The Battle of Sudong
_The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines--CCF
Counterattack at Sudong--Two Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of
NKPA Tank Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF
Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines_
The coastal plain of the Songchon estuary is one of the most spacious
flatlands in all North Korea. Its 100 square miles divide into two
irrigation districts, which regulate cultivation in a virtual sea of
rice paddies. The Songchon River, swollen by tributaries in its descent
from the northern hinterland, nourishes this agricultural complex
before flowing into the Sea of Japan.
Flanking the mouth of the waterway are the port city of Hungnam to the
north and the town of Yonpo, with its modern airfield, to the south.
Eight miles upstream lies Hamhung, an important transportation center
with a population of approximately 85,000 Koreans and Japanese in 1940.
Hamhung straddles the main railroad connecting Wonsan and Sonjin
as it follows the coastal route to the border of Soviet Russia. A
narrow-gauge line (2′ 6″) stems from Hungnam and passes through Hamhung
before penetrating into the mountainous heart of North Korea. Parallel
to this railroad is the only highway that could be utilized by the
transport of the 1st Marine Division for its advance to the north.
_The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni_
Soon the eyes of the world would be fixed on maps of the narrow,
winding 78-mile stretch of dirt and gravel road leading from the
supply port of Hungnam to the forlorn village of Yudam-ni at the
western tip of the Chosin Reservoir. Distances in road miles between
points along the route are as follows:
Hungnam to Hamhung 8
Hamhung to Oro-ri 8
Oro-ri to Majon-dong 14
Majon-dong to Sudong 7
Sudong to Chinhung-ni 6
Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri 10
Koto-ri to Hagaru 11
Hagaru to Yudam-ni 14
----
78
The first half of the distance--the 43 miles from Hungnam to
Chinhung-ni--is traversed by a two-lane road passing through
comparatively level terrain. Rolling country is encountered north of
Majon-dong, but it is at Chinhung-ni that the road makes its abrupt
climb into a tumbled region of mile-high peaks. There are few straight
or level stretches all the rest of the 35 miles to Yudam-ni, but the
route from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri is the most difficult.
Funchilin Pass, comprising eight of these ten miles, represents an
ascent of 2500 feet for a straining jeep or truck. The road is merely
a twisting, one-way shelf, with a cliff on one side and a chasm on the
other.
About two miles south of Koto-ri the trail reaches a rugged plateau
region. There it rejoins the railway along the Changjin River, though
the narrow-gauge line was operative only from Hamhung to Chinhung-ni.
Hagaru, at the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, with highways
branching off on both sides of that body of water, was an important
communications center before the war. And even though many buildings
had been flattened by bombing, the town was still impressive as
compared to such wretched mountain hamlets as Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri.
The road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni climbs from the tableland at the foot
of the Chosin Reservoir and winds its way up to 4000-foot Toktong Pass.
Descending through gloomy gorges, it finally reaches a broad valley
leading to Yudam-ni, where roads branch off to the north, west, and
south from a western arm of the Reservoir.
This was the 78-mile main supply route that would soon be claiming
its page in history. In only a few weeks it would be known to thousands
of Marines as _the_ MSR, as if there never had been another.
[Illustration: THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION
November-December 1950
MAP-7
]
Officers and NCOs of the 7th Marines, which was fated to be the first
United States unit to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle, were
given a verbal preview of the MSR and the part it might play in their
future. This was as the result of a flight of inspection made by
Major Henry J. Woessner on 30 October, following a briefing at the X
Corps CP in Wonsan. The S-3 of the 7th Marines was fortunate enough
to arrive just in time to hear the briefing given General Barr by
General Almond. Pointing to the map, the X Corps commander indicated
that the 7th Infantry Division would push northward to Hyesanjin on
the Yalu. Meanwhile the Marines were to head for the border by way of
Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru while the 3d Infantry Division took
over responsibility for the rear area.
“When we have cleared all this out,” concluded General Almond, pointing
again to the map, “the ROKs will take over, and we will pull our
divisions out of Korea.”[239]
[239] Descriptions of the briefing session and reconnaissance
flight are based on LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov
56.
At the X Corps CP, Woessner met a U. S. Army liaison officer just
returned from the 26th ROK Regiment with a report of that unit’s
encounter with Chinese Communists. The ROKs had been north of Sudong
when they collided with the new enemy and were pushed back, after
taking 16 prisoners.
Colonel Edward H. Forney, ranking Marine officer on the X Corps staff,
arranged for Major Woessner to make a reconnaissance flight over the
Hamhung-Hagaru route in an Air Force T-6. The S-3 saw no sign of
enemy troop movements all the way to the northern end of the Chosin
Reservoir, but he did not fail to note the formidable character of the
terrain through which the new MSR passed.
When he returned that evening with his report, Colonel Litzenberg
called a meeting of officers and NCOs at the regimental CP. In an
informal talk, he told them that they might soon be taking part in the
opening engagement of World War III.
“We can expect to meet Chinese Communist troops,” he concluded, “and it
is important that we win the first battle. The results of that action
will reverberate around the world, and we want to make sure that the
outcome has an adverse effect in Moscow as well as Peiping.”[240]
[240] Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov
56; Maj M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56. The quotation is
from Litzenberg.
_ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines_
On 1 November the 7th Marines trucked out of Hamhung to an assembly
area midway between Oro-ri and Majon-dong. Moving into position behind
the 26th ROK Regiment without incident, Colonel Litzenberg ordered a
reconnaissance which took Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st
Battalion about four miles northward to the South Korean positions
above Majon-dong. Late that afternoon the regiment secured for the
night in a tight perimeter.[241]
[241] 7thMar _SAR_, 5, 7.
Attached to the regiment were the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Major
Francis F. Parry); Division Reconnaissance Company (First Lieutenant
Ralph B. Crossman); Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion (Captain Byron
C. Turner); 1st Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin L.
Beall); Company E, 1st Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Charles
K. Holloway); and detachments from the 1st Signal Battalion, 1st
Service Battalion, and Division Military Police Company.[242]
[242] _Ibid._, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.
Intelligence based on the questioning of the 16 prisoners taken by the
ROKs had revealed that they had been attacked by elements of the 370th
Regiment of the 124th CCF Division. Along with the 125th and 126th, the
other two divisions of the 42d CCF Army, the 124th had crossed the Yalu
during the period 14–20 October. After marching southeast via Kanggye
and Changjin, the unit deployed for the defense of the Chosin Reservoir
power complex while the 126th pushed eastward to the Fusen Reservoir
and the 125th protected the right flank of the 42d CCF Army.[243]
[243] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
X Corps G-2 officers concluded that these CCF forces were “probably
flank security” for the enemy’s 4th Army Group across the peninsula in
the EUSAK zone.[244] The G-2 section of the 1st Marine Division arrived
at this interpretation:
[244] X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov 50_, 24.
The capture by the 26th ROK Regt. of 16 POWs identified as being
members of the 124th CCF Division ... would seem to indicate
that the CCF has decided to intervene in the Korean War. It
would indicate, also, that this reinforcement is being effected
by unit rather than by piecemeal replacement from volunteer
cadres. However, until more definite information is obtained it
must be presumed that the CCF has not yet decided on full scale
intervention.[245]
[245] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6.
Division intelligence officers concluded their analysis with the
comment, “The advantage to be gained by all-out intervention, at a
time when the NK forces are on the verge of complete collapse, is not
readily apparent.”[246]
[246] _Ibid._
There was little activity in the valley on 31 October and 1 November.
The ROKs, upon learning that they would be relieved shortly by the
7th Marines, withdrew from advance positions near Sudong to a valley
junction about four miles south of that town. Here, at 0600 on 2
November, they were hit by an enemy “counterattack” which, since it was
of about two-platoon strength and of only 30 minutes duration, amounted
really to a CCF combat patrol action.[247]
[247] 1stMarDiv _PIRS 7 & 8_; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
Shortly after this clash, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st
Battalion, 7th Marines, moved out of the regimental assembly area and
marched toward the ROK lines at Majon-dong in route column. Major Webb
D. Sawyer’s 2d Battalion followed at an interval of 500 yards, while
overhead the Corsairs of VMF-312 orbited on station for reconnaissance
and close air support missions.[248]
[248] The account of 2 Nov, unless otherwise noted, is derived
from: 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 3 (hereafter
3/11 _SAR_), 3; G-3 _SAR_, 16; 7thMar _SAR_, 12; VMF-312
_SAR_, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, sec 6, 10; Col H. L.
Litzenberg interv by HistDiv HQMC, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul
51; LtCol F. F. Parry interv by HistDiv HQMC, 4 Apr 51;
Caps D. C. Holland, J. G. Theros, and H. G. Connell
interv by HistBr G-3 HQMC, n. d.; W. J. Davis interv, 18
Oct 55; 1stLt W. F. Goggin interv by HistDiv HQMC, n.
d.; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1157 2 Nov 50; MajGen
H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col A. L. Bowser
Comments, n. d.; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.;
Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Capt W. J. Davis Comments,
15 Apr 56; Bey Comments, 24 Apr 51.
The passage of lines proceeded smoothly and quietly, save for the drone
of aircraft as they probed the reaches of the valley. It was over by
1030. Thereafter, progress to the front was slow and watchful. Led
by Company A, under Captain David W. Banks, the 1st Battalion took
ineffectual long-range CCF fire with only a few casualties. Batteries G
and H of 3/11 displaced forward during the morning, and at noon Battery
I opened up with the first of 26 missions fired by the artillery
battalion that day.
Though second in the tactical column, 2/7 was responsible for high
ground on both sides of the MSR, dominated on the left by Hill 698.
Company D ascended the eastern slopes early in the afternoon to relieve
a ROK unit that apparently had been unable to hold the crest. When the
South Koreans saw the Marines approaching, they promptly abandoned
their position about midway up the slope and headed for the rear.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF SUDONG 1ST PHASE
MAP-8]
Dog Company continued up the exposed hillside. Scattered enemy shots
from the top of the ridge gradually merged into a pattern of light
resistance as the Marines climbed higher. Captain Milton A. Hull
ordered his troops to halt, deployed his machine guns for return
fire, and radioed for an air strike. Within a few minutes a flight of
Corsairs swept down and worked over the ridgeline.
Hull’s only assault route traversed a barren area about 50 yards from
the crest. His two assault platoons, fully exposed to the enemy’s
observation, inched upward by fire and movement, taking casualties,
and finally reached the top. Their foothold on the ridgeline did not
discourage the Red Chinese, who continued to pour fire from skillfully
camouflaged positions. To prevent continued attrition among his now
exhausted troops (by this time they had climbed some 1600 vertical
feet from ground level over an average gradient of 25 per cent),
Hull recalled the two platoons to the eastern slopes and radioed for
supporting fire.
This fire was not forthcoming. Company D held a line near the summit
until about 2200 when Easy Company passed through to occupy a small
plateau about 150 yards below the crest for the night.
Meanwhile, down in the valley, Litzenberg’s “walking perimeter”
completed a 1300-yard advance by 1630. Owing to the nature of the
terrain, with the attendant 360-degree vulnerability, the regimental
commander stipulated that the 7th Marines’ column extend not less than
4000 (the minimum distance which would allow for close-in artillery
support) nor more than 6000 yards in length. This allowed sufficient
depth for over-all protection, with no loss of mutual support among the
three infantry battalions.
Enemy resistance had flared up now and then in the course of the
day, but Marine supporting arms so ruled the valley that no serious
challenge by the Chinese developed. VMF-312 flew 12 close support
missions in the Sudong area, and VMF(N)-513 assisted with several
more. The whole precipitous skyline on either side of the regiment was
blasted with 500-pound bombs, 20mm shells, and high-velocity rockets.
By way of reply to the heavy shelling and bombing, Chinese mortars and
at least one small artillery piece began to fire sporadically as the
day wore on. A 120mm mortar round struck 1/7’s CP at 1700 and wounded
three men.
_CCF Counterattack at Sudong_
Although the unit commanders of the 7th Marines anticipated more
fighting with the new enemy, they probably did not suspect what the
night held in store when the regiment dug in at dusk on 2 November.
They did not know that the 371st Regiment, 124th CCF Division, was
massed to the north and west, nor that the 370th Regiment occupied high
ground east of the MSR in strength--both units within easy striking
distance of Litzenberg’s perimeter. The 372d Regiment, in reserve,
stood poised in its hidden encampment several miles to the rear.[249]
[249] This section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from:
G-3 _SAR_, 18–19; 7thMar _SAR_, 13, n. p.; 3/7 SAR, n.
p.; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 9_ & _10_; Litzenberg
interv 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Parry interv, 4 Apr 51;
Holland-Theros-Connell interv, n. d.; Wilson-Graeber
interv, 20 Oct 55; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct
55; Geer, _The New Breed_, 228–235; Capt William J.
Davis, “Nightmare Alley,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, MS.;
Narrative of SSgt R. E. McDurmin, 23 Jul 56; Col R. G.
Davis Comments, n. d.; W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56;
Maj W. E. Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer
Comments, n. d.
Leading elements of the 7th Marines deployed defensively less than
a mile south of Sudong (see Map 8). To the right of the MSR, Able
Company’s 3d, 2d, and 1st Platoons, in that order, formed a line which
extended across Hill 532 and part way up a spur of massive Hill 727,
then bent rearward sharply to refuse the east flank. Emplaced along
the road in anti-mechanized defense was the company’s 3.5-inch rocket
squad. The 60mm mortar section and company CP set up in the low ground
behind the spur, but Captain Banks himself decided to spend the night
in an OP with his rifle platoons.
Lieutenant Colonel Davis of 1/7 deployed Charlie Company (-) across the
MSR from Able, on the northeast slopes of Hill 698.[250] To the rear,
headquarters and one platoon of Company B dug in on an arm of the same
hill, while the other two platoons went into position on the lower
reaches of Hill 727 behind Company A. One platoon of Charlie Company,
Davis’ CP and the battalion 81mm mortars were located in low ground
behind Able Company and the elements of Baker on the right of the road.
[250] Due to 2/7’s difficulties on Hill 698 Charlie Company
was unable to move position until dusk. As Col Davis
has pointed out, this was fortuitous because it allowed
Charlie to move into position unseen by the Chinese and
was a major factor in trapping the Chinese in the valley
the next morning. R. G. Davis Comments, 3.
South of 1/7 lay Major Sawyer’s 2d Battalion with Company D at the foot
of Hill 698, E on its crest and slopes, and F spread along the steep
incline of 727. Sawyer’s CP and elements of the 7th Marines’ Antitank
and 4.2-inch Mortar Companies were situated in a shallow meadow along
the road beneath the Fox Company positions. Several hundred yards
to the rear, south of a sharp bend in the road, Major Maurice E.
Roach’s 3d Battalion deployed in what was in effect a second perimeter
protecting the regimental train, 3/11, and Litzenberg’s CP on the
valley floor. Tieing in at the MSR, Companies H and I occupied ridges
on the left and right of the road respectively, while G (-) arched
through the low ground as the southernmost element of the regiment.
Colonel Litzenberg was concerned about the valley which joined the
Sudong Valley below Oro-ri lest it contain Chinese. He had Major Roach
make a helicopter reconnaissance during the afternoon. Roach sighted
nothing.[251]
[251] LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
Except for the occasional thump of an incoming mortar round, night
settled on the valley and the Marine perimeter with deceptive quiet.
Deceptive, since at Sudong two CCF battalions were poised to smash at
the 7th Marines with a well-coordinated double envelopment.
At 2300, Davis’ 1st Battalion reported itself under attack from the
right flank, the enemy apparently descending the higher slopes of
Hill 727. This announcement was somewhat premature, as the Marines of
Company A were merely experiencing the infiltration and probing that
precede almost every Communist assault. At 2400, 2/7 reported two enemy
battalions on the left flank.[252] During the first hour of 3 November,
sobering messages were received from Litzenberg’s northernmost units.
What had begun at 2300 as a staccato of small-arms fire swelled in
volume by imperceptible degrees until Hills 698 and 727 were engulfed
in a ceaseless din. And by 0100 the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th
Marines bent under the weight of a full-scale attack on both flanks.
[252] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50. Since neither
D nor F Companies was involved at this time, the
information must have come from E. Capt Bey, however,
doubts if either of the probing attacks received by E
Company was made by more than 20 men. Capt R. T. Bey
Comments, 24 Apr 56.
Avoiding the obvious approach through the corridor leading south from
Sudong, the commander of the 371st CCF Regiment had dispatched a
battalion along each of the ridgelines bordering the valley. Bursting
flares and bugle calls signaled when the two assault units came
abreast of the Marine positions on the lower reaches of Hills 727 and
698. Then, treading swiftly and silently in their rubber sneakers,
the Chinese infantrymen swept down obliquely and struck Able and Fox
Companies on the east and Baker on the west. Charlie on the slopes
of Hill 698 was undisturbed. Where the Chinese met resistance, they
slugged it out at close range with grenades and submachine guns.
Where they found gaps, they poured through and raced to the low
ground. To the Marines, the specific CCF objectives were not readily
apparent in those hectic hours before dawn, for the enemy seemed to be
everywhere.[253]
[253] X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 1stMarDiv _PIR 10_; 7thMar msg
to CG 1stMarDiv, 1530 3 Nov 50; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 51.
Shortly after the battle was joined high on the hillsides, Marines at
Able Company’s CP heard the clanking sounds of a tracked vehicle on
the MSR to the north. When the machine passed the rocket section at
the roadblock without incident, they dropped their guards momentarily,
believing it to be a friendly bulldozer. The big vehicle rumbled into
the CP and stopped, one headlight glaring at exposed mortar crews and
headquarters personnel.
“Tank!” shouted Staff Sergeant Donald T. Jones, section chief of Able
Company’s 60mm mortars.
It was a Russian T-34, one of the five remaining to the 344th North
Korean Tank Regiment, supporting the 124th CCF Division. The troops at
the roadblock had been caught napping.
A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank sent the lightly armed
Marines scurrying for cover. The armored vehicle quickly withdrew
to the road and drove farther south, into 1/7s’ CP. After a short,
inquisitive pause, it rumbled toward the 1st Battalion’s 81mm mortar
positions. The Russian 85mm rifle flashed four times in the darkness,
but the shells screamed harmlessly over the mortars and detonated in
the high ground beyond.
Rocket launchers of Charlie Company and the recoilless rifles of
7th Marines Antitank Company opened up from positions around 1/7’s
headquarters. At least one 75mm round struck home, and the belt of
sandbags around the T-34’s turret began to burn. The tank swung back
onto the MSR and headed north. Approaching Able Company’s roadblock,
through which it had entered the Marine position, it took a hit from
the 3.5-inch rocket section. In reply, one 85mm shell at pistol range
all but wiped out the Marine antitank crew. The enemy vehicle, trailing
flame and sparks, clanked around a bend in the road and disappeared.
Not long after this astounding foray, the fighting on Hills 698 and 727
spread down to the MSR. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, pressed
now from three directions and suffering heavy casualties, retracted to
the 3d Platoon positions at the tip of the spur. Some of the men were
cut off and forced back on the Baker Company elements east of the MSR.
Ultimately, one of the two Company B platoons in this area was driven
down to the low ground, and the other forced to fall back. Later they
counterattacked and recovered their foxholes.
West of the MSR, the remainder of Company B fought off assaults on its
left flank and rear by Chinese who had skirted around Charlie Company’s
advance positions.[254] Lieutenant Colonel Davis sent the battalion
reserve, Lieutenant Graeber’s 2d Platoon of Baker, to reinforce the
hard pressed left platoon. Attempting to lead his men across the MSR,
Graeber found the route effectively blocked by the enemy in the river
bed.
[254] _Ibid._
Descending now from both sides of the road, enemy infantrymen swarmed
over the valley floor. They overran most of the 7th Marines 4.2-inch
Mortar Company and captured one of its tubes. They seriously threatened
the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs and the AT Company in the same general
idea. High on the slopes in 2/7’s zone, Companies E and F were beset
by small bands of infiltrators. And though these two companies held
their ground, the Reds found their flanks, slipped behind them, and
entrenched at the key road bend separating 2/7 from 3/7 to the south.
The principal Marine unit at the sharp curve in the MSR was Battery I,
whose position in the low ground became increasingly precarious as the
night wore on.
_Two Marine Battalions Cut Off_
Dawn of 3 November revealed a confused and alarming situation in
the valley south of Sudong. Enemy troops shared the low ground with
Marine elements between the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs, and they had
blown out a section of the MSR in this locale.[255] The 2d Battalion’s
commander later remarked, “When daylight came, we found that we were
in a dickens of a mess. The rifle companies were well up in the hills,
and the Chinese were occupying the terrain between the CP and the
companies.”[256]
[255] The demolition had little more than dramatic effect,
however, since the Songchon river bed was negotiable to
vehicles of all types.
[256] Sawyer Comments.
Between 2/7 and 3/7, a company of Reds had dug in on a finger of
high ground overlooking the road bend and Battery I from the east.
Scattered Chinese forces roamed Hills 698 and 727 almost at will.
On the latter height, elements of the 371st CCF Regiment had been
reinforced by a battalion of the 370th, so that pressure against the
right flank of 1/7 and 2/7 continued long after daybreak.[257]
[257] _Ibid._; X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 7thMar msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50; 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv,
1315 3 Nov 50; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 235–236.
With his lead battalions thrown back on the defensive, Colonel
Litzenberg relied on overwhelming superiority in supporting arms to
tip the scales on 3 November and regain the initiative. While the
regimental 4.2-inch mortars fired, howitzers of Batteries G and H
thundered almost ceaselessly the whole night long from positions within
3/7’s perimeter. Battery I, after being extricated from the enemy
dominated road bend at 1100 with the help of a platoon of G Company,
added its metal to the bombardment. In the course of the day, the
18 field pieces of the battalion fired a total of 1431 rounds in 49
missions.[258]
[258] 3/11 _SAR_, 3; Maj W. R. Earney Comments, n. d.
VMF-312 provided constant air cover after first light. Its planes not
only scourged enemy assault troops left exposed on the ridges, but
also searched out and attacked CCF artillery positions and vehicles.
This squadron alone flew 18 close support missions on 3 November, the
alternating flights being led by Major Daniel H. Davis, Captain Harry
G. C. Henneberger, Captain George E. McClane, and First Lieutenant
Shelby M. Forrest.[259] VMF(N)-513 dispatched a flight of night
fighters to Sudong at 0910 under Major Robert L. Cochran. After raking
enemy troops with 1500 rounds from their 20mm cannon, Cochran and his
three pilots unloaded three general purpose and fragmentation bombs
along with 15 high-velocity rockets.[260]
[259] VMF-312 _SAR_, 12.
[260] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 11. The others on this flight were Capt
Edwin Pendry, 1stLt Warren J. Beyes, and 1stLt William E.
Jennings.
As much supporting fire fell within the 7th Regiment’s perimeter as
outside. Since the crack of dawn it had been the principal mission
of the advance Marine elements to eject scores of Chinese troops,
individuals and small bands, who were scattered along the hillsides
and valley floor within the zones of the 1st and 2d Battalions. While
accomplishing this task, the Marines established a tactical principle
for coming weeks: that to nullify Chinese night tactics, regardless of
large-scale penetrations and infiltration, defending units had only to
maintain position until daybreak. With observation restored, Marine
firepower invariably would melt down the Chinese mass to impotency.
This was the case on 3 November, although the melting down process was
a savage, all-day affair. With the help of air, artillery, and mortars,
the 1st Battalion cleared the low ground by midmorning and restored its
right flank later in the day. The Chinese in the valley were crushed,
the main group being annihilated by the heavy machine guns of Weapons
Company as they attempted to march northward along the railroad in
column at daylight. Counted enemy dead in 1/7’s zone alone amounted to
662.[261]
[261] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 27; 7thMar
_SAR_, 13; R. G. Davis Comments, 7–9; Vorhies Comments.
The main effort in the 2d Battalion’s zone was aimed at the CCF
concentration on the spur of Hill 727 overlooking the bend in the
MSR. Owing to this barrier, Litzenberg had to call for an airdrop of
supplies to sustain his leading elements on 3 November.[262] Major
Sawyer ordered Company D, on the base of Hill 698 to the south of the
roadblock, to move up the valley, cross the river, and clean out the
spur at Hill 727. Finding the low ground blocked by heavy fire, Captain
Hull circled to the left along the incline of Hill 698, intending to
come abreast of the Chinese strong point before striking at it across
the MSR.[263]
[262] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul
51.
[263] Goggin interv; Hull Comments.
Meanwhile, Captain Walter D. Phillips’ Easy Company, perched on the
side of Hill 698, struggled to secure the peak of that hill mass. A
rush by First Lieutenant John Yancey’s 2d Platoon at about 0800 secured
a small plateau about 50 yards below the crest against the opposition
of one Chinese soldier. First Lieutenant Robert T. Bey’s 3d Platoon
then passed through and frontally assaulted the peak only to be thrown
back by what Bey calls “the most concentrated grenade barrage this
writer has had the dubious distinction to witness.” Following an air
strike at about 1400 Easy Company secured the crest with its 40 Chinese
dead.[264]
[264] Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.
With all of the rifle companies involved in fire fights or security
missions, Litzenberg resorted to supporting arms and headquarters
troops to knock out the roadblock. From his regimental CP he dispatched
First Lieutenant Earl R. Delong, Executive Officer of the AT Company,
with a reserve 75mm recoilless rifle and a makeshift crew. Delong moved
into position opposite the strong point at a range of 500 yards, while
air and artillery hammered the enemy positions.[265]
[265] 7thMar msg to CG 1st MarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; and Capt E.
R. Delong interv, 18 Oct 50.
Simultaneously, the Division Reconnaissance Company ascended the high
ground east of the MSR in the vicinity of Litzenberg’s headquarters,
then advanced northward along the ridge to envelop the roadblock. This
unit, just returned from an active, overnight patrol to Huksu-ri, moved
into a hillside position and took the rear of the Chinese under fire
across an intervening gulley.[266]
[266] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, EE (hereafter HqBn _SAR_), 10; HqBn
_URpt 8_, 2–3; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.
Delong’s 75 had begun firing high explosive and white phosphorus into
the enemy’s front; and Company D, after cleaning up the scattered
resistance on the slopes of Hill 698, closed on the roadblock under
cover of two air strikes and prepared to assault. The Chinese,
obviously shaken by the pounding of supporting arms, had commenced a
withdrawal into the hills east of the roadbend when Hull’s men began
their assault. From Recon Company’s positions, Lieutenant Crossman
called for air and artillery to catch the retreating Reds in the
open. But the request was turned down because Dog Company troops were
already filtering through the objective area. By 1810 the roadblock was
eliminated, although Dog Company had to withstand two counterattacks
before its hold on the spur was secure. The Chinese had left behind 28
dead, strewn among the boulders and recesses of a natural redoubt.[267]
[267] _Ibid._, Goggin interv; Delong interv, 18 Oct 50; and
7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; Hull Comments.
The main enemy encroachments having been smashed, the 7th Marines’
MSR was again clear for traffic, save for long-range harassment by an
occasional CCF rifleman hidden in the hills. At dusk, trucks streamed
northward from the regimental CP to deliver supplies to the 1st and
2d Battalions and to evacuate about 100 battle casualties from those
units. The wounded were rushed to the Division Hospital and the 121st
Army Evacuation Hospital in Hungnam.[268]
[268] 7thMar _SAR_, appendix 4, 4; ADC 1stMarDiv tel to G-3
1stMarDiv, 1320 3 Nov 50; and Delong interv, 18 Oct 50.
Casualty figures could only be estimated in after action
reports, since all 7th Marines’ records were destroyed
before the withdrawal from Yudam-ni in early December
1950. Throughout the remainder of this volume, only those
casualty figures for the Division as a whole can be
reported with consistent accuracy.
_End of NKPA Tank Regiment_
The coming of darkness on 3 November marked the finish of the first
phase. Litzenberg’s perimeter remained essentially the same as on the
previous day, the only changes being Company D’s occupation of the
high ground east of the road bend, Recon Company’s assumption of local
security at the regimental CP, and 3/11’s tighter concentration within
the zone of 3/7. What few light contacts occurred during the night were
decided quickly by Marine artillery and mortars.[269]
[269] 7thMar _SAR_, 14; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; Goggin interv; HqBn
_URpt 8_, 2–3; 7th Mar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0804 and
1508 4 Nov 50.
Later intelligence evaluations proved that these contacts could have
involved only CCF patrols or stragglers, for it was in this same period
that the 370th and 371st CCF Regiments withdrew some three miles from
Sudong to a defense line established by elements of the 372d Regiment
north of Chinhung-ni. The two assault units had paid a high price for
failure during the 2–4 November fighting. The 371st Regiment lost the
equivalent of five companies out of its 1st and 3d Battalions, with the
total dead estimated at 793. And the 3d Battalion, 370th Regiment, was
reduced by the destruction of two companies.[270]
[270] X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 11_ and _12_,
encl 1; 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.
It was a wobbly 124th CCF Division, then, that dug in with heavy
machine guns and mortars on two massive hills, 987 and 891, flanking
the MSR about two miles north of Chinhung-ni. The depleted 344th NKPA
Tank Regiment could not avail itself of such defensible terrain,
for until Marine engineers widened the tortuous cliff road through
Funchilin Pass it would not accommodate armor.[271]
[271] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex NN (hereafter 1stEngrBn _SAR_), 8;
and 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.
Apparently the Chinese Communists had left their North Korean comrades
of the 344th to fend for themselves. The NKPA unit had already dwindled
considerably from its original organization of three armored and
three infantry companies. On 2 November it comprised only five T-34s
and their crews. One of these machines, after being damaged during
the single-handed raid on the 7th Marines’ perimeter that night, was
abandoned the next day. The NKPA crews put the remaining four vehicles
into camouflaged positions next to the MSR at Chinhung-ni, where they
waited resignedly at a tactical dead-end.[272]
[272] G-2 _SAR_, 34; and 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.
Colonel Litzenberg was aware of the probability of further resistance
along the road, since on 3 November Marine air had reported
approximately 300 enemy trucks--in groups of 15 or 20--on the move
south of the Chosin Reservoir.[273] At dawn of 4 November, after
a night of relative calm around the old perimeter, he ordered his
subordinates to conduct vigorous patrolling preparatory to continuing
the advance.[274]
[273] 1stMarDiv _PIR 10_.
[274] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1508 4 Nov 50.
[Illustration: CHINHUNG-NI TANK FIGHT
4 November
MAP-9
]
Troops of 1/7 moved forward in the early light and scouted the valley
as far north as the edge of Sudong. They met no opposition and returned
to the perimeter. Litzenberg then formed the 7th Marines in column,
with the Reconnaissance Company in the lead, followed by 1/7 and 3/7 in
that order. He left the 2d Battalion in position on Hills 698 and 727
to protect the regimental flanks.[275]
[275] The advance to Chinhung-ni and the engagement with
enemy tanks is derived from: 7thMar _SAR_, 13;
Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, _The New
Breed_, 236–237; and P. G. Martin ltr to HistBr G-3 HQMC,
21 Oct 55; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0045, 5 Nov 50;
R. G. Davis Comments, 13–15; Maj R. B. Crossman Comments,
n. d.; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56.
Recon Company moved out in jeeps at 0800, First Lieutenant Ernest C.
Hargett’s 1st Platoon in the point. Entering Sudong a short time later,
the vanguard rounded a bend in the middle of town and surprised a group
of CCF soldiers. In a 30-minute fight, Hargett’s men killed three and
captured about 20. The 2d and 3d Platoons of the Reconnaissance Company
meanwhile inspected the high ground above Sudong without opposition.
Lieutenant Crossman reorganized his company in column on the road and
set out for Chinhung-ni with Second Lieutenant Donald W. Sharon’s 2d
Platoon in the lead. About the same time, 1000, the 1st Battalion moved
out of the 7th Marines’ perimeter south of Sudong and traced Crossman’s
route through the low ground.
At Chinhung-ni the highway runs along the east side of the river while
the railroad traces the west side. The narrow-gauge track enters
the village over a bridge spanning a branch stream. Just beyond is
Samgo station, which served as a railhead for the cable-car system of
Funchilin Pass. As the Reconnaissance Company approached Chinhung-ni on
4 November, a small group of Chinese soldiers milled around the train
cars and buildings of Samgo Station. They probably had some tactical
connection with the four T-34 tanks camouflaged opposite them across
the river and road; but the two forces seemed oblivious not only of
each other but also of the Marines bearing down on them.
Lieutenant Sharon’s platoon advanced rapidly from Sudong at 1400,
followed closely by the rest of the Reconnaissance Company and
a section of 75mm recoilless rifles. About 2000 yards south of
Chinhung-ni they halted on sighting fresh tank tracks but quickly
moved out again on orders of Lieutenant Colonel Davis. At the highway
entrance to Chinhung-ni, Sharon’s troops unknowingly passed the first
T-34, hidden on the right of the road. Coming abreast of the second
Communist tank, which also remained undetected for the moment, the
Marines spotted the Chinese soldiers across the river at Samgo Station
and opened fire.
The CCF infantrymen scattered under the hail of small-arms fire and
many of them were cut down. This was fortunate for Company C of 1/7,
which was marching along the railroad tracks and just then nearing
the bridge south of the station, where it could have been taken under
enfilade fire by the enemy soldiers and tanks.
It was during the exchange with the Chinese that Sharon and his men
spotted the second North Korean tank under a pile of brush on the right
of the road. The platoon leader, accompanied by Staff Sergeant Richard
B. Twohey and Corporal Joseph E. McDermott, climbed upon the dormant
vehicle. Suddenly the periscope began to revolve. McDermott smashed the
glass and Twohey dropped in a grenade. With Sharon they jumped to the
ground just as the grenade exploded inside the machine.
The tank engine roared and the vehicle lurched toward the three
Marines. Twohey jumped on it again and dropped another grenade down
the periscope. After the dull thump of the second explosion, the T-34
stopped dead and began smoking.
By this time Staff Sergeant William L. Vick’s 75mm recoilless gun
section and 3.5-inch rocket crews of Company C had moved up. Together
they gave the _coup de grace_ to the damaged T-34. Simultaneously,
Sharon’s men saw a thatched hut farther down the road disintegrate
as tank number three emerged, its 85mm rifle swinging menacingly
toward the valley crowded with Marines and vehicles. First Lieutenant
Raymond J. Elledge fired his 75s from their carts, and Company C’s
rocket launchers opened up. The T-34 took hits but rumbled on. Seconds
earlier, First Lieutenant Dan C. Holland, Forward Air Controller
for 1/7, had radioed overhead Corsairs for assistance. One of the
gull-winged planes plummetted out of formation and unleashed a pair of
five-inch rockets. They were direct hits. The T-34 blew up and died on
the road.[276]
[276] Available records do not indicate whether tank number
three should be credited to VMF-312 or to VMF(N)-513,
both of which had close-support flights in the area.
Sharon and his men moved forward cautiously. While passing the blazing
hulk, they spotted enemy tank Number Four, camouflaged against a
hillside just ahead. At almost the same moment, Marines passing
Chinhung-ni stumbled upon docile tank Number One in the midst of their
formation. Recoilless rifles and rocket launchers blasted the machine,
and its crew climbed out and surrendered. Sharon then led the antitank
crews through the river bed toward the fourth T-34. The Communist
tankmen, entrenched on the slope behind their empty vehicle, gave up
without a fight. The tank itself was knocked out by 3.5-inch rockets
and 75mm shells; and the 344th NKPA Tank Regiment ceased to exist.
_The Fight for How Hill_
After the destruction of enemy armor, Colonel Litzenberg began
deploying the 7th Marines in perimeter around the valley junction at
Chinhung-ni. The advance had netted about 6000 yards by midafternoon,
and the remaining daylight was needed to bring all elements forward and
consolidate the newly won ground.[277]
[277] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; and 1stMarDiv _POR 116_.
Aware that the Chinese were at the top of Funchilin Pass but not that
he was directly under their guns, the regimental commander at 1600
ordered Reconnaissance Company to patrol some 2000 yards into Funchilin
Pass and outpost the southern tip of Hill 891. The high ground selected
for the outpost coincided with the eastern half of the Chinese forward
line, and it would later be remembered as “How Hill” in honor of
Company H of 3/7.[278]
[278] 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv,
20 Oct 55; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56.
As 1/7 dug in on the heights flanking Chinhung-ni, Recon Company, with
Second Lieutenant Charles R. Puckett’s 3d Platoon leading, advanced
in motorized column about a mile into the pass. At this point, Hill
987 looms up on the west and the highway veers sharply to the east for
approximately 1000 yards. After a hairpin turn, the road climbs on a
parallel line almost to its starting point, then resumes its northerly
course, clinging to the rocky wall of Hill 891 which rises abruptly
from the chasm that separates it from Hill 987.
Puckett’s platoon had approached the road bend warily, for a sizeable
enemy group had been spotted earlier near the base of Hill 987 across
the gorge. At 1630 the first two jeeps of the column eased around the
curve and immediately came under fire from Hill 987 to the left, 891 to
the front, and from a CCF patrol to the right, on the road itself.[279]
[279] HqBn _URpt 8_, 3; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20
Oct 55.
For 45 minutes Puckett and his men were pinned to the road and
hillside, and only darkness and a strike by Marine air finally
enabled the whole column to withdraw to the 7th Marines’ lines. The
clash cost Recon two killed and five wounded, and heavy machine-gun
fire had destroyed the two lead jeeps.[280]
[280] _Ibid._
[Illustration: ACTION OF 4–5 NOVEMBER AND FUNCHILIN PASS
MAP-10
]
During the relatively quiet night of 4–5 November, Colonel Litzenberg
issued his order for the next day’s advance. The 1st Battalion was
to hold the flanks at Chinhung-ni while 3/7, followed at a distance
of 500–1000 yards by 2/7, passed through and attacked into Funchilin
Pass. Major Parry’s 3/11 and the 4.2 Mortar Company were to support
the infantry by high-angle fire from positions south of Sudong.[281]
Resistance could be expected, for even as the 7th Marines peacefully
sat out the hours of darkness, the night fighters of VMF(N)-513 were
bombing and strafing enemy convoys around the southern tip of the
Chosin Reservoir.[282]
[281] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; 3/11 _SAR_, 3.
[282] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 12.
At 0700 Lieutenant Hargett’s 1st Platoon of Recon Company departed
Chinhung-ni along the MSR to patrol on the right flank. Reaching the
hairpin curve, the platoon was pinned down by enemy fire at exactly the
same place where Puckett’s unit had come to grief. VMF-312 and 3/11
promptly went into action, and Hargett ultimately withdrew his patrol
under the shield of their supporting fire. Marine casualties were four
wounded.[283]
[283] HqBn _SAR_, 12; HqBn _URpt 9_, 2; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon
interv, 20 Oct 55; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 237–238;
Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. This was the last
employment of Recon by the 7th Marines. On 7 November it
was detached and ordered back to Majon-dong to patrol the
road to Huksu-ri and the division’s left flank.
Major Roach’s 3d Battalion moved out for the attack at 0800, passing
through the high-ground positions of 1/7 on either side of Chinhung-ni.
Company I advanced toward Hill 987 and G toward 891 (see Map 10).
Both units were hit hard by small-arms and machine-gun fire as they
came abreast of the road bend; and for the remainder of the day, the
“advance was negligible.”[284]
[284] The fight for Hills 891 and 987 is derived from 7thMar
_SAR_, 13–14; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; VMF-312
_SAR_, 9; VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 13; 1stMarDiv _OpnO 19-50_,
5 Nov 50; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; W.
J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 12 & 13_;
Aide-de-Camp, CG 1stMarDiv tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1130
5 Nov 50; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035, 1200,
1330, 1900, 2130, and 2215 5 Nov 50, and 1145, 1245,
1410, 1425, 2055, and 2245 6 Nov 50; 7thMar _ISUM 14_;
1stMarDiv _POR 122_; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 237-240;
Capt H. H. Harris Comments, n. d.; Earney Comments, 2–8;
Capt M. P. Newton, “The Attack on ‘How’ Hill,” (MS);
Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
From 1000 onward, the second phase of the battle roared to a climax
as a duel between supporting arms. In 26 missions during 5 November,
the batteries of 3/11 threw 943 shells into the enemy positions. The
Chinese answered with counterbattery fire from their 122mm mortars,
but toward the end of the day these weapons were silenced by Marine
howitzer barrages. A forward observer with Company G reported an enemy
ammunition dump destroyed. This information was later verified by a
POW who mentioned the following additional losses in CCF mortars: 10
crewmen killed and 17 wounded, one mortar destroyed, two mortars put
out of action, and the dispersal of “most of the remaining personnel.”
VMF-312 flew 37 sorties in 90 hours of close support combat on the
5th. Between Chinhung-ni and the Chosin Reservoir, 21 enemy trucks
were destroyed. Pilots reported that “the surrounding ridges were
filled with enemy troops” and that their strikes against these Chinese
were “extremely effective.” Led by Major Cochran and Captain Otis W.
S. Corman, flights from VMF(N)-513 blasted troops, buildings, supply
vehicles, and gun emplacements scattered from Koto-ri at the top of
Funchilin Pass to Hagaru at the reservoir. General Smith, during a
helicopter visit to Litzenberg’s CP, remarked that a “considerable
number of planes ... really worked the place over.”[285]
[285] Smith, _Chronicle_, 73.
On the ground, the fight ended at dusk with the Chinese retaining their
firm grip on these well camouflaged positions studding Hills 891 and
987 despite heavy losses.[286] Marine casualties were light, for it
was the tortuous terrain in conjunction with enemy bullets, not enemy
fire alone, that obstructed the attackers. Since General Smith earlier
in the day had named Koto-ri as the 7th Marines’ immediate objective,
Colonel Litzenberg ordered the 3d Battalion to resume the advance at
0800 the next morning.
[286] One Chinese took all the pounding from supporting arms
that he could, then climbed out of his bunker and walked
into G Company’s lines to surrender. On interrogation
he pinpointed his regiment: one battalion on Hill 987,
one on Hill 891, and the reserve battalion in the saddle
between 987 and 1304. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
The night of 5–6 November witnessed only minor contacts around the
regimental perimeter. Some 200 Korean laborers accounted for most of
the activity during darkness as they carried supplies to forward Marine
positions and evacuated casualties to the rear.
Major Roach’s plan for 6 November called for How Company, supported by
the fire of George, to envelop the southeast slope of Hill 891 while
Item continued its attack on Hill 987. At about 0800 First Lieutenant
Howard H. Harris led How Company out of its reserve position. It took
him until nearly 1500 to traverse the rugged landscape and get into
position. Meanwhile, Item Company under First Lieutenant William E.
Johnson had beaten off one counterattack and edged about 300 yards
closer to Hill 987, with its most effective opposition coming from
bunkers on a spur overlooking the MSR.
Captain Thomas E. Cooney had been wounded twice the previous day while
leading Company G against the trenches and foxholes on the southern tip
of Hill 891. Except for a feint by one platoon along the MSR into the
hairpin turn, his company spent the day in a long-range fight with the
Chinese defenders.
Lieutenant Harris led his men over the high ground behind G into
positions to the east. Cooney’s experience showed that the only
possible approach to Hill 891 was to flank it from the southeast.
Although the fresh company arrived sometime after 1400, its attack
was held up until about 1600 to await air. Following a strike by two
Corsairs, the howitzers of 3/11 and the regimental 4.2 mortars began
pounding the Chinese positions.
How Company jumped off at about 1615. Two assault platoons, led by
Second Lieutenants Robert D. Reem and Minard P. Newton, descended into
the intervening gulley at the tip of the hairpin curve. During a quick
reorganization in the low ground, machine guns were posted to cover
the ascent. Then the platoons started up towards the enemy-held summit
through companion draws, Harris accompanying Newton’s outfit on the
left.
The powdery soil of the steep slope made climbing difficult and
exhausting. About a hundred yards up, Newton’s platoon began receiving
light fire, followed a few yards farther by a hail of grenades and
machine gun slugs. The Marines inched forward and were stopped by
the Chinese fire. On the right, meanwhile, Reed climbed against
no opposition, so it appeared that the envelopment was working.
Unexpectedly, the two draws converged near the top of the hill, with
the result that the platoons met.
Lieutenant Harris revised his plans by directing Newton, with his left
squad supporting by BAR fire, to lead Reem to the top of the hill. Once
there, Newton was to swing right and Reem left to envelop the Chinese
positions. Newton worked a squad up onto a nose extending out from
the summit. The Chinese replied with a renewed barrage of grenades
and counterattacked Newton’s left. Sergeant Charlie Foster, seeing
apparent victory turning into defeat, lunged forward to break up the
attack. He reached the top and died but the men behind him repulsed the
Reds.
During the close fighting on the left, Lieutenant Reem had gathered
his squad leaders for instructions preparatory to the final assault on
the right. An enemy grenade fell into the midst of the group, and Reem
was killed as he smothered the explosion with his body. Staff Sergeant
Anthony J. Ricardi took over the platoon.
At about 1800 Harris radioed Roach that his troops were exhausted.
Although it was already dusk, he was bringing up his reserve platoon,
he said, for the Chinese still held the crest in strength. Company
H had taken only eight casualties, but ammunition was low and the
approaching darkness prevented the dispatching of more fresh troops.
The battalion commander relayed the report to Colonel Litzenberg, who
immediately ordered the company to disengage and withdraw. The fighting
descent under cover of a 4.2 mortar and artillery bombardment brought
Company H back within the lines of 3/7 by 2000 with its six wounded and
the body of Lieutenant Reem.
_Disappearance of CCF Remnants_
Darkness on the night of 6 November descended like a cloak over the
124th CCF Division. In the morning the Chinese had vanished. The 3d
Battalion, 7th Marines, encountered no opposition whatever as it
occupied the southern tips of Hills 891 and 987.[287]
[287] 7thMar _SAR_ 14.
The mysterious disappearance of this unit, following the equally
strange withdrawal of the Chinese Reds who made the first CCF contacts
in the EUSAK zone, aroused no end of speculation. Officers of the
7th Marines believed that enemy losses had been heavy enough for a
disabling effect. This opinion was confirmed the following year when
a Marine Corps Board visited Korea for a special analytical study
of Marine operations of 1950, based on all Army and Marine records
available at that time as well as interviews and interrogations. The
Board concluded that “the 124th CCF Division was estimated to have been
rendered militarily noneffective.”[288]
[288] _Marine Corps Board Study_ (hereafter _MCB Study_),
II-C-16. _CCF Army Histories_, 31, states that the 124th
was in action in west central Korea by the middle of
November.
Following the enemy’s disappearance on the night of 6–7 November, the
7th Marines occupied the southern reaches of Hills 891 and 987 while
reconnoitering to the top of 891. The rest of the day and all the next
was devoted to consolidating positions along the MSR and sending out
patrols in a vain search for the vanished 124th CCF Division.[289]
[289] 7thMar _SAR_, 14; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Roach Comments, 7 May
56.
On 8 November, General Almond visited the 7th Marines. Upon hearing
of the valor of Captain Cooney at “How Hill,” he awarded that officer
the Silver Star medal on the spot. There being neither pendant nor
citation available, the Corps Commander pinned a slip of paper to
Cooney’s jacket in the brief ceremony. Scrawled on the fragment was the
inscription, “Silver Star Medal for Gallantry in Action--Almond.”[290]
[290] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; CG’s Diary in X
Corps _WD_, 8 Nov 50; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
While the 7th Marines advanced astride the MSR, a volunteer patrol of
fifteen men, led by First Lieutenant William F. Goggin of 2/7, traced
a lonely, circuitous route in the mountains to the west. Having left
Chinhung-ni at 1200 on 8 November, the scouting party covered some 25
miles through perpendicular wilds during the following 26 hours. This
journey brought it to the Chosin Reservoir plateau at a point just
southwest of Koto-ri.
Lieutenant Goggin, his slight wound the only scar of the patrol’s
single clash with Chinese, radioed Colonel Litzenberg that Koto-ri was
clear of enemy. He then led his party southward, and in the evening of
the 9th, returned through the lines of 3/7.[291]
[291] 7thMar _SAR_, 13–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 243–247;
Goggin interv.
The Marines had been told that big game animals were hunted before
the war in the mountains of northeast Korea. But not until the
otherwise calm night of 9–10 November did a four-legged enemy invade
the positions of RCT-7. Near the cable-car trestle, midway through
Funchilin Pass, an unfriendly bear, no doubt a Russian bear, paid a
nocturnal visit to the 1st Platoon of George Company. An unnamed Marine
PFC, awakened in his sleeping bag, swore afterwards that the animal was
wearing a hammer and sickle emblem. However this may be, the intruder
was routed by his startled yell and disappeared into the night.[292]
[292] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55.
_Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines_
At 0830 on 10 November--the Marine Corps Birthday--the 1st Battalion
passed through the 3d and emerged from Funchilin Pass onto the open
plateau. Koto-ri (designated as Objective One) was occupied without
opposition an hour and a half later. Litzenberg halted his column and
drew up a perimeter around the mountain village.
Upon reaching the Koto-ri plateau the 7th Marines was first to meet a
new enemy who would take a heavier toll in casualties than the Chinese.
This was General Winter, who has won many a historic campaign. When
the first cold blasts struck, “our men were not conditioned for it,”
commented Litzenberg. “The doctors reported numerous cases where the
men came down to the sickbay suffering from what appeared to be shock.
Some of them would come in crying; some of them were extremely nervous;
and the doctors said it was simply the sudden shock of the terrific
cold when they were not ready for it.”[293]
[293] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 45.
The Marines recovered quickly after “thawing out,” and platoon warming
tents, heated by camp stoves burning fuel oil, were set up at Koto-ri.
Buckets of steaming water were provided for the warming of “C” rations.
Hot weather, however uncomfortable it may be, is fighting weather
as compared to sub-zero cold which seems to numb the spirit as well
as flesh. Cold weather clothing is a handicap to movement and the
use of firearms; and some weapons, particularly the carbine, are not
dependable at low temperatures. It was probably as well for morale
that the Marines at Koto-ri could not foresee that this was only the
beginning of a prolonged operation in sub-zero weather without a
parallel in the nation’s history.[294]
[294] Marshall, _CCF in the Attack_. See also FECOM, _Terrain
Study No. 6_, XIX-8; R. G. Davis Comments; Dowsett
Comments, 29 May 56; Cdr J. C. Craven, USN, Comments, n.
d.
Until 13 November, when the 7th Marines advanced toward Hagaru, patrols
from Koto-ri repeatedly sighted bands of Chinese in the distance.
Except for a fight on 11 November in which C Company claimed to have
inflicted 40 casualties on the enemy and lost four killed and four
wounded, there was little action. With a little pressure on the
ground or from the air, the enemy vanished, and thus the uneasy calm
continued.[295]
[295] 7th Mar _SAR_, 15–16; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1400
10 Nov 50; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56.
[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS
1st Marine Division
October-December 1950
MAP-2
]
While the 7th Regiment had been fighting, marching, and climbing toward
the Chosin Reservoir in early November, the 5th Marines peacefully
combed the approaches to the Fusen Reservoir to the east. After
detaching 1/5 to Division control on 4 November and stationing 3/5
near Oro-ri, Lieutenant Colonel Murray sent the 2d Battalion into the
Sinhung Valley to relieve the 18th ROK Regiment. The relief took place
at 1145 on the 4th, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed 2/5
around a valley junction five miles north and 15 miles east of the then
embattled 7th Marines.[296]
[296] 2/5 _SAR_, 10; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to CO 5thMar, 1605 and
2202 3 Nov 50; CG X Corps msg X 11939, 3 Nov 50; CO
5thMar msg to 2/5, 1/11, A/Engr, ATCo, 4.2″ MCo, 2100 3
Nov 50; 2/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 2.
Roise’s mission was twofold: to block the Sinhung corridor while
determining the strength and disposition of the enemy, if any; and to
check certain northerly routes shown on maps as possibly leading to
either the Fusen or Chosin Reservoirs, or both. Reconnaissance patrols
in squad strength and combat patrols of reinforced platoons and company
size fanned out in a broad arc during 5–9 November. They determined
that no usable route led to either reservoir from the south, but that
the highway continuing northeast from the town of Sinhung, leading
to the 7th Infantry Division’s zone and the Manchurian border, would
carry military traffic. From 7 November, Roise’s troops made daily
contact with Army patrols coming down the highway, but no units tried
to penetrate the apparent screen of enemy defenses close to the Fusen
Reservoir.[297]
[297] 2/5 _SAR_, 10.
Major Merlin R. Olson, 1/5’s Executive Officer, led Companies A and B
on 7 November in a reconnaissance in force to Huksu-ri, that annoying
road junction west of Oro-ri. On the 8th Olson’s force had a running
fight with North Koreans before being recalled while still short of his
objective. Olson’s recall resulted from reports of 2000 North Koreans
moving towards the MSR.[298]
[298] CO 1/5 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1820 8 Nov 50; “Special
Reconnaissance of the 1st Bn 5thMar, 7–9 Nov 50,” 10 Nov
50.
On 8 November, Company D (Reinf) made an overnight trek deep into a
branch valley northwest of Sinhung, reaching a point about 10 miles due
east of Koto-ri. One CCF soldier was captured while asleep in a house.
He said he belonged to the 126th Division and that Red China would
commit a total of 24 divisions against the UN forces in Korea.[299]
[299] 2/5 _SAR_, 10, 32.
On 9 November, Colonel Murray received orders to concentrate his
regiment along the MSR leading to the Chosin Reservoir. During the
next two days he deployed the 1st and 3d Battalions at Majon-dong and
Chinhung-ni respectively. The ambush of a Charlie Company patrol on the
10th delayed the departure of 1/5 from the Chigyong area. The patrol
had to be rescued by a battalion attack the next day before the force
could move to Majon-dong.[300] On the 13th while operating out of
Majon-dong a 1/5 patrol ran into 50–150 enemy who inflicted 7 KIA and 3
WIA before withdrawing.[301]
[300] 1/5 msg to 5thMar, 1956 10 Nov 50; 1/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 5;
5thMar _URpt 4_.
[301] 5thMar _URpt 4_; 1/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 6.
The 2d Battalion moved out of the Sinhung Valley on 13 and 14 November
to relieve the 7th Marines of the responsibility for defending Koto-ri
and thus free Colonel Litzenberg’s regiment for the advance to Hagaru
and the north. Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion had completed its
mission without firing more than a few shots and with a total prisoner
bag of 12 North Koreans and one Chinese.[302]
[302] 5thMar _SAR_, 12; 5thMar _URpt 4_.
Although the new enemy had seemingly evaporated from the path of the
1st Marine Division, there was good reason to believe that he was not
forsaking his aggressive designs in North Korea. For in addition to
the ominous but questionable predictions of Chinese POWs, eyewitness
accounts of pilots of VMF(N)-542 provided G-2 officers with information
of the gravest portent in early November. The Marine airmen made
nightly strikes from the 1st to the 9th against Sinuiju at the mouth
of the Yalu, and they repeatedly reported a steady stream of trucks
moving into northwest Korea from Antung, Manchuria. Time after time
they blasted Sinuiju with bombs, rockets, and 20mm shells, and though
parts of the city were continuously aflame, it still seethed with
activity. They described southward bound traffic as “heavy,” “very
heavy,” and even “tremendous,” and at least one convoy was reported to
be “gigantic.”[303]
[303] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix I (hereafter VMF(N)-542
_SAR_), 1–8.