SIR HARRY SMITH ADVANCES TO ATTACK THE SIKHS IN THEIR CAMP--THE
BATTLE OF ALIWAL--THE ENEMY DEFEATED AND DRIVEN ACROSS THE
RIVER--OBSERVATIONS.
On the 27th of January, all the reinforcements which had been on the
march to join our column had arrived, and Colonel Godby's force, part
of which were in Loodiana, moved out in the evening to Buddewal. The
whole force, which amounted to about ten thousand men, were brigaded
for the approaching struggle, and verbal orders were issued to the
several commanders.
The cavalry,[40] which were formed into two brigades, were placed under
the direction of Brigadier Cureton, of H.M. 16th Lancers; and to the
cavalry division were attached the four troops of horse artillery.
The infantry consisted of four brigades, under Brigadiers Hicks,
Wheler, Wilson, and Godby.
A nine-pounder, light field-battery, and the eight-inch howitzers
completed the sum of the force under Sir Harry Smith's command.
Shortly before daybreak on the 28th of January, the "Arouse bugle" from
the general's quarters, taken up by each regiment successively along
the line, summoned all to prepare for the fray.
The camp was speedily levelled, and all camp-followers and
"impedimenta" (as the Romans aptly termed their baggage) were left
in charge of a detail of Native Cavalry and Infantry at the fort of
Buddewal.
Slowly and silently the dark masses of cavalry, infantry, and
artillery, fell into their respective places on the sandy alarm post
in front of the general's quarters, and soon after daybreak the army
advanced in compact order, over the open plain, under the guidance of
the acting engineers.
Advanced guards, and flanking parties of cavalry, were thrown out from
the main column, and every eye watched eagerly for the first glitter
of the Sikh weapons.
The suspense was not destined to be of long duration; for soon after
sunrise, having marched about eight miles, we reached the verge of a
sandy ridge, beneath which lay a hard, level plain, nearly two miles in
breadth, and about one in length, flanked on our right by the Sutlej,
and on the left by trees, through which an open country could be
discerned to a considerable distance.
To our right front lay the fortified village of Aliwal, and to our left
front that of Boondree, amidst a thin grove of trees. Along the ridge
connecting these villages were thrown up light field entrenchments,
(then invisible to us,) from whence a gradual slope towards the ridge
where we stood gave the position a resemblance to the glacis of a low
fort, and rendered it peculiarly suited for defensive purposes.
Descending into this plain, in column of threes, the cavalry deployed,
and advanced a few yards, whilst the infantry and artillery formed a
second line, masked effectually by the advance.
The enemy were soon perceived rapidly occupying the position between
the villages of Aliwal and Boondree, pouring from their entrenched
camp, which lay about a mile in rear of the second ridge, on the bank
of the river, but concealed from our view.
Sir Harry Smith, whose watchful eye, from the top of a village-hut on
the first ridge, had detected the enemy in motion from their camp, now
rode forwards to make his dispositions for the battle, which the most
sanguine had not ventured to anticipate as likely to take place on open
ground, whilst a fortified camp lay scarcely a mile in rear.
The British line was speedily formed. The 2nd Brigade of Cavalry, under
the personal direction of Brigadier Cureton, stretched nearly to the
banks of the Sutlej; the infantry and artillery held the centre; and
the 1st Brigade of Cavalry, under Brigadier M'Dowell, formed the left
wing of the army.
It was reported to the general, that morning, by a spy, that the Sikhs
were about to move forward on Jugraon as a new position, and there is
some reason to suppose that we found them actually commencing their
march. Be that as it may, they manifested an equal alacrity with
ourselves for action; the cannon soon opened their iron mouths upon us,
but with little effect, the distance being as yet too great.
Sir Harry Smith, with his characteristic readiness, had formed his
plan of attack. Perceiving that the village of Aliwal, the strongest
point of the enemy's position, was apparently weakly garrisoned, the
first and fourth brigades were ordered to advance and carry it by a
coup-de-main, which was soon effected, after a faint resistance. The
remainder of the British line continued steadily to advance, and when
under fire of the Sikh batteries, our own artillery opened along the
whole line.
The enemy, although Aliwal was carried, and that important battery
silenced, bravely maintained their position, and poured a steady
rolling fire upon our advancing line. The noble 50th Regiment being in
the centre, and opposed to the heaviest battery, fell fast under the
fire; but their path has ever led to victory, and no storm of round
shot and grape, supported by countless musketry, has yet availed to
repulse those gallant warriors.
A small band of Sikh horsemen, many of them richly attired, suddenly
rode forth from behind the batteries, and charged wildly down upon our
advancing line;[41] but they never lived to reach it; a sheet of fire
streamed from the centre, and a cloud of smoke slowly drifted over the
writhing forms of the devoted Goorcheras.
Brigadier Cureton, whose experienced eye observed the enemy's left
gradually giving way, now advanced his second brigade of cavalry,
sweeping the banks of the river towards the enemy's camp, in hopes
of cutting off that change of front, should the enemy attempt the
manoeuvre, and also of intercepting all communication with that
quarter, and the fords of the Sutlej in the vicinity.
The left of the Sikh line having been much doubled up by the foregoing
operations, and Runjoor Singh finding it now impracticable to hold his
present ground with a reasonable chance of success, endeavoured, by a
retrograde movement, taking Boondree as the pivot of his manoeuvre, to
change front left back, and thus take the British line in flank, whilst
his own troops might regain their order.
A large body of Goorchera horsemen thrown forward amongst the groves of
trees in the neighbourhood of the village of Boondree, announced some
new intention on the enemy's part.
The extreme British left then consisted of the 1st Brigade of Cavalry,
under Brigadier M'Dowell, (H.M. 16th Lancers and the 3rd Native
Cavalry,) who had continued to advance until they had become a target
on which the Sikh artillerymen had hitherto practised with impunity.
The bold approach of the Sikh Goorcheras on the British left, soon
altered the aspect of affairs in this part of the field. A squadron
of the 3rd Native Cavalry, supported by one from H.M. 16th Lancers,
were detached to check the operations of these Sikh Goorcheras. The
Native Cavalry advanced through the trees towards the Goorcheras, but,
finding them in considerable force, retreated, when the left squadron
of the 16th Lancers advancing and wheeling to the left, charged
through the grove of trees, breaking and putting to flight a band of
Goorchera horse, who, whilst retiring at full speed, wheeled round in
their saddles, and fired their matchlocks at their pursuers, but with
trifling effect.
Returning from their charge, this squadron suddenly found that a
regiment of Aeen infantry had advanced from Boondree to secure Runjoor
Singh's new change of front, and were in possession of the ground over
which the squadron had recently passed. The Sikh infantry hastily
formed square, and a sharp rattle of musketry emptied several saddles,
but "Charge!" from the squadron leader soon put the cavalry at full
speed, and, although interrupted by a small grove of trees in their
course, they tore like a whirlwind through the enemy's ranks, hurling
numbers to the earth, and putting the whole in a state of hopeless
confusion.
On the other side of the square, the fourth squadron joined the
third, which was returning from a similar charge made on a square of
Aeen infantry,[42] and with similar success, though the cavalry had
suffered severely, owing to the isolated charges they had been fated to
accomplish.
At this juncture two guns of the Horse Artillery, under Lieut. Bruce,
dashing to the front, sent a flight of shrapnel whizzing amongst the
enemy's disordered masses, which diversion was seconded by the 3rd
brigade of infantry, who hastened, by a flank movement, to the scene
of action, and followed the enemy through the village of Boondree, in
which they would otherwise have made a stand.
Just before these operations had taken place, on the extreme left of
the British line, the right wing of the 16th Lancers, having stood
exposed to the fire of a galling battery in their direct front, were
advanced to the attack under the directions of their gallant leader
Major J.R. Smyth,[43] commanding the regiment. The two squadrons,
moving forward in compact and beautiful order, charged home, and
captured every gun under a storm of fire, for the Sikh artillerymen
and musketeers stood their ground and fought with desperate bravery
and resolution. Venting their unconquerable hatred in savage yells of
abuse, the swarthy warriors cast away their discharged muskets, and
rushed sword in hand, to meet their abhorred opponents, preferring
death to retreat; but no efforts of despair could now restore the day
to the Khalsas, for their line had been doubled back and penetrated in
several places, and the greater part of their artillery captured or
abandoned.
The Khalsa army, hurled from the ridge on which they had taken up their
position, now directed their retreat on the nearest fords of the Sutlej
below the entrenched camp.
Sir Harry Smith, ordering the artillery forward, and still keeping
his forces in compact order, descended from the ridge towards the
retreating enemy, saluted by the deafening cheers of each regiment
as the gallant and victorious general rode past them. One such day
is worth years of repose and inactivity to the soldier, and Aliwal
has inscribed the name of Sir Harry Smith on the deathless scroll of
British conquerors.
The Sikh general had conducted his retreat with such precipitation,
that when the British forces approached the bank of the river the
greater part of the Sikh army had crossed, though many, losing the
fords or trampled by the cavalry, had been swept down the Sutlej and
drowned.
A few shots were fired, on our advance, from some pieces of cannon on
our side of the river, but they were the last those guns were destined
to fire against the British army, as the enemy were compelled to
abandon them, and provide for their own safety on the further shore.
Our artillery, having formed on the bank, opened a fire of shrapnel
on the retreating masses upon the further shore, who soon dispersed,
some taking refuge in villages near the river, and others directing
their retreat towards the fortress of Philore, which is nearly opposite
Loodiana.
As the sun sunk beneath the horizon, the whole British force, drawn up
in line on the bank of the Sutlej, rested on their arms for the first
time since the morning's dawn had lighted their path to victory.
The enemy's deserted camp on the river, protected by a semicircular
entrenchment, had long been in the hands of our Native Cavalry,
and when our brigade arrived at their bivouac, at nightfall, it was
found most effectually stripped,[44] and I did not hear of any of the
Buddewal sufferers recovering as much as a stable jacket from the
wreck. A few books and other trifles of which the Sikhs could make
no use, found their way back to the original proprietors; but the
newspaper-report, that we had enriched ourselves with Sikh precious
stones and metals is, unfortunately, quite devoid of foundation.
Those who had carried away any Sikh metals usually found them more
troublesome than useful.
Camels, laden with tents, strayed in different directions over the
plain; but most of them were furnished with owners in the course of
the night, although our camp followers remained huddled together in
their den of safety at Buddewal. Enormous quantities of ammunition had
been collected in the Sikh camp, to carry on the long operations they
meditated against the British forces, and the cartridges, which were
packed in large wooden cases, continued to explode during the night.
Large portions were collected by our parties sent out for the purpose,
and, when fired, shook the earth as with an earthquake, and lit up
the surrounding country, causing our horses to break loose from their
pickets, when, conceiving that they had not been sufficiently worked
during the day, they galloped wildly through our bivouac.
The day of slaughter was certainly followed by a night of confusion;
but the Sikh army had been beaten, and few in our camp gave much
thought to anything beyond the exploits of the day. Covered with such
fragments of tents, or Sikh horse clothing as we could lay our hands
upon, or rolled in our cloaks, (the few happy men to whom Buddewal had
left such a garment,) we clustered together and discussed the day's
proceedings. Most of those who had escaped unwounded were splashed
with the blood of their comrades or enemies, and the field where we
lay was amply spotted with ghastly looking corpses, which would have
afforded valuable subjects for newspaper tales of horror; yet few, if
any, of our numerous party complained of their night's slumbers being
interrupted or haunted by such apparitions.
The human organ of destructiveness requires exercise for its
development, and with those advantages it becomes, with many, one of
the most engrossing of earthly passions. I have seen instances in
many veterans of men whose eye never brightened with such radiance
at any prospect as that of returning to their old gory pastime;
ay, and amongst that number were examples of warm-heartedness and
benevolence, which it would puzzle the metaphysician to reconcile with
their destructive propensities. Ambition is perhaps the best cause or
palliative for these inconsistencies; and I trust, from the examples
above alluded to, it may be deduced that war does not necessarily
harden the heart, though it nourishes the ambition of its votary. I
will never admit that worldly distinction is sought invariably on
selfish motives; for the gratification of one who is prized more than
life is a sufficient inducement, and I do not envy the soldier without
some such guiding star.
At daylight, on the morning of the 29th, orders were issued to change
ground from our bivouac, to the neighbourhood of Aliwal, a short
distance higher up on the same bank of the river, whilst parties
were detached to inter the bodies of the soldiers who had fallen the
preceding day.
A field-hospital had been established at a village on the ridge whence
we first descended into the plain of Aliwal, before the action. Parties
from each regiment, when the battle was over, took the wounded to this
place.
At daylight, on the morning of the 29th, so industrious had been the
plunderers accompanying the army, that scarcely a soldier's corpse
remained unstripped, with the exception of those whose numerous and
deep gashes had rendered any article they wore unserviceable.
The plunderers had the prudence to accomplish their desecrations under
the cover of night; had they been detected in the daylight, a short
shrift and an ounce of lead would have been their well-merited reward;
and, for my own part, I would rather have bestowed the contents of my
pistols on one of them, than on the most fanatic Alkali in the whole
Sikh army.
It was not easy to determine whence the miscreants had come, for the
Sikh villages were all deserted, and the camp-followers, who must have
heard the firing until nightfall, were not the most likely people to
venture forth ten miles on such an errand. Some of the natives in the
field-hospital, doubtless, assisted in the undertaking, but the task
was too laborious to be completed by them alone.
The amount of losses on our part were, in killed, wounded, and missing,
five hundred and eighty-nine men, and three hundred and fifty-three
horses. The enemy's loss, by their own statement, exceeded three
thousand. Many went to their homes, after the defeat, disheartened,
and laid aside the profession of arms against the British as an
unprofitable business.
The ordnance captured amounted to sixty-seven guns, mortars, and
howitzers, and forty swivel guns,[45] which were destroyed as an
incumbrance.
During the 29th and 30th of January, cartloads of captured ammunition
were taken to the enemy's forts in the neighbourhood, all of which were
deserted, and continual explosions told far into the Punjaub the tale
of their destruction. These forts belonged to the troublesome Ladwa
Rajah, who had instigated the recent expedition across the Sutlej,
mainly in order to carry off the most valuable portion of his moveable
property in the protected Sikh states, which feat having been performed
more easily than he expected, he was emboldened to act on the offensive.
The announcement of Buddewal having become a blackened heap of ruins,
was generally received with a savage degree of satisfaction, and the
very name of the place became a convenient resource and by-word for all
stray articles. Our native servants made it answer their purpose as a
receptacle for every valuable article afterwards missing, until the end
of the campaign, or an inventory checked the useful excuse.
A deserter from the Bengal Horse Artillery (John Porter, by name)
fell into our hands during the enemy's retreat, and was recognised
by some of his former associates. He had been some time in the Sikh
service, and had been instrumental in directing the fire of the light
guns upon his countrymen, for which employment he would have been
speedily consigned to the tender mercies of the kites and vultures,
had not the soldiers who captured him been restrained from carrying
their resentment to such lengths, and the political agent, hoping to
make some use of the renegade, saved his life. Mr. John Porter had
apparently imbibed a strong predilection for his adopted country,
and maintained that it would be impossible to subdue the Sikhs with
the present forces which the British Government had assembled on the
north-western frontier; but his opinion on this and other matters was
hardly of sufficient value to have saved his life.
This man was more fortunate than another Englishman in the Sikh ranks
at Ferozeshuhur, who, during the storm of the works by the British
infantry, fell amongst the assailants, crying aloud--"Spare me, lads!
I am an Englishman, and belonged to the old 44th!" His appeal was
answered by several bayonets and execrations.
On the afternoon of the 29th of January, the field-hospital, with
the wounded men, was removed into Loodiana. I rode over to see a
brother-officer who had been seriously wounded, and shall never forget
the sad scene of human suffering presented to view. Outside the
hospital tents were lain the bodies of those who had recently died;
many in the contorted positions in which the rigid hand of death had
fixed them; others, more resembling sleep than death, had calmly
passed away, struck down in full vigour and robust bodily health,
when the human frame, it was natural to suppose, would have struggled
more fiercely with its arch enemy; but the groans of the sufferers
undergoing painful surgical operations were more grievous to the
senses than the sight of those who needed no mortal aid. Pain, in all
its degrees and hideous varieties was forcibly portrayed on every
square yard of earth which surrounded me; and, passing from sufferer
to sufferer, I felt, or fancied I felt, each patient's eye following
wistfully the movements of such fortunate visitants as were exempted
from the services of the knife or lancet, and sometimes dwelling
reproachfully on the useless spectator of their sufferings. I felt it
was almost a sacrilege to remain in such a place without being useful;
but the medical officers and hospital-assistants so zealously fulfilled
every minute detail for the relief of their patients, that sympathy was
the only offering we could present to our stricken comrades.
Whilst raising the canvas door of a dark tent which I was entering,
I stumbled, and nearly fell over the leg of some one stretched across
the entrance. When I turned to make apologies to the owner, I found it
had none, but, on a pallet beside it, lay its former possessor, who
had just undergone amputation; beyond him lay a dead artilleryman; and
further on, amongst stumps of arms protruding from the pallets, lay
my wounded brother-officer, who appeared to suffer much more from the
surrounding objects than from his own severe personal injuries. But the
attention bestowed on those wounded at Aliwal, differed much from a
preceding occasion,[46] where the hospital stores and conveniencies had
been so far outmarched, that only two rush-lights were procurable to
_illuminate_ the hospital.
In the course of the 29th, at Loodiana, better shelter was afforded;
and its proximity to the sanatorium in the mountains gave a cheering
prospect for the approaching hot season to those who were not
qualified to become food for powder.
On the evening of the 29th, the remains of all the officers who had
fallen in action were interred in front of the standard guards, and
amongst them were many deeply regretted by their comrades. All were
young, and most had fallen in their first field; but a soldier's
grave has, from the earliest records of mankind, been deemed the most
honourable, and often the most desirable passage from this scene
of trial. No mourning group of relatives surround the couch of the
attenuated sufferer, to aggravate the grief of parting--no lingering
shaft of fate reduces the vigour of manhood to pitiful imbecility, but
the winged messenger or the flashing steel summons the victim, and
amidst the roar of battle's thunder, he bows to the destroying angel.
The warrior's grave, dug on the field of strife, and his bier shrouded
by the proud flag of his country, and surrounded by war-worn veterans
and faithful comrades, are funeral obsequies befitting the close of
the soldier's career. The hearse bedecked with lugubrious trappings
and nodding plumes, which conveys the remnants of frail mortality to
the sepulchre, the train of hired mourners, with their insignia of
office and the pompous mockery of woe, have always been, to my mind,
objects of peculiar disgust. Why should we seek to dress out death in
such fantastic guise, when the ceremonial can only be calculated to
harrow the feelings of suffering relatives by protracted mummery? The
active scene of the undertaker's solemnities closes with the church
portals upon the retiring crowd; but the mouldering corpse has yet to
undergo the sculptor's operations; and the carved sarcophagus tells to
posterity, as far as time will permit, how great and good a worm has
crawled out its allotted course on this scene of trial; and wondering
acquaintances are often astonished to read, after death, a catalogue
of virtues which they had failed to discover during a life of apparent
uselessness. I never could comprehend the object of these strange,
but not uncommon, deceptions. Friends and acquaintances must have
formed their own estimates before the closing scene, and can hardly
be deceived by an epitaph; the opinion of strangers must be a matter
of indifference; and the recommendations of a monument can hardly be
expected to pass current as an introduction to the invisible world. I
cannot think otherwise than that--
"Praises on tombs are trifles vainly spent;
A man's good name is his best monument."
But the poet and the cynic appear to have railed at, and ridiculed the
custom in vain, for the stone-mason continues to flourish with unabated
vigour.
The operations of Sir Harry Smith's division of the army afford
interesting matter for consideration, in a military point of view,
both on account of the enemy's embarrassing manoeuvres against the
weakly-defended points on the upper line of the Sutlej, and also
because the Sikhs ventured to fight for the first time on the open
plain: the light entrenchments, thrown up to cover partially the
working of their guns, will hardly obstruct the use of that term.
It will be remembered, that when Sir Harry Smith was first detached
from Hureeka, the intention was merely to re-open the communication
with Loodiana, brushing away such foraging or predatory bands as
were supposed to infest the intervening country. Dhurrumkote, about
twenty-six miles distant from army head-quarters, and an insignificant
fort, had refused an entrance, but three or four shrapnel speedily
induced the garrison to sue for terms, and a small detachment of native
troops were established in the place, which was hastily put under
repair.
In progress from that place, it was first ascertained that the enemy
were in greater force than was before supposed; and no sooner did
reinforcements move to join Sir Harry Smith, than a column of dust,
extending from the Sikh camp up the river, announced a corresponding
movement on the enemy's side, and the reports of our spies soon
corroborated the supposition.[47]
I think it hardly admits of a doubt, that the enemy's flank movement at
Loodiana, besides a predatory excursion, was intended to act against
our siege train, on its arrival at or near Bussean; for on the approach
of Sir Harry Smith's division, the Sikhs _advanced_ to Buddewal,
retreating again only to cover the passage of their reinforcements,
and again moving forwards towards Jugraon (as it was supposed), on the
morning of the 28th of January, when Sir Harry Smith fortunately met
them on their march.
Sir Harry has been violently assailed by the Indian press for the
operations in the neighbourhood of Buddewal; but it must be remembered
that his authority for the enemy occupying that position rested solely
on the report of a spy on the line of march; nor did he make any report
as to the batteries being manned and ready to open on us; the General,
therefore, saw no reason to suppose that it was more than an advanced
post, as had been intimated to him the preceding day.
The order for the march, on the morning of the 21st, had already
provided for that measure; and a party of irregular horse had been
directed "to watch the small fortress occupied by the enemy."
Our gallant General frequently expressed himself in the strongest terms
hostile to credulity in rumours, and doubtless acted on this principle
on the 21st of January. Had he decided to halt that morning, when the
enemy were first discovered, there was an excellent position beyond the
reach of their batteries, where the troops might have been assembled,
and the march towards Loodiana resumed over the open plain, and out of
reach of the Sikhs' heavy artillery.
Sir Harry had resolved upon reaching Loodiana that day, according to
the orders for the march; and when it became apparent that the enemy
was in full strength, and had unmasked his batteries, the British
General immediately perceived the disadvantages under which he must
have suffered had a general action ensued, and withdrew his forces with
a masterly hand, although the Sikhs exhibited an equally _masterly_ one
over our baggage.
Few military men will venture to blame Sir Harry Smith for declining
an action with the enemy on the 21st of January, when it is taken into
consideration--firstly, that Colonel Godby's force, taking another line
of country, had not arrived when the Sikhs were upon us; secondly,
that our infantry were nearly exhausted by fatigue, and scarcely able
to make their way through the deep sand, whilst the enemy were quite
fresh; and, lastly, that the Sikhs could have compelled us to attack
them under cover of their batteries in Buddewal, for which operations
we had no sufficient ordnance.
When also a great disparity of numbers exists, as on the occasion in
question, there can be no doubt of its being incumbent on the General
to bring the lesser body at least fresh upon the field, where so much
activity is required to counterbalance the opposing force; and in the
open plain the Sikhs so far outflanked our line, that Sir Harry was
compelled to make a defensive change of front when threatened by a
demonstration made by Runjoor Singh against the British left.
The want of heavy guns, and the paucity of our numbers compared to
the Sikhs, caused the attack of their post to be deferred, after
our bivouac at Loodiana, until the arrival of reinforcements from
head-quarters. After the enemy had evacuated their position at
Buddewal, and our expected reinforcements had arrived, many were
strongly of opinion that no attack could in prudence be attempted
until guns of heavier metal were procurable. Sir Harry Smith, however,
wisely foresaw the evil effect which must have ensued, should it be
promulgated throughout India that the right wing of the British forces
had been checked by the Sikhs, and continued inactive at Loodiana,
apparently unable to commence offensive operations.
The news of a daring conspiracy[48] at Patna had, at this juncture,
reached the Governor-general's camp; and an immediate and decisive blow
was especially necessary, to convince the people of India that the
British resources were sufficient to crush the invaders and to punish
domestic sedition. The whole province of Bengal having been nearly
denuded of British troops, any internal disaffection being allowed to
develop itself might have led to most disastrous consequences; but this
was happily discovered, and repressed in due season.
Had the Sikhs retreated across the Sutlej after the skirmish at
Buddewal, carrying off their booty unmolested, the result of Sir
Harry Smith's expedition would have been far from satisfactory; but,
fortunately for that gallant officer, the enemy had been inspired with
so much confidence, that they not only remained on the left bank, but
actually came out of their entrenched camp, and gave him battle on the
very day and hour he desired to bring on the engagement.
To so high a pitch had Sikh confidence risen since the operations
of the 21st of January, that there appears every reason to suppose
that their movement on the morning of the 28th was intended as much
to intercept us from the main column, as to threaten the siege train
advancing from Delhi. Had the Sikhs been in earnest in this manoeuvre,
and gained Jugraon by a forced march, the character of the subsequent
operations must have undergone a material change, the fort of that town
being of solid masonry, and capable of standing a siege; and there
is little doubt that they would have gained an acquisition of force
when in the protected Sikh states, by so bold an advance. But such a
movement must ultimately have proved fatal to their interest, when cut
off from the river, and placed between the two British columns.
It was reserved for the issue of the battle of Aliwal to teach our
enemies how rapid a defeat the best of their troops must suffer when
opposed in the open plain to a well organized British army, directed by
an experienced, brave, and intelligent leader.
In manning the position they had assumed, much had been neglected on
the part of the Sikhs. The fortified village of Aliwal, which covered
their left flank, and would have insured a most galling fire on our
advancing line, if resolutely defended by an effective garrison, was
occupied by an insufficient body of irregular troops, and defended only
by two or three pieces of ordnance, which were carried with little
resistance. Such an oversight must be attributed to surprise; for, if
the enemy were actually on their march towards Jugraon on the morning
of the 28th, they certainly had not time to throw a sufficient force,
with heavy guns, into the village (which held an advanced position)
before Sir Harry Smith was upon them.
When Aliwal was once carried, the only resource left was that which was
readily adopted by Runjoor Singh, namely, changing front left back,
thus endeavouring to throw his left into the entrenched camp on the
Sutlej, whilst his right rested on Boondree. But even this manoeuvre
was almost desperate, for the extent of front along this new position
was so great, that ere the movement could be effected, his flanks were
doubled up and his line pierced in several places, nor were the Sikhs
a sufficiently disciplined army to manoeuvre steadily under fire.
When driven at every point from their well chosen position, the Aeen
battalions fell doggedly back, but never condescended to fly, though
plied with musketry and shrapnel. They retreated, maintaining the
character they had earned, and facing about at intervals to check their
pursuers by a retreating fire. Those troops, the pupils of Avitabile,
did credit that day to themselves and their master; and, however
we may abhor their treachery and thirst of blood, displayed in the
revolutionary annals of the Punjaub since the death of the old Lion of
Lahore, we must at least bear witness to their resolute courage and
soldierlike bearing.
The Goorcheras and Irregular Infantry (as we were subsequently
informed) had not the same heart in the cause as the Aeen battalions,
of whom war was the profession and livelihood, and plunder and
assassination the pastime.
It has been asserted that Sir Harry Smith might, without difficulty,
have crossed the Sutlej with his victorious army after the battle of
Aliwal, and seized on or destroyed the fortress of Philoor, which
had been the harbour of assemblage for the Sikhs whilst threatening
Loodiana; but it must be taken into consideration that the British
general's directions were only to clear the left bank of the enemy,
and that our forces were not equipped for an incursion into the Sikh
territories. Had such a measure been deemed prudent, it would have
called for extensive commissariat arrangements. To have crossed merely
to destroy the innocent fort of Philoor, and then to retire, would have
been useless and undignified.
But there were stronger reasons even than these. Sir Harry Smith had
no authority to cross the Sutlej. The Sikhs were playing our game so
industriously on our own side of the river, in crossing and occupying
in force their most inexplicable position near Hureeka, that the
final act of the tragedy was at hand, for which it was necessary to
concentrate the whole British strength.
RETURN OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT THE BATTLE OF ALIWAL, JAN. 28TH, 1846.
+------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------------+
| | KILLED. | WOUNDED. |
| +------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+
| |Offi- |Non- |Trumpe-|Offi- |Non- |Trump- |Mis- |
| | cers.|commis-| ters, | cers.|commis-| eters,| sing.| |
| | | sioned|Drum- | | sioned|Drum- | |
| | |offi- | mers, | |offi- | mers, | |
| | | cers. |Rank & | | cers. |Rank & | |
| | | | File. | | | File. | |
+------------------------+------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+
|Cavalry Division-- | | | | | | | |
| 1st Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| H.M. 16th Lancers | 2 | -- | 56 | 6 | -- | 77 | 1 |
| 3rd Light Cavalry | -- | 2 | 27 | -- | 1 | 21 | |
| 4th Irregulars | 1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 2 | |
| 2nd Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| Body-Guard | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | |
| 1st Cavalry | -- | -- | 9 | 2 | -- | 14 | |
| 5th ditto | -- | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 8 | |
| Shekawattee Cavalry | -- | -- | 1 | -- | 2 | 12 | |
| | | | | | | | |
|Artillery | -- | -- | 3 | -- | -- | 15 | 5 |
| | | | | | | | |
|Infantry-- | | | | | | | |
| 1st Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| H.M. 31st Regt. | -- | -- | 1 | 1 | -- | 14 | |
| 24th Native Infantry| -- | -- | -- | 1 | -- | 5 | 7 |
| 47th ditto | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- | 9 | |
| 2nd Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| H.M. 50th Regt. | 1 | -- | 9 | 10 | -- | 59 | 4 |
| 48th Native Infantry| -- | 1 | 9 | 4 | 1 | 36 | |
| Sirmoor Battalion | -- | -- | 9 | -- | 1 | 39 | |
| 3rd Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| H.M. 53rd Regt. | -- | -- | 3 | -- | -- | 8 | 2 |
| 30th Native Infantry| -- | -- | 4 | -- | -- | 24 | 1 |
| 4th Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| 36th Native Infantry| -- | -- | 3 | 1 | -- | 10 | 1 |
| Nusseeree Battalion | -- | -- | 6 | -- | -- | 16 | |
| Shekawattee Infantry| -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- | 13 | 4 |
| +------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+
| Total | 4 | 3 | 144 | 25 | 6 | 382 | 25 |
+------------------------+------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+
Horses killed 177
" wounded 79
" missing 97
Total killed, wounded, and missing, 589 men,
" " 353 horses.
_Nominal Roll of Officers Killed and Wounded at the Battle of Aliwal,
28th Jan. 1846._
Killed.
1st Cavalry Brigade--
H.M. 16th Lancers Lieut. Swetenham.
" Cornet G.B. Williams.
4th Irreg. Cavalry Lieut. and Adjutant Smalpage.
2nd Infantry Brigade--
H.M. 50th Regt. Lieut. Grimes.
Wounded.
1st Cavalry Brigade--
H.M. 16th Lancers Major Smyth, severely.
" Capt. E. Bere.
" Capt. L. Fyler, severely.
" Lieut. W.K. Orme, ditto.
" Lieut. T. Pattle.
" Lieut. W. Morris.
2nd Cavalry Brigade--
1st Light Cavalry Cornet Farquhar, mortally.
" Cornet Beatson, slightly.
1st Infantry Brigade--
H.M. 31st Regt. Lieut. Atty, slightly.
24th N.I. Lieut. Scott.
2nd Infantry Brigade--
H.M. 50th Regt. Capt. O'Hanlon, badly.
" Capt. Knowles, dangerously.
" Capt. Wilton, severely.
" Lieut. Frampton, dangerously.
" Lieut. R.H. Bellers, slightly.
" Lieut. W.P. Elgree, slightly.
" Lieut. A.W. White, severely.
" Lieut. W.C. Vernett, ditto.
" Lieut. T. Purcell, ditto.
" Lieut. W. Farmer, ditto.
48th N.I. Capt. Troup, slightly.
" Capt. Palmer, ditto.
" Lieut. and Adjutant Wall, severely.
" Ensign Marshall, slightly.
4th Infantry Brigade--
36th N.I. Ensign Bagshaw.
_Return of Ordnance captured from the Enemy in action at Aliwal, by
the 1st Division of the Army of the Sutlej, under the personal command
of Major-General Sir Harry Smith, K.C.B., on the 28th Jan. 1846._
_Camp, Aliwal, 30th Jan._
13 Howitzers:
8 inch, brass, 2ft. 9in., serviceable.
24 pounder, 3ft. 11in., do.
13 pounder, copper, 3ft. 9in., do.
12 pounder, brass, 4ft. 9in., do.
12 pounder, do. do. do.
7 pounder, do., 3ft. 5-1/2in., unserviceable.
12 pounder, copper, 3ft. 9in., serviceable.
12 pounder, do. do. do.
12 pounder, do. do. do.
12 pounder, brass, 3ft. 9in., highly ornamented, serviceable.
9 pounder, copper, 3ft. 11in., do. do.
9 pounder, do., 2ft. 9-1/2in., do.
12 pounder, do., 3ft. 4-1/2in., do.
4 Mortars:
10 inch, brass, 2ft. 3in., mounted, and field carriage,
serviceable.
8-1/2 inch, copper, 1ft. 9in., do. do.
6 inch, brass, 1ft. 4-1/2in., a curious old piece,
with highly carved and ornamented carriage, do.
4-1/2 inch, brass, 1ft. 4-1/2in., do. do.
52 Guns:
1. 8 pounder, brass, 10ft. 2in., ornamented with dolphin
and rings, apparently a French battering
gun, heavy metal, serviceable.
2. 8 pounder, copper, 4ft. 11-3/4in., do.
3. 8 pounder, brass, 4ft. 11in., do.
4. 8 pounder, brass, 5ft. 1in., do.
5. 7 pounder, do., 4ft. 11in., heavy metal, do.
6. 7 pounder, do., 4ft. 3-1/2in., do. do.
7. 6-1/2 pounder, copper, 5ft. 1in., do.
8. 6 pounder, brass, 5ft., do.
9. 6 pounder, do., 4ft. 1in., do.
10. 6 pounder, copper, 5ft. 3-1/2in., do.
11. 6 pounder, brass, 5ft. 5-1/2in., heavy metal, unserviceable.
12. 6 pounder, do., 4ft. 11in., do., serviceable.
13. 6 pounder, do., 4ft. 10in., inscription in English
characters--Owner, King Runjeet Sing; Commander,
Meg Sing Kakur; Maker, Rai Sing;
Lahore, 1833, No. 1, serviceable.
14. 6 pounder, do., 4ft. 8in., do.
15. 6 pounder, do., 4ft. 11-1/4in., highly ornamented carriage, do.
16. 6 pounder, do., 4ft. 11in., do., same as No. 13, do.
17. 6 pounder, 4ft. 8in., Persian inscription, do.
18. 6 pounder, do., 5ft., do.
19. 6 pounder, copper, do. do.
20. 6 pounder, brass, 4ft. 10-1/2in., do.
21. 6 pounder, do. do. do.
22. 6 pounder, copper, 4ft. 11in., highly ornamented
carriage, inlaid with brass and steel, do.
23. 6 pounder, do. do. do. do.
24. 6 pounder, brass, do. do. do.
25. 6 pounder, 4ft. 9-1/2in., do. do.
26. 6 pounder, copper, 4ft. 10-3/4in., do. do.
27. 6 pounder, gun metal, 4ft. 10-1/2in., apparently a
capital gun, do.
28. 5-3/4 pounder, brass, 5ft. 7in., Persian inscription, do.
29. 5-3/4 pounder, 5ft. 9in., heavy metal, would ream out
to a 9 pounder, do.
30. 4 pounder, 4ft. 7in., heavy metal, do.
31. 3 pounder, copper, 3ft., Persian inscription, do.
32. 3-1/2 pounder, brass, 4ft. 7in., heavy metal, do.
33. Unknown, sunk in the Sutlej.
34. Do. do.
35. Do. do.
36. Do. do.
37. Do., spiked on opposite bank.
38. Do. do.
39. 6 pounder, brass, do., taken possession of in the fort of Gungrana.
40. 9 pounder, do., do., do.
41. 6 pounder, 4ft. 11-1/2 in., serviceable.
42 to 52. Unknown, sunk in the Sutlej, or since brought in.
Abstract of Captured Ordnance:
Serviceable, 12 howitzers, 4 mortars, 33 guns.
Unserviceable, 1 howitzer, 2 guns.
Sunk and spiked, 13 guns.
Since brought in, 2 guns.
Grand total, 67 guns.
Forty swivel camel guns also captured, which have since been destroyed.
(Signed) W. Barr,
Lt. and Bt. Capt. II. Artillery,
Adjt. Artillery Division.
(Signed) G. Lawrenson,
Major 2nd Brigade H.A.,
Commanding Artillery 1st Divn.
Army of the Sutlej.
N.B.--The quantity of ammunition captured with the artillery, and found
in the camp of the enemy, is beyond accurate calculation, consisting
of shot, shell, grape, and small-arm ammunition of every description,
and for every calibre. The powder found in the limbers and wagons
of the guns, and in the magazines of the entrenched camp, has been
destroyed, to prevent accidents. Six large hackery loads have also been
appropriated to the destruction of forts in the neighbourhood. As many
of the shot and shell as time would admit of being collected, have been
brought into the park. The shells, being useless, have been thrown into
the river. The shot will be appropriated to the public service.
(Signed) G. Lawrenson,
Major 2nd Brigade H.A.,
Commanding Artillery 1st Divn.
Army of the Sutlej.
(Signed) W. Barr,
1st Lieut. and Bt. Capt. Adjt.
Artillery Division.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 40:
Cavalry--
1st Brigade H.M. 16th Lancers.
" 3rd Native Cavalry.
" 4th Irregulars.
2nd Brigade Body-Guard.
" 1st Native Cavalry.
" 5th ditto.
" Shekawattee Horse.
Infantry--
1st Brigade H.M. 31st Regt.
" 24th Native Infantry.
" 47th ditto.
2nd Brigade H.M. 50th Regt.
" Sirmoor battalion.
" 48th Native Infantry.
3rd Brigade H.M. 53rd Regt.
" 30th Native Infantry.
4th Brigade 36th Native Infantry.
" Nusseeree Battalion.
" Shekawattee Infantry.
" Sappers.
]
[Footnote 41: I have particularized this case, because there were few
instances of the Sikh cavalry emulating the example of their comrades
on foot during the whole campaign.]
[Footnote 42: These Aeen troops were Avitabile's battalions, formed
and drilled by him at Peshawur. Their uniforms were scarlet with
green facings; their arms were a musket and sword. The Sikh irregular
infantry were usually dressed in white, and armed with a matchlock,
sword, and shield--the latter slung on the back.]
[Footnote 43: In this charge Major Smyth was severely wounded; but,
regardless of personal injury, he continued to direct the operations of
his regiment until the Sikhs finally abandoned their position.]
[Footnote 44: It was here that the Shekawattee brigade and body guard
earned their _undying renown_. This was the last chance for them, as,
during the day, they had not come into collision with the enemy.]
[Footnote 45: These swivel guns were fired from camels' backs, and
usually carried balls of about one pound weight.]
[Footnote 46: At Moodkee.]
[Footnote 47: This imitative propensity of the Sikhs had often amused
us. If a new picket were ever posted in any out of the way place, the
Sikhs invariably posted a party of similar strength within a few hours.
If the videttes or sentries were doubled, their shadows forthwith
appeared on the opposite bank.]
[Footnote 48: Some men of influence and property in the neighbourhood
of Patna tampered with the native officers of a sepoy regiment
quartered there, but the plot was divulged and crushed in its infancy.]