Advance To The Chosin Reservoir
_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New Enemy--The
Turning Point of 15 November--Changes in X Corps Mission--Marine
Preparations for Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN
Command--Marine Concentration on MSR_
On 4 November, while RCT-7 was at the height of its fight with the
Chinese, the Division CP displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam. General
Craig, the ADC, who inspected the area on the 2d, recommended the
abandoned Engineering College on the western outskirts as the best
location. During his visit he was shown a knoll outside the city where
the bodies of some 200 Korean civilians were laid out in a perfect row.
All had been victims of the retreating NKPA forces.[304]
[304] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.
A location in Hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites
were already taken by X Corps. General Smith flew to Hungnam by
helicopter and opened the new CP at 1100 on the morning of the 4th.
That evening a train carrying 160 officers and men of Headquarters
Battalion and the Division staff arrived at 2130 from Wonsan. En route
it had been fired on by guerrillas but no casualties resulted.[305]
[305] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv
msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W.
Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.
A perimeter defense, consisting of two outposts and eight machine-gun
positions, was set up to command all likely approaches to the new CP.
Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun positions
and outposts being connected by telephone.
During these proceedings everyone was blissfully unaware of the
existence of 250 tons of NKPA high explosive, stored only 600 yards
from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered for a week, this
enemy cache was believed capable of demolishing the command post. A
16-man security detachment was placed on guard until the explosive
could be removed and detonated.[306]
[306] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514. Some
explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the
caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.
_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR_
Protection of the Wonsan-Hungnam MSR took on added importance as
the 1st Marine Division speeded up its move to the north. This
responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division and Corps
on 3 November in accordance with a decision by General Almond. The 1st
Marines and elements of the 1st Tank Battalion maintained security
from Wonsan 15 miles northward to Munchon, while the 1st Battalion of
the 5th Marines was responsible from Hamhung southward to Chigyong.
This left the 54-mile stretch between Chigyong and Munchon without any
protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC agents and the Special
Operations Company, USA, both under Corps control.
On 4 November this company reported that large numbers of North Koreans
were moving into the area to the west. That same afternoon Corps
notified Division that a group of mounted guerrillas had fired on
railway police in the yards at Kowon, 15 miles north of Munchon.[307]
[307] Smith, _Notes_, 472–473; G-3 _SAR_, 21. The previous day
an A/Tks patrol had killed an estimated 150 NKs in a
short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, _SAR_, 12.
On 6 November, immediately after landing at Wonsan, the 65th RCT of
the 3d Infantry Division (less one battalion, placed temporarily under
1st Marine Division control for the Majon-ni operation) was ordered by
Corps to relieve elements of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, USA,
which had been recently sent to Yonghung. The Army RCT was assigned a
mission of protecting the Yonghung-Kowon area and patrolling to the
west (see map on Page 122).[308]
[308] CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry
Division in Korea_, 69; Smith, _Notes_, 473.
The Wonsan-Hamhung rail line took on special importance after the
announcement that water transportation would be delayed until
enemy mines were cleared from the harbor at Hungnam. This made it
necessary for the 1st Marine Division to send daily supply trains from
Wonsan.[309] The first two completed the run without incident, but
after departing Wonsan at dusk on the 6th the third train was halted
at Kowon by the destruction of rails ahead. North Korean guerrillas
attacked the train, guarded by a lieutenant and 38 men from Company C
of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[310]
[309] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
[310] The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived
from: 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn _HD_, _Nov
50_, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d.
The detachment was taken by surprise in the darkness by foes firing
from both sides of the track. When the Marines attempted to reverse the
train, the enemy wounded the engineer and put a hole in the boiler with
grenades. In the darkness the guard became separated into two groups,
the smaller of which was surrounded in a car. The guerrillas fired
through the wooden sides, forcing the Marines to the floor, and threw
grenades through the windows until all ten men were killed or wounded,
only two of them surviving.
The remaining 29 men of the guard made a stand on an embankment about
200 yards from the track. Six Marines were wounded in the ensuing fire
fight. The train guard broke off the action and withdrew to the area of
the Army artillery battalion.
An empty train from Hamhung, guarded by a platoon from Company A of
the Amtracs, was halted at 1700 on the afternoon of 6 November by
railway officials at Yonghung. Reports of guerrilla activity in the
area had proved to be only too well founded when elements of the 96th
Field Artillery Battalion were attacked early that morning. Their
perimeter south of the town was breached with losses to the Army unit
of equipment and ammunition.
The 2d Battalion of the 65th RCT, which arrived at Yonghung late that
afternoon, had its baptism of fire within a few hours. Guerrillas
in estimated strength of 500 to 800 attacked at 0300 on the 7th,
inflicting casualties of six killed and 14 wounded. Troops of the 96th
Field Artillery Battalion also came under attack, as did elements of
the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion
sent a Marine tank and “Weasel” (M-29) to evacuate the wounded with
the assistance of the Amtrac platoon guarding the empty train at
Yonghung.[311]
[311] G-3 _SAR_, 24; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 13.
At 1400 that afternoon the empty train resumed its run to Wonsan.
Only two miles had been covered when the locomotive and six cars were
derailed by a split rail and wrecked just south of Yonghung. Personnel
losses amounted to one man killed and 14 injured.[312]
[312] The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon:
1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn HD, _Nov 50_, 3;
Dolcater _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 69; G-3 _SAR_,
24; X Corps _POR 42_; and _1stMarURpt (S-3) 9_; D/Tks tel
to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0955 8 Nov 50.
At almost exactly this same hour the fourth supply train was stopped
south of Kowon by a blown section of track. The guard proceeded on
foot to investigate and encountered the depressing spectacle of the
third supply train, abandoned by the enemy after being plundered.
One ammunition car was still burning and in another riddled car the
bodies of the trapped Marines were found. So extensive was the damage
to tracks and switches that rail service could not be resumed until 9
November.[313]
[313] CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7
Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 475–478.
The Corps commander summoned General Smith to Wonsan that morning for
a conference on measures for the security of the rail line. It was
decided that only daytime runs would be made thereafter, with the train
guard increased from 38 to 50 men. The 65th RCT, the 26th ROK Regiment
and a battery of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion were placed under
the temporary control of the 1st Marine Division with a mission of
guarding bridges and other key points.[314]
[314] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps
_WD_ 7 Nov 50.
General Smith worked out a plan for the ROK regiment to drive the
guerrillas southward from the Chigyong area toward the 65th RCT at
Yonghung. As it proved, elements of both units were given Corps
commitments which prevented this maneuver from being put into effect.
They remained only a few days under nominal Division control, being
used for a variety of security missions along the Wonsan-Hamhung
MSR.[315]
[315] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50.
By 9 November, when the Division supply trains resumed their runs,
95 loaded cars had accumulated at Wonsan. The 1st Combat Service
Group continued to route supplies northward from the railhead at the
Wonsan airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in open gondola
cars.[316]
[316] 1st CSG _SAR_, 8.
_Appraisals of the New Enemy_
It is understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have
enveloped military decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the UN command groping their way through a fog of war,
division commanders in Korea could not be expected to see very far
ahead.
Disconcerting as it had been to have the Chinese appear in the first
place, it was even more disturbing to have them break off contact and
vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff
had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers at this time. On 2 November
the UN command estimated that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had
crossed the Yalu and 450,000 CCF regulars were in Manchuria. Three
days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s intelligence summary
warned that the Chinese had the potential to start a large-scale
counteroffensive.[317]
[317] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in
Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_.
General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations for the first half
of November, stated that 12 CCF divisions had been identified in Korea,
indicating a total of perhaps 100,000 troops. Nine of these units had
appeared on the Eighth Army front and three in the X Corps zone north
of Hamhung.
“At the same time,” the report continued, “United Nations aerial
reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in
Manchuria, and into Korea.”[318]
[318] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations
in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept
State, _United Nations Action in Korea_ (Washington,
1951), 9.
Quite as important as the new enemy’s numbers was the question of
his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of so-called
volunteers making a demonstration to encourage the beaten _NKPA_
remnants? Or were the Chinese contemplating an all-out military
intervention?
President Truman asked JCS on 4 November to obtain from General
MacArthur an estimate of the situation.[319] The general’s reply stated
that it was “impossible to authoritatively appraise the actualities of
Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.” He recommended “...
that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of
military facts.”[320]
[319] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman _Memoirs_ II, 373.
[320] Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.
During the next three days the issue of bombing bridges across the Yalu
posed a question that has remained a controversial subject ever since.
General MacArthur was granted permission, after being at first refused,
but cautioned “that extreme care be taken to avoid violation [of]
Manchurian territory and airspace.”[321]
[321] CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50;
JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 375–376;
Whitney, _MacArthur_, 405–411.
[Illustration: 1ST MARINE DIVISION ZONE AND OBJECTIVES
November 1950
MAP-11
]
In two messages of 7 November, the UN commander confirmed his original
appraisal to the effect that the Chinese were not making a full-scale
intervention. But he conceded that reinforcements might enable the new
enemy to stop the UN advance or even throw it into reverse. He planned
a resumption of the initiative, he said, in order to take “accurate
measure ... of enemy strength.” And he repeated that the restriction of
his bombing operations provided “a complete sanctuary for hostile air
immediately upon their crossing of the Manchuria-North Korean border.”
This factor, he warned, could “assume decisive proportions....”[322]
[322] CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman,
_Memoirs_, II, 377.
On this same date, with the wary phase of UN strategy at its height,
General Almond flew to Hungnam to confer with General Smith. The X
Corps commander still wore another hat as General MacArthur’s chief of
staff; and though he could not function actively in this position, he
kept in close touch with strategic aims at Tokyo. Thus the cautious
spirit of the UN commander’s messages of 7 November was reflected in
Almond’s changed viewpoint. Where he had previously urged haste in the
X Corps drive to the border, he was now disposed to put on the brakes
and carry out that mission with less scattering of forces.
The prospect of a winter campaign was discussed, and the Marine general
recommended that only enough territory be held for the security of
Hamhung, Hungnam and Wonsan. Almond believed that Hagaru should also
be included, but he agreed that a greater degree of concentration was
advisable.[323]
[323] Smith, _Notes_, 552–553.
As day after day passed without further CCF contacts of importance,
however, operations again took on the character of an occupation rather
than a drive which might end in a collision with a powerful new enemy.
X Corps OpnO 6, issued at 2400 on 11 November, called for an advance
to the border by I ROK Corps on the right, the 7th Infantry Division
in the center and the 1st Marine Division on the left. The 3d Infantry
Division, with the 26th ROK Regiment attached, was to have the
responsibility for the Wonsan-Yonghung area after relieving elements
of the 1st Marine Division; the Marines were directed to take blocking
positions at Huksu-ri and Yudam-ni. In the Corps rear, the 1st KMC
Regiment (-) had a zone to the south and west of Kojo.
The Marine zone on the Yalu, about 40 miles in width, was approached
and bounded by two roads branching off from the Changjin area. One of
them ended at Huchanggangu and the other at Singalpajin. From that
point the zone of the 7th Infantry Division extended east to Hyesanjin
(where the border turns north at a right angle) and thence again
eastward to the Hapsu area. I ROK Corps was to operate from the line
Hapsu-Chuchonhujang and drive northward along the coast with Chongjin
as an objective.[324]
[324] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 11 Nov 50.
Such a dispersion of forces, depending for supplies on poor secondary
roads through wild mountain regions, could hardly have been
contemplated if large-scale CCF opposition were expected. As a further
indication of renewed confidence, General MacArthur asked informally
and indirectly that X Corps do everything possible to assist the Eighth
Army in its drive to the Yalu. This request was conveyed in a personal
letter of 11 November from General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, to the Corps
commander.[325]
[325] _X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov to 10
Dec 50, 9_; X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5.
_The Turning Point of 15 November_
The date of General Almond’s reply, the 15th, is worthy of recognition
as a turning point. For it was also the occasion of messages from the
UN commander-in-chief and the commanding general of the 1st Marine
Division which had an effect on strategy. Indeed, the entire course
of the Chosin Reservoir campaign was channeled into new directions as
a result of the concepts advanced in these three communications of 15
November 1950.
Obviously the gap of 80 miles separating the Eighth Army from X Corps
would have to be reduced before much help could be given by the latter.
General Almond replied to General Wright in a letter proposing that X
Corps attack to the west of the Chosin Reservoir while also continuing
to advance northward in zone to complete its original mission.
That same day, while the letter was en route to Tokyo, General
MacArthur came to a far-reaching decision. In a radio message he
directed the X Corps commander to develop, as an alternative to
OpnO 6, a plan for reorienting his attack to the west on reaching
Changjin in order to cut the Chinese MSR, as represented by the
Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon road and rail line.
This was the first indicated change in mission, according to the X
Corps command report, since CinCFE’s directive late in October calling
for a drive to the border. The amendment “was made necessary,” the
report continued, “by the enemy build-up in front of the Eighth Army
and the fact that the enemy action had halted the first attempt ...
to advance Eighth Army to the border. An estimate of the Eighth
Army situation ... fixed the relative combat power as 100,000 UN to
100,000 enemy with UN forces having air superiority and superior
artillery support.... The enemy was given an offensive capacity which
he could implement with an estimated reserve of 140,000 CCF troops
north of the Yalu River. In view of the enemy’s offensive capacity,
Eighth Army adopted a conservative plan to make a general advance
with the main effort in the center generally parallel to the enemy
MSR (Huichon-Kanggye). This course of action was designed to meet any
course of action which might be adopted by the enemy. To assist the
Eighth Army advance, X Corps was to initiate a main attack to the West
from the Chosin Reservoir area, cutting the enemy MSR at Mupyong-ni,
and advance in a northwesterly direction to the Yalu River line at
Manpojin.”[326]
[326] X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 4–5.
By a coincidence it was also on Wednesday, 15 November, that General
Smith wrote a letter which foreshadowed future military events.
Addressed to General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
this communication made it plain that the 1st Marine Division commander
and his staff did not share in the renewed optimism as to the course
of the UN war effort. Not only did the Marines accept the possibility
of imminent and formidable CCF intervention, but they were making
preparations to meet it.
So far our MSR north of Hamhung has not been molested, but there is
evidence that this situation will not continue....
Someone in high authority will have to make up his mind as to
what is our goal. My mission is still to advance to the border.
The Eighth Army, 80 miles to the southwest, will not attack until
the 20th. Manifestly, we should not push on without regard to the
Eighth Army. We would simply get further out on a limb. If the
Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision will have to be
made as to what to do next. I believe a winter campaign in the
mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier
or marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this
area during the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick and
wounded.
The letter mentioned such preparations as the work done by Marine
engineers to strengthen the Hamhung-Hagaru road for tanks and heavy
vehicles. Plans had been approved, added General Smith, for an airstrip
at Hagaru capable of landing cargo planes for resupply and casualty
evacuation.
He emphasized that he did not mean to be pessimistic. “Our people are
doing a creditable job,” he said; “their spirit is fine, and they will
continue to do a fine job.” But in conclusion he reiterated his doubts
about his “wide open left flank” and his concern over “the prospect of
stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120
air miles from Hamhung to the border.”[327]
[327] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen
Almond comments: “I am very mindful of the skepticism of
General Smith in all of the supply plans that X Corps
conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very
thoroughly. However, in my mind there was always the
assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or
landing them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation
to be expected by plane from the air field that we were
to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56.
General Smith had no more than finished dictating his letter when two
Navy officers called at the CP--Rear Admiral Albert K. Morehouse,
chief of staff to Admiral Joy, and Captain Norman W. Sears, chief of
staff to Admiral Doyle. Both were old acquaintances of the Marine
general, who had led the assault landing force on Peleliu in 1944 while
Sears commanded an LST group. Smith felt that he could speak frankly,
therefore, and expressed his concern over the aspects of the strategic
situation he had discussed in the letter.[328]
[328] Smith, _Chronicle_, 31.
CinCFE had requested in his message of the 1st that the plan for
reorienting the X Corps attack be submitted to him as an alternative to
OpnO 6. General Almond put his staff to work on the 16th, and that same
day Draft No. 1, of OpnO Plan 8 was completed. This was a concept of an
attack on Kanggye by means of a drive westward from Changjin.[329]
[329] This section is based on: X Corps _Special Report, Chosin
Reservoir_, 9; and X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5–6, 51–52.
_Changes in X Corps Mission_
Almond disapproved the first draft on the grounds that the MSR of the
Corps element making the effort would be too far extended. He requested
the preparation of a new plan based on the concept of an advance
farther south on the Hagaru-Mupyong-ni axis and west of the zone of the
1st Marine Division. The X Corps commander also directed:
(1) That the Hamhung-Hagaru road be developed as a Corps MSR with
intensive effort on the part of Corps troops, including Corps
engineers;
(2) That an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of
seizing Changjin in order to protect the right flank of the 1st
Marine Division.
The Corps commander considered that Changjin and Mupyong-ni were too
widely separated as objectives to be assigned to a single division,
not to mention the difficult terrain. His staff worked for four days
on Draft No. 2 of OpnO Plan 8 before submitting it to him. He accepted
it with several modifications and directed that the third draft be
taken to Tokyo by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, the Corps G-3, for
presentation to GHQ.
_Marine Preparations for Trouble_
General Smith, for his part, lost no time in putting into effect his
preparations for trouble in the shape of a formidable CCF attack. The
completion of mine clearance at Hungnam had opened that port on 15
November, thus easing the transportation situation. That same day the
7th Marines occupied Hagaru, being greeted by a temperature of four
degrees below zero which threatened an early and bleak winter.
Only four days previously, X Corps OpnO No. 6 had directed the 1st
Marine Division to take up blocking positions to the west, at Huksu-ri
and Yudam-ni, while continuing the northward advance to the Yalu. This
meant a further dispersion at a time when Smith hoped to reduce the 163
road miles separating his infantry battalions.
In order to carry out the Corps directives, Division OpnO 21-50 of 13
November assigned the following tasks:
RCT-1--to seize Huksu-ri;
RCT-7--to seize Hagaru, and, on order, to seize Yudam-ni;
RCT-5--to protect the MSR from positions at Majon-dong,
Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri, while preparing to pass through
RCT-7 in the Hagaru area and advance to Changjin
(approximately 40 miles northward);
Division Reconnaissance Company--to screen the Division right
flank by operating in the Soyang-ni-Sinhung valley to the
east Division boundary.[330]
[330] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 21-50_, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the
seizure of Hagaru and the 5th Mar’s movement of a
battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv
FragO, 2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a
fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
1437 14 Nov 50.
In connection with the mission of RCT-7, the words “on order” deserve
special notice. For the commanding officer was directed by Smith’s
oral instructions to take up blocking positions at Toktong Pass, about
halfway between Hagaru and Yudam-ni, until additional units of the
Division could be moved up to the Hagaru area. In other words, the
Division commander believed that the possibilities of large-scale
CCF intervention were such as to justify caution in the drive to
Yudam-ni.[331]
[331] Smith, _Notes_, 592–594.
Not only would the concentration of the Marine units ease General
Smith’s concern over the tactical situation; it would also greatly
simplify the administrative load. Colonel Bowser has commented,
“Division was faced with the problem of handling a division scattered
from Wonsan and Majon-ni in the south to the heavy engagement of the
7th Mar in the north. Add to this the problem of guerrilla bandits
between Wonsan and Hungnam/Hamhung as well as a completely unknown
situation to the West, and you have a task of considerable magnitude
for any division staff.”[332]
[332] Bowser Comments.
RCT-1 was delayed several days by lack of railway facilities in its
move 70 miles northward to Chigyong after being relieved in the Wonsan
area by the 3d Infantry Division.[333] But most of the other Marine
units had been pulled up--a battalion or even a company at a time--as
far as the Hungnam area. Along the new MSR north of Hamhung, the column
of advance on 15 November consisted of these units:
[333] 1stMar _SAR_, 13.
Hagaru--RCT-7;
Koto-ri--2d Battalion, RCT-5;
Chinhung-ni--3d Battalion, RCT-5; Battery K, 4th Battalion,
11th Marines; Detachment 1st Ordnance Battalion; Detachment
1st Service Battalion; 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company A, 1st
Engineer Battalion; Company B (less 3d Platoon), 1st Engineer
Battalion;
Majon-dong--1st Battalion RCT-5; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion.
The Division command and staff took a dim view of the possibility of
completing “the race to the Yalu” before winter. It was already too
late, if sub-zero temperatures were any indication; and preparations
must now be made for tactical and logistical support of a midwinter
campaign in the mountains. Among the most essential provisions were the
selection of a forward base, the construction of airstrips along the
MSR, and the strengthening of the road to make it fit for tanks and
heavy vehicles.
Hagaru, at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, had been recommended by
General Craig as the best location for a forward base when he visited
here on the 15th. The commanding generals of the Division and Wing
arrived for a tour of inspection the next day. General Harris made
the trip at the express request of General Almond, who believed that
a strip long enough to land R4Ds was necessary to insure resupply
and casualty evacuation in a midwinter emergency. One of the few
comparatively flat pieces of real estate in northeast Korea was found
just south of the town. The black loam promised to make a hard surface
in freezing weather, so that the prevailing arctic temperatures offered
at least one consolation.[334]
[334] Smith, _Notes_, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56.
An OY strip had been completed on 13 November at Koto-ri, but heavier
engineer equipment was needed at Hagaru. Before it could be brought
forward, the road from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri required strengthening
and widening. This task had already been assigned to Lieutenant Colonel
Partridge, commanding the 1st Engineer Battalion. After a survey by
jeep, he decided to begin operations at the highest point of the
one-way dirt road.
“By working down,” he explained, “we could first of all provide for
what we considered to be a dangerous accumulation of snow, and the
problem of land slides.... The work on the road involved a good bit
of drainage in order to insure that the melting snows from day to day
during the sunlight hours would not filter across and destroy the road
bed. It involved demolitions and drilling and a good deal of dozer and
grader work.”[335]
[335] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51,
31–32.
Enough progress had been made by 18 November so that armor could be
sent forward to support RCT-7. Only the day before, the 1st Tank
Battalion had begun functioning with its Headquarters and Service
Companies at Soyang-ni, eight miles northwest of Hamhung. The road
between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri was still impassable for M-26
(Pershing) tanks until the engineers could widen some of the turns. But
Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne, the battalion commander, organized
a provisional tank platoon consisting of two M4A3 (Sherman) tanks from
Headquarters Company and four dozer tanks from Company D at Majon-dong.
They proceeded without incident on the 18th to Hagaru, operating as a
gun platoon.[336]
[336] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare
the MSR for tank use on 6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO
1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50.
Opening the mountain road to heavy traffic made it possible on the
18th to begin work on the Hagaru airstrip. Five large dozers with pans
of eight cubic yards capacity arrived at the site the next day, and
Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion tackled the job of hacking out
a runway from ground frozen as hard as granite. Plans called for a cut
of 90,000 cubic yards and a fill of 60,000 for a 3200-foot runway. The
rub was that engineering field manuals prescribed a runway of 3600 feet
for R4Ds or C-47s at sea level, plus an additional 1000 feet for each
1000 feet of altitude. And since Hagaru was about 4000 feet above sea
level, it could only be hoped that pilots were right in estimating that
a strip of 3000 to 4500 feet might do in a pinch.[337]
[337] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge
interv, 25 Jun 51, 39–40.
The 19th also dated the establishment of the Supply Regulating Station
at Hagaru for the purpose of building up stockpiles. Prior to this
time, the 1st Service and 1st Ordnance Battalions had been in charge
of division dumps at Hamhung. Supplies arrived by rail after being
unloaded from the ships at Wonsan by the 1st Shore Party Battalion and
the 1st Combat Service Group.
The completion of mine clearance made it possible to order the latter
organization to Hungnam by sea to operate in-transit depots for X
Corps. Practically all Division supplies were soon being received by
sea at this port, where the 1st Combat Service Group separated the
incoming cargo into proper classifications and forwarded it to the
dumps at Hamhung. Port operation was the responsibility of the 2d
Engineer Special Brigade, USA. After the project got into full swing,
from 2000 to 2500 Korean laborers were employed at Hungnam and as many
as 6000 tons of cargo unloaded in 24 hours.[338]
[338] Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 53–54.
A limited amount of rolling stock was available for the narrow-gauge
railway from Hungnam to Chinhung-ni. But it was up to the Marines
to put the line back into operation, for the X Corps Railway
Transportation Section already had its hands full with the
Wonsan-Hamhung route. The 1st Service Battalion was authorized to make
the attempt, and enough Korean crews were rounded up to operate the
trains. Chinhung-ni thus became the railhead for supplies tracked the
rest of the way to Hagaru.[339]
[339] _Ibid._
Preparations were also made for large-scale casualty evacuation to the
Division hospital at Hungnam. H&S, A and B Companies of the 1st Medical
Battalion remained there to set up the Division hospital while D, C
and E Companies were attached to RCTs 1, 5 and 7 respectively. As the
Division center of gravity shifted northward, medical officers foresaw
the need of a hospital-type facility at Hagaru in addition to the
clearing stations contemplated at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. Plans were
approved, therefore, for Companies C and E to pool their resources at
Hagaru and establish a medical supply dump. Additional surgical teams
were to be flown to Hagaru in an emergency by Companies A and B from
the hospital at Hungnam.
Meanwhile the hospital ship _Consolation_, commanded by Captain John
W. McElroy, USNR, prepared to move from Wonsan to Hungnam. There the
Division hospital had been enlarged to 400 beds, and an additional 100
to 150 were planned for the new annex at Hamhung. In order to speed up
casualty evacuation, several heated railway cars were equipped for that
purpose on the 35-mile narrow-gauge line from Chinhung-ni.[340]
[340] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50;
1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex HH (hereafter 1stMedBn _SAR_), 4–7.
_Supplies Trucked to Hagaru_
Provisions for the advance of RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir were
included in Division OpnO 22-50, issued at 0800 on 17 November. As a
preliminary, RCT-7 was given a two-fold mission: (1) to protect the
Division left flank between Hagaru and Yudam-ni with a minimum of a
battalion; and (2) to relieve elements of RCT-5 and protect the MSR in
zone from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.
RCT-5 was assigned these missions: (1) to pass a minimum of a battalion
through RCT-7 at Hagaru; (2) to move up the east side of the Chosin
Reservoir and seize Sinhung-ni, about 7 miles northeast of Hagaru; and
(3), on order, to seize the road junction at Kyolmul-ni, some 20 miles
north of Hagaru.
Division Reconnaissance Company was to screen the left flank of the MSR
in the vicinity of Majon-dong, and the 11th Marines to maintain its 4th
Battalion in that area prepared for employment in the north on order.
OpnO 22-50 directed the Supply Regulating Detachment (1) to establish
a truckhead at Hagaru after taking over and consolidating the dumps of
RCT-7; (2) to control traffic between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni; and (3)
to support RCTs 5 and 7, with priority to RCT-5. The following supply
levels were fixed:
Classes I and III, five days;
Class V, 1 Unit of fire;
Classes II and IV, as required for all troops operating to the
north and west of Koto-ri.[341]
[341] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 22-50_, 17 Nov 50.
Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission of
RCT-1, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed the movement
from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived on the
18th when Corps asked and received the consent of Division to the
employment of the 26th ROK Regiment for the attack on Huksu-ri, with
the understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT-1 at
a later date. On the morning of the 19th the ROK unit left Chigyong to
execute its mission.[342]
[342] 1stMar _SAR_, 12; G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1220
18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.
Two days later RCT-1 was relieved of this responsibility when Corps
verbally notified Division that Huksu-ri had been placed within the
modified boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. This was confirmed
the next day by X Corps OI 17, which also directed the Division to
establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni.[343]
[343] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; X Corps _OI 17_, 22 Nov 50. See
also G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in
G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 20 Nov 50.
Up to this time General Smith had not been able to make much progress
toward Yudam-ni without dispersing his units to an extent which he
regarded as imprudent. But with the availability of RCT-1 to occupy
positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments, he could
now push ahead.
As an added factor, the 1st Marine Division had just acquired a new
unit. Early in November Admiral Joy had inquired if General Smith could
use the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines. This British unit
of 14 officers and 221 enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Douglas B. Drysdale, and attached to ComNavFE in Japan, had requested
service with the U. S. Marines. Smith replied that he would be glad to
have these fine troops. Highly trained in reconnaissance, they could
operate with the Division Reconnaissance Company in protecting the
flank of the Marine advance. The British Marines arrived at Hungnam on
the 20th and reported to the 1st Marine Division.[344]
[344] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; 1stMarDiv _POR 164_.
Division OpnO 23-50, issued at 0800 on the 23d, directed the Commandos
to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank, ranging as far as
13 miles west of Koto-ri. It was hoped that the British unit and the
Division Reconnaissance Company might flush out CCF troops beyond the
reach of routine infantry patrols. Other tasks assigned to elements of
the Division were as follows:
RCT-7--to seize Yudam-ni and maintain one battalion in that
position;
RCT-5--to seize Kyolmul-li (20 miles north of Hagaru) and be
prepared to seize Toksil-li (10 miles northwest of
Kyolmul-li) and Tuan-di (15 miles northeast of Kyolmul-li)
on order;
RCT-1--to relieve elements of RCT-7 in the vicinity of Hagaru and
Koto-ri and protect the Division MSR from positions in the
vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni;
1st Tank Battalion (less detachments)--to protect the MSR from
positions in the vicinity of Majon-dong and Soyang-ni;
1st Engineer Battalion--to support Division operations with
priority to the maintenance of the MSR and construction of
the airfield at Hagaru.
OpnO 23-50 also provided that the Supply Regulating Station Detachment
continue operation of the truckhead at Hagaru and stock supplies at
the following levels: Classes I and III, 8 days; Classes II and IV, as
required; and Class V, one and one-third U/F for all troops operating
to the north and west of Chinhung-ni.[345]
[345] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 23-50_, 23 Nov 50.
The trucking facilities of the Division had been strained to the
limit ever since the Wonsan landing. Shortly afterwards the bulk of
the 7th Motor transport Battalion was taken under the operational
control of X Corps, and it became necessary to attach the 1st Motor
Transport Battalion to RCT-7. On 19 November, however, the 1st MT (less
detachments) had passed to the control of the 1st Supply Regulating
Detachment at Hagaru. There the truckers not only built up the
stockpile of supplies but rendered the best support that units of the
division had known so far along the MSR.[346]
[346] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn _SAR_), 4,
7; 7th MTBn _SAR_, 2–3.
_Confidence of UN Command_
General MacArthur did not appear to be shaken by EUSAK G-2 reports
during the third week of November which called attention to a
formidable CCF build-up on both sides of the Yalu. On the contrary,
a UN order of the 20th, giving directions for the conduct of troops
at the border, indicated that an occupation rather than a fight was
expected:
Elements of minimum size only will be advanced to the immediate
vicinity of the geographical boundary of Korea. No troops or
vehicles will go beyond the boundary between Korea and Manchuria,
or between Korea and the USSR, nor will fire be exchanged with, or
air strikes be requested on forces north of the northern boundary
of Korea. Rigid control of troop movements in vicinity of northern
boundary will be exercised. _Damage, destruction or disruption of
service of power plants will be avoided._ No personnel, military
or civilian, will be permitted to enter or leave Korea via the
Manchurian or USSR border. Commanders will insure that the sanctity
of the international border is meticulously preserved.[347]
[347] CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added.
The italicized sentence emphasizes an assumption which had made
converts in high State Department as well as Defense circles in
Washington. The Chinese, according to this conjecture, were concerned
chiefly with defending their Manchurian frontier and guarding the power
complexes along the Yalu. As evidence, it was pointed out that early in
November the Sinuiju radio described the CCF troops crossing the river
as a “volunteer corps” for the protection of the hydro-electric plants
along the Yalu serving Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Proceeding from
this premise, it was a logical conclusion that if no provocation were
given these forces, a large-scale fight might be avoided.[348]
[348] See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists
Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50; and Truman, _Memoirs_,
II, 372.
General MacArthur, after receiving a qualified permission to bomb the
Yalu bridges, had enjoined UN airmen not to violate territory or air
space on the other side of the river. This meant that the bomber crews
must take much greater risks, since their restricted axes of approach
and flight paths were known to enemy antiaircraft gunners in advance.
Moreover, CCF jet fighters could attack and retire to the sanctuary of
Manchuria when hard-pressed.[349]
[349] JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50;
Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. See also Karig, _Korea_,
376–378.
Despite these handicaps, Air Force and Navy bombers knocked out four of
the twelve international bridges and damaged most of the others. These
efforts doubtless imposed delays, but troops and supplies continued
to cross throughout November.[350] After arrival in North Korea, they
seemed to vanish into that void of mystery which had swallowed up
Chinese Communist troops ever since they broke off contact.
[350] Schnabel _Korean Conflict_. Bombing of the bridges ceased
6 December with the freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, _Report
from the Secretory of Defense ... on Operations in
Korea_, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4.
Students of history may have recalled at this time that one of the most
significant engagements of modern history was known as the Battle of
the Yalu. From a tactical viewpoint, to be sure, the clash of 30 April
1904 was not a great affair. The Japanese army, after disembarking at
Chemulpo (Inchon) and marching up the Korean peninsula, numbered five
times the Russian force which opposed the crossing of the Yalu at Uiji,
just east of Sinuiju. A Japanese victory was doubtless to be expected,
yet a new page of history had opened. For the first time in modern
chronicles, an Asiatic army had successfully challenged a European army
with the weapons and tactics of the Machine Age.
Now, nearly half a century later, history was repeating itself as
another Asiatic army crossed the Yalu with unknown capabilities and
intentions. If the Chinese Communists were merely sending a force to
guard the hydro-electric complexes and frontier, hopes of peace by
Christmas might be realized. But if the invaders were secretly massing
for an all-out counter-offensive, a great new war might soon be flaming
up from the ashes of the old.
Little fault can be found with current G-2 estimates of CCF numbers,
which hold up surprisingly well even when viewed with the wisdom of
hindsight. Quite as much depended on interpretations of CCF intentions
by the UN command, and there can be no doubt that an end-of-the-war
atmosphere prevailed on the eve of the Eighth Army offensive of 24
November.
Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the 23d, was celebrated both in Korea
and the United States in a spirit of rejoicing over a victorious
peace which seemed almost within grasp. It was a tribute to American
bounty as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea were
served a dinner which would have done credit to a first-rate Stateside
restaurant. The menu, as proposed by X Corps to component units,
included shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives, roast young tom turkey with
cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes, fruit salad, fruit cake, mince
pie and coffee.[351]
[351] X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50.
As an item of good news for this Thanksgiving, it was learned the
day before that the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division had
reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin. Not a single Chinese soldier had
been encountered by troops who had troubles enough with sub-zero
temperatures and mountain roads.[352]
[352] This was the only American unit ever to push as far north
as the border. On the Eighth Army front a regiment of the
6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October, only to
be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first
CCF attacks. EUSAK, _WDSum, Oct 50_, 38, 44.
Since the first week of November, in fact, there had been no clashes of
any importance with the invaders from Red China. On the 24th, as usual,
the front was quiet everywhere except for minor patrol contacts. Yet
this was the D-day of the great Eighth Army offensive, and the stirring
communique of the commander-in-chief was read to all troops in Korea.
It was a message in the bold spirit of Inchon, and no one could doubt
the confidence of the UN command after hearing these words:
The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea
against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its
decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our air
forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained
attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully
interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further
reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential
supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer, with
noteworthy and effective naval support, has now reached commanding
enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the
enemy’s geographical potential. This morning the western sector
of the pincer moves forward in general assault in an effort to
complete the compression and close the vise. If successful, this
should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and
unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations
military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean
people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality.
It is that for which we fight.[353]
/s/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
_General of the Army_,
_United States Army_,
_Commander-in-Chief_.
[353] CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50.
Eighth Army troops found it something of an anticlimax, after this
message, to jump off without meeting any large-scale opposition.
General MacArthur, who flew to the front for the occasion, watched from
his plane as the UN columns moved out unmolested, as if conducting a
motor march.
“The Army offensive began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours on 24 November,”
said the EUSAK report. “Since for some time there had been little
contact with enemy forces the advance of EUSAK elements was in the
nature of a meeting engagement, with little or no resistance in the
initial stage. Across the Eighth Army front as a whole, advances were
made from 4000 to 16,000 yards.”[354]
[354] EUSAK _WD_, 24 Nov 50.
_Marine Concentration on MSR_
On this same day Lieutenant Colonel Chiles presented X Corps OpnPlan 8,
Draft 3, at Tokyo. It was approved at UNC Headquarters with only one
modification--the shifting of the proposed boundary between X Corps and
Eighth Army farther to the south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division.
This plan was the basis of X Corps OpnO 7. Issued on the 25th, it
provided for a reorientation of the X Corps attack to provide more
assistance for Eighth Army. H-hour was to be 0800 on the 27th, and the
principal units of X Corps were assigned these tasks:
1st Marine Division--to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu;
7th Infantry Division--(1) to attack from east side of Chosin
Reservoir and advance to Yalu in zone; (2) to secure Pungsan area,
coordinating with 1 ROK Corps;
1 ROK Corps--to advance from Hapsu and Chongjin areas, destroying
enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea;
3rd Infantry Division--(1) to gain and maintain contact with the
right flank of Eighth Army in zone; (2) to protect the left flank
of X Corps; (3) to support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps
order; (4) to protect harbor and airfield at Wonsan; (5) to destroy
enemy guerrillas in zone.[355]
[355] X Corps _OpnO 7_, 25 Nov. 50.
A Corps warning order, issued on the evening of the 24th, was
supplemented by a briefing session at Corps Headquarters at 1000 the
next morning. General Smith learned that his division was to be the
northern arm of the pincers in the “massive compression envelopment”
while the 7th Infantry Division took over the previous Marine mission
of advancing east of the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu.[356]
[356] CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps
_WD_, 25 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 727.
The new Marine boundary cut across Korea to the north of Eighth Army.
From Yudam-ni the Marine route of advance led to Mupyong-ni 55 miles to
the west. This objective was about halfway between Huichon in the south
and Kanggye in the north (see map, Page 130). From the latter, which
was believed to be the assembly area of the NKPA remnants, a good road
led about 40 miles north to Manpojin on the Yalu.
In accordance with Corps OpnO 7, the rear boundary of the 1st Marine
Division had been moved north to a line just south of Hagaru. The 3d
Infantry Division had the responsibility for the area south of Hagaru,
but this unit had so many other commitments that it could assign few
troops to the task. General Smith was granted permission, therefore,
to retain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. This left the 3d
Infantry Division responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong
southward to Hamhung.[357]
[357] Smith, _Notes_, 727–729.
Corps OpnO 7, in short, provided for a wide envelopment to be
spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division on 27 November. The other arm
of the pincers, of course, was to be the Eighth Army; but on the
evening of the 25th came the disturbing news that its right wing, the
II ROK Corps, had been hurled back by a surprise CCF counterstroke.
This reverse took place in the vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 air miles
southwest of Yudam-ni.[358]
[358] _Ibid._, 728; EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov 50.
EUSAK intelligence reports, as it proved, were not far off the mark in
estimating enemy strength on the Eighth Army front at 149,741 troops
at this time.[359] During the past few days, however, estimates of
probable enemy courses of action had been so reassuring as to justify
the confidence of CinCFE’s communique on D-day. Even the setback of the
25th was not regarded as alarming.
[359] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of
95,741 over EUSAK’s estimate of the day before. EUSAK
_PIR 136_, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 25 Nov 50.
“With the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on the
east flank,” said the next day’s G-2 report, “the enemy reaction to the
EUSAK attack has been one of active defense with local counterattacks
in strength.” The enemy’s probable course of action was believed to be
“an active defense in depth along present lines employing strong local
counterattacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities with
bypassed units; limited air activity; and further reinforcement by CCF
or USSR forces.”[360]
[360] EUSAK _PIR 137_, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov
50.
On the X Corps front the reorientation of the attack to the west gave
General Smith a long-sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units
and achieve a relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT-1
from its Huksu-ri mission made it possible to bring that infantry
regiment up behind the other two. This move in turn enabled RCT-5 to
advance east of the Chosin Reservoir and RCT-7 to push on to Yudam-ni.
Progress might have been more rapid for all units if adequate
transportation had been available for RCT-1 in the Chigyong area. Only
by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to
Chinhung-ni, where it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines
on 23 November. During the next two days the 2d Battalion and RCT-1
Headquarters relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. After the return of the vehicles,
3/1 (less Company G, left behind for lack of trucks) was lifted to
Hagaru on the 26th to relieve the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.[361]
[361] 1stMar _SAR_, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_,
2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.
All three battalions of RCT-5 were operating east of the Chosin
Reservoir by 24 November. Until supply levels were built up at
Hagaru, however, General Smith kept a careful check on the advance
in this quarter. The farthest penetration took place on the 25th
when a platoon-size patrol of 3/5, reinforced by two tanks, drove
nearly to the northern end of the Reservoir. Scattered enemy groups
were flushed out and an abandoned 75mm gun destroyed after a pursuit
resulting in five Chinese killed and one captured. This was one
of the few encounters in an area combed by patrols from all three
battalions, and no signs of large-scale enemy activity were reported
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett, CO of 3/5, after a helicopter
reconnaissance.[362]
[362] 5thMar _SAR_ 15–18. Smith, _Notes_, 626.
Meanwhile RCT-7 began its move to Yudam-ni. This objective had first
been mentioned as early as 11 November in X Corps OpnO 6. But until
RCT-1 could be brought up to the MSR, the Division Commander limited
the advance to the vicinity of Toktong Pass. There an estimated 150 to
200 enemy resisted with machine-gun fire but were scattered with the
aid of air strikes and artillery support.
On the 23d, in accordance with Division OpnO 23-50, the 1st Battalion
led the advance of RCT-7. During the next two days Lieutenant Colonel
Davis’s reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby-trapped but
undefended road blocks and scattered small groups of enemy along
the route. The men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the
24th with a full, hot turkey dinner--their last full meal for 17
days--and seized battered Yudam-ni the next day against negligible
resistance.[363] The 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters, and 3/11
(-) followed.
[363] 7thMar _SAR_, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19
Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.
Marine operations east of the Chosin Reservoir came to an end at
1200 on the 25th with the relief of RCT-5 by the 1st Battalion, 32d
Infantry, 7th Infantry Division. Corps orders called for this unit
to remain under operational control of the 1st Marine Division until
the assumption of command in the area by the CO, 31st Infantry. All
elements of RCT-5 were to be relieved by the following noon for the
mission of advancing to Yudam-ni and then passing through RCT-7 to lead
the attack toward Mupyong-ni.[364]
[364] 5thMar _SAR_, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25
Nov 50.
This was in accordance with Division OpnO 24-50, issued at 0800 on the
26th to implement the provisions of Corps OpnO 7. The jump-off was to
be at 0800 on 27 November, with the first objective the road junction
at Yongnim-dong (27 road miles west of Yudam-ni), in preparation for
further advance on order to the high ground about one mile south of
Kogae-gol and 35 miles west of Yudam-ni. Other provisions of OpnO 24-50
were as follows:
RCT-7--to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay, and when
passed through by RCT-5, to protect the Division MSR from
Sinhung-ni (7 miles west of Hagaru) to Yudam-ni;
RCT-5--to pass through RCT-7 west of Yudam-ni by 0800, 27
November, advance to the west and seize first objective,
prepared for further advance;
RCT-1--in Division reserve, to occupy positions in the vicinity of
Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru for the protection of the
MSR;
11th Marines--less detachments, to provide general support from
positions in the vicinity of Yudam-ni;
41st Commando--reinforced, to move to Yudam-ni prepared for
operations to the southwest to protect Division left flank;
Reconnaissance Company--to move to Yudam-ni and reconnoiter to the
north in co-ordination with operations of RCT-7.[365]
[365] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 24-50_, 26 Nov 50.
[Illustration:
USN Photo 421351
_Operation Yo-Yo--Back and forth, changing course at
twelve-hour intervals, the ships bearing the Marines and their
gear mark time during mine clearance operations at Wonsan._
]
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 351586
]
_Wonsan Arrivals--Above, Bob Hope entertaining Marine airmen
who were first to reach the seaport; and, below, Marine
infantry disembarking from cargo nets of_ Marine Phoenix _into
the LCVPs_.
[Illustration:
USN Photo 421451
]
[Illustration:
USN Photo 421319 USN Photo 421362
]
_Administrative Landing--Above, an LCM and a troop-laden
amtrac in Wonsan harbor; and, below, LSTs drawn up abreast to
land the thousands of tons of supplies required by a division._
[Illustration:
USN Photo 421388
]
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 351722
]
_Wonsan Scenes--Above, a camouflaged hangar on Wonsan
airfield; below, Marine infantry in railway station awaiting
transportation shortly after their debarkation._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4552
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4323
]
_First Action in Northeast Korea--Two views of Marine infantry
mopping up guerrillas after surprise counterattack in Kojo
area by NKPA troops escaping to join Chinese Reds._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4327
]
[Illustration:
USN Photo 423189 Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig
]
_On the Planning Level--Above, RAdm J. H. Doyle, CTF-90, and
BrigGen E. A. Craig, ADC of 1st Marine Division; below, V/Adm
A. D. Struble, Cdr JTF-7, and MajGen E. M. Almond, CG X Corps,
in the USS_ Missouri.
[Illustration:
USN Photo 422376
]
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 391740
]
_Command Conference--Above, left to right, MajGen W. J.
Wallace, USMC; LtGen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC; MajGen O.
P. Smith, USMC; MajGen E. A. Almond, USA; and MajGen Field
Harris, USMC; below, 1st Marine Division CP at Hungnam._
[Illustration:
Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4534
]
_First Chinese Resistance--Above, infantry of 7th Marines
setting up mortar during initial encounter with Chinese in
northeast Korea; and, below, enemy tank killed by Marine fire._
[Illustration:
Photo courtesy Maj R. B. Crossman
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4550
]
_Advance of RCT-7--Above, artillery emplacement of Battery
G, 11th Marines, on 3 November 1950; and, below, supplies
transported over railroad from Wonsan to Hamhung._
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 352741
]
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 365268
]
_As Seen from the Air--Above, “Frozen Chosin” and the rugged
terrain of the Reservoir area; and, below, an aerial view of
the MSR winding its precarious way through Funchilin Pass--“a
cliff on one side and a chasm on the other.”_
[Illustration:
Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5389
]
_As Seen by the Infantry--Here are two views of the sort
of terrain encountered by the infantry of the 1st Marine
Division; sometimes it was as difficult to complete an
approach march as to dislodge the enemy after arrival._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5432
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4841 USMC Photo A 4912
]
_Air Supply and Evacuation--Above, an air drop of supplies
and helicopter evacuation of casualties at Yudam-ni; below,
parachute-rigged cases of ammunition in an Air Force C-47._
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 353608
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4860
]
_Preparations for Yudam-ni Breakout--Above, Marines selecting
gear for breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru; and, below, the
first stages of the three-day fighting advance._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4843
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4500
]
_Chinese Communist POWs--Above, these CCF prisoners don’t seem
unhappy about their captivity; below, a Chinese officer being
interrogated with the aid of an interpreter._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5206
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5675
]
_Marines on the March--These two pictures give some idea of
the exhaustion of Marines, many of them walking wounded, as
they huddle by the roadside during halts of the Yudam-ni
breakout._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5676
]
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 5356
]
_Covered by Artillery--Above, a 105mm howitzer fires to the
rear as the infantry fights its way forward from Yudam-ni;
below, a quarter of a mile per hour was considered good
progress._
[Illustration:
USMC Photo A 4863
]
General Smith, flying by helicopter from Hungnam to Yudam-ni on the
morning of the 26th, could survey the MSR below him and reflect with
satisfaction that it was now easier to count the Marine outfits south
of Chinhung-ni than those to the north. These included the 1st Tank
Battalion with the exception of the provisional platoon at Hagaru and
the 2d Platoon of Company D at Chinhung-ni. Transportation had not yet
been provided for the 41st Commando, but the new unit was scheduled
to move up in convoy on the 28th with Headquarters Battalion when the
Division CP displaced from Hungnam to Hagaru. By that time only service
units and a few platoons of tanks and engineers would be left in the
rear area.
At Hagaru the C-47 airstrip was taking shape as the dozers hacked away
at the frozen earth night and day, working under flood lights in the
darkness. Companies C and E of the 1st Medical Battalion had set up
clearing stations and built up dumps of medical supplies. Troop units
at Hagaru and Yudam-ni had two days’ supplies of rations and fuel, but
only a unit of fire was stockpiled at Hagaru in addition to the half
unit carried by the troops.
Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow, twisting mountain
road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni in preparation for the attack in the
morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s 1/7 CP, General
Smith learned to his discomfort that the hovering ability of a
rotary-wing aircraft is curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter
dropped like a stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury
resulted to passenger, pilot or machine.[366]
[366] Smith, _Chronicle_, 89.
On the 26th intelligence arrived at Hamhung from the 7th Marines,
reporting capture of three soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They
asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Army
had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th. According to these enlisted
men, Chinese strategy envisioned a move south and southeast from
Yudam-ni to cut the MSR after two Marine regiments passed.[367]
[367] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50.
X Corps had received similar reports of Chinese movement southeast from
Yudam-ni as well as air reports of enemy activity north and northeast
of the Chosin Reservoir. Six Chinese divisions had now been identified
in northeast Korea but both Corps and Division intelligence estimates
of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. Although Chinese
attacks on the division’s MSR or along the Huichon-Huksu-ri-Hamhung
axis were not ruled out, G-2 officers seemed to consider a continued
westward withdrawal more likely.[368]
[368] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 32;
1stMarDiv _PIR 33_.
Division planning went ahead on the assumption of commander and staff
that the enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous country west
of Yudam-ni. This was the basis for the decision to pass the relatively
fresh 5th Marines through the 7th for the attack westward.[369]
[369] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, _Chronicle_, 79,
82, 87.
It was a cold, clear Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned to
Hungnam. From his helicopter he could see for several miles on either
side, and no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow-clad
hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however, the Marine
general was informed that the situation had gone from bad to worse
in west Korea. The II ROK Corps on the right flank had disintegrated
on the 26th under a second day’s heavy blows, thus exposing the 2d
Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short, the
Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill before the
Marines could jump off in the morning as the other arm of the United
Nations envelopment.