Majon-ni and Ambush Alley
_Marine Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of Mission--Roads
Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop of Supplies Requested--First
Attack on Perimeter--KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st
Marines to Chigyong_
From a distance the Y-shaped mountain valley, encircled by peaks and
crossed by two swift, clear streams, might have been taken for a scene
in the Alps. This impression was borne out by the village of Majon-ni,
which nestled close to the earth, as seen from afar, with the tranquil
and untroubled air of a Swiss hamlet.
On closer inspection, however, such first impressions could only prove
to be illusory. The most prominent building in the Korean village was
a new schoolhouse with the onion-shaped dome of Russian architecture.
An incongruous and pretentious structure for such a small peasant
community, it had been erected not so much for the instruction of
children as the indoctrination of adults in Communist principles.
Majon-ni, in short, had been for five years a hotbed of forced culture
in the doctrines of the Communist puppet state set up in northern Korea
after World War II by the occupation forces of Soviet Russia. And it
was here that the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines arrived on 28 October
1950. Relief of elements of the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 enabled those
troops to return to Wonsan in the vehicles which had brought 3/1.[159]
[159] CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _URpt_
(_S-3_) 7, 2.
The Marines had been assigned the mission of “setting up a defensive
position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces, and denying them the use
of this road net.” In addition, the unit was “to patrol roads to the
north, south, and west, and keep the road open between Majon-ni and
Wonsan.”[160]
[160] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also
CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar
_OpnO 9-50_, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv _AdmO 14-50_, 27 Oct 50.
This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions
relieving the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the
Wonsan-Majon-ni road. The reason for the change was apparent when the
troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons
on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial
plain, the shelf-like road twists precariously through a 3000-foot
pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges which
are ideal for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be
known to the troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it
offered too much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the
dispatch of the iron elephants.[161]
[161] Col T. L. Ridge, _Notes on Operations in North Korea_,
9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, _Notes_) and comments on
preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, _The New
Breed_ (New York, 1952), 203.
[Illustration: MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO WONSAN
A Ambush of 2 Nov 50
B Ambush of 3 Nov 50
C Ambush of 7 Nov 50
D Ambush of 12 Nov 50
E Ambush of H Co., 2 Nov 50
MAP-5
]
The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position
at the headwaters of the river Imjin and the junction of roads leading
east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. They were being
traveled extensively at this time by NKPA troops escaping northward in
civilian clothes after the collapse of the Red Korean military effort.
It was natural that the 1st Marine Division, with a zone of more than
15,000 square miles to control, should be ordered to occupy such an
important road junction and potential assembly area as Majon-ni.[162]
Thus the Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge’s reinforced
battalion were sent as a blocking and screening force.
[162] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6.
_Marine Units Tied In for Defense_
In addition to H&S, Weapons, and the three rifle companies, the task
organization consisted on 28 October of Battery D of the 2d Battalion,
11th Marines, the 3d Platoon of Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, and
detachments from ANGLICO, 1st Signal Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical
Battalion; and H&S Company, 1st Marines.[163]
[163] Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based
on: Ridge, _Notes_; and Comments, 28 Feb 50; LtCol E. H.
Simmons ltr, 14 Jan 56; 1stLt Charles R. Stiles, “The
Dead End of Ambush Alley,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvi,
no. 11 (Nov 51), 38–45.
The battalion commander and his S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, decided
after a survey of the terrain that the commanding ground was too far
from the village and too rugged for company outposts. The logical
solution seemed to be a battalion perimeter combined with daytime
company OPs and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads. In order
to tie in all units of a perimeter 3770 yards in circumference, it was
necessary to create provisional platoons of such H&S, artillery and
engineer troops as could be spared from their regular duties. Even so,
the defense was spread thin in places.
The schoolhouse was the obvious place for the battalion CP.
Communication within the perimeter was by telephone, with wires laid
from the CP to artillery and mortar positions as well as company and
platoon CPs. Radio communication was established with the regiment and
the division but due to the terrain remained irregular at best.
First Lieutenant Leroy M. Duffy and his engineers were assigned the
task of constructing on OY strip on the east side of the perimeter
which was completed on 2 November. A parallel cliff made it necessary
to land planes at a dangerous angle, but no better site could be had
in this steep-sided valley.
[Illustration: MAJON-NI PERIMETER
All roadblocks manned by Weapons Co. Perimeter between A and B manned
by H&S Co, 3/1 and Btry D, 2/11, 28 Oct-4 Nov 50, by Able Co., 1/1, 5–7
Nov; and by H&S Co., 3/1, and Btry D, 2/11, 8–9 Nov. Perimeter between
C and D manned by 3d Bn, KMC Regt, 10–14 Nov 50.
MAP-6
]
Topography also limited Captain Andrew J. Strohmenger’s cannoneers,
who were almost literally “firing out of a barrel.” Close-in support
was out of the question in the bowl-like valley ringed with peaks, but
the six howitzers were emplaced so that they could be swung to fire on
any avenue of approach, especially toward the three roads leading into
Majon-ni.[164]
[164] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 14; Capt A. J. Strohmenger,
ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 16 Sep 55; 3/1 msg to 1stMar, n.
t. 2 Nov 50.
No difficulty was found in deciding on a water point, for tests
established the purity of the water from both branches of the Imjin
flowing through the perimeter. Lieutenant Duffy explained that he added
chlorine only because the Marines were accustomed to the flavor.
_Political Aspects of Mission_
The Marine mission had its political as well as military side. Major
Edwin H. Simmons, CO of Weapons Company, was given the responsibility
for defending the three road blocks of the perimeter with Weapons
Company personnel. At each of them he stationed a heavy machine gun
section and a 3.5″ rocket launcher section. These barriers were also
ports of entry where all Korean transients were searched for weapons.
When a group of 20 to 30 accumulated, they were escorted under guard to
the prison stockade, just across the road from the battalion CP.[165]
[165] This section is based upon LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 4
Nov 55 and ltr, 14 Jan 56.
There they were “processed” by the Civil Affairs Section, consisting of
12 Marine enlisted men under the command of First Lieutenant Donald M.
Holmes and Master Sergeant Marian M. Stocks, known facetiously as the
mayor and sheriff respectively of Majon-ni. Their decisions were based
largely on the findings of the 181st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)
team and the battalion S-2, Second Lieutenant Frederick W. Hopkins.
The CIC specialists proved to be indispensable by contributing daily
intelligence based on civilian as well as POW interrogations.
As might be supposed, the question of whether a transient was an
escaping NKPA soldier or a harmless peasant might have perplexed
Solomon himself. But the Marines came up with a simple off-the-cuff
solution. Time did not permit a lengthy screening, and each Korean
was given a brief examination with the aid of interpreters. If his
head was still close-cropped in the NKPA manner, if his neck showed
a tanned V-line recently left by a uniform, if his feet bore the
tell-tale callouses left by military footgear--if he could not pass
these three tests, the transient was sent to the prison stockade as a
fugitive Red Korean soldier. Now that Chinese Communist troops had been
encountered both on the X Corps and Eighth Army fronts, it was all the
more important that battlewise NKPA elements should be prevented from
joining their new allies if Red China intervened.
Some of the prisoners were admittedly NKPA veterans, weary of the war
and ready to give up voluntarily. Manifestations of this spirit caused
Lieutenant Colonel Ridge to send a radio request for an air drop of
surrender leaflets.
The first full day’s operations, on 29 October, resulted in 24
prisoners being taken. But this was a trickle as compared to the
torrent which would follow until an average daily rate of 82 was
maintained during the 17 days of the operations.
_Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies_
Each of the rifle companies was given the mission of sending out daily
motorized or foot patrols while manning, as required, company OPs. The
three roads were assigned as follows:
George Company (Captain Carl L. Sitter), the road to Wonsan;
How Company (Captain Clarence E. Corley, Jr.) the road to Seoul;
Item Company (First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher), the road to
Pyongyang.[166]
[166] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 4.
All patrols reported negative results throughout the first four days.
Nevertheless, a system of artillery and 81mm mortar harassing and
interdiction fires on suspected Red Korean assembly areas was put into
effect. Major Simmons was designated the Supporting Arms Coordinator
(SAC), and OYs were used for artillery spotting and to call air strikes
when planes were on station.[167]
[167] _Ibid._, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.
The battalion commander emphasized to his officers the necessity for
maintaining as good relations with the inhabitants as security would
permit. Strict troop discipline was to be maintained at all times,
and the villagers were allowed their own mayor and council along with
such laws or customs as did not conflict with the Marine mission.[168]
A policy of justice and fairness had its reward when the inhabitants
warned the CIC team of an impending attack by organized NKPA troops.
[168] LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51.
POW interrogations and reports by civilians identified the enemy
unit as the 15th NKPA Division, including the 45th, 48th, and 50th
regiments, commanded by Major General Pak Sun Chol. Following the NKPA
collapse, the division had been able to maintain its organization
while infiltrating northward from the Pusan Perimeter and raiding the
villages for food. The mission was reported to be the occupation and
control of the upper Imjin valley as a base for guerrilla operations,
with the Majon-ni road junction being designated one of the main
objectives.[169]
[169] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 8; 1st MarDiv _PIRs 21_ and
_22_.
Enemy numbers were said to reach a total of 11,000. But that figure,
like most Oriental estimates of numbers, had to be taken with the
traditional grain of salt.
At any rate, the Marines had no further doubt on the morning of
2 November that they were opposed by a resolute enemy skilled at
guerrilla tactics. Second Lieutenant Harvey A. Goss’ platoon of How
Company, reinforced with 81mm mortars, light machine guns, an artillery
forward observer (FO) team and a FAC, was ambushed in a deep gorge
five miles south of Majon-ni while conducting a motorized patrol. The
Marines, raked by rifle and automatic small-arms fire from an unseen
enemy hidden along the heights on both sides, got off only the message,
“We’ve been hit, send help, send help” before the radio was hit.[170]
[170] The account of the How Company ambush is derived from:
3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5; VMF-312 _SAR_, 8–9; 3/1
memo: “Summary of Friendly Situation as of 1600,” 2 Nov
50; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 8_, 3; 2/11 _SAR_, 16; Simmons
interv, 4 Nov 55; and ltr, 14 Jan 56; Capt R. A. Doyle
Comments, n. d.; Maj C. E. Corley Comments, n. d.
Effective deployment in the narrow road was prevented by stalled
vehicles. Casualties were mounting when Second Lieutenant Kenneth A.
Bott and PFC Donald O. Hoffstetter ran the gauntlet of fire in a jeep.
They reached Majon-ni unhurt although one tire of the jeep had been
shot.
The 3/1 CP was delayed in summoning air because of the difficulties
in radio transmission.[171] This break in communications alarmed
Major Simmons, acting as SAC. He persuaded the pilot of an OY to fly
him over the scene of the ambush. From his point of vantage Simmons
had a good view of the deployment of Captain Corley’s remaining two
rifle platoons, riding artillery trucks and reinforced with heavy
machine guns and 81mm mortars, which had been sent out from Majon-ni
to extricate the patrol. The 81mm mortars were set up just off the
road and began pounding the North Korean cliffside positions. PFC Jack
Golden, a one-man task force, climbed with a 94-pound heavy machine
gun to a height where he could fire down on the Communists. Marine
Corsairs came on station, somewhat tardily because of the poor radio
communication, and the remnants of the enemy disappeared into the hills.
[171] As a result of this experience a radio which could
contact planes was later requested. 3/1 msg to CG
1stMarDiv, n. t. 2 Nov 50.
Lieutenant Robert J. Fleischaker, (MC) USN, the battalion medical
officer, and his assistants cared for the less critical Marine
casualties. One man died during the night but most of the others were
evacuated during the next day in three helicopter flights--much to
the astonishment of the natives. Fleischaker and his assistants also
treated Korean civilians on occasion, and the saving of a village boy’s
life by an emergency appendectomy did much to gain the good will of the
community.[172]
[172] LtCol V. J. Gottschalk interv, 21 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle
Comments; Cdr R. J. Fleischaker Comments, n. d.
_Air Drop of Supplies Requested_
Radio communication between Majon-ni and Wonsan was so uncertain,
because of the intervening hill mass, that it was possible to
get through for only a few hours at night. The surest means of
communication was a written message carried by helicopter or OY pilots,
who had to insure delivery to regiment after landing at the Wonsan
airfield.[173]
[173] Col T. L. Ridge, ltr, 28 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments.
The supply problem had already begun to pinch before the first week
ended. A convoy came through from Wonsan without molestation on 29
October, but it was the last for a week. On 1 November, just to play
safe, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge requested a practice air drop which went
off satisfactorily. His judgment was upheld on the morning of the How
Company ambush when a 3/1 supply convoy was attacked seven miles west
of Wonsan (see Map 5) and forced to turn back.
First Lieutenant James D. Beeler commanded the George Company rifle
platoon escorting the column of supply vehicles which was under the
charge of Second Lieutenant James L. Crutchfield of H&S Company. The
third truck in line, loaded with diesel fuel and C-3 composition,[174]
burst into flames after running into a hail of enemy rifle and
automatic weapons bullets. Meanwhile the first two trucks continued
until they came to a roadblock created by blowing a crater. Turning
around under intense fire, they got back to the point of original
ambush just as the other vehicles were trying to reverse direction; and
in the confusion two trucks went off the narrow road, making a total of
three lost.
[174] C-3 composition is a powerful, putty-like explosive used
chiefly by military engineers for demolitions work.
A flight of three VMF-312 Corsairs led by Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank
Cole dispersed an enemy force estimated at 200 to 300 men. The convoy
was extricated and brought back to Wonsan after the 1st Marines sent
out a task force consisting of four tanks, a tank dozer and six trucks
filled with infantry. Personnel losses in the ambush were nine men
killed and 15 wounded.[175]
[175] S-2 1stMar to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1200 2 Nov 50; 1stMar tel to
G-3 1stMarDiv, 1115 2 Nov 50; VMF-312 _SAR_, 8–9; 1stTkBn
_SAR_, 11; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, 2–3; 1stLt J. L.
Crutchfield ltr to CMC, 23 Jan 56.
Ridge now had to call for an air drop in earnest. Gasoline, rations,
grenades and artillery, mortar and machine gun ammunition to a total of
more than 21 tons were packaged at the Wonsan airfield on 2 November
by Captain Hersel D. C. Blasingame’s 1st Air Delivery Platoon. Four
hours after the receipt of the message, the Air Force C-47s released
152 parachutes over the Majon-ni perimeter. This was one of the 141
replenishment missions of the Air Delivery Platoon in November,
amounting to 864 man-hours of flying time and 377 tons of supplies
dropped.[176]
[176] 1stAirDelPlat, _HD_, _Nov 50_; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_,
3.
Less than the usual amount of breakage resulted, but Colonel Puller
considered it so necessary to push a truck convoy through to
Majon-ni that he assigned a rifle company as guards. This mission
fell to Captain Barrow’s Able Company, reinforced by one platoon of
Captain Lester G. Harmon’s Company C engineers, Technical Sergeant
Shelly Wiggins’ section of 81mm mortars, and Second Lieutenant
Harold L. Coffman’s section of 75mm recoilless rifles. Thirty-four
supply vehicles were in the column which left Wonsan at 1430 on 4
November.[177]
[177] The rest of this section is based upon these sources: Maj
R. H. Barrow interv, 7 Oct 55; ExecO 1stMar tel to G-3,
1stMarDiv 3 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2010 5
Nov 50; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, 3–4.
The late hour of departure was a handicap; and though an OY flew
reconnaissance, the convoy had no FAC. A TACP jeep well back in the
column could communicate with the OY, which relayed the message to the
two VMF-312 Corsairs on station.
Barrow reasoned that because so many of the enemy roadblocks required
engineer equipment, it would be advisable for Harmon’s vehicles to
lead, followed by First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s infantry
platoon. This scheme promised well when four undefended crater
roadblocks were encountered and speedily filled in by the engineers.
The fifth, however, was the scene of an ambush by Red Koreans occupying
the steep heights on both sides of the narrow, winding road.
The engineers soon had a hot fire fight on their hands. Taking cover
behind the vehicles, they gave a good account of themselves. But the
stalled trucks delayed the infantry platoon coming to their aid;
and lack of a FAC resulted in less effective close air support than
the Corsairs usually rendered. Thus, with the early November dusk
approaching, Captain Barrow decided on a return to Wonsan.
By a near-miracle the trucks turned about safely on the narrow shelf
that passed for a road. As the enemy long-range fire increased, Barrow
ordered lights out when the column commenced its eight-mile return
trip. In the darkness a truck loaded with 20 Marines missed a hairpin
turn and plunged over the edge. Fortunately, the accident happened at
one of the few spots where the vehicle could land on a wooded shoulder
instead of hurtling through space to the rocky valley floor several
hundred feet below. It was found that nothing worse than broken bones
and concussion had resulted after a human chain brought the injured men
back up to the road.
Lights were turned on and the convoy got back without further trouble.
Barrow reported to his regimental commander at Togwon that his losses
amounted to eight men wounded and 16 injured in addition to five
vehicles destroyed.
Colonel Puller assured him that his failure had been due to an
unavoidably late start and lack of a FAC rather than faulty judgment.
The following morning, after departing Wonsan at 0830, the air
controller was not needed. Barrow had put into effect a new tactical
plan based on the premise that the guerrillas of Ambush Alley would be
waiting as usual for the sound of approaching trucks. He prepared a
surprise, therefore, by directing his infantry platoons to take turns
at leading the column on foot, keeping a thousand yards or more in
advance of the vehicles.
The scheme worked to perfection as Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones’
platoon rounded a bend near the scene of yesterday’s ambush and
surprised about 70 guerrillas as they were eating. The ambushers had
in effect been ambushed. The Marines opened up with everything they
had, and only a few of the Reds escaped with their lives. There was
no further trouble after the convoy got under way again, arriving
at Majon-ni early in the afternoon of 5 November without a single
casualty. Losses of 51 killed and three prisoners were inflicted on the
enemy.
_First Attack on Perimeter_
The supplies were no less welcome than the Marines who brought
them, for the CIC team had warned of an attack on Majon-ni at 0100
the following night. Colonel Puller placed Able Company under the
operational control of 3/1 for the defense, and the commanding officer
assigned the three rifle platoons and their reinforcing elements a
sector between How and George Companies on the perimeter.
This addition to his strength made it possible for Lieutenant
Colonel Ridge to send out his executive officer, Major Reginald R.
Myers, in command of a motorized patrol large enough to cope with a
reported enemy build-up of 2000 to 3000 men about six miles northwest
of Majon-ni on the Pyongyang road. Intelligence received by Corps
indicated that this force was assembling in an old mining area, and a
3/1 reconnaissance in force was ordered.
The Marine task force, consisting of George and Item Companies, plus
elements of Weapons Company, was supported by artillery from Majon-ni.
Nothing more formidable was encountered than a few guerrillas firing at
long-range, but Myers brought back 81 willing prisoners.[178]
[178] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _9_;
Ridge ltr, 28 Nov 55; Narrative of Capt H. L. Coffman, n.
d.
That night at 0130, trip flares and exploding booby traps were the
prelude to the first NKPA probing attacks on the perimeter. The enemy
was half an hour late, but otherwise the assault developed pretty much
as the CIC team had predicted, even to the identification of elements
of the 45th Regiment of the 15th NKPA Division. The assailants showed
no disposition to close, and the assault turned into a desultory fire
fight. At 0500, with a fog reducing visibility almost to zero, the
enemy could be heard but not seen in his assault on the battalion
OP. This position was located on the How Company front and manned by
wiremen and artillery and mortar FO teams. When their ammunition ran
out, these Marines were forced to withdraw; but Captain Thomas E.
McCarthy, Second Lieutenants Charles Mattox and Charles R. Stiles with
an assortment of H&S Company personnel recaptured the position the
moment that the fog lifted. The enemy withdrew into the hills after the
Corsairs came on station, and the action ended at 0730 with two wounded
Marines representing the casualty list of 3/1 in the engagement.[179]
[179] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0945 7 Nov 50. 1stMar
_SAR_, 10, 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5–6; 2/11 _SAR_,
17; Capt C. R. Stiles ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 25 Jan
56; Corley Comments.
Able Company returned to Wonsan that morning with 619 of the prisoners
who had been accumulating at Majon-ni until the stockade was almost
overflowing with Korean humanity. Captain Barrow packed the captives
into open trucks covered with tarpaulins. This precaution was taken
in order not to advertise the nature of the cargo while passing
through Ambush Alley, since it might be embarrassing if the guerrillas
attempted to liberate prisoners who outnumbered their keepers three to
one.
Simultaneously with the return of Able Company, Colonel Puller ordered
his 2d Battalion (-) to proceed via the Majon-ni road to Munchon-ni.
Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s mission was similar to that of Lieutenant
Colonel Ridge at Majon-ni: to block enemy movement along the trails
leading north and to screen civilians. The hamlet of Munchon-ni
squatted near the top of the highest pass along Ambush Alley. Trucks
could be supplied for only one reinforced rifle company--Easy--which
departed Wonsan at 0830.
Four miles short of the objective, the motorized column entered a
horseshoe bend large enough to contain all the vehicles. On the left
of the road was a sheer drop, and on the right rose cliffs 200 feet in
height. The last truck had just entered the bend when the first was
stopped by a landslide roadblock. As the column ground to a halt the
enemy opened up with rifles and automatic weapons from well camouflaged
positions in the high ground at the far end of the horseshoe.[180]
[180] The account of the Easy Company ambush is derived from:
1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 2/1 _SAR_, 6–7; Col A. Sutter
Comments 2 Feb 56; TSgt H. T. Jones ltr, n. d.
The Marines scrambled out of the trucks and returned the fire. But it
was necessary to attack in order to dislodge the enemy, and during
the advance Easy Company took a total of 46 casualties--8 KIA and
38 WIA--in addition to six wounded truck drivers. Five of the seven
officers were wounded, including the company commander, Captain Charles
D. Frederick.
It was estimated that the roadblock had been defended by about 200 Red
Koreans, who left 61 counted dead behind them and probably removed at
least as many wounded. Fifty cases of 120mm mortar ammunition were
destroyed by the Marines and 300 cases of small arms cartridges.
At 1615 Sutter and the remainder of the 2/1 force arrived on the scene
from Wonsan just as Able Company and its prisoners appeared from the
opposite direction. Helicopters having already evacuated the Easy
Company’s critical casualties, Able Company brought the lightly wounded
and prisoners to Wonsan without further enemy interference. Sutters’
force proceeded to Munchon-ni as originally planned.
_KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni_
At Majon-ni an OP manned by two squads of Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s
2d Platoon of How Company was threatened with encirclement on the 8th
when a Red Korean force gradually built up to an estimated 250 men
worked around to the rear. The other two platoons of the company,
reinforced with heavy machine guns and an Item Company platoon, were
sent out from the perimeter. Artillery and mortars helped to scatter
the enemy in confusion with estimated 40 per cent losses. Marine
casualties were one man killed and ten wounded.[181]
[181] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 6. 1stMar ISUM, 1200 9 Nov 50;
2/11 _SAR_, 17; Capt R. A. Mason Comments, 25 Jan 56. See
also Corley Comments.
On 10 November, reflecting the concern of CO 1st Marines over enemy
activity in the Majon-ni area, the 3d KMC Battalion arrived as
reinforcements together with a convoy of supplies. CO 3/1 assigned the
unit to the sector in the perimeter recently vacated by Able Company of
1/1.[182]
[182] 2/1 _SAR_, 7. Ridge, _Notes_.
The celebration of the 175th birthday of the U. S. Marine Corps was not
neglected at Majon-ni. Somehow the cooks managed to bake a prodigious
cake, with thinly spread jam serving as frosting, and all hands were
rotated a few at a time to their company CPs to receive a slice.[183]
[183] Geer, _The New Breed_, 215.
That afternoon an OY of VMO-6 spotted an estimated 300 enemy
troops about four miles west of Majon-ni. Under direction of the
aerial observers, Captain Strohmenger’s howitzers broke up this
concentration.[184]
[184] VMO-6 _SAR_, 8; X Corps, _Guerrilla Activities X Corps
Zone, Nov 50_, 1; 1stMarDiv _PIR 18_; 2/11 _SAR_, 17.
The CIC team warned that another attack on the perimeter by the 45th
NKPA Regiment would take place on the night of 11–12 November. As
a prelude, General Pak made an effort to terrorize inhabitants who
had kept the team informed of his plans and movements. Some of the
villagers took his threats seriously enough to prepare for a hurried
leavetaking, but the Civil Affairs section reassured them and put a
curfew into effect.[185]
[185] Col T. L. Ridge interv, 22 Nov 55.
After such a menacing build-up, the second attack on the perimeter
fizzled out like a damp firecracker. A few probing jabs, beginning at
0130, were followed by a weak main assault on the KMC front which was
easily repulsed. The enemy tried again to overrun the OP but gave up
the attempt after stumbling into a field of “Bouncing Betty” mines.
At 0600 the last action of the Majon-ni operation came to an end as
the Communists withdrew. Friendly losses were two men killed and six
wounded.[186]
[186] 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_, 6. 1stMarDiv _URpt_ (_S-3_)
9. 1stMar _SAR_, 11; 2/11 _SAR_, 17. The “Bouncing Betty”
type of antipersonnel mine was equipped with a spring
which sent it several feet into the air to explode with
maximum destructive effect.
This was the final appearance of the 15th NKPA Division, which
apparently abandoned Majon-ni as an objective and transferred its
guerrilla operations southward along the Imjin valley. The relief of
the Marines and KMCs on position began the next afternoon as elements
of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U. S. 3d Infantry Division,
arrived to take over the perimeter.
The Army column, including 34 Marine supply vehicles, had moved out
from Wonsan at 1030 the day before. Although 2/1 (less Dog Company)
had maintained its blocking positions at Munchon-ni, the convoy was
stopped a few miles beyond the Marine outposts by a wrecked bridge and
three large craters. Guerrillas poured in small-arms fire from the high
ground which resulted in two soldiers being killed and four wounded.
Two Marine trucks and a jeep were destroyed.
Extensive repairs to the road being needed, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
M. Blanchard, the commanding officer of 1/15, formed a defensive
perimeter for the night. The column reached Majon-ni without further
incident at 1530 on the 13th.[187]
[187] Air Off 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1445 12 Nov 50;
S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1845 12 Nov 50; LnO
1stMar tel to 1stMarDiv, 1530 14 Nov 50; G-3 1stMarDiv
tel to S-3 1stMar, 1600 14 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv _POR 146_;
3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 3–4, 6–7; 2/1 _SAR_, 9; 1stMar
_SAR_, 11–12; Capt Max W. Dolcater, USA, _3d Infantry
Division in Korea_ (Tokyo, 1953), 73; Ridge Comments, 28
Feb 56.
Following relief by the Army unit, the Marine battalion departed
at 1015 on the 14th by truck for the Wonsan area. A total of 1395
prisoners had been taken during the 17 days of Majon-ni--a large
proportion of them voluntary--and more than 4000 Korean transients
screened. Enemy battle casualties were estimated at 525 killed and an
unknown number wounded.[188]
[188] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_. General Ruffner, Chief of
Staff of X Corps, later commented: “Personally, I always
had a feeling that the Marines did a masterful job at
Majon-ni. To begin with, it was a very tough assignment
and in the second place I always felt that it broke up
what remained of organized units in the North Korean Army
that would otherwise have given us a tremendous amount of
trouble in our backyard at Wonsan. A lot of determined
enemy action on our perimeter at Wonsan would have been
most disconcerting, troublesome, and unquestionably
slowed down our subsequent movement to the north.” MajGen
C. L. Ruffner ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 13 Jan 56.
Losses of the Marine battalion numbered 65--16 KIA, 4 DOW and 45 WIA.
Non-battle casualties were remarkably low, owing to strict enforcement
of sanitary and health regulations.[189]
[189] 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_, 7.
The vulnerability of a tenuous MSR must also be taken into account, and
casualties of nine killed and 81 wounded or injured were incurred by
Marines escorting supply convoys through Ambush Alley.
_Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong_
From the 1st Marines in the Wonsan area to the 7th Marines leading the
northward advance, a distance of more than 130 road miles separated the
elements of the 1st Marine Division. But the arrival of more U. S. Army
units made possible a first step toward concentration.
On 29 October the 17th RCT of the 7th Infantry Division had begun
landing at Iwon (see Map 2), about 60 air miles northeast of Hungnam.
Other units and reinforcing elements followed until all had completed
unloading by 8 November--a total of 28,995 troops, 5924 vehicles, and
30,016 short tons of cargo.[190]
[190] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 13–14; X Corps _WD_,
29 Oct 50; X Corps _POR 35_.
Transports had been sent by CTF-90 on 31 October to Moji, Japan, for
the first units of the 3d Infantry Division. The 65th RCT landed at
Wonsan on 5 November, but it was not until the 18th that the last
elements arrived.[191] All four of the major units of X Corps--the two
Army divisions as well as the 1st Marine Division and I ROK Corps--were
then in the zone of operations, even though dispersed over a wide area.
[191] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; X Corps _WD_,
5 Nov 50; X Corps _POR 40_.
The commanding generals of both Army units were “old China hands.”
Major General Robert H. Soule, CG 3d Infantry Division, had been U. S.
military attaché in Nationalist China during the last months of the
civil war. During this same period Major General David G. Barr, CG 7th
Infantry Division, was senior officer of the United States Military
Advisory Group in China.[192]
[192] Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs,
Department of State, _United States Relations with
China: With Spacial Reference to the Period 1944–1949_
(hereafter _U. S. Relations with China_), (Washington,
1949), 318, 331.
On 31 October, by order of ComNavFE, JTF-7 had been dissolved and the
TG 95.2 Support and Covering Group passed to the operational control
of CTF-90, Admiral Doyle. As the center of gravity of X Corps gradually
shifted to the north, General Almond moved his advanced CP from Wonsan
to Hamhung on 2 November and the remainder of his headquarters on the
10th. He was joined four days later by Admiral Doyle and his staff as
the _Mount McKinley_ anchored off Hungnam.[193]
[193] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; ComNavFE msg
to NavFE, 0204 30 Oct 50; X Corps _POR 150_; LtGen E. A.
Craig ltr, 20 Feb 56.
The 1st Marine Division CP had displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam on 4
November as the 5th and 7th Marines carried out assignments in the
north. This movement included 2/5, which had been under the operational
control of the 1st Marines for patrolling missions in the Wonsan area.
Not until a week later was General Smith able to plan the northward
advance of Colonel Puller’s regiment. On the 12th, X Corps OpnO 6
directed the 3d Infantry Division to relieve elements of the 1st
Marines. The mission of the Army division was to protect the left flank
of X Corps and prepare for an advance to the west.[194]
[194] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50.
For a time it had appeared that 1/1, which had the responsibility for
security in the Wonsan area after its return from Kojo, might be sent
to Chongjin, 220 air miles northeast of Wonsan, in accordance with
X Corps OI-13 of 25 October. This battalion was designated for the
mission in 1stMarDiv OpnO 10-50, issued on 5 November, but four days
later X Corps cancelled this requirement.[195]
[195] 1stMar _OpnO 19-50_, 5 Nov 50; X Corps msg X 14010 9
Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 459–460. 1/5 had been initially
assigned as the standby BLT but was replaced by 1/1 on
its return from Kojo.
Before departing the Wonsan area, Puller’s headquarters had another
false alarm. Small craft sighted by air on 8 November, and two
mysterious explosions, led to the report that 500 to 1000 enemy boats
were attempting an amphibious landing ten miles north of Wonsan.
An armored patrol of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, was sent to
investigate but reported no contact.[196]
[196] 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50;
1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 14. Ruffner ltr
13 Jan 56.
X Corps directed that upon the relief of the Marines by the 3d Infantry
Division, the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions, which had been under the
operational control of RCT-1, would then be attached to the Army
unit.[197]
[197] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 492–493;
Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 73; CG
1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50.
After lack of transport imposed a delay of two days, 1/1 initiated
the northward movement of RCT-1 by rail and closed Chigyong, eight
miles southwest of Hamhung, by 1820, 14 November. A motor convoy
followed.[198]
[198] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 145; Smith, _Notes_, 494; 1/1 msg to
CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry
Division in Korea_, 73.
Relief of 2/1(-), which had been holding screening and blocking
positions on Ambush Alley, was completed on the 15th by the 3d
Battalion of the 15th Infantry. Other Army elements relieved Dog
Company in the rear area near Wonsan. On the 16th 2/1 moved by rail
to Chigyong, followed by 3/1 and the last elements of RCT-1 the next
day.[199]
[199] 2/1 _SAR_, 9–10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15
Nov 50; 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_; 1stMar _SAR_, 12;
1stMarDiv _POR 154_; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in
Korea_, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56.
Thus the 1st Marine Division achieved a relative and temporary degree
of concentration. The farthest distance between components had been
reduced from 130 to less than 60 miles by the middle of November, but a
new dispersion of units was already in progress.