Napoleon had desired. Advantage had been taken of the bombardment of
Copenhagen, which was held to be a fresh proof of the lawless ambition
of England, to oblige Austria, Russia, and Prussia all to declare war
with England. Denmark had joined the French alliance, Sweden had been
compelled to forego the friendship of England. But there still existed
one part of Europe where the Berlin Decree was unacknowledged, and the
blockade of the British Isles was thus incomplete; this country was
Portugal.
[Sidenote: Condition of the Peninsula.]
[Sidenote: Napoleon's pretext for war with Portugal.]
Napoleon had long had his eyes fixed upon the Peninsula; by the Treaty
of Tilsitt it had in fact been delivered into his hands as Finland into
the hands of Alexander. The condition of the Peninsula was very
favourable to his schemes. Charles IV., a weak old man, was on the
throne, governed by his wife and by her favourite minister Godoy, the
Prince of the Peace. In strong opposition to his father and to the Queen
was Ferdinand, the Prince of Asturias. Both parties intrigued for the
support of Napoleon, but Godoy had been able to offer the more tempting
bait. Napoleon had induced the Prince of Asturias to enter into
communication with regard to a marriage with a lady of the Bonaparte
family. The secret correspondence had been brought to the knowledge of
the King, and made use of by him and his minister to affix a charge of
treason upon the Prince, and to imprison him for having conspired to
drive his father from the throne. By the people the story of the
conspiracy was regarded as a calumny of the minister to destroy the
Prince, and fearful of the storm he had excited, Godoy now attempted to
mediate a reconciliation between the King and his son. The Prince in his
imprisonment was induced to write penitential letters, and a solemn
pardon was given. But though the attempt to remove the Prince had thus
failed, Godoy's own connection with Napoleon, who had probably been at
the bottom of the late affair, was almost immediately shown by the
publication, on the 29th of October, of the Treaty of Fontainebleau.
This treaty disclosed the bait with which Godoy had been enabled to
secure the alliance of Bonaparte. He suggested that France and Spain
should join in appropriating Portugal if only he were allowed a
principality out of the spoil. The house of Braganza was to be
dispossessed; the northern province of Portugal was to be given to the
King of Etruria,[21] whose own province, Tuscany, might thus be appended
to the Italian kingdom; Godoy was to be rewarded with the principality
of Alentejo and Algarves. Some excuse was of course wanted for this
wanton attack upon Portugal. It was found in the way in which the Court
of Lisbon obeyed the demand addressed to it after the Peace of Tilsitt,
to close the ports of Portugal against England, to detain all Englishmen
resident in Portugal, and to confiscate all English property. Meanwhile
all Portuguese merchant ships in the ports of France were to be
detained. The Prince Regent of Portugal was not strong enough to resist
the demand. He obeyed the first order, without however forfeiting the
friendship of England, which confessed the coercion laid upon him. To
the other two demands he also at length conceded, but not till he had
given plentiful warning to the English to withdraw and to sell their
property. The delay was, however, sufficient to afford Napoleon the
pretext he wanted.
[Sidenote: Junot's army enters Spain. Oct. 18.]
[Sidenote: Ferdinand VII. succeeds his father Charles IV. March 19,
1808.]
[Sidenote: Murat occupies Madrid. March 23.]
[Sidenote: Napoleon places Joseph on the throne.]
While negotiations were still proceeding with Portugal, the real
intention of the Emperor--to appropriate both that country and
Spain--became obvious. For this purpose nearly 30,000 French troops were
to enter Spain, and 40,000 more were assembled at Bayonne. While Junot,
with "the first army of the Gironde," poured through Salamanca (in
October 1807), and proceeded to the conquest of Portugal, the domestic
quarrels of the Spanish Court continuing, the 40,000 men assembled at
Bayonne moved in two armies into Spain, and while apparently preparing
to follow Junot, really occupied the line of mountains north of Madrid,
and cut off that capital from the northern provinces, which were thus
practically conquered without a blow. In March 1808 riots both in Madrid
and Aranjuez, ending in the abdication of Charles and the accession of
Ferdinand, gave the French, now under the command of Murat, an excuse
for crossing the mountains by the Pass of Somo Sierra and occupying
Madrid. By a series of shameless intrigues Napoleon attracted both
Ferdinand and his father to Bayonne. Ferdinand was there induced to
restore the crown to his father (May 5), who abdicated a second time,
placing the crown in the hands of Napoleon. Napoleon immediately
established his brother Joseph upon the vacant throne (June 15).
[Sidenote: Insurrection in Spain.]
[Sidenote: Operations of Napoleon's three armies from Madrid.]
[Sidenote: Joseph evacuates Madrid. Aug. 1, 1808.]
But the Spaniards, especially the Castilians, were a people of high
temper; in spite of a century's degradation, certain remembrances of a
former greatness hung about them. They saw with scorn and disgust the
treacherous conduct of their own rulers, who were handing them over,
bound hand and foot, to a foreign prince, whose very virtues rendered
him doubly detestable to them; for the rule of the French meant splendid
and centralized organization, restraint, self-denial, and wise
government, very much opposed to Spanish feeling. While their rulers
were basely truckling to the invader the people rose; the flame of
insurrection spread far and wide; great riots in Toledo and Madrid were
followed by similar exhibitions of national anger throughout the
country, and Napoleon's armies, though they found no regular opposition,
though intrigue and treachery had apparently removed all obstacles,
found themselves in the midst of a hostile population, and masters only
of the ground on which they stood. To meet this new difficulty the
fertile mind of the Emperor had at once a plan ready. Madrid was to be a
centre from which should radiate in all directions expeditionary armies
to suppress the insurrections, Madrid itself resting for support on
France. To hold the communications between Madrid and France therefore
became a prime object. This work was intrusted to Bessières, while
Duhesme operated in Catalonia, and expeditions were sent out from Madrid
against Valencia under Moncey, and against Andalusia under Dupont.
Bessières, though his general Lefèbvre failed before the desperate
energy of the Saragossans, thoroughly defeated the Gallician troops
under Blake and Cuesta at the Rio Seco. Duhesme effected nothing, and
was obliged to raise the siege of Gerona. Moncey, though he reached the
town of Valencia with success, was unable to take it, and had to
retreat. Dupont pushed at first as far as Cordova, but losing heart, and
badly supplied from Madrid, also attempted to retreat, was pursued by
the Spaniards, and compelled to lay down his arms with 18,000 men, after
the battle of Baylen, before he could recross the Sierra Morena.
Unsuccessful, therefore, on all sides, and though victorious yet hard
pressed upon the North, the French were obliged to retire, and King
Joseph, evacuating Madrid, withdrew to France.
[Sidenote: The Portuguese royal family emigrate to Brazil. Nov. 29,
1807.]
[Sidenote: Junot's army occupies Lisbon. Nov. 30.]
Meanwhile Junot's army had proceeded direct to Portugal with orders to
occupy it by the 30th of November 1807. As Junot approached the capital,
the Prince Regent, acting under the advice of Lord Strangford, the
English ambassador, determined to leave his European dominions and to
transfer the apparatus and seat of government to Brazil. On the 29th of
November as many as 15,000 persons were carried by the English fleet
down the Tagus. The last ship had hardly sailed when Junot arrived. He
had wished to stop and reorganize his troops in Salamanca, but pressed
by the Emperor, he hurried forward in spite of the difficulties of the
way, and marched upon Lisbon with only a few thousand weary and
travel-worn soldiers. He however met with no opposition there, and after
the manner of Napoleon's lieutenants, at once set about Gallicizing the
country. The Portuguese army was chiefly sent away to France. The police
in the hands of the French was well administered, and though the people
of Lisbon obeyed unwillingly, order was successfully maintained. The
position of Spain and Portugal was thus closely analogous; in both cases
the people had been deserted by their natural rulers, in both cases the
consequences were the same. The insurrections in Spain were followed by
similar movements in Portugal. The people took the government into their
own hands, and a popular Junta was established at Oporto under the
influence of the Bishop.
[Sidenote: Enthusiasm in England for the Spanish insurrection.]
[Sidenote: Asturian envoys arrive in England. June 1808.]
The insurrection in Spain had been observed with enthusiastic admiration
by the people of England. It seemed at last as if that popular
insurrection against the tyranny of Napoleon, which had long been
expected, had arrived. Nevertheless, the total absence of central
authority produced its inevitable effects upon a country so ill ruled
and so ignorant of self-government as Spain. Ambitious men everywhere
laid hold of the local authority, and irresponsible juntas arose. The
provincial feeling, always unreasonably strong in the Peninsula, found
full vent. Junta disputed with junta, and the whole country was involved
in the wildest anarchy. None the less the feeling of the English people
was a true one. Napoleon had reached the point when he came into
collision with that very power which formed the basis of his own
success--the power of the people. Already his behaviour in Germany had
excited among the lower classes enthusiastic feelings of hatred to their
conquerors and of desire for national liberty; and the outbreak of the
Spanish insurrection added fresh vigour and raised fresh hopes in the
lovers of liberty throughout the whole of Europe. To the English
Government the arrival of two Asturian envoys in the month of June
seemed to offer an opportunity which had long been wanted of giving a
national and unselfish character to our opposition to the great
conqueror. In the course of time it afforded also a battle-ground on
which at length the military power of the country found room to move in
larger and more combined action, than in the feeble expeditions of the
earlier part of the war. But as yet this was not foreseen. For some
years the great war in the Peninsula was starved, while money was
lavished upon useless and isolated efforts in other parts of the
Continent; it was only slowly and by degrees that the genius, the
steadfastness, the success, of Wellington taught England the necessity
of large and well-continued efforts in one direction. The Asturian
envoys were received with enthusiasm not only by the Opposition but by
the Government. But the opportunity offered was not wisely made use of.
Spain was inundated with agents of no political ability, who were
deceived by the boasting assertions of the Spaniards. Money and arms
were sent over in lavish quantities to be left unopened on the quays,
appropriated by the rival juntas for their own personal or local
advantage, or to fall into the hands of the enemy, and the Spaniards,
who did little or nothing for themselves, were taught to demand the
assistance of England as a right.
[Sidenote: An English force sent to Portugal.]
[Sidenote: Wellesley lands at Figueras. Aug. 1, 1808.]
The position of Portugal seemed to offer a more favourable ground for
action, and thither it was determined to send an English armament. But
the Government could not yet conceive of war upon a large scale, and in
entire ignorance of the real condition of Spain believed that a mere
handful of English troops, aided by the boasted enthusiasm of the
Spanish nation, would be able to withstand the enormous armies Napoleon
was ready to pour into the Peninsula. The army at first sent was little
better than an expeditionary force. A body of troops ready at Cork for
war in South America were despatched under Sir Arthur Wellesley, at that
time Secretary for Ireland; but by some ridiculous mismanagement two
senior officers, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Governor of
Gibraltar, were put over his head, and Sir John Moore, who was
despatched with a second body of troops to reinforce him, though he had
served as commander-in-chief both in Sicily and Sweden, also found
himself in a subordinate position. The expedition touched first at
Corunna, but was persuaded by the members of the local junta to proceed
to Portugal, where they declared the numerous Spanish army was already
collected, and whither they promised speedily to send reinforcements.
Upon reaching Oporto, however, the commander found that there were no
Spanish troops in the north of Portugal, neither were there any
Portuguese troops; but upon the river Mondego there appeared to be a
disorganized body of about 5000 men, representing 40,000 for whom the
Bishop of Oporto had received accoutrements. With them there were some
10,000 peasants without arms. Wellesley had now a choice left. He might
land north of Lisbon and act against Junot, or proceed to Cadiz, and
joining Spencer, who had a small command there, act against the French
in Spain. He preferred the first alternative, and determined to land at
the mouth of the Mondego, near Figueras. He sent to Cadiz for Spencer's
troops, but fortunately that general, on hearing of the victory of
Baylen, had already determined to sail for the Tagus. The two corps when
joined amounted to about 12,000 men. The landing of the English at the
Mondego confined the operations to that tongue of land which lies
between the sea and the Tagus in its south-westerly course, and which is
terminated by the city of Lisbon.
[Sidenote: Combat of Rorica. Aug. 17.]
Wellesley determined to strike rapidly, and bring affairs in Portugal to
a crisis at once. Therefore, although deserted by the Portuguese troops,
he advanced directly southward towards Lisbon. Junot's troops were
somewhat scattered, and the temper of the people prevented him from
energetic action. He proceeded, however, to concentrate his troops, and
while this movement was going forward the English army came into contact
with one of his divisions under Laborde, occupying a strong position at
the end of a valley leading from Obidos to Rorica. Here, after a sharp
contest, the French general found himself outflanked by the hills which
line the valley, and withdrew, allowing Wellesley to proceed. Meanwhile
Junot had been continuing his concentration, and had collected 14,000
men at Torres Vedras, to bar the road to Lisbon. Sir Harry Burrard,
Wellesley's superior officer, had now arrived at the coast, and
Wellesley begged him to allow Sir John Moore's division, on its arrival
from England, to land on the Mondego river, and cross the tongue of land
to the Tagus, thus cutting off the natural line of retreat into Spain,
which would be up the valley of that river. He then proceeded to advance
against Junot. But Burrard, a commonplace general, disregarding his
advice, determined to bring Sir John Moore up as a reinforcement, and
forbad Wellesley to undertake any offensive movement till that general's
arrival.
[Illustration: Battle of Vimiero, Aug 21, 1808]
[Sidenote: Battle of Vimiero. Aug. 21, 1808.]
Wellesley was therefore obliged to return to his army, which was in
position at Vimiero. A little hill covered the village to the front. On
either side of it ran a chain of heights, from which on the east a
branch ran off southwards. There was a direct road between Vimiero and
Torres Vedras, and a second road from Torres Vedras to a place called
Lourinham ran along the top of the branch ridge crossing the main ridge.
On the hill before the village and upon the ridge to the west Wellesley
took up his position, expecting to be attacked on his right. But early
on the 21st the French came into view on the Lourinham road, and as they
pressed forward evidently threatened the left, and not the right, of the
English position. A considerable body of troops was therefore moved from
the right to the left ridge, a movement unobserved by the French, for
the valley between the armies was thickly wooded. For the same reason a
ravine which rendered the left wing nearly unassailable was unobserved
by the French. Junot directed two main attacks, upon the central hill
and upon the left ridge. The attack upon the centre was defeated, for it
was open on the flank to the fire of an English brigade moving to the
left, which halted half-way up the hill when the strength of the
central attack was seen; the left attack was ruined by the ravine.
Meanwhile troops had been sent to turn the English left by the Lourinham
road and to advance along the left ridge, which the French believed
almost unoccupied; but, as has been mentioned, it was now covered with
troops, and Ferguson's brigade beat the assailants back, and pursued
them along the ridge till he had wholly separated them from the rest of
the French army. They must have capitulated had not an unexpected order
arrived to halt. Sir Harry Burrard, who had been on the field all day,
had just assumed the command, and the change of leaders became at once
perceptible. When the battle was over, thirteen guns, and many
prisoners, including a general, were in the hands of the English, and
the French had lost between 2000 and 3000 men.
[Sidenote: Convention of Cintra. Aug. 30.]
The road to Torres Vedras from Lourinham, on which the beaten French
army had collected, was two miles longer than the direct road from
Vimiero. Wellesley designed to push forward with his victorious army,
part of which had not been engaged, to forestall the French at Torres
Vedras, and cut them off from Lisbon, a measure which, had Sir John
Moore been landed from Mondego, must have completed their ruin. Again
the prudence of Sir Harry Burrard thwarted Wellesley's plan. He was
compelled to allow his army to rest in their old position. Sir Harry
Burrard having thus spoilt a great victory, was almost immediately
superseded by the arrival of Sir Hugh Dalrymple. Their combined wisdom
allowed an advance upon Lisbon, but insisted on bringing Sir John Moore
to join the army. While this was being settled, an envoy arrived from
the French offering to treat, and finally the convention known as the
Convention of Cintra was entered into, in many points against
Wellesley's advice. It stipulated for the evacuation of Portugal, but
for the transport of the whole French army, with their guns and horses,
to France. It was likewise arranged that the Russian fleet, at that time
in Lisbon, should be regarded as in a neutral port; but as some English
regiments had got possession of the mouth of the river, and had hoisted
the English flag, this clause was overruled, and Siniavin, the Russian
admiral, with his fleet, passed into the hands of the English.
[Sidenote: Napoleon's position in Europe.]
It was not to be supposed that Napoleon would calmly watch the defeat of
his troops even in an obscure corner of Europe, still less when their
defeat seemed to thwart the completeness of his system, and was
connected with events which had driven his brother from his throne.
Though he knew that conquered Prussia beneath the surface was glowing
with inextinguishable hatred, and though Austria, in spite of the war
against England in which she was nominally engaged, was strengthening
her army and re-establishing her finances in a way which seemed to
threaten fresh efforts at freedom on her part, he determined to turn the
full strength of his Empire upon the devoted Peninsula. He felt that so
long as his friendship with Russia existed, so long as the Peace of
Tilsitt held firm, his position was tolerably secure. He therefore
renewed his alliance with Russia at a meeting with the Czar at Erfurth
(Oct. 12), and suddenly ordered the widely scattered divisions of the
grand army to concentrate on Paris preparatory to marching into Spain.
[Sidenote: Preparations in Spain.]
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore's march to Salamanca. Oct.]
Unconscious of the coming danger and of the vast strength of its enemy,
the central Junta at Madrid went on with its ill-arranged preparations
to secure the freedom of Spain, and with its idle boasts as to the
strength of the national armies. The English Government had not yet lost
faith in Spanish assertions, nor learnt the absolute worthlessness of
Spanish generals and armies; the fables of the Junta gained credence,
and while all the other generals who had gone to Portugal were recalled,
some 25,000 men were intrusted to Sir John Moore, with orders to advance
into Spain and assist the Spanish troops, which were now occupying the
valley of the Ebro and closing the French frontier. Even had the Spanish
troops been worth anything, there was an absurd disproportion between
the forces prepared and the scene of action for which they were
intended. Nor did this weakness fail to strike military men. The Duke of
York, though by no means a first-rate general, called the attention of
Government to the wide dissipation of the Spanish troops, and the great
distance of Portugal from the scene of action, and gave it as his
opinion that to employ less than 60,000 men was merely to waste them.
The Government refused to listen to his advice, Lord Castlereagh, the
War Minister, was unmoved, and Moore was sent forward to certain
failure. With a raw commissariat, and ill supplied with money, although
it was at that very time being lavished upon the Spaniards, he embarked
upon his dangerous march through a country where the roads were so bad
that his artillery to reach Salamanca had to proceed all up the valley
of the Tagus almost to Madrid and come back to meet him at Salamanca,
where he was to be joined by reinforcements from England under Sir David
Baird. Moore's concentration at Salamanca was wholly based on the
supposition that the Spanish armies were strong enough at all events to
retard, if not wholly to resist, the invasion of the French. Yet the
grand army was rapidly approaching, and before long the forces collected
upon the frontier rendered resistance hopeless. In September
arrangements were made for the incorporation of the troops coming from
Germany with those already in Spain, and eight great corps d'armée,
commanded by six French marshals and Generals Junot and St. Cyr, besides
the Imperial Guard, were collected to bear down all opposition.
[Sidenote: Napoleon arrives at Vittoria. Nov. 8, 1808.]
While Moore was painfully completing his concentration at Salamanca,
Napoleon himself arrived at Vittoria, and almost immediately the Spanish
troops, which the English general was to support, were scattered to the
winds.
[Sidenote: Destruction of the Spanish armies. Napoleon at Madrid. Dec.
4, 1808.]
From his central position the Emperor was able to concentrate his chief
force now on his right, now on his left. In a rapid succession of
victories Lefèbvre and Soult destroyed the armies upon the left and
centre of the Spanish line, and on the 11th of November Blake was
entirely ruined at Espinosa. Immediately the whole strength of the
French army was turned against the right, and on the 23rd of the same
month Lannes crushed Palafox and Castaños at Tudela. All the boasted
armies of Spain were thus swept away as it were in a moment, and
Napoleon advanced upon Madrid, forced the passage of the Somo-Sierra,
and after some slight opposition took possession of the capital on the
4th of December. The news of the defeats of Espinosa and Tudela reached
Moore at Salamanca before his artillery had joined him. He resolved to
await its arrival, and then to retreat.
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore's retreat.]