Crisis at Yudam-ni
_Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before CCF
Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese Seize Hill
1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of North Ridge_
The 2d battalion, vanguard of the 5th Marines, completed its move
from the east coast of the Chosin Reservoir to Yudam-ni during the
afternoon and evening of 26 November. After deploying his command south
of the village, Lieutenant Colonel Roise and his S-3, Major Theodore
F. Spiker, made a reconnaissance in preparation for the next day’s
attack.[370]
[370] 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 8–9.
Yudam-ni lies in the center of a broad valley surrounded by five great
ridges, named in relation to their direction from the village: North,
Northwest, Southwest, South, and Southeast. Beginning at the rim of
the valley, each of these ridges extends several thousand yards and
includes many peaks, spurs, and draws, certain of which took on special
significance as the crisis at Yudam-ni unfolded.
A finger of the Chosin Reservoir reaches toward Yudam-ni in the
valley between North and Southeast Ridges. The other four corridors
radiating from the valley are highway routes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise
surveyed the westerly road, which leaves Yudam-ni between Northwest and
Southwest Ridges. His assigned objective encompassed distant spurs of
these heights, bordering the road about a mile and a half west of the
village.[371]
[371] 5thMar _OpnO 39-50_, 26 Nov 50.
The 7th Marines (-) was disposed in perimeter around Yudam-ni on
terminal hills of four of the five ridges: D and E Companies (attached
to 1/7) on North Ridge, 3/7 on Southwest, and 1/7 on South and
Southeast.[372] Since the high ground occupied by 3/7 overlooked the
route of attack and Roise’s objective, Colonel Litzenberg[373] later
in the day specified a new destination for 2/5, a pass ten miles west
of Yudam-ni. It was a big order, but Litzenberg’s troops would support
the 5th Marines’ outfit by making limited advances along the skylines
of Northwest and Southwest Ridges. With this protection on his flanks
initially, Roise could concentrate more strength for the drive through
the low ground.[374]
[372] The transport priority given the move of the 5th Marines
prevented H&S and Weapons (-) Companies from moving to
Yudam-ni. Fox Company moved to Toktong Pass on the 27th
while How Battery of 3/11 remained at Hagaru to support
Fox Company. The two rifle companies of 2/7 at Yudam-ni
were assigned to 1/7 for operational control. MajGen H.
L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; LtCol W. D.
Sawyer Comments, 7 Sept 56.
[373] Col Roise states that he was attached to the 7th Marines
in the absence of the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines.
The record does not indicate a formal attachment. Col
Litzenberg appears to have acted in his capacity as
senior officer present. See Col R. L. Murray Comments, n.
d.; Col H. S. Roise Comments, n. d.; LtCol H. J. Woessner
Comments, 13 Nov 56.
[374] 7thMar _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 14; 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 8–9;
Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; Sawyer Comments, 7
Sep 56. Roise Comments.
Nightfall of 26 November was accompanied by an abrupt temperature drop
to zero degrees Fahrenheit. The north wind screamed across the frozen
reservoir and lashed the Marines on the valley floor and hillsides
around Yudam-ni. At 2200, a group of half-frozen company commanders
gathered within the flapping walls of Roise’s blackout tent to receive
their orders. The attack was to start at 0800 the next morning,
with 2/5 passing through the 7th Marines in a column of companies.
Recoilless rifles and 4.2-inch mortars of the 5th Marines would support
the advance, along with First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards’ 2d Platoon
of Able Company Engineers. Two Corsairs of VMF-312 and a spotter
plane from VMO-6 were to provide aerial reconnaissance and close air
support.[375]
[375] 2/5 _SAR_, 14.
In other wind-blown tents, 7th Regiment officers learned of their
missions as assigned by Colonel Litzenberg. The 3d Battalion would
move farther along the crest of Southwest Ridge on 27 November and
also seize the terminal peak, Hill 1403, of Northwest Ridge across
the MSR, in order to support 2/5’s attack more effectively. Dog and
Easy Companies were to patrol North Ridge and the west coast of the
Reservoir, while 1/7 scouted both South and Southeast Ridges and
their adjoining corridors. Particular attention would be paid to the
valley running southward between these hill masses, for therein lay the
vital road to Hagaru.[376]
[376] 7thMar FragO, 1850 26 Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 20–21.
[Illustration: YUDAM-NI
MAP-12
]
_Marine Attack on 27 November_
The Yudam-ni perimeter was quiet throughout the long, frigid night
of 26–27 November. At dawn the basin and hillsides came alive with
parka-clad figures stamping and clapping life back into leaden limbs.
Gradually they began to cluster around small fires to thaw out the
morning rations and their weapons.
Companies G and H of 3/7 jumped off in the attack at 0815, the former
to extend the foothold on Southwest Ridge, the latter to seize Hill
1403, terminal height of Northwest Ridge. Led by Captain Leroy M.
Cooke, How Company advanced unopposed and secured its objective by
midmorning.[377] Captain Cooney’s Company G moved rapidly 1200 yards
along the crest of Southwest Ridge and occupied a commanding peak,
Hill 1426, at 0845 without meeting opposition. But when Cooney resumed
the advance, his troops almost immediately came under fire from enemy
positions on another peak 500 yards away.[378]
[377] Cooke had taken over the company on 12 November, and
Lieutenant H. H. Harris reverted to ExecO.
[378] Unless otherwise stated this section is derived from:
7thMar _SAR_, 20–21; RCT 7 _URpt 5_; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.;
2/5 _SAR_, 15–18; 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 9; 1stMarDiv _SAR_,
annex SS, appendix A (hereafter 1/11 _SAR_), 8–9; VMF-312
_SAR_, 15; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1945 27 Nov 50;
LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.
During 3/7’s operations on the high ground the 2d Battalion, 5th
Marines, had marched out of Yudam-ni and launched the main attack along
the road. Company F, under Captain Uel D. Peters, led 2/5 as it passed
beneath the steep walls of Southwest and Northwest Ridges. The first
objective was a long spur of the latter height, 500 yards across a draw
from the 7th Marines on Hill 1403. Approaching the mouth of the draw
on the right of the road, Fox Company was hit by long-range small-arms
fire from enemy emplacements on the objective. About the same time,
0935, a message from the VMO-6 spotter plane told of CCF positions all
across the front. Captain Peters held up momentarily to appraise the
situation, and engineers moving behind his outfit began to clear the
first of nine unmanned enemy roadblocks that obstructed the MSR.
[Illustration: MARINE ATTACKS - 27 NOV
MAP-13
]
According to plan, Company F ascended part way up the slopes of Hill
1403 and then advanced across the front of the 7th Marines to the head
of the long draw that set off the Communist-held spur. Simultaneously,
4.2-inch and 81mm mortar crews positioned their weapons along the road
to support this envelopment. The flatlands south of Yudam-ni trembled
as the 105mm howitzers of Lieutenant Colonel Harvey A. Feehan’s
1st Battalion, 11th Marines, opened up at 1015 with a 15-minute
preparation.[379]
[379] Feehan, on 15 Nov 50, had relieved LtCol Ransom M. Wood
who had commanded 1/11 since its arrival in Korea with
the 1st ProvMarBrig on 2 Aug 50.
While Company F moved overland to strike at the left (north) flank of
the CCF position, Captain Samuel S. Smith’s Dog Company edged forward
along the MSR to the mouth of the draw. Like the earlier unit, it was
met by a hail of bullets. The regimental 4.2-inch mortars opened fire
on the crest of the spur, and recoilless rifles slammed 75mm shells
into bunkers just now sighted on the forward slopes. At 1115, after
ground supporting arms had partially neutralized the CCF positions,
Corsairs of VMF-312 blasted the objective with rockets and bombs.
In the wake of the air strike, First Lieutenant Gerald J. McLaughlin
led Fox Company’s 1st Platoon against the enemy’s north flank, the rest
of the company supporting the assault by fire from Hill 1403. Most of
the Chinese defenders fled to the west, and McLaughlin’s troops cleared
the northern half of the spur by 1300, capturing three Red soldiers.
The 2d Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Donald J. Krabbe, then
passed through to secure the southern half, overlooking the road.
Although the attackers encountered only negligible local resistance,
they were slowed by heavy machine-gun fire sweeping in from a peak 1000
yards farther west.
During Company F’s action on the high ground, Dog Company filed around
the road bend at the south end of the spur and moved toward a valley
junction a few hundred yards away. This fork is dominated by Sakkat
Mountain to the west; and the Chinese, in order to block the Marine
advance, had dug tiers of entrenchments on the eastern slopes of the
massive height. Frontal fire from these positions converged on Company
D’s column. Faced by such formidable resistance and terrain Lieutenant
Colonel Roise discontinued the attack. At 1430 he ordered Fox Company
to set up on Northwest Ridge for the night, and Dog to deploy
defensively across the MSR on a spur of Southwest Ridge.
On the crest of the latter, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had found
progress increasingly costly during the afternoon of 27 November. The
peak beyond Hill 1426 was occupied by Company G at 1500,[380] bringing
that unit on line with Dog Company of 2/5 in the low ground to the
north. Like the 5th Marines’ outfit, Company G was now confronted with
the broad crescent of CCF fortifications buttressed by the defensive
complex on Sakkat Mountain. Machine-gun barrages drove the 7th Marines’
unit off the hilltop, and Company I of 3/7 rushed forward from the high
ground overlooking Yudam-ni to add its firepower in support. Baker
Company of 1/7, on patrol in the valley between Southwest and South
Ridges, ascended into the bullet-swept zone at 1230 to help out. When
it became heavily engaged, elements of Company C were ordered forward
from the Yudam-ni vicinity as reinforcement. Thus parts of three
battalions, 2/5, 3/7, and 1/7, felt the storm of steel and lead on
Southwest Ridge throughout the afternoon.
[380] While returning to the rear to bring up reinforcements,
George Company’s commander, Capt Cooney, was mortally
wounded. LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.
While fighting raged in an arc from south to west on the 27th, another
danger area was discovered to the north and northeast, completing a
vast semicircle of known CCF concentrations in proximity to Yudam-ni.
A patrol from Company D of 2/7, moving over North Ridge along the
west coast of the reservoir, ran into heavy machine-gun and mortar
fire about 4000 yards from the village. Marine air struck at the
entrenchments of an estimated enemy company, and at 1645 the patrol
withdrew with several casualties to Company D’s lines on the southern
tip of North Ridge.
At dusk on the 27th a general calm settled over Yudam-ni, broken only
occasionally by scattered exchanges of small-arms fire. The main Marine
attack had netted about 1500 yards, placing 2/5 on the objective
originally assigned by the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Murray. That the Chinese did not allow this battalion to advance three
more miles, to its new objective and into hopeless entrapment, seems
inconsistent in view of the CCF plans for the night of 27–28 November.
The auxiliary attack by 3/7 won 1200 more yards of the crest of
Southwest Ridge, and the occupation of Hill 1403 by How Company of that
battalion represented a gain of about 2000.
In a few hours, the Marines would give thanks that their successes on
27 November had been modest ones.
_Marine Dispositions Before CCF Attack_
The units of Yudam-ni will be listed counter-clockwise, beginning with
those on North Ridge, according to the positions they occupied around
the perimeter on the night of 27–28 November. North Ridge, bounded on
the east by the reservoir and on the west by the valley separating
Northwest Ridge, lay closest to the village and was therefore of
immediate tactical importance. Facing this hill mass from Yudam-ni,
one sees four distinct terminal heights: Hill 1167 on the right, Hills
1240 and 1282 in the center, and the giant spur of Hill 1384 on the
left. Companies D and E of the 7th Marines, occupied Hills 1240 and
1282 respectively. Since the combined front of these two units was a
mile wide, they concentrated on their assigned hilltops and relied on
periodic patrols to span the gaping, 500-yard saddle between. Although
both flanks of each company dangled “in the air,” they were backed by
two-thirds of the 5th Marine Regiment in the valley of Yudam-ni.[381]
[381] This section is derived from: 5thMar _SAR_, 19–20; 7thMar
_SAR_, 21; 1/5 _SAR_, 11–12; 2/5 _SAR_, 15–18; 3/5 _SAR_,
13.
The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had arrived from the east coast of the
Chosin Reservoir at noon on the 27th, while the attacks to the west
were in full progress. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett placed his unit in an
assembly area at the base of North Ridge, beneath the large, unoccupied
spur leading to Hill 1384. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, did not
complete its move to Yudam-ni from the east side of the reservoir
until after dark. Lieutenant Colonel John W. Stevens, II, secured for
the night in the valley below Hills 1282 and 1240; and with Taplett’s
nearby command, 1/5 thus comprised a formidable reserve behind the thin
high-ground defenses of Companies D and E of 2/7.
To the left of North Ridge, going round the clock, Company H of
3/7 dug in on the crest of Hill 1403, terminal height of Northwest
Ridge. Farther to the left, in the broad draw through which Company
F had earlier enveloped the CCF-held spur, Company E of 2/5 took up
strong blocking positions. The latter unit was not tied in with the
7th Marines’ troops on Hill 1403, there being a steep and rugged gap
of about 200 yards on the intervening hillside. Easy Company’s line
extended up the left side of the draw and connected with Fox’s on the
northern tip of the newly won spur. Company F manned the remainder
of that finger of high ground, its left flank overlooking the road
separating Southwest Ridge.
As mentioned before, Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied
a finger of Southwest Ridge jutting out toward the road and directly
opposite Fox Company’s spur. To the left, but beyond physical contact,
Companies G and I of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, defended the
topographical crest of Southwest Ridge. As an example of altitudes
and distances involved around the perimeter, the latter company,
perched atop Hill 1426 (meters), sat 1200 feet above the valley floor
at Yudam-ni[382] and at a lineal distance of a mile and a half from
the village. To its left rear, 2000 yards away on the same hill mass,
Company A of 1/7 defended a terminal peak, Hill 1294, overlooking the
broad valley separating South Ridge. A platoon of Company C, 1/7, was
deployed on the valley floor to block that avenue into Marine artillery
positions.
[382] Yudam-ni itself is 3500 feet above sea level.
South Ridge, capped by a conical peak jutting 1600 feet skyward, points
at Yudam-ni and the reservoir like a great arrowhead. Company B of 1/7,
after returning from the active patrol mentioned earlier, entrenched on
the tip, Hill 1276, to cover the deep gorge between South and Southeast
Ridges. In this narrow ribbon of low ground, the MSR from Yudam-ni
travels southward four miles before turning abruptly east into Toktong
Pass. Company C of 1/7, less one platoon, occupied a spur of Southeast
Ridge near the sharp turn--three miles from the Valley of Yudam-ni and
five from the village itself.
Even farther out on a tactical limb was Fox Company of 2/7, which
had departed Hagaru at noon on 27 November[383] to take up hilltop
positions in the center of Toktong Pass. Its mission, like that of
Company C, was to guard the vulnerable MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni.
But it was seven miles from the friendly perimeter at Hagaru on the
one side and over two mountainous miles from Company C on the other.
Fox Company, numerically and geographically, appeared to be fair game
for some CCF regiment on the prowl--although appearances are sometimes
deceiving.
[383] Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 7 Mar 51.
This, then, was the disposition of the 5th and 7th Marines in the
evening of 27 November: a total of ten understrength rifle companies
of both regiments on the high ground around Yudam-ni; two battalions
of the 5th in the valley near the village; and two rifle companies,
Charlie and Fox, of the 7th in isolated positions along the 14-mile
route to Hagaru.
The regimental command posts of Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant
Colonel Murray were located at Yudam-ni along with the usual
headquarters elements, except for the Antitank Company of the 7th
Marines, at Hagaru. Also at Hagaru were Lieutenant Colonel Randolph S.
D. Lockwood’s headquarters of 2/7,[384] and Weapons Company (-) of that
battalion. For this reason, Companies D and E, on Hills 1240 and 1282
at Yudam-ni, came under temporary control of 1/7.
[384] LtCol Lockwood had relieved Maj Sawyer as CO 2/7 on 5 Nov.
Despite the lack of tanks,[385] the Yudam-ni perimeter encompassed
an impressive array of Marine supporting arms. The 1st and 4th
Battalions, together with Batteries G and I of the 3d, represented
almost three-fourths of the fire power of the 11th Regiment. The 48
howitzers--thirty 105mm and eighteen 155mm--were emplaced in the
expansive flats generally south of the village, in the direction of
South and Southeast Ridges. In position to the north were the 75mm
recoilless rifles of the 5th Marines and the 4.2-inch mortar companies
of both infantry regiments.
[385] Four M-4 tanks of the Provisional Tank Platoon had
attempted to come through from Hagaru but gave up the
attempt when all slid off the road. Later on the 27th one
M-26 succeeded in completing the trip, but the Chinese
cut the road before the others could follow. 1stTkBn,
_SAR_, 21.
The Yudam-ni lines bristled with enough firepower to give any commander
confidence, but the supply situation was not reassuring. Although
Captain Robert A. Morehead and a detachment from the 1st Service
Battalion arrived during the 27th to begin establishment of a division
dump, the supply level was low. The dumps of the 5th and 7th Marines
contained about 3 days’ rations, 3 days’ POL, and 2 U/F of small arms
ammunition in addition to amounts in the hands of the troops. Very
little artillery ammunition was available beyond that held by the
firing batteries. During the 27th Colonel Litzenberg sent his S-4,
Major Maurice E. Roach, to Hagaru to arrange for the dispatching of
about five truckloads each of rations, POL, and ammunition. They
arrived late on the evening of the same day--the last supplies to
get through from Hagaru. That same evening Lieutenant Colonel Beall,
commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, led all the
organic vehicles (except 40-50) of the 5th and 7th Marines back to
Hagaru with the intent of returning them the following day loaded. The
Chinese, who had already invested the road, for some reason permitted
the trucks to pass. Beall reached Hagaru without incident. The trucks
were never able to return.[386]
[386] 7thMar _SAR_, 42–43; 5thMar _SAR_, 45-50; 1stMarDiv
_SAR_, annex FF (1stServBn); 1stMTBn _SAR_, 9; Roach
Comments, 24 Jul 56.
_The Battle of Northwest Ridge_
At 1830, two hours after the looming mass of Sakkat Mountain had
blotted out the sun on 27 November, Yudam-ni was pitch black. The
temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero.[387]
[387] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from
7thMar _SAR_, 21, n. p.; RCT 7 _URpt 5_; 2/5 _SAR_,
17–18; 2/5 _HD Nov 50_, 9; CO 7thMar msgs to CG
1stMarDiv, 2253 27 Nov 50, 1000 and 1250 28 Nov 50; Capt
Samuel Jaskilka, “Easy Alley,” _Marine Corps Gazette_,
xxxv, no. 5 (May 51), 15–18; Maj S. Jaskilka Comments, n.
d.
On Northwest Ridge the infantrymen of 3/7 and 2/5 slowly grew numb from
the penetrating cold. Trigger fingers, though heavily gloved, ached
against the brittle steel of weapons, and parka hoods became encrusted
with frozen moisture. In the cumbersome shoe-pacs, perspiration-soaked
feet gradually became transformed into lumps of biting pain.
When men are immobilized for hours in such temperatures, no amount of
clothing will keep them warm. Yet, even more disturbing to the Marines
on the Yudam-ni perimeter was the effect of the weather on carbines and
BARs. These weapons froze to such a degree that they became unreliable
or, in some cases, completely unserviceable. The M-1 rifle and Browning
machine guns showed stubborn streaks but retained their effectiveness,
provided they had been cared for properly.
While the Marines sat in their holes and cursed the frigid night, the
quiet hills around them came alive with thousands of Red Chinese on the
march. Unseen and unheard, the endless columns of quilted green wound
through valleys and over mountain trails leading toward the southern
tips of North and Northwest Ridges. These were the assault battalions
of the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions. With seven other divisions they
comprised Red China’s 9th Army Group led by Sung Shin-lun, one of the
best field commanders in the CCF. Lin Pao, commanding the 3d Field
Army, had dispatched Sung’s army group to northeast Korea specifically
to destroy the 1st Marine Division. The knockout blow, aimed at
the northwest arc of the Yudam-ni perimeter, amounted to a massive
frontal assault. Another CCF division, the 59th, had completed a wide
envelopment to the south, driving in toward South Ridge and Toktong
Pass to cut the MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni.[388]
[388] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 31–32; G-2 _SAR_, 15, 30–31; _CCF Army
Histories_, 13, 21.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF NORTHWEST RIDGE
MAP-14
]
This was the main effort of the CCF in northeast Korea: three divisions
against two regiments of Marines. And in addition to the advantage
of mass, the Reds held the trump cards of mobility and surprise.
They enjoyed superior mobility because they were unencumbered by
heavy weapons and hence could use primitive routes of approach in the
darkness. They had the advantage of surprise because their practice
of marching by night and hiding by day had concealed their approach
to a large degree from UN air observation. To offset these odds, the
outnumbered Marines would have to rely on superior firepower, command
of the air, and another weapon called _esprit_.
By 2100, Northwest Ridge was crawling with Chinese only a few hundred
yards from the positions of Companies E and F, 5th Marines, and
Company H, 7th Marines. The enemy troops, padding silently in their
rubber sneakers, had as yet given no hint of their presence. To divert
attention, the Red commander sent a patrol against 2/5’s roadblock on
the MSR between Northwest and Southwest Ridges. Troops of Company D,
5th Marines, exchanged grenades with the Chinese and killed two of
them. The remainder they quickly dispersed with mortar fire.
Simultaneously with the thrust at the roadblock, small enemy teams
probed Fox Company’s line on the spur of Northwest Ridge, vanishing
into the night after each light contact. These disturbances in the
center of 2/5’s zone enabled CCF infiltrators and grenadiers on the
northern tip of the spur to crawl undetected within a few yards of the
limiting point between Company F and Company E on the right. Bugle
calls cut through the darkness, and the grenadiers began heaving their
missiles while the submachine gunners opened up. The din of this first
attempt to unnerve the defenders lasted several minutes. Then came a
sustained mortar bombardment of Marine front lines. While the shells
rained down, the Chinese opened fire with crew-served automatic weapons
emplaced all across Northwest Ridge.
At 2125 the mortar eruptions began to walk toward the Marine rear.
Whistles screeched, enemy machine guns fell silent, and the first
Chinese assault waves hurled themselves against the juncture of
Companies E and F. The enemy attacked on an extremely narrow front in
order to maintain control. His troops advanced in column within grenade
range, then deployed abruptly into skirmish lines that flailed the
Marine positions ceaselessly and without regard to losses.
The machine guns and rifles of Companies E and F piled the attackers
in grotesque heaps up and down the front, but the pressure of human
tonnage was unremitting. Ultimately, the Reds broke through on the
northern tip of the spur, where the two units were joined. They
poured troops into the gap, and as they attempted to roll back the
newly exposed flanks, they overran part of Fox Company’s right wing
platoon. Captain Samuel Jaskilka, commanding Easy Company in the draw,
dispatched a light machine-gun section and a squad from his 3d Platoon
(deployed in the rear) to reinforce his 1st Platoon at the edge of the
breakthrough. The latter unit, under Second Lieutenant Jade L. Nolan,
held firm and bent back its left to prevent encroachment on the rear.
Staff Sergeant Russell J. Borgomainero, of the 1st Platoon, deployed
the reinforcements to contain the penetration, while 2/5’s 81mm mortars
laid barrages on the salient.
At 2215, as the attack against Companies E and F was reaching its
height, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered H&S Company of 2/5 to deploy
for the immediate defense of his command post. The Chinese, blocked in
their attempts to get behind Easy Company, continued to stab at the
rear of Fox. If their envelopment succeeded, they could swarm over the
headquarters and supporting arms positions of the 2d Battalion.
Roise’s precaution proved unnecessary. As fast as the Red commander
sent troops into the salient, they were cut down by mortar,
machine-gun, and rifle fire. The few who did worm their way into
Marine supporting positions died in individual combat. At 2230, on the
right of Company E’s front, the 2d Platoon turned its machine guns on
a native hut 200 yards up the draw and set it ablaze. The brilliant
illumination exposed all CCF troops in the narrow corridor and on the
adjoining slopes; and the Marines commenced a turkey shoot that ended
at 2400 with the virtual annihilation of the main enemy force.
The Chinese maintained their grip on the northern tip of the
spur, however, and fought off patrols from Easy Company trying to
re-establish contact with Fox. Since the gap remained, leaving the
enemy in position to fire on the Marine rear, Roise shifted the
reserve platoon of Company D to Fox Company’s side of the salient.
This redeployment, in conjunction with Company E’s earlier action on
the other side, converted the penetration area into a gantlet for the
Chinese. Already weakened by casualties numbering in the hundreds, the
Red commander apparently wrote off the salient as a net loss, for he
never used it again.
_Chinese Seize Hill 1403_
At 2135, just as the first assault waves were pounding 2/5’s front, the
vanguard of another enemy force began to feel out the lines of Company
H, 3/7, on Hill 1403 to the north. Captain Cooke’s three platoons were
deployed in an arc from the road to the peak of the hill to protect
the line of communication to the valley of Yudam-ni. Out of physical
contact with all friendly elements, How Company was assailable from
every direction, as the Chinese quickly discovered.[389]
[389] Unless otherwise stated the sources for this section
are: 7thMar _SAR_; RCT 7 _URpt_ 6; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 2/5
_HD_, _Nov 50_, 9–10; 2/5 _SAR_, 18–19; CO 7thMar msgs to
CG 1stMarDiv, 0810 and 1000 28 Nov 50; Jaskilka, “Easy
Alley,” 18–19; Capt M. P. Newton Comments, n. d.
Following a half hour of lightning probes, the enemy launched a strong
attack against First Lieutenant Elmer A. Krieg’s platoon on the right
front. Communications with Cooke’s CP went out almost immediately, and
in the space of a few minutes the Marine right flank collapsed under
the weight of CCF numbers. Krieg shifted his remaining men to the left
and joined Second Lieutenant Paul E. Denny’s platoon.
At the company CP on the reverse slope, Captain Cooke and his forward
observers radioed for all available supporting arms. The prompt
barrages by artillery and mortars in the valley stopped the Communists
on the right half of the summit and enabled Cooke to reorganize his
forward platoons. As the supporting fires lifted, he personally led
an assault to restore the right flank. But the CCF machine guns and
grenades smashed the counterattack, and Cooke was cut down at the head
of his men.
Second Lieutenant James M. Mitchell, executive officer, temporarily
took command of Company H. When word of Cooke’s death reached 3/7’s CP,
Lieutenant Colonel William F. Harris[390] dispatched Lieutenant Harris
(no relation), recently returned to duty after illness, to take over
the beleaguered unit.
[390] LtCol Harris, son of MajGen Field Harris, had relieved
Maj Roach on 11 Nov.
The younger Harris, who had been out of action since shortly after the
“How Hill” battle in early November, safely ascended the enemy-infested
slopes of Hill 1403 in the darkness. About midnight he reached How
Company’s positions and found all of Cooke’s officers wounded but one,
Lieutenant Newton. The platoons of Krieg and Denny were badly depleted,
but Harris moved Newton’s platoon from the left flank to the right.
Newton’s men regained enough ground in a counterattack to cement the
company’s position.
After these first attacks against 2/5 and H/7 over the two-mile breadth
of Northwest Ridge, the Chinese remained generally inactive for a
period of about two hours. They had paid heavily for minor gains--so
heavily that fresh battalions were called from reserve to stamp out the
Marine resistance on the tip of the ridge. And at 0300, several hundred
CCF riflemen, grenadiers, and submachine gunners commenced the second
general assault, striking at 2/5 and Company H simultaneously.
In the low ground at the center of the two-mile front, Jaskilka’s Easy
Company threw a curtain of machine-gun fire across the draw in the path
of 300 Chinese advancing frontally. The first enemy ranks marched into
the fire lanes and were mowed down like rows of grain. The CCF soldiers
in subsequent formations apparently viewed the grisly, corpse-strewn
corridor with misgivings, for they stopped several hundred yards up the
narrow valley and took cover. Thereafter, the main fighting in Company
E’s zone involved long-range exchanges of machine-gun and mortar fire,
although clashes at close quarters occasionally flared up on the flanks.
Approximately 200 Communist troops had concentrated meanwhile against
Fox Company on the spur to the left, where the ground afforded more
cover and space for maneuver. Stumbling over a carpet of their own
dead, the Reds thrust repeatedly at the center of the Marine line. They
inflicted many casualties on the defenders and ultimately overran two
machine-gun positions. But this was the sum total of their success; and
fighting on the north half of the spur, at the edge of the gap between
Companies E and F, continued sporadically for the rest of the night
with neither side gaining any appreciable advantage.
On the right of the 2d Battalion, the second CCF onslaught had struck
the front and both flanks of Company H on Hill 1403. Human cannon
fodder of Red China was hurled against the Marine positions for a full
hour, but Lieutenant Harris’ command held. H Company’s roadblock,
commanded by Sergeant Vick, decisively beat off a Chinese attack in the
valley; and at 0400 Lieutenant Colonel Harris ordered the hard pressed
company to pull back toward the rear of Easy Company, 2/5. Two hours
later How Company completed its fighting withdrawal.
The loss of Hill 1403 posed a grave threat to the whole defensive
network around the village. Not only were the Chinese now ideally
situated to strike at the rear of 2/5 and sever it from the two
regiments, but in sufficient strength they could attack the rear and
flanks of the Marine units on North and Southwest Ridges. Moreover, at
dawn, they would be looking down the throats of some 2000 Marines on
the valley floor.
_Fighting at 3/5’s CP_
The partially successful assault on Northwest Ridge involved two
regiments, the 266th and 267th, of the 89th CCF Division. Operating
abreast of this force, the 79th Division had meanwhile advanced over
the rugged spine of North Ridge toward the two isolated companies of
the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, occupying terminal Hills 1282 and 1240
of that huge land mass. Elements of the 79th Division’s three regiments
were in the fore, and each regiment was apparently disposed in a column
of battalions. Facing south toward the Marine positions on North Ridge,
the CCF order of battle, with probable objectives assigned, was as
follows:
237th Regt 235th Regt 236th Regt
Hill 1384 Hill 1240 Hill 1167
(Unoccupied) (D/7) (Unoccupied)
For reasons unknown, the commander of the 235th Regiment did not
include Hill 1282 in his plan for seizing the high ground above
Yudam-ni. He ordered his 1st Battalion to take only Hill 1240, and the
commanding officer of that unit in turn assigned the mission to his
1st and Special Duty Companies. After these two outfits had seized
the objective, the 2d and 3d Companies would pass through and, in
conjunction with other CCF forces in the locale, “... annihilate the
enemy at Yudam-ni.”[391]
[391] ATIS, _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_, Issue 84,
38. Except where otherwise noted, this section is based
on: _Ibid._, 26–43; LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 3 May
56; 1stLt R. T. Bey ltr to Maj A. C. Geer, 26 Jun 52;
RCT 7 _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28
Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
0730 28 Nov 50; 3/5 _SAR_, 13–14; Hull Comments; Capt J.
H. Cahill ltr, 3 Jul 56. The ATIS translation contains a
number of detailed and apparently accurate critiques of
small unit actions. An earlier translation is to be found
in ATIS, _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_, Issue 66,
87–134.
Approaching the terminal high ground in darkness, the 1st Battalion,
235th Regiment, veered off its course and mistakenly ascended a spur
toward Hill 1282. The 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment, keeping contact
as it advanced on the left, participated in the error and wound up
at the foot of Hill 1240. Thus confronted with this precipitous mass
instead of low, gently sloping Hill 1167, the 3d Battalion floundered
for several hours and did not take part in the first attack against
the Marine perimeter. It did, however, send out the usual screen of
infiltrators.
At 2200, submachine gunners and grenadiers of the 1st and Special Duty
Companies, 1/235, commenced the preliminaries against Company E, 7th
Marines on Hill 1282, believing they were engaging a Marine platoon on
Hill 1240. The harassing force was driven off after failing to disrupt
the Marine defenses. Almost two hours later, at 2345, Company D of 2/7
reported enemy infiltration on Hill 1240 a thousand yards to the east.
Both Marine companies cancelled the patrols scheduled for the long
saddle connecting their positions and went on a 100% alert.
Captain Phillips, commanding Easy Company, had arranged two platoons in
perimeter around the summit of Hill 1282, and the third he had deployed
to the right rear, on a spur that dipped toward Yudam-ni. At midnight,
after a period of silence across the company front, the initial CCF
assault wave slammed into the northeastern arc of the perimeter,
manned by First Lieutenant Yancey’s platoon. Marine firepower blunted
this frontal attack, and the Reds tried to slip around the east side
of the hilltop. They ran head-on into First Lieutenant Bey’s platoon
entrenched on the spur and were thrown back.
Resorting to grinding tactics, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted Company
E’s position from midnight to 0200. Whistles and bugles blared over the
reaches of North Ridge, and the charging squads of infantry met death
stoically, to the tune of weird Oriental chants. When one formation
was cut to pieces by machine-gun fire and grenades, another rose out
of the night to take its place. By 0200, as the first attack began to
taper off, the northeastern slopes of Hill 1282 lay buried under a mat
of human wreckage. An hour later, the 1st and Special Duty Companies
of the 1st Battalion, 235th CCF Regiment, had ceased to exist, having
lost nearly every man of their combined total of over 200. Company E’s
casualties had been heavy, but the Marines still held Hill 1282.
[Illustration: ACTION AT 3/5’S CP
MAP-15
]
On Hill 1240, a thousand yards to the east, infiltrators of the 3d
Battalion, 236th CCF Regiment, probed Dog Company’s perimeter while
Easy was under attack. By 0030, some of the harassing parties had
side-slipped through the saddle separating Hill 1282 and opened fire on
the 5th and 7th Regimental headquarters in Yudam-ni.
The sniping from the slopes of North Ridge did not surprise the Marines
in the valley, for they had long been preparing for a possible threat
from that direction. Early in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett
had re-deployed 3/5 from an assembly area just north of the village to
a broad tactical perimeter in the same locale. Companies H and I, the
latter on the right, he positioned facing Northwest Ridge--specifically
Hill 1403. Two platoons of Company G held blocking positions near the
base of Southwest Ridge, and the third manned an outpost on the slopes
of that high ground. At the bottom of North Ridge, in the draw between
Hill 1282 and the spur of 1384, Taplett established his CP with H&S and
Weapons Companies providing local security.
When 3/5’s commander learned that the spur of Hill 1384 was unoccupied,
he dispatched a platoon of Company I to an outpost position 500 yards
up the slope. About 300 yards behind the Item Company unit, on a
portion of the spur directly above the battalion CP, a platoon of South
Korean police deployed with two heavy machine guns.
At 2045, fifteen minutes before any other unit on the Yudam-ni reported
a contact, the outpost platoon of Item Company began receiving fire
from above. This harassment, probably involving advance elements of
the 237th CCF Regiment, continued sporadically for several hours,
throughout the period of the first Communist attacks against other
fronts.
In the valley at 2120, a few men of How Company, 7th Marines, entered
3/5’s positions barefooted and partially clothed. Taplett, personally
noting the time of their arrival, questioned them in the battalion aid
station, and they told how their 60mm mortar position on Hill 1403 had
been seized by the Chinese.[392]
[392] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 20 Jul 56.
The battalion commander returned to his CP, and after listening to the
far-off din of the initial Communist attacks, placed his perimeter on
a 100% alert at 0115. Half an hour later, the Item Company platoon
on the spur of Hill 1384 reported an increase in enemy fire coming
from above. A message from H/7 next warned that CCF troops were moving
around Hill 1403 to cut the MSR. Company I observed activity in that
quarter shortly afterwards, and at 0218 opened fire on an enemy
platoon, which promptly retracted.
A few minutes later, a company--possibly two companies--of Chinese
swept down the spur of Hill 1384, overran the Item Company platoon
outpost, and continued on towards the police platoon. The South
Koreans, after inflicting heavy casualties on the Reds with their two
machine guns, vacated the high ground. Enemy troops then spread out
along the crest and poured plunging fire into H&S and Weapons Companies
defending the draw.
Weapons Company, on the far side of the depression, held its ground,
but H&S, directly under the gun, shortly fell back across the MSR.
Taplett’s CP was left in a no man’s land, with enemy bullets raining
down out of the night and Marine fire whistling back from across the
draw and road. Upon learning of the withdrawal, the battalion commander
elected to remain in the tent in order to keep telephone contact with
his rifle companies, which were as yet uninvolved. He did not consider
the situation too serious, and it seemed as though the police platoon’s
machine guns had taken the sting out of the enemy assault.
Except for a few individuals, the Chinese did not descend from the
spur. Nor did they direct much fire at Taplett’s blackout tent, which
they probably took to be unoccupied. Inside, the battalion commander
studied his maps, received reports and issued instructions over the
field phone while his S-3, Major Thomas A. Durham, sat nearby with
pistol drawn. Major John J. Canney, the executive officer, left the
CP to retrieve H&S Company and was killed as he approached the MSR.
Private First Class Louis W. Swinson, radio operator, whose instrument
had proved unreliable in the severe cold, took position outside
the tent and covered the approaches with his rifle. This unique
situation--a battalion commander under fire in an exposed position
while his rifle companies lay peacefully entrenched several hundred
yards away--lasted for over an hour.
_The Battle of North Ridge_
At approximately 0300, when Taplett, Durham, and Swinson began their
lonely vigil, the 79th CCF Division launched another assault on North
Ridge (see Map 16).[393] As a result of the enemy’s first attack,
and in anticipation of the second, Colonel Murray earlier had moved
elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, into position behind 3/5.
[393] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from:
1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 1/5 _HD, Nov 50_; 7thMar _SAR_, 21;
7thMar _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28
Nov 50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven
Comments, 24 Aug 56; Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56;
Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun
56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56.
Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell’s 1st Platoon of Company A
left the battalion assembly area in the valley at 0100 and started up
the steep incline of Hill 1282. Climbing the icy slopes by day was
difficult enough, but darkness and a minus-20-degree temperature made
it a gruelling and perilous ordeal. Trapnell’s outfit did not reach the
crest until after 0300, when the CCF assault was at the height of its
fury and Company E was facing imminent annihilation. The Able Company
unit moved into position with Lieutenant Bey’s platoon on the spur
jutting back from the peak. As yet, the full force of the Chinese drive
had not spread to this area.
The Red commander of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, used his 3d
Company for the second attack against the cap of Hill 1282. With the
few survivors of the 1st and Special Duty Companies attached, the fresh
unit probably numbered about 125 troops. In squads of eight to ten,
the Chinese struck again and again at the perimeter on the summit, and
the two depleted platoons of Easy Company dwindled to a mere handful
of tired, desperate Marines. First Lieutenant Robert E. Snyder’s 3d
Platoon of A/5, having been sent up from the valley shortly after
Trapnell’s outfit, arrived as reinforcements. Snyder did not have
contact with Bey and Trapnell, whose platoons were still intact, so he
integrated his men with the remnants of the two platoons on the peak.
Both sides suffered crippling losses during the close fighting on Hill
1282. The Reds finally drove a wedge between the Marine defenders on
the summit and the platoons of Bey and Trapnell on the spur. According
to Bey:
It soon became obvious that a penetration had been made to our
left. The positions atop the hill and the Command Post area were
brightly illuminated by flares and other explosions. By this
time [approximately 0400] nothing but Chinese could be heard on
the telephone in the command post and my Platoon Sergeant, Staff
Sergeant Daniel M. Murphy, requested permission to take what men we
could spare in an attempt to close the gap between the left flank
of the platoon and the rest of the company. I told him to go ahead
and do what he could.[394]
[394] Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF NORTH RIDGE
MAP-16
]
Meanwhile, the center and rear of Easy Company’s perimeter was reduced
to the chaos of a last stand. Yancey, already wounded, was hit again
as he tried to reorganize the few Marine survivors on the peak. First
Lieutenant Leonard M. Clements, the other platoon leader, fell wounded
as did First Lieutenant William J. Schreier of the mortar section and
Lieutenant Snyder. Captain Phillips, hurling grenades in the midst of
the melee, was killed. His executive officer, First Lieutenant Raymond
O. Ball, took command of Company E, shouting out encouragement as he
lay immobilized by two wounds. He was hit several more times before he
lapsed into unconsciousness and died after reaching the aid station.
Lieutenant Snyder took command.
By 0500, CCF infantrymen of the 3d Company, 1/235, occupied the summit
of Hill 1282, still believing it to be Hill 1240. The remnants of
the platoons of Yancey, Clements, and Snyder had been driven to the
reverse slope in the west, while the units of Trapnell and Bey clung to
the crest of the southeastern spur, overlooking Yudam-ni. Up to this
point, Chinese casualties on Hill 1282 probably numbered about 250,
with Marine losses approximating 150. Easy Company had been reduced to
the effective strength of a rifle platoon (split in two), and the pair
of A/5 platoons paid with upwards of 40 killed and wounded during the
brief time on the battle line; only six effectives remained of Snyder’s
platoon.
The danger from enemy-held Hill 1282 was compounded by the success of
the 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment on Hill 1240 to the east. At about
0105 the Chinese who had previously been content only to make probing
attacks on Captain Hull’s Dog Company shifted to a full-scale assault.
Sergeant Othmar J. Reller’s platoon, holding the northwest portion of
the company perimeter, beat off three attacks before being overrun at
about 0230. First Lieutenant Richard C. Webber, the machine gun platoon
leader, attempted to plug the gap with the available reinforcements but
was prevented by a fire fight outside the Company CP. First Lieutenant
Edward M. Seeburger’s platoon holding the perimeter on the right (east)
was under too heavy an attack to extend to the left and tie in with
Webber. The Chinese overran Hull’s CP at about 0300, and he ordered
Seeburger and First Lieutenant Anthony J. Sota, commanding the rear
platoon, to reorganize at the foot of Hill 1240.
Captain Hull, wounded, his command cut to the size of a few squads,
rallied his troops on the hillside and led a counterattack against
the crest. The surprised Chinese recoiled and the Marines won a small
foothold. Then the enemy smashed back from the front, right flank, and
right rear. Hull was wounded again but continued in action as his hasty
perimeter diminished to the proportions of a squad position. With the
approach of dawn, he had only 16 men left who could fight. The enemy
was on the higher ground to his front, on both flanks, and on the
slopes in his rear.