ASSEMBLAGE OF THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE SUTLEJ--SIKHS THREATEN TO
RECROSS--SIR HARRY SMITH DETACHED TOWARDS LOODIANA--SKIRMISH NEAR
BUDDEWAL.
During the first week in January, the reserve force, under Sir John
Grey, joined the main column of the army, and took post near the river,
along which pickets were thrown out by the divisions nearest the
enemy's position, to watch their proceedings on the opposite bank.
Nearly every soldier in the north-western provinces was at,
or approaching, the head-quarter camp, which extended over no
inconsiderable portion of ground. Large supplies had been laid in for
the army at Ferozepore and from the country bordering on Bussean. The
British generals now became masters of their own time for the planning
and prosecution of further operations.
On the opposite bank of the Sutlej, the Sikh camp, with its hives of
parti-coloured canvas, speckled the country as far as the eye could
reach, and appeared to shelter a mighty host, notwithstanding their
recent losses. Nearly opposite the village of Sobraon the tents
appeared more closely packed together, about a mile distant from
the river, and thence the banks sloped gradually towards the water;
but, about three miles higher up, and immediately above the fords of
Hureeka, the banks rise precipitously, on the right shore, to a height
of about forty or fifty feet, and overlook the British side of the
river where the slope is very gradual and nearly uniform.
The country on the left bank is mostly bare, except near the river and
close above Hureeka, where some thick reeds and underwood served as a
cover for the enemy's spies and stragglers to watch or fire upon our
videttes, but this jungle was shortly afterwards burnt.
Opposite Sobraon the Sikhs appeared to be remarkably busy, and it was
shortly discovered that they were employed in constructing a bridge of
boats across the Sutlej. This, at the time, was considered a mere piece
of bravado. Few conjectured that the enemy would have the hardihood to
attempt a passage in the face of the British army, and they were left,
unmolested, to complete their purpose. In a few days the bridge was
complete save four boats, and we began to suspect that the deficiency,
which was of some days' continuance, was intentional, when one morning
the gap was filled up, and their workmen were seen busily constructing
a tête-de-pont on the British shore.
A battery of Sikh guns was posted on the right bank which would sweep
the bridge, and it was conjectured that the enemy had mined some of
the boats, so that in case of the British attempting to use them they
might at any time be blown up; but no inclination was manifested on
our part to accept this invitation.
The hum in the enemy's camp towards nightfall, and the glare of their
camp fires, caused the scene to resemble the vicinity of a large city,
whilst the occasional arrival of a chief from Lahore was greeted with
acclamations and the roar of cannon. From the ramparts of a small
fortified village on the right flank of our position, we could observe
the Sikh battalions turning out every evening for parade and exercise,
and their artillery practice was almost unremitting. The fire of cannon
and musketry, which was constantly heard even after nightfall, made
us frequently conjecture that some point of our position had been
attacked, but it proved that the enemy were only amusing themselves.
Our spies brought word that an attack on the British army was meditated
on the part of the enemy, who only awaited a report, from their
astrologers, of the stars being favourable to the success of the
undertaking.
On the 13th of January, a battery of guns was brought up by Sir Hugh
Gough's orders, and placed in position; and, as soon as the daylight
enabled him to ascertain the distance, a cannonade was opened on their
advanced lines, which was promptly replied to by the enemy. Little
or no damage ensued except the bursting of our largest gun (an iron
eighteen pounder), which wounded an artilleryman severely, and put an
end to the game. That evening the Sikhs struck their tents, which had
been impudently pitched so near our position, not wishing to risk the
effects of a chance shot on a repetition of that day's proceeding; but
they might have spared themselves the trouble, for the first experiment
was sufficient.
Occasional skirmishes took place at the outposts along the river,
which served to interrupt in a measure the tedium of camp routine. The
Sikhs, who now crossed in great numbers during the day to work at their
entrenchments, and usually retired towards nightfall, amused themselves
with ball practice at any moving object they could discern within
musket range.
A small look-out tower, which we had thrown up to watch their
proceedings, served the Sikhs for constant practice, and the compliment
was returned upon such of their marksmen as ventured to offer
themselves for targets.
As our officers were strictly interdicted from the pursuit of small
game in the jungles which bordered on the river, some were obliged to
content themselves with this inferior sport, but the practice, being at
a long range, was nearly innocent.
One night a party of Sikhs made a successful foray upon a picket of
irregular cavalry, and killed three or four of them. As the enemy
occupied the high ridge above Hureeka ford, which precluded any view
into the interior, it was impossible to ascertain the post or strength
of their pickets, although the videttes on the bank were always
visible. The Sikhs had therefore the advantage of commanding the fords
whenever they pleased to make use of them for predatory excursions.
Our inaction at this time, when in face of the whole Sikh army, may
appear strange to many, but the British generals had wisely resolved
that offensive operations should not be resumed, if avoidable, until
the means were at hand for striking an effective blow and pursuing the
advantage when gained. The siege train had only quitted Delhi early
in January, and the pontoon train at Ferozepore was, in the meantime,
being secretly but effectively prepared for service. Any operations
which might be undertaken before the whole machinery could be brought
into action would therefore have been of little avail.
The time dragged slowly and monotonously on with us. The outpost
duties of outlying and inlying pickets and camp guards were severe and
tiresome; but even when free from such restraints, few quitted the
lines of their regiments, as we knew not the hour we might be called on
for action.
This state was not destined to be of long duration. Reports had already
been forwarded to head-quarters that Loodiana was threatened by the
enemy, and about the middle of January the communication with that
place was interrupted.
The Sikh army, swollen daily by the influx from Lahore, began to
experience a scarcity of provisions, which induced them to send
foraging parties across, on the line of the upper Sutlej, to procure
supplies. As our line of frontier was too considerable to be properly
watched without an extension of front, which was deemed imprudent,
the fords of the Sutlej being very numerous, the enemy were enabled
hitherto to communicate freely with the opposite shore.
It now became necessary, however, to sweep the country of the obstacles
to a free communication with Loodiana. To effect this object, Sir Harry
Smith was detached, on the 17th of January, with the first brigade[34]
of his division, two corps of Native cavalry, and a light field
battery, to clear the country of the enemy.
The day after the major-general had quitted camp, intelligence arrived
which proved that the enemy were in much greater force than had been at
first supposed, and had committed some ravages at Loodiana, which place
was now threatened by a considerable body from the right bank.
On the 19th, Brigadier Cureton was despatched, with the 16th Lancers
and two troops of Horse Artillery, to reinforce Sir Harry Smith.
Brigadier Cureton, after two forced marches, overtook the major-general
at the town and fort of Jugraon, where H.M.'s 53rd Regiment, on its
route from the lower provinces, also joined Sir Harry's column.
Accounts were received at Jugraon, of the enemy being in great force
on the British side of the river; and it was stated that a portion of
the cantonments of Loodiana had been destroyed by the Sikhs, who had
afterwards encamped on the plain below the town, and between it and the
river.
Brigadier Godby now held the cantonments with one corps of native
cavalry and three of native infantry, (including a Goorkha[35]
battalion, recently arrived from their mountain quarters,) and a light
field battery. The fort, which stands in the town of Loodiana, on
the side looking towards the river, but beyond cannon-range from the
Sutlej, was garrisoned by a few convalescents, and the depôt of the
50th.
The enemy were reported to have thrown an advanced party into the
fort of Buddewal, which lay on the road between Jugraon and Loodiana,
and belonged to the Ladwa Rajah, a Sikh chief, who had instigated
this expedition, and had conveyed his family and valuables from the
protected Sikh states into the Punjaub.
A small party belonging to the Puttealah Rajah had for some time before
the arrival of Colonel Godby's force occupied the town of Loodiana, but
had not stirred a hand in defence of the cantonment.
Sir Harry Smith had met with none of the enemies' parties on his march
to Jugraon, except in the fort of Durrumkhote, where a few shrapnel
induced the garrison to abandon the place, and a small party of sepoys
were placed to occupy it.
At two o'clock on the morning of the 21st of January, the British
forces moved from Jugraon towards Loodiana, instructions having been
forwarded to Brigadier Godby to march out of cantonment, and effect
a junction with the advancing column, on its line of march, about
daybreak. The heavy baggage and wheel-carriages were ordered to be
left in the citadel of Jugraon, which was occupied by two companies of
sepoys. The cavalry and horse artillery took the head of the column;
and after a slow and weary march in the dark,[36] Sir Harry's forces
arrived about sunrise within two miles of Buddewal, all baggage
being kept in rear of the column, to prevent any obstruction in the
operations which might be requisite.
During the halt, a native spy arrived with information of the enemy
having advanced, and occupied the fort of Buddewal in strength; but the
general discredited the report, and the advance was sounded without any
alteration of route being determined on. Brigadier Godby's forces did
not make their appearance, although the time for meeting as appointed
had passed; it was therefore evident that they must have taken another
route, and have probably missed us in the dark.
On issuing from the close country upon the plain, a cloud of dust
was discerned rising over some trees on our left flank, and soon
afterwards, some Goorchera horsemen, galloping through the grove,
announced the enemy to be on the alert. In a few minutes, the grove
was swarming with the Sikh irregular cavalry, who continued to move
parallel with our brigade, which advanced steadily into the plain,
having wheeled into open column of troops. Several of the Sikh chiefs
rode boldly up within a hundred yards of us, and watched the cavalry
brigade passing in review, and approaching the fort of Buddewal.
On our front, and to the right, nearly as far as the eye could
reach, stretched a sandy plain, with scarcely a bush on its surface,
beyond which lay Loodiana, about six miles distant. Our left was
flanked by groves of trees, and on the left front was the town and
fort of Buddewal, frowning over the low range of mud houses in its
neighbourhood, the whole of which swarmed with the enemy's infantry.
The fort was a brick building of some solidity, in which were placed
the heaviest guns; but entrenchments and abattis were thrown up round
the town, which were defended by lighter guns and musketeers.
The cavalry and horse artillery continued to advance into the plain,
and deployed under cover of some sand hills, whilst Sir Harry Smith
rode along the position, to reconnoitre the enemy. Several Sikh
chiefs continued busily employed in the same manner; but as yet, no
hostilities had taken place, though each sought eagerly an opening to
give the first advantageous blow. At length, the head of our infantry
column came in sight, and the Sikhs, who had been intently watching
their movements, now ranged themselves in continuous line amongst
the trees up to the walls of the town. A quick flash from the Sikh
position, succeeded by a cannon-ball, which plunged heavily into
the sand, announced the enemy's hostile intentions; but the cavalry
brigade were cleverly posted among the sand hills, which defiladed them
from fire in a great measure, although they were too low to be quite
effectual for that useful purpose.
The infantry, as they advanced into the plain, toiling through the deep
sand, fared much worse; for the Sikh light guns, being pushed forward,
soon got the range, and the shot tore through the ranks with deadly
precision.
The enemy's shells were comparatively harmless, being made of pewter or
lead, and simply loaded with powder; but the round and chain-shot came
hurtling through the air, or playfully ricochetting from the sand ere
they plunged through or over our line, seldom missing their object by
an interval which the next discharge was not likely to correct.
One direct shot from a battery, which must, I think, have been a
chain-shot, I saw strike a subdivision of infantry on the flank, and
turn over every man. At length, the toilsome and blood-stained advance
was accomplished, and the infantry, nearly exhausted, formed a second
line to the cavalry, and halted to recover breath.
The Sikhs, emboldened at the paucity of our numbers, advanced from
under cover into the open plain, whilst a body of cavalry, issuing
from the grove of trees before-mentioned, pounced upon our baggage,
which had not yet reached the open ground. Two Ressalahs of irregular
horse, and details of a few men from each regiment, were marching
with the baggage. The enemy, taking two light field-pieces with them,
fired upon the confused heap of cattle, and soon caused such a scene
of commotion, that they were enabled to plunder as much as they
could carry away; and a great portion of the sick men, carried in
doolies,[37] fell into the enemy's hands. Some were taken prisoners,
but the greater part were massacred.
The rear portion of the baggage, by taking to flight, escaped to
Jugraon; and a few stray camels, with drivers possessed of some
presence of mind, by making a circuit, arrived safely at Loodiana.
A small guard of H.M.'s 53rd Regiment, under the command of the
quarter-master, kept together, and saved a portion of the regimental
stores of that corps, with which they retired on Jugraon.
In the meantime, the enemy, having drawn up his forces on the open
plain, seemed disposed to follow up his advantage, and the Sikh chiefs,
galloping along the front of their line, were seen directing the
advance, and animating the soldiers. Our artillery being advantageously
posted behind some low sand-hills, now opened a well-directed fire of
shrapnel upon the enemy's left, which soon appeared to check their
ardour, and seriously disturb the meditated operations.
Brigadier Cureton pushed forward with the 16th Lancers, in echelon of
squadrons, to follow up the confusion which had ensued from the fire of
our artillery, and threatened a charge on the left flank of the Sikhs,
when the movement was countermanded by Sir Harry Smith's orders.
The British General having found himself much outflanked by the enemy's
line, (and the infantry being greatly exhausted by the toil they had
undergone,) resolved not to hazard an action under such disadvantages,
and before a junction with Brigadier Godby, who had not yet been
discovered. Orders were therefore sent to the cavalry to retire, but to
keep the enemy in check.
The cavalry-brigade having deployed, retired by alternate squadrons,
covering the line of infantry, which had, in the meantime, made a
partial change of front, to repel a demonstration which the Sikhs had
made against the British left. The enemy, advancing boldly, when he
discovered that Sir Harry was unwilling to come to close quarters,
opened a galling fire of artillery along his whole line; but the front
shown by the British cavalry-brigade deterred him from coming up to
attack.
Under the able direction of the gallant Cureton, the cavalry were
manoeuvred as steadily as at an ordinary field-day. Presenting
a moveable target, which called forth all the skill of the Sikh
artillerymen, the 16th Lancers, 3rd Cavalry, and Captain Hill's
Irregulars, continued to menace the enemy, and to despise the deadly
missiles which showered around them; whilst, among that overwhelming
host of Sikh Goorcheras, not one effort was made to measure lance or
sabre with their opponents. They were content to leave us to be dealt
with by the artillery.
The prudence of such a measure on the enemy's part was perhaps
unquestionable.
Thus, gradually retiring across the plain, and placing on the
ammunition carts, or on horseback, the unfortunate men who were
wounded by the incessant cannonade to which the Sikhs subjected the
force, we reached a distance of about two miles from Buddewal, when the
enemy ceased to advance.
When our retreat was first commenced, nearly all the officers
conjectured it was Sir Harry's object to draw the Sikh forces well
out of their position, and attack them in the open plain; but as we
continued to retire, it soon became evident that no action was to take
place, and we were compelled to receive the numerous kicks which were
bestowed upon us with all the philosophy that could be mustered. "Now
we are going at 'em--now for it, lads!" burst from the ranks on many
occasions, when the squadrons faced about and confronted the foe; but
the fatal "threes about," gradually diminished these hopes, and at last
the homely observation of "By G--, if we are not bolting from a parcel
of niggers!" called something between a blush and a smile to many a
cheek.
About sunset, the troops arrived before the half-burned cantonments
of Loodiana, and bivouacked on the plain. Hardly a tent or a native
follower made their appearance in our gloomy lines, and many a bitter
lamentation was vented over departed comforts and luxuries seized by
the ruthless Sikhs. Nearly all the hospital stores had fallen into the
hands of the Philistines, which was a heavy misfortune; but we dwelt
with some satisfaction on the probability of their being mistaken for
wines and liqueurs, in which event we anticipated, with much glee,
the effects likely to ensue, and only regretted we had no chance of
witnessing the commotions which would prevail in the Sikh camp on the
auspicious occasion.
Late in the evening, a few camp-followers, and a very few
baggage-animals, came straggling into the lines, having made a detour,
and avoided the plunderers. With the usual native propensity for
exaggeration, they expatiated on their own hairbreadth escapes, and
gave mournful details of the tragic sufferings and deaths of most
of those who were missing. One man was describing in glowing terms
the resolute defence of a fellow-servant, who fell, covered with
innumerable wounds, when the innocent hero of the tale actually walked
up, and had the honesty to confess that he owed his safety to his
fleetness of foot.
Very few of our camp-followers were maltreated by the enemy, beyond
taking away any property found on their persons, and keeping some of
them prisoners a few days, whilst they extracted any intelligence they
were able to afford. Most of the prisoners were then turned loose, and
furnished with the information that the Sikhs entertained no animosity
towards the natives of Hindostan, but had resolved to conquer and rule
the country, and would not fail to massacre every Feringhee who was
foolhardy enough to give them an opportunity. At the same time, with
the candour becoming true chivalry, they strongly recommended the
British to abandon all useless resistance, to submit to the modest
Khalsas, or take to flight--in fact, to do anything rather than fight,
as that might be inconvenient.
The actual loss at Buddewal has never been published, as a great
portion of those reported missing had escaped to Jugraon, and six or
seven were carried prisoners to Lahore.[38] The total amount of killed,
wounded, and missing, were between three and four hundred, but more
than half this number subsequently made their appearance. The report
which prevailed in India, that the losses were amalgamated in one
return with those killed at Aliwal, is a stupid fabrication.
Early in the day, Captain A.W. Campbell, of H.M. 14th Regiment, was
killed by a cannon-shot, whilst acting as aide-de-camp to Sir Harry
Smith. He had only succeeded in reaching the army the preceding night,
after a hasty journey from Calcutta, and was struck down on his first
field of action: but whoever accompanies Sir Harry Smith in battle,
must be prepared to encounter the thickest of the fire.
In our destitute condition, we were most hospitably treated by Col.
Godby's Brigade, who had marched out in the morning to meet us,
according to the instructions received, but we had missed each other,
owing to the brigadier supposing that we should not march directly
under the guns of the enemy's position.
On the day succeeding our arrival, some of the scared merchants of
Loodiana disclosed their hidden stores in cellars and outhouses, and we
were enabled to replace many deficiencies.
The fort of Loodiana was garrisoned by a few convalescents from the
50th Regiment, and a small detail of native troops; but being on the
outskirts of the town, the Sikhs had not ventured within sweep of its
guns to pillage, and had satisfied themselves with burning the furthest
and most exposed part of the cantonments.
The Puttealah Rajah's troops, who were stationed as a protection for
the buildings, viewed the proceedings with indifference, nor was it
to be expected they would be very energetic in our cause, against
their own countrymen. The small party of Sepoys then at Loodiana were
quite insufficient for hostile measures, but the damages have been
much exaggerated. The brunt of the losses fell on the officers and men
of H.M. 50th, and if ever a regiment deserved to be indemnified, the
gallant half hundred have earned the claim.
Our spies, returning from the enemy's post at Buddewal, reported that
the Sikhs had come to the determination of attacking us immediately,
most probably that night, as the stars were propitious. Being now
reduced to the lightest possible marching order, it was impossible
to find us better prepared for an active campaign; and we looked
forward with much satisfaction to the visit, which was promised on the
fine open plain on which we were bivouacked. To ascertain the time
of arrival, our pickets were posted far in advance, and patrols and
reconnoitring parties were constantly on the move.
At sunrise, on the 23rd of January, news arrived of the enemy being
in motion, and the forces immediately turned out with much alacrity.
The cavalry and Horse Artillery moved under a ridge nearly parallel
with the Sutlej, and marking the limits of its extreme course, whilst
the infantry shortly afterwards took the upper route on the same line.
About 9 A.M. we were informed that the whole Sikh forces had quitted
Buddewal, and were marching towards the heights of Valore, which flank
the direct road between Loodiana and Ferozepore, and extend to the
waters of the Sutlej.
Brigadier Cureton, who was in advance with a small party of cavalry,
sent an urgent request for the cavalry brigade to push forward, as he
had come up with the enemy's rear guard, and could cut them off with
a large quantity of baggage and ammunition under their care; but Sir
Harry Smith was unwilling to make the experiment. After halting for
about two hours, information was sent from the reconnoitring party
that the Sikhs had taken up a position near Valore. On receipt of this
intelligence Sir Harry Smith ordered his forces to advance and occupy
the enemy's vacated position at Buddewal. On arriving at that place
in the afternoon, we found the fort and town completely deserted, the
Sikhs having marched out during the night and left quantities of grain
and stores behind them, for which they had no carriage, as we had
encumbered them with a superfluity of valuables, which were, no doubt,
ere then safely lodged in the Punjaub.
Buddewal was speedily and thoroughly ransacked, but very little was
found worth carrying off. Tents, empty trunks, and crazy furniture
abounded in and around the palace (as it was called) of our friend the
Ladwa Rajah, the author of the Sikh expedition into this neighbourhood,
and a quantity of grain and cattle were found in the town.
Our camp followers soon made the place a wreck; nor did their vengeance
stay here, but, wandering in parties about the country, they set fire
to several villages in the vicinity, and nightfall exhibited a long
series of conflagrations marking their track. This was condemned in the
severest terms by Sir Harry Smith, and all officers of the army were
called upon to exert themselves in suppressing a system which tended
to engender a spirit of animosity towards us among the inhabitants of
this country, who were not guilty of the origin of these hostilities.
Our camp followers, in palliation of their conduct, declared that
the inhabitants of all these villages had taken an active part in
plundering them and our camels on the 21st, which was not at all
improbable.
The bodies of several soldiers who had fallen in the recent skirmish
were found on the plain near Buddewal, and interred. Amongst the slain,
Captain Campbell's body was found, and buried by two officers, who went
for the purpose of discovering the body of their fallen comrade.
Many of our servants, who had escaped to Jugraon with part of the
baggage, now rejoined us, and also a great portion of the sick under
protection of the Shekawattee brigade, which added one thousand native
troops to our force.
Some of our servants, having escaped from the Sikhs, came to the
outposts with their mouths full of the extensive armament which the
Sikhs were preparing for our destruction; but all united in asserting
that reinforcements were pouring into their camp from the opposite side
of the river. Our best spies were furnished by Captain Hill's corps
of Irregular Horse, many of whom, disguised as faqueers, entered the
Sikh camp and brought accounts of the enemy being about forty thousand
strong, with seventy or eighty guns, and of their being employed in
throwing up entrenchments similar to those of Ferozeshuhur. This
burrowing system was universally practised by the enemy, even when they
were meditating offensive measures, and therefore it formed no clue to
their present intentions.
Our cavalry reconnoitring parties were daily in the enemy's vicinity,
and officers were employed to form plans of their position; but our
adversaries had great objections to this inquisitive practice, and
threw forward their outposts to check the intruders. But, amongst
the whole army, for constant activity and careful observation of the
enemy's proceedings, none, even in the prime of life, displayed more
alacrity than the two generals, Sir Harry Smith and Brigadier Cureton.
Daily, at the first peep of dawn, our indefatigable commanders were
hovering around the enemy's post, whilst the whole of the troops stood
ready accoutred for immediate action in case of the enemy being equally
vigilant; but our opponents testified less appetite for the keen
morning air.
The Sikhs talked boldly in their own lines of their daily intention
of coming out to attack us, and the spies failed not to report the
resolution; but as it had now been deferred so many days, there
appeared some probability of their being anticipated.
The main object of the Sikh's change of position seemed to be to secure
a post on the river where they could receive reinforcements which had
been sent from their head-quarter camp, and at the same time occupy our
_direct_[39] road of communication with the main column. The siege
train, which was approaching from Delhi with a very small escort of
native troops, was also, beyond doubt, the ultimate object of their
manoeuvres, although it had not yet approached within reach of a safe
"dour."
By advancing from Loodiana to Buddewal, Sir Harry Smith was better
enabled to watch the enemy until the time for action; and the post
being (as we recently experienced) on the line of communication with
our head-quarters, by Jugraon and Dhurrumkote, the main object of the
Sikhs was, in a great measure, neutralized, and we had much reason to
be thankful to them for having given us so eligible a lodgment without
a struggle. In the meantime, reinforcements were in full march, to
join Sir Harry Smith, from head-quarters by the Jugraon route; and two
eight inch howitzers were being equipped for field service, having been
hastily mounted and brought to Buddewal from the fort of Loodiana.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 34: H.M.'s 31st Regiment, 24th N.I., 47th N.I.]
[Footnote 35: The troops commonly called "Goorkhas," are three
battalions, termed the Sirmoor, Nusseeree, and Goorkha, which
are recruited in the Himalayahs. They are a small, hardy race of
mountaineers, and the best soldiers in the native army.]
[Footnote 36: During this night march, large fires were constantly lit
by the camp-followers, which must have indicated our line of march to
the enemy. These blazed with such vehemence on every elevated spot we
reached, that it looked more like design than accident.]
[Footnote 37: "Doolies" are litters for carrying the sick or wounded
men off the field, or on the line of march.]
[Footnote 38: These prisoners were released and restored after the
British forces crossed the Sutlej and reached Kussoor.]
[Footnote 39: The route we had taken by Dhurrumkote and Jugraon is not
the direct line between Ferozepore and Loodiana.]