and too much attached to their country. That if war was

dangerous, peace had also its dangers: that in bringing back his armies

into the interior, it would enclose and concentrate there too many

daring interests and passions, which repose and their association would

tend to ferment, and which he should no longer be able to keep within

bounds: that it was necessary to give free vent to all such aspirations;

and that, after all, he dreaded them less without the empire than within

it."

He concluded thus: "Do you dread the war, as endangering my life? It was

thus that, in the times of conspiracy, attempts were made to frighten me

about Georges; he was said to be every where upon my track: that

wretched being was to fire at me. Well! suppose he had! He would at the

utmost have killed my _aide-de-camp_: but to kill me was impossible! Had

I at that time accomplished the decrees of fate? I feel myself impelled

towards a goal of which I am ignorant. As soon as I shall have reached

it, so soon shall I no longer be of service,--an atom will then suffice

to put me down; but till then, all human efforts can avail nothing

against me. Whether I am in Paris, or with the army, is, therefore,

quite indifferent. When my hour comes, a fever, or a fall from my horse

in hunting, will kill me as effectually as a bullet: our days are

numbered."

This opinion, useful as it may be in the moment of danger, is too apt to

blind conquerors to the price at which the great results which they

obtain are purchased. They indulge a belief in pre-destination, either

because they have experienced, more than other men, whatever is most

unexpected in human destiny, or because it relieves their consciences of

too heavy a load of responsibility. It was like a return to the times of

the crusades, when these words, _it is the will of God_, were considered

a sufficient answer to all the objections of a prudent and pacific

policy.

Indeed, the expedition of Napoleon into Russia bears a mournful

resemblance to that of St. Louis into Egypt and Africa. These invasions,

the one undertaken for the interests of Heaven, the other for those of

the earth, terminated in a similar manner; and these two great examples

admonish the world, that the vast and profound calculations of this age

of intelligence may be followed by the same results as the irregular

impulses of religious frenzy in ages of ignorance and superstition.

In these two expeditions, however, there can be no comparison between

their opportunities or their chances of success. The last was

indispensable to the completion of a great design on the point of being

accomplished: its object was not out of reach; the means for reaching it

were not inadequate. It may be, that the moment for its execution was

ill chosen; that the progress of it was sometimes too precipitate, at

other times unsteady; but on these points facts will speak sufficiently:

it is for them to decide.

CHAP. III.

In this manner did Napoleon reply to all objections. His skilful hand

was able to comprehend and turn to his purpose every disposition; and,

in fact, when he wanted to persuade, there was a kind of charm in his

deportment which it was impossible to resist. One felt overpowered by

his superior strength, and compelled, as it were, to submit to his

influence. It was, if it may be so expressed, a kind of magnetic

influence; for his ardent and variable genius infused itself entirely

into all his desires, the least as well as the greatest: whatever he

willed, all his energies and all his faculties united to effect: they

appeared at his beck; they hastened forward; and, obedient to his

dictation, simultaneously assumed the forms which he desired.

It was thus that the greater part of those whom he wished to gain over

found themselves, as it were, fascinated by him in spite of themselves.

It was flattering to your vanity to see the master of Europe appearing

to have no other ambition, no other desire than that of convincing you;

to behold those features, so formidable to multitudes, expressing

towards you no other feeling but a mild and affecting benevolence; to

hear that mysterious man, whose every word was historical, yielding, as

if for your sake alone, to the irresistible impulse of the most frank

and confiding disclosure; and that voice, so caressing while it

addressed you, was it not the same, whose lowest whisper rang throughout

all Europe, announced wars, decided battles, settled the fate of

empires, raised or destroyed reputations? What vanity could resist a

charm of so great potency? Any defensive position was forced on all

points; his eloquence was so much more persuasive, as he himself

appeared to be persuaded.

On this occasion, there was no variety of tints with which his brilliant

and fertile imagination did not adorn his project, in order to convince

and allure. The same text supplied him with a thousand different

commentaries, with which the character and position of each of his

interlocutors inspired him; he enlisted each in his undertaking, by

presenting it to him under the form and colour, and point of view, most

likely to gratify him.

We have just seen in what way he silenced the one who felt alarmed at

the expenses of the conquest of Russia, which he wished him to approve,

by holding out the perspective, that another would be made to defray

them.

He told the military man, who was astonished by the hazard of the

expedition, but likely to be easily seduced by the grandeur of ambitious

ideas, that peace was to be conquered at Constantinople; that is to say,

at the extremity of Europe; the individual was thus free to anticipate,

that it was not merely to the staff of a marshal, but to a royal

sceptre, that he might elevate his pretensions.

To a minister[14] of high rank under the ancient _régime_, whom the idea

of shedding so much blood, to gratify ambition, filled with dismay, he

declared "that it was a war of policy exclusively; that it was the

English alone whom he meant to attack through Russia; that the campaign

would be short; that afterwards France would be at rest; that it was the

fifth act of the drama--the _dénouement_."

[Footnote 14: Count Molé.]

To others, he pleaded the ambition of Russia, and the force of

circumstances, which dragged him into the war in spite of himself. With

superficial and inexperienced individuals, to whom he neither wished to

explain nor dissemble, he cut matters short, by saying, "You understand

nothing of all this; you are ignorant of its antecedents and its

consequents."

But to the princes of his own family he had long revealed the state of

his thoughts; he complained that they did not sufficiently appreciate

his position. "Can you not see," said he to them, "that as I was not

born upon a throne, I must support myself on it, as I ascended it, by

my renown? that it is necessary for it to go on increasing; that a

private individual, become a sovereign like myself, can no longer stop;

that he must be continually ascending, and that to remain stationary

will be his ruin?"

He then depicted to them all the ancient dynasties armed against his,

devising plots, preparing wars, and seeking to destroy, in his person,

the dangerous example of a _roi parvenu_. It was on that account that

every peace appeared in his eyes a conspiracy of the weak against the

strong, of the vanquished against the victor; and especially of the

great by birth against the great by their own exertions. So many

successive coalitions had confirmed him in that apprehension! Indeed, he

often thought of no longer tolerating an ancient power in Europe, of

constituting himself into an epoch, of becoming a new era for thrones;

in short, of making every thing take its date from him.

It was in this manner that he disclosed his inmost thoughts to his

family by those vivid pictures of his political position, which, at the

present day, will probably appear neither false nor over-coloured: and

yet the gentle Josephine, always occupied with the task of restraining

and calming him, often gave him to understand "that, along with the

consciousness of his superior genius, he never seemed to possess

sufficient consciousness of his own power: that, like all jealous

characters, he incessantly required fresh proofs of its existence. How

came it, amidst the noisy acclamations of Europe, that his anxious ear

could hear the few solitary voices which disputed his legitimacy? that

in this manner his troubled spirit was always seeking agitation as its

element: that strong as he was to desire, but feeble to enjoy, he

himself, therefore, would be the only one whom he could never conquer."

But in 1811 Josephine was separated from Napoleon, and although he still

continued to visit her in her seclusion, the voice of that empress had

lost the influence which continual intercourse, familiar habits of

affection, and the desire of mutual confidence, impart.

Meanwhile, fresh disagreements with the pope complicated the relations

of France. Napoleon then addressed himself to cardinal Fesch. Fesch was

a zealous churchman, and overflowing with Italian vivacity: he defended

the papal pretensions with obstinate ardour; and such was the warmth of

his discussions with the emperor, on a former occasion, that the latter

got into a passion, and told him, "that he would compel him to obey."

"And who contests your power?" returned the cardinal: "but force is not

argument; for if I am right, not all your power can make me wrong.

Besides, your majesty knows that I do not fear martyrdom."--"Martyrdom!"

replied Buonaparte, with a transition from violence to laughter; "do not

reckon on that, I beseech you, M. le Cardinal: martyrdom is an affair in

which there must be two persons concerned; and as to myself, I have no

desire to make a martyr of any individual."

It is said that these discussions assumed a more serious character

towards the end of 1811. An eye-witness asserts that the cardinal, till

that time a stranger to politics, then began to mix them up with his

religious controversies; that he conjured Napoleon not thus to fly in

the face of men, the elements, religion, earth and heaven, at the same

time; and that, at last, he expressed his apprehension of seeing him

sink under such a weight of enmity.

The only reply which the emperor made to this vehement attack was to

take him by the hand, and leading him to the window, to open it, and

inquire, "Do you see that star above us?"--"No, sire."--"Look

again."--"Sire, I do not see it."--"Very well! _I_ see it!" replied

Napoleon. The cardinal, seized with astonishment, remained silent,

concluding that there was no human voice sufficiently loud to make

itself heard by an ambition so gigantic, that it already reached the

heavens.

As to the witness of this singular scene, he understood in quite a

different sense these words of his sovereign. They did not appear to him

like the expression of an overweening confidence in his destiny, but

rather of the great distinction which Napoleon meant to infer as

existing between the grasp of his genius and that of the cardinal's

policy.

But granting even that Napoleon's soul was not exempt from a tendency to

superstition, his intellect was both too strong and too enlightened to

permit such vast events to depend upon a weakness. One great inquietude

possessed him; it was the idea of that same death, which he appeared so

much to brave. He felt his strength decaying; and he dreaded that when

he should be no more, the French empire, that sublime trophy of so many

labours and victories, would fall a prey to dismemberment.

"The Russian emperor," he said, "was the only sovereign who pressed upon

the summit of that colossal edifice. Replete with youth and animation,

the strength of his rival was constantly augmenting, while his was

already on the decline." It seemed to him that Alexander, on the banks

of the Niemen, only waited the intelligence of his death, to possess

himself of the sceptre of Europe, and snatch it from the hands of his

feeble successor. "While all Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Prussia, and

the whole of Germany, were marching under his banners, why should he

delay to anticipate the danger, and consolidate the fabric of the great

empire, by driving back Alexander and the Russian power, enfeebled as

they would be by the loss of all Poland, beyond the Boristhenes?"

Such were his sentiments, pronounced in secret confidence; they,

doubtless, comprised the true motives of that terrible war. As to his

precipitation in commencing it, he was, it would seem, hurried on by the

instinct of his approaching death. An acrid humour diffused through his

blood, and to which he imputed his irascibility, ("but without which,"

added he, "battles are not to be gained,") undermined his constitution.

A profound knowledge of the organization and mysteries of the human

frame would probably enable us to decide whether this concealed malady

was not one of the causes of that restless activity which hurried on the

course of events, and in which originated both his elevation and his

fall.

This internal enemy testified its presence, more and more, by an

internal pain, and by the violent spasms of the stomach which it

inflicted. Even in 1806, at Warsaw, during one of its agonizing crises,

Napoleon was[15] heard to exclaim, "that he carried about with him the

germ of premature dissolution; and that he should die of the same malady

as his father."

[Footnote 15: By the count Lobau.]

Short rides in hunting, even the most gentle gallop of his horse,

already began to fatigue him: how then was he to support the long

journeys, and the rapid and violent movements preparatory to battles?

Thus it was, that while the greater part of those who surrounded him

concluded him to be impelled into Russia by his vast ambition, by his

restless spirit and his love of war, he in solitude, and almost

unobserved, was poising the fearful responsibilities of the enterprise,

and urged by necessity, he only made up his mind to it after a course of

painful hesitation.

At length, on the 3d of August, 1811, at an audience in the midst of all

the ambassadors of Europe, he declared himself; but the burst of

indignation which was the presage of war, was an additional proof of his

repugnance to commence it. It might be that the defeat which the

Russians had just sustained at Routschouk had inflated his hopes;

perhaps he imagined that he might, by menace, arrest the preparations of

Alexander.

It was prince Kourakin whom he addressed. That ambassador having just

made protestations of the pacific intentions of his master, he

interrupted him: "No," exclaimed he, "your master desires war; I know,

through my generals, that the Russian army is hurrying towards the

Niemen! The emperor Alexander deludes, and gains all my envoys!" Then,

perceiving Caulaincourt, he rapidly traversed the hall, and violently

appealing to him, said: "Yes, and you too have become a Russian: you

have been seduced by the emperor Alexander." The duke firmly replied,

"Yes, sire; because, in this question, I consider him to be a

Frenchman." Napoleon was silent; but from that moment, he treated that

great dignitary coldly, without, however, absolutely repelling him:

several times he even essayed, by fresh arguments, intermixed with

familiar caresses, to win him over to his opinion, but ineffectually; he

always found him inflexible; ready to serve him, but without approving

the nature of the service.

CHAP. IV.

While Napoleon, prompted by his natural character, by his position, and

by circumstances, thus appeared to wish for, and to accelerate the

period of conflict, he preserved the secret of his embarrassment. The

year 1811 was wasted in parleys about peace, and preparations for war.

1812 had just begun, and the horizon was already obscured. Our armies in

Spain had given way; Ciudad Rodrigo was taken by the English (on the

19th of January, 1812); the discussions of Napoleon with the Pope

increased in bitterness; Kutusof had destroyed the Turkish army on the

Danube (on the 8th of December, 1811); France even became alarmed about

her means of subsistence; every thing, in short, appeared to divert the

attention of Napoleon from Russia; to recall it to France, and fix it

there; while he, far from blinding his judgment, recognized in these

contrarieties the indications of his ever-faithful fortune.

It was, especially in the midst of those long winter nights, when

individuals are left more than usually to their own reflections, that

his star seemed to enlighten him with its most brilliant illumination:

it exhibited to him the different ruling genii of the vanquished

nations, in silence awaiting the moment for avenging their wrongs; the

dangers which he was about to confront, those which he left behind him,

even in his own family: it showed him, that like the returns of his

army, the census of the population of his empire was delusive, not so

much in respect to its numerical as to its real strength; scarcely any

men were included in it but those who were old in years, or worn out in

the service, and children--few men in the prime of life. Where were

they? The tears of wives, the cries of mothers answered! bowed in

sadness to the earth, which, but for them, would remain uncultivated,

they cursed the scourge of war as identified in his person.

Nevertheless, he was about to attack Russia, without having subjected

Spain; forgetting the principle of which he himself so often supplied

both the precept and example, "never to strike at two points at once;

but on one only, and always in mass." Wherefore, in fact, should he

abandon a brilliant, though uncertain position, in order to throw

himself into so critical a situation, that the slightest check might

ruin every thing; and where every reverse would be decisive?

At that moment, no necessity of position, no sentiment of self-love,

could prompt Napoleon to combat his own arguments, and prevent him from

listening to himself. Hence he became thoughtful and agitated. He

collected accounts of the actual condition of the different powers of

Europe; he ordered an exact and complete summary of them to be made; and

buried himself in the perusal: his anxiety increased; to him of all men,

irresolution was a punishment.