[Illustration]
[Illustration]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME III
_The Chosin Reservoir Campaign_
by
LYNN MONTROSS
and
CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC
Based on Research by
K. JACK BAUER, PHD.
[Illustration]
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C., 1957
Preceding Volumes of
_U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_
Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”
Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation”
Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 57-60727
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government
Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. Price $2.75
Official Price of this Publication $2.75
Foreword
The breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir area
will long be remembered as one of the inspiring epics of our history.
It is also worthy of consideration as a campaign in the best tradition
of American military annals.
The ability of the Marines to fight their way through twelve Chinese
divisions over a 78-mile mountain road in sub-zero weather cannot be
explained by courage and endurance alone. It also owed to the high
degree of professional forethought and skill as well as the “uncommon
valor” expected of all Marines.
A great deal of initiative was required of unit commanders, and tactics
had to be improvised at times on the spur of the moment to meet
unusual circumstances. But in the main, the victory was gained by firm
discipline and adherence to time-tested military principles. Allowing
for differences in arms, indeed, the Marines of 1950 used much the same
fundamental tactics as those employed on mountain roads by Xenophon
and his immortal Ten Thousand when they cut their way through Asiatic
hordes to the Black Sea in the year 401 B.C.
When the danger was greatest, the 1st Marine Division might have
accepted an opportunity for air evacuation of troops after the
destruction of weapons and supplies to keep them from falling into the
enemy’s hands. But there was never a moment’s hesitation. The decision
of the commander and the determination of all hands to come out
fighting with all essential equipment were in keeping with the highest
traditions of the United States Marine Corps.
[Illustration: (signature)]
R. MCC. PATE
_General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
_Commandant of the Marine Corps._
Preface
This is the third in a series of five volumes dealing with the
operations of the United States Marine Corps in Korea during the period
2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume III presents in detail the
operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a
part of X Corps, USA, in the Chosin Reservoir campaign.
The time covered in this book extends from the administrative landing
at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 to the Hungnam evacuation which ended
on Christmas Eve. The record would not be complete, however, without
reference to preceding high-level strategic decisions in Washington and
Tokyo which placed the Marines in northeast Korea and governed their
employment.
Credit is due the U. S. Army and Navy for support on land and sea, and
the U. S. Navy and Air Force for support in the air. But since this is
primarily a Marine Corps history, the activities of other services are
described here only in sufficient detail to show Marine operations in
their proper perspective.
The ideal of the authors has been to relate the epic of the Chosin
Reservoir breakout from the viewpoint of the man in the foxhole as well
as the senior officer at the command post. Grateful acknowledgment is
made to the 142 Marine officers and men who gave so generously of their
time by contributing 338 narratives, letters, and interviews. In many
instances this material was so detailed that some could not be used,
because of space limitations. But all will go into the permanent Marine
archives for the benefit of future historians.
Thanks are also extended to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as
Marine officers, who offered valuable comments and criticisms after
reading the preliminary drafts of chapters. Without this assistance no
accurate and detailed account could have been written.
The maps contained in this volume, as in the previous ones, have been
prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,
Virginia. The advice of officers of the Current History Branch of the
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, has
also been of aid in the preparation of these pages.
[Illustration: (signature)]
E. W. SNEDEKER
_Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
_Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._
Contents
_Page_
I Problems of Victory 1
Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender
Message to NKPA Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of
Celerity--Logistical Problems of Advance--Naval
Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint
Planning for Wonsan Landing
II The Wonsan Landing 21
ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and
Embarkation--Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation
Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at Objective--MacArthur Orders
Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine Division
III First Blood at Kojo 43
1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The
All-Night Fight of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to
Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan Area--Marines
Relieved at Kojo
IV Majon-ni and Ambush Alley 61
Marines Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of
Mission--Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop
of Supplies Requested--First Attack on Perimeter--KMC
Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st Marines to
Chigyong
V Red China to the Rescue 79
Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New
Enemy--Communist Victory in Civil War--Organization of
the CCF--The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier--CCF Arms and
Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--CCF
Strategy and Tactics
VI The Battle of Sudong 95
The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved
by 7th Marines--CCF Counterattack at Sudong--Two
Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of NKPA Tank
Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF
Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines
VII Advance to the Chosin Reservoir 125
Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New
Enemy--The Turning Point of 15 November--Changes
in X Corps Mission--Marine Preparations for
Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN
Command--Marine Concentration on MSR
VIII Crisis at Yudam-ni 151
Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before
CCF Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese
Seize Hill 1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of
North Ridge
IX Fox Hill 177
Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company
at Toktong Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North
Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not Enough
Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November
X Hagaru’s Night of Fire 197
Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear
MSR--Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of
Marine Units--CCF Attacks from the Southwest--East Hill
Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting Fires--Marine
Attacks on East Hill
XI Task Force Drysdale 221
CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by
Marine Tanks--The Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack
of George Company on East Hill--High Level Command
Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue
of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip
XII Breakout From Yudam-ni 249
Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419
and 1542--March of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack
of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The Ridgerunners of Toktong
Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542--Advance of
Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter
XIII Regroupment at Hagaru 277
4,312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements
Flown to Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning
for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at
Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of RCT-7
to the South--Advance of the Division Trains
XIV Onward From Koto-ri 305
Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task
Force Dog--Air Drop of Bridge Sections--Division
Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in the
Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine
Operations of 9 and 10 December--Completion of Division
Breakout
XV The Hungnam Redeployment 333
Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st
Marine Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines
Arrive at New Assembly Area--Contributions of Marine
Aviation--Losses Sustained by the Enemy--Results of the
Reservoir Campaign
_Appendixes_
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 361
B Task Organization, 1st Marine Division 365
C Naval Task Organization 373
D Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 379
E 1st Marine Division Casualties 381
F Command and Staff List, 8 October-15 December 1950,
1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 383
G Enemy Order of Battle 397
H Air Evacuation Statistics 399
I Unit Citations 401
Bibliography 405
Index 413
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 148 and 276.
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
1 Eighth Army Advances and Restraining Lines 4
2 Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division,
October-December 1950 12, 122
3 Wonsan and Harbor 16
4 Kojo Area 47
5 Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan 62
6 Majon-ni Perimeter 64
7 The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division 97
8 Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase 101
9 Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November 111
10 Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass 115
11 1st Marine Division Zone and Objectives 130
12 Yudam-ni 153
13 Marine Attacks, 27 November 155
14 Battle of Northwest Ridge 162
15 Action at 3/5’s CP 169
16 The Battle of North Ridge 173
17 Hagaru Defensive Perimeter 199
18 East Hill Attacks, 29 November 212
19 Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December 223
20 Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December 227
21 Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November 230
22 East Hill Attacks, 30 November 237
23 Breaking off Action, 30 November 252
24 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December 256
25 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December 269
26 Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December 289
27 Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December 292
28 Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December 295
29 Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December 310
30 Hungnam Docks and Beaches 344
CHAPTER I
Problems Of Victory
_Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender Message to_ NKPA
_Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity--Logistical Problems of
Advance--Naval Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint
Planning for Wonsan Landing_
It is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can
be as difficult as problems of how to win one. This truism was brought
home forcibly to the attention of the United Nations (UN) heads,
both political and military, during the last week of September 1950.
Already, with the fighting still in progress, it had become evident
that the UN armies were crushing the forces of Communism in Korea, as
represented by the remnants of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA).
Only a month before, such a result would have seemed a faint and
unrealistic hope. Late in August the hard-pressed Eighth U. S. Army
in Korea (EUSAK) was defending that southeast corner of the peninsula
known as the Pusan Perimeter.
“Nothing fails like success,” runs a cynical French proverb, and the
truth of this adage was demonstrated militarily when the dangerously
over-extended NKPA forces paid the penalty of their tenuous supply
line on 15 September 1950. That was the date of the X Corps amphibious
assault at Inchon, with the 1st Marine Division as landing force
spearheading the advance on Seoul.
X Corps was the strategic anvil of a combined operation as the Eighth
Army jumped off next day to hammer its way out of the Pusan Perimeter
and pound northward toward Seoul. When elements of the two UN forces
met just south of the Republic of Korea (ROK) capital on 26 September,
the routed NKPA remnants were left only the hope of escaping northward
across the 38th parallel.[1]
[1] The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and
Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the Pusan Perimeter has been
told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with
the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in
the Inchon-Seoul operation.
The bold strategic plan leading up to this victory--one of the most
decisive ever won by U. S. land, sea and air forces--was largely
the concept of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, who was
Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CinCUNC) as well as
U. S. Commander in Chief in the Far East (CinCFE). It was singularly
appropriate, therefore, that he should have returned the political
control of the battle-scarred ROK capital to President Syngman Rhee on
29 September. Marine officers who witnessed the ceremony have never
forgotten the moving spectacle of the American general and the fiery
Korean patriot, both past their 70th birthdays, as they stood together
under the shell-shattered skylight of the Government Palace.[2]
[2] Col C. W. Harrison, interview (interv) 22 Nov 55. Unless
otherwise noted, all interviews have been by the authors.
_Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel_
“Where do we go from here?” would hardly have been an oversimplified
summary of the questions confronting UN leaders when it became apparent
that the NKPA forces were defeated. In order to appraise the situation,
it is necessary to take a glance at preceding events.
As early as 19 July, the dynamic ROK leader had made it plain that he
did not propose to accept the pre-invasion _status quo_. He served
notice that his forces would unify Korea by driving to the Manchurian
border. Since the Communists had violated the 38th Parallel, the aged
Rhee declared, this imaginary demarcation between North and South no
longer existed. He pointed out that the sole purpose of the line in the
first place had been to divide Soviet and American occupation zones
after World War II, in order to facilitate the Japanese surrender and
pave the way for a democratic Korean government.
In May 1948, such a government had come about in South Korea by popular
elections, sponsored and supervised by the UN. These elections had been
scheduled for all Korea but were prohibited by the Russians in their
zone. The Communists not only ignored the National Assembly in Seoul,
but also arranged their own version of a governing body in Pyongyang
two months later. The so-called North Korean People’s Republic thus
became another of the Communist puppet states set up by the USSR.
That the United Nations did not recognize the North Korean state in
no way altered its very real status as a politico-military fact. For
obvious reasons, then, all UN decisions relating to the Communist state
had to take into account the possibility of reactions by Soviet Russia
and Red China, which shared Korea’s northern boundary.
At the outbreak of the conflict on 25 June 1950, the UN Security
Council had, by a vote of 9-0, called for an immediate end to the
fighting and the withdrawal of all NKPA forces to the 38th Parallel.[3]
This appeal having gone unheeded, the Council on 27 June recommended
“... that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
and to restore international peace and security in the area.”[4] It
was the latter authorization, supplemented by another resolution on 7
July, that led to military commitments by the United States and to the
appointment of General MacArthur as over-all UN Commander.
[3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the UN in Korea_ (Washington,
1951). Yugoslavia abstained from the vote, and the USSR,
then boycotting the Council, was absent.
[4] _Ibid._
These early UN actions constituted adequate guidance in Korea until
the Inchon landing and EUSAK’s counteroffensive turned the tide. With
the NKPA in full retreat, however, and UN Forces rapidly approaching
the 38th Parallel, the situation demanded re-evaluation, including
supplemental instructions to the military commander. The question arose
as to whether the North Koreans should be allowed sanctuary beyond the
parallel, possibly enabling them to reorganize for new aggression. It
will be recalled that Syngman Rhee had already expressed his thoughts
forcibly in this connection on 19 July; and the ROK Army translated
thoughts into action on 1 October by crossing the border.
The UN, in its 7 July resolution, having authorized the United States
to form a unified military force and appoint a supreme commander in
Korea, it fell upon the Administration of President Harry S. Truman
to translate this dictum into workaday reality. Aiding the Chief
Executive and his Cabinet in this delicate task with its far-reaching
implications were the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Army
member, General J. Lawton Collins, also functioned as Executive Agent
of JCS for the United Nations Command in Korea, thus keeping intact
the usual chain of command from the Army Chief of Staff to General
MacArthur, who now served both the U. S. and UN.[5]
[5] Maj J. F. Schnabel, USA, Comments on preliminary
manuscript (Comments).
[Illustration:
EIGHTH ARMY ADVANCES
AND
RESTRAINING LINES
MAP-1
]
Late in August, two of the Joint Chiefs, General Collins and Admiral
Forrest P. Sherman, USN, had flown to Japan to discuss the forthcoming
Inchon landing with General MacArthur. In the course of the talks, it
was agreed that CinCUNC’s objective should be the _destruction_ of the
North Korean forces, and that ground operations should be extended
beyond the 38th Parallel to achieve this goal. The agreement took the
form of a recommendation, placed before Secretary of Defense Louis
Johnson on 7 September.[6]
[6] JCS memo to Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 7 Sep 50.
Unless otherwise stated, copies of all messages cited are
on file in Historical Branch, HQMC.
A week later, JCS informed MacArthur that President Truman had approved
certain “conclusions” relating to the Korean conflict, but that these
were not yet to be construed as final decisions. Among other things,
the Chief Executive accepted the reasoning that UN Forces had a legal
basis for engaging the NKPA north of the Parallel. MacArthur would plan
operations accordingly, JCS directed, but would carry them out only
after being granted explicit permission.[7]
[7] JCS message (msg) WAR 91680, 15 Sep 50; Harry S. Truman,
_Memoirs_, 2 vols (Garden City, 1955–1956), II, 359.
The historic authorization, based on recommendations of the National
Security Council to President Truman, reached General Headquarters
(GHQ), Tokyo, in a message dispatched by JCS on 27 September:
Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean
Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to
conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne
landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea,
provided that at the time of such operations there has been no
entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces,
no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our
operations militarily in North Korea....
The lengthy message abounded in paragraphs of caution, reflecting the
desire of both the UN and the United States to avoid a general war. Not
discounting the possibility of intervention by Russia or Red China,
JCS carefully outlined MacArthur’s courses of action for several
theoretical situations. Moreover, he was informed that certain broad
restrictions applied regardless of developments:
... under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the
Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no
non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in the northeast provinces
bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian
border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of
the 38th parallel will not include Air or Naval action against
Manchuria or against USSR territory....[8]
[8] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360;
MajGen Courtney Whitney, _MacArthur, His Rendezvous
with History_ (New York, 1956), 397. Commenting on the
JCS authorization Gen MacArthur stated, “My directive
from the JCS on 27 September establishing my military
objective as ‘... the destruction of the North Korean
Armed Forces’ and in the accomplishment thereof
authorizing me to ‘... conduct military operations,
including amphibious and airborne landings or ground
operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea ...’
made it mandatory rather than discretionary ... that
the UN Forces operate north of that line against enemy
remnants situated in the north. Moreover, all plans
governing operations north of that Parallel were designed
to implement the resolution passed by the UN General
assembly on 7 October 1950, and were specifically
approved by the JCS. Indeed, the military objectives
assigned by the JCS, and the military-political
objectives established by said resolution of the UN could
have been accomplished in no other way.” Gen D. MacArthur
letter (ltr) to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 24 Feb 56.
Thus MacArthur had the green light, although the signal was shaded by
various qualifications. On 29 September, the new Secretary of Defense,
George C. Marshall, told him in a message, “... We want you to feel
unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th
parallel....”[9]
[9] JCS msg 92985, 29 Sep 50. For a differing interpretation
see Whitney, _MacArthur_, 398.
_Surrender Message to NKPA Forces_
Meanwhile, a step was taken by the U. S. Government on 27 September in
the hope that hostilities might end without much further loss or risk
for either side. By dispatch, JCS authorized MacArthur to announce, at
his discretion, a suggested surrender message to the NKPA.[10] Framed
by the U. S. State Department, the message was broadcast on 1 October
and went as follows:
[10] JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
To: The Commander-in-chief, North Korean Forces. The early and
total defeat and complete destruction of your Armed Forces and war
making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decision of
the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further
loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations
Commander-in-Chief, call upon you and the forces under your
command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down
your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision
as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all
United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your
control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care,
maintenance, and immediate transportation to such places as I
indicate.
North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of
the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care
indicated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return
to their homes as soon as practicable.
I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to
avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of
property.[11]
[11] CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in
EUSAK _War Diary_ (_WD_), 1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg
92762, 27 Sep 50.
The surrender broadcast evoked no direct reply from Kim Il Sung,
Premier of North Korea and Commander in Chief of the NKPA. Instead, the
reaction of the Communist bloc came ominously from another quarter. Two
days after MacArthur’s proclamation, Red China’s Foreign Minister Chou
En-Lai informed K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, that
China would intervene in the event UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel.
He added, however, that such action would not be forthcoming if only
ROK troops entered North Korea.[12]
[12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct
50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361–362. The information was
forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that he
had never been informed of it. _Military Situation in
the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United
States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To
Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far
East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that
area_ (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter _MacArthur
Hearings_), 109.
It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September
permitted operations north of the Parallel “... provided that at the
time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by
major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, _no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North
Korea_....”[13] In view of the last two provisos, MacArthur’s plans
for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled after
Chou’s announcement. But optimism over the course of the war ran high
among the United Nations at this time, and CinCUNC shortly received
supplemental authority from both the UN and JCS--the one establishing
legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, the other reaffirming
military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution adopted on 7
October, the United Nations directed that
[13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360;
Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397. Italics supplied.
All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability
throughout Korea and all constituent acts be taken ... for the
establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government
in the Sovereign State of Korea....[14]
[14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in _Guide to the UN in Korea_, 20.
Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, MacArthur could
attend to the UN objectives only by occupying North Korea militarily
and imposing his will. JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified its early
instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows:
Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in
Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement,
you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action
by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of
success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington
prior to taking any military actions against objectives in Chinese
territory.[15]
[15] JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 362;
Whitney, _MacArthur_, 404.
_MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity_
Anticipating his authority for crossing the 38th Parallel, CinCUNC
on 26 September had directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations
Group (JSPOG) to develop a plan for operations north of the border.
He stipulated that Eighth Army should make the main effort in either
the west or the east, and that however this was resolved, there should
be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast--at Chinnampo,
Wonsan, or elsewhere.[16] Despite recommendations of key staff members,
MacArthur did not place X Corps under EUSAK command for the forthcoming
campaign but retained General Almond’s unit as a separate tactical
entity under GHQ.[17]
[16] C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The
Chief of Military History (OCMH).
[17] Maj J. F. Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict: Policy,
Planning, Direction_. MS at OCMH. See also: Capt M.
Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” _Army_, vii,
no. 4 (Nov 56), 38–44, 65.
JSPOG, headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur’s G-3,
rapidly fitted an earlier staff study into the framework of CinCUNC’s
directive. And the following day, 27 September, a proposed Operation
Plan (OpnPlan) 9-50 was laid before the commander in chief.[18] This
detailed scheme of action evolved from two basic assumptions: (1) that
the bulk of the NKPA had already been destroyed; and (2) that neither
the USSR nor Red China would intervene, covertly or openly.
[18] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_.
Eighth Army, according to plan, would attack across the 38th
Parallel, directing its main effort in the west, along the axis
Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang (see Map 1). JSPOG designated the latter
city--capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea--as final
objective of the first phase. Further, it recommended that EUSAK’s
drive begin in mid-October, to be followed within a week by a X Corps
amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. After establishing a
beachhead, Almond’s force would attack 125 road miles westward through
the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor and link up with General Walker’s army,
thereby trapping North Korean elements falling back from the south.[19]
[19] _Ibid._, and CinCFE _OpnPlan_ 9-50. Copy at OCMH.
JSPOG suggested that both commands should then advance north to the
line Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, ranging roughly from 50 to
100 miles below the Manchurian border. Only ROK elements would proceed
beyond the restraining line, in keeping with the spirit and letter of
the 27 September dispatch from JCS.[20]
[20] _Ibid._
Major General Doyle O. Hickey, acting as CinCUNC’s chief of staff
during General Almond’s tour in the field, approved the JSPOG draft
of 28 September. It thereby became OpnPlan 9-50 officially. MacArthur
forwarded a summary to JCS the same day, closing his message with this
reassurance:
There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by
major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces.[21]
[21] CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II,
361; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397–398.
Within three days, he received word from the Joint Chiefs that they
approved his plan.[22] On 2 October it became the official operation
order for the attack.[23]
[22] JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361;
Whitney, _MacArthur_, 398. All dates in the narrative and
in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the
action. Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the
30th in Tokyo.
[23] UNC _Operation Order_ (_OpnO_) 2, 2 Oct 50.
_Logistical Problems of Advance_
On 29 September, the day before he received the JCS endorsement of his
plan, General MacArthur arrived in Seoul to officiate at the ceremony
restoring control of South Korea to the legal ROK government. During
the visit, he met with the principals named in the Task Organization of
OpnPlan 9-50:
Eighth U. S. Army LtGen Walton H. Walker, USA
Naval Forces Far East VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN
Far East Air Forces (FEAF) LtGen George E. Stratemeyer, USAF
X Corps MajGen Edward M. Almond, USA
Missing from the top-level conference, Major General Walter L. Weible,
USA, of the Japan Logistical Command, probably was already aware of
things to come.[24]
[24] LtGen E. A. Almond, USA, (Ret.) ltr to Col J. Meade, USA,
14 Jun 55.
MacArthur outlined his concept of operations in North Korea to those
present. He set 20 October as D-Day for the Wonsan amphibious assault
by the 1st Marine Division, which, with all X Corps Troops, would
embark for the operation from Inchon. The 7th Infantry Division, also a
part of X Corps, would motor 200 miles to Pusan and there load out for
an administrative landing behind the Marines.[25]
[25] _Ibid._
Initial overland routing of the 7th Division was made necessary by
problems arising out of Inchon’s limited port facilities. General
MacArthur gave EUSAK the logistic responsibility for all UN Forces in
Korea, including X Corps. To carry out this charge, General Walker
could rely on only two harbors, Pusan and Inchon. There were no other
ports in South Korea capable of supporting large-scale military
operations. Meeting the tight Wonsan schedule would require that X
Corps have immediate priority over the whole of Inchon’s capacity, even
with the 7th Division being shunted off on Pusan. And it still remained
for Walker to mount and sustain Eighth Army’s general offensive
_before_ the Wonsan landing!
In the light of logistical considerations, then, Wonsan had more than
mere tactical significance as the objective of X Corps. Its seizure
would open up the principal east-coast port of Korea, together with
vital new road and rail junctions. But while MacArthur had decided on
an amphibious assault by a separate tactical unit as the proper stroke,
there existed a school of dissenters among his closest advisers.
Generals Hickey and Wright had recommended that X Corps be incorporated
into EUSAK at the close of the Inchon-Seoul Operation. Major General
George L. Eberle, MacArthur’s G-4, held that supplying X Corps in
North Korea would be simpler if that unit were a part of Eighth Army.
And General Almond himself, while hardly a dissenter, had expected
his corps to be placed under General Walker’s command after the Seoul
fighting.[26]
[26] _Ibid._; Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_; Blumenson,
“MacArthur’s Divided Command.” Gen MacArthur stated: “If
such a dissension existed it was never brought to my
attention. To the contrary, the decision to retain as a
function of GHQ command and coordination between Eighth
Array and X Corps until such time as a juncture between
the two forces had been effected was, so far as I know,
based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior members
of my staff....” MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. Gen Wright has
stated: “Neither General Hickey, General Eberle, nor I
objected to the plan, but we did feel that X Corps should
have been made part of the Eighth Army immediately after
the close of the Inchon-Seoul operation.” MajGen E. K.
Wright, USA, ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 16 Feb 56.
_Naval Missions Prescribed_
Logistical problems were magnified by the tight embarkation schedule
laid out for the amphibious force. In submitting its proposed plan for
North Korean operations to General MacArthur on 27 September, JSPOG had
listed the following “bare minimum time requirements:”
For assembling assault shipping 6 days
For planning 4 days
For loading 6 days
For sailing to Wonsan 4 days
Thus it was estimated that the 1st Marine Division could assault Wonsan
10 days after receiving the order to load out of Inchon, provided
that shipping had already been assembled and planning accomplished
concurrently.[27]
[27] JSPOG memo to C/S, FECOM: “Plans for future operations,”
27 Sep 50. Copy at OCMH.
Following CinCUNC’s meeting in the capitol building on the 29th,
General Almond called a conference of division commanders and staff
members at his X Corps Headquarters in Ascom City, near Inchon.
MacArthur’s strategy was outlined to the assembled officers, so that
planning could commence on the division level. Almond set 15 October
as D-Day for the Wonsan landing. He based this target date on the
assumption that Eighth Army would pass through and relieve X Corps on 3
October, the date on which the necessary shipping was to begin arriving
at Inchon.[28]
[28] 1stMarDiv _Special Action Report for the
Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 Oct-15 Dec
50_ (hereafter 1stMarDiv _SAR_), 10.
On 29 September, the 1st Marine Division was still committed tactically
above Seoul, two regiments blocking and one attacking. If the first
vessels began arriving at Inchon on 3 October, the assault shipping
would not be completely assembled until the 8th, according to the JSPOG
estimate. Four days would be required to get to the objective, leaving
two days, instead of the planned six, for outloading the landing
force. Neither Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General (CG)
1stMarDiv, nor his staff regarded this as a realistic schedule.[29]
[29] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes
on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the
First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51_ (MS),
(hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 370–371.
[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS
1st Marine Division
October-December 1950
MAP-2
]
The Marine officers came away from the conference without knowledge
of the types and numbers of ships that would be made available to the
division. And since they had no maps of the objective area and no
intelligence data whatever, it was manifestly impossible to lay firm
plans along either administrative or tactical lines.[30]
[30] _Ibid._
Vice Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE), issued
his instructions on 1 October in connection with the forthcoming
operations. To Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force
7 (JTF-7), which had carried out the Inchon attack, he gave these
missions:
1. To maintain a naval blockade of Korea’s East coast south of
Chongjin.
2. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to Eighth Army as
directed.
3. To conduct pre-D-Day naval operations for the Wonsan landing as
required.
4. To load and transport X Corps to Wonsan, providing cover and
support en route.
5. To seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead
in the Wonsan area on D-Day.
6. To provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistical support
to X Corps at Wonsan until relieved.[31]
[31] ComNavFE _OpnPlan 113-50_. Copy at OCMH.
Admiral Joy’s directive also warned: “The strong probability exists
that the ports and possible landing beaches under control of the North
Koreans have been recently mined. The sighting of new mines floating in
the area indicates that mines are being seeded along the coast.”[32]
[32] _Ibid._, B, 11.
_X Corps Relieved at Seoul_
The related events, decisions, and plans of September 1950 had unfolded
with startling rapidity. Before the scattered UN forces could
shift from one phase of operations to another, a transitional gap
developed during the early days of October. Orders might flow forth in
abundance, but not until MacArthur’s land, sea and air forces wound up
one campaign could they begin another. Thus, from the standpoint of
Marine operations, the first week of October is more a story of the
Inchon-Seoul action than of preparations for the Wonsan landing.
On 2 October, when Eighth Army commenced the relief of X Corps, General
Almond ordered the 7th Infantry Division to begin displacing to Pusan
by motor and rail.[33] There was as yet no such respite for the 1st
Marine Division, which on the same day lost 16 killed in action (KIA)
and 81 wounded (WIA). Practically all of the casualties were taken
by the 7th Regiment, then approaching Uijongbu on the heels of the
enemy.[34]
[33] X Corps _OpnO 3_, 2 Oct 50.
[34] MajGen Oliver P. Smith: _Chronicle of the Operations of
the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months
of the Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), (hereafter, Smith,
_Chronicle_), 54.
Despite the limited planning data in the hands of the 1st Marine
Division, General Smith’s staff put a cautious foot forward on 3
October.[35] Word of the pending Wonsan operation went out by message
to all subordinate units, with a tentative task organization indicating
the formation of three Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs).
[35] Gen Wright stated, “There was definitely _not_ a complete
lack of planning data. I doubt if any operation ever
had more planning data available. It may not have been
in General Smith’s hands on 3 October, but it was
available.” Wright ltr, 16 Feb 56.
The 1st and 7th Marines were earmarked to launch the amphibious
attack. Each would plan on the basis of employing two battalions in
the assault. These battalions were to embark on LSTs and hit the beach
in LVTs. All tactical units were to combat-load out of Inchon. And
although still uninformed as to available shipping, the Marine planners
named likely embarkation groups and listed tentative arrangements for
loading tanks and amphibious vehicles.[36]
[36] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units: “Planning
Information,” 3 Oct 50.
The following day saw the publication of X Corps OpnO 4, specifying
subordinate unit missions. The 7th Infantry Division, together with the
92d and 96th Field Artillery (FA) Battalions, was instructed to mount
out of Pusan and to land at Wonsan on order (see Map 2). These tasks
were assigned to the 1st Marine Division:
1. Report immediately to the Attack Force Commander (Commander,
Amphibious Group One) of the Seventh Fleet as the landing force
for the Wonsan attack.
2. Seize and secure X Corps base of operations at Wonsan,
protect the Wonsan Airfield, and continue such operations
ashore as assigned.
3. Furnish logistic support for all forces ashore until relieved
by Corps Shore Party.[37]
[37] Special Report 1stMarDiv, in CinCPacFlt _Interim
Evaluation Rpt #1_, annex DD, 11; 1stMarDiv _Historical
Diary_ (_HD_), Oct 50; X Corps _OpnO 4_, 4 Oct 50.
As Almond’s order went out for distribution on 4 October, EUSAK’s 1st
Cavalry Division, bound for Kaesong, passed through the 5th Marines
northwest of Seoul. Simultaneously, the II ROK Corps began assembling
along the road to Uijongbu, captured by the 7th Marines the previous
day.[38]
[38] Smith, _Chronicle_, 54.
After 20 days in the line, the weary battalions of the 5th Marines
retired on 5 October across the Han River to an assembly area at
Inchon. They were followed on the 6th by the 1st Regiment, and
on the next day by the 7th Marines. The withdrawal of the latter
unit completed the relief of X Corps, and General Almond’s command
officially reverted to GHQ Reserve.[39]
[39] _Ibid._, 55.
October 7th also marked the displacement of the 1st Marine Division
command post (CP) to Inchon, where planning and reality had finally
merged to the extent that preparations for Wonsan could begin in
earnest. Two days earlier, Vice Admiral Struble had re-created JTF-7
out of his Seventh Fleet; and by publication of his OpnO 16-50 on
the same date, 5 October, he set in motion the operational elements
involved in the projected amphibious envelopment. His new task
organization, almost identical to that which had carried out the Inchon
Operation with historic dispatch, was as follows:
TF 95 (Advance Force) RAdm Allen E. Smith
TG 95.2 (Covering & Support) RAdm Charles C. Hartman
TG 95.6 (Minesweeping) Capt Richard T. Spofford
TF 90 (Attack Force) RAdm James H. Doyle
TF 79 (Logistical Support Force) Capt Bernard L. Austin
TF 77 (Fast Carrier Force) RAdm Edward C. Ewen
TG 96.8 (Escort Carrier Group) RAdm Richard W. Ruble
TG 96.2 (Patrol & Reconnaissance) RAdm George R. Henderson
TG 70.1 (Flagship Group) Capt Irving T. Duke
Struble, who had directed the Inchon assault from the bridge of the
USS _Rochester_, would now fly his flag in the recently arrived USS
_Missouri_, the sole American battleship in commission at this early
stage of the Korean war.[40]
[40] ComSeventhFlt _OpnO 16-50_, 5 Oct 50.
[Illustration: WONSAN AND HARBOR
MAP-3
]
_Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing_
The Seventh Fleet directive of 5 October dispatched both the Fast
Carrier and the Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces of JTF-7 on the usual
search and attack missions preliminary to an amphibious assault. Task
Force 77, consisting of the carriers _Boxer_, _Leyte_, _Philippine Sea_
and _Valley Forge_, escorted by a light cruiser and 24 destroyers,
was under orders to direct 50 per cent of the preparatory air effort
against the local defenses of Wonsan. Simultaneously, the Advance
Force, with its cruisers, destroyers and mine sweeping units, would
close in to shell the target and wrest control of the offshore waters
from the enemy.[41]
[41] _Ibid._
Topographic and hydrographic studies made available to the Attack and
Landing Forces showed Wonsan to be a far more accessible target than
Inchon (see Map 3). Nestling in the southwestern corner of Yonghung
Bay, 80 miles above the 38th Parallel, the seaport offers one of the
best natural harbors in Korea. A vast anchorage lies sheltered in the
lee of Kalma Peninsula which, finger-like, juts northward from a bend
in the coastline. Tides range from seven to 14 inches, fog is rare, and
currents are weak. Docks can accommodate vessels drawing from 12 to 25
feet, and depths in the bay run from 10 fathoms in the outer anchorage
to 15 feet just offshore.[42]
[42] The description of Wonsan is based upon: GHQ, FECOM,
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater
Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch, _Terrain Study
No. 6, Northern Korea_, sec v, 13–16; 1stMarDiv _OpnO
15-50_, annex B, sec 2, 1, 3, 10 Oct 50; and 1stMarDiv
_SAR_, annex B (hereafter G-2 _SAR_), sec 2, 1.
Beaches around Wonsan are of moderate gradient, and the floor at
water’s edge consists of hard-packed sand. Though slightly wet landings
might be expected, amphibious craft could easily negotiate any of the
several desirable approaches. The coastal plain, ranging from 100
yards to two miles in depth, provides an acceptable lodgment area, but
the seaward wall of the Taebaek mountain range renders inland egress
difficult from the military standpoint.
In 1940, the population of Wonsan included 69,115 Koreans and 10,205
Japanese, the latter subsequently being repatriated to their homeland
after World War II. Under the Japanese program of industrialization,
the city had become Korea’s petroleum refining center. The construction
of port facilities, railways, and roads kept pace with the appearance
of cracking plants, supporting industries, and huge storage areas.
Two airfields served the locale in 1950. One of these, situated on the
coast about five miles north of the seaport, was of minor importance.
The other, known as Wonsan Airfield, on Kalma Peninsula across the
harbor, ranked high as a military prize. Spacious and accessible, it
was an excellent base from which to project air coverage over all of
Korea and the Sea of Japan. The Japanese first developed the field as
an air adjunct to the naval base at Wonsan; but after World War II,
a North Korean aviation unit moved in and used it until July 1950.
Thereafter, with the skies dominated by the UN air arm, Wonsan Airfield
temporarily lost all military significance. Its vacant runways,
barracks, and dispersal areas were given only passing attention in the
UN strategic bombing pattern, although the nearby industrial complex
was demolished.
In addition to being situated on an excellent harbor, Wonsan is the
eastern terminus of the Seoul-Wonsan corridor, the best of the few
natural routes across the mountainous nation. This 115-mile road and
rail passageway, once considered as a possible overland approach for
X Corps, separates the northern and southern divisions of the Taebaek
range, which rises precipitously from Korea’s east coast to heights of
5000 feet. Railroads and highways, primitive by western standards, also
trace the seaward base of the Taebaek Mountains to connect Wonsan with
Hamhung in the north and Pusan far to the south. Still another road and
railway leads to Pyongyang, 100 miles across the narrow neck of the
peninsula in the western piedmont.
The climate along Korea’s northeast coast is comparable to that of the
lower Great Lakes region in the United States. Mean summer temperatures
range between 80 and 88 degrees, although highs of 103 degrees have
been recorded. Winter readings drop as low as -7 degrees, but the
season is usually temperate with winds of low velocity. Despite light
snowfalls and moderate icing, the period from October through March is
best suited to military operations, for the heavy rains of spring and
summer create difficulties on the gravel-topped roads.
Although members of Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group One (PhibGruOne)
staff met with planners of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon early
in October, it soon became apparent that the projected D-Day of 15
October could not be realized. Maps and intelligence data necessary
for planning did not reach the Attack Force-Landing Force team until 6
October. The relief of X Corps by EUSAK was completed, not on 3 October
as General Almond had anticipated, but on the 7th. Moreover, the first
transport vessels to reach Inchon ran behind schedule, and they had not
been pre-loaded with a ten-day level of Class I, II, and V supplies,
as was promised. Planning and outloading consequently started late and
from scratch, with the result that D-Day “... was moved progressively
back to a tentative date of 20 October.”[43]
[43] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10. The classes of supply are as
follows: I, rations; II, supplies and equipment, such
as normal clothing, weapons, vehicles, radios etc, for
which specific allowances have been established; III,
petroleum products, gasoline, oil and lubricants (POL);
IV, special supplies and equipment, such as fortification
and construction materials, cold weather clothing, etc,
for which specific allowances have not been established;
V, ammunition, pyrotechnics, explosives, etc.