The temporary annihilation of Austria at Austerlitz, and the complete
overthrow of Prussia at Jena, had made Napoleon master of nearly the
whole of Europe. Nothing is more remarkable than the rapid expansion of
his ambition; each new success seemed to supply him with a new
starting-point for further schemes. His mind, in spite of its practical
character, had a strong tendency towards romance; as in his youth he had
been fired with the idea of a great Eastern monarchy, so now, as
circumstances had been favourable to him, the idea of repeating the rôle
of Charlemagne, and the re-establishment of the Empire of the West,
seems to have been prominent in his mind. Already, in his dealings with
the Pope, in the Confederation of the Rhine, and in the creation of
vassal kingdoms, he had shown his wish to imitate the conduct of that
great ruler. The idea was confirmed by the conquest of Prussia, and
strengthened by a petition from one of his armies that he would take the
title of Emperor of the West. Russia was the only opponent left upon the
Continent. If Russia could be either conquered or won over, not only
would he have been in truth the Western Emperor, but he would have the
means, as he believed, of wreaking his vengeance upon his detested rival
England, which still refused to yield to his ascendancy. Already in
fact, he believed that this vengeance was in his grasp. On the 21st of
November he issued the extraordinary measure known as the Berlin Decree.
Even during the negotiations with Fox he had insisted upon Prussia
closing against English traffic the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. The
measure had not been a success, 400 Prussian vessels had been seized in
reprisal, and the mouths of the North German rivers declared in a state
of blockade. That blockade had been real. But the Emperor now, as he
said by a just use of the law of retaliation (while he was unable with
safety to place a single ship upon the ocean), declared that the whole
of the British Isles were in a state of blockade, forbad on the part of
all his dependent countries any commerce or correspondence with them,
declared every subject of England found in a country occupied by French
troops a prisoner of war, and all English merchandise, even all private
property of Englishmen, confiscated. Thus was established what is known
as the Continental system. It laboured under three disadvantages. In
the first place, it was absolutely impracticable, Europe could not be
supplied without England, as Napoleon himself found in the course of the
year when he authorized the clothing of his own army with English cloth;
secondly, it enabled England by retaliatory measures to destroy every
mercantile marine in Europe except its own; thirdly, it was so
distressing and vexatious, and interfered so wantonly both with private
property and the supply of necessaries for the people, that, more than
anything else that Napoleon did, it excited popular indignation against
him, and tended to his downfall. And yet it was not without a certain
plausible excuse, which rested on the difference then existing between
the laws of war as carried on by land and upon the sea. By land the
property of an enemy was not considered lawful prize unless it belonged
to the hostile government itself; by sea the property of peaceable
merchants was liable to seizure and confiscation. By land no one was
considered a prisoner of war unless taken with arms in his hand; by sea
the crews of merchantmen were imprisoned as well as those of armed
vessels. The second point which formed Napoleon's excuse was the
extension given by England to the right of blockade. These two points
afforded the pretext under which the Decree was promulgated, and was
declared to be a fundamental law of the French Empire, till England
should recognize the laws of war to be the same by sea and by land, and
should consent to restrict the right of blockade to fortified towns
actually invested by a sufficient force. In issuing his Decree, then,
Napoleon put on a specious appearance of magnanimity, and took upon
himself the part which he was fond of assuming, that of champion of the
rights of nations against the tyranny of the English.
[Sidenote: Orders in Council.]
[Sidenote: Their effect on America.]
The necessity under which England as a belligerent lay of employing to
the full the power which usage gave it of necessity inflicted
considerable inconvenience upon neutral powers. The retaliatory measures
which the Government thought it wise to take still further injured the
neutrals, and threatened almost to annihilate the American trade. A
series of orders in Council was issued, extending from January to
November 1807. By the first of these orders vessels were forbidden to
trade between any ports in the possession of France, or of her allies if
under her control. By the second, issued in November, after the
extension of the Continental system to the Mediterranean, general
reprisals were granted against the goods, ships, and inhabitants of
Tuscany, Naples, Dalmatia, and the Ionian Islands. By the third, all
ports from which the flag of England was excluded were declared in
blockade, all trade in their produce unlawful, and their ships a prize,
while all vessels carrying certificates of origin (a measure which
Napoleon had insisted upon to prevent evasion of his system) were
declared liable to capture. By the fourth, another plan of evasion was
forbidden; the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral was declared
illegal, because the French had managed to preserve much of their
commerce by fictitious sales, enabling them to continue their business
under neutral flags. The Americans were the chief sufferers by these
orders, and the irritation already felt by them was so increased that it
ultimately ripened into war. Their two special grievances were the
constant search of their vessels for deserters, and the refusal of the
British authorities to recognize their customhouse arrangements. By the
English law as then existing an English subject could not get rid of his
nationality. But America was full of English and Irish emigrants and
deserters from English ships, and the Americans had the constant
mortification of seeing even their war-ships stopped and searched, and
the asylum of their flag violated by the apprehension, under the rough
justice of English naval officers, of many of their best seamen. By the
neutral laws direct trading between the colony of a belligerent and its
mother country was forbidden, but neutrals might trade for their own
supply with the colonies. More than this, if they imported from the
colonies more than they wanted they might re-export it even to the
mother country; the proof of a _bona fide_ interrupted voyage was the
payment of the customhouse dues in the ports of the neutral. But these
dues were in America paid not in money but in bonds, which were
cancelled when the goods were re-exported. The payment of goods was
therefore fictitious, and English officials refused to recognize them.
The irritation produced by these two causes was but slightly allayed by
negotiations in 1809, and, as will be subsequently mentioned, the
people, especially the Southerners, forced the States into war in 1812.
[Sidenote: Battle of Eylau. Feb. 7, 1807.]
To enable Napoleon to carry out his idea either of a Western Empire or
of the complete annihilation of English trade it was necessary that war
with Russia should continue. As a means for injuring that power he had
already held out hopes of restoration of liberty to Poland, and in
December he was received as a national saviour at Warsaw; but some
remnant of the Prussian army had formed a junction with the forces of
the Czar, and Benigsen, in command of the combined armies, refused to
give the French a resting time in their new quarters. Napoleon had
again himself to take the field. The allies fell back northwards to
Eylau, not far from Königsberg, and there, on the 7th of February, was
fought a great battle, which, for almost the first time, the French
could not claim as a victory. Their exhaustion was great. Three times
within seven months fresh conscriptions had been ordered in France. The
firmness of the Russians at Eylau gave rise to well-grounded hopes that
the chance of checking Napoleon had arrived, but money and
reinforcements of troops were sorely wanted.
[Sidenote: Incapacity of the Grenville ministry.]
But at this critical moment the Grenville ministry exhibited to the full
its incapacity for carrying on war. The Emperor of Russia was told that
he need expect no great assistance from England, and money was doled out
to him with ridiculous parsimony. There was indeed in England a total
misapprehension of the necessities of a great war. Since the time of
Marlborough and Queen Anne the idea of war on a large scale, except upon
the sea, seemed to have wholly disappeared from the minds of the public
men of the country. Even the great successes of Chatham had depended
principally upon his good fortune in securing the alliance of Frederick
the Great, and now all the resources of England were frittered away in a
ridiculous series of small expeditions. When a concentration of troops
and a frank and open-handed assistance to its allies might have saved
Europe, the English Government taught them by its conduct, that while
urging them to fight it would practically desert them at the moment when
its assistance was wanted, and spend its men and money on such frivolous
expeditions as the attack on Buenos Ayres, Alexandria, or upon the
Dardanelles. These were the three military projects of the Grenville
ministry.
[Sidenote: Expedition to Buenos Ayres. May 1807.]
In 1806 the English had recaptured from the Dutch the Cape of Good Hope.
Sir Home Popham, who commanded the fleet, without orders from
Government, determined upon a similar assault upon the Spanish colonies
in America, and proceeded to capture Buenos Ayres. He thence wrote home
a triumphant letter calling upon the English merchants to come to the
magnificent new market he had opened. His triumph was of short duration.
The colonists rallied under command of a French colonel, the city was
recaptured, and the troops compelled to surrender as prisoners of war.
In February 1807, 3000 men were sent out under Sir Samuel Auchmuty to
assist Popham. Too late to save Buenos Ayres, he attacked and captured
Monte Video. Before his success was known fresh reinforcements were
sent out under General Whitelocke, with orders to assume the chief
command, and with Popham's forces recapture Buenos Ayres. The attempt
was a disgraceful failure; the troops were ordered to enter the city
with unloaded muskets, and to rendezvous in the central square. The
effect of so strange an attempt at street fighting may be easily
conjectured. From the side-streets, housetops, and barricades thrown up
across the roads, a destructive fire was kept up. Though Auchmuty met
with some success, by nightfall 2500 of the English were either killed
or prisoners, and Whitelocke was glad to accept the freedom of the
prisoners both of the present engagement and of the past year, and to
withdraw his troops, surrendering Monte Video and all he had conquered.
In the judgment of the court martial which tried Whitelocke he was held
totally unfit to serve his Majesty in any military capacity whatever,
and the popular voice changed his name to General Whitefeather.
[Sidenote: Turkey declares war against Russia.]
[Sidenote: Expedition to the Dardanelles. Feb. 1807.]
During the continuance of the great European war the friendship of
Turkey had been a constant object with the great powers. The ambassadors
from Russia, France, and England had used all their powers of persuasion
and menace to secure the adhesion of the Sultan. Before the end of the
year 1806 the threats of Russia had had the effect of driving the Sultan
to the friendship of France, and the Porte had declared war with Russia
just after the battle of Jena. Wanting his troops for the defence of his
own country, and being at that time in close friendship with England,
Alexander requested the English Government to take charge of his
interests at the Turkish capital, and despatch a fleet to oblige Selim
to give up his friendship with France. The plan, being one which could
be carried out by the navy, suited the policy of the Grenville
Government, and orders were sent to Lord Collingwood, then cruising off
Cadiz, to send a squadron to the Dardanelles. He was not allowed to
choose his own commander, but received orders from home to appoint Sir
John Duckworth. Nothing could be worse managed than the expedition.
Collingwood had given strict charge to Duckworth not to be drawn into
negotiations. But when the passage of the Dardanelles, at that time
almost unfortified, was forced, Duckworth, forgetful of Collingwood's
advice, suffered himself to be entangled in negotiations. Sebastiani,
the French ambassador, aroused the temper of the Turks, and instructed
them in the best manner of fortifying their coasts. The English fleet
was in danger of being shut up in the Straits. It became necessary to
withdraw; but that step was no longer easy. On the 1st of March the
fleet sailed back through the Dardanelles. Batteries had been erected at
every point, and though the fleet succeeded in running the gauntlet
through the terrible fire, with the loss of only some 300 men, it found
itself entirely prevented from any return. The object of the expedition
had completely failed, and the only resource left was to keep the
Turkish fleet blockaded.
[Sidenote: Expedition to Alexandria. March to August.]
In connection with this expedition a body of troops had been despatched
under General Fraser to capture Alexandria. It was hoped that on the
receipt of the news of Duckworth's expected success, it would have been
able to advance to the reconquest of Egypt. Want of food necessitated an
attack upon Rosetta. It was undertaken in the same foolish spirit as
Whitelocke's attack upon Buenos Ayres. Entangled in the streets, the
English soldiery were shot down in great numbers, and with the loss of a
third of his troops the general in command withdrew to Alexandria. A
subsequent effort was made to besiege Rosetta in form, but the forces of
the Pasha of Egypt proved too strong for the besiegers; with heavy loss
they withdrew to Alexandria, and in August 1807 were compelled to
evacuate the country.
[Sidenote: Expedition to Sicily. July, 1806.]
The only gleam of success which attended the military operations of the
Grenville ministry was gained in the south of Italy. It will be
remembered that immediately after the battle of Austerlitz the kingdom
of Naples had been appropriated by France. Sicily, however, was not
conquered, and in that island there was an English army commanded by Sir
John Stewart. Urged to do something for the assistance of the Neapolitan
Court, he landed in Calabria in July, and there fought and won the
battle of Maida, in which the French general Reynier was completely
beaten. The forces at Stewart's command were insufficient for the
reconquest of the country, which fell again into French hands on the
retirement of the English, after a lengthened opposition on the part of
the peasantry.
[Sidenote: Complete dissolution of the coalition.]
The attempt made at the Peace of Westphalia to establish the balance of
power in Europe, and to secure the rights of small states, had proved
unsuccessful. It had been rudely shocked by the career of Frederick II.,
and almost annihilated by the partition of Poland. A spirit of jealousy
and a desire for selfish aggrandizement had taken possession of the
great reigning houses, and had proved a fatal obstacle to the formation
of loyal coalitions for a general purpose. It is to this that may be
traced the failure of united effort in the last war, and the terrible
reverses which both Austria and Prussia had undergone; England had in
the same spirit just been frittering away its strength in attempts to
secure the mastery of the sea, and the opening of new markets for her
trade; thus left without the assistance they had a right to demand, the
Russians were completely defeated at the battle of Friedland (June 14).
It was now the turn for Russia to seek its own ends, and to secure them
by deserting its allies. Disgusted with the lukewarm assistance afforded
by England, attached to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and
eager to carry on its schemes of aggression against Turkey, the Czar
allowed himself to be dazzled by the flattering offers of Napoleon. The
Emperor had found his difficulties increase with his empire; he had
discovered that the Russians were more difficult to conquer than the
Austrians or Prussians, and he was now willing to purchase the
friendship of the Czar and his assistance against England by an
arrangement by which Alexander should be Emperor of the East, while he
kept for himself the envied position of Emperor of the West.
[Sidenote: Treaty of Tilsitt. July 7, 1807.]
The meeting between the Emperors took place, as upon neutral ground, on
a raft in the middle of the Niemer at Tilsitt. "I hate the English as
you do," Alexander is reported to have said. "Then," replied Napoleon,
"peace is made;" and the two Emperors set to work to arrange Europe
according to their own fancies, upon the common basis of dislike to
England, and under the showy pretext of checking her overweening pride
upon the sea. As Russia was fighting not for herself but for her allies,
a treaty of peace and amity was all that was wanted between her and
France, and of course the lately conquered King of Prussia had to pay
the price of the treaty, the terms being chiefly in favour of France.
Prussia was deprived of all its provinces between the Rhine and the
Elbe, and of its Polish possessions. The former were incorporated with
Hesse, Brunswick, and a part of Hanover, to form a kingdom of
Westphalia, which was given to Jerome Bonaparte; the latter were formed
into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and given to the King of Saxony, one
province only excepted, which was given to Russia, nominally to cover
the expenses of the war. All the alterations which Napoleon had effected
in Europe were accepted; the Duchies of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were
restored to their possessors, on the condition that the French should
hold their ports till the conclusion of a general peace; Silesia and the
German provinces on the right bank of the Elbe were restored to Prussia,
but a military road was allowed to Saxony through Silesia, to afford the
Saxon Prince access to his new dominions. Prussia was, however, to
acknowledge the Berlin Decree, to reduce its troops to 42,000 men, to
pay France £6,000,000 of money, in addition to the charges of the war,
amounting to about £20,000,000, and to leave Berlin and its chief
fortresses in the hands of the French till the debt was paid; as the
yearly revenue of Prussia was not much more than £3,000,000, this
promised to be for some time.
[Sidenote: Secret articles of the treaty.]
But the real point of the treaty was its secret articles, which were
dimly suspected at the time, and the existence of which has subsequently
been fully proved. By these articles, if England had not consented by
the 1st of November to conclude peace--recognizing that the flags of all
Powers ought to enjoy an equal and perfect independence on the seas, and
restoring all conquests won from France or its allies since 1805--Russia
was to make common cause with France against her, and oblige the Courts
of Lisbon, Stockholm and Copenhagen to join in the alliance. In exchange
for this, which was to wreak Napoleon's vengeance upon England, it was
stipulated that if the Porte did not accept the mediation of France,
France would make common cause with Russia against the Porte, and would
agree to take from the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire in
Europe, with the exception of the town of Constantinople and Roumelia.
Napoleon had thus thrown over, for his own advantage, the Poles, on
whose hopes of liberty he had traded, and the Turks, whom he had induced
to declare war with Russia; Spain and Portugal were left open to his
ambition; Sweden was placed at the disposal of Russia, which was
likewise rid of all difficulty from Poland.
[Sidenote: Conduct of Alexander.]
The conduct of Alexander has an appearance of extreme treachery. Only a
few days before he had written to the English King that "there was no
salvation to himself or to Europe but by interminable resistance to
Bonaparte;" moreover, he did not refuse to accept a considerable portion
of the territories of his ally the King of Prussia. His apologists
assert that his readiness to accept Napoleon's terms was assumed to
afford him an opportunity for strengthening himself for future
opposition to French aggrandizement. More probably he was led away,
partly by his peculiar enthusiastic temperament, which made him wish to
have a large share both in the establishment of peace and in the
rearrangement of Europe, and partly by an undercurrent of ambition
which laid him open to offers securing him the acquisition of Poland,
and the command both of the Baltic and the Black Seas.
[Sidenote: Consequences of the Peace of Tilsitt.]
[Sidenote: Capture of the Danish fleet. Sept. 8.]
[Sidenote: War between Russia and Sweden. Oct. 31.]
Already, before the signing of the Peace of Tilsitt, information had
been brought to Canning, our Foreign Minister, that the fleets of
Portugal and Denmark were to be taken by the French and used for an
assault upon England. The secret articles of the treaty vindicate the
truth of this information, and justify in some degree the immediate
action which the English Government took upon it. For although there
seems to be proof that the Danes themselves were anxious to maintain
their friendship with England, it was more than probable that they would
be unable to resist the combined pressure of Russia and France. Refusing
the mediation offered by Russia, unless England was put on a fair
footing with France by a frank disclosure of the nature of the late
treaty, the English Government despatched a squadron to require the
immediate surrender of the Danish fleet. It was no doubt a harsh
measure, rendered still harsher by the courageous conduct of the Danes.
Although Copenhagen was unprepared for an attack, the demand was
refused, and it was found necessary to bombard the city. The effect of
this step was, on the one hand, a surrender of the whole Danish fleet,
which was brought to England, and on the other, to make Denmark,
whatever its previous intention may have been, a close ally of France.
In a second direction the consequences of the treaty became immediately
obvious. Russia demanded of Sweden her adhesion to the Continental
System. Christian IV., the king of that country, was chivalrous and
impetuous to the verge of madness. He refused all solicitations to
forsake his alliance with England, and became entangled in a war with
France and Russia at once. When scarcely strong enough to defend his own
country, he began an assault upon the Danish province of Norway, and
consequently lost all his territory in Pomerania and Finland, which
amounted to nearly a third of his kingdom. Sir John Moore, with an army
of 10,000 men, were sent to his assistance, but found him so wild and
unreasonable that he thought it better to sail home without even landing
his troops. Frightened at the eccentricities of their sovereign, the
Swedes removed him from the throne, setting up his uncle in his place.
[Sidenote: Continental System acknowledged everywhere except in
Portugal.]