this opposite direction seems to constitute the entrance, and as it were
the gates of Muscovy. It is the focus of the roads which lead to the two
capitals of that empire.
Napoleon's whole attention was directed to that point. By the retreat of
Alexander upon Drissa, he foresaw that which Bagration would attempt to
make from Grodno towards Witepsk, through Osmiana, Minsk, and
Docktzitzy, or by Borizof; he determined to prevent it, and instantly
pushed forward Davoust towards Minsk, between these two hostile bodies,
with two divisions of infantry, the cuirassiers of Valence, and several
brigades of light cavalry.
On his right, the king of Westphalia was to drive Bagration on Davoust,
who would cut off his communication with Alexander, make him surrender,
and get possession of the course of the Boristhenes; on his left, Murat,
Oudinot, and Ney, already before Drissa, were directed to keep Barclay
and his emperor in their front; he himself with the _élite_ of his army,
the army of Italy, the Bavarian army, and three divisions detached from
Davoust, was to march upon Witepsk between Davoust and Murat, ready to
join one or the other of them; in this manner penetrating and
interposing between the two hostile armies, forcing himself between them
and beyond them; finally, keeping them separate, not only by that
central position, but by the uncertainty which it would create in
Alexander as to which of his two capitals it would be requisite for him
to defend. Circumstances would decide the rest.
Such was Napoleon's plan on the 10th of July at Wilna; it was written in
this form on that very day under his dictation, and corrected by his own
hand, for one of his chiefs, the individual who was most concerned in
its execution. Immediately, the movement, which was already begun,
became general.
CHAP. VI.
The king of Westphalia then went along the Niemen at Grodno, with a view
to repass it at Bielitza, to overpower the right of Bagration, put it to
the rout, and pursue it.
This Saxon, Westphalian, and Polish army had in front of it a general
and a country both difficult to conquer. It fell to its lot to invade
the elevated plain of Lithuania: there are the sources of the rivers
which empty their waters into the Black and Baltic seas. But the soil
there is slow in determining their inclination and their current, so
that the waters stagnate and overflow the country to a great extent.
Some narrow causeways had been thrown over those woody and marshy
plains; they formed there long defiles, which Bagration was easily
enabled to defend against the king of Westphalia. The latter attacked
him carelessly; his advanced guard only three times encountered the
enemy, at Nowogrodeck, at Myr, and at Romanof. The first rencontre was
entirely to the advantage of the Russians; in the two others,
Latour-Maubourg remained master of a sanguinary and contested field of
battle.
At the same time, Davoust, proceeding from Osmiana, extended his force
towards Minsk and Ygumen, behind the Russian general, and made himself
master of the outlet of the defiles, in which the king of Westphalia was
compelling Bagration to engage himself.
Between this general and his retreat was a river which takes its source
in an infectious marsh; its uncertain, slow, and languid current, across
a rotten soil, does not belie its origin; its muddy waters flow towards
the south-east; its name possesses a fatal celebrity, for which it is
indebted to our misfortunes.
The wooden bridges, and long causeways, which, in order to approach it,
had been thrown over the adjacent marshes, abut upon a town named
Borizof, situated on its left bank, on the Russian side. This bank is
generally higher than the right; a remark applicable to all the rivers
which in this country run in the direction of one pole to the other,
their eastern bank commanding their western bank, as Asia does Europe.
This passage was important; Davoust anticipated Bagration there by
taking possession of Minsk on the 8th of July, as well as the entire
country from the Vilia to the Berezina; accordingly when the Russian
prince and his army, summoned by Alexander, to the north, pushed forward
their piquets, in the first instance upon Lida, and afterwards
successively upon Olzania, Vieznowo, Troki, Bolzoï, and Sobsnicki, they
came in contact with Davoust, and were forced to fall back upon their
main body. They then bent their course a little more in the rear and to
the right, and made a new attempt on Minsk, but there again they found
Davoust. A scanty platoon of that marshal's vanguard was entering by one
gate, when the advanced guard of Bagration presented itself at another;
on which, the Russian retreated once more into his marshes, towards the
south.
At this intelligence, observing Bagration and 40,000 Russians cut off
from the army of Alexander, and enveloped by two rivers and two armies,
Napoleon exclaimed, "I have them!" In fact, it only required three
marches more to have hemmed in Bagration completely. But Napoleon, who
since accused Davoust of suffering the escape of the left wing of the
Russians by remaining four days in Minsk, and afterwards, with more
justice, the king of Westphalia, had just then placed that monarch under
the orders of the marshal. It was this change, which was made too late,
and in the midst of an operation, which destroyed the unity of it.
This order arrived at the very moment when Bagration, repulsed from
Minsk, had no other retreat open to him than a long and narrow causeway.
It occurs on the marshes of Nieswig, Shlutz, Glusck, and Bobruisk.
Davoust wrote to the king to push the Russians briskly into this defile,
the outlet of which at Glusck he was about to occupy. Bagration would
never have been able to get out of it. But the king, already irritated
by the reproaches which the uncertainty and dilatoriness of his first
operations had brought upon him, could not suffer a subject to be his
commander; he quitted his army, without leaving any one to replace him,
or without even communicating, if we are to credit Davoust, to any of
his generals, the order which he had just received. He was permitted to
retire into Westphalia without his guard; which he accordingly did.
Meanwhile Davoust vainly waited for Bagration at Glusck. That general,
not being sufficiently pressed by the Westphalian army, had the option
of making a new _detour_ towards the south, to get to Bobruisk, and
there cross the Berezina, and reach the Boristhenes near Bickof. There
again, if the Westphalian army had had a commander, if that commander
had pressed the Russian leader more closely, if he had replaced him at
Bickof, when he came in collision with Davoust at Mohilef, it is certain
that in that case Bagration, enclosed between the Westphalians, Davoust,
the Boristhenes, and the Berezina, would have been compelled to conquer
or to surrender We have seen that the Russian prince could not pass the
Berezina but at Bobruisk, nor reach the Boristhenes, except in the
direction of Novoï-Bikof, forty leagues to the south of Orcha, and sixty
leagues from Witepsk, which it was his object to reach.
Finding himself driven so far out of his track, he hastened to regain it
by reascending the Boristhenes, to Mohilef. But there again he found
Davoust, who had anticipated him at Lida by passing the Berezina at the
very point at which Charles XII. had formerly done so.
This marshal, however, had not expected to find the Russian prince on
the road to Mohilef. He believed him to be already on the left bank of
the Boristhenes. Their mutual surprise turned in the first instance to
the advantage of Bagration, who cut off a whole regiment of his light
cavalry. At that time Bagration had with him 35,000 men, Davoust 12,000.
On the 23d of July, the latter chose an elevated ground, defended by a
ravine, and flanked by two woods. The Russians had no means of extending
themselves on this field of battle; they, nevertheless, accepted the
challenge. Their numbers were there useless; they attacked like men sure
of victory; they did not even think of profiting by the woods, in order
to turn Davoust's right.
The Muscovites say that, in the middle of the contest they were seized
with a panic at the idea of finding themselves in the presence of
Napoleon; for each of the enemy's generals imagined him to be opposed
to them, Bagration at Mohilef; and Barclay at Drissa. He was believed to
be in all places at once: so greatly does renown magnify the man of
genius! so strangely does it fill the world with its fame! and convert
him into an omnipresent and supernatural being!
The attack was violent and obstinate on the part of the Russians, but
without scientific combination. Bagration was roughly repulsed, and
again compelled to retrace his steps. He finally crossed the Boristhenes
at Novoï-Bikof, where he re-entered the Russian interior, in order
finally to unite with Barclay, beyond Smolensk.
Napoleon disdained to attribute this disappointment to the ability of
the enemy's general; he referred it to the incapacity of his own. He
already discovered that his presence was necessary every where, which
rendered it every where impossible. The circle of his operations was so
much enlarged, that, being compelled to remain in the centre, his
presence was wanting on the whole of the circumference. His generals,
exhausted like himself, too independent of each other, too much
separated, and at the same time too dependent upon him, ventured to do
less of themselves, and frequently waited for his orders. His influence
was weakened over so great an extent. It required too great a soul for
so great a body; his, vast as it was, was not sufficient for the
purpose.
But at length, on the 16th of July, the whole army was in motion. While
all were hurrying and exerting themselves in this manner, he was still
at Wilna, which he caused to be fortified. He there ordered a levy of
eleven Lithuanian regiments. He established the duke of Bassano as
governor of Lithuania, and as the centre of administrative, political,
and even military communication between him, Europe, and the generals
commanding the _corps de armée_ which were not to follow him to Moscow.
This ostensible inactivity of Napoleon at Wilna lasted twenty days. Some
thought that, finding himself in the centre of his operations with a
strong reserve, he awaited the event, in readiness to direct his motions
either towards Davoust, Murat, or Macdonald; others thought that the
organization of Lithuania, and the politics of Europe, to which he was
more proximate at Wilna, retained him in that city; or that he did not
anticipate any obstacles worthy of him till he reached the Düna; a
circumstance in which he was not deceived, but by which he was too much
flattered. The precipitate evacuation of Lithuania by the Russians
seemed to dazzle his judgment; of this Europe will be the best judge;
his bulletins repeated his words.
"Here then is that Russian empire, so formidable at a distance! It is a
desert, for which its scattered population is wholly insufficient. They
will be vanquished by its very extent, which ought to defend them. They
are barbarians. They are scarcely possessed of arms. They have no
recruits in readiness. Alexander will require more time to collect them
than he will take to reach Moscow. It is true that, from the moment of
the passage of the Niemen, the atmosphere has been incessantly deluging
or drying up the unsheltered soil; but this calamity is less an obstacle
to the rapidity of our advance, than an impediment to the flight of the
Russians. They are conquered without a combat by their weakness alone;
by the memory of our victories; by the remorse which dictates the
restitution of that Lithuania, which they have acquired neither by peace
nor war, but solely by treachery."
To these motives of the stay, perhaps too protracted, which Napoleon
made at Wilna, those who were nearest to his person have added another.
They remarked to each other, "that a genius so vast as his, and always
increasing in activity and audacity, was not now seconded as it had been
formerly by a vigorous constitution. They were alarmed at finding their
chief no longer insensible to the heat of a burning atmosphere; and they
remarked to each other with melancholy forebodings, the tendency to
corpulence by which his frame was now distinguished; the sure sign of a
premature debility of system."
Some of them attributed this to his frequent use of the bath. They were
ignorant, that, far from being a habit of luxury, this had become to him
an indispensable relief from a bodily ailment of a serious and alarming
character[17], which his policy carefully concealed, in order not to
excite cruel expectations in his adversaries.
[Footnote 17: The _dysuria_, or retention of urine.]
Such is the inevitable and unhappy influence of the most trivial causes
over the destiny of nations. It will be shortly seen, when the
profoundest combinations, which ought to have secured the success of the
boldest, and perhaps the most useful enterprise in a European point of
view, come to be developed;--how, at the decisive moment, on the plains
of the Moskwa, nature paralysed the genius, and the man was wanting to
the hero. The numerous battalions of Russia could not have defended her;
a stormy day, a sudden attack of fever, were her salvation.
It will be only just and proper to revert to this observation, when, in
examining the picture which I shall be forced to trace of the battle of
the Moskwa, I shall be found repeating all the complaints, and even the
reproaches, which an unusual inactivity and languor extorted from the
most devoted friends and constant admirers of this great man. Most of
them, as well as those who have subsequently given an account of the
battle, were unaware of the bodily sufferings of a chief, who, in the
midst of his depression, exerted himself to conceal their cause. That
which was eminently a misfortune, these narrators have designated as a
fault.
Besides, at 800 leagues' distance from one's home, after so many
fatigues and sacrifices, at the instant when they saw the victory escape
from their grasp, and a frightful prospect revealed itself, it was
natural for them to be severe; and they had suffered too much, to be
quite impartial.
As for myself, I shall not conceal what I witnessed, in the persuasion
that truth is of all tributes that which is alone worthy of a great
man; of that illustrious captain, who had so often contrived to extract
prodigious advantages from every occurrence, not excepting his reverses;
of that man who raised himself to so great an eminence, that posterity
will scarcely be enabled to distinguish the clouds scattered over a
glory so brilliant.
CHAP. VII.
Meantime, he was apprised that his orders were fulfilled, his army
united, and that a battle claimed his presence. He at length departed
from Wilna on the 16th of July, at half-past eleven at night; he stopped
at Swentziani, while the heat of the 17th was most oppressive; on the
18th he was at Klubokoe: taking up his residence at a monastery, whence
he observed that the village which it commanded bore more resemblance to
an assemblage of savage huts than to European habitations.
An address of the Russians to the French soldiers had just been
dispersed throughout his army. He found in it some idle abuse, coupled
with a nugatory and unskilful invitation to desert. His anger was
excited at its perusal; in his first agitation, he dictated a reply,
which he tore; then a second, which experienced the same fate; at length
a third, with which he expressed himself satisfied. It was that which
was, at the time, read in the journals, under the signature of a French
grenadier. In this manner he dictated even the most trivial letters,
which issued from his cabinet or from his staff; he perpetually reduced
his ministers and Berthier to the condition of being mere secretaries;
his mind still retained its activity, notwithstanding his sinking frame;
their union, however, began to fail; and this was one cause of our
misfortunes.
In the midst of this occupation, he learned that Barclay had, on the
18th, abandoned his camp at Drissa, and that he was marching towards
Witepsk. This movement opened his eyes. Detained by the check which
Sebastiani had received near Druïa, and more especially by the rains and
bad state of the roads, he found (though perhaps too late) that the
occupation of Witepsk was urgent and decisive; that that city alone was
eminently aggressive, inasmuch as it separated the two hostile rivers
and armies. From that position, he would be enabled to turn the broken
army of his rival, cut him off from his southern provinces, and crush
his weakness with superior force. He concluded that, if Barclay had
anticipated him in reaching that capital, he would doubtless defend it:
and there, perhaps, he was to expect that so-much-coveted victory which
had escaped him on the Vilia. He, therefore, instantly directed all his
corps on Beszenkowiczi; thither he summoned Murat and Ney, who were then
near Polotsk, where he left Oudinot. For himself, he proceeded from
Klubokoe (where he was surrounded by his guard, the Italian army, and
three divisions detached from Davoust), to Kamen, always in a carriage,
except during the night, either from necessity, or, perhaps, with a view
to keep his soldiers in ignorance of the inability of their chief to
share their fatigues.
Till that time, the greater part of the army had proceeded with
astonishment, at finding no enemy; they had now become habituated to the
circumstance. By day the novelty of the places, and impatience to get to
their journey's end, occupied their attention; at night the necessity of
choosing or making for themselves a place of shelter; of finding food,
and dressing it. The soldiers were so much engaged by so many cares,
that they considered themselves less employed in making war than a
troublesome journey; but if the war and the enemy were to fall back
always thus, how much farther should they have to go in search of them?
At length, on the 25th, the report of cannon was heard, and the army, as
well as the emperor, indulged their hopes of a victory and peace.
This was in the direction of Beszenkowiczi, Prince Eugene had there
encountered Doctorof, who commanded Barclay's rear-guard. In following
his leader from Polotsk to Witepsk, he cleared his way on the left bank
of the Düna to Beszenkowiczi, the bridge of which he burnt as he
retired. The viceroy, on capturing this town, came in sight of the Düna,
and re-established the passage; the few Russian troops left in
observation on the other side feebly opposed the operation. When
Napoleon contemplated, for the first time, this river, his new
conquest, he censured sharply, and not unjustly, the defective
construction of the bridge which made him master of the two banks.
It was no puerile vanity which induced him then to cross that river, but
anxiety to see with his own eyes how far the Russian army had proceeded
on its march from Drissa to Witepsk, and whether he might not attack it
on its passage, or anticipate its arrival at the latter city. But the
direction taken by the enemy's rear-guard, and the information obtained
from some prisoners, convinced him that Barclay had been beforehand with
him; that he had left Wittgenstein in front of Oudinot, and that the
Russian general-in-chief was in Witepsk. He was, indeed, already
prepared to dispute the possession of the defiles which cover that
capital with Napoleon.
Napoleon having observed on the right bank of the river nothing but the
remains of a rear-guard, returned to Beszenkowiczi. His various
divisions arrived there at the same time by the northern and western
roads. His orders of march had been executed with so much precision,
that all the corps which had left the Niemen, at different epochs, and
by different routes, notwithstanding obstacles of every description,
after a month of separation, and at a hundred leagues' distance from the
point of their departure, found themselves all reunited at
Beszenkowiczi, where they arrived on the same day, and nearly at the
same hour.
Great disorder was naturally the result; numerous columns of cavalry,
infantry, and artillery presented themselves on all sides; contests
took place for precedence; and each corps, exasperated with fatigue and
hunger, was impatient to get to its destination. Meanwhile, the streets
were blocked up with a crowd of orderlies, staff-officers, valets,
saddle-horses, and baggage. They ran through the city in tumultuous
groups; some looking for provisions, others for forage, and a few for
lodgings; there was a constant crossing and jostling; and as the influx
augmented every instant, chaos in a short time reigned throughout.
In one quarter, _aides-de-camp_, the bearers of urgent orders, vainly
sought to force a passage; the soldiers were deaf to their
remonstrances, and even to their orders: hence arose quarrels and
outcries; the noise of which, united with the beating of drums, the
oaths of the waggoners, the rumbling of the baggage-carts and cannon,
the commands of the officers, and, finally, with the tumult of the
regular contests which took place in the houses, the entrances of which,
while one party attempted to force, others, already established there,
prepared to defend.
At length, towards midnight, all these masses, which were nearly
confounded together, got disentangled; the accumulation of troops
gradually moved off in the direction of Ostrowno, or were distributed in
Beszenkowiczi; and the most profound silence succeeded the most
frightful tumult.
This great concentration, the multiplied orders which came from all
parts, the rapidity with which the various corps were pushed forward,
even during the night--all announced the expectation of a battle on the
following day. In fact, Napoleon not having been able to anticipate the
Russians in the possession of Witepsk, was determined to force them from
that position; but the latter, after having entered by the right bank of
the Düna, had passed through that city, and were now come to meet him,
in order to defend the long defiles which protect it.
On the 25th of July, Murat proceeded towards Ostrowno with his cavalry.
At the distance of two leagues from that village, Domon, Du Coëtlosquet,
Carignan, and the 8th hussars, were advancing in column upon a broad
road, lined by a double row of large birch trees. These hussars were
near reaching the summit of a hill, on which they could only get a
glimpse of the weakest portion of a corps, composed of three regiments
of cavalry of the Russian guard, and six pieces of cannon. There was not
a single rifleman to cover their line.
The colonels of the 8th imagined themselves preceded by two regiments of
their division, which had marched across the fields on the right and
left of the road, and from the view of which they were precluded by the
bordering trees. But these corps had halted; and the 8th, already
considerably in advance of them, still kept marching on, persuaded that
what it perceived through the trees, at 150 paces' distance, in its
front, were these two regiments, of which, without being aware of it, it
had got the start.
The immobility of the Russians completed the error into which the
chiefs of the 8th had fallen. The order to charge seemed to them to be a
mistake; they sent an officer to reconnoitre the troop which was before
them, and still marched on without any distrust. Suddenly they beheld
their officer sabred, knocked down, made prisoner, and the enemy's
cannon bringing down their hussars. They now hesitated no longer, and
without losing time to extend their line under the enemy's fire, they
dashed through the trees, and rushed forward to extinguish it. At the
first onset they seized the cannon, dispersed the regiment that was in
the centre of the enemy's line, and destroyed it. During the disorder of
this first success, they observed the Russian regiment on the right,
which they had passed, remaining motionless with astonishment; upon this
they returned, and attacking it in the rear dispersed it. In the midst
of this second victory, they perceived the third regiment on the enemy's
left, which was giving way in confusion, and seeking to retreat; towards
this third enemy they briskly returned, with all the men they could
muster, and attacked and dispersed it in the midst of its retreat.
Animated by this success, Murat drove the enemy into the wood of
Ostrowno, where he seemed to conceal himself. That monarch endeavoured
to penetrate the wood, but a strong resistance obstructed the attempt.
The position of Ostrowno was well chosen and commanding; those posted
there could see without being seen; it intersected the main road; it had
the Düna on the right, a ravine in front, and thick woods on its
surface and on the left. It was, moreover, in communication with
magazines; it covered them, as well as Witepsk, the capital of these
regions, which Ostermann had hurried to defend.
On his side, Murat, always as prodigal of his life, which was now that
of a victorious king, as he had formerly been when only an obscure
soldier, persisted in attacks upon these woods, notwithstanding the
heavy fire which proceeded from them. But he was soon made sensible that
a furious onset was fruitless here. The ground carried by the hussars of
the 8th was disputed with him, and his advance-column, composed of the
divisions Bruyères and Saint Germain, and of the 8th corps of infantry,
was compelled to maintain itself there against an army.
They defended themselves as victors always do, by attacking. Each
hostile corps, as it presented itself to assail our flanks, was in turn
assaulted. Their cavalry were driven back into the woods, and their
infantry broken at the point of the sabre. Our troops, nevertheless,
were getting fatigued with victory, when the division Delzons arrived;
the king promptly pushed it forward on the right, toward the line of the
enemy's retreat, who now became uneasy, and no longer disputed the
victory.
These defiles are several leagues in length. The same evening the
viceroy rejoined Murat, and the next day they found the Russians in a
new position. Pahlen and Konownitzin had united with Ostermann. After
having repulsed the Russian left, the two French princes were pointing
out to the troops of their right wing the position which was to serve
them as a _point d'appui_, from which they were to make the attack, when
suddenly a great clamour arose on their left: their eyes were instantly
turned that way; the cavalry and infantry of that wing had twice
attacked the enemy, and been twice repulsed; the Russians, emboldened by
this success, were issuing in multitudes, and with frightful cries, from
their woods. The audacity and fervour of attack had passed over to them,
while the French exhibited the uncertainty and timidity of defence.
A battalion of Croats, and the 84th regiment, vainly attempted to make a
stand; their line gradually decreased; the ground in front of them was
strewed with their dead; behind them, the plain was covered with their
wounded, who had retired from the battle, with those who carried them,
and with many others, who, under the plea of supporting the wounded, or
being wounded themselves, successively abandoned their ranks. A rout
accordingly began. Already the artillery corps, who are always picked
men, perceiving themselves no longer supported, began retiring with
their pieces; a few minutes longer, and the troops of all arms, in their
flight towards the same defile, would have there met each other; thence
would have resulted a confusion, in which the voices and the efforts of
their officers would have been lost, where all the elements of
resistance would have been confounded and rendered useless.
It is said that Murat, on seeing this, darted forward in front of a
regiment of Polish lancers; and that the latter, excited by the presence
of the king, animated by his words, and, moreover, transported with rage
at the sight of the Russians, followed him precipitately. Murat had only
wished to stimulate them and impel them against the enemy; he had no
intention of throwing himself with them into the midst of a conflict, in
which he would neither be able to see nor to command; but the Polish
lances were ready couched and condensed behind him; they covered the
whole width of the ground; and they pushed him before them with all the
rapidity of their steeds; he could neither detach himself from them nor
stop; he had no resource but to charge in front of the regiment, just
where he had stationed himself in order to harangue it; a resource to
which, like a true soldier, he submitted with the best possible grace.
At the same time, general Anthouard ran to his artillerymen, and general
Girardin to the 106th regiment, which he halted, rallied, and led back
against the Russian right wing, whose position he carried, as well as
two pieces of cannon and the victory; on his side, general Piré
encountered and turned the left of the enemy. Fortune having again
changed sides, the Russians withdrew into their forests.
Meanwhile, they persevered on the left in defending a thick wood, the
advanced position of which broke our line. The 92d regiment,
intimidated by the heavy fire which issued from it, and bewildered by a
shower of balls, remained immoveable, neither daring to advance nor
retreat, restrained by two opposite fears--the dread of danger and the
dread of shame--and escaping neither; but general Belliard hastened to
reanimate them by his words, and general Roussel by his example; and the
wood was carried.
By this success, a strong column which had advanced on our right, in
order to turn it, was itself turned; Murat perceived this, and instantly
drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Let the bravest follow me!" But this
territory is intersected with ravines which protected the retreat of the
Russians, who all plunged into a forest of two leagues in depth, which
was the last natural curtain which concealed Witepsk from our view.
After so warm a contest, the king of Naples and the viceroy were
hesitating about committing themselves to so covered a country, when the
emperor came up: both hastened to his presence, in order to show him
what had been done, and what still remained to be done. Napoleon
immediately ascended the highest rising ground, which was nearest to the
enemy. From thence his genius, soaring over every obstacle, soon
penetrated the mystery of the forests, and the depths of the mountains
before him; he gave his orders without hesitation; and the same woods
which had arrested the audacity of the two princes, were traversed from
end to end. In short, that very evening, Witepsk might have discerned
from the summit of her double eminence our light troops emerging into
the plain by which she is surrounded.
Here, every thing contributed to stop the emperor; the night, the
multitude of hostile fires which covered the plain, an unknown country,
which it was necessary to reconnoitre, in order to direct his divisions
across it, and especially the time requisite to enable the crowd of
soldiers to disengage themselves from the long and narrow defile through
which they had to pass. A halt was therefore ordered, for the purpose of
taking breath, reconnoitring, rallying, refreshing, and getting their
arms ready for the next day. Napoleon slept in his tent, on an eminence
to the left of the main road, and behind the village of Kukowiaczi.
CHAP. VIII.
On the 27th, the emperor appeared at the advanced posts before daylight;
its first rays exhibited to him at last the Russian army encamped on an
elevated plain, which commands all the avenues of Witepsk. The river
Luczissa, which has worn itself a deep channel, marked the foot of this
position. In advance of it 10,000 horse and some infantry made a show of
defending its approaches; the infantry was in the centre, on the main
road; its left in woody uplands; all the cavalry to the right in double
lines, supported by the Düna.
The front of the Russians was no longer opposite to our column, but upon
our left; it had changed its direction with that of the river, which a
winding had removed from us. The French column, after having crossed, by
means of a narrow bridge, the ravine which divided it from the new field
of battle, was obliged to deploy by a change of front to the left, with
the right wing foremost, in order to preserve the support of the river
on that side, and so confront the enemy: on the banks of this ravine,
near the bridge, and to the left of the main-road, there was an isolated
hillock which had already attracted the notice of the emperor. From that
point he could see both armies, being stationed on the flank of the
field of battle, like the second in a duel.
Two hundred Parisian _voltigeurs_ of the 9th regiment of the line were
the first to debouch; they were immediately pushed forward to the left,
in front of the whole Russian cavalry, like them supporting themselves
by the Düna, and marking the left of the new line; the 16th horse
chasseurs followed, and then some light pieces. The Russians coolly
allowed us to defile before them, and mature our attack.
Their inactivity was favourable to us; but the king of Naples, whose
brain was intoxicated by the general notice he attracted, yielding to
his usual impetuosity, urged the chasseurs of the 16th on the whole body
of the Russian cavalry. All eyes beheld with terror that feeble French
line, broken on its march by the deep ravines which intersected the
ground, advance to attack the enemy's masses. These unfortunate men,
feeling themselves sacrificed, proceeded with hesitating steps to
certain destruction. In consequence, at the first movement made by the
lancers of the Russian guard, they took to flight; but the ravine, which
it was necessary to pass, obstructed their flight; they were overtaken,
and precipitated into these shoals, where many of them perished.
At sight of this, Murat, grieved beyond measure, precipitated himself,
sabre in hand, in the midst of this medley, with the sixty officers and
horsemen surrounding him. His audacity so astonished the Russian
lancers, that they halted. While this prince was engaged, and the
_piqueur_ who followed him saved his life by striking down an enemy
whose arm was raised over his head, the remains of the 16th rallied, and
went to seek shelter close to the 53d regiment, which protected them.
This successful charge of the lancers of the Russian guard had carried
them as far as the foot of the hillock from which Napoleon was directing
the different corps. Some chasseurs of the French guard had just
dismounted from their horses, according to custom, in order to form a
circle around him; a few discharges from their carabines drove off the
assailant lancers. The latter, being thus repulsed, encountered on their
return the two hundred Parisian _voltigeurs_, whom the flight of the
16th horse chasseurs had left alone between the two armies. These they
attacked, and all eyes were instantly fixed on the engagement.
Both armies concluded these foot soldiers to be lost; but though
single-handed, they did not despair of themselves. In the first
instance, their captains, by dint of hard fighting, obtained possession
of a ground intersected by cavities and thickets which bordered on the
Düna; there the whole party instantly united, urged by their warlike
habits, by the desire of mutual support, and by the danger which stared
them in the face. In this emergency, as always happens in imminent
dangers, each looked to his neighbour; the young to their elders, and
all of them to their chiefs, in order to read in their countenances what
they had to hope, to fear, or to perform; each aspect was replete with
confidence, and all, relying on their comrades, relied at the same time
more upon themselves.
The ground was skilfully turned to account. The Russian lancers,
entangled in the bushes, and obstructed by the crevices, couched their
long lances in vain; they were struck by our people's balls while they
were endeavouring to penetrate their ranks, and fell, wounded, to the
earth; their bodies, and those of their horses, added to the
difficulties of the ground. At length they became discouraged, and took
to flight. The joyful shouts of our army, the crosses of honour, which
the emperor instantly sent to the bravest of the group, his words,
afterwards perused by all Europe,--all taught these valiant soldiers the
extent of a glory, which they had not yet estimated; noble actions
generally appearing quite ordinary to those who perform them. They
imagined themselves on the point of being killed or taken; and found
themselves almost at the same instant victorious and rewarded.
Meanwhile, the army of Italy and the cavalry of Murat, followed by three
divisions of the first corps, which had been confided, since they left
Wilna, to count Lobau, attacked the main-road and the woods which formed
the support of the enemy's left. The engagement was, in the first
instance, very animated; but it terminated abruptly. The Russian
vanguard retreated precipitately behind the ravine of the Luczissa, to
escape being thrown into it. The enemy's army was then entirely
collected on the opposite bank, and presented a united body of 80,000
men.
Their determined countenance, in a strong position, and in front of a
capital, deceived Napoleon; he conceived that they would regard it as a
point of honour to maintain their ground. It was only eleven o'clock; he
ordered the attack to cease, in order to have an opportunity of
exploring the whole front of the line, and preparing for a decisive
battle on the following day. In the first instance, he proceeded to post
himself on a rising ground among the light troops, in the midst of whom
he breakfasted. Thence he observed the enemy's army, a ball from which
wounded an officer very near him. The subsequent hours he spent in
reconnoitring the ground, and in waiting for the arrival of the other
corps.
Napoleon announced a battle for the following day. His parting words to
Murat were these:--"To-morrow at five o'clock, the sun of Austerlitz!"
They explain the cause of that suspension of hostilities in the middle
of the day, in the midst of a success which filled the army with
enthusiasm. They were astonished at this inactivity at the moment of
overtaking an army, the pursuit of which had completely exhausted them.
Murat, who had been daily deluded by a similar expectation, remarked to
the emperor that Barclay only made a demonstration of boldness at that
hour, in order to be enabled more tranquilly to effect his retreat
during the night. Finding himself unable to convince his chief, he
rashly proceeded to pitch his tent on the banks of the Luczissa, almost
in the midst of the enemy. It was a position which gratified his desire
of hearing the first symptoms of their retreat, his hope of disturbing
it, and his adventurous character.
Murat was deceived, and yet he appeared to have been most clear-sighted;
Napoleon was in the right, and yet, the event placed him in the wrong;
such are the freaks of fortune! The emperor of the French had correctly
appreciated the designs of Barclay. The Russian general, believing
Bagration to be still near Orcha, had resolved upon fighting, in order
to give him time to rejoin him. It was the intelligence which he
received that very evening, of the retreat of Bagration by Novoï-Bikof
towards Smolensk, which suddenly changed his determination.
In fact, by daybreak on the 28th, Murat sent word to the emperor that he
was about to pursue the Russians, who had already disappeared. Napoleon
still persisted in his opinion, obstinately affirming that the whole
enemy's army was in front of him, and that it was necessary to advance
with circumspection; this occasioned a considerable delay. At length he
mounted his horse; every step he took destroyed his illusion; and he
soon found himself in the midst of the camp which Barclay had just
deserted.
Every thing about it exhibited the science of war; its advantageous
site; the symmetry of all its parts; the exact and exclusive nicety in
the use to which each of them had been destined; the order and neatness
which thence resulted; in fine, nothing left behind, not one weapon, nor
a single valuable; no trace, nothing in short, in this sudden nocturnal
march, which could demonstrate, beyond the bounds of the camp, the route
which the Russians had taken; there appeared more order in their defeat,
than in our victory! Though conquered, their flight left us lessons by
which conquerors never profit; whether it be that good fortune is
contemptuous, or that it waits for misfortune to correct it.
A Russian soldier, who was surprised asleep under a bush, was the
solitary result of that day, which was expected to be so decisive. We
entered Witepsk, which was found equally deserted with the camp of the
Russians. Some filthy Jews, and some Jesuits, were all that remained;
they were interrogated, but without effect. All the roads were
abortively reconnoitred. Were the Russians gone to Smolensk? Had they
re-ascended the Düna? At length, a band of irregular cossacks attracted
us in the latter direction, while Ney explored the former. We marched
six leagues over a deep sand, through a thick dust, and a suffocating
heat. Night arrested our march in the neighbourhood of Aghaponovcht-china.
While parched, fevered, and exhausted by fatigue and hunger, the army
met with nothing there but muddy water. Napoleon, the King of Naples,
the Viceroy, and the Prince of Neufchatel, held a council in the
imperial tents, which were pitched in the court-yard of a castle,
situated upon an eminence to the left of the main road.
"That victory which was so fervently desired, so rapidly pursued, and
rendered more necessary by the lapse of every succeeding day, had, it
seemed, just escaped from our grasp, as it had at Wilna. True, we had
come up with the Russian rear-guard; but was it that of their army? Was
it not more likely that Barclay had fled towards Smolensk by way of
Rudnia? Whither, then, must we pursue the Russians, in order to compel
them to fight? Did not the necessity of organizing reconquered
Lithuania, of establishing magazines and hospitals, of fixing a new
centre of repose, of defence, and departure for a line of operations
which prolonged itself in so alarming a manner;--did not every thing,
in short, decidedly prove the necessity of halting on the borders of old
Russia?"
An affray had just happened, not far from that, respecting which Murat
was silent. Our vanguard had been repulsed; some of the cavalry had been
obliged to dismount, in order to effect their retreat; others had been
unable to bring off their extenuated horses, otherwise than by dragging
them by the bridle. The emperor having interrogated Belliard on the
subject, that general frankly declared, that the regiments were already
very much weakened, that they were harassed to death, and stood in
absolute need of rest; and that if they continued to march for six days
longer, there would be no cavalry remaining, and that it was high time
to halt.
To these motives were added, the effects of a consuming sun reflected
from burning sands. Exhausted as he was, the emperor now decided; the
course of the Düna and of the Boristhenes marked out the French line.
The army was thus quartered on the banks of these two rivers, and in the
interval between them; Poniatowski and his Poles at Mohilef; Davoust and
the first corps at Orcha, Dubrowna, and Luibowiczi; Murat, Ney, the army
of Italy and the guard, from Orcha and Dubrowna to Witepsk and Suraij.
The advanced posts at Lyadi, Vinkowo, and Velij, opposite to those of
Barclay and Bagration; for these two hostile armies, the one flying from
Napoleon, across the Düna, by Drissa and Witepsk, the other, escaping
Davoust across the Berezina and the Boristhenes, by way of Bobruisk,
Bickof, and Smolensk, succeeded in forming a junction in the interval
bounded by these two rivers.
The great divisions of the army detached from the central body were then
stationed as follows: To the right, Dombrowski, in front of Bobruisk and
opposed to the corps of 12,000 men commanded by the Russian general
Hoertel.
To the left, the Duke of Reggio, and St. Cyr, at Polotsk and at Bieloé,
on the Petersburgh road, which was defended by Wittgenstein and 30,000
men.
At the extreme left were Macdonald and 38,000 Prussians and Poles,
before Riga. They extended their line towards the right upon the Aa, and
in the direction of Dünabourg.
At the same time, Schwartzenberg and Regnier, at the head of the Saxon
and Austrian corps, occupied, towards Slonim, the interval between the
Niemen and the Bug, covering Warsaw and the rear of the grand army,
which was menaced by Tormasof. The Duke of Belluno was on the Vistula
with a reserve of 40,000 men; while Augereau assembled an eleventh army
at Stettin.
As to Wilna, the Duke of Bassano remained there, surrounded by the
envoys of several courts. That minister governed Lithuania, communicated
with all the chiefs, sent them the instructions which he received from
Napoleon, and forwarded the provisions, recruits, and stragglers, as
fast as they arrived.
As soon as the emperor had made up his mind, he returned to Witepsk
with his guard: there, on the 28th of July, in entering the imperial
head-quarters, he laid down his sword, and abruptly depositing it on his
maps, with which his tables were covered, he exclaimed; "Here I stop!
here I must look round me; rally; refresh my army, and organize Poland.
The campaign of 1812 is finished; that of 1813 will do the rest."
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
With the conquest of Lithuania, the object of the war was attained, and,
yet, the war appeared scarcely to have commenced; for places only had
been vanquished, and not men. The Russian army was unbroken; its two
wings, which had been separated by the vivacity of the first onset, had
now united. We were in the finest season of the year. It was in this
situation that Napoleon believed himself irrevocably decided to halt on
the banks of the Boristhenes and the Düna. At that time, he could much
more easily deceive others as to his intentions, as he actually deceived
himself.
His line of defence was already traced upon his maps; the siege-equipage
was proceeding towards Riga; the left of the army would rest on that
strong place; hence, proceeding to Dünabourg and Polotsk, it would
maintain a menacing defensive. Witepsk, so easy to fortify, and its
woody heights, would serve as an entrenched camp for the centre. Thence,
towards the south, the Berezina and its marshes, covered by the
Boristhenes, supply no other passage but a few defiles; a very few
troops would be sufficient to guard them. Further on, Bobruisk marked
out the right of this great line, and orders were given to obtain
possession of that fortress. In addition, an insurrection of the
populous provinces of the south was calculated on; they would assist
Schwartzenberg in expelling Tormasof, and the army would be increased by
their numerous cossacks. One of the greatest proprietors of these
provinces, a nobleman in whom every thing was distinguished, even to his
external appearance, hastened to join the liberators of his country. He
it was whom the emperor intended for the leader of this insurrection.
In this position nothing would be wanting. Courland would support
Macdonald; Samogitia, Oudinot; the fertile plains of Klubokoe, the
emperor; the southern provinces would effect the rest. In addition, the
grand magazine of the army was at Dantzic; its intermediate ones at
Wilna and Minsk. In this manner the army would be connected with the
country which it had just set free; and all things appertaining to that
country--its rivers, marshes, productions, and inhabitants, would be
united with us: all things would be agreed for the purposes of defence.
Such was Napoleon's plan. He was at that time seen exploring Witepsk and
its environs, as if to reconnoitre places where he was likely to make a
long residence. Establishments of all kinds were formed there.
Thirty-six ovens, capable of baking at once 29,000 pounds of bread, were
constructed. Neither was utility alone attended to; embellishment was
also considered. Some stone houses spoiled the appearance of the square
of the palace; the emperor ordered his guard to pull them down, and to
clear away the rubbish. Indeed, he was already anticipating the
pleasures of winter; Parisian actors must come to Witepsk; and as that
city was abandoned, fair spectators must be attracted from Warsaw and
Wilna.
His star at that time enlightened his path: happy had it been for him,
if he had not afterwards mistaken the movements of his impatience for
the inspirations of genius. But, whatever may be said, it was by himself
alone that he suffered himself to be hurried on; for in him every thing
proceeded from himself; and it was a vain attempt to seduce his
prudence. In vain did one of his marshals then promise him an
insurrection of the Russians, in consequence of the proclamations which
the officers of his advanced guard had been instructed to disseminate.
Some Poles had intoxicated that general with inconsiderate promises,
dictated by the delusive hope common to all exiles, with which they
flatter the ambition of the leaders who rely upon them.
But Murat was the individual whose incitements were most frequent and
animated. Tired of repose, and insatiable of glory, that monarch, who
considered the enemy to be within his grasp, was unable to repress his
emotions. He quitted the advanced guard, went to Witepsk, and in a
private interview with the emperor, gave way to his impetuosity. "He
accused the Russian army of cowardice; according to him it had failed
in the _rendezvous_ before Witepsk, as if it had been an affair of a
duel. It was a panic-struck army, which his light cavalry alone was
sufficient to put to flight." This ebullition extorted a smile from
Napoleon; but in order to moderate his fervour, he said to him, "Murat!
the first campaign in Russia is finished; let us here plant our eagles.
Two great rivers mark out our position; let us raise block-houses on
that line; let our fires cross each other on all sides; let us form in
square battalion; cannons at the angles and the exterior; let the
interior contain our quarters and our magazines: 1813 will see us at
Moscow--1814 at Petersburgh. The Russian war is a war of three years!"
It was thus that his genius conceived every thing in masses, and his eye
expatiated over an army of 400,000 men as if it were a regiment.
That very day he loudly addressed an administrator in the following
words: "As for you, sir, you must take care to provide subsistence for
us in these quarters; for," added he, in a loud voice, and addressing
himself to some of his officers, "we shall not repeat the folly of
Charles the Twelfth." But his actions in a short time belied his words;
and there was a general astonishment at his indifference to giving the
necessary orders for so great an establishment. To the left no
instructions were sent to Macdonald, nor was he supplied with the means
of obtaining possession of Riga. To the right, it was Bobruisk which it
was necessary to capture; this fortress stands in the midst of an
extensive and deep marsh; and it was to a body of cavalry that the task
of besieging it was committed.
Napoleon, in former times, scarcely ever gave orders without the
possibility of being obeyed; but the prodigies of the war of Prussia had
since occurred, and from that time the idea of impossibility was not
admitted. His orders were always, that every thing must be attempted,
because up to that time every thing had succeeded. This at first gave
birth to great exertions, all of which, however, were not equally
fortunate. Persons got discouraged; but their chief persevered; he had
become accustomed to command every thing; those whom he commanded got
accustomed not to execute every thing.
Meantime Dombrowski was left before that fortress with his Polish
division, which Napoleon stated at 8000 men, although he knew very well
that it did not at that time amount to more than 1200; but such was his
custom; either because he calculated on his words being repeated, and
that they would deceive the enemy; or that he wished, by this
exaggerated estimate, to make his generals feel all that he expected
from them.
Witepsk remained for survey. From the windows of its houses the eye
looked down perpendicularly into the Düna, or to the very bottom of the
precipices by which its walls are surrounded. In these countries the
snow remains long upon the ground; it filters through its least solid
parts, which it penetrates to a great depth, and which it dilutes and
breaks down. Hence those deep and unexpected ravines, which no
declination of the soil gives reason to foresee, which are imperceptible
at some paces from their edge, and which on those vast plains surprised
and suddenly arrested the charges of cavalry.
The French would not have required more than a month to render that city
sufficiently strong as even to stand a regular siege: the natural
strength of the place was such as to require little assistance from art,
but that little was denied it. At the same time a few millions, which
were indispensable to effect the levy of the Lithuanian troops, were
refused to them. Prince Sangutsko was to have gone and commanded the
insurrection in the South, but he was retained in the imperial
head-quarters.
But the moderation of the first discourses of Napoleon had not deceived
the members of his household. They recollected that, at the first view
of the deserted camp of Barclay, and of Witepsk abandoned, when he heard
them congratulating each other on this conquest, he turned sharply round
to them and exclaimed, "Do you think then that I have come so far to
conquer these huts?" They also knew perfectly, that when he had a great
object in view, he never devised any other than a vague plan, preferring
to take counsel of opportunity; a system more conformable to the
promptitude of his genius.
In other respects, the whole army was loaded with the favours of its
commander. If he happened to meet with convoys of wounded, he stopped
them, informed himself of their condition, of their sufferings, of the
actions in which they had been wounded, and never quitted them without
consoling them by his words, or making them partakers of his bounty.
He bestowed particular attention on his guard; he himself daily reviewed
some part of them, lavishing commendation, and sometimes blame; but the
latter seldom fell on any but the administrators; which pleased the
soldiers, and diverted their complaints.
Every day he went and visited the ovens, tasted the bread, and satisfied
himself of the regularity of all the distributions. He frequently sent
wine from his table to the sentinel who was nearest to him. One day he
assembled the _élite_ of his guards for the purpose of giving them a new
leader; he made them a speech, and with his own hand and sword
introduced him to them; afterwards he embraced him in their presence. So
many attentions were ascribed by some, to his gratitude for the past; by
others, to his exigency for the future.
The latter saw clearly that Napoleon had at first flattered himself with
the hope of receiving fresh overtures of peace from Alexander, and that
the misery and debility of his army had occupied his attention. It was
requisite to allow the long train of stragglers and sick sufficient
time, the one for joining their corps, and the latter for reaching the
hospitals. Finally, to establish these hospitals, to collect provisions,
recruit the horses, and wait for the hospital-waggons, the artillery,
and the pontoons, which were still laboriously dragging after us across
the Lithuanian sands. His correspondence with Europe must also have
been a source of occupation to him. To conclude, a destructive
atmosphere stopped his progress! Such, in fact, is that climate; the
atmosphere is always in the extreme--always excessive; it either parches
or inundates, burns up or freezes, the soil and its inhabitants, for
whose protection it appears expressly framed; a perfidious climate, the
heat of which debilitated our bodies, in order to render them more
accessible to the frosts by which they were shortly to be pierced.
The emperor was not the least sensible of its effects; but when he found
himself somewhat refreshed by repose, when no envoy from Alexander made
his appearance, and his first dispositions were completed, he was seized
with impatience. He was observed to grow restless; whether it was that
inactivity annoyed him, as it does all men of active habits, and that he
preferred danger to the weariness of expectation, or that he was
agitated by that desire of acquisition, which, with the greater part of
mankind, has stronger efficacy than the pleasure of preserving, or the
fear of losing.
It was then especially that the image of captive Moscow besieged him; it
was the boundary of his fears, the object of his hopes: possessed of
that, he would possess every thing. From that time it was foreseen that
an ardent and restless genius, like his, and accustomed to short cuts,
would not wait eight months, when he felt his object within his reach,
and when twenty days were sufficient to attain it.
We must not, however, be too hasty in judging this extraordinary man by
the weaknesses common to all men. We shall presently hear from
himself;--we shall see how much his political position tended to
complicate his military position. At a later period, we shall be less
tempted to blame the resolution he was now about to take, when it is
seen that the fate of Russia depended upon only one more day's health,
which failed Napoleon, even on the very field of the Moskwa.
Meantime, he at first appeared hardly bold enough to confess to himself
a project of such great temerity. But by degrees, he assumed courage to
look it in the face. He then began to deliberate, and the state of great
irresolution which tormented his mind affected his whole frame. He was
observed to wander about his apartments, as if pursued by some dangerous
temptation. Nothing could rivet his attention; he every moment began,
quitted, and resumed his labour; he walked about without any object;
inquired the hour, and looked at his watch; completely absorbed, he
stopped, hummed a tune with an absent air, and again began walking
about.
In the midst of his perplexity, he occasionally addressed the persons
whom he met with such half sentences as "Well! what shall we do? Shall
we stay where we are, or advance? How is it possible to stop short in
the midst of so glorious a career?" He did not wait for their reply; but
still kept wandering about, as if he was looking for something or
somebody to terminate his indecision.
At length, quite overwhelmed with the weight of such an important
consideration, and oppressed with so great an uncertainty, he would
throw himself on one of the beds which he had caused to be laid on the
floor of his apartments. His frame, exhausted by the heat, and the
struggles of his mind, could only bear a covering of the slightest
texture; it was in that state that he passed a portion of his days at
Witepsk.
But when his body was at rest, his spirit was only the more active. "How
many motives urged him towards Moscow! How support at Witepsk the
_ennui_ of seven winter months?--he, who till then had always been the
assailant, was about to be reduced to a defensive position; a part
unworthy of him, of which he had no experience, and adverse to his
genius.
"Moreover, at Witepsk, nothing had been decided, and yet, at what a
distance was he already from France! Europe, then, would at length
behold him stopped, whom nothing had been able to stop. Would not the
duration of the enterprise augment its danger? Ought he to allow Russia
time to arm herself entirely? How long could he protract this uncertain
condition without impairing the charm of his infallibility, (which the
resistance of Spain had already enfeebled) and without engendering
dangerous hopes in Europe? What would be thought, if it were known that
a third of his army, dispersed or sick, were no longer in the ranks? It
was indispensable, therefore, to dazzle the world speedily by the éclat
of a great victory, and hide so many sacrifices under a heap of
laurels."
Then, if he remained at Witepsk, he considered that he should have the
_ennui_, the whole expense, all the inconveniences and anxieties of a
defensive position to bear; while at Moscow there would be peace,
abundance, a reimbursement of the expenses of the war, and immortal
glory. He persuaded himself that audacity for him was henceforth the
greatest prudence; that it is the same with all hazardous undertakings,
as with faults, in which there is always risk at the beginning, but
frequently gain at the conclusion; that the more inexcusable they are,
the more they require to be successful. That it was indispensable,
therefore, to consummate this undertaking, to push it to the utmost,
astonish the universe, beat down Alexander by his audacity, and carry
off a prize which should be a compensation for so many losses.
Thus it was, that the same danger which perhaps ought to have recalled
him to the Niemen, or kept him stationary on the Düna, urged him towards
Moscow! Such is the nature of false positions; every thing in them is
perilous; temerity is prudence; there is no choice left but of errors;
there is no hope but in the errors of the enemy, and in chance.
Having at last determined, he hastily arose, as if not to allow time to
his own reflections to renew so painful a state of uncertainty; and
already quite full of the plan which was to secure his conquest, he
hastened to his maps; they presented to his view the cities of Smolensk
and Moscow; "the great Moscow, the holy city;" names which he repeated
with complacency, and which served to add new fuel to his ambitious
flame. Fired with this prospect, his spirit, replete with the energy of
his mighty conception, appears possessed by the genius of war. His voice
deepens; his eye flashes fire; and his countenance darkens; his
attendants retreat from his presence, struck with mingled awe and
respect; but at length his plan is fixed; his determination taken; his
order of march traced out. Instantly, the internal struggle by which he
had been agitated subsided; and no sooner was he delivered of his
terrible conception, than his countenance resumed its usual mild and
tranquil character.
CHAP. II.
His resolution once taken, he was anxious that it should satisfy his
friends; he conceived that by persuading them, they would be actuated by
greater zeal, than by commanding their obedience. It was, moreover, by
their sentiments that he was enabled to judge of those of the rest of
his army; in short, like all other men, the silent discontent of his
household disturbed him. Surrounded by disapproving countenances, and
opinions contrary to his own, he felt himself uncomfortable. And,
besides, to obtain their assent to his plan, was in some degree to make
them share the responsibility which possibly weighed upon his mind.
But all the officers of his household opposed his plan, each in the way
that marked his peculiar character; Berthier, by a melancholy
countenance, by lamentations, and even tears; Lobau and Caulaincourt, by
a frankness, which in the first was stamped by a cold and haughty
roughness, excusable in so brave a warrior; and which in the second was
persevering even to obstinacy, and impetuous even to violence. The
emperor repelled their observations with some ill-humour; he exclaimed,
addressing himself more especially to his aid-de-camp, as well as to
Berthier, "that he had enriched his generals too much; that all they now
aspired to was to follow the pleasures of the chase, and to display
their brilliant equipages in Paris: and that, doubtless, they had become
disgusted with war." When their honour was thus attacked, there was no
longer any reply to be made; they merely bowed and remained silent.
During one of his impatient fits, he told one of the generals of his
guard, "you were born in a _bivouac_, and in a _bivouac_ you will die."
As to Duroc, he first signified his disapprobation by a chilling
silence, and afterwards by terse replies, reference to accurate reports,
and brief remarks. To him the emperor replied, "that he saw clearly
enough that the Russians wanted to draw him on; but that, nevertheless,
he must proceed as far as Smolensk; that there he would establish his
head-quarters; and that in the spring of 1813, if Russia did not
previously make peace, she would be ruined; that Smolensk was the key
of the two roads to Petersburgh and Moscow; that he must get possession
of it; and that he would then be able to march on both those capitals at
the same time, in order to destroy every thing in the one, and preserve
every thing in the other."
Here the grand marshal observed to him, that he was not more likely to
make peace at Smolensk, or even at Moscow, than he was at Witepsk; and
that in removing to such a distance from France, the Prussians
constituted an intermediate body, on whom little reliance could be
placed. But the emperor replied, that on that supposition, as the
Russian war no longer offered him any advantageous result, he ought to
renounce it; and if so, he must turn his arms against Prussia, and
compel her to pay the expenses of the war.
It was now Daru's turn. This minister is straightforward even to
stiffness, and possesses immoveable firmness. The great question of the
march upon Moscow produced a discussion which lasted during eight
successive hours, and at which only Berthier was present. The emperor
having desired his minister's opinion of the war, "It is not a national
war," replied Daru; "the introduction of some English merchandize into
Russia, and even the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, are not
sufficient reasons for engaging in so distant a war; neither your troops
nor ourselves understand its necessity or its objects, and to say the
least, all things recommend the policy of stopping where we now are."
The emperor rejoined, "Did they take him for a madman? Did they imagine
he made war from inclination? Had they not heard him say that the wars
of Spain and Russia were two ulcers which ate into the vitals of France,
and that she could not bear them both at once?
"He was anxious for peace; but in order to negotiate, two persons were
necessary, and he was only one. Had a single letter from Alexander yet
reached him?
"What, then, should he wait for at Witepsk? Two rivers, it was true,
traced out the line of position; but, during the winter, there were no
longer any rivers in this country. It was, therefore, a visionary line
which they traced out; it was rather a line of demarcation than of
separation. It was requisite, therefore, to constitute an artificial
line; to construct towns and fortresses capable of defying the elements,
and every species of scourge; to create every thing, land and
atmosphere; for every thing was deficient, even provisions, unless,
indeed, he chose to drain Lithuania, and render her hostile, or ruin
ourselves; that if they were at Moscow, they might take what they
pleased; here it was necessary to purchase every thing. Consequently,"
continued he, "you cannot enable me to live at Witepsk, nor shall I be
able to defend you here: both of us, therefore, are here out of our
proper element.
"That if he returned to Wilna, he might there indeed, be more easily
supplied, but that he should not be in a better condition to defend
himself; that in that case it would be necessary for him to fall back to
the Vistula, and lose Lithuania. Whereas at Smolensk, he would be sure
to gain either a decisive battle, or at least, a fortress and a position
on the Dnieper.
"That he perceived clearly that their thoughts were dwelling on Charles
the Twelfth; but that if the expedition to Moscow wanted a fortunate
precedent, it was because it was deficient in a man capable of making it
succeed; that in war, fortune went for one-half in every thing; that if
people always waited for a complete assemblage of favourable
circumstances, nothing would ever be undertaken; that we must begin, in
order to finish; that there was no enterprise in which every thing
concurred, and that, in all human projects, chance had its share; that,
in short, it was not the rule which created the success, but the success
the rule; and that, if he succeeded by new means, that success would
create new principles.
"Blood has not yet been spilled," he added, "and Russia is too great to
yield without fighting. Alexander can only negotiate after a great
battle. If it is necessary, I will even proceed to the holy city in
search of that battle, and I will gain it. Peace waits for me at the
gates of Moscow. But with his honour thus saved, if Alexander still
persists, I will negotiate with the Boyards, or even with the population
of that capital; it is numerous, united, and consequently enlightened.
It will understand its own interests, and comprehend the value of
liberty." He concluded by saying, that "Moscow hated Petersburgh; that
he would take advantage of their rivalry; that the results of such a
jealousy were incalculable."
It was in this manner that the emperor, when animated by conversation
and the banquet, revealed the nature of his hopes. Daru replied, "That
war was a game which he played well, in which he was always the winner,
and that it was natural to infer, that he took a pleasure in playing it.
But that, in this case, it was not so much men as nature which it was
necessary to conquer; that already the army was diminished one-third by
desertion, sickness, or famine.
"If provisions failed at Witepsk, what would be the case farther on? The
officers whom he had sent to procure them, either never re-appeared, or
returned with empty hands. That the small quantity of flour, or the few
cattle which they had succeeded in collecting, were immediately consumed
by the imperial guard; that the other divisions of the army were heard
to murmur, that it exacted and absorbed every thing, that it
constituted, as it were, a privileged class. The hospital and
provision-waggons, as well as the droves of cattle, were not able to
come up. The hospitals were insufficient for the sick; provisions, room,
and medicines, were all wanting in them.
"All things consequently admonished them to halt, and with so much the
more effect, as they could not calculate on the favourable disposition
of the inhabitants beyond Witepsk. In conformity with his secret orders,
they had been sounded, but without effect. How could men be roused to
insurrection, for the sake of a liberty whose very name they did not
understand? What influence could be obtained over a people almost
savages, without property, and without wants? What could be taken from
them? With what could they be tempted? Their only property was their
life, which they carried with them into regions of almost infinite
space."
Berthier added, "That if we were to proceed forward, the Russians would
have in their favour our too-much elongated flanks, famine, and
especially their formidable winter; while in staying where he was, the
emperor would enlist the latter on his side, and render himself master
of the war; that he would fix it within his reach, instead of following
its deceitful, wandering, and undecided flight."
Such were the replies of Berthier and Daru. The emperor mildly listened
to their observations, but oftener interrupted them by subtile
arguments; begging the question, according to his wishes, or shifting
it, when it became too pressing. But however disagreeable might be the
truths which he was obliged to hear, he listened to them patiently, and
replied with equal patience. Throughout this discussion, his
conversation and whole deportment were remarkable for affability,
simplicity, and good-humour, which, indeed, he almost always preserved
in his own family; a circumstance which sufficiently explains why,
notwithstanding so many misfortunes, he was so much beloved by those who
lived on terms of intimacy with him.
Still dissatisfied, the emperor summoned successively several of the
generals of his army; but his questions were such as indicated their
answers; and many of these chiefs, born in the capacity of soldiers, and
accustomed to obey his voice, were as submissive in these conversations
as upon the field of battle.
Others waited the issue, in order to give their opinion; concealing
their dread of a reverse, in the presence of a man who had always been
fortunate, as well as their opinion, lest success might on some future
day reproach them for it.
The greater part signified their approbation, being perfectly convinced
that were they even to incur his displeasure by recommending him to
stop, he would not be the less certain to advance. As it was necessary
to incur fresh dangers, they preferred meeting them with an appearance
of good-will. They found it more convenient to be wrong with him, than
right against him.
But there was one individual, who, not content with approving his
design, encouraged it. Prompted by a culpable ambition, he increased
Napoleon's confidence, by exaggerating the force of his division. For
after incurring so many fatigues, unaccompanied by danger, it was a
great merit in those chiefs who preserved the greatest number of men
around their eagles. The emperor was thus gratified on his weak side,
and the time for rewards was approaching. In order to make himself more
agreeable, the individual in question boldly took upon himself to vouch
for the ardour of his soldiers, whose emaciated countenances but ill
accorded with the flattery of their leader. The emperor gave credit to
this ardour, because it pleased him, and because he only saw the
soldiers at reviews; occasions when his presence, the military pomp, the
mutual excitation produced by great assemblages, imparted fervor to the
mind; when, in short, all things, even to the secret orders of the
chiefs, dictated an appearance of enthusiasm.
But in fact it was only with his guard that he thus occupied his
attention. In the army, the soldiers complained of his non-appearance.
"They no longer saw him," they said, "except in days of battle, when
they had to die for him, but never to supply them with the means of
existence. They were all there to serve him, but he seemed no longer
there to serve them."
In this manner did they suffer and complain, but without sufficiently
considering that what they complained of was one of the inseparable
evils of the campaign. The dispersion of the various corps d'armée being
indispensable for the sake of procuring subsistence in these deserts,
that necessity kept Napoleon at a distance from his soldiers. His guard
could hardly find subsistence and shelter in his immediate
neighbourhood; the rest were out of his sight. It is true that many
imprudent acts had recently been committed; several convoys of
provisions belonging to other corps were on their passage daringly
retained at the imperial head-quarters, for the use of the guard, by
whose order is not known. This violence, added to the jealousy which
such bodies of men always inspire, created discontent in the army.
The emperor was ignorant of these complaints; but another cause of
anxiety had occurred to torment him. He knew that at Witepsk alone,
there were 3000 of his soldiers attacked by the dysentery, which was
extending its ravages over his whole army. The rye which they were
eating in soup was its principal cause. Their stomachs, accustomed to
bread, rejected this cold and indigestible food, and the emperor was
urging his physicians to find a remedy for its effects. One day he
appeared less anxious. "Davoust," said he, "has found out what the
medical men could not discover; he has just sent to inform me of it; all
that is required is to roast the rye before preparing it;" and his eyes
sparkled with hope as he questioned his physician, who declined giving
any opinion until the experiment was tried. The emperor instantly called
two grenadiers of his guard; he seated them at table, close to him, and
made them begin the trial of this nourishment so prepared. It did not
succeed with them, although he added to it some of his own wine, which
he himself poured out for them.
Respect, however, for the conqueror of Europe, and the necessity of
circumstances, supported them in the midst of their numerous privations.
They saw that they were too deeply embarked; that a victory was
necessary for their speedy deliverance; and that he alone could give it
them. Misfortune, moreover, had purified the army; all that remained of
it could not fail to be its _élite_ both in mind and body. In order to
have got so far as they had done, what trials had they not withstood!
Suspense, and disgust with miserable cantonments, were sufficient to
agitate such men. To remain, appeared to them insupportable; to retreat,
impossible; it was, therefore, imperative to advance.
The great names of Smolensk and Moscow inspired no alarm. In ordinary
times, and with ordinary men, that unknown region, that unvisited
people, and the distance which magnifies all things, would have been
sufficient to discourage. But these were the very circumstances which,
in this case, were most attractive. The soldiers' chief pleasure was in
hazardous situations, which were rendered more interesting by the
greater proportion of danger they involved, and on which new dangers
conferred a more striking air of singularity; emotions full of charm for
active spirits, which had exhausted their taste for old things, and
which, therefore, required new.
Ambition was, at that time, completely unshackled; every thing inspired
the passion for glory; they had been launched into a boundless career.
How was it possible to measure the ascendancy, which a powerful emperor
must have acquired, or the strong impulse which he had given them?--an
emperor, capable of telling his soldiers after the victory of
Austerlitz, "I will allow you to name your children after me; and if
among them there should prove one worthy of us, I will leave him every
thing I possess, and name him my successor."
CHAP. III.
The junction of the two wings of the Russian army, in the direction of
Smolensk, had compelled Napoleon also to approximate his various
divisions. No signal of attack had yet been given, but the war involved
him on all sides; it seemed to tempt his genius by success, and to
stimulate it by reverses. On his left, Wittgenstein, equally in dread of
Oudinot and Macdonald, remained between the two roads from Polotsk and
Dünabourg, which meet at Sebez. The Duke of Reggio's orders had been to
keep on the defensive. But neither at Polotsk nor at Witepsk was there
any thing found in the country, which disclosed the position of the
Russians. Tired of feeling nothing of them on any side, the marshal
determined to go in quest of them himself. On the 1st of August,
therefore, he left general Merle and his division on the Drissa, to
protect his baggage, his great park of artillery, and his retreat; he
pushed Verdier towards Sebez, and made him take a position on the
high-road, in order to mask the movement which he was meditating. He
himself, turning to the left with Legrand's infantry, Castex's cavalry,
and Aubrey's light artillery, advanced as far as Yakoubowo, on the road
to Osweïa.
As chance would have it, Wittgenstein, at the same moment, was marching
from Osweïa to Yakoubowo; the hostile armies unexpectedly met each
other in front of that village. It was late in the day; the shock was
violent, but of short duration: night put an end to the combat, and
postponed its decision.
The marshal found himself engaged, with a single division, in a deep and
narrow pass, surrounded with woods and hills, all the declivities of
which were opposed to us. He was hesitating, however, whether he should
quit that contracted position, on which all the enemy's fire was about
to be concentrated, when a young Russian staff-officer, scarcely emerged
from boyhood, came dashing heedlessly into our posts, and allowed
himself to be taken, with the despatches of which he was the bearer. We
learned from them, that Wittgenstein was marching with all his forces to
attack and destroy our bridges over the Düna. Oudinot felt it necessary
to retreat, in order to rally and concentrate his forces in a less
unfavourable position; in consequence, as frequently happens in
retrograde marches, some stragglers and baggage fell into the hands of
the Russians.
Wittgenstein, elated by this easy success, pushed it beyond all bounds.
In the first transport of what he regarded as a victory, he ordered
Koulnief, and 12,000 men, to pass the Drissa, in order to pursue
d'Albert and Legrand. The latter had made a halt; Albert hastened to
inform the marshal. They covered their detachment by a rising ground,
watched all the movements of the Russian general, and observing him
rashly venturing himself into a defile between them and the river, they
rushed suddenly upon him, overthrew and killed him; taking from him also
eight pieces of cannon, and 2000 men.
Koulnief, it was said, died like a hero; a cannon ball broke both his
legs, and threw him prostrate on his own cannon; where, observing the
French approaching, he tore off his decorations, and, in a transport of
anger at his own temerity, condemned himself to die on the very spot
where his error was committed, commanding his soldiers to leave him to
his fate. The whole Russian army regretted him; it imputed this
misfortune to one of those individuals whom the caprice of Paul had made
into generals, at the period when that emperor was quite new to power,
and conceived the idea of entering his peaceable inheritance in the
character of a triumphant conqueror.
Rashness passed over with the victory from the Russian to the French
camp; this unexpected success elated Casa-Bianca and his Corsican
battalions; they forgot the error to which they were indebted for it,
they neglected the recommendation of their general, and without
reflecting that they were imitating the imprudence by which they had
just profited, they precipitated themselves upon the flying footsteps of
the Russians. They proceeded, headlong, in this manner for two leagues,
and were only reminded of their temerity by finding themselves alone in
presence of the Russian army. Verdier, forced to engage in order to
support them, was already compromising the rest of his division, when
the Duke of Reggio hurried up, relieved his troops from this peril, led
them back behind the Drissa, and on the following day resumed his first
position under the walls of Polotsk. There he found Saint-Cyr and the
Bavarians, who increased the force of his corps to 35,000 men. As to
Wittgenstein, he tranquilly took up his first position at Osweïa. The
result of these four days was very unsatisfactory to the emperor.
Nearly about the same time intelligence was brought to Witepsk that the
advanced guard of the viceroy had gained some advantages near Suraij;
but that, in the centre, near the Dnieper, at Inkowo, Sebastiani had
been surprised by superior numbers, and defeated.
Napoleon was then writing to the Duke of Bassano to announce daily fresh
victories to the Turks. True or false was of no consequence, provided
the communications produced the effect of suspending their treaty with
Russia. He was still engaged in this task, when deputies from Red Russia
arrived at Witepsk, and informed Duroc, that they had heard the report
of the Russian cannon announcing the peace of Bucharest. That treaty,
signed by Kutusof, had just been ratified.
At this intelligence, which Duroc transmitted to Napoleon, the latter
was deeply mortified. He was now no longer astonished at Alexander's
silence. At first, it was the tardiness of Maret's negotiations to which
he imputed this result; then, to the blind stupidity of the Turks, to
whom their treaties of peace were always more fatal than their wars;
lastly, the perfidious policy of his allies, all of whom, taking
advantage of the distance, and in the obscurity of the seraglio, had,
doubtless, dared to unite against their common dictator.
This event rendered a prompt victory still more necessary to him. All
hope of peace was now at an end. He had just read the proclamations of
Alexander. Being addressed to a rude people, they were necessarily
unrefined: the following are some passages of them: "The enemy, with
unexampled perfidy, has announced the destruction of our country. Our
brave soldiers burn to throw themselves on his battalions, and to
destroy them; but it is not our intention to allow them to be sacrificed
on the altars of this Moloch. A general insurrection is necessary
against the universal tyrant. He comes, with treachery in his heart, and
loyalty on his lips, to chain us with his legions of slaves. Let us
drive away this race of locusts. Let us carry the cross in our hearts,
and the sword in our hands. Let us pluck his fangs from this lion's
mouth, and overthrow the tyrant, whose object is to overthrow the
earth."
The emperor was incensed. These reproaches, these successes, and these
reverses, all contributed to stimulate his mind. The forward movement of
Barclay, in three columns, towards Rudnia, which the check at Inkowo had
disclosed, and the vigorous defensive operations of Wittgenstein,
promised the approach of a battle. He had to choose between that, and a
long and sanguinary defensive war, to which he was unaccustomed, which
was difficult to maintain at such a distance from his reinforcements,
and encouraging to his enemies.
Napoleon accordingly decided; but his decision, without being rash, was
grand and bold, like the enterprise itself. Having determined to detach
himself from Oudinot, he first caused him to be reinforced by
Saint-Cyr's corps, and ordered him to connect himself with the Duke of
Tarentum; having resolved also to march against the enemy, he did it by
changing in front of him, and within his reach, but without his
knowledge, the line of his operations at Witepsk for that of Minsk. His
manoeuvre was so well combined; he had accustomed his lieutenants to
so much punctuality, secrecy, and precision, that in four days, while
the surprised hostile army could find no traces of the French army
before it, the latter would by this plan find itself in a mass of
185,000 men on the left flank and rear of that enemy, which but just
before had presumed to think of surprising him.
Meantime, the extent and the multiplicity of the operations, which on
all sides claimed Napoleon's presence, still detained him at Witepsk. It
was only by his letters, that he could make his presence universally
felt. His head alone laboured for the whole, and he indulged himself in
the thought that his urgent and repeated orders would suffice to make
nature herself obedient to him.
The army only subsisted by its exertions, and from day to day; it had
not provisions for twenty-four hours: Napoleon ordered that it should
provide itself for fifteen days. He was incessantly dictating letters.
On the 10th of August he addressed eight to the prince of Eckmühl, and
almost as many to each of his other lieutenants. In the first, he
concentrates every thing round himself, in conformity with his leading
principle, "that war is nothing else than the art of assembling on a
given point, a larger number of men than your enemy." It was in this
spirit that he wrote to Davoust: "Send for Latour-Maubourg. If the enemy
remain at Smolensk, as I have reason to suppose, it will be a decisive
affair, and we cannot have too much numerical strength. Orcha will
become the pivot of the army. Every thing leads me to believe that there
will be a great battle at Smolensk; hospitals will, therefore, be
requisite; they will be necessary at Orcha, Dombrowna, Mohilef,
Kochanowo, Bobr, Borizof, and Minsk."
It was then particularly that he manifested extreme anxiety about the
provisioning of Orcha. It was on the 10th of August, at the very moment
when he was dictating this letter, that he gave his order of march. In
four days, all his army would be assembled on the left bank of the
Boristhenes, and in the direction of Liady. He departed from Witepsk on
the 13th, after having remained there a fortnight.
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
It was the check at Inkowo which decided Napoleon; ten thousand Russian
horse, in an affair with the advanced guard, had overthrown Sebastiani
and his cavalry. The intrepidity and reputation of the defeated general,
his report, the boldness of the attack, the hope, nay the urgent
necessity, of a decisive engagement, all led the emperor to believe,
that their numbers alone had carried the day, that the Russian army was
between the Düna and the Dnieper, and that it was marching against the
centre of his cantonments: this was actually the fact.
The grand army being dispersed, it was necessary to collect it together.
Napoleon had resolved to defile with his guard, the army of Italy, and
three of Davoust's divisions, before the front of attack of the
Russians; to abandon his Witepsk line of operation, and take that of
Orcha, and, lastly, to throw himself with 185,000 men on the left of the
Dnieper and of the enemy's army. Covered by the river, his plan was to
get beyond it, for the purpose of reaching Smolensk before it; if
successful, he should have separated the Russian army not only from
Moscow, but from the whole centre and south of the empire; it would be
confined to the north; and he would have accomplished at Smolensk
against Bagration and Barclay united, what he had in vain attempted at
Witepsk against the army of Barclay alone.
Thus the line of operation of so large an army was about to be suddenly
changed; 200,000 men, spread over a tract of more than fifty leagues,
were to be all at once brought together, without the knowledge of the
enemy, within reach of him, and on his left flank. This was,
undoubtedly, one of those grand determinations which, executed with the
unity and rapidity of their conception, change instantaneously the face
of war, decide the fate of empires, and display the genius of
conquerors.
As we marched from Orcha to Liady, the French army formed a long column
on the left bank of the Dnieper. In this mass, the first corps, that of
Davoust, was distinguished by the order and harmony which prevailed in
its divisions. The fine appearance of the troops, the care with which
they were supplied, and the attention that was paid to make them careful
of their provisions, which the improvident soldier is apt to waste;
lastly, the strength of these divisions, the happy result of this severe
discipline, all caused them to be acknowledged as the model of the whole
army.
Gudin's division was the only one wanting; owing to an ill-written
order, it had been wandering for twenty-four hours in marshy woods; it
arrived, however, but diminished by three hundred combatants; for such
errors are not to be repaired but by forced marches, under which the
weakest are sure to sink.
The emperor traversed in a day the hilly and woody tract which separates
the Düna from the Boristhenes; it was in front of Rassasna that he
crossed the latter river. Its distance from our home, the very antiquity
of its name, every thing connected with it, excited our curiosity. For
the first time, the waters of this Muscovite river were about to bear a
French army, and to reflect our victorious arms. The Romans had known it
only by their defeats: it was down this same stream that the savages of
the North, the children of Odin and Rurik, descended to plunder
Constantinople. Long before we could perceive it, our eyes sought it
with ambitious impatience; we came to a narrow river, straitened between
woody and uncultivated banks; it was the Boristhenes which presented
itself to our view in this humble form. At this sight all our proud
thoughts were lowered, and they were soon totally banished by the
necessity of providing for our most urgent wants.
The emperor slept in his tent in advance of Rassasna; next day the army
marched together, ready to draw up in order of battle, with the emperor
on horseback in the midst of it. The advanced guard drove before it two
pulks of cossacks, who resisted only till they had gained time to
destroy some bridges and some trusses of forage. The villages deserted
by the enemy were plundered as soon as we entered them: we passed them
in all possible haste and in disorder.
The streams were crossed by fords which were soon spoiled; the regiments
which came afterwards passed over in other places, wherever they could.
No one gave himself much concern about such details, which were
neglected by the general staff: no person was left to point out the
danger, where there was any, or the road, if there were several. Each
_corps d'armée_ seemed to be there for itself alone, each division, each
individual to be unconnected with the rest; as if the fate of one had
not depended on that of the other.
The army every where left stragglers behind it, and men who had lost
their way, whom the officers passed without noticing; there would have
been too many to find fault with; and besides, each was too much
occupied with himself to attend to others. Many of these men were
marauders, who feigned illness or a wound, to separate from the rest,
which there was not time to prevent, and which will always be the case
in large armies, that are urged forward with such precipitation, as
individual order cannot exist in the midst of general disorder.
As far as Liady the villages appeared to us to be more Jewish than
Polish; the Lithuanians sometimes fled at our approach; the Jews always
remained; nothing could have induced them to forsake their wretched
habitations; they might be known by their thick pronunciation, their
voluble and hasty way of speaking, the vivacity of their motions, and
their complexion, animated by the base passion of lucre. We noticed in
particular their eager and piercing looks, their faces and features
lengthened out into acute points, which a malicious and perfidious smile
cannot widen; their tall, slim, and supple form; the earnestness of
their demeanour, and lastly, their beards, usually red, and their long
black robes, tightened round their loins by a leather girdle; for every
thing but their filthiness distinguishes them from the Lithuanian
peasants; every thing about them bespeaks a degraded people.
They seem to have conquered Poland, where they swarm, and the whole
substance of which they extract. Formerly their religion, at present the
sense of a reprobation too long universal, have made them the enemies of
mankind; of old they attacked with arms, at present by cunning. This
race is abhorred by the Russians, perhaps on account of its enmity to
image-worship, while the Muscovites carry their adoration of images to
idolatry. Finally, whether from superstition or rivalry of interests,
they have forbidden them their country: the Jews were obliged to put up
with their contempt, which their impotence repaid with hatred; but they
detested our pillage still more. Enemies of all, spies to both armies,
they sold one to the other from resentment or fear, according to
occasion, and because there is nothing that they would not sell.
At Liady the Jews ended, and Russia proper commenced; our eyes were
therefore relieved from their disgusting presence, but other wants made
us regret them; we missed their active and officious services, which
money could command, and their German jargon, the only language which we
understood in these deserts, and which they all speak, because they
require it in their traffic.
CHAP. II.
On the 15th of August, at three o'clock, we came in sight of Krasnoë, a
town constructed of wood, which a Russian regiment made a show of
defending; but it detained Marshal Ney no longer than the time necessary
to come up with and overthrow it. The town being taken, there were seen
beyond it 6000 Russian infantry in two columns, while several squadrons
covered the retreat. This was the corps of Newerowskoi.
The ground was unequal, but bare, and suitable for cavalry. Murat took
possession of it; but the bridges of Krasnoë were broken down, and the
French cavalry was obliged to move off to the left, and to defile to a
great distance in bad fords, in order to come up with the enemy. When
our troops were in presence of the latter, the difficulty of the passage
which they had just left behind them, and the bold countenance of the
Russians, made them hesitate; they lost time in waiting for one another
and deploying, but still the first effort dispersed the enemy's cavalry.
Newerowskoi finding himself uncovered, drew together his columns, and
formed them into a full square so thick, that Murat's cavalry penetrated
several times into it, without being able to break through or to
disperse it.
It is even true that our first charges stopped short at the distance of
20 paces from the front of the Russians: whenever the latter found
themselves too hard pressed, they faced about, steadily waited for us,
and drove us back with their small arms; after which, profiting by our
disorder, they immediately continued their retreat.
The cossacks were seen striking with the shafts of their pikes such of
their foot-soldiers as lengthened the line of march, or stepped out of
their ranks; for our squadrons harassed them incessantly, watched all
their movements, threw themselves into the smallest intervals, and
instantly carried off all that separated from the main body; they even
penetrated into it twice, but a little way, the horses remaining, as it
were, stuck fast in that thick and obstinate mass.
Newerowskoi had one very critical moment: his column was marching on the
left of the high-road through rye not yet cut, when all at once it was
stopped by a long fence, formed of a stout palisade; his soldiers,
pressed by our movements, had not time to make a gap in it, and Murat
sent the Wurtembergers against them to make them lay down their arms;
but while the head of the Russian column was surmounting the obstacle,
their rearmost ranks faced about and stood firm. They fired ill, it is
true, most of them into the air, like persons who are frightened; but so
near, that the smoke, the flash of the reports of so many shot,
frightened the Wurtemberg horses, and threw them into confusion.
The Russians embraced that moment to place between them and us that
barrier which was expected to prove fatal to them. Their column profited
by it to rally and gain ground. At length some French cannon came up,
and they alone were capable of making a breach in this living fortress.
Newerowskoi hastened to reach a defile, where Grouchy was ordered to
anticipate him; but Murat, deceived by a false report, had diverted the
greatest part of that general's cavalry in the direction of Elnia;
Grouchy had only 600 horse remaining. He made the 8th chasseurs dash
forward to the defile, but it found itself too weak to stand against so
strong a column. The vigorous and repeated charges made by that
regiment, by the 6th hussars, and the 6th lancers, on the left flank of
that dense mass, which was protected by the double row of birch-trees
that lined the road on each side, were wholly insufficient, and
Grouchy's applications for assistance were not attended to; either
because the general who followed him was kept back by the difficulties
of the ground, or that he was not sufficiently sensible of the
importance of the combat. It was nevertheless great, since there was
between Smolensk and Murat but this one Russian corps, and had that been
defeated, Smolensk might have been surprised without defenders, taken
without a battle, and the enemy's army cut off from his capital. But
this Russian division at length gained a woody ground where its flanks
were covered.
Newerowskoi retreated like a lion; still he left on the field of battle
1200 killed, 1000 prisoners, and eight pieces of cannon. The French
cavalry had the honour of that day. The attack was as furious as the
defence was obstinate; it had the more merit, having only the sword to
employ against both sword and fire: the enlightened courage of the
French soldier being besides of a more exalted nature than that of the
Russian troops, mere docile slaves, who expose a less happy life, and
bodies in which cold has extinguished sensibility.
As chance would have it, the day of this success was the emperor's
birth-day. The army had no idea of celebrating it. In the disposition of
the men and of the place, there was nothing that harmonized with such a
celebration; empty acclamations would have been lost amid those vast
deserts. In our situation, there was no other festival than the day of a
complete victory.
Murat and Ney, however, in reporting their success to the emperor, paid
homage to that anniversary. They caused a salute of 100 guns to be
fired. The emperor remarked, with displeasure, that in Russia it was
necessary to be more sparing of French powder; the answer was, that it
was Russian powder which had been taken the preceding day. The idea of
having his birth-day celebrated at the expense of the enemy drew a smile
from Napoleon. It was admitted that this very rare species of flattery
became such men.
Prince Eugene also considered it his duty to carry him his good wishes.
The emperor said to him, "Every thing is preparing for a battle; I shall
gain it, and we shall see Moscow." The prince kept silence, but as he
retired, he returned for answer to the questions of Marshal Mortier,
"Moscow will be our ruin!" Thus did disapprobation begin to be
expressed. Duroc, the most reserved of all, the friend and confidant of
the emperor, loudly declared, that he could not foresee the period of
our return. Still it was only among themselves that the great officers
indulged in such remarks, for they were aware that the decision being
once taken, all would have to concur in its execution; that the more
dangerous their situation became, the more need there was of courage;
and that a word, calculated to abate zeal, would be treasonable; hence
we saw those who by silence, nay even by words, opposed the emperor in
his tent, appear out of it full of confidence and hope. This attitude
was dictated by honour; the multitude has imputed it to flattery.
Newerowskoi, almost crushed, hastened to shut himself up in Smolensk. He
left behind him some cossacks to burn the forage; the houses were
spared.
CHAP. III.
While the grand army was thus ascending the Dnieper, along its left
bank, Barclay and Bagration, placed between that river and the lake of
Kasplia, towards Inkowo, believed themselves to be still in presence of
the French army. They hesitated; twice hurried on by the counsel of
quarter-master-general Toll, they resolved to force the line of our
cantonments, and twice dismayed at so bold a determination, they stopped
short in the midst of the movement they had commenced for that purpose.
At length, too timid to take any other counsel than their own, they
appeared to have left their decision to circumstances, and to await our
attack, in order to regulate their defence by it.
It might also be perceived, from the unsteadiness of their movements,
that there was not a good understanding between these two chiefs. In
fact, their situation, their disposition, their very origin, every thing
about them was at variance. On the one hand the cool valour, the
scientific, methodical, and tenacious genius of Barclay, whose mind,
German like his birth, was for calculating every thing, even the chances
of the hazard, bent on owing all to his tactics, and nothing to fortune;
on the other the martial, bold, and vehement instinct of Bagration, an
old Russian of the school of Suwarrow, dissatisfied at being under a
general who was his junior in the service--terrible in battle, but
acquainted with no other book than nature, no other instructor than
memory, no other counsels than his own inspirations.
This old Russian, on the frontiers of Russia proper, trembled with shame
at the idea of retreating without fighting. In the army all shared his
ardour; it was supported on the one hand by the patriotic pride of the
nobles, by the success at Inkowo, by the inactivity of Napoleon at
Witepsk, and by the severe remarks of those who were not responsible; on
the other hand, by a nation of peasants, merchants, and soldiers, who
saw us on the point of treading their sacred soil, with all the horror
that such profanation could excite. All, in short, demanded a battle.
Barclay alone was against fighting. His plan, erroneously attributed
to England, had been formed in his mind so far back as the year 1807;
but he had to combat his own army as well as ours; and though
commander-in-chief and minister, he was neither Russian enough, nor
victorious enough, to win the confidence of the Russians. He possessed
that of Alexander alone.
Bagration and his officers hesitated to obey him. The point was to
defend their native land, to devote themselves for the salvation of all:
it was the affair of each, and all imagined that they had a right to
examine. Thus their ill fortune distrusted the prudence of their
general; whilst, with the exception of a few chiefs, our good fortune
trusted implicitly to the boldness, hitherto always prosperous of ours;
for in success to command is easy; no one inquires whether it is
prudence or fortune that guides. Such is the situation of military
chiefs; when successful, they are blindly obeyed by all; when
unfortunate, they are criticized by all.
Hurried away notwithstanding, by the general impulse, Barclay had just
yielded to it for a moment, collected his forces near Rudnia, and
attempted to surprise the French army, dispersed as it was. But the
feeble blow which his advanced guard had just struck at Inkowo had
alarmed him. He trembled, paused, and imagining every moment that he saw
Napoleon approaching in front of him, on his right and every where
excepting on his left, which was covered as he thought by the Dnieper,
he lost several days in marches and counter-marches. He was thus
hesitating, when all at once Newerowskoi's cries of distress resounded
in his camp. To attack was now entirely out of the question: his troops
ran to arms, and hurried towards Smolensk for the purpose of defending
it.
Murat and Ney were already attacking that city: the former with his
cavalry, at the place where the Boristhenes enters its walls; the
latter, with his infantry, where it issues from them, and on woody
ground intersected by deep ravines. The marshal's left was supported by
the river, and his right by Murat, whom Poniatowski, coming direct from
Mohilef, arrived to reinforce.
In this place two steep hills contract the channel of the Boristhenes;
on these hills Smolensk is built. That city has the appearance of two
towns, separated by the river and connected by two bridges. That on the
right bank, the most modern, is wholly occupied by traders; it is open,
but overlooks the other, of which it is nevertheless but a dependency.
The old town, occupying the plateau and slopes of the left bank, is
surrounded by a wall twenty-five feet high, eighteen thick, three
thousand fathoms in length, and defended by twenty-nine massive towers,
a miserable earthen citadel of five bastions, which commands the Orcha
road, and a wide ditch, which serves as a covered way. Some outworks and
the suburbs intercept the view of the approaches to the Mohilef and
Dnieper gates; they are defended by a ravine, which, after encompassing
a great part of the town, becomes deeper and steeper as it approaches
the Dnieper, on the side next to the citadel.
The deluded inhabitants were quitting the temples, where they had been
praising God for the victories of their troops, when they saw them
hastening up, bloody, vanquished, and flying before the victorious
French army. Their disaster was unexpected, and their consternation so
much the greater.
Meanwhile, the sight of Smolensk inflamed the impatient ardour of
Marshal Ney: we know not whether he unseasonably called to mind the
wonders of the Prussian war, when citadels fell before the sabres of our
cavalry, or whether he at first designed only to reconnoitre this first
Russian fortress: at any rate he approached too near; a ball struck him
on the neck; incensed, he despatched a battalion against the citadel,
through a shower of balls, which swept away two-thirds of his men; the
remainder proceeded; nothing could stop them but the Russian walls; a
few only returned. Little notice was taken of the heroic attempt which
they had made, because it was a fault of their general's, and useless
into the bargain.
Cooled by this check, Marshal Ney retired to a sandy and wooded height
bordering the river. He was surveying the city and its environs, when he
imagined that he could discern troops in motion on the other side of the
river: he ran to fetch the emperor, and conducted him through coppices
and dingles to avoid the fire of the place.
Napoleon, on reaching the height, beheld a cloud of dust enveloping long
black columns, glistening with a multitude of arms: these masses
approached so rapidly that they seemed to run. It was Barclay,
Bagration, nearly 120,000 men: in short, the whole Russian army.
Transported with joy at this sight, Napoleon clapped his hands,
exclaiming, "At last I have them!" There could be no doubt of it; this
surprised army was hastening up to throw itself into Smolensk, to pass
through it, to deploy under its walls, and at length to offer us that
battle which was so ardently desired. The moment that was to decide the
fate of Russia had at last arrived.
The emperor immediately went through the whole line, and allotted to
each his place. Davoust, and next to him Count Lobau, were to deploy on
the right of Ney: the guard in the centre, as a reserve, and farther
off the army of Italy. The place of Junot and the Westphalians was
indicated; but a false movement had carried them out of the way. Murat
and Poniatowski formed the right of the army; those two chiefs already
threatened the city: he made them draw back to the margin of a coppice,
and leave vacant before them a spacious plain, extending from this wood
as far as the Dnieper. It was a field of battle which he offered to the
enemy. The French army, thus posted, had defiles and precipices at its
back; but Napoleon concerned himself little about retreat; he thought
only of victory.
Bagration and Barclay were meanwhile returning at full speed towards
Smolensk; the first to save it by a battle, the other to cover the
flight of its inhabitants and the evacuation of its magazines: he was
determined to leave us nothing but its ashes. The two Russian generals
arrived panting on the heights on the right bank; nor did they again
take breath till they saw that they were still masters of the bridges
which connect the two towns.
Napoleon then caused the enemy to be harassed by a host of riflemen, for
the purpose of drawing him to the left bank of the river, and ensuring a
battle for the following day. It is asserted that Bagration would have
fallen in with his views, but that Barclay did not expose him to the
temptation. He despatched him to Elnia, and took upon himself the
defence of Smolensk.
Barclay had imagined that the greatest part of our army was marching
upon Elnia, to get between Moscow and the Russian army. He deceived
himself by the disposition, so common in war, of imputing to one's enemy
designs contrary to those which he demonstrates. For the defensive,
being uneasy in its nature, frequently magnifies the offensive, and
fear, heating the imagination, causes it to attribute to the enemy a
thousand projects of which he never dreamt. It is possible too that
Barclay, having to cope with a colossal foe, felt authorized to expect
from him gigantic movements.
The Russians themselves have since reproached Napoleon with not having
adopted that manoeuvre; but have they considered, that to proceed thus
to place himself beyond a river, a fortified town and a hostile army, to
cut off the Russians from the road to their capital, would have been
cutting off himself from all communication with his reinforcements, his
other armies, and Europe? Those are not capable of appreciating the
difficulties of such a movement who are astonished that it was not made,
without preparation, in two days, across a river and a country both
unknown, with such masses, and amidst another combination the execution
of which was not yet completed.
Be that as it may, in the evening of the 16th, Bagration commenced his
march for Elnia. Napoleon had just had his tent pitched in the middle of
his first line, almost within reach of the guns of Smolensk, and on the
brink of the ravine which encircles the city. He called Murat and
Davoust: the former had just observed among the Russians movements
indicative of a retreat. Every day since the passage of the Niemen, he
had been accustomed to see them thus escape him; he did not therefore
believe that there would be any battle the following day. Davoust was of
a contrary opinion. As for the emperor, he had no hesitation in
believing what he wished.
CHAP. IV.
On the 17th, by daybreak, the hope of seeing the Russian army drawn up
before him awoke Napoleon; but the field which he had prepared for it
remained empty: he persisted, nevertheless, in his illusion, in which
Davoust participated; it was to his side that he proceeded. Dalton, one
of the generals of that marshal, had seen some hostile battalions quit
the city and range themselves in order of battle. The emperor seized
this hope, which Ney, jointly with Murat, combated in vain.