THE ARMY ADVANCE TO ATTACK THE SIKHS IN THEIR ENTRENCHED CAMP AT
FEROZESHUHUR--THE ACTIONS OF THE 21ST AND 22ND OF DECEMBER--SIKHS
RETREAT BEHIND THE SUTLEJ--OBSERVATIONS.
On the morning of the 19th, intelligence was brought by the spies that
the whole forces of the Sikhs had resolved upon advancing to attack the
British army at Moodkee. Preparations were made to receive them, and a
more advantageous post than that of the former day was taken up, to act
on the defensive, as reinforcements were hourly expected.
The spies' reports proved false, as is not unfrequently the case in
Indian warfare, and on the night of the 19th, the arrival of H.M. 29th
Regiment, and the Company's 1st European Regiment, from their hill
cantonments, was welcomed with much satisfaction.
The 20th of December was given to the army to recruit their strength,
after the toil they had endured, and to prepare for the approaching
struggle.
Authentic accounts having been received of the enemy being in position
at Ferozeshuhur, about nine miles from Moodkee, and twelve from
Ferozepore, and on the direct line of communication between those
places, orders were sent to Sir John Littler, commanding at Ferozepore,
to move out, with his division, from cantonments, and unite with the
main column in the attack on the enemy planned for the following day.
Early on the morning of the 21st of December, the British forces
advanced from Moodkee, having left the wounded in charge of a small
party in the fort, and marching slowly in order of battle, moved
obliquely from the enemy's position towards Ferozepore. Having marched
across about fifteen miles of country, covered mostly with the same
stunted trees as at Moodkee, and in other places with a sandy soil, on
which grain and wheat had been planted, Sir John Littler's division was
descried advancing about one in the afternoon.
Sir John Littler having left two regiments of Native Infantry to
protect Ferozepore, and eluded the vigilance of the enemy's cavalry,
who were posted to watch his division, effected a junction with the
main column unmolested by the enemy.
The position of Ferozeshuhur was then hastily reconnoitred. The Sikh
camp, consisting of a dense and confused mass of tents, encompassed the
village of Ferozeshuhur, which occupied a rising ground, and was armed
with batteries of heavy guns. The entrenchments, which had been thrown
forward to cover the village, were an irregular quadrangular figure,
of upwards of eighteen hundred yards in length, and rather more than
half that distance in breadth, and consisted of a ditch, about four
feet in depth and from six to seven in breadth, the deblai earth from
which formed a parapet, protecting the defenders from fire of grape
or musketry. Batteries of the enemy's lighter guns were disposed at
intervals in rear of the parapets, where the ground was uniformly flat,
save in the centre of the position, where it rose gradually into the
mound, covered by the mud-houses of the village, as before mentioned.
In front of the entrenchment, every obstacle to the range of fire had
been removed, and a plain, mostly bare, or producing scanty crops,
presented no shelter for the assailants; such trees or shrubs as might
have afforded any cover, having been lopped or cleared away by the
enemy.
The village of Ferozeshuhur is situated on the road between Moodkee and
Ferozepore, but the road is rarely a matter of much consideration in
military operations in India, where the country is usually flat, and
unobstructed by fences.
It was past four in the afternoon when the British forces advanced
to storm this position, defended, as it was conjectured, by an
army of more than fifty thousand Sikhs. The investing force,
numbering altogether about sixteen thousand five hundred men, with
sixty-six pieces of artillery, (six and nine-pounders, twelve and
twenty-four-pound howitzers, and two eight-inch mortars,) were formed
in two lines; the first consisted of Generals Gilbert and Littler's
divisions, and Col. Wallace's brigade, with the principal force of
artillery in the centre, and one troop of horse artillery on each flank.
The reserve force, comprising the division of Sir Harry Smith, the
cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, formed a second line.
Sir Hugh Gough personally directed the operations of the right, and Sir
Henry Hardinge, who had volunteered his services, as second in command,
superintended the movements on the left.
When at a distance of about eleven hundred yards from the works, the
oppressive silence was broken by the voice of our mortars hurling
their loads of hissing iron through the air. The enemy's batteries
opened forthwith, and soon enveloped the works in smoke. The light
field batteries now began their part in the fray, at a distance of
about eight hundred yards, to cover the advance, and shortly afterwards
the whole of our artillery opened at a nearer range; but the Sikh
fire told with deadly effect, and many of the British light guns were
disabled, even before they were unlimbered. It soon became evident that
the Sikhs had the range of their batteries accurately measured, and
that our light guns were unable to cope with the enemy's artillery,
which being of very heavy metal, though not of large calibre, they were
enabled to use double charges of powder, grape, and round shot.
Under cover of the clouds and dust which wrapped the scene of
contention, our line of infantry continued to advance, and the
commander-in-chief, perceiving that the contest could only be decided
by a hand to hand struggle, ordered the entrenchments to be stormed
with the bayonet.
One incessant stream of fire continued to issue from the canopy of
smoke which enveloped the works, and the deadly breaks in each regiment
told with what murderous effect the enemy served his batteries; yet
their assailants, though broken and checked, still approached the
entrenchments with invincible resolution; but now, from behind the
batteries, poured forth a rolling shower of musketry, which seemed to
threaten utter annihilation to the daring and exposed force of Britons,
now reduced from brigades to regiments.
Night was fast approaching; the Sikh army continued to pour death into
our ranks, and received the roll of our musketry, under cover of their
trenches, with comparative impunity.
With that unconquerable determination which has marked the British
soldier in the hour of direst carnage, that gallant band rushed
onwards, seeking only to close in hand to hand conflict with their
galling antagonists, through the iron shower which tore their ranks
at every step, checked only where death had made so wide a gap, that
time was required to fill the deadly intervals, and give breath to the
survivors.
At one point, on the left of the attacking line, where Sir John
Littler's division was engaged, the incessant stream of fire from the
batteries, and the rain of musketry from behind them, was such, that
one British regiment (the 62nd) was nearly destroyed.[25] One-third of
the regiment were stretched on the field, when the brigadier, seeing
the utter hopelessness of carrying the enemy's strongest battery,
defended by thousands of musketeers, with the shattered remainder of
the 62nd, which had been left to do the work single-handed, gave orders
to retire.
On the centre and right the attack was more successful, the enemy's
entrenchments being penetrated, after a desperate struggle, at several
points, by General Gilbert's and Colonel Wallace's attack; but so
intermixed were the combatants, and so stunning was the din of battle
around the entrenchments, which were enveloped in impenetrable clouds
of smoke and dust, that it was impossible for the leaders to ascertain
the success or even the position of other brigades. Cheering on his
men, and just surmounting the enemy's entrenchments, fell Colonel
Taylor, at the head of his regiment, the gallant 9th, which he had led
so often to victory, but never before under such a fire as poured from
the trenches of Ferozeshuhur.
Chafing under the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the rash
Broadfoot, with his characteristic contempt of danger, charged,
single-handed, one of the enemy's howitzers with countless defenders,
and fell at its mouth.
Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge were ever with the foremost in
the fight, cheering all to renewed exertions, and affording personal
examples of contempt for danger which were gloriously followed by their
dauntless comrades.
Three batteries were captured, and on those points the enemy fell back
from their entrenchments; but from the village and the inner trenches
on the flanks still streamed forth the iron shower, rendered less
deadly by the obscurity of evening. In the meantime, the reserve, under
Sir Harry Smith, had forced their way through every obstacle, and,
having penetrated the entrenchments, established themselves in the
village, unaware of the post of the remainder of the army; but there,
in the midst of the enemy's lines, stood the banners of the glorious
fiftieth.
Hoping that yet, ere night had fallen, the Sikhs might be driven from
all their entrenchments, an order was issued for Colonel White's
brigade of cavalry to charge the daring front which was still presented
for defence. With alacrity was the order obeyed, and the exhausted
British infantry rested for an interval on their arms, whilst a rushing
sound, as of a suddenly bursting tempest, was heard approaching the
fray, and onwards came H.M. 3rd Light Dragoons to the charge. The
entrenchments and the batteries were equally futile obstacles to
oppose those gallant cavaliers, though the former brought many a horse
and rider to the ground, and the latter tore a deadly gap through
their ranks. Onwards poured the glittering squadrons, in spite of all
resistance, over the entrenchments, past the batteries, through the
very heart of the enemy's camp, the Sikhs falling back bewildered at
this unexpected mode of warfare.
Though paralyzed for a time by the strange onslaught of these bold
horsemen charging for a second time resolutely into the midst of their
army, yet the Sikhs, recovering from their surprise, began to pour a
destructive fire of musketry amongst the Dragoons,[26] who had been
much scattered, owing to the ground over which they had charged; and,
as each saddle was emptied, countless knives and tolwars awaited the
ill-fated soldier who was dismounted.
Having ridden throughout the enemy's lines, and being much broken
and thinned in numbers, they now charged back again, though scarcely
bringing two thirds of their numbers unwounded out of the enemy's lines.
One officer, Lieut. Burton, having lost his charger amongst hordes
of the enemy, and sought hopelessly for another, perceived a party
of dragoons close to him, and, seizing the tail of a horse, was
dragged by him at full speed through the camp, until, on arriving at
the entrenchments, the trooper, bounding over the ditch, dashed the
officer with such violence against the counterscarp that he lost the
hold he had so desperately retained, but still lives to confirm the
tale.[27]
Darkness now caused the fire on each side to slacken, part of the
enemy's camp and field works being in our possession, whilst the Sikhs
continued to hold the remainder; but darkness brought no rest to the
brave and wearied soldier; for the enemy's expense magazines continued
to explode in various parts of the works, the slow matches or burning
cartridges falling amongst them, and several were blown up or scorched
thereby. The main column of our troops were, in consequence of these
disasters, ordered to withdraw outside the trenches, where they lay
amongst the bodies of their dead and dying comrades, worn out with
their almost unremitted exertions; faint from hunger, but, worse than
all, parched with intolerable thirst, as few of the water-carriers who
accompany an Indian army on active service had ventured to the ground
where the Britons lay during that awful night.
The enemy had no intention of allowing the time to pass unprofitably
while darkness prevailed, but, on ascertaining the position occupied by
our soldiers outside the entrenchments, they sent spies who indicated
the direction by tinkling a bell and running off, or by affixing a blue
light to a stick, which was placed in the ground and lighted to serve
as a direction for the Sikh guns, which forthwith opened a galling
fire. One cannon of heavy metal was plied with such effect that H.M.
80th Regiment, and 1st Europeans were ordered to advance and take it,
which duty they speedily accomplished.
The night of the 21st of December, naturally the longest of the year,
seemed almost an eternity to the wearied "army of the Sutlej," and
unhappily proved so to many, for the Sikhs lost no opportunity of
inflicting injury.
The thirst which afflicted many was so oppressive, that it overcame
all other considerations, and many of the soldiers strayed in search of
water towards the village, heedless of the vicinity of the enemy.
A portion of Sir Harry Smith's division, which had occupied the village
in the entrenchments, remained a great part of the night in that post,
darkness preventing them from ascertaining the position occupied by the
remainder of the army. In the pell-mell assault, regiment had become
so intermixed with regiment, that it is difficult to particularize the
exploits of an individual corps, as a portion of some other, in all
probability, bore a share of the labour.
In the course of the night Sir Harry Smith's division withdrew
from their advanced post, and, being unable to discover the
commander-in-chief's column, retired to a village at about a mile and a
half's distance from the trenches.
Sir John Littler's division was also unsuccessful in finding
head-quarters during this awful night of errors, nor did either of
these divisions reach the main column of the army till they had renewed
the attack on the following morning.
The dawn of day on the 22nd of December served to restore some order
amongst the troops, and to discover the enemy still occupying the
entrenchments. The British soldier was again called to action, sinking
with hunger, thirst, and toil, and responded to that call on which hung
the fate of the British empire in India, with untiring devotion. A
line was formed of our shattered forces, and Sir Hugh Gough, animating
all around him by his zeal and example, pressed forwards to clear the
entrenchments, and again began the work of death.
The enemy's position, the whole of which was again manned, was for
the second time stormed by the British infantry; but, as they were
assailed now from a nearer range, the struggle was on more favourable
terms, though the overpowering numbers of the enemy rendered his losses
comparatively trifling, whilst ours was most severe, considering
the small band of warriors now opposed to the foe. The Sikh dead,
intermixed with our own, strewed the face of the soil, and the footing
of the combatants was slippery with blood. Never had so resolute an
enemy opposed the British arms in India, and never had the aspect of
British interests in the East rested on so slender a thread. But the
Sikh powers of endurance had reached their limit; and, deeming the
British indomitable, they fell back, leaving their camp and guns in
the hands of the victors. Pressing forward upon the retiring enemy,
the British line swept the Sikh soldiery from the whole position, and
rested on the Sutlej front of the works.
The resolution and courage of the British troops had probably never
undergone a more severe test than on the field of Ferozeshuhur, and
when victory at length appeared to have crowned their efforts, a
heartfelt cheer burst from the ranks. No thoughts were entertained of
pursuing the enemy, for both strength and ammunition were expended.
Congratulations on the ultimate success of the day went round amongst
the victors as they rested on their arms; and perhaps the sudden and
successful result was hailed by none with more sense of thankfulness
than by the two chiefs of the army.
But this satisfaction was destined to be of short duration; for scarce
two hours had elapsed after the retreat, when the enemy were seen
advancing again. The British troops were eagerly searching for water
in the blood-stained village of Ferozeshuhur, having piled their arms
outside, when the alarm was given of the enemy's advance. The column
which now approached was ascertained to be the reserve force under Tej
Singh, consisting principally of cavalry and horse artillery, with some
of the Aeen battalions; this force had advanced from their position
near the river, to take part in the fray, and were estimated at about
twenty-five thousand strong.
Again burst the storm of artillery over our army, and apparently with a
sure prospect of success for the enemy; for our guns were all crippled,
the ammunition was exhausted, and the troops now advancing to attack
were fresh, and doubtless well provided with all material for action.
There remained now only the prospect of allowing as many of the enemy's
missiles to fly over the soldiers' heads as would take that desirable
course, and to bring the matter as speedily as possible to the final
issue of a hand to hand struggle. This the enemy also seemed resolved
to expedite; for having altered his front of attack, he appeared
desirous of turning the left of the British, and intercepting all
retreat, while the main attack was directed on the village.
A partial change of front was made on the British side to meet this,
and the cavalry advanced against the enemy's right flank; which
threatened attack, Sir Hugh Gough states, in his despatch, he intended
to have supported with infantry. The fatal crisis had now apparently
arrived; but our soldiers had become of late too intimate with death to
think of avoiding it. At all events, the Sikhs would not have obtained
a bloodless victory, though our ammunition was expended; but at this
critical moment the battle was ended in the most unexpected and sudden
manner, by Tej Singh withdrawing his forces from the field. Although
not suffering from a hostile fire, nor in any way incommoded in his
operations or intentions, the enemy suddenly converted his threatened
attack into a precipitate retreat, and fell back towards the fords of
the Sutlej, where the main column of his army had already preceded him.
This extraordinary conclusion of the battle was soon ascertained by our
cavalry reconnoitring parties to be no feint on the part of the enemy,
but a final retreat.
The only means of accounting for Tej Singh's extraordinary departure,
after having beforehand stood his ground so manfully, is on the
supposition that his second advance with the reserve force under his
personal direction, was meant only to cover the retreat of the main
column, and that he knew not the extent to which the British forces
were crippled.
The supposition that the movement of Colonel Harriott's brigade of
cavalry towards Ferozepore alarmed the Sikh general, lest _we should
intercept his retreat_ by that manoeuvre, is almost too wild a
conjecture to be entertained.
No attempt, of course, was made to pursue the enemy: he had already
been sufficiently obliging, and such a proceeding would have been
ungrateful.
The cannon taken from the enemy in this action amounted to
seventy-three pieces, which, added to their loss at Moodkee, made
a total of eighty-eight captured during the two actions. Some were
afterwards discovered thrown into wells in the village, when rendered
unserviceable.
The return of killed and wounded on the British side was not published
for some time afterwards, which caused an injurious effect, when the
news of the battle reached the provinces, as it opened a path for much
exaggeration. It was confidently whispered amongst the natives of
Hindostan that the British had met with their match at last; and though
the Sikhs had recrossed the river, that they had left their opponents
in such a condition, as to be unable to reap any advantages from their
victory. The state of suspense in which the friends and families of
those engaged at Ferozeshuhur were kept, for want of authenticated
returns of the casualties may be well imagined; but the mystery which
enveloped this sanguinary engagement was, for a time, so impenetrable,
that the reserve force under Sir John Grey were actually unaware of the
killed and wounded amongst their comrades, when they crossed the field
of battle a fortnight afterwards, and recognised amongst the corpses
many of which yet lay unburied, the friends of whose fate they had been
ignorant.
The forces engaged on the British side in this action were, seven
troops of Horse Artillery, and four companies of foot; one regiment of
British Dragoons, seven regiments of British Infantry, seven regiments
of Native Cavalry, and fourteen regiments of Native Infantry.
The casualties were, 694 killed, and 1721 wounded; but, of these,
the British regiments suffered a heavy proportion, losing nearly 500
killed, and more than 1100 wounded. These losses, added to those at
Moodkee, gave a sum total of 3287 _hors de combat_, out of an army
amounting altogether to about 16,000 actually engaged.
Those who had fallen in action were only partly interred in the
trenches, for the wounded demanded all the attention that could be
bestowed.
The enemies' bodies were left to the disposal of the jackals and
vultures, who fulfilled their task very imperfectly, satiety having
made them epicures.
The country, from the field of Ferozeshuhur to the fords of Hureeka,
marked the track of the enemy's retreat by the corpses of soldiers
wounded in the battle, who had died on the road, but the actual number
of the enemy's loss could not have exceeded our own.
The whole army with which Tej Singh crossed the Sutlej has been
estimated at sixty thousand men; but more than this number must be
allowed them if the entrenchments of Ferozeshuhur held fifty thousand
defenders, as conjectured; for Sir Hugh Gough conceives that Tej Singh,
when renewing the action of the 22nd of December, brought up several
fresh battalions, supported by thirty thousand Goorcheras, and the
greater portion of these must have constituted the force which was
placed to watch Ferozepore, or to cover their retreat.
A field hospital was established for the wounded: those regiments which
had suffered most severely were moved to Ferozepore, where they were
enabled to receive medical attention under better cover than could
be provided in camp. The main column of the army under Sir Hugh Gough
proceeded towards the river, and encamped about twelve miles north-east
of Ferozepore, and three miles from the banks of the Sutlej.
The enemy, immediately after crossing, had taken up the position he
now occupied near the fords of Hureeka, anticipating, no doubt, that
an immediate passage of the river would be attempted by the British
generals. The Sikhs, in coming to this conclusion, were evidently
ignorant of the amount of injury which they had inflicted, and of the
state of our magazines on the north-western frontier.
Immediately after the action of Ferozeshuhur, when thanks had been
returned to the Supreme Being for deliverance, every available regiment
was ordered to the frontier, and an ample siege train from the Delhi
magazine, with abundant supplies of ammunition, and every requisite for
the prosecution of the campaign, were ordered forward with the most
urgent despatch.
Regiments of irregular cavalry,[28] and large levies of infantry, were
ordered to be forthwith raised with all the energy which the critical
situation of affairs demanded, for a golden opportunity now offered
itself to any malcontent chiefs in Hindostan to take advantage of the
concentration of the Bengal army on the far-distant frontier. These
orders were now enabled to reach the provinces in safety, as the
population of the protected Sikh states no longer considered it prudent
to interrupt the communication after their friends had recrossed the
Sutlej.
The 21st and 22nd of December will ever be the most memorable (if it
be not also deemed the most critical) epoch since the establishment of
British supremacy in India.
Had the British forces been overwhelmed by the continual influx of
fresh troops from the enemy's reserve force, and the failure of
ammunition on their own, the sole barrier to the advance of the Sikh
army into the British territories was the Merut force, less than five
thousand strong, under Sir John Grey. And, that such a casualty had
been deemed more than _possible_, may be concluded from the fact of
Count Ravensberg, who accompanied the Governor-general's camp (and of
whom continual mention is made in the despatches) being requested to
quit the field, that he might not be a witness of, or a sufferer in,
the issue which was anticipated. That nobleman, following the request
which had been conveyed to him, proceeded reluctantly to Ferozepore,
and thence to Buhawalpore on the Indus, before news reached him of the
unexpected issue of the struggle.
In entering upon a consideration of the tactics adopted, let me not be
judged guilty of such unpardonable presumption as that of canvassing
the measures of officers whose conduct has been rewarded by the highest
honours their country could bestow. My humble remarks are addressed
to my brother officers of the subordinate ranks; and if these casual
observations should succeed in meriting the attention of any one who
takes sufficient interest in his profession to discuss such topics, I
profess my readiness to give up my imaginary line of operations as soon
as I am convinced that the position is untenable. These subjects, when
we had little else to think of, or talk about, formed an ample theme
for discussion; and though they have often provoked the remark that
"all the subalterns of the army had promoted themselves to generals,"
the cavil did not produce any argument against so advantageous and
extensive a brevet. Indeed, such a line of promotion might give an
opportunity to the military chiefs of later days to earn the applause
of their countrymen before the weight of years should finally consign
the military hero to the family physician or the nursery.
When the Sikh forces fell back, on the night of the 18th of
December, from the battle-field of Moodkee upon the main body in the
entrenchments of Ferozeshuhur, the reserve force, stationed to watch
Ferozepore by the Sikh general's orders, continued to occupy the same
position.
The avowed object in the hasty attack on the enemy's strong position at
Ferozeshuhur was to prevent the Sikh forces from forming a junction,
and to relieve Ferozepore.
Had the enemy been desirous to effect the junction alluded to, it would
appear difficult to account for his not taking advantage of the respite
on the 19th and 20th of December to ensure the movement. But, perhaps,
a strong reason for his not doing so may be adduced by the fact of the
area of his entrenchments being already so crowded with defenders,
that it is almost difficult to assign places within the dimensions[29]
of the works for such hordes of Sikh soldiery as, by the published
estimates, would seem to have occupied the position.
In the next place, had the Sikhs been anxious to attack Ferozepore,
it is strange that they neglected to attempt the siege or investment
between the 13th and 18th of December. Nay, instead of doing so, they
immediately advanced and took up a strong position, leaving a reserve
force to watch the garrison, and perhaps to cover their own retreat
in case of a reverse, whilst they pushed boldly forward to occupy
a position in the direct route of our forces, which post, judging
from former military transactions in India, they expected would be
immediately stormed.
The force detached to Moodkee, having failed in their object, fell back
upon Ferozeshuhur, where no disposition was manifested for a farther
retreat; but the enemy calmly awaited, in that advantageous position,
the attack which they doubtless hoped would ensue.
By following the line of operations expected by the Sikhs, the British
forces came into action late in the afternoon, having been under arms
and marching the whole of that day, and weakened from want of food and
water; whilst the horses, already much jaded, were ill prepared for the
work they had to undergo. These evils, great on the night of the 21st,
were not alleviated after the sanguinary struggle; and on the 22nd,
being far from all resources and supplies, the failure of ammunition
might be viewed as an almost desperate misfortune.
The _veni, vidi, vici_ principle has been in some measure warranted,
in Indian campaigns, by the great precedents of Assye and Lord
Hastings's Mahratta campaigns. It had been employed with considerably
less success during the Goorkha war, where the reverses of other
divisions of the army were fortunately counteracted by General
Ochterlony's prudence and foresight. But the Sikhs were a far different
enemy[30] from the Mahrattas or any power we had hitherto encountered
in India, and worthy of the respect which they inspired after the first
two engagements.
To view the subject under its various phases, I will now proceed to
consider the probable results had the army been advanced to a position
in the vicinity of Ferozeshuhur, where free communication could have
been maintained with the garrison of Ferozepore, and where, as the
enemy had established himself in a fixed position, his intercourse with
Lahore might have been threatened at the same time that we had free
range of the country.
In such a position, the enemy might have been safely watched, whilst
preparations were made to attack his entrenchments in due form,[31] and
our troops would have been fresh, and ought not to have been without
ammunition in case of being suddenly brought into action. The Merut
reserve force, with the 9th and 16th Lancers, H.M. 10th Regiment,
and four regiments of Native Troops, accompanied by three troops of
Artillery and the elephant battery of twelve pounders, would, by
using despatch, have arrived in less than ten days[32] had an order
been forwarded from Bussean, and such a force would have been beyond
the reach of any coup-de-main of a detachment from the enemy's camp.
Then, with properly constructed batteries, (for the fort at Ferozepore
contained some heavy guns) and with regular approaches, the Sikh
position would have been advantageously assailed, and there is little
doubt that a well directed fire of artillery, poured into such crowded
works, would have been severe in its effect, and would ultimately have
compelled the enemy to evacuate them. When the Sikhs should have been
once compelled to take to the open ground, their heavy siege guns would
have been too unwieldly to manoeuvre, whilst our light artillery would
have been on advantageous ground, and, with an effective force of
cavalry, the victory ought to have been speedy, and the enemy's retreat
to the ford not altogether unmolested.
To all this, perhaps it may be objected that the Sikhs would assuredly
not have awaited a concentration of our forces, and these preparations
for attack. In reply, it must be borne in mind that the choice of
battle rested with the British, unless the enemy vacated his post, when
the advantages to be derived in the open plain would have been ours,
and rendered a much easier victory a matter beyond a question with an
army like our own, whose whole "materiel" were expressly qualified for
action in the open plain, where superior discipline and rapidity of
movement, with a fresh and well appointed army of sixteen thousand men,
ought to have ensured success upon easier terms than when storming the
same enemy in a strong position.
With an effective British force of 16,000 or 20,000 men in the open
plain, I conceive it to be a matter of unimportance whether a native
enemy be double or treble that amount; for when confusion once ensues
amongst a half-disciplined multitude, it doubtless is greater in
proportion to the number.
In the battle of Ferozeshuhur, the fate of the day was committed to the
gallantry and bull-dog qualities of the British soldiers, and the issue
proved that they had not been over-rated; but as these were resources
which would always have remained in reserve, and ready for action when
called upon, a question may be raised as to the policy of employing
this reserve before the advantages of strategy had been employed.
The result of this action would hardly answer to establish a precedent
for the repetition of similar measures under similar circumstances;
for three or four such battles would have used all the European
material, and British regiments cannot be hastily recruited or replaced
in India.
RETURN OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT FEROZESHUHUR, DEC. 21ST AND 22ND.
+-----------------------------+------------------------+------------------------+
| | KILLED. | WOUNDED. |
| +-------+-------+--------+------+-------+---------+
| |Offi- |Native |Trumpe- |Offi- |Native |Privates,|
| | cers. |& non- | ters, | cers.|& non- | &c. |
| | |commis-|Drumm- | |commis-| |
| | |sioned | ers, | |sioned | |
| | |offic- |Privates| |Offic- | |
| | | cers. | | | cers. | |
+-----------------------------+-------+-------+--------+------+-------+---------+
|Personal staff | -- | -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- |
|General staff | 1 | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- |
| | | | | | | |
|Artillery. | | | | | | |
| (Col. Brooke, com.) | | | | | | |
|Staff | -- | -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- |
|Horse | 2 | 1 | 26 | 1 | 7 | 54 |
|Foot | -- | 2 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 18 |
| | | | | | | |
|Cavalry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Col. White.) | | | | | | |
|Staff | -- | -- | -- | 3 | -- | -- |
|1st Brig., H.M. 3rd Lt. Drag.| 3 | 2 | 55 | 6 | 6 | 80 |
| " 8th Native Cavalry | -- | 1 | 3 | -- | 2 | 7 |
| " 9th Irregulars | -- | 2 | 8 | -- | -- | 11 |
|2nd ditto, Body-guard | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 2 |
| " 5th Native Cavalry | -- | 1 | -- | -- | -- | 2 |
| " 8th Irregular Horse | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- | 4 |
|3rd do. 4th Native Cavalry | -- | -- | 9 | -- | 2 | 6 |
| " 3rd Irregulars | -- | -- | 3 | -- | -- | 13 |
| | | | | | | |
|1st Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Sir Harry Smith.) | | | | | | |
|Staff | -- | -- | -- | 3 | -- | -- |
| 1st Brigade, H.M. 31st Rgt.| 2 | 2 | 57 | 5 | 4 | 92 |
| " 24th N.I. | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 24 |
| " 47th ditto | | | 9 | | 2 | 24 |
| 2nd ditto H.M. 50th Regt. | | | 27 | 6 | 5 | 86 |
| " 42nd Native Infantry | 1 | 4 | 10 | 2 | 5 | 35 |
| " 48th ditto | | 2 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 46 |
| | | | | | | |
|2nd Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Gen. Gilbert.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | 2 | | | 1 | | |
| 1st Brigade, H.M. 29th Rgt.| 2 | 1 | 67 | | 6 | 110 |
| " 45th N.I. | | 2 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 30 |
| 2nd do. 1st European Regt. | 2 | 2 | 43 | 6 | 12 | 139 |
| " 2nd Native Infantry| 1 | 2 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 43 |
| " 16th ditto | 1 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 51 |
| | | | | | | |
|3rd Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Brigadier Wallace.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | 1 | | | | | |
| 1st Brigade, H.M. 9th Rgt. | 3 | 1 | 66 | 6 | 5 | 192 |
| " 26th Native Infantry | 2 | 1 | 8 | | 3 | 42 |
| " 73rd ditto | 1 | 1 | 19 | | 6 | 31 |
| H.M. 80th Regiment | 4 | | 20 | 3 | 1 | 53 |
| | | | | | | |
|4th Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Sir J. Littler.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | 1 | | | 2 | | |
| 1st Brigade, H.M. 62nd Rgt.| 7 | 6 | 76 | 10 | 5 | 156 |
| " 12th Native Infantry | | 1 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 61 |
| " 14th ditto | | 3 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 59 |
| 2nd ditto, 33rd ditto | | 2 | 6 | | 8 | 32 |
| " 44th ditto | | | 9 | | 2 | 14 |
| " 54th ditto | | | 2 | | | 6 |
| +-------+-------+---+----+------+-------+---------+
| Grand total | 73 | 44 | 613 | 78 |120 | 1523 |
+-----------------------------+-------+-------+--------+------+-------+---------+
Killed.
Personal Staff Capt. Hare, Deputy Secretary.
Artillery--
2nd Troop, 1st Bat. Capt. Todd.
3rd " 3rd " Lieut Lambert.
Cavalry--
H.M. 3rd Lt. Drag. Capt. Codd.
" Cornet Ellis.
" Cornet Bruce, 16th Lancers.
1st. Division (Infantry)--
H.M. 31st Regt. Lieut. Pollard.
" Lieut. and Adjutant Bernard.
24th N.I. Brevet-Major Griffin.
42nd N.I. Lieut. Woollen.
2nd Division--
Staff Capt. Lucas, B.M.
" Capt. Burnett, ditto.
H.M. 29th Regt. Capt. Molle.
" Lieut. Simmons.
1st European Regt. Capt. Box.
" Ensign Moxon.
2nd N.I. Ensign Armstrong.
16th N.I. Major Hull.
3rd Division--
Lieut.-Col. Wallace, B.
H.M. 9th Regt. Lieut.-Col. Taylor.
" Capt. Dunn.
" Capt. Field.
H.M. 80th Regt. Capt. Best.
" Capt. Scheberras.
" Lieut. Warren.
" Lieut. Bythesea.
26th N.I. Lieut. Croly.
" Lieut. Eatwell.
72nd N.I. Capt. Hunter.
4th Division--
Staff Lieut. Harvey, A.D.C.
H.M. 62nd Regt. Capt. Clarke.
" Capt. Wells.
" Lieut. Scott.
" Lieut. M'Nair.
" Lieut. Gubbins.
" Lieut. Kelly.
" Lieut. and Adjutant Sims.
Wounded.
Personal Staff Lieut.-Col. Wood, A.D.C., severely.
" Lieut. Haines, A.D.C., ditto.
" Major F. Somerset, Military Secretary,
since dead.
Artillery--
Staff Capt. Warner, Commissary of Ordnance, slightly.
" Capt. Mackenzie, B.M., ditto.
1st Troop, 3rd Bat. 1st Lieut. Paton, ditto.
3rd Company 1st Lieut. Atlay, ditto.
Cavalry--
Staff Lieut.-Col. Harriott, ditto.
" Capt. Havelock, H.M. 9th Regt., Assistant
Quartermaster-Gen., ditto.
" Lieut.-Col. White, 3rd Light Dragoons,
Brigadier, ditto.
H.M. 3rd Lt. Drag. Major Balders, ditto.
" Lieut. Morgan, severely.
" Lieut. Burton, slightly.
" Cornet Orme, severely.
" Lieut. White, slightly.
" Lieut. Rathwell, ditto.
1st Division (Infantry)--
Staff Capt. Lugard, 31st Regt., A.A.G.
" Lieut. Galloway, Assistant
Quartermaster-General.
" Lieut. Holdich, A.D.C.
H.M. 31st Regt. Major Baldwin, severely.
" Lieut. Plasket, ditto.
" Lieut. Pilkington, ditto.
" Ensign Paul, slightly.
" Ensign Hutton, ditto.
H.M. 50th Regt. Capt. Knowles, ditto.
" Lieut. Chambers, ditto.
" Lieut. Moualt, ditto.
" Lieut. Barnes, ditto.
" Ensign White, ditto.
" Lieut. and Adjutant Mullen, ditto.
24th N.I. Ensign Grubb, ditto.
42nd N.I. Lieut. and Adjutant Ford, ditto.
48th N.I. Ensign Wardlaw, ditto.
" Lieut. Litchford, ditto.
" Lieut. Taylor, ditto.
2nd Division--
Staff Lieut.-Colonel Taylor, H.M. 29th Regt.,
Brigadier.
H.M. 29th Regt. Major Congreve.
" Capt. Stepney.
1st European Regt. Capt. Clerk, severely.
" Capt. Kendall, dangerously.
" Lieut. Beatson, severely.
" Lieut. Fanshaw, slightly.
" Ensign Wriford, ditto.
2nd N.I. Ensign Salusbury, severely.
" Capt. Bolton, ditto.
" Ensign Hodson, slightly.
16th N.I. Ensign O'Bryen, ditto.
" Lieut. Hamilton.
3rd Division--
H.M. 9th Regt. Capt. Barton, severely.
" Lieut. Taylor.
" Lieut. Vigors.
" Lieut. Sievewright, dangerously.
" Lieut. Cassidy.
H.M. 80th Regt. Ensign Forster, contused.
" Major Lockhart.
" Capt. Fraser, since dead.
" Lieut. Freeman.
4th Division--
Staff Capt. Egerton.
" Capt. Burnett, B.M., slightly.
H.M. 62nd Regt. Lieut.-Col. Reed, Brigadier, ditto.
" Major Short, ditto.
" Capt. Graves, badly.
" Capt. Sibley.
" Capt. Garroch, slightly.
" Lieut. Gregorson, badly.
" Lieut. Craig, ditto.
" Lieut. Ingall, slightly.
" Ensign Roberts, severely.
" Ensign Hewett, slightly.
" Lieut.-Col. Bruce, very severely.
" Capt. Holmes, ditto.
" Lieut. Tulloch, ditto.
" Ensign Ewart, slightly.
" Capt. Struthers.
" Capt. Walsh.
" Lieut. Wood, severely.
" Lieut. Lukin, slightly.
" Ensign Weld, severely.
_Return of Ordnance captured at Ferozeshuhur._
+---------+----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
| | | | | Weight of |
| Number. | | Calibre. | Length. | shot. |
+---------+----------|----------------+---------------+-----------+
| | | inch. tenths. | feet. inch. | |
| 1 | Gun | 4 5 | 5 10 | 9 lbs. |
| 2 | Howitzer | 7 0 | 14 10 | 42 |
| 3 | Gun | 5 0 | 7 0 | 18 |
| 4 | | 5 0 | 6 9 | 18 |
| 5 | | 5 0 | 6 6 | 18 |
| 6 | | 4 5 | 5 10 | 9 |
| 7 | | 4 5 | 5 10 | 9 |
| 8 | | 4 5 | 8 4 | 9 |
| 9 | | 4 0 | 6 4 | 8 |
| 10 | | 4 5 | 7 0 | 9 |
| 11 | | 4 5 | 6 0 | 9 |
| 12 | | 4 5 | 6 0 | 9 |
| 13 | | 5 0 | 6 9 | 18 |
| 14 | | 4 2-1/2 | 6 0 | 9 |
| 15 | | 4 2-1/2 | 6 0 | 9 |
| 16 | | 5 5 | 7 6 | 18 |
| 17 | | 4 0 | 5 9 | 8 |
| 18 | | 4 0 | 5 9 | 8 |
| 19 | | 4 0 | 5 6 | 8 |
| 20 | | 3 7-1/2 | 4 7 | 6 |
| 21 | | 4 5 | 5 9 | 9 |
| 22 | | 4 7-1/2 | 6 0 | 12 |
| 23 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 7 |
| 24 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 7 |
| 25 | | 4 0 | 6 5 | 8 |
| 26 | | 5 3 | 10 0 | 18 |
| 27 | | 5 0 | 7 6 | 15 |
| 28 | | 4 7 | 6 6-1/2 | 11 |
| 29 | | 5 7 | 2 1 | 24 |
| 30 | | 2 8 | 8 11 | 3 |
| 31 | | 2 8 | 3 11 | 3 |
| 32 | | 3 7 | 7 11-1/2 | 6 |
| 33 | | 5 7 | 3 11-1/2 | 24 |
| 34 | | 3 7 | 4 11-3/4 | 6 |
| 35 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 6 |
| 36 | | 4 0 | 6 6 | 9 |
| 37 | | 2 7 | 3 0 | 3 |
| 38 | Gun | 3 9 | 4 11-1/2 | 8 lbs. |
| 39 | | 3 7 | 4 11 | 6 |
| 40 | | 4 0 | 6 0 | 9 |
| 41 | | 4 2 | 6 1 | 9 |
| 42 | | 4 0 | 6 2 | 9 |
| 43 | | 4 5 | 6 1 | 12 |
| 44 | | 4 3 | 6 1 | 10 |
| 45 | | 3 5 | 6 4-1/2 | 6 |
| 46 | | 3 8 | 4 11-1/2 | 8 |
| 47 | | 4 7 | 7 11 | 12 |
| 48 | | 4 3 | 6 1 | 10 |
| 49 | | 4 3 | 6 9-1/2 | 10 |
| 50 | | 4 7 | 4 10 | 12 |
| 51 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 8 |
| 52 | | 2 7 | 3 11-1/2 | 3 |
| 53 | | 4 2 | 7 11-1/2 | 10 |
| 54 | | 4 3 | 7 11-1/2 | 9 |
| 55 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 8 |
| 56 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 8 |
| 57 | | 4 2 | 5 8 | 9 |
| 58 | | 2 7 | 3 0 | 2 |
| 59 | Mortar | 9 5 | 2 5 | 10in. |
| 60 | Gun | 2 8 | 3 11-1/2 | 3 lbs. |
| 61 | | 3 6 | 4 6 | 6 |
| 62 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 8 |
| 63 | | 3 7 | 4 11-3/4 | 7 |
| 64 | | 2 8 | 2 11 | 3 |
| 65 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 8 |
| 66 | | 3 8 | 4 11 | 8 |
| 67 | | 6 0 | 3 9 | 32 |
| 68 | | 4 3 | 7 10-1/4 | 9 |
| 69 | Mortar | 5 7 | 2 0 | 24 |
| 70 | Gun | 4 3 | 7 10-1/2 | 9 |
| 71 | Howitzer | 4 3 | 3 9 | 9 |
| 72 | Gun | 5 2 | 8 8-1/2 | 18 |
| 73 | | 6 0 | 8 9 | 30 |
+---------+----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
Many of these guns have long Persian inscriptions,[33] and very
old dates, some are highly ornamented. The carriages are closely
assimilating to those in use with the Bengal artillery, the whole
well fitted for post guns. The metal is much heavier than those of a
similar calibre in use with the Bengal artillery.
Two more guns were discovered at Sooltan Khan Wallah, of which no
return has yet been received.
(Signed) G. Brooke,
Brigadier, &c. &c.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 25: Much has been said and written concerning the carnage
and retreat of the 62nd, which has engendered, unnecessarily, some ill
feeling. Sir John Littler states explicitly, in his despatch, that the
Sikh fire was "furious and _irresistible_;" therefore if he expected
that regiment to accomplish what he allows to be impossible, we need
not set any value on the unfortunate general's opinion.]
[Footnote 26: The enemy's fire was opened from the low doorways of the
tents, inaccessible to horsemen.]
[Footnote 27: Another officer of the 3rd Dragoons, who had been
dismounted and wounded in this charge, whilst wandering among the
entrenchments, met a body of native soldiers, who demanded ransom, and
ordered him to strip off his jacket; he pointed to his broken arm; but
they were not chivalrous enough to admit this appeal, and, taking his
uniform, allowed him to escape. This was the sole act of clemency on
the Sikhs' part I have heard recorded.]
[Footnote 28: This expedient has often been resorted to in critical
times, as it gives employment to many doubtful characters, and raises a
temporary bulwark, which can easily be disposed of when danger is over.]
[Footnote 29: About eighteen hundred yards by nine hundred and fifty,
as well as a horse's stride enabled me to judge.]
[Footnote 30: I allude only to their bravery and discipline. Their
generalship brought the war to a speedy conclusion.]
[Footnote 31: The batteries at Ferozeshuhur were attacked in front. Had
they been taken in flank or reverse many heavy guns in fixed positions
could not have been brought to bear readily against the assailants.]
[Footnote 32: That is, they might have reached Moodkee by the 28th of
December. The advanced guard of the reserve were within hearing of the
cannonade of Ferozeshuhur.]
[Footnote 33: The inscriptions on these guns, like that on the
celebrated pocket-pistol at Dover, were much given to boasting.]