The Wonsan Landing
_ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and Embarkation--Two
Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at
Objective--MacArthur Orders Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine
Division_
On 6 OCTOBER 1950, after the arrival of the initial assault shipping
at Inchon, General Smith ordered the 1st Marine Division to commence
embarkation on the 8th. Similar instructions were issued by X Corps
the following day.[44] Thus, the first troops and equipment were to be
loaded even before the G-2 Section of the Landing Force could begin
evaluating the enemy situation at the objective, since it was not until
8 October that the intelligence planners received X Corps’ OpnO 4,
published four days earlier. Summing up the outlook at the time, G-2
later reported:
[44] 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (_EmbO_) 2-50, 6 Oct 50;
Smith, _Notes_, 394.
Inasmuch as subordinate units of the Division were scheduled to
embark aboard ship some time prior to 15 October 1950, it was
immediately obvious that preliminary intelligence planning, with
its attendant problems of collection, processing, and distribution
of information, and the procurement and distribution of graphic
aids, would be both limited and sketchy.... Fortunately ...
the section [G-2] had been previously alerted on the projected
operation, and while elements of the Division were yet engaged with
the enemy at Uijongbu, had requested reproductions of some 100
copies of pertinent extracts of the JANIS (75) of Korea. Thus it
was ... that subordinate units would not be wholly unprepared for
the coming operation.[45]
[45] G-2 _SAR_, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint
Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
General Smith’s OpnO 16-50, published on 10 October, climaxed the
accelerated planning at Inchon. Worked out jointly by the staffs
of PhibGruOne and the 1st Marine Division, this directive covered
the Wonsan attack in detail and pinpointed subordinate unit
responsibilities.
Kalma Peninsula was chosen as the point of assault, with two beaches,
YELLOW and BLUE, marked off on the eastern shore. Ten high-ground
objectives described the semicircular arc of the beachhead, which
focused on Wonsan and fanned out as far as five miles inland. The 1st
and 7th Marines were to hit YELLOW and BLUE Beaches, respectively and
drive inland to their assigned objectives. The 5th, upon being ordered
ashore, would assemble west of Wonsan, prepared for further operations.
Two battalions of the 11th Marines were to land on call in direct
support of the assault units, and the remainder of the artillery would
initially function in general support.
Other subordinate units drew the usual assignments. The Reconnaissance
Company, after landing on order, was to screen the Division’s left
flank by occupying specified objectives. Attached to the 1st and 7th
Regiments respectively, the 5th and 3d Korean Marine Corps (KMC)
Battalions would also go ashore on call.[46]
[46] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 16-50_, 10 Oct 50.
_ROK Army Captures Wonsan_
At 0815, 10 October, coincidentally with the publication of 1stMarDiv
OpnO 16-50, troops of I ROK Corps, advancing rapidly up the east coast
of Korea, entered Wonsan. By evening of the next day, the ROK 3d and
Capital Divisions were mopping up minor resistance in the city and
guarding the airfield on Kalma Peninsula.[47]
[47] EUSAK _War Diary Summary_ (_WD Sum_), _Oct 50_, 14–16.
Overland seizure of the 1st Marine Division’s amphibious objective did
not come as a surprise either at GHQ in Tokyo or at General Smith’s CP
aboard the _Mount McKinley_ in Inchon Harbor. General MacArthur had, in
fact, prepared for this eventuality by considering an alternate assault
landing at Hungnam, another major seaport, about 50 air miles north
of Wonsan. On 8 October, therefore, the JSPOG completed a modified
version of CinCFE OpnPlan 9-50. Eighth Army’s mission--the capture of
Pyongyang--remained unchanged in this draft, but X Corps would now
land “... in the vicinity of Hungnam in order to cut the lines of
communications north of Wonsan and envelop the North Korean forces in
that area.”
Although the choice of a new objective seemed logical on the basis of
the ROK Army’s accomplishment, certain logistical obstacles at once
loomed in the path of the alternate plan. Not unaware of the most
imposing of these, JSPOG commented:
The harbor at Wonsan cannot accommodate at docks the large vessels
lifting the 7th Division. Since most of the amphibious type boats
are carried on ships lifting the 1st Marine Division, the plans for
off-loading the 7th Division will have to be revised.[48]
[48] CinCFE _OpnPlan 9-50_ (_Alternate_), 8 Oct 50.
But the plans for off-loading the 7th Division could not be revised. If
the Army unit was to land within a reasonable length of time, it would
have to go in on the heels of the 1st Marine Division, using the same
landing craft. If the ship-to-shore movement took place at Hungnam,
the 7th Division would be ill-disposed for beginning its overland
drive to Pyongyang as planned; for it would have to backtrack by land
almost all the way to Wonsan. On the other hand, if the Army division
landed at Wonsan while the Marines assaulted Hungnam, the Navy would
be handicapped not only by the lack of landing craft but also by the
problem of sweeping mines from both harbors simultaneously.
From the standpoint of Admiral Joy in Japan and Admiral Doyle in Korea,
there was insufficient time for planning a new tactical deployment
of X Corps at this late date. And the time-space handicap would be
compounded by serious shortages of mine sweepers and intelligence
information. Joy was unsuccessful on 8 October in his first attempt to
dissuade MacArthur from the new idea. On the 9th, unofficial word of
the pending change reached General Smith at Inchon, just as his staff
wound up work on the draft for the Wonsan assault. ComNavFE persisted
in his arguments with the commander in chief, however, with the final
result that on 10 October the original plan for landing the whole X
Corps at Wonsan was ordered into effect.[49] Coming events were to
uphold the Navy viewpoint; for while the Wonsan landing itself was
delayed several days by enemy mines, it was 15 November before the
first ships safely entered the harbor at Hungnam.[50]
[49] C/S Notes in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne,
“Report of ... Operations ... 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,”
11; Smith, _Chronicle_, 57–59; and Capt Walter Karig,
_et al_, _Battle Report_: _The War In Korea_ (New York,
1952), 301–302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur’s G-3,
“Admiral Joy may have ‘discussed’ this often with the
Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever ‘argued’ with him.”
Wright ltr 16 Feb 56.
[50] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
_Marine Loading and Embarkation_
On 11 October, the day after he opened his CP on the _Mount McKinley_,
General Smith learned that the Hungnam plan had been dropped. The 1st
Marine Division continued loading out in accordance with X Corps OpnO
4, even though its objective had already been captured.[51]
[51] Smith, _Chronicle_, 59.
During the period 4–10 October, Admiral Doyle had assembled at Inchon
an assortment of Navy amphibious vessels, ships of the Military Sea
Transport Service (MSTS), and Japanese-manned LSTs (SCAJAP).[52] With
the arrival of Transport Squadron One on 8 October, the total shipping
assigned to the landing force consisted of one AGC, eight APAs,
two APs, 10 AKAs, five LSDs, 36 LSTs, three LSUs, one LSM, and six
commercial cargo vessels (“Victory” and C-2 types).[53]
[52] ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 10. SCAJAP is the
abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under
this designation were American ships lent to Japan after
World War II, of which many were recalled during the
Korean War to serve as cargo vessels.
[53] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex D (hereafter G-4 _SAR_), 2.
Loading a reinforced division, several thousand Corps troops and
thousands of tons of supplies and equipment proved to be an aggravating
job under the circumstances. Pressure on the attack and landing forces
for an early D-Day only magnified the shortcomings of Inchon as a port.
Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock activity to
a series of feverish bursts. Moreover, many ships not part of the
amphibious force had to be accommodated since they were delivering
vital materiel. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate, according
to the Division G-4 and “considerable quantities” of vehicles had to be
left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was temporarily
diverted to help transport the 7th Infantry Division to Pusan; and
although unavailable for port operations when needed, it returned at
the last minute to disrupt outloading of the Shore Party’s heavy beach
equipment.[54] Out of conditions and developments such as these grew
the necessity for postponing D-Day from 15 October, the date initially
set by General Almond, to the 20th.
[54] _Ibid._, 3.
For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping
space, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to out-load with less
than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force.[55]
Resupply shipping would be so scheduled as to deliver adequate stocks
of Class I, II, III, and IV consumables “... prior to the time they
would be needed,” even though when “they would be needed” was anybody’s
guess at this stage of the war.[56]
[55] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days;
individual assault rations for one day; POL for five
days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five
units of fire (U/F). _Ibid._; 1stMarDiv _Administrative
Order_ (_AdmO_) 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a
convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of
ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds
per weapon.
[56] G-4 _SAR_, 1.
In anticipation of a rapid advance to the west (which did not
materialize), Division G-4 not only assigned 16 pre-loaded trucks
and trailers to each RCT, but also earmarked three truck companies
and 16 more trailers as a mobile logistical reserve. These supply
trains would stay on the heels of the attacking regiments in order to
maintain ammunition dumps as far forward as possible in a fast-moving
situation.[57]
[57] _Ibid._, 3.
On 8 October, ComNavFE directed Admiral Doyle and General Smith to
effect his OpnPlan 113-50.[58] Coincidentally, the first contingents of
the 5th Marines boarded the _Bayfield_ (1/5), _George Clymer_ (2/5),
and _Bexar_ (3/5). Three days later, on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel
Raymond L. Murray, commander of the reserve regiment, opened his CP in
the _Bayfield_, and his unit completed embarkation.[59]
[58] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others,
0200 8 Oct 50.
[59] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv
_SAR_, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 _SAR_), 4,
appendix B (hereafter 2/5 _SAR_), 6, and appendix C
(hereafter 3/5 _SAR_), 4.
Although reserve and administrative elements of the 1st and 7th Marines
loaded earlier, the four assault battalions of these regiments could
not begin embarkation until 13 October, owing to the fact that the LSTs
had been used for shuttle service around Inchon Harbor. General Smith
opened his CP in the _Mount McKinley_ at 1200 on the 11th.[60] The
last of the landing ships were loaded by high tide on the morning of
the 15th, and later that day all of them sailed for the objective. By
evening of the 16th, most of the transports were on the way, but the
_Mount McKinley_ and _Bayfield_ did not depart until the next day.[61]
[60] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith,
_Notes_, 373.
[61] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar _SAR_), 9;
Smith, _Notes_, 399, 409; 1stMar _HD Oct 50_, 3.
Broken down into seven embarkation groups, the landing force and X
Corps troops leaving Inchon comprised a grand total of 1902 officers
and 28,287 men. Of this number, 1461 officers and 23,938 men were on
the rolls of the 1st Marine Division, the breakdown being as follows:
Marine officers 1119
Marine enlisted 20,597
Navy officers 153
Navy enlisted 1002
U. S. Army & KMC officers attached 189
U. S. Army & KMC enlisted attached 2339[62]
[62] 1stMarDiv _Embarkation Summary_, 16 Oct 50; and “Special
Report 1stMarDiv,” 12.
Even in the last stages of loading and during the actual departure,
new orders had continued to flow out of higher headquarters. It
will be recalled that General Smith issued his OpnO 16-50 for the
Wonsan assault on 10 October. An alternate plan, to be executed on
signal, went out to subordinate units the same day, providing for an
administrative landing by the Division on RED Beach, north of Wonsan,
instead of Kalma Peninsula.[63]
[63] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 17-50_, 10 Oct 50.
As a result of discussions during a X Corps staff conference on 13
October, a party headed by General Almond flew to Wonsan the next
day.[64] The purpose of his visit was to reconnoiter the objective
and to explain his latest operational directive to the I ROK Corps
commander, who would come under his control.[65] This new order,
published on the 14th, called for an administrative landing by X
Corps and a rapid advance westward along the Wonsan--Pyongyang axis
to a juncture with EUSAK. Assigned to the 1st Marine Division was an
objective northeast of Pyongyang, the Red capital.[66]
[64] “... Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown
to Wonsan in accordance with a definite plan which
materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a
matter of fact the personnel for these parties and even
some of the jeeps were already loaded out and had to be
removed from the shipping prior to our sailing.” Col A.
L. Bowser, Comments, n. d.
[65] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith,
_Chronicle_, 59.
[66] X Corps _Operation Instruction_ (_OI_) _11_, 14 Oct 50;
Smith, _Notes_, 385.
It was this tactical scheme, then, that prevailed as the Marines
departed Inchon from 15 to 17 October and the 7th Infantry Division
prepared to embark from Pusan. General Smith, of course, placed into
effect his alternate order for a landing on RED Beach.[67] While there
may be a note of humor in the fact that on 15 October ComPhibGruOne
issued his OpnO 16-50 for the “assault landing” at Wonsan, it must be
remembered that the ship-to-shore movement would remain essentially
the same from the Navy’s standpoint, regardless of the swift march of
events ashore.
[67] According to General Smith, “The reason for issuing
1stMarDiv OpnO 17-50 was to provide for an administrative
landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where
there would be easy access to the existing road net. The
ship-to-shore movement provided for in 1stMarDiv OpnO
16-50 was retained intact. This plan [OpnO 17-50] had
to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was
completely blocked by mines, and that it would be much
quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula
where we eventually landed ... 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450
24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv OpnOs 16 and 17 and
provided for an administrative landing on the Kalma
Peninsula as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to
authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated,
letters may be assumed to be to the authors.
_Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping_
Mine sweeping for the Wonsan landing commenced on 8 October, when Task
Group 95.6, commanded by Captain Spofford, began assembling for the
mission of clearing a path ahead of the 250-ship armada bringing the
1st Marine Division and other units of X Corps. It had been known for a
month that the waters of the east coast were dangerous for navigation.
The first mine was discovered off Chinnampo on the west coast on 7
September, and four days later Admiral Joy ordered the United Nations
Blocking and Escort Force to stay on the safe side of the 100-fathom
line along the east coast. But it was not until 26 and 28 September
that more definite information was acquired the hard way when the U. S.
destroyer _Brush_ and the ROK mine sweeper _YMS 905_ were damaged by
east coast mines.[68]
[68] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1090.
On the 28th ComNavFE issued his OpnO 17-50 covering operations of mine
sweepers in Korean waters. The herculean task awaiting the 12 available
American vessels of this type may be judged by the fact that more than
a hundred had been employed off Okinawa in World War II.
Although the exact date remained unknown, it was a safe assumption
that North Korean mining activities, beginning in late July or early
August, were speeded by the Inchon landing, which aroused the enemy
to the peril of further amphibious operations. Russian instructors
had trained Korean Reds at Wonsan and Chinnampo in the employment of
Soviet-manufactured mines. Sampans, junks, and wooden coastal barges
were used to sow a field of about 2000 in the harbor and approaches to
Wonsan.[69]
[69] _Ibid._, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, _Notes_, 404; Karig,
_Korea_, 301. See also ADVATIS Rpt 1225 in EUSAK _WD_, 24
Oct 50.
Captain Spofford’s TG 95.6 commenced its sweep off Wonsan on 10 October
after a sortie from Sasebo. Unfortunately, the three large fleet
sweepers, _Pledge_, _Pirate_, and _Incredible_, were not well adapted
to the shallow sweeping necessary at Wonsan. More dependence could
be placed in the seven small wooden-hulled U. S. motor mine sweepers
_Redhead_, _Mocking Bird_, _Osprey_, _Chatterer_, _Merganser_, _Kite_,
and _Partridge_, which were rugged even though low-powered. Spofford’s
two big high-speed sweepers, _Doyle_ and _Endicott_, had their
limitations for this type of operation; and the nine Japanese and
three ROK sweepers lacked some of the essential gear.[70]
[70] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1004;
Dept Army, Joint Daily Situation Report (D/A Daily
SitRpt) 105; Karig, _Korea_, 311–314.
The U. S. destroyers _Collett_, _Swenson_, _Maddox_, and _Thomas_ were
in the Wonsan area as well as the cruiser _Rochester_. On the 9th the
_Rochester’s_ helicopter sighted 61 mines in a reconnaissance, and the
next day the observer found them too numerous to count. In spite of
these grim indications, rapid progress the first day led to predictions
of a brief operation. By late afternoon a 3000-yard channel had been
cleared from the 100-fathom curve to the 30-fathom line. But hopes
were dashed at this point by the discovery of five additional lines of
mines.[71]
[71] Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE
Intelligence Summary (IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations
Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt 105; Karig,
_Korea_, 315.
On 12 and 13 October the naval guns of TG 95.2 bombarded Tanchon and
Songjin on the northeast coast. While the USS _Missouri_ treated the
marshaling yards of Tanchon to 163 16″ rounds, the cruisers _Helena_,
_Worcester_, and _Ceylon_ fired at bridges, shore batteries, and
tunnels in the Chongjin area.[72]
[72] ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in
CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, 13–15;
ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in _Ibid._, 7.
Spofford tried to save time on the morning of the 12th by
counter-mining as 39 planes from the carriers _Leyte Gulf_ and
_Philippine Sea_ dropped 50 tons of bombs. It was found, however,
that even the explosion of a 1000-pound bomb would not set off nearby
mines by concussion.[73] According to Admiral Struble, “The results
of this operation simply bore out our experience in World War II, but
were tried out on the long chance that they might be effective in the
current situation.”[74]
[73] CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal,
X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE
IntSum 82; Karig, _Korea_, 315.
[74] VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.
The 12th was a black day for the sweeping squadron. For the steel
sweepers _Pledge_ and _Pirate_ both were blown up by mines that
afternoon and sank with a total of 13 killed and 87 wounded. Rescue of
the survivors was handicapped by fire from enemy shore batteries.[75]
[75] ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in
CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, H4;
ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15;
Karig, _Korea_, 318–322.
While the blast of a half-ton bomb had not been powerful enough,
Spofford reasoned that depth charges might start a chain reaction in
which mines would detonate mines. But a precision drop by naval planes
met with no success, and there was nothing left but a return to the
slow, weary, and dangerous work of methodical sweeping.[76]
[76] ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82.
The flying boats, Mariners and Sunderlands, were called upon to assist
by conducting systematic aerial searches for moored and drifting
mines, which they destroyed by .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Soon an
effective new technique was developed as the seaplanes carried overlays
of Hydrographic Office charts to be marked with the locations of all
mines sighted. These charts were dropped to the sweepers and were of
considerable assistance in pinpointing literally hundreds of mines.[77]
[77] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt
_Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, D8.
On the 18th one of the Japanese sweepers, the _JMS-14_, hit a mine
and went down. In spite of this loss, the end seemed in sight. No
attempt was being made to clear all the mines; but with a lane swept
into the harbor, it remained only to check the immediate area of the
landing beaches. So hopeful did the outlook appear that it was more
disillusioning when the ROK _YMS 516_ disintegrated on 19 October
after a terrific explosion in the supposedly cleared lane. Thus was TG
95.6 rudely introduced to the fact that the sweepers had to deal with
magnetic mines in addition to the other types. The mechanism could
be set to allow as many as 12 ships to pass over the mine before it
exploded. This meant, of course, that the sweepers must make at least
13 passes over any given area before it could be considered safe.[78]
[78] Smith, _Notes_, 404–407; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326.
The _Mount McKinley_ having arrived off Wonsan that same day, Admiral
Doyle and General Almond, with six members of the X Corps staff, went
by boat to the battleship _Missouri_ for a conference with Admiral
Struble. CJTF-7 asserted that he would not authorize the administrative
landing until the magnetic mines were cleared from the shipping lane--a
task which he estimated would take three more days. This announcement
led to General Almond’s decision to fly ashore in the _Missouri’s_
helicopter on the 20th and establish his CP in Wonsan.[79] So rapidly
had the situation changed, it was hard to remember that this date had
once been set as D-Day when the Marine landing force would fight for a
beachhead.
[79] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith,
_Notes_, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,”
11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean
Conflict,” _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, lxxx,
no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326;
1stMarDiv G-1 Journal 20 Oct 50.
_Operation Yo-Yo_
Shortly after 1700 on the afternoon of 19 October, a rumor swept
through the 250 ships of the Tractor and Transport Groups. “War’s
over!” shouted the excited Marines. “They’re taking us back to Pusan
for embarkation to the States.”
Rumor seemed to have the support of fact on this occasion, for compass
readings left no doubt that the armada had indeed executed a maritime
“about face” to head southward. What the men on the transports did
not know was that the reversal of direction had been ordered for
purely military reasons as a result of the conference that day on the
_Missouri_.
It was puzzling enough to the troops the following morning when the
ships resumed their original course. But this was nothing as compared
to their bewilderment late that afternoon as the Tractor and Transport
Groups turned southward again.
Every twelve hours, in accordance with the directive of CJTF-7,
the fleet was to reverse course, steaming back and forth off the
eastern coast of Korea until the last of the magnetic mines could be
cleared from the lane in preparation for an administrative landing at
Wonsan.[80]
[80] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, _Notes_,
404; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.
Marines have always been ready with a derisive phrase, and “Operation
Yo-Yo” was coined to express their disgust with this interlude of
concentrated monotony. Never did time die a harder death, and never
did the grumblers have so much to grouse about. Letters to wives and
sweethearts took on more bulk daily, and paper-backed murder mysteries
were worn to tatters by bored readers.
On the 22d, at CJTF-7’s regular daily meeting, Admirals Struble and
Doyle conferred in the destroyer _Rowan_ with Admiral Smith and Captain
Spofford. It was agreed that the sweeping could not be completed
until the 24th or 25th, which meant that Operation Yo-Yo might last a
week.[81]
[81] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments,
16 Mar 56.
The situation had its serious aspects on LSTs and transports which
were not prepared for a voyage around Korea taking nearly as long as
a crossing of the Pacific. Food supplies ran low as gastro-enteritis
and dysentery swept through the crowded transports in spite of strict
medical precautions. The MSTS transport _Marine Phoenix_ alone had
a sick list of 750 during the epidemic. A case of smallpox was
discovered on the _Bayfield_, and all crewmen as well as passengers
were vaccinated that same day.[82]
[82] _Ibid._, 11; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex VV, (hereafter
7thMTBn _SAR_), 2; ComPhibGruOne msg to BuMed, 0034 27
Oct 50.
On the 23d, as the _Mount McKinley_ proceeded into the inner harbor
at Wonsan, there could be no doubt that the final mine sweeping would
be completed by the 25th. Operation Yo-Yo came to an end, therefore,
when Admiral Doyle directed the amphibious fleet to arrive on the 25th,
prepared for an administrative landing. The order of entry called for
the Transport Group to take the lead, followed by the vessels of the
Tractor Group.[83]
[83] CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X
Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50.
On the morning of the 25th, Admirals Struble and Doyle held a final
conference with General Almond and Captain Spofford. By this time they
had decided to land the Marines over YELLOW and BLUE Beaches on Kalma
Peninsula, as originally conceived in 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50. The inner
harbor of Wonsan would remain closed until completely clear of mines,
and then it would be developed as a supply base.[84]
[84] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith,
_Notes_, 407; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450
24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56.
_Marine Air First at Objective_
The sense of frustration which oppressed the Marine ground forces
during Operation Yo-Yo would have been increased if they had realized
that the air maintenance crews had beaten them to Wonsan by a margin
of twelve days. Even more humiliating to the landing force troops,
Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell were flown to the objective area. On the
evening of the 24th they put on a USO show spiced with quips at the
expense of the disgruntled Leathernecks in the transports.
Planning for Marine air operations in northeast Korea had been modified
from day to day to keep pace with the rapidly changing strategic
situation. On 11 October, when ROK forces secured Wonsan, preparations
for air support of an assault landing were abandoned. Two days later
Major General Field Harris, CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Tactical
Air Command X Corps (TAC X Corps), flew to Wonsan. After inspecting
the airfield he decided to begin operations without delay.[85]
[85] Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW
_HD_, _Oct 50_; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K (hereafter MAG-12
_SAR_), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF-312 _SAR_), 3, 5–6;
and Smith, _Notes_, 433–441.
These developments, of course, were accompanied by amendments to the
original plan which had assigned Marine Fighter Squadrons (VMFs)-214
and -323 the air support role in the naval task force, with Marine
Aircraft Group (MAG)-12 to be landed as soon as the field at Wonsan was
secured.
In response to changing conditions, VMF-312 aircraft flew from Kimpo
to Wonsan on the 14th, and R5Ds lifted 210 personnel of the advance
echelons of Headquarters Squadron (Hedron)-12, Service Squadron
(SMS)-12, and Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron (VMF(N))-513. Two
LSTs sailed from Kobe with equipment of MAG-12, and Combat Cargo
Command aircraft of Far East Air Force began flying in aviation
gasoline. Bombs and rockets were flown to Wonsan by the planes of
VMF(N)-513.[86]
[86] E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin
Reservoir,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul
52), 19–20; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix H (hereafter
VMF(N)-513 _SAR_), sec 6, 2.
On the 16th, VMFs-214 and -323 departed Sasebo for station off Wonsan
in the CVE’s _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_. From the following day
until the 27th these two fighter squadrons were to provide air cover
for the mine sweeping operations off Wonsan and the ensuing 1st Marine
Division administrative landing.[87]
[87] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF-214
_SAR_), 2.
TAC X Corps OpnO 2-50, issued on 15 October, had contemplated the
opening of the port at Wonsan and arrival of the surface echelon within
three days. Until then the two squadrons at Wonsan airfield were to be
dependent on airlift for all supplies.
The unforeseen ten-day delay in clearing a lane through the mine field
made it difficult to maintain flight operations. Fuel was pumped by
hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled along the ground about
a mile from the dump to the flight line. Muscle also had to substitute
for machinery in ordnance sections which had only one jeep and eight
bomb trailers for moving ammunition.[88]
[88] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,”
20; 1stMAW _HD_, _Oct 50_; TAC X Corps _OpnO 2-50_, 15
Oct 50, in _Ibid._
Despite such difficulties, air operations from the new field were
speeded up when General Almond landed to establish the X Corps CP
at Wonsan on the 20th, after taking control of I ROK Corps. Armed
reconnaissance sorties were flown regularly and attacks made on
retreating bodies of NKPA troops. On the 24th a VMF-312 flight
surprised a column of about 800 Korean Reds near Kojo, 39 miles
southeast of Wonsan, and scattered it with heavy losses.
There were administrative as well as operational problems to be solved.
If an assault landing had been carried out at Wonsan, the provision
for air support would have been planned in a manner similar to that of
Inchon. But the change to an administrative landing caused the 1st MAW
to be placed under the control of the Far East Air Forces. This was in
accordance with a CinCFE directive to the effect that when both FEAF
and Naval air were assigned missions in Korea, coordination control
would be exercised by CG FEAF. He had in turn delegated that control
north of the 38th parallel, including close-support operations of
carrier-borne planes, to CG Fifth Air Force.
An effort was made at first by MAG-12 officers to comply with Fifth AF
procedures, which required the schedule for any given day’s strikes to
be submitted to that headquarters by 1800 the previous day. Obviously,
the distance separating X Corps in Wonsan from Fifth Air Force
Headquarters in Seoul made it virtually impossible to get clearance in
time. This issue was speedily settled by a conference in which Major
General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, CG Fifth Air Force, gave General
Harris oral permission to plan and execute supporting missions for X
Corps in northeast Korea while awaiting clearance from the Fifth AF.
His decision was made on the basis of a liberal interpretation of the
authority of CG 1st MAW to take action “in emergencies.” In practice,
the arrangement worked out smoothly during this preliminary period, and
on 12 November CG Fifth Air Force confirmed his oral agreement with a
written directive.
Direction of air operations in support of X Corps was exercised by
MAG-12 for the 1st MAW from 15 October to 9 November. Night operations
did not begin until late in October for lack of runway lights at
Wonsan, so that VMF(N)-513 flew daytime missions along with VMF-312.
The two carrier-based squadrons conducted flights in a similar manner.
Aircraft reported at designated times to specified Tactical Air Control
Parties (TACPs) for operations directed by a daily Fifth AF order, some
of them in response to previously submitted requests of ground units
for air support.
Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-6
was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, though
it was under the administrative direction of MAG-12. Two helicopter
pilots, Captain Wallace D. Blatt and First Lieutenant Chester C. Ward,
flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 23 October. The rest of the squadron had
proceeded by LST. A flight echelon of helicopters, commanded by Captain
Victor A. Armstrong, VMO-6 executive officer, remained temporarily at
Kimpo at the request of the Fifth Air Force to evacuate casualties of
the 187th Airborne RCT in the Sukchon area.[89]
[89] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex WW (hereafter VMO-6 _SAR_), 2.
_MacArthur Orders Advance to Border_
From all that has gone before, it might be expected that UN strategy
and tactics, after frequent modification, had finally been decided upon
by mid-October 1950. This was not the case, and a brief recapitulation
of events in western and central Korea is now necessary in order to set
the scene for the sweeping changes that followed.
General Walker’s Eighth Army, as mentioned earlier, had deployed along
the 38th Parallel after relieving X Corps above Seoul on 7 October. Two
days later, armored elements of the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the
boundary to spearhead the U. S. I Corps drive on Sariwon and Pyongyang.
The former city was secured on 17 October with the help of the 27th
Commonwealth Brigade, while the 24th Infantry Division moved up the
west coast on the left of the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis.[90] The
1st Cavalry Division continued the attack toward Pyongyang on the
18th, entering the Red capital with the 1st ROK Division the next day.
Pyongyang was secured on 21 October, and elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division also occupied the undefended port city of Chinnampo, 35 miles
to the southwest.[91]
[90] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 13–23.
[91] _Ibid._, 25–30.
A vertical envelopment on 20 October had come as a dramatic supplement
to the attack on Pyongyang. The 187th Airborne RCT parachuted
successfully into the Sukchon-Sunchon area, about 30 miles north of
the city, thereby cutting the two principal NKPA escape routes to
Manchuria. After watching the drop from his plane, General MacArthur
stopped off at Pyongyang and declared that the surprise stroke had
closed the trap on the enemy. At his Tokyo headquarters the next day,
he predicted that the war would end shortly.[92]
[92] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_.
In mountainous central Korea on the right flank of I US Corps, the 6th
ROK Division had been leading the rapid advance of South Korean forces
under EUSAK. With Hwachon captured on 8 October, the division went on
to take the vital hubs of Chorwon on the 10th and Kumwha on the 11th.
It made contact with ROK Capitol Division elements from Wonsan the
following day. During the next 24 hours, the 6th Division advanced 20
miles, and the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions fanned out to exploit the
deepening penetration. On 14 October the 6th closed on Yangdok, about
midway between Wonsan and Pyongyang.[93]
[93] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 11–20.
Thereafter the ROK forces in the center of the peninsula began veering
northwest, so that by 22 October, the day after Pyongyang fell to I
Corps, the vanguard 6th Division was bearing down on Kunu-ri,[94] about
45 air miles to the north of the capital.
[94] _Ibid._, 20–32.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that a trans-peninsular drive by
X Corps was no longer necessary after mid-October. In fact, both in
Washington and in Tokyo the attitude prevailed that the Korean war
was nearing an end. President Truman had deemed a meeting of minds
appropriate at this time, and he flew to Wake Island for a conference
with General MacArthur on 15 October.[95]
[95] The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is
primarily based on: Gen O. N. Bradley, Comp., _Substance
of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October
15, 1950_ (Washington, 1951); and Truman, _Memoirs_,
II, 364–367. These accounts are strongly objected to in
MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 36. For a differing account of
the meeting see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain,
_MacArthur 1941–1951_ (New York, 1954), 382–383; Whitney,
_MacArthur_, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen.
MacArthur Makes His Reply,” _Life_, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb
56), 107–108. Participants in the conference besides
Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank
Pace; Ambassador Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea
John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary of
State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt;
Averell Harriman; and BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM
Headquarters.
Various aspects of American policy in the Far East were discussed at
the meeting, but the Korean situation ranked high on the agenda. When
asked by President Truman about the chances of Russian or Chinese
interference in the war, General MacArthur replied, “Very little.” His
conclusion agreed with that held by many in high government circles,
although officials in both Washington and Tokyo realized that the
possibility of Communist intervention could not be dismissed entirely.
MacArthur stated that about 300,000 Chinese troops were stationed in
Manchuria, of whom from 100,000 to 125,000 had been deployed along
the Yalu River boundary with Korea. He estimated that only 50,000 to
60,000 of these troops could get across the river. If they attempted to
move on Pyongyang, he said, they would be “slaughtered,” owing to the
proximity of UN air bases.
The commander in chief added that Russia had no troops immediately
available for a thrust into the peninsula. It would take six weeks for
a Soviet division to assemble at the border, and by that time winter
would have set in. And while Russia had a fairly good air force in
Siberia and Manchuria, tactical support of Chinese ground troops would
be difficult to control. “I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese
as often as they would bomb us,” MacArthur remarked.[96]
[96] By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the
Marine Corps’ highly technical system of tactical air
employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to
do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained
for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as
the marines but they are effective.”
Part of the conference dealt with the rehabilitation of Korea and
the eventual departure of UN troops after the fighting had ceased.
MacArthur expressed his belief that organized resistance would end by
Thanksgiving (23 November). He hoped to withdraw EUSAK to Japan by
Christmas, leaving X Corps, reconstituted with the 2d and 3d U. S.
Infantry Divisions and other UN detachments, as a security force until
peace and order were fully restored. All present seemed to agree that
elections should be held early to achieve stability in the re-united
country, and that the ROK Army must be made tough enough to deter the
Chinese Communists from any aggressive moves.
The conference ended on a note of general optimism. President Truman
pinned a Distinguished Service Medal on the commander in chief (his
fifth), and the latter boarded his plane and departed shortly after the
meeting.
Once back in Tokyo, MacArthur issued on 17 October a new order that
would become effective if Pyongyang fell before X Corps landed at
Wonsan (as was the case four days later). This draft established
parallel zones of action for EUSAK and X Corps in North Korea, with
the Taebaek Range as the dividing line. The restraining line for UN
Forces was advanced as much as 60 miles to a lateral drawn through
Chongsanjangsi-Koingdong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-Pungsan-Songjin (see Map
1). ROK Forces, of course, would still drive all the way to the borders
of Manchuria and the USSR.[97]
[97] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50;
Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_.
On 24 October, just as the 1st Marine Division was preparing to land
at Wonsan, General MacArthur did away with the restraining line
altogether. The original restriction on the advance of UN elements,
he told his subordinate commanders, was based on the possibility of
enemy capitulation. Since there appeared to be no prospect of a formal
surrender, he now authorized Generals Walker and Almond to use whatever
of their ground forces were necessary to secure all of North Korea. And
he enjoined them “... to drive forward with all speed and with full
utilization of all their force.”[98]
[98] CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov
50_, 5.
The commander in chief received a message from JCS the next day,
telling him that they considered his new order “not in consonance”
with their 27 September authorization, which had stipulated a policy
of using only ROK ground forces in the provinces bordering Russia and
Manchuria. The matter had caused some concern in Washington, the Joint
Chiefs said, and they wanted to know MacArthur’s reasons for making the
decision.[99]
[99] JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.
In reply they were informed that the commander in chief’s decision was
a “matter of military necessity,” since the ROK Army lacked both the
strength and the seasoned commanders required for securing North Korea.
MacArthur added that the 27 September authorization had “... merely
enunciated the [restraining line] provision as a matter of policy,”
and had admitted the possibility of JCS instructions being modified in
accordance with developments. He stated further that he possessed the
authority to so modify from Secretary of Defense Marshall himself, who
had told him “... to feel unhampered tactically and strategically....”
Assuring the Joint Chiefs that he understood the reasons for their
apprehension, he warned that “... tactical hazards might even result
from other action than that which I have directed.”[100]
[100] CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.
And there the matter rested.
_Landing of 1st Marine Division_
It was at a X Corps staff meeting on 18 October that General Almond
disclosed MacArthur’s plan for parallel zones of action and the
new Chongsanjansi-Songjin restraining line in North Korea. Upon
establishing his CP at Wonsan two days later, he accordingly assumed
command of all UN and ROK forces north of the 39° 10′ parallel and
east of the Taebaek Range.[101]
[101] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.
By this time the ROK Capitol Division was occupying Hamhung, Hungnam,
and nearby Yonpo Airfield, all of which had been captured on 17
October during the swift drive northward.[102] The ROK 3d Division had
one regiment at Wonsan, another at Kojo, and the third en route to
Hamhung.[103]
[102] EUSAK _WD_, 23 Oct 50.
[103] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.
On the 21st, General Almond requested CJTF-7 to land one battalion
of Marines at Kojo immediately, for the purpose of relieving the ROK
regiment defending that locale. He contended that Navy LSTs could beach
there safely, since SCAJAP ships had already done so. Learning of the
proposed landing, Admiral Doyle argued against it and Admiral Struble
forbade it on the ground that the military requirement did not justify
the risk incident to negotiating unswept waters. Thus the landing was
called off, although the Marines had not heard the last of Kojo.[104]
[104] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in _Ibid._;
ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, _Notes_,
404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.
On 22 October, General Smith issued a new plan based on the proposed X
Corps deployment as far north as the Chongsanjangsi-Songjin line. The
1st Marine Division would now occupy the southern part of the extended
corps zone, with each regiment responsible for the security of its
assigned sector.[105] But again planning went for naught when, two
days later, General Almond received MacArthur’s order to disregard the
restraining line and use whatever forces necessary to drive rapidly
to the Manchurian and Soviet borders. On 25 October, therefore, X
Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to concentrate one RCT in the
Hamhung area and to relieve elements of the I ROK Corps at the Chosin
and Fusen Reservoirs. South Korean troops had already begun their
advance on these vital power centers, some 50 to 60 air miles north of
Hamhung.[106]
[105] 1stMarDiv _OpnPlan_ 4-50, 22 Oct 50. “G-3 (Col Bowser)
and G-4 (Col McAlister) landed by boat at Wonsan through
a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of
October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted
at this time and a reconnaissance of the entire Wonsan
area was made to select and mark administrative assembly
areas for units of the Division. Included in this
reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which was
selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view
of its projected employment to the north shortly after
landing.” Bowser Comments.
[106] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in
_ibid._; Smith, _Notes_, 285.
It was also on the 25th that the 1st Marine Division finally began its
administrative landing at Wonsan--as anticlimactic a landing as Marines
have ever made. Five LSTs loaded with Engineer, Shore Party, and Combat
Service Group elements beached on Kalma Peninsula in the evening. Since
the approaches had not been declared clear until late afternoon, the
main ship-to-shore movement was delayed until the next day. Thus, 26
October actually became D-Day--or “Doyle Day,” as it was referred to by
an impatient General Almond.[107]
[107] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar _SAR_), 4;
and Smith, _Notes_, 407–409. The orders covering the
actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90
msgs to CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg
to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and CG 1stMarDiv msg to
subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was
given in CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50.
At first light on the 26th, landing craft clustered around the
transport vessels in the swept channel as troops spilled down
debarkation nets. The first of 39 scheduled waves were shortly on
the way, with amphibious craft of every description churning the
water.[108] LSUs began disgorging armor of the 1st Tank Battalion at
0730, and the big machines, fitted with deep-water fording adapters,
thrashed through the surf and onto the loose sand.[109] Simultaneously,
swarms of vehicles of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion crawled
ashore shuttling troops and cargo.[110]
[108] “At the time of the administrative landing we thought
that we might as well use the planned ship-to-shore
movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making
a new ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to
execute by referring to our original plan [OpnO 16-50]
for the assault landing without issuing an entire new
order.” Bowser Comments.
[109] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn _SAR_), 2–8.
[110] 1stAmphTracBn _HD Oct 50_, 2–3.
At 0900, LSTs landed the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines on
YELLOW Beach, while Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s regimental headquarters
splashed ashore out of landing craft dispatched from the _Noble_. The
reserve battalion, 2/1, remained on board ship until the 28th. By 1700,
the 3d Battalion was in position for the night and the 1st was well on
the way to Kojo for a special mission. In the midst of the landing,
Colonel Puller received a message from General Smith congratulating him
on his being selected for promotion to brigadier general.[111]
[111] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26
Oct 50.
Troops of the 7th Marines marched ashore on BLUE Beach without
incident, and the assembled battalions moved to assigned areas north
of Wonsan. At 1300, Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg opened his regimental
CP at St. Benedict’s Abbey, which had been gutted by the retreating
Communists.[112]
[112] 7thMar _SAR_, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628
26 Oct 50. For a detailed account of the tragedy of St.
Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, _The
History of the Chaplains Corps_, _U. S. Navy_, (MS) V.
Advance parties of the 5th Marines began landing over both beaches at
0800. Priority was given to unloading the reserve unit’s cargo, and the
majority of troops remained on board transports for the night. Most
of the regiment debarked the next day and assembled about three miles
northwest of Wonsan, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray established his CP
at 1800.[113]
[113] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar _SAR_), 8.
Only the 2d Battalion and several reconnaissance parties of the 11th
Marines landed on the 26th. The remainder of the artillery regiment
went ashore the next day and bivouacked at the coastal town of
Munpyong-ni, five miles above Wonsan. Colonel James H. Brower, the
regimental commander, detached 2/11 to the 1st Marines at 1715 on 27
October, but the other battalions “... remained in a mobile state
awaiting further orders.”[114]
[114] 11thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), 21–28 Oct 50.
The Wonsan landing, though tactically insignificant at the moment,
was a major logistical undertaking to such units as the 1st Engineer
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge), the 1st Shore Party
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe), and the 1st Combat
Service Group (Colonel John H. Cook, Jr.).
Representatives from these and other support and service units had
flown to the objective area several days before the Division’s arrival.
After completing an inspection of Wonsan, the Shore Party detachment
employed 500 North Korean POWs and 210 civilians to improve landing
sites and beach exits. This work continued 24 hours a day for nine
days, until the vanguard LSTs grated ashore on Kalma Peninsula in the
evening of 25 October.[115] At this point, Shore Party Group C (Major
George A. Smith) assumed responsibility for YELLOW Beach in the north,
and Group B (Major Henry Brzezinski) took over BLUE Beach.
[115] The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from
1stMarDiv _SAR_, annexes MM (hereafter 1stSPBn SAR), 5–8,
and UU (hereafter 1st CSG _SAR_) 6 and 1stSPBn, _HD for
Advance Party_, 1–2.
With the arrival of the first waves of LSTs, LSUs, LVTs, and landing
craft in the morning, there began a routine of unremitting toil that
would abate only after all of X Corps had landed weeks later. Because
of the shallow offshore gradient, many amphibious craft could not
reach the beach with their heavy cargoes, and the Shore Party troops
had to construct ramps which projected 30 feet into the water. These
improvised piers were made of rice bags filled with sand, with the
result that their maintenance required considerable effort in men and
heavy equipment. A pontoon causeway constructed on 27 October lessened
the difficulties connected with getting troops ashore, but other
problems persisted.
One of these had to do with a sandbar that stretched across the boat
lanes about 50 yards from the coast. Heavier craft frequently grounded
here, and while some could be towed ashore by tractor dozers (TD-18s)
and LVTs, others had to be unloaded in the water by cranes operating
off the ramps and from barges.
Once men and supplies finally reached dry land, there was the
difficulty of transporting them inland over the loose sand and around
the sprawling dunes of the peninsular beaches. Trucks and trailers
often bogged down to such depths that they had to be uprooted and towed
by LVTs or dozers. This tied up the overworked tracked vehicles when
they were badly needed elsewhere.
The Combat Service Group established its Class I, III, and V dumps
according to plan on 26 October, but Class II and IV supplies arrived
on the beach “... in a completely mixed condition,” owing to the haste
of the outloading at Inchon. From D-Day onward, from 1500 to 2000
Korean civilians were hired daily to help segregate and issue supplies.
Upon the completion of mine sweeping in the inner harbor, the intact
port facilities of Wonsan became operative on 2 November. During
the next nine days, the Combat Service Group dispatched by rail to
Hamhung 3900 tons of ammunition alone. On 9 November, the group was
attached to X Corps for operational control, thereafter assuming
specific responsibility for such varied tasks as: operation of all port
facilities; unloading all X Corps elements; transporting all equipment
and supplies to inland dumps and supply points; casualty evacuation;
maintenance of an airhead at Wonsan Airfield; providing local security;
traffic control in the port and its environs; and providing field
maintenance for all units in the Wonsan area.
The magnitude of the logistical operation can be imagined from a survey
of statistics mentioned in Shore Party reports. By 31 October, when
the 1st Marine Division’s landing was completed, a total of 24 cargo
vessels, 36 LSTs, and one LSM had been unloaded. Bulk cargo in the
order of 18,402 tons had moved across the beaches along with 30,189
personnel and 4731 vehicles. During the same period, 2534 troops were
outloaded with 70 vehicles and 4323 POWs. And in November, as the
MAG-12 elements and the rest of X Corps poured ashore, the total of
ships handled soared to 76 cargo and 52 LSTs, adding 30,928 personnel,
51,270 tons of supplies, and 7113 vehicles to the short-lived build-up
in Northeast Korea.