pressing onward rapidly to Madrid, in a few days to drive the members of
the supreme Junta fugitives to Badajos, the old system of
misrepresentation was kept up. Mr. Frere, the English plenipotentiary,
had been persuaded to share in the illusions of the Junta, and he wrote
peremptory letters, urging Moore to advance, and to rally the Spanish
armies around him behind the Tagus. But news had at length reached Moore
that those Spanish armies did not exist; the national excitement he had
been taught to expect was nowhere visible, and he presently heard that
the capital itself was in the hands of Napoleon. For 25,000 or 30,000
English soldiers to oppose the grand army with Napoleon at its head was
simply ridiculous; their retreat was a matter of necessity. But Moore
determined before retreating to relieve if possible the pressure upon
the south of Spain, by pushing forward against Soult and threatening the
French communications with France. In acting thus he judged that
Napoleon was far more likely to direct his efforts against the English
force than to spend his time in subduing the southern provinces, which
would easily fall into his hands afterwards. He therefore advanced
towards the Carrion river, where Soult had collected his army. The
measure succeeded. Napoleon heard of the advance on the 21st; dismissing
all thought of the Spaniards, he checked the further advance of his
troops, and turned all his attention to crushing the English. On receipt
of the news that Napoleon had left Madrid, Moore, who had been hoping to
strike a blow before the arrival of Napoleon, at once began his retreat.
He was closely followed by Soult, while Napoleon, forcing the passes of
the Guadarama, which were deep in snow, came up from the south upon his
flank. The retreat was attended with great difficulty. Moore's troops
were young, the subordination was not perfect, and the enemy pressed him
close; and at length, on the 1st of January, Napoleon and Soult formed a
junction at Astorga, and their combined army amounted to 70,000 men. In
ten days Napoleon had moved in the depth of winter 50,000 men across 200
miles of hostile country. But Moore's rapidity had spoilt the effect of
even this stupendous march; he had already passed Astorga.
[Sidenote: Napoleon leaves Spain.]
[Sidenote: Moore reaches Corunna. Jan. 10.]
There news reached the Emperor of the approaching declaration of war
from Austria, and he found it necessary to resign the command to Soult.
Some of his troops he took with him; but Soult himself, and Ney, who
supported him, still commanded upwards of 60,000 men, by whom the
pursuit was recommenced. Amid many scenes of disorder the English army
pursued its career towards Vigo, where it was expected that the fleet
would be ready to receive it. But information was brought that the
harbour was not fit for the embarkation of troops. The line of retreat
was therefore changed to Corunna. At Lugo, so close was the pursuit that
Moore thought it necessary to prepare for battle, and the troops, though
they had suffered much and become disorderly in retreat, at once showed
that their spirit was unbroken. To the number of 16,000 they formed
willingly and regularly in array of battle. But as the French did not
attack, and as the supplies would not permit of more than one great
battle, the army being now concentrated and encouraged, Moore marched
off at night, and resumed his course towards the sea. Although the
movement was executed in the midst of a heavy storm, and though so much
disorganization followed that the loss between Lugo and Betangos was
more than in all the former part of the retreat, from thence to Corunna,
the army being collected, marched in good order. As they approached the
port, to their horror they discovered that the fleet had not arrived.
Contrary winds were still detaining it at Vigo, "and the last consuming
exertion made by the army was rendered fruitless." Battle was after all
necessary. Large magazines of arms and ammunition left unappropriated
and undistributed by the Spanish authorities, though their armies were
in desperate want, were found and destroyed. The horses, many of them
already broken down, were put to death. Soult's army, almost as
exhausted by pursuit as Moore's by retreat, did not assemble till the
12th, but it was not till the 14th that the English transports arrived.
The cavalry, who had lost their horses, the sick, and fifty pieces of
artillery, were put on board, and preparations made for covering the
embarkation of the troops. The ridge on which Soult's army was drawn up
overlooked and commanded the position of the English, and some generals
were desirous even then of entering into negotiations to secure the safe
withdrawal of the army. Moore would not hear of it.
[Sidenote: Battle of Corunna. Jan. 16.]
It was determined that upon the evening of the 16th the embarkation
should take place, but about the middle of the day the French army began
the attack. Even in the last hour of retreat the English showed their
strength; the assaults of the French were repulsed on all sides, and
when night closed they were everywhere falling back in confusion. Moore
had fallen in the battle, and the command devolved on Hope. Had he known
that Soult's ammunition was nearly exhausted he would have continued the
strife, and the disaster of the French would have been complete. As it
was, he held it wiser to embark the English army during the night, an
operation which was performed successfully and without confusion. The
loss of the English was estimated at 800, that of the French at between
2000 and 3000. But though, no doubt, the battle of Corunna was an
English victory, it was advantageous only in allowing the army to be
withdrawn, and left the north-west provinces of Spain and the north of
Portugal open to the French. Sir John Moore, whose character as a
soldier had already been acknowledged, decoyed by false hopes and
misled by false information, had yet nobly succeeded in withdrawing for
a time the pressure of the French from the south of Spain, and in the
midst of overwhelming difficulties had saved the British army and closed
his career with a brilliant victory.
[Sidenote: Discouragement of the English ministry.]
[Sidenote: Beresford made commander of the Portuguese army.]
[Sidenote: Wellesley arrives. April 22, 1809.]
The Convention of Cintra and the retreat of Sir John Moore, the
greatness of which was not understood, discouraged the English ministry
with regard to its policy in the Peninsula. The cause of the Spaniards
was however so popular that it was not deemed advisable wholly to desert
them. For three months after the convention Portugal had been left a
prey to its own anarchy, but in December Sir John Cradock was sent out
to command the English troops. The armaments which had been sent to
Cadiz having failed to effect anything there, collected at Lisbon. The
Portuguese were at length wise enough to demand an English general for
their army, and Beresford was sent out to take the command, and thus
something like order was re-established. But Napoleon had commanded the
conquest of Portugal, the troops of Victor threatened it in the valley
of the Tagus, while Soult had entered it from the north and mastered
Oporto. Refusing to act with insufficient troops, and waiting for
reinforcements, Sir John Cradock had wisely taken the position to defend
Lisbon from the advance of Victor, and was stationed at Lumiar and
Sacavem just above Lisbon. It was in this position that Wellesley found
the English army when he came to take the command on the 22nd of April.
With his arrival begins what is properly called the Peninsula War, a war
which, by constantly sapping the strength of Napoleon, by exhibiting the
possibility of his defeat, and by showing him and his rule, in
opposition not to a government, but to a people, was to do more than
anything else to complete his final overthrow.
[Sidenote: Division of opinion in England.]
[Sidenote: Scandal of the Duke of York.]
But the English ministry, even while continuing the war, by no means
regarded it in this light. Their hopes were not unnaturally turned
rather to political coalitions in Europe and to expeditions which
appeared more directly to attack the heart of the French empire.
Moreover, political feeling in England was strongly excited. Though
there was a general desire for the continuation of the war, there was no
unanimity as to the means of carrying it on, or as to the people by whom
it should be carried on. Every disaster was exaggerated for political
purposes, every obstacle thrown in the way of ministerial action. Our
system of party government is not well suited either to great European
combinations (because the open hostility exhibited to the ministry of
necessity gives an appearance of uncertainty to our engagements) or to
the carrying on of war where secresy is necessary, and where reliance
upon those to whom the war is intrusted is required. In domestic affairs
its effect is different, and at this time the Opposition was doing good
service in bringing abuses to light and rendering salutary reforms
necessary. Early in the spring they found grounds for assaulting the
ministry in the conduct of the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief, who
was accused by a certain militia colonel, Wardle by name, of being
influenced by his mistress, Mrs. Clark, in his appointments, while her
favour was said to be procured by money. The scandal excited was great,
and the immoral details of the story were in everybody's mouth. The
inquiry made it evident that Mrs. Clark's influence had been used, but
it was not so clear that the Duke had ever himself acted otherwise than
conscientiously. The majorities in his favour, however, were so small,
that he felt it necessary to resign his office, and Sir David Dundas was
appointed in his place. Before long his accuser was himself sued by a
tradesman for the price of goods with which he had furnished a house for
Mrs. Clark. This gave such an air of malice to the charge, and displayed
Colonel Wardle's desire for purity in so strange a light, that it
greatly lessened the feeling against the Duke, who was before long
restored to his office.
[Sidenote: Charges against Lord Castlereagh, May.]
This quarrel, in addition to the case of Lord Melville, excited
attention as to the general purity of the administration. Considerable
sums of money, amounting to nearly £20,000,000, were unaccounted for.
Nor did a committee of inquiry, though it sent in its report, throw much
light on the matter. But in March the Chancellor of the Exchequer
brought in a Bill to prevent the sale and brokerage of office. Among
other matters, attention was drawn to patronage in India, and Lord
Castlereagh confessed to having purchased a seat in Parliament for a
friend by a gift of an Indian writership. Lord Castlereagh's frank
confession induced the House to resolve that no criminating resolution
was necessary. Again in May a fresh charge was brought involving Lord
Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval also. They were charged with procuring the
election of a certain Mr. Quintin Dick, and of afterwards influencing
his vote. They were acquitted by a large majority. None the less,
Romilly remarks in his Memoirs, "the decision of this night, coupled
with some that had lately taken place, will do more towards disposing
the nation in favour of a parliamentary reform than all the speeches
that have been or will be made in popular assemblies." This question of
parliamentary reform was now again beginning to occupy the public mind.
Though still commanding majorities, the Cabinet was not at one with
itself, and before the year was over the ministry had to be reorganized.
[Sidenote: Opposition to Napoleon in Germany. 1809.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Aspern. May 22, 1809.]
But meanwhile the war was proceeding in its course. The threatening news
from Austria which checked Napoleon in his pursuit of Moore proved true.
The cruelty and injustice of the attack upon Spain, and the spectacle of
a people in revolt, had strongly excited the feelings of Germany.
Earnest men of all ranks had enrolled themselves in the secret society
known as the Tugendbund, which was shortly to show its strength. The
same feeling of hostility to France had shown itself in irresistible
force in Austria, smarting under its repeated disgraces. There the Court
and Government put itself at the head of the movement, and the Archduke
Charles, who was regarded as a military genius, issued a proclamation
declaring that the liberty of Europe rested with the Austrian arms.
There was no regular coalition formed, but Austria felt that it could
rely upon the friendship of England (although still nominally at war
with it), of Prussia, where the popular feeling ran high, and probably
even of Russia. Armies numbering more than 200,000 men were set on foot,
and on the 9th of April Austria declared war against Bavaria, an ally of
France. The generals left in charge of Napoleon's army in Germany
somewhat mistook his orders, and the Archduke succeeded in forming a
partial concentration of his troops and occupying Ratisbon. The arrival
of the Emperor on the field soon changed the face of affairs. A series
of battles was fought; the left wing of Charles's army was separated
from the right, and his forward advance entirely frustrated by defeats
at Abendsberg (April 20), Eckmühl (April 21), and Ratisbon (April 22).
Napoleon again advanced to Vienna. But there he found the Archduke
Charles still fronting him upon the northern side of the Danube, and the
great bridge which crosses the river at Vienna broken down. Near that
city the course of the Danube is divided by an island called Lobau,
about three miles in length. Napoleon constructed bridges at the island,
and brought his army across them into the level called the Marchefeldt
on the northern side. There was fought the great battle of Aspern.
Victory declared for neither party, and Napoleon found himself in an
awkward situation, for the river had risen, and aided by the efforts of
the Austrians, had swept away the bridge, and he was thus cut off from
reinforcements. He contrived to get back to Lobau, and there awaited his
opportunity.
[Sidenote: Revolt of the Tyrolese.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Wagram. July 6, 1809.]
[Sidenote: Peace of Vienna. Oct. 14, 1809.]
His position was indeed precarious. The secret societies had shown
themselves, and a partisan insurrection had broken out under Colonel
Schill and the Duke of Brunswick in Saxony and Westphalia. It was
premature, and without much difficulty suppressed. The Tyrolese too,
headed by Andrew Hofer, an inn-keeper of the valley of Passeyr, had
burst into revolt; 25,000 Bavarians which marched to suppress them had
been beaten back. Again and again in the mountain passes they
encountered and defeated both the French and Bavarian troops. The revolt
was unsuppressed, when Napoleon determined to break from his difficult
position. In July, while pretending to build a massive bridge across the
river, he brought his army rapidly across it on a temporary structure.
The Archduke, who had expected to attack the French while crossing, had
now to fight another pitched battle, and two vast armies, numbering
together between 300,000 and 400,000 men, encountered each other upon
the tableland of Wagram. The French gained a hard-won victory. The
Archduke was pursued to Zmaim, in Moravia, and there an armistice was
made which ripened subsequently into the Peace of Vienna, signed on the
14th of October, by which fresh territory was torn from Austria for the
advantage of Bavaria, France, and Russia; the kingdom of Spain was
recognized; the insurgents of the Tyrol deserted, and a further pledge
for the maintenance of the Continental System given. The close of the
year was marked by a still further act of wickedness on the part of
Napoleon, and a stronger proof of how completely he had deserted the
principles of the Revolution. On the 6th of December he divorced his
wife Josephine, and entered into negotiations, which were completed the
following year, for his marriage with Maria Louisa, an Austrian
princess.
[Sidenote: The Walcheren expedition. July 1809.]
[Sidenote: Flushing taken. Aug. 15.]
The armistice of Zmaim was entered into on the 12th of July. On the 27th
of that month, the very day on which the news of the armistice reached
England, a great expedition left for the mouth of the Scheldt, for the
English ministry had not deceived the hopes of the Austrians, and were
determined to undertake what they hoped would prove a diversion in their
favour. For this purpose all the strength of England was to be employed.
40,000 soldiers were to be carried across in 400 transports under the
charge of no less than 245 ships of war. Yet, great as was the effort,
the commonest precautions were neglected. Although it was well known
that the climate of the islands at the mouth of the Scheldt was
pestiferous, the medical officers were not consulted, none of the proper
medicines were sent, and the force was accompanied, in spite of the
protest of the surgeon-general, by only one hospital ship. Moreover, the
pomp and publicity with which the expedition, which was intended to be
secret, was prepared deprived it of much of its value; and lastly, Court
and ministerial favour secured the command for Lord Chatham,
Master-General of the Ordnance, a man wholly unfitted for an important
command. At length, after much delay caused by the want of harmony
between the two branches of the service, the fleet set sail. It was the
opinion of the best officers of the army that Antwerp might have been at
once secured by a _coup de main_, yet it was determined to proceed more
regularly and with deliberation; and Flushing (which, as the dykes had
been cut, was regarded as impregnable) was taken in two days after the
arrangements for the attack had been completed. It was not till the 21st
of August that Lord Chatham began to think of moving towards Antwerp.
But, as by that time the enemy's squadron had been withdrawn up the
river to the city, and the intermediate fortresses had been so
strengthened as to render the advance difficult, absolutely nothing
further was even attempted. The army was kept lying in the
plague-stricken swamps of Walcheren. Fever began to make fearful
ravages. On the 29th Chatham wrote home that he could do no more--that
already 3000 of the troops were sick. By September 11,000 men were
stricken, and the great bulk of the army was ordered home. Lord Chatham,
taking with him as many of the sick as he could, accompanied it. 15,000
men were left to occupy the island. Though the fever still spread with
fearful rapidity, the only remedy supplied was a quantity of Thames
water, which was constantly sent out. The roofs of the huts had fallen
in, the men were removed to the churches, and the churches proved damp
and worse than the roofless huts. At last 100 bricklayers were sent from
England to repair the huts; the bricklayers were speedily themselves in
hospital. The death rate was now 200 or 300 a week; and so terrible was
the effect of the fever, that before the next June, of the 40,000 troops
sent out 35,000 had been in hospital. Nor did this great folly produce
the smallest effect on the general war. Even had the expedition not been
so delayed that the Austrian armistice was already signed when it
sailed, it could have done no good. Napoleon himself wrote of it,
"Before six weeks, of the 15,000 troops which are in the Isle of
Walcheren not 1500 will be left, the rest will be in hospital. The
expedition has been undertaken under false expectations and planned in
ignorance."
[Sidenote: Wellesley victorious in Portugal.]
While wasting their strength in this idle display, the ministry were
being taught, had they been willing to learn, where English forces might
have been wisely employed. In Portugal, Wellesley, on taking the
command, had marched against Soult in the north, had brought his army
across the Douro in face of the French, who were occupying Oporto, had
recaptured that city, and driven Soult to a desperate retreat. By
extraordinary vigour and good fortune, Soult, though there were traitors
in his camp, contrived to extricate his army, but Portugal was free. And
Wellesley, victorious in the north, and deceived by the constant false
information of the Spaniards as to the weakness of his enemies,
determined to turn his arms against the other French army which was
threatening Portugal in the valley of the Tagus. He was there to act
with the Spanish army under Cuesta, an old man of crabbed temper and of
great self-conceit. Victor's army fell back before the advancing English
from Talavera behind the Alberche river.
[Sidenote: Wellesley marches towards Madrid.]
By this march Madrid was threatened, and Joseph collected for its
defence the troops of Victor, Sebastiani, and his own guard, amounting
to about 50,000 men. As Wellesley had with him less than 20,000 English
troops, and as he could place no reliance upon the Spaniards of Cuesta
though they were nearly 40,000 in number, it was a bold resolve to march
against Victor. But Wellesley was ignorant of the extreme danger of his
movement. Constantly misinformed by the Spaniards, he believed Soult's
army in Castile and the plain of the Douro to consist of about 15,000
men; in reality it was more than 50,000 strong. With these it was
possible, collecting them at Salamanca, to cross the mountains
separating the plains of the Douro and the Tagus, to pass between
Wellesley's troops and Portugal, and thus placing him between two
armies, each virtually superior to his own, entirely ruin him. Ignorant
as yet of the character of the Spaniards, Wellesley could not believe
that he should be kept uninformed, nor could he believe that the Spanish
troops supplied to occupy the passes of the mountains, and restrain, or
at least check, Soult's movements, would give ground without striking a
blow; nor, before entering on his enterprise, could he have conceived
that his army would have been systematically kept without food. It is
nevertheless true that the greatest difficulty was found in procuring
rations, which often consisted merely of a few handfuls of grain, while
the Spanish troops were very fairly fed. Victor and the King had taken
up a position beyond the Alberche stream, a little river flowing from
the north into the Tagus above Talavera. Beyond that stream, Wellesley,
when he found how he was treated, positively refused to move. Beginning
to appreciate the character of the Spanish troops, he urged Cuesta not
to venture on a forward movement without him; but the obstinate old man
persisting in passing the Alberche, was roughly handled by Victor, and
only saved from the consequences of his rashness by English assistance.
[Sidenote: Battle of Talavera. July 28, 1809.]