Hagaru’s Night of Fire
_Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear MSR--Intelligence
as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of Marine Units--CCF Attacks from
the Southwest--East Hill Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting
Fires--Marine Attacks on East Hill_
The importance of Hagaru in the Marine scheme of things was starkly
obvious after the Chinese cut the MSR. Hagaru, with its supply dumps,
hospital facilities and partly finished C-47 airstrip, was the one
base offering the 1st Marine Division a reasonable hope of uniting its
separated elements. Hagaru had to be held at all costs, yet only a
reinforced infantry battalion (less one rifle company and a third of
its Weapons Company) and two batteries of artillery were available for
the main burden of the defense.
Owing to transportation shortages, the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines
did not arrive at Hagaru until after dusk on 26 November. Even so, it
had been necessary to leave George Company and a platoon of Weapons
Company behind at Chigyong for lack of vehicles.[423]
[423] This section is derived from: 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_, 2; 3/1
_SAR, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 2–3; Col T. L. Ridge ltr, 22 Sep
55, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons Comments,
n. d.
The parka-clad Marines, climbing down stiffly from the trucks, had
their first sight of a panorama which reminded one officer of old
photographs of a gold-rush mining camp in the Klondike. Tents, huts,
and supply dumps were scattered in a seemingly haphazard fashion about
a frozen plain crossed by a frozen river and bordered on three sides by
low hills rising to steep heights on the eastern outskirts. Although
many of the buildings had survived the bombings, the battered town
at the foot of the ice-locked Chosin Reservoir was not a spectacle
calculated to raise the spirits of newcomers.
It was too late to relieve 2/7(-) that evening. Lieutenant Colonels
Ridge and Lockwood agreed that Fox Company, 7th Marines, and Weapons
Company (-) of 2/7 would occupy positions jointly with 3/1. The hours
of darkness passed quietly and relief was completed the next day. Fox
Company then moved to its new positions near Toktong Pass.
_Four-Mile Perimeter Required_
On the morning of 27 November, of course, an all-out enemy attack was
still in the realm of speculation. But it was evident to Lieutenant
Colonel Ridge, CO of 3/1, that one to two infantry regiments and
supporting arms would be required for an adequate defense of Hagaru.
With only a battalion (-) at his disposal, he realized that he must
make the best possible use of the ground. For the purposes of a
survey, he sent his S-3, Major Trompeter, on a walking reconnaissance
with Major Simmons, CO of Weapons Company and 3/1 Supporting Arms
Coordinator.
After a circuit of the natural amphitheater, the two officers agreed
that even to hold the reverse slopes would require a perimeter of more
than four miles in circumference (see Map 17). The personnel resources
of 3/1 would thus be stretched to an average of one man for nearly
seven yards of front. This meant that the commanding officer must take
his choice between being weak everywhere or strong in a few sectors to
the neglect of others. In either event, some areas along the perimeter
would probably have to be defended by supporting fires alone.[424]
[424] Ridge, _Notes_; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55.
“Under the circumstances,” commented General Smith, “and considering
the mission assigned to the 1st Marine Division, an infantry component
of one battalion was all that could be spared for the defense of
Hagaru. This battalion was very adequately supported by air, and had
sufficient artillery and tanks for its purposes.”[425]
[425] Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 17 May 56.
The terrain gave the enemy two major covered avenues of approach for
troop movements. One was the hill mass east of Hagaru, the other a draw
leading into the southwest side of the town, where the new airstrip
was being constructed. Nor could the possibility of a surprise attack
from some other quarter be dismissed entirely, since CCF observers
would be able to watch Marine preparations from the surrounding hills
in daylight hours.
[Illustration: HAGARU DEFENSIVE PERIMETER
28–29 November 1950
MAP-17
]
Lieutenant Colonel Ridge decided that final troop dispositions must
depend not only on terrain but equally on intelligence as to enemy
capabilities. Until he had more information, the units of 3/1 were to
remain in the areas formerly occupied by 2/7.
_Attempts to Clear MSR_
The Battalion CP had been set up in a pyramidal tent at the angle of
the road to Yudam-ni. Most of the day on the 27th was given over to
improving positions. At the southwest end of the perimeter, First
Lieutenant Fisher’s Item Company took over from Captain Barber’s Fox
Company, the only rifle company of 2/7 remaining at Hagaru.
On the strength of preliminary S-2 reports, Ridge instructed the
commanders of his two rifle companies to improve their sectors, which
included the entire south and southwest curve of the perimeter. All the
Division Headquarters troops except one motor convoy had reached Hagaru
by the 27th, and it was due to leave Hungnam the next morning. The new
Division CP was located in the northeast quarter of town, near the long
concrete bridge over the frozen Changjin River. Rows of heated tents
surrounded a Japanese type frame house repaired for the occupancy of
General Smith, who was expected by helicopter in the morning. Already
functioning at the CP were elements of the General Staff Sections and
Headquarters Company.[426]
[426] Smith, _Notes_, 689–690.
The busiest Marines at Hagaru on the 27th were the men of the 1st
Engineer Battalion. While a Company B platoon built tent decks for the
Division CP, detachments of Company A were at work on the maintenance
of the MSR in the area, and Company D had the job of hacking out
the new airstrip. Apparently the latter project had its “sidewalk
contractors” even in sub-zero weather, for this comment found its way
into the company report:
Dozer work [was] pleasing to the eye of those who wanted activity
but contributed little to the overall earth-moving problem of
90,000 cubic yards of cut and 60,000 cubic yards of fill.[427]
[427] D/Engr _SAR_.
Motor graders and scrapers with a 5.8 cubic yard capacity had been
moved up from Hamhung. So difficult did it prove to get a bite of the
frozen earth that steel teeth were welded to the blades. When the pan
was filled, however, the earth froze to the cutting edges until it
could be removed only by means of a jack hammer.
The strip was about one-fourth completed on the 27th, according to
minimum estimates of the length required. Work went on that night
as usual under the flood lights.[428] Not until the small hours of
the morning did the first reports reach Hagaru of the CCF attacks on
Yudam-ni and Fox Hill.
[428] 1stEngrBn _SAR_, 11; and Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51.
Some remnants of 2/7 were still at Hagaru, for lack of transportation,
when Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood, commanding officer of the battalion,
received a dispatch from Colonel Litzenberg directing him to proceed to
Toktong Pass and assist Fox Company. At 0530 he requested the “loan”
of a rifle company of 3/1 to reinforce elements of Weapons Company
(-), 2/7. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge could spare only a platoon from How
Company, and at 0830 the attempt was cancelled. An hour later Weapons
Company and three tanks from the 2d Platoon of Company D, 1st Tank
Battalion, made another effort. They pushed half-way to the objective,
only to be turned back by heavy Chinese small-arms and mortar fire
from the high ground on both sides of the road. Supporting fires from
3/1 helped the column to break off contact and return to Hagaru at
1500.[429]
[429] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 4; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 21; 3/1 msg
to CO 1stMar, 1845 28 Nov 50.
No better success attended a reinforced platoon of How Company, 3/1,
accompanied by three Company D tanks, when it set out on the road to
Koto-ri. On the outskirts of Hagaru, within sight of Captain Corley’s
CP, the men were forced to climb down from their vehicles and engage in
a hot fire fight. They estimated the enemy force at about 50, but an OY
pilot dropped a message warning that some 300 Chinese were moving up
on the flanks of the patrol. The Marines managed to disengage at 1530,
with the aid of mortar and artillery fires from Hagaru, and returned to
the perimeter with losses of one killed and five wounded.[430]
[430] _Ibid._; Narrative of Maj C. E. Corley, n. d.
A similar patrol from Item Company, 3/1, struck off to the southwest of
the perimeter in the direction of Hungmun-ni. Late in the morning of
the 28th, this reinforced platoon encountered an estimated 150 enemy
and called for artillery and mortar fires. After dispersing this CCF
group, the patrol routed a second enemy detachment an hour later after
a brief fire fight.[431]
[431] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 4; and 1stLt R. C. Needbon
[sic] interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 28 May 51.
Any lingering doubts as to the extent of the Chinese attack on the MSR
were dispelled by reports from the OY and HO3S-1 pilots of VMO-6. They
disclosed that defended enemy road blocks had cut off Yudam-ni, Fox
Hill, Hagaru, and Koto-ri from any physical contact with one another.
The advance units of the 1st Marine Division had been sliced into
four isolated segments as CCF columns penetrated as far south as the
Chinhung-ni area.[432]
[432] VMO-6 tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1015 28 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg
to CG 1stMarDiv, 1100 28 Nov 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO
1stMar, 1103 28 Nov 50.
_Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities_
There was no question at all in the minds of Lieutenant Colonel Ridge
and his officers as to whether the Chinese would attack at Hagaru. As
early as the morning of the 27th, the problem had simply been one of
when, where, and in what strength. It was up to the S-2 Section to
provide the answers, and upon their correctness would depend the fate
of Hagaru, perhaps even of the 1st Marine Division.
Second Lieutenant Richard E. Carey, the S-2, was a newcomer to the
battalion staff, recently transferred from a George Company infantry
platoon. His group consisted of an assistant intelligence chief,
Staff Sergeant Saverio P. Gallo, an interpreter, and four scout
observers.[433] There were also two CIC agents assigned to 3/1 by
Division G-2.
[433] This section is based on Ridge, _Notes_, and Comments,
7 Jun 56; Narrative of Capt R. E. Carey, 3 Feb 56. The
need for NCOs in rifle platoons was so pressing that the
former intelligence chief, TSgt James E. Sweeney, had
been transferred from the S-2 Section just before the
move to Hagaru.
At Hagaru, as at Majon-ni, the Marines had won respect at the outset by
allowing the Korean residents all privileges of self-government which
could be reconciled with military security. The police department and
town officials had been permitted to continue functioning. They in turn
briefed the population as to restricted areas and security regulations,
particularly curfew. Korean civilians entering Hagaru through Marine
road blocks were searched before being taken to the police station
where they were questioned by an interrogation team from the S-2
Section.
Hagaru’s resemblance to a gold-rush mining camp was heightened on the
27th by a tremendous influx both of troops and Koreans from outlying
districts. A large truck convoy from Headquarters Battalion arrived
to set up the new Division CP, and detachments from various Marine or
Army service units entered in a seemingly endless stream. The Korean
refugees had much the same story to tell; most of them came from areas
to the north and west of Hagaru, and they had been evicted from their
homes by large numbers of CCF troops.
Carey instructed his CIC agents to converse with incoming Koreans and
learn everything possible about the enemy situation. Again, as at
Majon-ni, people who had been thoroughly indoctrinated with Communism
were found “highly co-operative.” As untrained observers, however,
their estimates of CCF numbers and equipment could not be taken too
literally. Since their statements agreed that the enemy was in close
proximity, Carey decided to take the risk of sending his two CIC agents
on the dangerous mission of establishing direct contact. They were
enjoined to make a circuit of the perimeter, mingling whenever possible
with the Chinese and determining the areas of heaviest concentration.
The results went beyond Carey’s fondest expectations. Not only did
his agents return safely from their long hike over the hills, but
they brought back vital information. Well led and equipped Chinese
Communist units had been encountered to the south and west of Hagaru.
And since Marine air also reported unusual activity in this area, it
was a reasonable assumption that the enemy was concentrated there
approximately in division strength.
This answered the questions as to “how many” and “where.” There
remained the problem as to “when” the attack might be expected, and
again on the 28th Carey sent out his CIC agents to make direct contact.
“I expected little or no information,” he recollected, “but apparently
these men had a way with them. Upon reporting back, they told me that
they had talked freely with enemy troops, including several officers
who boasted that they would occupy Hagaru on the night of 28 November.”
Major enemy units were reported to be five miles from the perimeter.
Dusk was at approximately 1800, with complete darkness setting in
shortly afterwards. Adding the estimate of three and a half hours for
Chinese movements to the line of departure, the S-2 Section calculated
that the enemy could attack as early as 2130 on the night of the 28th
from the south and west in division strength.[434]
[434] The possibility of an attack from the East Hill area was
considered, since Chinese forces were known to be east of
the hill. Col Ridge states, “I assume[d] that the build
up of such forces would not allow their capability of a
strong attack.” Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56.
_Positions of Marine Units_
These intelligence estimates were accepted by Lieutenant Colonel
Ridge as the basis for his planning and troop dispositions. As
the main bastion of defense, the tied-in sectors of How and Item
Companies were extended to include the south and southwest sides
of the perimeter--nearly one-third of the entire circumference--in
a continuous line 2300 yards in length, or more than a mile and a
quarter. Each platoon front thus averaged about 380 yards, which meant
that supporting arms must make up for lack of numbers.[435]
[435] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon the
following sources: 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_; Ridge,
_Notes_; Maj A. J. Strohmenger ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 17
Aug 55; Corley narrative; Narrative of Maj J. R. Fisher,
n. d.; Simmons Comments.
East Hill, considered the second most likely point of enemy attack, was
to be assigned to George Company on arrival. Captain Sitter’s outfit
had orders to depart the Chigyong area on the morning of the 28th, so
that it could be expected at Hagaru before dark.
The southeast quarter of the perimeter, between East Hill and the
left flank of How Company, was to be held by the following units: (1)
Weapons Company (less detachments reinforcing the rifle companies and
its 81mm mortars emplaced near the battalion CP) manning a road block
on the route to Koto-ri and defending the south nose of East Hill; (2)
Dog Company, 1st Engineer Battalion (less men at work on the airstrip),
occupying the ground south of the concrete bridge; and (3) Dog Battery,
2d Battalion, 11th Marines, which had the mission of covering 75 per
cent of the perimeter with observed indirect fire and 25 per cent with
direct fire.
These dispositions left a gap between Weapons Company and the engineer
and artillery units on the west bank of the Changjin River. But this
stretch of frozen marshland was so well covered by fire that an enemy
attack here would have been welcomed.
The first reports of the CCF onslaughts at Yudam-ni and Fox Hill, as
interpreted by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, “clearly indicated that no
time was to be lost at buttoning up the Hagaru perimeter.” He called
on Colonel Bowser, the Division G-3, on the morning of the 28th and
recommended that an overall defense commander be designated with
operational control over all local units. Ridge also requested that
George Company and the 41st Commando be expedited in their movement to
Hagaru.
Before a decision could be reached, General Smith arrived by
helicopter and opened the Division CP at 1100. A Marine rear echelon
had remained at Hungnam to cope with supply requirements. Colonel
Francis A. McAlister, the G-4, left in command, accomplished during the
forthcoming campaign what General Smith termed “a magnificent job” in
rendering logistical support.[436]
[436] Smith, _Notes_, 695–696; CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units,
1015 28 Nov 50.
The CP at Hagaru had been open only half an hour when General Almond
arrived in a VMO-6 helicopter to confer with the Division commander.
Departing at 1255, he visited the 31st Infantry troops who had been
hard hit the night before by CCF attacks east of the Chosin Reservoir.
On his return to Hamhung, the Corps commander was informed that CinCFE
had directed him to fly immediately to Tokyo for a conference. There
he learned that the Eighth Army was in full retreat, with some units
taking heavy losses both in personnel and equipment. Generals Almond,
Walker, Hickey, Willoughby, Whitney, and Wright took turns at briefing
the commander in chief during a meeting which lasted from midnight to
0130.[437]
[437] CG Diary, in X Corps _WD_, 28 Nov 50; X Corps _WDSum_,
Nov 50, 16.
At Hagaru it was becoming more apparent hourly to Ridge that his
prospects of employing Captain Sitter’s company on East Hill were
growing dim. As he learned later, the unit had left Chigyong that
morning in the trucks of Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion,
commanded by Captain Clovis M. Jones. Sitter was met at Koto-ri by
Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of RCT-1, and
directed to report to the regimental S-3, Major Robert E. Lorigan.
Efforts to open up the road to Hagaru had failed, he was told, and
it would be necessary for George Company to remain overnight at
Koto-ri.[438]
[438] Narrative of Major C. L. Sitter, n. d.
The probability of such an outcome had already been accepted by Ridge
on the basis of the resistance met on the road to Koto-ri by his How
Company patrol. With this development added to his worries, he received
a telephone call at 1500 from Colonel Bowser, informing him that he had
been named defense commander at Hagaru by General Smith.[439]
[439] This was made official by CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate
Units, 1625 28 Nov 50.
Just ten minutes later a single CCF shell, assumed to be of 76mm
caliber, exploded in the Battalion CP area and fatally wounded Captain
Paul E. Storaasli, the S-4. The perimeter was so cluttered with tents
and dumps that artillery fire at random could hardly have been wasted;
but the enemy gun remained silent the rest of the day, doubtless to
avert Marine counter-battery reprisals.
Only three hours of daylight remained when the newly designated defense
commander summoned unit commanders to an initial conference. It was
not made clear just what troops had been placed under his operational
control. “A primary reason,” commented Ridge, “was that no one knew
what units were there, this being compounded by the numerous small
elements such as detachments, advance parties, etc., of which many were
Corps and ROK units. Hence, the Battalion S-1 and his assistants were
a combination of town criers and census takers. We did, however, get
most of the commanders of major units (if such they could be called)
to the initial conference, but the process of locating and identifying
smaller units was thereafter a continuous process which we really never
accurately completed.”[440]
[440] Ridge, _Notes_, 27–28.
The larger outfits could be summoned to the conference by telephone but
it was necessary to send out runners in other instances. With George
Company not available, the question of defending East Hill loomed
large. Ridge decided against all proposals that one of the two rifle
companies be used for that purpose. On the strength of the S-2 report,
he preferred to concentrate as much strength as possible against an
attack from the southwest. This meant taking his chances on East Hill
with such service troops as he could scrape up, and it was plain that a
strong CCF effort in this quarter would have to be met in large part by
fire power from supporting arms.
The two main detachments selected for East Hill (excluding the south
nose) were from Dog Company of the 10th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA,
and elements of X corps Headquarters. Since the mission called for
control of mortar and artillery fires as well as tactical leadership,
two officers of Weapons Company, 3/1, were assigned--Captain John C.
Shelnutt to the Army engineer company, and First Lieutenant John L.
Burke, Jr., to the Headquarters troops. Each was to be accompanied by a
Marine radio (SCR 300) operator.
Smaller detachments were later sent to East Hill from two other service
units--the 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, and the 4th
Signal Battalion of X Corps.
The Antitank Company of the 7th Marines defended the area to the north
of East Hill. Next came How Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, which
had the primary mission of supporting Fox Company, 2/7, on the hill
near Toktong Pass. But by moving gun trails the cannoneers could with
some difficulty fire on the 270° arc of the perimeter stretching from
the right flank of Item Company around to the north nose of East Hill.
Between the sectors held by How Battery, 3/11, and Item Company, 3/1,
were troops of five Marine units: Regulating Detachment, 1st Service
Battalion; 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Marine Tactical Air Control
Squadron 2 (MTACS-2); Division Headquarters Battalion; and H&S Company
3/1. The only other unit in this quarter was Weapons Company (-), 2/7,
which held the road block on the route to Yudam-ni.
At the conference it was decided that since Lieutenant Colonel Charles
L. Banks’ Regulating Detachment had taken the lead in organizing the
Supply Area on the north side of Hagaru, the arc of the perimeter east
of the river and west of East Hill was to be made into a secondary
defense zone. Banks thus became in effect a sub-sector commander.
The only infantry troops in the Supply Area being detachments of 2/7
units, it was also agreed that tactical decisions concerning the zone
should be discussed with the two ranking battalion officers--Lieutenant
Colonel Lockwood, the commander, and Major Sawyer, the executive.[441]
[441] “CO 2/7 and his headquarters were not given a specific
mission because it was assumed that his uncanceled order
from CO 7th Marines would require his further efforts in
the relief of Fox Company.” Ridge Comments, 7 June 56.
These matters having been settled, the conference broke up shortly
after 1700 and the various commanders hastened back to their outfits to
make last-minute preparations for the night’s attack. A strange hush
had fallen over the perimeter, broken only by the occasional crackle of
small-arms fire, and the damp air felt like snow.
_CCF Attack from the Southwest_
How and Item Companies were ready. All platoon positions were well dug
in, though the earth was frozen to a depth of six to ten inches.
The men of Item Company used their heads as well as hands after
Lieutenant Fisher managed to obtain a thousand sandbags and several
bags of C3. This explosive was utilized in ration cans to make
improvised shape charges which blasted a hole through the frozen crust
of snow and earth. Then it became a simple matter to enlarge the hole
and place the loose dirt in sandbags to form a parapet.[442] This
ingenious system resulted in de luxe foxholes and mortar emplacements
attaining to the dignity of field fortifications.
[442] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: 3/1
tel to CO 1stMar, 2100 29 Nov 50; Ridge, _Notes_; Simmons
interv, 1 Dec 55 and Comments; Fisher narrative; Corley
narrative; Narrative of Capt R. L. Barrett, Jr., 9 Aug
55; Capt J. H. Miller ltr to authors, 10 Oct 55; and Sgt
K. E. Davis ltr to authors, 20 Oct 55.
Both company fronts bristled with concertinas, trip flares, booby
traps, and five-gallon cans of gasoline rigged with thermite bombs for
illumination. Three probable routes of enemy attack channeled the low
hills to the southwest--a main draw leading to the junction between the
two company sectors, and a lesser draw providing an approach to each.
The ground in front of the junction had been mined, and two tanks from
the Provisional Platoon were stationed in this quarter. Detachments
from Weapons Company also reinforced both rifle companies. Thus the six
platoons faced the enemy in the following order:
ITEM COMPANY HOW COMPANY
Lt Fisher Capt Corley
Lt Degerne Lt Hall Lt Needham Lt Barrett Lt Endsley Lt Mason
1st 3d 2d 1st 3d 2d
Beginning at 1700, hot food was served to all hands in rotation. A
fifty per cent alert went into effect after dark as the men were sent
back on regular schedule for coffee and a smoke in warming tents
located as close to the front as possible. The first snowflakes
fluttered down about 1950, muffling the clank of the dozers at work as
usual under the floodlights on the airstrip behind the How Company’s
sector. Just before 2130, the expected time of CCF attack, both company
commanders ordered a hundred per cent alert, but the enemy did not
show up on schedule. It was just over an hour later when three red
flares and three blasts on a police whistle signaled the beginning of
the attack. Soon trip flares and exploding booby traps revealed the
approach of probing patrols composed of five to ten men.
A few minutes later, white phosphorus mortar shells scorched the Marine
front line with accurate aim. The main CCF attack followed shortly
afterwards, with both company sectors being hit by assault waves
closing in to grenade-throwing distance.
The enemy in turn was staggered by the full power of Marine supporting
arms. Snowflakes reduced an already low visibility, but fields of fire
had been carefully charted and artillery and mortar concentrations
skillfully registered in. Still, the Communists kept on coming in spite
of frightful losses. Second Lieutenant Wayne L. Hall, commanding the 3d
Platoon in the center of Item Company, was jumped by three Chinese whom
he killed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol after his carbine jammed.
The third foe pitched forward into Hall’s foxhole.
On the left flank, tied in with How Company, First Lieutenant Robert
C. Needham’s 2d Platoon sustained most of the attack on Item Company.
The fire of Second Lieutenant James J. Boley’s 60mm mortars and Second
Lieutenant John H. Miller’s light machine guns was concentrated in
this area. It seemed impossible that enemy burp guns could miss such a
target as Lieutenant Fisher, six feet two inches in height and weighing
235 pounds. But he continued to pass up and down the line, pausing at
each foxhole for a few words of encouragement. By midnight the enemy
pressure on Needham’s and Hall’s lines had slackened, and on the right
flank Second Lieutenant Mayhlon L. Degernes’ 1st Platoon received only
light attacks.
This was also the case on the left flank of How Company, where Second
Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s 2d Platoon saw little action as compared
to the other two. A front of some 800 yards in the center of the
2300-yard Marine line, including two platoon positions and parts of two
others, bore the brunt of the CCF assault on How and Item Companies.
Captain Corley had just visited his center platoon when the first
attacks hit How Company. Second Lieutenant Wendell C. Endsley was
killed while the company commander was on his way to Second Lieutenant
Roscoe L. Barrett’s 1st Platoon, on the right, which soon had its left
flank heavily engaged.
Never was CCF skill at night attacks displayed more effectively.
Barrett concluded that the Chinese actually rolled down the slope into
the How Company lines, so that they seemed to emerge from the very
earth. The 3d Platoon, already thinned by accurate CCF white phosphorus
mortar fire, was now further reduced in strength by grenades and burp
gun bursts. About this time the company wire net went out and Corley
could keep in touch with his platoons only by runners. The battalion
telephone line also being cut, he reported his situation by radio to
the Battalion CP.
Two wiremen were killed while trying to repair the line. The Chinese
continued to come on in waves, each preceded by concentrations of
light and heavy mortar fire on the right and center of the How Company
position. About 0030 the enemy broke through in the 3d Platoon area
and penetrated as far back as the Company CP. A scene of pandemonium
ensued, the sound of Chinese trumpets and whistles adding to the
confusion as it became difficult to tell friend from foe. “Tracers were
so thick,” recalled Sergeant Keith E. Davis, “that they lighted up the
darkness like a Christmas tree.”[443]
[443] K. E. Davis ltr, 20 Oct 55.
Corley and five enlisted men operated as a supporting fire team while
First Lieutenant Harrison F. Betts rounded up as many men as he could
find and tried to plug the gap in the 3d Platoon line. This outnumbered
group was swept aside as the next wave of CCF attack carried to the
rear of How Company and threatened the engineers at work under the
floodlights.
A few Chinese actually broke through and fired at the Marines operating
the dozers. Second Lieutenant Robert L. McFarland, the equipment
officer, led a group of Dog Company engineers who counterattacked and
cleared the airstrip at the cost of a few casualties. Then the men
resumed work under the floodlights.[444]
[444] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 45. Ridge Comments, 7 Jun
56, questions whether the floodlights were on during the
whole attack.
The Battalion reserve, if such it could be called, consisted of any
service troops who could be hastily gathered to meet the emergency.
Shortly before midnight Ridge sent a platoon-strength group of X Corps
signalmen and engineers under First Lieutenant Grady P. Mitchell to
the aid of How Company. Mitchell was killed upon arrival and First
Lieutenant Horace L. Johnson, Jr., deployed the reinforcements in a
shallow ditch as a company reserve.
About midnight the fight had reached such a pitch of intensity that
no spot in the perimeter was safe. The Company C medical clearing
station, only a few hundred yards to the rear of Item Company, was
repeatedly hit by machine gun bullets whipping through the wooden walls
as surgeons operated on the wounded. The Division CP also took hits,
and a bullet which penetrated General Smith’s quarters produced unusual
sound effects when it ricocheted off pots and pans in the galley.[445]
[445] Smith, _Chronicle_, 93.
The Chinese seemed to be everywhere in the How Company zone. Shortly
after midnight they surrounded the CP, portable galley and provision
tent. “It is my personal opinion,” commented Captain Corley, “that if
the enemy had decided to effect a major breakthrough at this time,
he would have experienced practically no difficulty. However, he
seemed content to wander in and around the 3d Platoon, galley and hut
areas.”[446]
[446] Corley narrative.
The Chinese, in short, demonstrated that they knew better how to
create a penetration than to exploit one. Once inside the How Company
lines, they disintegrated into looting groups or purposeless tactical
fragments. Clothing appealed most to the plunderers, and a wounded
Marine in the 3d Platoon area saved his life by pretending to be dead
while Communists stripped him of his parka.
About 0030 the Battalion CP advised Corley by radio that more
reinforcements were on the way. Lieutenant Johnson met the contingent,
comprising about 50 service troops, and guided them into the company
area, where they were deployed as an added reserve to defend the
airstrip.
Item Company was still having it hot and heavy but continued to beat
off all CCF assaults. Elements of Weapons Company, manning the south
road block, came under attack at 0115. Apparently a small enemy column
had lost direction and blundered into a field of fire covered by heavy
machine guns. The hurricane of Marine fire caught the Communists before
they deployed and the result was virtual annihilation.
_East Hill Lost to Enemy_
Half an hour later, with the situation improving in the How Company
zone, the Battalion CP had its first alarming reports of reverses
on East Hill. The terrain itself had offered difficulties to men
scrambling up the steep, icy slopes with heavy burdens of ammunition.
These detachments of service troops, moreover, included a large
proportion of newly recruited ROKs who had little training and
understood no English.
[Illustration: EAST HILL ATTACKS
29 November
MAP-18
]
The largest of the East Hill units, Company D of the 10th Engineer
Combat Battalion, commanded by Captain Philip A. Kulbes, USA, was
composed of 77 American enlisted men and 90 ROKs. Combat equipment
(in addition to individual weapons) consisted of four .50 caliber
machine guns, five light .30 caliber machine guns, and six 3.5 rocket
launchers.[447]
[447] References to Co D, 10th Engr Bn, USA, are based on Lt
Norman R. Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” in Capt John
G. Westover, Ed., _Combat Support in Korea_ (Washington,
1955), 206–208.
The Army engineers had arrived at Hagaru at 1200 on the 28th, shortly
before the enemy cut the MSR. After being assigned to the East Hill
sector during the afternoon, the company used the few remaining hours
of daylight to move vehicles and gear back to an equipment park in the
perimeter. It was 2030 before the four platoons got into position on
East Hill after an exhausting climb in the darkness with heavy loads of
ammunition. Some use was made of existing holes, but most of the men
were not dug in when the Chinese attacked.
On the left the collapse of a ROK platoon attached to X Corps
Headquarters led rapidly to confusion everywhere on East Hill. Captain
Shelnutt, the Marine officer assigned to the Army engineers, found
that he could not close the gap by extending the line to the left. Nor
did the men, particularly the ROKs, have the training to side-slip
to the left under fire and beat off flank attacks. The consequence
was a general withdrawal on East Hill, attended in some instances by
demoralization. Shelnutt was killed as the four engineer platoons fell
back some 250 yards in “a tight knot,” according to Lieutenant Norman
R. Rosen, USA, commander of the 3d Platoon.
This was the situation as reported by the Marine radio operator, PFC
Bruno Podolak, who voluntarily remained as an observer at his post, now
behind enemy lines. At 0230 a telephone call to Colonel Bowser from the
3/1 CP was recorded in the message blank as follows:
“How Company still catching hell and are about ready to launch
counterattack to restore line. About an hour ago, enemy appeared on
East Hill. A group of enemy sneaked up to a bunch of Banks’ men and
hand-grenaded hell out of them and took position. Sending executive
officer over to see if we can get some fire on that area. Should be
able to restore the line but liable to be costly. Reserve practically
nil. Do have a backstop behind the break in How lines on this side of
airstrip, composed of engineers and other odds and ends.”[448]
[448] 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0230 29 Nov 50.
At 0400 there was little to prevent the enemy from making a complete
breakthrough on East Hill and attacking the Division CP and the supply
dumps. A friendly foothold had been retained on reverse slopes of the
southern nose, but the northern part was held only by artillery fires.
Along the road at the bottom of East Hill a thin line of service troops
with several tanks and machine guns formed a weak barrier.
All indications point to the fact that the Chinese themselves were not
in sufficient strength to follow up their success. Their attack on East
Hill was apparently a secondary and diversionary effort in support of
the main assault on the sectors held by How and Item Companies. At any
rate, the enemy contented himself with holding the high ground he had
won.
Some of the defenders of East Hill had fought with bravery which is the
more admirable because of their lack of combat training. Battle is a
business for specialists, and Lieutenant Rosen relates that the Army
engineers “had a great deal of difficulty with our weapons because they
were cold and fired sluggishly. We had gone into action so unexpectedly
that it had not occurred to us to clean the oil off our weapons.” As
an example of the difficulties imposed by the language barrier, the
officers were given to understand by the ROKs that they had no more
ammunition. “Weeks later,” commented Rosen, “we found that most of
them had not fired their ammunition this night, but continued to carry
it.”[449]
[449] Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” 209.
In view of such circumstances, the service troops put up a creditable
if losing fight in the darkness on East Hill. The 77 Americans of the
Army engineer company suffered losses of 10 KIA, 25 WIA, and nine MIA;
and of the 90 ROKs, about 50 were killed, wounded, or missing, chiefly
the latter.[450]
[450] _Ibid._, 209–210; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1445 29
Nov 50.
_The Volcano of Supporting Fires_
As usual, the men in the thick of the fight saw only what happened in
their immediate area. The scene as a whole was witnessed by a young
Marine officer of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, on duty at a
sawmill two miles north of Hagaru. From the high ground he could look
south down into the perimeter, and the awesome spectacle of a night
battle made him think of a volcano in eruption. Gun flashes stabbing
the darkness were fused into a great ring of living flame, and the
thousands of explosions blended into one steady, low-pitched roar.[451]
[451] Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 28 Mar 56.
Seldom in Marine history have supporting arms played as vital a part as
during this night at Hagaru. It is possible that a disaster was averted
on East Hill when the Marines of Captain Benjamin S. Read’s How Battery
shifted trails and plugged the hole in the line with howitzer fires
alone. Lieutenant Colonel Banks and Major Walter T. Warren, commanding
the antitank company of the 7th Marines, acted as observers. Reporting
by telephone to the gun pits, they directed the sweating gunners so
accurately that an enemy attack would have come up against a curtain of
fire.[452]
[452] Capt Benjamin S. Read (as told to Hugh Morrow): “Our Guns
Never Got Cold,” _Saturday Evening Post_, ccxxiii (7 Apr
51), 145.
Captain Strohmenger’s Dog Battery had been attached to 3/1 so long
that a high degree of co-ordination existed. His 105s fired about
1200 rounds that night, and POW interrogations disclosed that enemy
concentrations in rear areas were repeatedly broken up.
When CCF guns replied, shortly before midnight, there was danger of
a fuel or ammunition dump being hit and starting a chain reaction of
detonations in the crowded perimeter. Strohmenger ordered five of his
howitzers to cease fire while he moved the sixth out about 150 yards to
act as a decoy. Its flashes drew fire from the enemy, as he had hoped,
revealing the positions of the Chinese artillery. Dog Battery officers
set up two aiming circles and calculated the range and deflection. Then
the command was given for all six Marine howitzers to open up. The
enemy guns were silenced for the night. A later survey established that
two CCF 76mm guns had been destroyed and two others removed.[453]
[453] Strohmenger ltr, 17 Aug 55.
The 60mm mortars of the two rifle companies fired a total of more than
3200 rounds; and on both fronts the heavy machine guns of Weapons
Company added tremendously to the fire power. Illuminating shells
being scarce, two Korean houses on the Item Company’s front were set
ablaze by orders of Lieutenant Fisher. The flames seemed to attract CCF
soldiers like moths, and the machine guns of the two tanks stationed
here reaped a deadly harvest. Curiously enough, the Chinese apparently
did not realize what excellent targets they made when silhouetted
against the burning buildings.
By 0400 it was evident that the enemy’s main effort had failed. No
further attacks of any consequence were sustained by the two rifle
companies. It remained only to dispose of the unwelcome CCF visitors
sealed off in the How Company zone, and at 0420 Captain Corley rounded
up men for a counterattack.
“It will be just as dark for them as for us,” he told his NCOs.
Second Lieutenant Edward W. Snelling was directed to fire all his
remaining 60mm mortar ammunition in support. Corley and Betts led the
service troops sent as reinforcements while Johnson advanced on the
left. A bitter fight of extermination ensued, and by 0630 the MLR had
been restored. How Company, which sustained the heaviest losses of any
Marine unit that night, had a total of 16 men killed and 39 wounded,
not including attached units.[454]
[454] Corley and Barrett narratives.
After it was all over, the stillness had a strange impact on ears
attuned the whole night long to the thump of mortars and clatter of
machine guns. The harsh gray light of dawn revealed the unforgettable
spectacle of hundreds of Chinese dead heaped up in front of the two
Marine rifle companies.[455] Shrouds of new white snow covered many of
them, and crimson trails showed where the wounded had made their way to
the rear.
[455] POW reports stated that the Chinese assault force in this
sector had been one regiment. CIC tel to G-2 1stMarDiv,
1715 29 Nov 50.
_Marine Attacks on East Hill_
But even though the enemy’s main attack had failed, his secondary
effort on East Hill represented a grave threat to perimeter security.
At 0530 Ridge decided to counterattack, and Major Reginald R. Myers
volunteered to lead an assault column composed of all reserves who
could be scraped together for the attempt.
It was broad daylight before the Battalion executive officer moved out
with an assortment of Marine, Army, and ROK service troops, some of
them stragglers from the night’s withdrawals from East Hill (see Map
18). Their total strength compared to that of an infantry company.
About 55 separate units were represented at Hagaru, many by splinter
groups, so that most of Myers’ men were strangers to one another as
well as to their officers and NCOs.
The largest Marine group was the platoon led by First Lieutenant Robert
E. Jochums, assistant operations officer of the 1st Engineer Battalion.
Clerks, typists, and truck drivers were included along with Company D
engineers. Armed with carbines or M-1s and two grenades apiece, the men
carried all the small arms ammunition they could manage. Few had had
recent combat experience and the platoon commander knew only one of
them personally--a company clerk whom he made his runner.
It was typical of the informality attending this operation that a
Marine NCO with a small group attached themselves to Jochums, giving
him a total of about 45. They had an exhausting, 45-minute climb up the
hill to the line of departure, where Myers directed them to attack on
the left of his main force.
The early morning fog enshrouded East Hill and Myers’ attack had to
wait until it cleared. The jump-off line lay along a steep slope with
little or no cover. From the outset the advancing troops were exposed
to scattered small-arms fire as well as grenades which needed only
to be rolled downhill. New snow covering the old icy crust made for
treacherous footing, so that the heavily laden men took painful falls.
Myers’ little task force can scarcely be considered a tactical
organization. His close air support was excellent; but both artillery
and mortar support were lacking. Jochums did not notice any weapons
save small arms and grenades.
“Our plane assaults were very effective, especially the napalm
attacks,” he commented on the basis of a personal log kept at the time.
“During these strikes, either live or dry runs, the enemy troops in the
line of fire would often rise and run from their positions to those in
the rear.”[456]
[456] Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments.
Marine air came on station at 0930 as VMF-312 planes peeled off to hit
the enemy with napalm and bombs. The squadron flew 31 sorties that
day at Hagaru, nearly all in the East Hill area. Enemy small-arms
fire crippled one aircraft; but the pilot, First Lieutenant Harry W.
Colmery, escaped serious injuries by making a successful crash landing
within the perimeter.[457]
[457] VMF-312 _SAR_, 15–16.
All accounts agree that the ground forces met more serious opposition
from the terrain at times than from the enemy. So cut up into ridges
and ravines was this great hill mass that the troops seldom knew
whether they were advancing in defilade or exposing themselves to
the fire of hidden adversaries. Thus the attack became a lethal game
of hide-and-seek in which a step to the right or left might make the
difference between life and death. On the other hand, when the Corsairs
provided shooting gallery targets by flushing out opponents, only a
few men could get into effective firing position along the narrow,
restricted ridges before the Communists scuttled safely to new cover.
It took most of the energies of the attackers to keep on toiling
upward, gasping for breath, clutching at bushes for support, and
sweating at every pore in spite of the cold. At noon, after snail-like
progress, the force was still far short of the main ridge recognized as
the dividing line between friendly forces and the enemy. By this time
more than half of Myers’ composite company had melted away as a result
of casualties and exhaustion. Jochums saw no more than 15 wounded men
in the attacking force during the day. He noted about the same number
of dead Chinese. As for enemy strength, he estimated that the total may
have amounted to a company or slightly more.
It was his conviction that “three well organized platoons could have
pressed the assault without serious consequences and seized the
immediate highest objective. What was behind that I am unable to
say, but I feel that taking this high ground would have solved the
problem.”[458]
[458] Myers Comments state: “High ground was taken. But [we]
could not control movement of the enemy on the reverse
side. As a result [we] could not stay on top.”
Most of the friendly casualties were caused by the grenades and grazing
machine-gun fire of concealed opponents who had the law of gravity
fighting on their side. Jochums was painfully wounded in the foot but
continued with his platoon. “The age-old problem of leadership in such
an operation,” he concluded, “may be compared to moving a piece of
string--pulling it forward will get you farther than pushing.”
Enemy small-arms fire increased in volume when Myers’ remnants,
estimated at 75 men, reached the military crest of the decisive ridge.
There the groups in the center and on the right were halted by the
Chinese holding the topographical crest and reverse slope. On the left
Jochums’ men managed to push on to an outlying spur before being
stopped by CCF fire from a ridge to the northeast. Jochums’ position
was still short of the commanding high ground, yet it was destined to
be the point of farthest penetration on East Hill.
Myers ordered his men to take what cover they could find and draw up
a defensive line “short of the topographical crest” while awaiting
a supporting attack.[459] This was to be carried out by elements of
Captain George W. King’s Able Company of the 1st Engineer Battalion,
which had been stationed at a sawmill two miles north of Hagaru to
repair a blown bridge. These troops reached the perimeter without
incident at noon and proceeded immediately to the assault.
[459] Myers Comments.
First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st Platoon led the column.
Orders were to ascend the southwestern slope of East Hill, pass
through Myers’ force and clear the ridge line. But after completing
an exhausting climb to the military crest, the engineer officer was
directed to retrace his steps to the foot. There Captain King informed
him that a new attack had been ordered on the opposite flank, from a
starting point about 1000 yards to the northeast.
Moving to the indicated route of approach, Canzona began his second
ascent with two squads in line, pushing up a spur and a draw which
became almost perpendicular as it neared the topographical crest. Only
his skeleton platoon of about 20 men was involved. There were neither
radios nor supporting arms, and a light machine gun was the sole weapon
in addition to small arms and grenades.
Upon reaching the military crest, the engineers were pinned down by CCF
machine-gun fire along a trail a few feet wide, with nearly vertical
sides. Only Canzona, Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPhersen and PFC Eugene
B. Schlegel had room for “deployment,” and they found the platoon’s one
machine gun inoperative after it was laboriously passed up from the
rear. Schlegel was wounded and rolled downhill like a log, unconscious
from loss of blood.
Another machine gun, sent up from the foot, enabled the platoon to hold
its own even though it could not advance. Canzona put in a request by
runner for mortar support, but only two 81mm rounds were delivered
after a long delay. It was late afternoon when he walked downhill
to consult King, who had just been ordered to withdraw Company A to
a reverse slope position. Canzona returned to his men and pulled
them back about half-way down the slope while McPherson covered the
retirement with machine-gun fire. The winter sun was sinking when
the weary engineers set up a night defense, and at that moment the
howitzers of How Battery cut loose with point-detonation and proximity
bursts which hit the Chinese positions with deadly accuracy.
Canzona estimated the enemy strength in his zone at no more than a
platoon, which might have been dislodged with the aid of artillery or
even mortar fire.[460]
[460] Canzona narrative, 28 Mar 56. Col Brower points out that
the Chinese positions were defiladed from artillery fire.
Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.
About 500 yards south of the engineers, Major Myers held a defensive
position with his remaining force of about two platoons. The Battalion
CP had reason to believe that the outposts on East Hill would be
relieved shortly by George Company, with the 41st Commando in perimeter
reserve. Both had departed Koto-ri that morning in a strong convoy
which also included an Army infantry company, four platoons of Marine
tanks, and the last serial of Division Headquarters Battalion.
It was still touch and go at Hagaru at dusk on the 29th, but the
defenders could take satisfaction in having weathered the enemy’s
first onslaught. General Smith, courteous and imperturbable as always,
visited the Battalion CP to commend Ridge and his officers for the
night’s work. Two rifle companies had inflicted a bloody repulse on
several times their own numbers, and the counterattacking forces on
East Hill had at least hung on by their eyelashes.
In the final issue, a bob-tailed rifle battalion, two artillery
batteries and an assortment of service troops had stood off a CCF
division identified as the 58th and composed of the 172d, 173d, and
174th Infantry Regiments reinforced with organic mortars and some
horse-drawn artillery. Chinese prisoners reported that the 172d, taking
the principal part in the attacks on How and Item Companies, had
suffered 90 per cent casualties. Elements of the 173d were believed
to have figured to a lesser extent, with the 174th being kept in
reserve.[461]
[461] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 9–10; Ridge, _Notes_; Carey
narrative.
This was the situation in the early darkness of 29 November, when the
disturbing news reached Hagaru that George Company and the Commandos
were being heavily attacked on the road from Koto-ri and had requested
permission to turn back.