Fox Hill
_Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company at Toktong
Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge--Deadlock on Hill 1240--The
Fight for Northwest Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not
Enough Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November_
Of the Marine artillery units at Yudam-ni, those most directly
imperiled by CCF gains on North Ridge were Major Parry’s 3d Battalion
and Battery K of the 4th. The latter, under First Lieutenant Robert C.
Messman, lay beneath the southeastern spur of Hill 1282, having gone
into position at 2100 on 27 November. Rearward of King Battery, 3/11
was positioned below the steep slopes of Hill 1240 where its 105s had
fired in direct support of the 7th Marines on 26 and 27 November (see
Map 12).[395]
[395] 3/11 _SAR_, 6; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 4,
(hereafter 4/11 _SAR_), 5.
The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which had arrived at Yudam-ni
early on the 27th to support the 5th Regiment, was emplaced in the
valley between the tips of South and Southwest Ridges. Major William
McReynolds, commanding the 4th Battalion, reached the perimeter with
his outfit later. He had two batteries in action by 1900 and all three
by 2300 on the low ground separating South and Southeast Ridges.
Battery K, firing under the direction of 1/11 pending the arrival of
the parent unit, then reverted to McReynolds’ control, although it did
not displace rearward to 4/11’s positions until the next day.
The TD-14 bulldozers of the 11th Marines had proved to be no match
for the eight-inch frostline around the Reservoir, with the result
that all batteries and security positions sat fully exposed on
the concrete-like flatlands. Incoming mortar fire harassed the
artillerymen throughout the day of 27 November, and after dark CCF
flat trajectory weapons stepped up the tempo of bombardment. Marine
casualties in the valley were light, however, for the enemy gunners
seemed unable to group their erratic pot shots into effective
barrages.[396]
[396] 1/11 _SAR_, 8; 4/11 _SAR_, 5; LtCol W. McReynolds interv,
26 Nov 56.
It was the imminent threat of Communist infantry attack from North
Ridge that weighed down on the artillerymen of the 11th Regiment
during the predawn hours of 28 November. Since the beginning of the
CCF onslaught, they had been firing their howitzers almost ceaselessly
in a 180-degree arc, and ammunition stocks were fast dwindling to a
critical level. Their gun flashes providing brilliant targets for enemy
infiltrators, they could reasonably expect a full-scale assault in the
event of the dislodgment of Easy and Dog Companies from Hills 1282 and
1240. The effect of countermoves by Colonels Litzenberg and Murray
would not be known until after dawn, and meanwhile the Marine gunners
kept on firing their howitzers while the black outline of North Ridge
loomed ever more menacing.
_Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7_
While the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions pounded the northwest arc of
the Yudam-ni perimeter during the night of 27–28 November, the 59th
completed its wide end-sweep to the southeast and moved against the
14-mile stretch of road to Hagaru. At the moment the Communist effort
in that quarter could be considered a secondary attack, but if ever a
target fulfilled all the qualifications of a prime objective, it was
this critical link in the MSR--the very lifeline to most of the 1st
Marine Division’s infantry and artillery strength.
During the 27th Captain Wilcox’s Baker Company of the 7th Marines
patrolled along South Ridge. As darkness fell, it was heavily engaged
and incumbered with a number of litter casualties. With the permission
of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Davis led Captain John
F. Morris’s Charlie Company (-) down the MSR to positions across the
road from Hill 1419. Aided by Charlie Company, Baker was then able to
withdraw and return to Yudam-ni with Davis while Morris and his reduced
company took up positions on Hill 1419.[397]
[397] Col R. G. Davis Comments, 30 Nov 56.
He deployed his two rifle platoons and 60mm mortar section in a
crescent on the lower slopes of the eastern spur, facing the distant
crest. At 0230, five hours after Yudam-ni came under attack, a CCF
force descended from the high ground and struck the right flank.[398]
[398] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived
from: Geer, _The New Breed_, 288–290; Lynn Montross,
“Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” _Marine Corps Gazette_,
xxxvii, no. 5 (May 53), 16–23; 7thMar ISUM 67; and 7thMar
msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50.
After overrunning part of First Lieutenant Jack A. Chabek’s platoon
and inflicting heavy casualties, the Reds lashed out at the left flank
of the crescent-shaped defense. Here Staff Sergeant Earle J. Payne’s
platoon, less one squad in an outpost on higher ground, bent under the
weight of the attack and was soon in danger of being driven out of
position. Captain Morris reinforced the platoons on each flank with
men from his headquarters and the mortar section. The reshuffling was
accomplished in the nick of time and just barely tipped the scales in
favor of the defenders. A seesaw battle raged until after dawn on the
28th when, with the help of artillery fire from Yudam-ni, the Marines
drove the Chinese back into the hills.
Although the critical pressure eased at daybreak, Company C remained
pinned down by enemy fire coming from every direction, including the
crest of Hill 1419 directly above. The Chinese were in absolute control
of the MSR to the south, toward Toktong Pass, and to the north, in
the direction of Yudam-ni. Morris had taken about 40 casualties--a
dangerously high proportion, since he had only two of his three rifle
platoons. His radio had been knocked out by enemy bullets, and the 60mm
mortar section was left with but a few rounds of ammunition. For want
of communication, he could get no help from the Marine Corsairs on
station overhead.
The outpost squad from Payne’s platoon could not be contacted in
its position on the higher slopes of Hill 1419. Corporal Curtis J.
Kiesling, who volunteered to search for the lost unit, was killed by
CCF machine-gun fire as he attempted to scale the rugged incline. Other
men of Company C repeatedly exposed themselves in order to drag wounded
comrades to the relative safety of a draw leading down to the MSR.
Surrounded and outnumbered, Morris had no alternative but to await
help from Yudam-ni. He contracted his perimeter on the hillside east
of the road, and from this tiny tactical island, for the rest of the
morning, his men watched Communist troops jockey for position around a
360-degree circle.
_Fox Company at Toktong Pass_
Where Morris had taken a reduced infantry company into its lonely
assignment on the MSR, Captain William E. Barber went into position at
Toktong Pass on the 27th with a heavily reinforced outfit.[399] His
Fox Company of 2/7, augmented by heavy machine gun and 81mm mortar
sections of Weapons Company, numbered 240 officers and men. At the
midway point of the pass, Barber chose an isolated hill just north of
the MSR for his company perimeter. He placed the 3d Platoon (First
Lieutenant Robert C. McCarthy) on the summit, facing generally north,
with the 1st (First Lieutenant John M. Dunne) on the right and the 2d
(First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson) on the left. The 3d Platoon formed
a hilltop perimeter with two squads forward and the third in reserve
to the rear. Tied in on each flank, the 1st and 2d Platoons stretched
down the respective hillsides and bent back toward the MSR. These two
were connected on the reverse slope by company headquarters and the
rocket squad. Just below, at the base of the hill next to the road,
were Barber’s CP together with the 81mm and 60mm mortar sections. All
machine guns, including the heavies from Weapons Company, were emplaced
with the rifle platoons.
[399] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is
derived from Capt R. C. McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 3 (Mar 53), 16–23; Montross,
“Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” 16–23; 7thMar _SAR_,
20–21; 7thMar _URpt_ 5; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
1000 28 Nov 50; Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A.
Z. Freeman, 3 Jul 51; 1stLt C. C. Dana and SSgt R. R.
Danford interv by Capt Freeman, 4 Jul 51.
During the first half of the night of 27–28 November, Toktong Pass
rumbled with the reverberations of truck convoys--the final serials
of 1/5 and 4/11 outbound for Yudam-ni and Lieutenant Colonel Beall’s
empty trucks inbound for Hagaru. It was after 2000 before the last
trucks climbed to the summit, then nosed downhill, whining and roaring
through the night as they made the twisting descent. Chinese Communists
had already launched their first attacks against Southwest Ridge at
Yudam-ni, but Fox Company’s perimeter remained quiet, even during the
first hour of 28 November.
It was actually too quiet at 0115 when Lieutenant McCarthy inspected
the 3d Platoon positions atop Fox Hill, now glittering in the light
of a full moon. Finding his men numbed by the severe cold, he called
together his squad leaders and admonished them to be more alert. A
short time later, during his next inspection, McCarthy heard the proper
challenges ring out at every point.
There was no lack of watchfulness at 0230. For it was then that Chinese
in estimated company strength lunged out of the night and assaulted the
north, west, and south arcs of Company F’s perimeter. On the summit,
the two forward squads of McCarthy’s platoon were overwhelmed almost
immediately, losing 15 killed and nine wounded out of a total of 35
men. Three others would later be listed as missing. The eight uninjured
fell back to the reserve squad’s position on the military crest to the
rear, and the enemy took over the topographical peak.
Fighting with small arms and grenades also raged on the hillside to the
left, where the Chinese attempted to drive a wedge between the 2d and
3d Platoons. Repeated assaults were hurled back with grievous losses to
the Reds, and they apparently threw in fresh units in their bid for a
critical penetration. That they failed was due largely to the valor of
three Marines who made a determined stand at the vital junction: PFC
Robert F. Benson and Private Hector A. Cafferatta of the 2d Platoon,
and PFC Gerald J. Smith, a fire team leader of the 3d. These men,
assisted by the members of Smith’s team, are credited with annihilating
two enemy platoons.
While the enemy had undoubtedly planned the attack on the two rifle
platoons with typical precision, it seems that he literally stumbled
into the rear of Fox Company’s position. Corporal Donald R. Thornton,
member of a rocket launcher crew, reported that a group of Chinese
walking along the MSR suddenly found themselves at the edge of Barber’s
CP and the mortar positions. The Communist soldiers recovered from the
surprise and closed in aggressively, forcing the company commander and
the mortar crews to ascend the hill to a protective line of trees. An
embankment where the MSR cut through the base of the hill prevented
pursuit by the Chinese. When they tried to climb over it they were cut
down by small-arms fire; when they hid behind it they were riddled by
grenades that the Marines rolled downhill; when they finally gave up
and tried to flee, they were shot as they ran into the open.
On the right (east) side of the perimeter, the 1st Platoon was engaged
only on the flanks, near the summit where it tied in with the 3d and
down the slope where it joined the headquarters troops and mortar crews
defending the rear.
Fighting around the 270° arc of the perimeter continued until after
daybreak. Despite losses of 20 dead and 54 wounded, Fox Company was in
complete control of the situation. Lieutenant McCarthy described the
breaking-off action as follows:
By 0630, 28 November, the Chinese had received so many casualties
that the attack could no longer be considered organized. Few
Chinese remained alive near the company perimeter. Individual
Chinese continued to crawl up and throw grenades. A Marine would
make a one-man assault on these individuals, shooting or bayoneting
them. The attack could be considered over, although three Marines
... were hit by rifle fire at 0730. We received small arms fire
intermittently during the day, but no attack.
McCarthy estimated that enemy dead in front of the 2d and 3d Platoons
numbered 350, while yet another 100 littered the 1st Platoon’s zone and
the area at the base of the hill along the MSR.[400]
[400] These figures would indicate the complete destruction of
a CCF Battalion.
_Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge_
As Companies C and F of the 7th Marines were fighting on the MSR in the
hours just before dawn of 28 November, the first of a series of Marine
counterattacks commenced at Yudam-ni. It was essential to the very
survival of the 5th and 7th Regiments that the Chinese be driven back,
or at least checked, on the high ground surrounding the village.
Lieutenant Colonel Taplett, operating his CP in the no man’s land at
the base of North Ridge, ordered Company G of 3/5 to counterattack the
spur of Hill 1384 at about 0300.[401] The platoon of George Company
outposting Southwest Ridge was left in position, but the other two
platoons, under Second Lieutenants John J. Cahill and Dana B. Cashion,
moved out abreast shortly after 0300. Driving northward aggressively,
they crossed the MSR, “liberated” Taplett’s CP, and cleared the draw
in which Weapons Company of 3/5 was still entrenched. Troops of H&S
Company followed the attackers and reoccupied their old positions in
the gulley.
[401] The description of 3/5’s counterattack is derived from:
5thMar _SAR_, 21–22; 3/5 _SAR_, 14; Taplett interv, 3 May
56; Capt D. B. Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56 and statement, n. d.
Cahill and Cashion, displaying remarkable cohesion on unfamiliar ground
in the darkness, led the way up Hill 1384. Their men advanced swiftly
behind a shield of marching fire and routed the few[402] Chinese on
the spur. The position earlier vacated by the police platoon was
recaptured, and the Marines saw numerous enemy dead in front of the
South Korean machine gun emplacements. About 500 yards beyond the
battalion CP the two platoons halted until daylight. The seven men
who had formed the Item Company outpost on Hill 1384 arrived shortly
afterwards and were integrated into Cashion’s platoon.
[402] Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56, estimates the opposition came
from 25–30 Chinese.
He continued the attack soon after daybreak, with Cahill’s platoon
giving fire support. Cashion and his men plunged into enemy territory
along the ridge line leading northward to the topographical crest of
Hill 1384, about 1000 yards distant. They had reached the final slopes
when Taplett received the radio message, almost incredible to him,
that the two platoons were nearing the peak of Hill 1384. He directed
them to discontinue the attack and withdraw to the top of the spur.
There they were to establish a defense line overlooking Yudam-ni until
receiving further orders. The spirited drive led by the two young
officers had taken considerable pressure off the Marine units in the
valley west of the village. One immediate effect was that approximately
80 officers and men of How Company, 7th Marines, were able to retire
into 3/5’s perimeter from the slopes of Hill 1403 on Northwest Ridge.
To the east of 3/5, a second successful counterattack by the 5th
Marines brought stability to yet another critical point. Company C of
1/5 had deployed shortly after midnight to back up 3/5, in the event
of a breakthrough in the valley. Owing to the adverse developments on
Hills 1282 and 1240, however, it was later placed under operational
control of the 7th Marines. One platoon left for Hill 1240 in the
middle of the night to reinforce D/7, and the remainder of the company,
led by Captain Jack R. Jones, ascended 1282 to assist E/7 and the two
platoons of A/5 earlier committed.[403]
[403] The account of Company C’s counterattack is derived from
5thMar _SAR_, 21; 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; 7th
Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; 1/5 _HD, Nov
50_, 8; Maj L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Bey ltr, 26
Jun 52; ATIS _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_ Issue
66, 130–134, and Issue 84, 38–43; LtCol J. W. Stevens,
II, Comments, 27 Jun 56; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19
Jun 56; SSgt R. C. Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.
Charlie Company moved up a draw with Jones and his executive officer,
First Lieutenant Loren R. Smith, in the van of the column, followed by
the 1st and 2d Platoons and the 60mm mortar section. Light machine-gun
sections were attached to the rifle platoons. The climb took almost two
hours in the predawn darkness, the company frequently halting while
Jones questioned wounded men descending from the top. Numb from cold,
shock, and loss of blood, they could give no intelligible picture of a
situation described as grim and confused.
At approximately 0430, the head of the column came under heavy fire
from above as it reached a point just below the military crest, about
100 yards from the summit of 1282. Here, Jones found Staff Sergeant
Murphy from E/7’s 3d Platoon which, along with Trapnell’s, was out of
sight on the spur to the right. Also out of sight but far to the left
were Snyder’s platoon of A/5 and a handful of men of Easy Company.
While CCF grenades and small-arms fire rained down, Murphy explained
that E/7’s main position had been overrun and that he was attempting to
form a holding line in the center with some 20 survivors of the summit
battle.
Jones quickly deployed his two platoons for the attack, the 2d under
Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness on the right, the 1st under Second
Lieutenant Max A. Merrit on the left. Murphy’s small contingent joined
the formation. Second Lieutenant Robert H. Corbet set up his 60mm
mortar section to support the advance, then took a place in the assault
line. Down in the valley the 81mm mortars of 1/5 opened up with a
preparatory barrage. Artillery could not fire because of the short
distance between friendly and enemy lines, and the first flight of
Corsairs was not yet on station.
The frontal attack against the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 235th CCF
Regiment began shortly after daybreak. Jones personally led the Marine
skirmishers against more than 50 enemy soldiers armed with machine
guns and grenades. His troops moved upward through a hail of fire and
overran the Communists after a savage clash that included hand-to-hand
fighting. The Marines then deployed with the just-arrived 2d Platoon
of Able Company bridging the gap between Jones and Trapnell in time to
thwart the advance of enemy reinforcements.
According to enemy reports, only six or seven men survived the 3d
Company’s defeat. One of them happened to be the company political
officer, who conveniently had retired from the battle line during the
crucial stage of the struggle. At 1/235’s CP, a few hundred yards
to the rear, he was given a platoon of the 2d Company “in order to
evacuate the wounded and to safeguard the occupied position on Hill
1282....” The fresh unit ascended the northern slopes of the height
while Jones’ company was battling its way up from the south. By the
time the Red soldiers of the 2d Company neared the summit, they were
confronted from above by the muzzles of Marine rifles and machine guns.
The whole story unfolds in CCF records as follows:
As soon as the 1st Platoon [2d Company] advanced to the 3d
Company’s position its assistant company commander came up with
the platoon. At that time, the enemy [C/5] counterattacked very
violently. Accordingly, the assistant company commander ordered
the 1st Platoon to strike the enemy immediately and determinedly.
Before the 1st Platoon’s troops had been deployed, Lee Feng Hsi,
the Platoon Leader, shouted: “Charge!” So both the 1st and 2d
Squads pressed forward in swarms side by side. When they were
within a little more than ten meters of the top of the hill they
suffered casualties from enemy hand grenades and short-range fire.
Consequently, they were absolutely unable to advance any farther.
At that time, the assistant company commander and the majority of
the platoon and squad leaders were either killed or wounded.
While the 1st and 2d Squads were encountering the enemy’s
counterattack, the 3d Squad also deployed and joined them in an
effort to drive the enemy to the back of the hill. As a result,
more than half of the 3d Squad were either killed or wounded. When
the second assistant platoon leader attempted to reorganize, his
troops suffered again from enemy flanking fire and hand grenades.
Thus, after having fought for no more than ten minutes, the entire
platoon lost its attacking strength and was forced to retreat
somewhat to be able to defend firmly the place it held.
Meanwhile, according to Chinese accounts, Tsung Hui Tzu, commander of
the 2d Company, had arrived at the CP of 1/235 with his 2d Platoon at
0620. Noting that his 1st Platoon was in trouble, he said to the leader
of the 2d, “There are some enemy soldiers on the hill [1282] in front
of us; attack forward determinedly.”
The 2d Platoon jumped off immediately with two squads abreast and one
trailing. Within 30 meters of the crest, the Reds attempted to rush
Charlie Company’s position behind a barrage of hand grenades. The
assault failed. On the right the assistant platoon leader fell at the
head of the 4th squad, which was reduced to three survivors. Tsung, the
company commander, rushed forward and led the 6th squad on the left.
He was wounded and the squad cut to pieces. Incredibly, the platoon
leader ordered the three remaining men of the 4th squad to assault the
summit again. They tried and only one of them came back. The 5th squad,
advancing out of reserve, had no sooner begun to deploy than it lost
all of its NCOs. “As it mixed with the 4th and 6th squads to attack,
they suffered casualties again from enemy flanking fire and hand
grenades from the top of the hill. Therefore, the entire platoon lost
its combat strength, with only seven men being left alive.”
Not only was the commanding officer of 1/235 down to his last company,
but that company was down to its last platoon. Forever hovering in the
rear, the 2d Company’s political officer, Liu Sheng Hsi, ordered the
platoon to “continue the attack.” The assault began with two squads
forward, led by the platoon leader and his assistant. They charged
uphill into the teeth of Charlie Company’s position. Like all the
others, they were ground into the mat of corpses on the blood-soaked
snow. To complete the suicide of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, the
reserve squad of this last platoon was committed. A few minutes later,
“... there were only six men left.”
The 2d Company paid for its failure with 94 of the original 116
officers and men. This loss, added to those of the 1st, 3d, and
Special Duty Companies, would place 1/235’s casualties on Hill 1282 at
approximately 400, including practically all the company commanders,
platoon leaders, and NCOs. It can be assumed that nearly all of the
wounded succumbed, since evacuation was well nigh impossible with
Marines in control of the summit for the next 24 hours.
Marine losses were not light. Able and Charlie Companies of 1/5
together suffered 15 KIA and 67 WIA. Easy Company of 2/7, according
to best estimates, made its stand at a cost of about 120 killed and
wounded.
_Deadlock on Hill 1240_
At daybreak of 20 November, several of Easy Company’s casualties still
lay in their foxholes on the forward slopes of Hill 1282. To recover
them was an undertaking of great risk, even after the defeat of 1/235;
for CCF survivors continued to fire at the summit from positions on the
lower slopes. Captain Jones directed the evacuation and repeatedly ran
forward of his lines to rescue half-frozen Marines who were immobilized
by wounds.[404]
[404] L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Geer, _The New Breed_, 285.
Headquarters personnel of 1/5 spent the whole morning removing
casualties from 1282 and carrying them to the battalion and regimental
aid stations, which soon were filled to overflowing. In the meantime,
Able Company joined Charlie on the crest and assimilated the depleted
platoons of Trapnell and Snyder. A new defensive line was drawn across
the vital peak with C/5 in the center, A/5 on the right, and E/7,
now under the command of Lieutenant Bey, on the left. By midmorning,
despite the continued exchange of fire with CCF troops on the slopes,
there was no doubt that the Marines would hold the hill.[405]
[405] 5thMar _SAR_, 12–13; Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56.
This was not the case 1000 yards to the right, where daybreak had
found the shattered remnants of D/7 clinging to a toehold on Hill 1240
and beset from every direction by troops of the 3d Battalion, 236th CCF
Regiment.[406] The 3d Platoon of C/5, which had been dispatched from
the valley at 0400 to help, was delayed by darkness and terrain. Second
Lieutenant Harold L. Dawe’s small relief force became hotly engaged
on the lower slopes, far short of Dog Company’s position, but made a
fighting ascent after dawn.
[406] The account of the action of Hill 1240 is derived from:
5thMar _SAR_, 12; 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 7thMar msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 288;
Capt H. L. Dawe, Jr., Comments, n. d.
Initially Dawe missed contact with the beleagured outfit, but
afterwards the two forces cleared the Chinese from 1240. From his
position on the northeastern spur of the hill he could see the enemy
massing on the reverse slopes of 1240 and 1282. Communications were out
and he could not call for fire. At about 1100 the Reds counterattacked
with an estimated two or more battalions and forced Dawe to withdraw
about 150 yards. There his depleted platoon and the 16 remaining men of
Dog Company held under heavy mortar fire until relieved by B/5 at 1700.
The price of a stalemate on Hill 1240 was to Dawe about half of his
platoon, and to Hull practically his whole company.
_The Fight for Northwest Ridge_
To the left of North Ridge, dawn of 28 November revealed a tactical
paradox on the looming massif of Northwest Ridge. Both Marines and
Red Chinese occupied the terminal high ground, and it was difficult
to determine which had emerged victorious from the all-night battle.
How Company, 7th Marines, had withdrawn from Hill 1403, and from this
commanding peak soldiers of the 89th CCF Division could observe and
enfilade the whole of Yudam-ni valley. In addition to the 80 officers
and men of How Company who had pulled back to the lines of 3/5 during
the early morning, another group found its way to the rear of Easy
Company, 2/5, as mentioned earlier.[407]
[407] 3/5 _SAR_, 14, and 2/5 _SAR_, 18; 7thMar msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 0840 28 Nov 50.
The appearance of the latter contingent at 0430 was a cause of
consternation to Lieutenant Colonel Roise. His rifle companies had
thrown back repeated CCF attacks along the draw and spur on the left
of the 7th Marines’ outfit, but the loss of 1403 now offset his
victory and gravely imperiled his line of communications to the rest
of the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni, a mile to the rear. Nevertheless, 2/5
continued to hold. At 0600 Company E counterattacked and drove the
Chinese from the northern tip of the spur which they had occupied
during the night. Fox Company, its right flank now restored and in
contact with Easy, lashed out at 0800 and recaptured the two machine
guns overrun by the enemy four hours earlier. Fifteen CCF soldiers who
had found their way into the rear of Company F some time in the night
were destroyed. Easy Company, after its successful counterattack on the
spur, drove off a large Communist force attempting to move against its
right flank.[408]
[408] _Ibid._; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley.”
Incredibly, 2/5’s losses for the night-long fight were 7 KIA, 25 WIA,
and 60 weather casualties. Chinese dead piled across the front of Easy
and Fox Companies numbered 500, according to a rough count.[409] There
was no estimate made by How Company, 7th Marines, of enemy losses on
Hill 1403.
[409] 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 9–10.
At 0145 on the 28th, Roise had received Murray’s order to continue the
attack to the west after daybreak, so that 3/5 could move forward,
deploy, and add its weight to the X Corps offensive. Events during the
night altered Murray’s plans, of course, and at 0545 the regimental
commander alerted Roise to the probability of withdrawing 2/5 to
Southwest Ridge later in the morning. The battalion commander, not
realizing the extent of the crisis at Yudam-ni, thought a mistake had
been made when he checked the map coordinates mentioned in the message.
Despite the fact that his whole front was engaged at the time, he was
prepared to continue the westward drive, and he questioned regimental
headquarters about the “error” which would take his battalion rearward.
Needless to say, the correctness of the map coordinates was quickly
confirmed.[410]
[410] 5thMar _SAR_, 21; 2/5 _SAR_, 19; Col J. L. Stewart interv
13 Jun 56.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray visited Colonel Litzenberg at dawn on the
28th, while elements of the 5th Marines were counterattacking the
Chinese forces on North and Northwest Ridges. They agreed that the
enemy had appeared in sufficient strength to warrant a switch to
the defensive by both regiments, and Murray cancelled the scheduled
westward attack by his 2d and 3d Battalions. At 1100 he ordered 2/5
to pull back to Southwest Ridge, tying in on the left with 3/7 on the
same hill mass, and on the right with 3/5, whose line extended from
the valley northwest of Yudam-ni to the crest of North Ridge.[411]
[411] _Ibid._; Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.
Orders officially halting the northwestward advance and directing the
5th Marines to coordinate positions with the 7th Marines were sent
by General Smith at 1650.[412] Twenty-three minutes earlier he had
ordered the 7th Marines to attack to the south and reopen the MSR to
Hagaru.[413]
[412] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 1650 28 Nov 50.
[413] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 7thMar, 1627 28 Nov 50.
To coordinate better the defense of the new perimeter, Murray moved his
CP from the northwestern edge of Yudam-ni to the center of the village,
where the 7th Marines’ headquarters was located. He spent most of his
time thereafter with Litzenberg, while Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L.
Stewart, his executive officer, ran the 5th Regiment command post.[414]
Through constant contact and a policy of close cooperation in all
matters, the two regimental commanders and their staffs came up with
joint plans for the defense of Yudam-ni and the ultimate breakout to
Hagaru.
[414] _Ibid._; 5th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1050 28 Nov 50.
The first of these plans had to do with the realignment of forces at
Yudam-ni and the rescue of Charlie and Fox Companies, 7th Marines.
Early in the afternoon of 28 November, 2/5 began withdrawing from
Northwest Ridge a company at a time, with Company E providing covering
fire as rear guard. The battalion’s displacement to Southwest Ridge was
completed by 2000 against CCF resistance consisting only of harassing
fires.[415]
[415] 2/5 _SAR_, 19.
Directly across the valley of Yudam-ni, Company I of 3/5 relieved the
elements of 1/5 on Hill 1282 of North Ridge in late afternoon. George
and How Companies of 3/5 deployed in the low ground to protect the
corridor approaches to Yudam-ni from the northwest. Lieutenant Colonel
Stevens, keeping the bulk of 1/5 in reserve, dispatched Company B at
1400 to relieve the battered handful of Marines on Hill 1240.
While this reshuffling took place on the 28th, Colonel Litzenberg
listened anxiously to the grim reports from his 1st Battalion, which
had set out in the morning to retrieve both Charlie and Fox Companies
from their encircled positions on the MSR leading to Hagaru.[416]
Able Company led off for the relief force at 1015, entering the gorge
between South and Southeast Ridges. Five hours of fighting, marching,
and climbing took it to a point about three miles from the Yudam-ni
perimeter and one mile short of Company C’s position. Here, while
moving through the high ground east of the MSR, the vanguard met heavy
resistance and was stopped cold.
[416] The account of C/5’s rescue, is derived from: 7thMar
_SAR_, 21; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv 1150, 1200, 1450,
1550, 1915, 2040 28 Nov 50, and 0144 29 Nov 50; 7thMar
msg to 2/7 0515 28 Nov 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 290–291.
Lieutenant Colonel Davis, who was following with the remainder of
the 1st Battalion, committed Company B to a flanking movement west
of the road. Air and 81mm mortars supported the auxiliary attack and
routed the Chinese. Both companies advanced to high-ground positions
abreast of Charlie Company’s perimeter, then bent toward the MSR to
provide a protective crescent between the beleaguered outfit and the
enemy-infested ground to the south.
By now it was dark. Fox Company, according to plan, was supposed
to have fought its way from Toktong Pass. Owing to the burden of
casualties and the ring of Chinese around its distant hilltop, it was
not able to do so. Litzenberg, concerned lest 1/7 be similarly trapped
in the gorge, recalled Davis to Yudam-ni. The relief force returned at
2110 with Charlie Company and its 46 wounded.
_Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill_
Fox Company, with 54 wounded on its hands, spent an active day at
the top of Toktong Pass.[417] After the Chinese attacks subsided
in the morning, Barber’s men collected ammunition and weapons from
Marine casualties and Communist dead. Included among enemy arms were
several of the familiar U. S. Thompson submachine guns and Model 1903
Springfield rifles.
[417] This account of Company F’s activities on 28 Nov is
derived from: 7thMar _SAR_, 18–24; McCarthy, “Fox Hill,”
16–23; Thornton interv, 3 Jul 51; Dana-Danford interv 4
Jul 51; Geer, _The New Breed_, 300–302; Statement of Cpl
C. R. North, n. d.
At 1030 a flight of Australian F-51s (Mustangs) blasted CCF positions
around Toktong Pass, particularly a rocky promontory several hundred
yards to the north on Hill 1653, which the enemy already had
transformed into a redoubt. Within the Marine perimeter, the wounded
were placed in two tents on a sheltered hillside where Navy corpsmen
attended them constantly. According to Lieutenant McCarthy’s account,
the medics, “by candlelight ... changed the bandages, slipped men in
and out of sleeping bags, warmed C-rations for the men, and melted the
morphine syrettes in their mouths before the injections. Because the
plasma was frozen the corpsmen had to watch men die for the lack of it.”
During late morning and the afternoon, Barber sent out patrols to
screen the areas immediately beyond his lines. The scouting parties
met only sniper fire, but other evidence of enemy activity indicated
that Fox Hill was completely surrounded. An appeal for resupply by air
was answered later in the day when Marine R5Ds dropped medical kits
and ammunition at the base of the hill. At a cost of two wounded, the
precious supplies were recovered before sundown.
Fox Company’s perimeter for the night of 28–29 November was the same as
before, except that the ranks were noticeably thinner. Nevertheless, a
feeling of confidence pervaded the men on the hilltop; they believed
implicitly that they could hold. They believed it despite the fact that
strong relief columns from both Yudam-ni and Hagaru had been unable to
break through to them.
All was quiet on Fox Hill until 0215, when CCF mortar rounds killed one
Marine and wounded two others in the 3d Platoon, now reduced to some 20
able-bodied men. About 40 Chinese made a penetration in this area after
a series of probing attacks all along the line. One Marine crew turned
its light machine gun about and brought it to bear on the bunched-up
attackers with deadly effect. A gap in the lines on both flanks caused
the platoon to pull back about 20 yards. At sunrise, however, Staff
Sergeant John D. Audas led a counterattack which regained the lost
ground at a cost of only two wounded.
The second night’s fighting cost Fox Company a total of five killed and
29 wounded. Both Captain Barber and Lieutenant McCarthy suffered leg
wounds, but continued in action after receiving first aid. The company
commander directed that the open ground on Fox Hill be marked with
colored parachutes from the previous day’s air drops. This provision
resulted in accurate drops and easy recoveries when Marine transport
planes arrived at 1030 on the 29th with ammunition and supplies.
Shortly afterwards First Lieutenant Floyd J. Englehardt of VMO-6 landed
with batteries for the SCR-300 and 619 radios. Although his helicopter
was damaged by hits from long-distance Chinese fire, he managed to take
off safely.
Air drops that afternoon by C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command missed
the marked zone at times, and much of the mortar ammunition landed
about 500 yards to the west of the perimeter. Lieutenant Peterson,
already twice wounded, led Marines who recovered some of the rounds
but were pinned down by CCF fire and got back, one at a time, with
difficulty. At dusk, under cover of fire from How Battery, another
detail recovered the ammunition without enemy interference.
_Not Enough Tents for Casualties_
The night of 28–29 November passed with only minor activity in the
Yudam-ni area for the infantry of RCT-5; but the regimental surgeon,
Lieutenant Commander Chester M. Lessenden (MC) USN, had his hands full.
During the fighting of the previous night the joint aid station had
been west of Yudam-ni. Tents sheltering the wounded were riddled by
enemy small-arms fire from the North Ridge battle, and on the morning
of the 28th the aid station displaced to a safer location southwest
of Yudam-ni. The seriously wounded filled the few tents initially
available, and the others were protected from freezing by being placed
outdoors, side by side, and covered by tarpaulins while lying on straw.
Primitive as this hospitalization was, DOW cases were no more than
might have been expected under better conditions.[418]
[418] 5thMar _SAR_, 48; Stewart interv, 13 Jun 56; 4/11 _SAR_,
5; McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.
The crowding in the aid stations was much relieved on 30 November by
the erection of sufficient tentage by 4/11 to provide shelter for
approximately 500 casualties.
“Everything was frozen,” said Lessenden later in an interview with
Keyes Beech, a press correspondent. “Plasma froze and the bottles
broke. We couldn’t use plasma because it wouldn’t go into solution and
the tubes would clog up with particles. We couldn’t change dressings
because we had to work with gloves on to keep our hands from freezing.
“We couldn’t cut a man’s clothes off to get at a wound because he
would freeze to death. Actually a man was often better off if we left
him alone. Did you ever try to stuff a wounded man into a sleeping
bag?”[419]
[419] Keyes Beech: _Tokyo and Points East_ (New York, 1954),
196.
The joint defense plan for the night of 28–29 November provided for
RCT-5 to take the responsibility for the west and north sectors, while
RCT-7 was to defend to the east, south and southwest. Enemy mortar
fire was received during the night in both regimental zones, but
there were few infantry contacts. This lack of activity could only be
interpreted as a temporary lull while the enemy regrouped for further
efforts.
As for the next attempt to relieve Fox Company and open the MSR to
Hagaru, the joint planners at Yudam-ni decided on the night of the
28th that all troops of the two regiments now in line were needed for
defense. There were actually no men to spare for a relief column, and
yet Division had ordered the effort to be made. The solution seemed
to be a composite battalion consisting of perimeter reserve units.
In order to replace these troops, personnel were to be assigned from
headquarters units and artillery batteries. This was the genesis of the
Composite Battalion, consisting of elements from Able Company of 1/5,
Baker Company of 1/7 and George Company of 3/7, reinforced by a 75mm
recoilless section and two 81mm mortar sections from RCT-7 battalions.
These troops were directed to assemble at the 1/7 CP on the morning
of the 29th, with Major Warren Morris, executive officer of 3/7, in
command.[420]
[420] This account of the Composite Battalion is derived from
the following sources: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n.
d., 5–8; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.
At 0800 the striking force moved out southward with the dual mission of
relieving Captain Barber and opening up the MSR all the way to Hagaru.
After an advance of 300 yards, heavy machine-gun fire hit the column
from both sides of the road. Groups of Chinese could be plainly seen on
the ridges, affording remunerative targets for the 81mm mortars and 75
recoilless guns. Forward air controllers soon had the Corsairs overhead
to lead the way. At a point about 4500 yards south of Yudam-ni,
however, Marine planes dropped two messages warning that the enemy was
entrenched in formidable force along the high ground on both sides of
the MSR.
Similar messages were delivered by the aircraft to the regimental CP at
Yudam-ni. They caused Colonel Litzenberg to modify the orders of the
Composite Battalion and direct that it relieve Fox Company and return
to Yudam-ni before dark.
By this time Morris’ troops had become engaged with large numbers of
Chinese who were being constantly reinforced by groups moving into the
area along draws masked from friendly ground observation. Litzenberg
was informed on a basis of air observation that Morris was in danger of
being surrounded, and at 1315 he sent an urgent message directing the
force to return to Yudam-ni. Contact was broken off immediately with
the aid of air and artillery cover and the Composite Battalion withdrew
without further incident.
_The Turning Point of 30 November_
The Yudam-ni area had a relatively quiet night on 29–30 November. But
even though there was little fighting, the continued sub-zero cold
imposed a strain on the men when at least a fifty per cent alert must
be maintained at all times. This was the third virtually sleepless
night for troops who had not had a warm meal since the Thanksgiving
feast.
“Seldom has the human frame been so savagely punished and continued to
function,” wrote Keyes Beech. “Many men discovered reserves of strength
they never knew they possessed. Some survived and fought on will power
alone.”[421]
[421] Beech, _Tokyo and Points East_, 197.
Certainly there was no lack of will power on Fox Hill as Captain Barber
called his platoon leaders together at about 1700 on 29 November and
told them not to expect any immediate relief. Chinese attacks, he
warned, might be heavier than ever this third night, but they would be
beaten off as usual.
The area was quiet until about 0200 on the 30th, when an Oriental
voice called out of the darkness in English, “Fox Company, you are
surrounded. I am a lieutenant from the 11th Marines. The Chinese will
give you warm clothes and good treatment. Surrender now!”[422] The
Marines replied with 81mm illumination shells which revealed targets
for the machine guns as the Chinese advanced across the valley from the
south.
[422] This description of the third night on Fox Hill is
derived from McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” 21.
Thanks to the afternoon’s air drops, Fox Hill had enough mortar
ammunition and hand grenades for the first time, and good use was made
of both. An estimated three CCF companies were cut to pieces at a cost
of a single Marine wounded.
At sunrise, as the Corsairs roared over, all tension vanished on Fox
Hill. For it was generally agreed that if the Chinese couldn’t take the
position in three nights, they would never make the grade.
The troops in the Yudam-ni area also felt that the enemy had shot
his bolt without achieving anything more than a few local gains at a
terrible cost in killed and wounded. It was recognized that some hard
fighting lay ahead, but the morning of the 30th was a moral turning
point both in the foxhole and the CP.
It was evident even on the platoon level at Yudam-ni that big events
were in the wind. Marine enlisted men are traditionally shrewd at
sizing up a tactical situation, and they sensed that a change was
at hand. For three days and nights they had been on the defensive,
fighting for their lives, and now the word was passed from one man to
another that the Marines were about to snatch the initiative.
The regimental commanders and staff officers had a worry lifted from
their minds when a helicopter brought the news that Hagaru had passed
a quiet night after repulsing large enemy forces in a dusk-to-dawn
battle the night before. It would have added enormously to the task
of the Yudam-ni troops, of course, if the Chinese had seized that
forward base with its air strip and stockpiles of supplies. Thus it was
heartening to learn that a single reinforced Marine infantry battalion
and an assortment of service troops had beaten off the attacks of large
elements of a Chinese division at Hagaru. The following two chapters
will be devoted to an account of that critical battle and its aftermath
before returning to Yudam-ni.