Task Force Drysdale
_CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks--The
Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack of George Company on East Hill--High
Level Command Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue
of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip_
Before the Chinese struck at Yudam-ni, they had penetrated 35 miles
farther south along the MSR. At Chinhung-ni, on the night of 26
November, the Marines of the 1st Battalion, RCT-1, exchanged shots in
the darkness with several elusive enemy groups making “light probing
attacks.”
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, the new battalion commander,
had set up a defensive perimeter upon arrival with his three rifle
companies reinforced by 4.2-inch mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle
platoons.[462] The identity of the enemy on the night of the 26th was
not suspected, and patrols the next day made no contacts. At 1900 on
the 27th, however, another light attack on the perimeter was repulsed.
During the next two days, patrol actions definitely established that
Chinese in estimated battalion strength were in a mountain valley to
the west, hiding in houses by day and probing by night apparently in
preparation for a determined attack.
[462] This section is based upon the following sources: 1stMar
_SAR_, 13–14; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _13_, 1–2; VMF-312
_SAR_, 16; LtCol D. M. Schmuck interv, 2 Apr 56; Maj W.
L. Bates, Jr., interv by HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 53; Col D.
M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
Schmuck decided to strike first. On the 29th, a Baker Company
reconnaissance patrol searched out the enemy positions, and the next
day the battalion commander led an attacking force composed of Captain
Barrow’s Able Company and part of Captain Noren’s Baker Company,
reinforced by 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars under the direction of Major
William L. Bates, Jr., commanding the Weapons Company.
While First Lieutenant Howard A. Blancheri’s Fox Battery of 2/11 laid
down supporting fires, the infantry “ran the Chinese right out of the
country,” according to Major Bates’ account. “We burned all the houses
they had been living in and brought the civilians back with us. We had
no more difficulty with the Chinese from that valley.”
The Communists were found to be warmly clothed in new padded cotton
uniforms and armed with American weapons presumably captured from the
Nationalists. An estimated 56 were killed by the ground forces before
the Corsairs of VMF-312 took up a relentless pursuit which lasted until
the enemy remnants scattered into hiding. Some of the Chinese were
mounted on shaggy Mongolian ponies.[463]
[463] Schmuck Comments.
_CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri_
During this same period, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2d Battalion of
RCT-1 had several hard-fought encounters with the new enemy. After
arriving at Koto-ri on the 24th, he set up a perimeter defense facing
west, north, and east which included a 4.2-inch Mortar Platoon as well
as Easy Battery of 2/11, commanded by Captain John C. McClelland, Jr.
Some commanding ground was left unoccupied, but Sutter believed that
a tight perimeter offered advantages over widely separated blocking
positions. In addition to 2/1, the regimental CP and H&S Company,
the AT Company (-), the 4.2 Mortar Company (-), Company D of the 1st
Medical Battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 11th Marines (less
Batteries D and F) were at Koto-ri.
The perimeter, second in importance only to Hagaru as a base, was to be
jammed during the next few days with hundreds of Marine and Army troops
held up by CCF roadblocks to the north. On 27 November, the enemy made
his presence known. A motorized patrol of platoon strength from Captain
Jack A. Smith’s Easy Company, supported by a section of tanks, engaged
in a fire fight with about 25 Chinese in the hills west of Koto-ri. Two
wounded CCF soldiers were left behind by the dispersed enemy. At this
point the patrol proceeded on foot until it was stopped by the fire of
an estimated 200 Communists dug in along ridge lines. At 1600 the
Marines returned to the perimeter with two men wounded.
[Illustration: KOTO-RI PERIMETER
28 November – 7 December
MAP-19
]
Enemy losses were reported as eight killed and 15 wounded in addition
to the two prisoners. Upon being questioned, these Chinese asserted
that they belonged to a Chinese division assembling to the west of
Koto-ri with a headquarters in a mine shaft.[464]
[464] 1stMar _SAR_, 14, and appendix 10, 6; CO 1stMar msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 1815 and 1930 27 Nov 50.
There could be no doubt the next day that the enemy had swarmed into
the area in fairly large numbers. A Marine outpost on a hill northeast
of the perimeter received heavy small-arms fire at 0845 and was
reinforced by a platoon from Easy Company. Finally these troops had to
be withdrawn and an air strike called on the hill to evict the enemy.
At 1058 General Smith ordered Colonel Puller to push a force up the MSR
to make contact with the tank patrol being sent south from Hagaru and
to clear the MSR.[465] Groups of Chinese, sighted during the day to
the north, west and east, were taken under artillery fire by Captain
McClelland’s battery. Reconnaissance planes landing at the Koto-ri OY
strip reported CCF roadblocks on the way to Hagaru; and at 1330 Captain
Gildo S. Codispoti, the S-3, dispatched Captain Welby W. Cronk’s Dog
Company in vehicles with orders to open up the route. Following in Dog
Company’s wake came the last serial of Division Headquarters troops, on
its way to Hagaru.[466]
[465] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1058 28 Nov 50.
[466] The remainder of this section is based upon: 2/1 _SAR_,
12–13; HqBn _URpt 12_. LtCol J. C McClelland, Jr., ltr,
21 Feb 56; Col A. Sutter Comments, n. d.
Less than a mile north of the perimeter, the convoy ran into a storm
of rifle and automatic weapons fire from Chinese entrenched along the
high ground on both sides of the road. The Marines of Dog Company piled
out of their vehicles and deployed for a hot fire fight, supported from
Koto-ri by 81mm mortars of Captain William A. Kerr’s Weapons Company.
Two platoons swung around to clear the enemy from the ridge. The other
platoon and the Headquarters troops advanced along the road.
At 1615 a platoon from Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company was
ordered out to assist in evacuating casualties. But as the afternoon
wore on, it grew apparent that the Chinese were in greater strength
than had been anticipated, and all troops were directed to return to
Koto-ri at 1735. They did so under cover of strikes by the Corsairs of
VMF-312.
Marine losses numbered four KIA or DOW and 34 WIA. Enemy casualties
were estimated at 154 killed and 83 wounded in addition to three
prisoners taken from a unit identified as the 179th Regiment of the
60th CCF Division. Captured Chinese weapons included 130 rifles, 25
machine guns, and two cases of grenades.
That evening George Company of 3/1, 41st Commando, Royal Marines, and
Baker Company of the 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, arrived at
Koto-ri on their way to Hagaru (see Map 20). Colonel Puller and his
S-3, Major Lorigan, organized the newcomers into a task force under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, CO of the British unit, with
orders to fight its way to Hagaru the following day.
Luckily the enemy did not elect to attack the overcrowded perimeter on
the night of the 28th. Every warming tent was packed to capacity, and a
CCF mortar round could hardly have landed anywhere without doing a good
deal of damage.
After a quiet night the Chinese began the new day by digging
emplacements in the hills to the west under harassing fire from F
Company. The howitzers of Easy Battery and the mortars of 2/1 provided
supporting fires for Task Force Drysdale when it moved out at 0945
followed by a convoy of Division Headquarters troops. A platoon of Easy
Company, 2/1, went along with corpsmen and ambulances to assist in
evacuating any early wounded back to Koto-ri. Stubborn CCF resistance
resulted in casualties from the outset, and it was 1600 before the Easy
Company escort platoon got back to the perimeter.
The Chinese, keeping the perimeter under observation all day, evidently
concluded that the northern rim, defended by Easy Company, offered the
best opportunity for a penetration. Marine air strikes were called
on the Chinese swarming over the near-by high ground during the last
minutes of daylight, but enemy mortar rounds hit Easy Company at 1745.
They were followed by bugle calls and whistle signals as the CCF
infantry attacked from the high ground to the northeast.
The assault force was estimated at company strength, with the remainder
of a battalion in reserve. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they had
made their intentions clear all day with unusual activity in the
surrounding hills, and Easy Company was not surprised. Major Clarence
J. Mabry, the 2/1 executive officer, could be heard above the machine
guns as he shouted encouragement to Marines who poured it into the
advancing Communists. They came on with such persistence that 17
managed to penetrate within the lines, apparently to attack the warming
tents.[467] All were killed. In addition, about 150 CCF bodies lay in
front of the sector when the enemy withdrew at 1855, after suffering a
complete repulse.
[467] LtCol R. E. Lorigan Comments, 16 May 56.
It was conjectured that the Chinese had interpreted the return of the
Easy Company platoon late that afternoon as an indication that a gap
in the line needed to be hastily plugged. But the supposed weak spot
did not materialize, and at 1935 the enemy signed off for the night
after pumping four final mortar rounds in the vicinity of the Battalion
CP without doing any harm. Losses of 2/1 for the day were six KIA and
18 WIA, total CCF casualties being estimated at 175 killed and 200
wounded. Ten heavy machine guns, seven LMGs, 12 Thompson submachine
guns, 76 rifles, four pistols, and 500 grenades were captured.
That was all at Koto-ri, where Recon Company arrived during the day
to add its weight to the defense. But during intervals of silence the
sound of heavy and continuous firing to the north gave proof that Task
Force Drysdale was in trouble.
_Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks_
Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale’s plan of attack had called for his British
Marines to lead out at 0930 and seize the first hill mass to the east
of the road. Captain Sitter’s George Company of 3/1 was to follow
and pass through to attack Hill 1236, with Baker Company of the 31st
Infantry in reserve. LtCol Sutter, assisted by his staff, had the
responsibility for planning and coordinating preparatory artillery and
mortar fires from Koto-ri and attaching an air liaison officer to the
task force.[468]
[468] Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on: CO
41st Commando ltr to CG 1stMarDiv, 30 Nov 50; 1stTkBn
_SAR_, 23–27; Smith, _Notes_, 859–868; Maj C. L. Sitter
ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 4 Oct 55; TSgt G. D. Pendas
ltr to HistBr G-3, 18 Dec 55; Narrative of Capt M. J.
Capraro, 2 Feb 56; Narrative of Capt J. D. Buck, 27 Jan
56; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, xxxvii no. 8 (Aug 51), 28–32; 1stMar
tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1705 29 Nov 50; and Lt Alfred J.
Catania, “Truck Platoon in Korea,” in Westover, _Combat
Support in Korea_, 53–57; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM,
Comments, n. d.
The first hill was taken without meeting serious resistance, but Sitter
came up against well entrenched CCF troops when he attacked Hill 1236,
about a mile and a half north of Koto-ri. It was nip and tuck until
Master Sergeant Rocco A. Zullo fired his 3.5 rocket launcher at a
range of 200 yards. Several rounds brought the Chinese out of their
holes and the Marines took possession of the hill.
[Illustration: ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE HAGARU
28 November-1 December
MAP-20
]
The Commandos and George Company moved up about a mile astride of the
road toward the third objective, Hill 1182. There the enemy resisted
strenuously with well-placed mortar as well as machine-gun fire from
strong positions on the high ground. The impetus of the attack had been
stopped when Sitter received orders from the task force commander to
break off action, withdraw to the road, and await new instructions.
Drysdale had received a message from RCT-1 at 1130 advising him that
the armor of Company D (less 2d platoon), 1st Tank Battalion, would be
available to him at 1300. He decided to wait, therefore, and re-form
the column before continuing the advance.
The two platoons of Company D tanks, reinforced by the tank platoon
of the AT Company, RCT-5, reached Koto-ri at noon after moving out
that morning from Majon-dong. Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, departed
Tongjong-ni, just south of Majon-dong, but did not arrive at Koto-ri
until 1500. The 2d Platoon being attached to Sutter’s battalion, the
remainder of the company was directed to bring up the rear of the Task
Force Drysdale, which by that time had renewed its attack. Thus the
convoy was made up of the following components, including the elements
which joined in the late afternoon of 29 November:
-----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
Unit |Estimated|Estimated|Estimated
|Strength |Vehicles | Tanks
-----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
41 Ind. Commando, RM | 235 | |
Co. G, 3/1 | 205 | |
Co. B, 31st Infantry, USA | 190 | 22 |
Det. Div. Hq. Bn. | 62 | 17 |
Det. 1st Sig. Bn. | 8 | 4 |
Det. 7th MT Bn.[469] | 12 | 22 |
Det. Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn. | 18 | 31 |
Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn. | 86 | 23 | 12
Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn. | 77 | 22 | 12
Tank Plat., AT Co., RCT-5 | 29 | | 5
-----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
Total | 922 | 141 | 29
-----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
[469] Trailers are included among the vehicles. George Company,
3/1 lacked organic transport and was mounted in the
vehicles of 7thMTBn. For similar reasons ServCo, 1stTkBn,
supplied the transportation for the 41st Commando and
377th Transportation Truck Company, USA, for B/31stInf.
At 1350 the head of the column had resumed the advance, with the order
of march as shown below:
D/TKs & AT/5 -- G/1 -- 41 Cmdo -- B/31 -- HqBn -- B/TKs
17 tks 22 veh 31 veh 22 veh 66 veh 12 tks
Shortly after moving out, Sitter’s men were hit by heavy small-arms
fire from houses on the right of the road. The company commander went
forward and requested the tanks to open up with their 90mm guns, and
the Chinese flushed out of the houses were destroyed by machine-gun
fire.
Progress was slow because of the necessity of further halts while the
tanks blasted out pockets of CCF resistance. Enemy mortar as well as
small-arms fire was encountered, and a round scored a direct hit on
one of the trucks carrying personnel of 3d Platoon of George Company,
wounding every man in the vehicle.
Further delays resulted while the tanks made their way over roadblocks
or around craters. For the three infantry companies, the advance
consisted of brief periods of movement alternated with interludes in
which the troops scrambled out of the trucks to engage in fire fights.
Finally, about 1615, the column ground to a complete halt about four
miles north of Koto-ri. At that time the tanks of Company B were just
leaving the 2/1 perimeter to join the convoy.
_The Fight in Hell Fire Valley_
Drysdale and Sitter were informed by the tank officers that they
thought the armor could get through, but that further movement for the
trucks was inadvisable in view of road conditions and increasing enemy
resistance. The task force commander requested a decision from Division
Headquarters as to whether he should resume an advance which threatened
to prove costly. It was a difficult choice for General Smith to make,
but in view of the urgent necessity for reinforcements at Hagaru he
directed Drysdale to continue.[470]
[470] Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are
the same as the preceding, plus: Statement of Capt M. C.
Capraro, 12 Feb 51; MSgt E. F. Grayson, Sgt E. J. Keeton,
and Cpl E. McCardell interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 17 Feb
51; Capt M. C. Capraro interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51;
CWO D. R. Yancey interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; Sgt C.
W. Dickerson, Cpl C. W. Williams, Sgt M. L. Estess, SSgt
J. B. Nash, and TSgt C L. Harrison intervs by HistDiv
HQMC, 25–31 Jul 51; Col H. S. Walseth interv by Capt
Shutts, 26 Jan 51; LtCol J. N. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov
56. Nash, Harrison, Dickerson, Estess, and Williams were
among the men captured with McLaughlin. They escaped from
Chinese imprisonment several months later.
The tanks had to refuel, so that more time was lost. CCF fire was
only moderate during this delay, thanks to the air strikes of VMF-321
planes directed by Captain Norman Vining. When the column stopped,
the vehicles had pulled off into a dry stream bed. Upon resuming the
advance, unit integrity was lost and infantry elements mingled with
headquarters troops.
[Illustration: TASK FORCE DRYSDALE AMBUSH
29 November
MAP-21
]
Not far south of the halfway point to Hagaru, increased enemy fire
caused an abrupt halt in a long valley. The high ground rose sharply
on the right of the road, while on the left a frozen creek wound
through a plain several hundred yards wide, bordered by the Changjin
River and wooded hills. This was Hell Fire Valley--a name applied by
Drysdale--and it was to be the scene of an all-night fight by half the
men of the convoy (see Map 21).
Such a possibility was far from their thoughts when they piled out of
the trucks once more, as they had done repeatedly all day, to return
the enemy’s fire. It did not even seem significant when an enemy
mortar shell set one of the trucks in flames at the far end of the
valley, thus creating a roadblock and splitting the column. The enemy
took advantage of the opportunity to pour in small-arms and mortar
fire which pinned down the troops taking cover behind vehicles or in
the roadside ditches and prevented removal of the damaged truck.
During this interlude the head of the column, consisting of Dog/Tanks,
George Company, nearly three-fourths of the 41st Commando and a few
Army infantrymen, continued the advance, with Drysdale in command, in
obedience to orders to proceed to Hagaru at all costs. Left behind in
Hell Fire Valley were 61 Commandos, most of Company B, 31st Infantry,
and practically all the Division Headquarters and Service troops.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, assistant Division G-4 and
senior officer caught south of the roadblock, ordered the barred
vehicles to turn around and attempt a return to Koto-ri. Before his
orders could be carried out, a Chinese attack severed the convoy about
200 yards to the north of him. Other enemy attacks cut the road south
of the stalled convoy, both Chidester and Major James K. Eagan being
wounded and captured.
Shallow ditches on either side of the road and the unused narrow-gauge
railway were utilized by the isolated troops as protection from the
fire of the Chinese occupying the high ground rising abruptly at the
right. The valley was about a mile long, covered with a frozen crust
of snow; and far from affording much cover, it offered the enemy a
convenient approach to the rear by way of the wide plain and frozen
river.
The Chinese fire was not heavy at first. But when darkness put an end
to Marine air strikes, the enemy became increasingly bolder. Even so,
there was no attempt for several hours to close within grenade-throwing
distance. During this interlude the defenders had time to recover from
their confusion and take defensive positions.
As nearly as the scene can be reconstructed from confused and
contradictory accounts, one large and three small perimeters were
strung out over a distance of perhaps 1200 yards from north to south.
Toward the north, near the outskirts of the village of Pusong-ni,
was the largest perimeter. It contained the troops caught north
of the second fracture of the column and was led by Major John N.
McLaughlin.[471] His hodge-podge of 130 to 140 men included Captain
Charles Peckham and part of his B Company, 31st Infantry; Warrant
Officer Lloyd V. Dirst and a group of Marine MPs; some Commandos,
Associated Press photographer Frank Noel, and assorted Marine service
and headquarters troops.
[471] Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had
transferred to the X Corps Staff. He was an Assistant G-3
and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv.
The three smaller perimeters appear to have resulted from the
splintering of a larger group originally containing nearly all the men
caught south of the second cut in the convoy. Major Henry J. Seeley,
Division motor transport officer, attempted to form a perimeter with
these men but was frustrated by Chinese attacks which forced the men
to fall back in small groups. About 300 yards south of McLaughlin’s
perimeter the remnants of two Army platoons crouched in a drainage
ditch. Apparently several Marines, including CWO Dee R. Yancey, were
with them. Some 30 yards farther down the ditch were Captain Michael
J. Capraro, the Division PIO, First Lieutenant John A. Buck, General
Craig’s aide, and about 15 headquarters troops. A few other Marines
clustered around Major Seeley, perhaps a hundred yards south of
Capraro’s group.[472]
[472] Distances are approximate, since it is understandable
that estimates made by participants in the darkness
varied a great deal.
There was some hope at first that the tanks of Baker Company, 1st Tank
Battalion, would come to the rescue. But the Marine armor ran into
heavy opposition near Hills 1236 and 1182 along the road cleared only a
few hours before by Task Force Drysdale.
When attacking a convoy, the Chinese usually strove to split the
motorized column into segments suitable for tactical mastication. That
is what happened to Baker Company. The tanks and trucks nearest to
Koto-ri got back without much trouble at 2110 after the enemy cut the
column into three groups. The middle group, comprising most of the
service trucks, was hit hardest. Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S. Walseth,
the Division G-1, was wounded as this group finally fought back to
Koto-ri at 0230 after heavy losses in trucks. This left the tank
platoon which had proceeded farthest; and it formed a tight perimeter
for the night about half a mile south of Seeley’s position, boxed in by
friendly artillery fires from Koto-ri. At dawn the tanks returned to
Koto-ri without further enemy interference.
No knowledge of these events reached the beleaguered troops in Hell
Fire Valley. They continued to hope that the tanks might arrive to the
aid of men who had no weapons larger than a single 75mm recoilless in
addition to rifles, carbines, and grenades. There were also a few 60mm
mortars but no ammunition for them.
Fortunately, no determined Chinese attacks were received up to
midnight. Looting the trucks proved more alluring than fighting to the
Asiatics, and their officers contented themselves with keeping the
perimeters pinned down and enveloped on three sides.
Not until the early hours of 30 November did the Communists resort to
probing attacks by small groups armed with grenades. The headquarters
and service troops gave a good account of themselves in the fire fight.
Signalmen, clerks, cooks, truck drivers, military policemen--the
Marines of Hell Fire Valley included a good many veterans of World War
II, and they proved as steady as the tough combat-trained Commandos.
Once again the value of the Marine Corps insistence on good basic
training showed itself.
Major McLaughlin sent reconnaissance parties south in an unsuccessful
attempt to link up with the other perimeters. He decided, therefore, to
remain in his positions and fight off the Chinese until air could come
on station at dawn. The wounded were placed in the deepest of the three
ditches and Army medics gave first aid.
As the night wore on, McLaughlin’s situation became increasingly grave.
By 0200 his men were out of grenades. An Army crew performed valiantly
with the 75mm recoilless, firing at enemy mortar flashes until all the
soldiers were killed or wounded and the gun put out of action. Twice
McLaughlin’s men drove the Chinese from their mortars only to have them
return.
Some of the Commandos managed to slip out of the perimeter in an effort
to reach Koto-ri and summon assistance. But an attempt by Noel and two
men to run the gantlet in a jeep between 0200 and 0300 ended in their
capture before they proceeded a hundred yards.
At about 0430 the Chinese sent their prisoners to the perimeter with
a surrender demand. McLaughlin, accompanied by a Commando, went out
to parley through an interpreter in the hope of stalling until help
arrived, or at least until some of the men escaped.
“Initially I demanded a CCF surrender!” he recalls. “But it made little
impression.”
The Marine officer stalled until the Chinese threatened to overrun the
perimeter with an all-out attack. They gave him ten minutes to discuss
the capitulation with his officers. McLaughlin went from one to another
of the approximately 40 able bodied men he had left. Some had no rifle
ammunition at all and none had more than eight rounds. For the sake of
his wounded, he consented to surrender on condition that the serious
cases be evacuated. The Chinese agreed and the fight in Hell Fire
Valley ended.
McLaughlin succeeded in killing enough time so that more men were given
the opportunity to slip away while the enemy relaxed his vigilance
during the prolonged negotiations. Largest of these groups was composed
of the survivors of the three small perimeters. Capraro and Buck,
both of whom were slightly wounded, managed to unite with the Army
infantrymen just north of them and nine Commandos, who joined them at
about 0200. An hour and a half later they linked up with the Marines
under Seeley, who led the combined group in a withdrawal to the high
ground across the river. Outdistancing their CCF pursuers, after
shooting down several, they made it safely to Koto-ri.
Other groups, including three more Commandos and 71 Army infantrymen,
also contrived to straggle back to the 2/1 perimeter.
Although the Chinese did not keep their word as to evacuation of the
wounded, they did not interfere with the removal of the more critical
cases to a Korean house. When the enemy retired to the hills for
the day, an opportunity was found to evacuate these casualties to
Koto-ri.[473]
[473] LtCol Chidester and Maj Eagan were still missing at the
end of the conflict, when the exchanges of prisoners took
place. From the information that LtCol McLaughlin has
been able to secure, it appears that both officers died
of wounds prior to reaching a prison camp. McLaughlin
Comments, 5 Nov 56.
An accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties will
probably never be made, but the following estimate is not far from the
mark:
-----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
| KIA | Total |
| and | Battle | Vehicles
Unit | MIA WIA | Casualties | Lost[A]
-----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
41st Commando | 18 43 | 61 |
Co. G, 3/1 | 8 40 | 48 |
Co. B, 1/31 | 100 19 | 119 | 22
Div. Hq. Bn. | 25 25 | 50 | 18
1st Sig. Bn. | 4 2 | 6 |
7th MT Bn. | 2 3 | 5 | 4
Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn | 5 6 | 11 | 30
Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn | 0 12 | 12 |
Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn | 0 8 | 8 | 1
Plat, AT Co., RCT-5 | 0 1 | 1 |
-----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
Total | 162 159 | 321 | 75
-----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
[A] Smith, _Notes_, 867–868.
“The casualties of Task Force Drysdale were heavy,” commented General
Smith, “but by its partial success the Task Force made a significant
contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the Division.
To the slender infantry garrison of Hagaru were added a tank company of
about 100 men and some 300 seasoned infantrymen. The approximately 300
troops which returned to Koto-ri participated thereafter in the defense
of that perimeter.”[474]
[474] _Ibid._ A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was
written the following spring in front-page headlines
announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17
enlisted Marines and a soldier. Among them were five
NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts for these pages.
Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either
escaped or survived their prison camp experiences and
were liberated in Operation Big Switch.
The head of the Task Force Drysdale column, with the Company D tanks
leading George Company and the Commandos, was not aware at dusk on the
29th that the convoy had been cut behind them. There had been previous
gaps during the stops and starts caused by enemy fire, and it was
supposed at first that the thin-skinned vehicles would catch up with
the vanguard.
Progress was fairly good, despite intermittent fire from the high
ground on the right of the road, until the tanks reached a point about
2200 yards from Hagaru. There the column was stopped by concentrated
CCF mortar and small-arms fire. One of the tanks was so damaged by a
satchel charge that it had to be abandoned, and several vehicles were
set afire. After Drysdale was wounded the command passed to Sitter,
who formed his force into a perimeter until the repulse of the Chinese
permitted the march to be resumed.[475]
[475] This section, except where otherwise specified, has been
derived from the following sources: 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15
Dec 50_, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 24–25; Ridge, _Notes_;
Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums
ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative, 27 Mar 56; Carey
narrative, 3 Feb 56.
Several pyramidal tents just outside the Hagaru perimeter were assumed
to be occupied by friendly troops until enemy in the vicinity destroyed
two George Company trucks and caused several casualties. Later it was
learned that the tents had been originally occupied by troops of the
10th Engineer Battalion and abandoned when the Chinese attacked on the
28th.
At 1915, Captain Sitter reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, who
directed that George Company and the 41st Commando spend the night in
perimeter reserve. After their all-day fight, the men of the column
could scarcely believe their eyes when they saw the Marine engineers at
work on the airstrip under the floodlights.
Contrary to expectations, the hours of darkness on 29–30 November
passed in comparative quiet at Hagaru except for CCF harassing fires.
It was not a coincidence that the enemy kept his distance. Attacks on
the East Hill and Item and How Company positions of 3/1 actually had
been planned and partly executed by troops of the 58th CCF Division,
according to POW testimony. They were broken up by Marine air attacks
and supporting fires which hit the assembly areas.
The effectiveness of these fires owed a good deal to the intelligence
brought back to Lieutenant Carey, the Battalion S-2, by CIC agents who
circulated among Chinese troops on 27 and 28 November. The Battalion
S-2 had a work table at the CP beside Major Simmons, the SAC, who
directed six sorties of the night hecklers of VMF(N)-542. He guided
the planes through the darkness to their targets with a fiery arrow
as converging machine-gun tracer bullets crossed over suspected CCF
assembly areas.
The 81mm mortars of Weapons Company, 3/1, fired about 1100 rounds
during the night, and the corresponding unit of 2/7 made a noteworthy
contribution. The following day, according to Carey, Chinese prisoners
reported that “most of the units employed around Hagaru were very badly
hit.”[476]
[476] This account of Marine supporting fires on the night of
29–30 November is based on: Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56;
LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15
Dec 50_, 4–5.
A few white phosphorus mortar rounds fell in the lines of How and Item
Companies, and a CCF green flare caused an alert for an attack which
never materialized. In the early morning hours of the 30th an enemy
concentration appeared to be taking place on the Item Company front,
but intensive 60mm mortar fire put an end to the threat.
_Attack of George Company on East Hill_
At 0800, the battalion commander ordered George Company to retake East
Hill while the Commandos remained in reserve. Sitter’s plan called for
his 1st and 2d platoons, commanded by Second Lieutenants Frederick W.
Hopkins and John W. Jaeger respectively, to pass through Myers’ group,
then make a sharp left turn and attack on either side of the ridge.
First Lieutenant Carl E. Dennis’ 3d Platoon and two platoons of Able
Company engineers were to follow in reserve.
Slow progress caused the George Company commander to modify the plan
by giving his 3d platoon and the two engineer platoons the mission of
enveloping the CCF right flank (see Map 22). Lieutenant Dennis led
the attack, with First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt’s and Lieutenant
Canzona’s engineer platoons following.
[Illustration: EAST HILL ATTACKS
30 November
MAP-22
]
Neither of the George Company attacks was successful. The trampling of
hundreds of feet over the snow had made the footing more treacherous
than ever; and once again the combination of difficult terrain and
long-range Chinese fire accounted for failure to retake East Hill.
Sitter’s request to set up defense positions on the ground previously
occupied by Myers was granted. Meanwhile Dennis’ platoon and the
engineers were directed to withdraw to the foot of the hill, so that
the Corsairs could work the CCF positions over with rockets and bombs.
_High Level Command Conference_
Although the Marines at Hagaru had little to do with the higher levels
of strategy, it was evident that the continued retreat of the Eighth
Army in west Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of X Corps.
Of more immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the
three battalions (two infantry and one artillery) of the 7th Infantry
Division east of the Chosin Reservoir. Brigadier General Henry I.
Hodes, assistant division commander, informed General Smith at noon on
the 29th that the Army troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties
while falling back toward Hagaru and were unable to fight their way out
to safety. At 2027 that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir area,
including the three Army battalions, were placed under the operational
control of the Marine commander by X Corps. The 1st Marine Division
was directed to “redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni area to
Hagaru area, gain contact with elements of the 7th Inf Div E of Chosin
Reservoir; co-ordinate all forces in and N of Hagaru in a perimeter
defense based on Hagaru; open and secure Hagaru-Koto-ri MSR.”[477]
[477] X Corps _OI 19_, 29 Nov 50.
On the afternoon of the 30th a command conference was held at Hagaru in
the Division CP. Generals Almond, Smith, Barr, and Hodes were informed
at the briefing session that a disaster threatened the three Army
battalions.[478]
[478] Smith, _Chronicle_, 95; X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 16–17;
CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 30 Nov 50.
Almond was also much concerned about the attacks on the Marine MSR. He
had been given a firsthand account that morning by the senior Marine
officer on the X Corps staff, Colonel Edward H. Forney, who had just
returned from Koto-ri.[479]
[479] Col E. H. Forney, _Transcript of Special Report, Deputy
Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August, 21 December 1950_, 3.
At the Hagaru conference the X Corps commander announced that he had
abandoned any idea of consolidating positions in the Chosin Reservoir
area. Stressing the necessity for speed in falling back toward Hamhung,
he promised Smith resupply by air after authorizing him to burn or
destroy all equipment which would delay his withdrawal to the seacoast.
The Marine general replied that his movements must be governed by his
ability to evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way out, he
added, and could not afford to discard equipment; it was his intention,
therefore, to bring out the bulk of it.[480]
[480] Smith, _Chronicle_, 95. These decisions were confirmed by
CG X Corps msg X 13522, 1 Dec 50.
Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule
for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. Those
two generals agreed, however, that not much could be done until the
Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru, and the conference ended on an
inconclusive note. That same afternoon X Corps OpnO 8-50 was received.
It defined the Corps mission as “maintaining contact with the enemy to
the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to the
Hamhung-Hungnam base of operation.”[481]
[481] X Corps _OpnO 8_, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps _WD Sum,
Nov 50_, 16–17; and CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_
30 Nov 50.
The decision to concentrate X Corps forces in that area meant the
evacuation of Wonsan. General Harris lost no time in directing MAG-12
to move from Wonsan Airfield to Yonpo. Hedron-12 and the three combat
squadrons began shifting personnel and equipment at once. Transfer of
the aircraft was completed on 1 December. In many instances the planes
took off on combat missions from Wonsan and landed at Yonpo, so that
the ground forces were not deprived of air support.[482]
[482] MAG-12 _HD Nov 50_, 8; 1stMAW _HD Dec 50_; CO MAG-12 msg
to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in
_ibid._ VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_.
High level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation
of northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral Joy foresaw
as early as the 28th that if the retreat of the battered Eighth Army
continued, X Corps would have to choose between falling back and
being outflanked. In view of the time needed to collect the enormous
quantities of shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date
that a large-scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle in
turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment either by
an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdrawal.[483]
[483] ComPhibGruOne, _Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment,
December 1950_, 1.
_CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru_
During the early hours of darkness on 30 November, it appeared that
Hagaru might have a second quiet night. Three bugle calls were heard
by Item Company at 2015, and the enemy sent up a green flare an hour
later. But no unusual CCF activity was reported until 2330, when small
patrols began probing for weak spots in the Item Company lines.
The enemy could scarcely have chosen a less rewarding area for such
research. As usual, Lieutenant Fisher had built up an elaborate system
of concertinas, trip flares, and booby traps; and his sandbagged
foxholes and weapon emplacements afforded his men maximum protection.
At midnight, when the enemy came on in strength, each successive
assault wave shattered against the terrific fire power which a Marine
rifle company, aided by artillery, tanks, 81mm mortars, and heavy
machine guns, could concentrate.
Several times the enemy’s momentum carried him to the Item Company
foxholes but no Communists lived to exploit their advantage. On one
of these occasions Sergeant Charles V. Davidson, having expended his
ammunition, proved that cold steel still has its uses by bayoneting the
last of his attackers.[484]
[484] Miller ltr, 10 Oct 55.
Again, as on the night of the 28th, the enemy had chosen to launch his
major attack against Marine strength, though his daytime observation
must have disclosed the preparations for a hot reception in the Item
Company sector. An estimated 500 to 750 Chinese were killed on this
front at a cost to Fisher’s men of two KIA and 10 WIA.[485]
[485] 3/1 _SAR_ 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 5; Ridge, _Notes_.
The Chinese also repeated themselves by carrying out another attack on
East Hill which ended in a second costly stalemate. The western slope
up to the military crest was held by the following units from right
to left: First Lieutenant Ermine L. Meeker’s 1st Platoon of Baker
Company engineers; the 2d, 1st, and 3d Platoons of George Company; and
Lieutenant Skelt’s 3d Platoon of Able Company Engineers. To the left of
Skelt, near the foot of the hill, were Lieutenant Canzona’s 1st Platoon
of Able engineers; two tanks of the AT Company, 2/7; and elements of
Lieutenant Colonel Banks’ 1st Service Battalion.[486]
[486] Sources for the balance of this section are as follows:
Smith, _Chronicle_, 97–100; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_,
5–6; Ridge, _Notes_; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Canzona
narrative, 8 Mar 56; Pendas ltr, 18 Dec 55; Carey ltr, 14
Feb 56; Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 10 Apr 56.
The action began shortly before midnight with one of those comedy
situations which develop on the grimmest occasions. The sign or
password was “Abraham” and the countersign “Lincoln,” but two Company A
engineers on a listening post did not pause for the customary exchange.
Having been jumped by what their startled eyes took to be a Chinese
regiment, they sprinted downhill yelling, “Abraham Lincoln! Abraham
Lincoln!” as they slid into Skelt’s lines with the enemy close behind.
His engineers had no leisure for a laugh. Within a few seconds they
were mixing it in a wild melee with Communists who seemed literally to
drop on them from above. Meanwhile, George Company was hard hit by well
aimed mortar fire which threatened to wipe out Lieutenant Hopkins’ 1st
Platoon. The ensuing double-headed CCF attack bent back the left flank
of George Company, with both the 1st and 3d Platoons giving ground.
On the left Skelt’s platoon was pushed down to the foot of the hill by
superior enemy numbers after exactly half of his 28 men were killed or
wounded. Here the fight continued with Banks’ service troops lending a
hand until the Chinese were exterminated.
This penetration was a hollow triumph for the enemy. No friendly forces
being left in the center, the How Battery howitzers walked shells up
and down the western slope. Mortars and machine guns chimed in, and
Lieutenant Canzona’s platoon was in position to direct the fire of the
two tanks of AT Company 2/7.
The scene became bright as day after an enemy artillery shell set 50
drums of gasoline ablaze in a Supply Area dump. Like an enormous torch,
the flames illuminated the battle so vividly that General Smith looked
on from the doorway of his CP, some 1200 yards away. Several bullets
pierced the roof and walls during the night.
Again, as in the fight of 28–29 November, Marine fire power blocked the
gap on the central and northwest slopes of East Hill. Marine and Army
service troops took a part in the fighting which is the more creditable
considering that they were ordered out in the middle of the night,
placed in a provisional unit with strange troops, and marched off into
the darkness to attack or defend at some critical point.
Lieutenant Meeker’s engineer platoon, on the right of George Company,
had a long-drawn fire fight but got off with losses of one man killed
and three wounded. At 0100 the CCF pressure on Sitter’s troops was
so heavy that Lieutenant Carey, former commander of the 1st Platoon,
was taken from his S-2 duties to lead a group of reinforcements which
he described as “all available hands from the CP or any other units
in Hagaru who could spare personnel.” Carrying as much ammunition as
possible, he arrived at the George Company CP to find Sitter still
commanding in spite of his wound. Scarcely a full squad was left of
Carey’s old outfit when he helped to restore the lines.
It was necessary for Ridge to send a further reinforcement consisting
of British Marines of the 41st Commando before George Company’s left
flank was secured. A counterattack at daybreak regained lost ground,
and the situation was well under control when air came on station at
0900.
Thus ended another night of confusion and frustration for both sides
on East Hill. While the Chinese attack had been better organized and
in larger force than the effort of the 29th, it was too little and too
late for decisive results in spite of heavy losses. On the other hand,
George Company and its reinforcing elements had suffered an estimated
60 men killed and wounded.
Although the Marines of Hagaru could not have suspected it on the
morning of 1 December, the enemy had, for the time being, shot his
bolt. His first two large-scale attacks, as POW interrogations were
to confirm, had used up not only the personnel of a division but most
of the limited supplies of ammunition available. Thus it is probable
that the following estimates of CCF casualties, as published in the 3/1
report, for the period of 28 November to 5 December, were nearer to
accuracy than most such summaries:
(1) 58th CCF Division: Estimated casualties of 3300 for the 172d
Regiment; 1750 each for the 173d and 174th Regiments.
(2) 59th CCF Division: Estimated 1750 casualties for the 176th
Regiment. No other units identified.
The known Chinese dead in the two night battles amounted to at least
1500; and if it may be assumed that three or four times that number
were wounded, the total casualties would have crippled an enemy
infantry division of 7500 to 10,000 men, plus an additional regiment.
Considering the primitive state of CCF supply and medical service,
moreover, it is likely that hundreds died of wounds and privations
behind their own lines.
The losses of 3/1 at Hagaru were given as 33 KIA, 10 DOW, 2 MIA, and
270 WIA--a total of 315 battle casualties, nearly all of which were
incurred from 28 November to 1 December.[487] There are no over-all
casualty figures for Marine or Army service troops, but it is probable
that their total losses exceeded those of 3/1.
[487] Ridge, _Notes_; Smith, _Notes_, 854.
_Rescue of U. S. Army Wounded_
Casualties estimated as high as 75 per cent were suffered by the three
U. S. Army battalions east of the Reservoir. At 2200 on the night
of 1 December, the first survivors, most of them walking wounded,
reached the Marine lines north of Hagaru with tales of frightful losses
suffered in the five days of continual fighting since the first CCF
attack on the night of 27–28 November.
Following this action Colonel Allan D. MacLean, commanding the 31st
Infantry, had set up a perimeter near Sinhung-ni with the 3d Battalion
of his regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 57th Field Artillery.
Along the shore farther to the north, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith,
USA, held a separate perimeter with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry
(see Map 20).[488]
[488] The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith,
unless otherwise noted, are: Statement of Capt Edward P.
Stamford, n. d., 2–15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak,
n. d.; Capt Martin Blumenson, USA, “Chosin Reservoir,”
in Capt Russell A. Gugeler, _Combat Actions in Korea_,
63–86; X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 33–34. Chinese accounts
of these actions may be found in ATIS _Enemy Documents:
Korean Campaign_, Issue 84, 7–15 and 20–25. LtCol Faith
had distinguished himself in World War II as aide to
MajGen Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the 82d
Airborne Div.
Both positions were hard hit by the Chinese on the night of 27–28
November and isolated from each other. During the next 24 hours they
beat off CCF attacks with the support of Marine and FEAF planes, and
Faith fought his way through to a junction with the Sinhung-ni force.
When the senior officer was killed, Faith took command of all three
battalions. Immobilized by nearly 500 casualties, he remained in the
Sinhung-ni perimeter, where he was supplied by air. On the 29th General
Hodes sent a relief force in company strength from 31st Infantry units
in the area just north of Hagaru. These troops, supported by several
Army tanks, were hurled back by superior CCF numbers with the loss of
two tanks and heavy personnel casualties.
On 1 December, fearing that he would be overwhelmed in his Sinhung-ni
perimeter, Faith attempted to break through to Hagaru. After destroying
the howitzers and all but the most essential equipment, the convoy with
its hundreds of wounded moved out under the constant cover of Marine
close air support, controlled by Captain Edward P. Stamford, USMC.[489]
[489] VMF(N)-542 _SAR_, sec C, 1–2; VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Dec 50,
1–2; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, (hereafter MAG-33 _SAR_), sec
B, 5, 8–9. See also descriptions of air support in 1stLt
H. S. Wilson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 29 Jan
51; 1stLt K. E. Kiester interv by Capt Kiernan, 25 Jan
51; Capt C. P. Blankenship interv by Capt Kiernan, 26 Jan
51; and 1stLt W. R. Lipscomb interv by Capt Kiernan, 18
Feb 51.
Progress was slow and exhausting, with frequent stops for fire fights.
There were many instances of individual bravery in the face of
adversity, but losses of officers and NCOs gradually deprived the units
of leadership. As an added handicap, a large proportion of the troops
were ROKs who understood no English.
The task force came near to a breakout. At dusk it was only four and a
half miles from Hagaru when Faith fell mortally wounded and the units
shattered into leaderless groups.[490] Soon the column had ceased to
exist as a military force. A tragic disintegration set in as wounded
and frostbitten men made their way over the ice of the Reservoir in
wretched little bands drawn together by a common misery rather than
discipline.
[490] The courageous Army officer was awarded posthumously a
Congressional Medal of Honor.
By a miracle the first stragglers to reach Hagaru got through the mine
fields and trip flares without harm. Before dawn a total of about 670
survivors of Task Force Faith had been taken into the warming tents of
Hagaru.
Lieutenant Colonel Beall, commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport
Battalion, made a personal search in the morning for other survivors.
Finding more than his jeep could carry, he organized a task force of
trucks, jeeps, and sleds. The only CCF opposition to the Marines came
in the form of long-distance sniping which grew so troublesome late in
the afternoon that the truckers set up a machine gun section on the
ice for protection. Far from hindering the escape of the Army wounded,
the Chinese actually assisted in some instances, thus adding to the
difficulty of understanding the Oriental mentality.[491]
[491] The account of the rescue of survivors from Task Force
Faith is based upon: 1stMar Div _SAR_, annex Q (hereafter
DivSurgeon _SAR_), n. p. and appendix II, 10; Statement
of LtCol O. L. Beall, n. d.; 1stMarDiv _POR 197_; Smith,
_Notes_, 902–906; and Smith, _Chronicle_, 98, 100.
Of the 319 soldiers rescued by Beall on 2 December, nearly all were
wounded or frostbitten. Some were found wandering about in aimless
circles on the ice, in a state of shock.
A company-size task force of Army troops from Hagaru, supported by
tanks, moved out that day to bring in any organized units of the three
shattered battalions which might have been left behind. Known as Task
Force Anderson after Lieutenant Colonel Berry K. Anderson, senior Army
officer at Hagaru, the column met heavy CCF opposition and was recalled
when it became evident that only stragglers remained.[492]
[492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Journal 1–2 Dec 50, entry 18; G-3 1stMarDiv
tel to S-3 11–12 Mar, 1150 2 Dec 50.
Beall and his men kept up their rescue work until the last of an
estimated 1050 survivors of the original 2500 troops had been saved.
A Marine reconnaissance patrol counted more than 300 dead in the
abandoned trucks of the Task Force Faith convoy, and there were
apparently hundreds of MIA. The 385 able-bodied soldiers who reached
Hagaru were organized into a provisional battalion and provided with
Marine equipment.[493]
[493] _Ibid._ Estimates of the number of soldiers evacuated by
air from Hagaru as casualties run as high as 1500, but
no accurate records were kept. Any such total, moreover,
would have to include men from the Army units stationed
at Hagaru as well as survivors of the Task Force Faith
disaster.
_First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip_
Casualty evacuation had become such a problem by 1 December that
Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, the Division surgeon, called at
General Smith’s CP that morning. He reported that some 600 casualties
at Hagaru were putting a severe strain on the limited facilities of C
and E Companies of the 1st Medical Battalion. It was further estimated
that 500 casualties would be brought in by the Yudam-ni units and 400
from the three Army battalions east of the Reservoir.[494]
[494] DivSurgeon _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, _Notes_, 990–994, and
_Chronicle_, 1 Dec 50; Capt E. R. Hering, “Address Before
U. S. Association of Military Surgeons,” 9 Oct 51; and
“Address Before American Medical Association Convention,”
14 Jun 51.
Although both figures were to prove far too low, they seemed alarmingly
high at a time when only the most critical casualties could be
evacuated by helicopter or OY. Flying in extreme cold and landing
at high altitudes where the aircraft has less than normal lift, the
pilots of Major Gottschalk’s VMO-6 saved scores of lives. From 27
November to 1 December, when the transports took over, 152 casualties
were evacuated by the OYs and helicopters--109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from
Hagaru, and seven from Koto-ri.[495]
[495] VMO-6 _SAR_, 14–15; Smith, _Notes_, 844.
Altogether, 220 evacuation flights and 11 rescue missions were
completed during the entire Reservoir campaign by a squadron which on
1 November included 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, eight OY-2 and two
L5G observation planes and nine HO3S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. First
Lieutenant Robert A. Longstaff was killed by enemy small-arms fire near
Toktong Pass while on an evacuation flight, and both Captain Farish and
Lieutenant Englehardt had their helicopters so badly riddled by CCF
bullets that the machines were laid up for repairs.[496]
[496] _Ibid._ See also Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New
York, 1954), 134–136.
Two surgical teams from Hungnam had been flown to Hagaru by helicopter,
but the evacuation problem remained so urgent on 1 December that the
command of the 1st Marine Division authorized a trial landing on the
new airstrip. Only 40 per cent completed at this time, the runway was
2900 feet long and 50 feet wide, with a 2 per cent grade to the north.
It was a tense moment, at 1430 that afternoon, when the knots of
parka-clad Marine spectators watched the wheels of the first FEAF
C-47 hit the frozen, snow-covered strip. The big two-motored aircraft
bounced and lurched its way over the rough surface, but the landing
was a success. An even more nerve-racking test ensued half an hour
later when the pilot took off with 24 casualties. It seemed for a
breath-snatching instant that the run wouldn’t be long enough for the
machine to become airborne, but at last the tail lifted and the wings
got enough “bite” to clear the hills to the south.
Three more planes landed that afternoon, taking off with about 60 more
casualties. The last arrival, heavily loaded with ammunition, collapsed
its landing gear on the bumpy strip and had to be destroyed and
abandoned.[497]
[497] DivSurgeon _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, _Notes_, 990–991, and
_Chronicle_, 98–99.
At the other end of the evacuation chain, clearing stations had been
established by X Corps at Yonpo Airfield to receive and distribute
casualties. A 30-day evacuation policy was maintained, and the
casualties to remain in the area went to the 1st Marine Division
Hospital in Hungnam, the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital in Hamhung, and
the USS _Consolation_ in Hungnam harbor. Casualties requiring more than
30 days of hospitalization were flown from Yonpo to Japan, though a
few critical cases were evacuated directly from Hagaru to Japan.[498]
[498] _Ibid._
It was planned for incoming transports at Hagaru to fly both supplies
and troop replacements. Meanwhile, on 1 December, the 1st Marine
Division had its first C-119 air drop from Japan. Known as “Baldwins,”
these drops consisted of a prearranged quantity of small arms
ammunition, weapons, water, rations, and medical supplies, though the
amounts could be modified as desired.[499]
[499] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n.
d.
Air drops, however, did not have the capability of supplying an RCT in
combat, let alone a division. At this time the Combat Cargo Command,
FEAF, estimated its delivery capabilities at only 70 tons per day;
and even though in practice this total was stepped up to 100, it fell
five short of the requirements of an RCT. Fortunately, the foresight
of the Division commander and staff had enabled the Supply Regulating
Detachment to build up a level of six days’ rations and two units of
fire at Hagaru.[500] This backlog, plus such quantities as could be
delivered by Baldwin drops, promised to see the Division through the
emergency.
[500] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004.
Infantrymen are seldom given to self-effacement, but at nightfall on 1
December only an ungrateful gravel-cruncher could have failed to pay a
silent tribute to the other services as well as to the supporting arms
of the Marine Corps. Navy medics, FEAF airmen, Army service units--they
had all helped to make it possible for the Marines to plan a breakout.
Yet it is likely that the 1st Engineer Battalion came first in the
affections of wounded men being loaded in the C-47s for evacuation.
In just twelve days and nights the engineers of Company D had hacked
this airstrip out of the frozen earth. Marine infantrymen could never
forget the two critical nights of battle when they looked back over
their shoulders from combat areas at the heartening spectacle of the
dozers puffing and huffing under the floodlights. In a pinch Lieutenant
Colonel Partridge’s specialists had doubled as riflemen, too, and
several platoons were riddled with casualties. Thanks in large part to
the engineers, the Hagaru base was no longer isolated on 1 December.
And though the enemy did not yet realize it, he had lost the initiative
on this eventful Friday. The Marines at Yudam-ni were coming out, and
they were coming out fighting with their casualties and equipment.