First Blood At Kojo
_1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The All-Night Fight
of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan
Area--Marines Relieved at Kojo_
It was perhaps inevitable after the NKPA collapse that an
end-of-the-war atmosphere should prevail. This attitude was found in
the CP as well as the foxhole. General MacArthur, while witnessing the
Eighth Army paratroop landings north of the captured enemy capital, was
quoted by the newspapers as saying:
The war is very definitely coming to an end shortly. With
the closing of that trap there should be an end to organized
resistance.[116]
[116] _Newsweek_, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30.
As another straw in the wind, General Smith had received a dispatch
from ComNavFE on 21 October which stated that on the conclusion of
hostilities it was his intention to recommend to CinCFE that the 1st
Marine Division be returned to the United States, less an RCT to be
stationed in Japan.[117]
[117] Smith, _Notes_, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n.
d. See also FMFPac Staff Study: “The Establishment of
a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the
Western Pacific,” 19 Oct 50.
On the 24th the Marine commander learned that X Corps had received
a document, for planning purposes only, providing that the Corps
commander would become commander of the occupation forces. These were
to consist of a single American division, probably the 3d Infantry
Division, while the remainder of the Eighth Army returned to Japan.[118]
[118] Smith, _Notes_, 403.
Such indications seemed less reassuring after an incident which
occurred at Wonsan on the evening of D-day. Two Marines, gathering
firewood on the beach, had been blown to pieces by a booby trap. They
were the only casualties from enemy action in the Wonsan landing.[119]
[119] CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50.
Firewood being scarce in Korea, it was sometimes booby
trapped.
As early as 24 October the Marine division CP aboard the _Mount
McKinley_ had been advised of an ancillary mission. Immediately
following the landing one battalion was to be sent 39 miles south of
Wonsan to the small seaport of Kojo. There it was to protect a supply
dump of the ROK I Corps.[120]
[120] Smith, _Notes_, 385; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex C (hereafter
G-3 _SAR_), 5. The assignment went to 1/1. See Col J.
Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to
CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning
and intelligence resulting from this order being received
while underway.
X Corps issued OI 13 on the 25th but General Smith did not receive
his copy until two days later. Corps orders now assigned the Marine
division a zone of action more than 300 road miles from north to south
and 50 road miles in width. The missions prescribed for the Marines
were those of an occupation rather than a fighting force:
(1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of Wonsan.
(2) To relieve all elements of I ROK Corps in Kojo and zone.
(3) To protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, employing not less
than one RCT, and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.
(4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.
(5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in
the Chongjin area rapidly on order.
(6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) (ROK) in the repair of
the Yonghung-Hamhung railroad, employing not less than one
engineer company.[121]
[121] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6.
The 1st Marine Division in turn assigned these tasks to the following
units in OpnO 18-50, issued at 0800 on the 28th but communicated orally
to most of the designated commanding officers during the preceding 48
hours:
(1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in
Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni zone, establish necessary road blocks
to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy
enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at
Kojo until further orders.
(2) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps along the
Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir road, advance rapidly to the
northern tip of the reservoir and Changjin, prepared for
further advance to the northern border of Korea, and to
destroy enemy in zone.
(3) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-7, relieve
elements of I ROK Corps in the vicinity of Fusen Reservoir,
establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the
area, patrol the roads and destroy the enemy.
(4) BLT1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to
the designated commander for operational control and landing
in the vicinity of Chongjin.
(5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less detachments, from an
assembly area in the vicinity of Hamhung, to be prepared for
operating in the zone of any RCT.[122]
[122] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to
COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 2146 28 Oct 50.
Two of the objectives mentioned in these orders, Chongjin and the
northern border of Korea, were more than 300 road miles north of
Wonsan. With the exception of the main coastal route, most of the roads
in the 1st Marine Division zone were mere mountain trails, unfit for
tanks or heavy vehicles.
OpnO 18-50 was modified the next day to provide for attaching the 1st
Battalion, KMC Regiment, to the 5th Marines, and the 5th KMC Battalion
to the 1st Marines. The security of the Munchon and Yonghung areas
(13 and 32 miles north of Wonsan respectively) was assigned for the
time being to the 5th Marines, reinforced by Company A of the 1st Tank
Battalion.
On the 27th General Smith moved from the _Mount McKinley_ at 1000 to
the new Division CP, a mile north of Wonsan. An old Russian barracks,
it was too small and badly in need of repairs. The building occupied by
the 1st Marine Air Wing was in even worse shape, but carpenters were
soon busy at boarding up windows and doors blown out by bombs.[123]
[123] Smith, _Chronicle_, 66; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments,
22 Mar 56; LtGen E. A. Craig, “Notes concerning Wonsan
Administrative Landing and events immediately following,
October 26, 1950 to November 5, 1950,” 4 Sep 56.
_1/1 Sent to Kojo_
A holiday spirit prevailed among the men of the 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, as they entrained on the morning of 26 October 1950 at a
railhead near the Wonsan airfield. Physical activity was a treat after
the monotony and confinement of Operation Yo-Yo, and 1/1 had been
selected for the Kojo mission. Immediately after the landing on YELLOW
Beach at 0900 that morning, preparations were made for departure by
rail of the rifle companies at noon. Supplies and reinforcing units
were scheduled to follow on the 27th on a second train and a convoy
consisting of 1/1 and Motor Transport Battalion vehicles; Battery F,
2d Battalion, 11th Marines; 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Engineer
Battalion; and a detachment of Company D, 1st Medical Battalion.[124]
[124] This section is derived from: 1/1 msg to 1stMarDiv,
1750 27 Oct 50; 1stMar _SAR_, 4; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_)
7; 1stMar _HD_, Oct 50, 4; X Corps _Periodic Operations
Report_ (_POR_) 30; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55;
Capt G. S. Belli Comments, n. d.
At 1330 a wheezing Korean engine manned by a Korean crew pulled out of
Wonsan with the rifle companies riding in gondola cars. It was a bright
blue day, with a hint of frost in the air; and not a sign of enemy
resistance appeared along the 39-mile route, though several tunnels
might have been utilized for a guerrilla attack.
Upon their arrival late that afternoon, Kojo proved to be the most
attractive town the men had seen in Korea--an almost undamaged small
seaport flanked by the white beaches and sparkling blue waters of the
bay.
There remained for the Marines the task of relieving ROK units and
protecting an area consisting of a coastal plain about 5000 yards in
diameter which stretched from the bay to a semicircle of hills ranging
from 150 to 600 feet in height (see Map 4). The ROK officers assured
the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins, that his men
would find their duty at Kojo a tame assignment. They admitted that
small bands of escaping NKPA soldiers had sometimes raided the villages
for rice, but added that ROK patrols had scoured the hills without
meeting any organized resistance.
The night passed uneventfully for the battalion in a perimeter
northwest of Kojo while the ROKs occupied outposts along the southern
fringe of the coast plain. In the morning the Marines found the rice
paddies glazed with the first ice of the autumn. After completing
the relief of the 2d Battalion of the 22d ROK Regiment at 1200, they
watched with amusement that afternoon as the Koreans crowded into the
gondola cars with their women, children, dogs, and chickens for the
ride back to Wonsan. When it seemed that the train could not hold
another human being, a ROK officer barked out an order and everyone
squeezed farther back with audible sighs and grunts. At last, as a
grand climax, the officer shouted a final command and the entire
trainload of Koreans sat down simultaneously, like collapsing dominoes.
It was an ironical circumstance that the ROKs on the overcrowded train
took with them the remnants of the supply dump that 1/1 was assigned to
guard. However important this dump may have been in its heyday, it had
apparently been consumed by the ROKs to the point where only a few
drums of fuel oil remained along with other odds and ends.
[Illustration: KOJO AREA
Unit locations are those of 1700
27 Oct 50
MAP-4
]
That afternoon the train and truck convoys arrived without incident,
bringing supplies and all reinforcing units except the artillery. And
though the Marines at Kojo did not neglect security precautions, they
had seen nothing during their first 24 hours to hint that an organized
enemy was about to launch a surprise attack.
_Marine Positions in Kojo Area_
Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins faced a problem in selecting positions for
his battalion.
Mindful of my mission--to protect the supply dump until removed--I
had to dispose the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this
end [he commented]. The supply dump was located at the railroad
station in the flat ground south of Kojo--a point difficult to
defend, since it was on low ground and could be approached by the
enemy from any direction. I considered the most likely direction
of enemy approach to be from the south along the coastal road
or through the valley leading toward Kojo from the southwest.
Therefore, I decided to place Company B in outpost positions to
cover these approaches.... The remainder of the battalion would be
deployed on the hill massif west of Kojo, prepared to defend the
area or counterattack if necessary to prevent loss of the supplies
at the railroad station. I did not consider this disposition
ideal by any means from the standpoint of defensive strength, but
it appeared to be the best possible disposition in the complex
terrain to protect the supply dump.... Also, I did not have reason
to expect an organized attack by large enemy forces. In the event
such a contingency should occur, it was planned that Company B, the
outpost, would withdraw to the main battle position.[125]
[125] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins
made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had
taken the supply dump with them.
Captain Wesley B. Noren’s Baker Company positions were about two miles
south and southwest of Kojo across an expanse of rice paddies. From
east to west the company held three isolated points of high ground:
1st Platoon (First Lieutenant George S. Belli), reinforced by one
section of light machine guns and one 3.2″ rocket launcher squad, on
the east slope of Hill 109;
3d Platoon (Master Sergeant Matthew D. Monk) and Company Headquarters,
reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns, one section of light
machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, one squad of 3.5″ rocket
launchers and a flame thrower, on high ground to the west and south of
the 1st Platoon;
2d Platoon (First Lieutenant George G. Chambers), reinforced by one
section of 81mm mortars, one section of light machine guns, a 75mm
recoilless rifle and one squad of 3.2″ rocket launchers, on Hill 185.
The remainder of 1/1 occupied positions west of Kojo. Captain Robert
P. Wray’s Charlie Company held a continuous line of foxholes in the
hills that rose from the rice paddies a mile and a half north of Baker
Company’s positions. From west to east were First Lieutenant Francis
B. Conlon’s 2d Platoon, First Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st and
Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey’s 3d. About 250 yards to the east
were two platoons of Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Able Company. On the
slopes north of Barrow stood Colonel Hawkins’ CP and the tubes of First
Lieutenant Edward E. Kaufer’s 4.2″ Mortar Platoon. Captain Barrow’s
third platoon occupied the topographical crest of Hill 117.[126]
[126] Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27–28 Oct 50, revised and
annotated in ltr to authors, 22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren
rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55;
Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56.
While the Marines organized their positions during the afternoon of
27 October, a column of refugees “almost as long as the eye could
see” appeared in the valley southwest of Kojo headed for the seaport.
Colonel Hawkins estimated that there were 2000 to 3000 people in the
column. Since he did not have the time to examine all the refugees
before darkness, Hawkins had them herded into the peninsula northeast
of Kojo for the night.[127]
[127] Hawkins ltr, n. d.
After a quiet afternoon on the 27th, the first hint of enemy opposition
came at 1600 when a wire team was fired upon in the vicinity of Hill
185. Two hours later a truck and a jeep borrowed from the S-3, Major
David W. Bridges, received fire from the high ground west of Hill
109. Both were abandoned after the truck broke down, and a Baker
Company patrol had a brief fire fight at 1900 when it recovered the
vehicles.[128]
[128] 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv
4 Nov 55.
These first indications of Red Korean activity in the Kojo area were
attributed to the forays of guerrilla bands. Not until after the
battle did the Marines learn from POW interrogations that the enemy
consisted of an estimated 1000 to 1200 men of the 10th Regiment, 5th
NKPA Division. This regiment, commanded by Colonel Cho Il Kwon, former
director of the Communist Party at Wonsan, was believed to have its CP
in the large village of Tongchon, about two miles south of the Baker
Company outposts. Other units of the NKPA division, which was credited
with a total strength of 7000 to 8000 men, occupied areas farther to
the south.[129]
[129] 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct
50; G-2 X Corps Rpt in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 29 Oct
50; X Corps _Periodic Intelligence Report_ (_PIR_) 33.
After the Red Korean collapse, the 2d, 5th, and 10th NKPA Divisions
had maintained their organization, though much depleted in strength by
casualties. Withdrawing to the Wonsan area, they kept to the secondary
roads and raided the villages for food. It is a tribute to Communist
discipline that the outfits had not lost their cohesion at a time when
their cause seemed to be collapsing. But the 5th NKPA Division was
one of the units made up almost entirely of Koreans who had served in
the Chinese Civil War, and its officers were fanatically dedicated to
Communist principles.[130]
[130] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 26; X Corps _PIR_ 41, annex 3; 1stMarDiv
_PIR_ 20, encl 2.
Only well trained and led troops could have launched the attacks which
hit both ends of the Baker Company’s chain of outposts simultaneously
about 2200, after the first few hours of darkness had passed in
comparative quiet punctuated by occasional shots. Normal security
measures were taken on a cold night with a 50 per cent watch--one
rifleman remaining on the alert in the two-man foxholes while the other
burrowed for warmth into a partially closed sleeping bag. The 81mm and
60mm mortars were registered on the hills just beyond the 2d and 3d
platoons.[131]
[131] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; Noren rpt; Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55.
These two units came under attack shortly before First Lieutenant
Carlon’s position at the extreme west of Charlie Company’s line was
assailed. In each instance the enemy infiltrated within grenade
throwing distance before his presence was detected. Past contacts with
American soldiers had given the Red Koreans some knowledge of the
language, and for purposes of deception the NKPA assault troops shouted
phrases in broken English:
“Come this way!... Don’t shoot! We’re friends.”[132]
[132] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 2130 31 Oct 50; Wray ltr, 24
Jan 56.
_The All-Night Fight of Baker Company_
The surprise was devastating, particularly in the Baker Company zone.
On the eastern slope of Hill 109 the 1st Platoon had no inkling until
men yelled warnings from the foxholes just as the enemy grenades
exploded and Red Koreans in estimated strength of two platoons overran
the position. Seven Marines were killed before they could get out of
their sleeping bags, and others lost contact in the darkness.
The 3d Platoon and Company CP were attacked from three points to the
south and southeast. Marine 60mm mortars fired within 50 yards of the
front line while the 81s laid down a barrage directly forward of the
position. After a brief and bitter struggle, Communists believed to
number three platoons were repulsed.
In the Charlie Company zone, Lieutenant Carlon’s position was hardest
hit. The North Koreans closed within ten feet before they were noticed.
During the confused fighting which followed, the enemy won a brief
foothold. An estimated 20 Marines were cut off but got back safely the
next morning.
After recovering from the initial surprise the Charlie Company outposts
repulsed all further attacks. Wray’s men lost 6 killed and 16 wounded
during the night’s encounters but could count 92 Korean bodies the next
morning.
At 2215 the 3d Platoon of Baker Company had a second attack at the same
points as the first one. The Red Koreans appeared to Captain Noren to
be exceptionally well disciplined and controlled in spite of heavy
casualties inflicted on them by combination of mortar, machine-gun and
small-arms fire, and grenades.[133]
[133] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon
the 1stMar _SAR_ 4–5, appendix II, 2; Noren rpt; Bridges
interv 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv 27 Oct 55; 1stMar, _HD Oct
50_, encl. 2; 1; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56; Hawkins ltr, n. d.;
Statement of Lt James M. McGhee, 15 Feb 51.
The plight of Belli’s platoon was first made known when 2/B on Hill
185 received a message to the effect that 1/B had withdrawn from Hill
109 with 30 men missing. The retirement was made possible by the brave
stand of Sergeant Clayton Roberts, who covered the movement with a
light machine gun until he was surrounded and killed.
The 3d Platoon beat off another attack meanwhile as the enemy closed in
from the left rear as well as the front. With machine-gun fire coming
from both directions, Noren informed the battalion CP at 2350 that his
position was untenable and asked permission to withdraw. His request
being granted, he directed Lieutenant Chambers to pull back from Hill
185, covering the withdrawal of 3/B with 81mm fire.
The intersection of the dike and railway track was designated as the
meeting place for the three Baker Company platoons. Noren covered
the rear of the 3/B withdrawal while his executive officer, First
Lieutenant Chester B. Farmer, took charge of the point. Opposite Hill
109 they encountered Staff Sergeant Robert Fisher and five men whom
Belli had directed to remain at the dike and pick up stragglers while
the rest of 1/B continued to pull back.
Fisher reported that the attack on Hill 109 had been conducted with
skill and discipline. Whistles and red and green flares were used for
signaling by Communists who cut off a listening post and overran a
squad on the right flank. The assault force numbered 160, according to
POW testimony.
The methodical, position-by-position withdrawal of the three Baker
Company platoons was conducted so skilfully that remarkably few
casualties resulted. Noren lost all contact for a short time when
enemy fire severed the antenna on his last operative SCR-300. At about
0215 Chambers’ platoon was last to reach the meeting place, having
beaten off several attacks during its withdrawal from Hill 185. With
another large-scale enemy assault threatening, Noren organized a 360°
defense on both sides of the railway track just south of the village
of Chonchon-ni. One Marine was killed and six wounded by enemy fire
received from the west as well as east.
Fox Battery of the 11th Marines had arrived in the Kojo area about
midnight and set up its guns on the beach northeast of the town at
about 0200.[134] Baker Company had no radio in operation, however,
until parts of two damaged SCR-300’s were combined into one to restore
communication. Contact was made with the 4.2″ mortars, which registered
about 0300, directed by Captain Noren, and broke up the NKPA attack.
The 81mm mortars made it hot for the enemy in Chonchon-ni, and at 0330
the Communists apparently disengaged to withdraw east of the railway
track and northward toward Kojo. Marine artillery had registered by
0400, but all was quiet in the area the rest of the night.
[134] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 2 (hereafter 2/11
_SAR_), 14.
Although a few NKPA mortar shells were received, enemy equipment
appeared to be limited for the most part to automatic weapons, small
arms, and grenades. There were indications that Korean civilians had
been used in several instances as human shields for an attacking
force.[135]
[135] Capt R. M. Taylor tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1545 28 Oct 50.
The NKPA withdrawal to Kojo led to the Marine speculation that the
Communists meant to make enforced recruits of some of the hapless
residents allotted a refuge in the peninsula north of the town. As
it proved, they were not harmed by the NKPA troops. The last enemy
effort, just before dawn, was an attack in platoon strength on Second
Lieutenant John J. Swords’ Able Company platoon by Reds who had
infiltrated through Kojo. A brief fight ensued on Hill 117 as the
Marines beat off the assault at the cost of one man killed and two
wounded.
Baker Company elements had meanwhile resumed their withdrawal along
the railway track north of Chonchon. All was quiet at first light when
Noren began the task of evacuating his wounded in ponchos through rice
paddies which were knee-deep in mud and water under a thin skin of ice.
Marines came out from the Able Company positions to lend a hand.
The evacuation had nearly been completed when about 200 enemy troops
suddenly moved out from Kojo in a westerly direction across the rice
paddies. Whether they meant to interfere with the evacuation or merely
to escape was never made clear. For the Marines of Able and Baker
Companies as well as the gunners of Fox Battery opened up in broad
daylight and found lucrative targets. An estimated 75 Communists were
killed and wounded before the rest scurried out of range into the hills
west of the coastal plain.
Some contact was maintained with the enemy until 1000 by elements of
Charlie Company, then the action was gradually broken off as the planes
of VMF(N)-513 came in low with close support.[136] Although the strikes
by air were largely uncontrolled because of poor radio communications
between the Forward Air Controller (FAC) and the planes, they were very
helpful to the Marines on the ground.[137]
[136] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, sec 6, 6; VMF(N)-513 _WD Oct 50_; 1/1
msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0050 29 Oct 50; Maj W. B. Noren
Comments n. d.
[137] Capt R. B. Robinson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 6
Feb 51; Hawkins ltr, n. d.
_2/1 Ordered to Kojo_
The radio message bringing the first news of the Kojo fight was sent
by 1/1 at 0418 on the 28th. Owing to transmission difficulty, it was
picked up by the 7th Marines, relayed to the 1st Marines at 0700, and
telephoned to the 1st Marine Division.[138] It stated briefly that
the battalion had been under attack since 1700 by an estimated 1000
enemy and had suffered a large number of casualties. Helicopters were
requested for air evacuation and an LSTH for water evacuation of the
wounded. Air support was required, the message continued, adding that
the destroyer in direct support of the battalion had not yet arrived on
station.
[138] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0700 28 Oct 50; CO
7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1825 29 Oct 50.
At 0830 an officer from 1/1 reported in to 1st Marines CP with a
further account. He reported a platoon of B Company cut off and
estimated 150 casualties.[139]
[139] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
A third report from 1/1 reached the CP of the 1st Marine Division as an
intercepted radio message at 1238 on the 28th while General Almond was
conferring with General Smith. Sent from Kojo at 1000, the message said:
Received determined attack from South North and West from sunset
to sunrise by large enemy force. Estimated from 1000 to 1200.
One company still heavily engaged. Civilian reports indicate
possibility 3000 enemy this immediate area. Have suffered 9 KIA,
39 WIA, 34 MIA [Missing in Action] probably dead. Two positions
overrun during night. If this position is to be held a regiment
is required. Enemy now to South North and West of us but believe
road to North is still open. Harbor is in our hands and ROK LST has
been here. Shall we hold here or withdraw to North? ROK supply dump
... removed. Request immediate instructions. Send all available
helicopters for wounded. Suggest send instructions by both radio
and helicopters.[140]
[140] 1/1 msg to 1stMar, 1000 28 Oct 55. As Col Hawkins points
out, the request for instructions refers to his only
orders being to defend the ROK supply dump which no
longer existed. Hawkins ltr, n. d.
The Corps and Division commanders agreed immediately that Kojo should
be held, since a large-scale NKPA attack appeared to be in the making.
Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply dump. Nobody at the
Division CP seemed to know as yet that it had been removed, but General
Smith directed his G-3 to issue the necessary orders to send Colonel
Puller, CO of the 1st Marines, and a battalion of reinforcements to
Kojo. Within five minutes Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, 1stMarDiv G-3,
telephoned Corps to request that a train be assembled on the Wonsan
siding immediately for a battalion lift.[141]
[141] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 28 Oct 50; Craig
“Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3
X Corps, 1215 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, 4; LtCol R.
E. Lorigan ltr to CMC 7 Dec 55.
Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC of the 1st Marine Division,
was on his way to a conference at the 1st Marines CP when he met
General Almond and Colonel Puller, and the three compared notes from
their jeeps. Craig informed them that action toward the providing of
transportation had already been initiated by Division. A request had
later been made for a second destroyer to provide gunfire support (the
first having already arrived) and an LSTH for casualty evacuation.
Another LST had been requested for the purpose of sending tanks to
Kojo, since the road and bridges would not bear the weight of armor.
The possibility of a major engagement taking place at Kojo seemed to
be confirmed by two later reports 1/1 sent at 1415 and 1840. The first
relayed prisoner of war statements to the effect that an estimated 7000
men of the NKPA 5th Division were located at Tongchon.[142] The second,
a radio message, read:
[142] 1/1 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; Hawkins ltr, n.
d.
Reinforcement train has not arrived as of 1800. NK prisoners
revealed large enemy force plans attack over position tonight.
Recommend LVTs with LSTs stand by at daylight in case of emergency
evacuation necessary. In view of large numbers of troops facing us
as previously reported and face enemy on all sides except seaward,
consider situation critical. Request higher authority visit.[143]
[143] 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
By that time Colonel Puller and the troops were on the way. Making up
a train and loading it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies
in three and a half hours had been something of an administrative feat,
particularly when the battalion was just coming off landing craft.
Yet Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter’s 2/1 and the Regimental Command
Group pulled out for Kojo at 1630 and a second train followed two hours
later.[144]
[144] Craig, “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; Col A. Sutter
Comments n. d.
Upon arrival at 2230, CO 1stMar learned that there had been no major
enemy contact since 1000. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins had contracted his
unit that afternoon to his main position along the high ground forming
a semicircle around Hill 117. The 2d Battalion and supporting arms
having tied in with the 1st for the night, Colonel Puller concluded
that no further cause for alarm existed. And since the battery
positions at Kojo were limited, he radioed General Smith that more
artillery would not be needed.[145]
[145] Barrow interv, 28 Oct 55.
Seventeen Marines previously listed as MIA by 1/1 had returned unhurt
to their units on the 28th after being cut off during the confusion
of the night’s fighting. Marine air had all but obliterated Tongchon
that afternoon while the U. S. destroyers _Hank_ and _English_ were
bombarding Kojo.
The request for water as well as air evacuation of serious casualties
had resulted in immediate action. Within an hour after receiving the
message, CTF-90 had the transport _Wantuck_ on the way with a surgical
team, and VMO-6 sent five helicopters which flew 17 wounded men to a
hospital ship at Wonsan on the 29th.[146]
[146] CTF-90 msg to USS _Wantuck_, 0839 28 Oct 50; VMO-6 _SAR_,
23.
Ten tanks of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded in LST 883 at
Wonsan on the 28th, but the ship was delayed by running aground. Upon
arrival at Kojo the next day, it again became necessary for the LST to
be pulled off the bar by a tug. By this time the military situation was
so well in hand that the tanks were taken back to Wonsan without being
unloaded.[147]
[147] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 9, 11; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1650
29 Oct 50.
_Security Provided for Wonsan Area_
Responsibility for the security of the Wonsan area having been assigned
to the 1st Marines, something of an administrative problem was created
on the 28th by the order sending 2/1 to reinforce 1/1 at Kojo. For the
3d Battalion of the regiment had departed that same day to relieve
a ROK unit at Majon-ni, 28 miles west of Wonsan. Since this left
no troops to patrol roads in the Wonsan area and maintain blocking
positions at Anbyon, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and 5th KMC
Battalion were attached to the 1st Marines for those missions.
Also available to the 1st Marines for such security duties as guarding
the Wonsan airfield and harbor area were the 1st Shore Party Battalion,
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and Company B of the 1st Armored
Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[148]
[148] 1stSPBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stMar _SAR_, 6; 1stMarDiv _SAR_,
annex TT (hereafter 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_) 4–5, appendix 2,
3–4.
By the morning of the 29th, moreover, it had already become apparent
that one or both of the battalions in the Kojo area could soon be
spared. When General Craig arrived by helicopter, he found the
situation well in hand.[149]
[149] Craig ltr, 4 Sep 55; Smith, _Notes_, 450.
About 60 percent of the seaport had been destroyed by air strikes
and the guns of the destroyers when a patrol consisting of Dog and
Fox Companies combed the ruins on the morning of the 29th without
finding any evidences of enemy occupation. Meanwhile an Easy Company
patrol ranged to the west of the coastal plain with equally negative
results.[150]
[150] 2/1 _SAR_, 3; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 8; CO 1stMar msg to
CG 1stMarDiv, 1816 29 Oct 50; 1stMar Fwd _ISUM_, 1900 29
Oct 50.
Captain George B. Farish of VMO-6 was making a reconnaissance flight
when he discerned the word HELP spelled out in rice straw near a
straw-stack a mile northeast of Tongchon. A Marine crawled out from
concealment, and the pilot landed his helicopter to pick up PFC William
H. Meister, who had been hiding since losing touch with his unit during
the enemy night attack on Hill 109. This was the first of four such
rescues completed by Farish that day.[151]
[151] VMO-6 _HD Oct 50_; VMO-6 _SAR_, 3.
On the afternoon of the 29th, Captain Noren led a patrol along the
railway track south of Kojo and retraced the route of his fighting
withdrawal in the darkness. In the vicinity of Hill 109, where
Lieutenant Belli’s platoon had been surprised, he found 12 Marine
bodies. None had been despoiled by the enemy of arms or equipment.
Pushing farther south, Noren encountered sniper fire from the ruins of
Tongchon, destroyed by Marine air, and called for more strikes. The
Corsairs flushed out a group of 20 enemy troops, 16 of whom were cut
down by the machine guns of the Baker Company patrol.[152]
[152] Smith, _Notes_, 451; Noren Comments.
By the 29th, when General Almond made a trip of inspection to Kojo, it
was possible to revise the original Marine casualty list as the MIA
casualties were reduced. The final count was 23 KIA, 47 WIA and four
MIA.[153]
[153] Smith, _Notes_, 451; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_,
29 Oct 40.
Twenty-four wounded Marines were evacuated to Wonsan that day by APD.
LST 883, when it returned to Wonsan with the tanks, took the bodies of
19 Marines and 17 prisoners.
Enemy losses, in addition to 83 POW, were estimated at 250 KIA and
an unknown number of WIA on the basis of more than 165 bodies found
by Marine patrols. Curiously enough, the Communists had shown little
interest in the equipment which fell into their hands, and two Marine
75mm recoilless rifles, rendered inoperative, were recovered with
their carts and ammunition in the vicinity of Chonchon-ni. Almost all
abandoned equipment was found in usable condition.[154]
[154] Smith, _Notes_, 451–452; 1stMar _SAR_, appendix 5, 2;
Noren Comments.
_Marines Relieved at Kojo_
Each of the Marine rifle companies set up outposts in front of its
zone. Morning and afternoon patrolling, with air on station, went on
during the last two days of October with negative results. Harassing
and interdiction fires were also continued until 1/1 departed.
LST 973 arrived off Kojo at 1430, 31 October, and disembarked the 5th
Battalion of the KMC Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ battalion,
accompanied by Colonel Puller, left Kojo at 0700 the next morning
on the return trip of the LST. The ship docked at Wonsan at 1230 on
2 November. That afternoon 1/1 relieved elements of the 1st Tank
Battalion at the road block near Katsuma, four miles southeast of
Wonsan.
Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CG FMFPac, who was acting
in an informal capacity as amphibious adviser to General MacArthur,
inspected 2/1 at Kojo by helicopter on 31 October. Having arrived at
Wonsan that day with Colonel Victor H. Krulak, his G-3, he conferred
at X Corps Headquarters with Admiral Struble and Generals Almond and
Smith.[155]
[155] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to ExecO 1stMar, 1450 30 Oct 50; CO
1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1521 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv
msg to CO 1stMarFwd, 2355 31 Oct 50; 1stMarAdv msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 1900 1 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 453–454; 1stMar
_SAR_, 6–7; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Sutter Comments.
Among the other subjects of discussion was the news that Chinese
Communist Forces (CCF) prisoners had been taken in the area north of
Hamhung by ROK units which were soon to be relieved by the 7th Marines.
Several clashes with organized Chinese forces during the last days of
October had also been reported by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division
of the Eighth Army in western Korea.
The 7th Marines had been given the mission of spearheading the Marine
advance to the northern border of Korea as directed in Corps orders.
After parkas and other cold weather clothing had been issued from the
beach dumps at Wonsan, the regiment completed the movement to Hamhung
by motor convoy from 29 to 31 October. By this time the Corps drive to
the Yalu was shifting into second gear, with the I ROK Corps far in
advance along the coastal highway. Two U. S. Army units were soon to
be involved. The 7th Infantry Division, which landed at Iwon from 29
October to 8 November, had Corps orders to push on toward the border;
and it was planned that the 3d Infantry Division, due to land its
first units on the 8th at Wonsan, would relieve 1st Marines units south
of Hamhung.[156]
[156] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 18-50, 28 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne,
“Operations Report”, 13–14; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 12; X Corps
_WDs_, 29 Oct-8 Nov 50.
Corps orders of 2 November called for 2/1 to return to Wonsan
immediately. The southern boundary of X Corps was to be moved 70 miles
farther south, effective on the departure of the battalion from Kojo.
In order to cover the new zone, the KMC regiment had already been
detached from the 1st Marine Division and given responsibility for the
Corps zone south of the 39th Parallel. The relief of the 2d Battalion
of the 5th Marines was completed by KMC elements that same day at
Anbyon, eight miles southeast of Wonsan, thus freeing that unit for a
motor lift northward to rejoin its regiment.[157]
[157] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 98; CG X Corps msg X11890; X Corps 01 14,
29 Oct 50; X Corps _OI_ 16, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv ltr
to CO 1stMar, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to 1stMar, 1803
2 Nov 50.
Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2/1 and the artillery battery departed Kojo
the following day. A small train and a truck convoy sent from Wonsan
were used chiefly for the transport of supplies, and most of the troops
traveled by shanks’ mare. The column was on the way when the report
came that the rail line had been blown up at Anbyon by guerrillas.
The battalion halted there and set up a perimeter for the night which
included both the train and truck convoys. At 0730 in the morning the
convoys moved out again for Wonsan. Delayed slightly by another rail
break, Sutter completed the movement at noon.[158]
[158] 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 8; CO 1stMar msg to 2/1, 1825 2 Nov
50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 3 Nov 50; 2/1
msg to 1stMar, 1820 3 Nov 50; 2/11 _SAR_, 14–15; Sutter
Comments.
The track-blowing incident gave evidence that the Marines must deal
with a third type of enemy. In addition to the NKPA remnants, and the
forces of Red China, it now appeared that account must be taken of
thousands of uprooted Koreans prowling in small bands for food and
loot--the flotsam of a cruel civil war. Called guerrillas by courtesy,
they were actually outlaws and banditti, loyal to no cause. And by
virtue of their very furtiveness, they were capable of doing a great
deal of mischief to organized forces.