THE BRITISH FORCES--THE SIKH ARMY CROSS THE SUTLEJ--THE BATTLE OF
MOODKEE--POSITION AND OPERATIONS CONSIDERED.
Under the circumstances thus briefly detailed, it would appear to have
been expedient to bring matters at once to a crisis; for this annual
threatening posture assumed by the gigantic incubus which Runjeet Singh
had created on our threshold, could not be suffered permanently to draw
the strength of the British forces in the presidency to guard their
frontier. But it was generally understood that the wishes of Leadenhall
Street were strongly in favour of a pacific line of conduct, and thus
the governor-general had little choice as to the line of operations to
be pursued.
No actual increase of numbers over the preceding year took place on the
frontier, but nearly every British regiment in Bengal had been marched
to the north-western provinces.
Umbala was the cantonment for the main body of the army, to which
Ferozepore and Loodiana were the outposts on the Sutlej, distant
respectively one hundred and ten, and seventy miles, whilst the base
line connecting the latter places measured about seventy-five miles.
The reserve force remained at Merut, which, being one hundred and fifty
miles from Umbala, and more than two hundred and sixty from Ferozepore,
might appear the most defective part of the arrangement.
The whole of the Bengal presidency had been so drained of British
troops to supply the north-western provinces, that from Merut
to Calcutta (nearly nine hundred miles,) there remained but one
British infantry regiment[16] to overawe the numerous independent
principalities of India, to garrison Fort William, and to show the
people of Hindostan that the British had not altogether forsaken them
in their ardour to form new acquaintances on the frontier. No one
will assert that the gallant 39th had not a handful of responsibility
assigned them, and none were more capable of undertaking whatever
Britons could effect, than the victors of Maharajpore.
The forces at Ferozepore, Loodiana, and Umbala, including the
regiments at the hill stations of Kussowlie and Subathoo, amounted to
about twenty thousand men, with seventy pieces of cannon, (six and
nine-pounders, and twelve and twenty-four-pound howitzers.) This force
having been warned some weeks previously to complete their marching
establishment, were available for field service at a few hours' notice.
The regiments composing the above-named force were as follow:--H.M.'s
3rd Light Dragoons, and seven regiments of Native Cavalry; H.M.'s 9th,
29th, 31st, 50th, 62nd, and 80th Regiments; the Company's European
Regiment, and fourteen regiments of Native Infantry, exclusive of
the Sirmoor and Nusseeree battalions, which were destined to garrison
Loodiana in case of emergency.
The reserve force, at Merut, amounted to more than four thousand
men, including H.M. 9th and 16th Lancers, 3rd Native Cavalry, H.M.
10th Regiment, two corps of Native Infantry, and two troops of Horse
Artillery. An elephant battery of twelve-pounders also moved with the
reserve force. Other corps in the neighbourhood or on the line of march
might complete the whole reserve force to a numerical strength of about
eight thousand men.
Thus, within a month, the whole army might, when concentrated on the
frontier, amount, in round numbers, to nearly thirty thousand men, with
one hundred pieces of artillery. Nearly one-third of which force would
consist of British troops, including the artillery, of which not more
than one-third were natives.
With such an army at his disposal, Sir Henry Hardinge cannot be deemed
guilty of having despised his enemies.
On the 20th of November, Major Broadfoot[17] communicated to the
governor-general that the information which he had received from Lahore
led him to suppose that the Sikhs had resolved on an advance towards
the Sutlej, for the purpose of invading the British territories, and
the next day's accounts tended to corroborate this statement.
On the 24th and 25th of November, a great portion of the Sikh
army were on their march towards the Sutlej, openly proclaiming
their intentions of crossing the river. On this news reaching the
governor-general's camp, the Sikh Vakeel (ambassador) was called upon
for an explanation of this hostile attitude, and being unable to give
any satisfactory answer, was ordered, on the 4th of December, to quit
the governor-general's camp at Umbala, and return to the Punjaub.
After the Vakeel's departure, Sir Henry Hardinge continued to advance
peaceably towards the frontier, visiting the protected Sikh states;
nor were orders issued for the movement of any portion of the army
until the 8th of December, which order did not reach army head-quarters
before the 10th of that month.
Sir Henry, in common with the primates in office, had unhappily so
far misjudged the Sikh character, as to suppose it was the intention
both of their government and soldiery to provoke, but not to commit,
hostilities.[18] The attitude and operations of the enemy, when once
the war broke out, evidently displayed the aggressive policy which
guided their efforts. One cause of ill-feeling engendered in the
Punjaub against the British Government, may be traced to a journal
published in the north-western provinces of India, whose inflammatory
articles had long-pointed out the Punjaub as a worthy object of
cupidity, and such sentiments, when circulated amongst the proud and
suspicious Sikhs, were doubtless mistaken for an exposition of the
views of Government, and must have gone far to stir the national
jealousy.
When the Sikh forces had actually quitted Lahore in progress to the
Sutlej, there could remain no doubt of the object of their march,
however sceptical many might be of the continuation of their humour;
and had it then been decided to move the Merut force[19] towards the
frontier, the features of the subsequent operations must have undergone
a material change by such an accession of strength, and especially of
cavalry, of which there was a sad deficiency. In lieu of being moved
on the 26th of November, the main column of that force did not quit
cantonments until the 16th of December, only two days before the action
fought at Moodkee. In the governor-general's dispatch, it is stated
that all troops destined for service on the frontier _had_ marched by
the 12th of December. Sir John Grey's division of the army were not all
on the line of march before the 16th, as before stated.
When the Sikhs had moved six brigades towards the Sutlej, on the 25th
of November, the most prudent and fastidious of the peace party could
not have reasonably objected to the advance of the reserve to Kurnal,
which would have brought them eighty miles nearer the scene of action,
and within three or four days reach of Umbala.
The force at army head-quarters having moved, pursuant to orders,
under the personal command of his Excellency Sir Hugh Gough, on the
11th and 12th of December, all doubt of the requisition of their
services was cleared up on the 13th, by receipt of intelligence at the
governor-general's camp, that the Sikhs, who had been assembled in
great force, for some days, at Hureeka ford, about twenty miles above
Ferozepore, had at length commenced the passage of the Sutlej. For two
or three days previously to their crossing, their hostile spirit was
fully evinced, by firing upon our reconnoitring parties from Ferozepore.
Sir John Littler, who was in command at Ferozepore, immediately
occupied a defensive position, but was not in sufficient force to
oppose the passage of so numerous an army as the Sikhs displayed, and
amply provided with heavy artillery to cover their landing.
It was fortunate that this important news reached head-quarters so
safely and expeditiously; for thenceforth a long farewell was taken of
all communication between the provinces and the interesting field of
operations on the north-west frontier.
On hearing that the enemy had actually invaded our territories, Sir
Henry Hardinge hastened with the small force at Loodiana[20] to form a
junction with Sir Hugh Gough, near Bussean, and issued a proclamation,
calling on the chiefs in the protected Sikh states to be quiet and
faithful, whilst the British army hastened to encounter and chastise
their treacherous invaders.
The junction between the Umbala and Loodiana forces was effected
without interruption; and all heavy baggage with the force having been
deposited at Bussean, where a large depôt for commissariat supplies
had been established, in case of the army being called into the field,
the forces hastily advanced towards Ferozepore to encounter the enemy.
Worn and harassed by forced marches,[21] and a constant scarcity
of water, the united forces, under the command of Sir Hugh Gough,
advanced, on the morning of the 18th of December, towards the fortified
village of Moodkee, pressing forward "with hot haste," lest the heart
of the Sikhs should fail them, and no fight take place. At least, such
appears to have been the object of these forced marches, for it is
distinctly asserted that Ferozepore was not considered in any danger,
as the fort could hold out for an indefinite time, and the town and
cantonment could not have been entitled to more consideration than was
bestowed on poor forsaken Loodiana.
On the memorable 18th of December, the cavalry and horse artillery
reached the village of Moodkee, about one P.M., after a severe march
of twenty-one miles, the greater portion of the infantry being still a
considerable distance in the rear, and, of course, much fatigued.
The cavalry pickets were moving to their posts soon after arrival, as
usual, when clouds of dust were discerned through the jungle, which
announced the approach of the enemy. Previously to arrival at Moodkee,
a small reconnoitring party of horse had been descried, who fell
back forthwith; but the enemy had scoured the whole country in the
morning, with their cavalry, and taken an officer prisoner,[22] and the
probable time of arrival had been well calculated. Major Broadfoot,
whose experience of native warfare had been gleaned amongst the rugged
defiles of Afghanistan, where his gallantry and intelligence had earned
him an undying fame, was firmly convinced of the enemy's vicinity,
and had some hours before intimated his belief: but doubts were still
entertained.
Moodkee is a small compact fort, situated on a mound commanding the
country, which is open and sandy for a circle of about three quarters
of a mile radius, taking the fort as a centre; thence, the country
becomes close, with stunted trees and bushes at a few yards interval
from each other, affording excellent shelter for irregular troops, but
mainly obstructing operations of regular cavalry, or bodies moving in
compact order from manoeuvring with precision.
When the alarm of the Sikhs' approach reached camp, the cavalry and
horse artillery moved forward towards the jungle, and the infantry, as
each brigade arrived within reach of the scene of operation, hastened
to take part in the fray.
The enemy, whose numbers and intentions were effectually masked by
the nature of the ground which he occupied, opened a heavy fire of
artillery, which crashed through the jungle with serious effect upon
the advancing column, who received the deadly blows without perceiving
whence the missives proceeded.
Our light guns were brought rapidly into play; but the advantage of
position was with the Sikhs, added to which, they came fresh into the
field. The struggle under these disadvantages threatened to be severe.
As each of the brigades of infantry endeavoured to fall into its place
in advancing, they found themselves so much impeded by the number
of stunted trees, that it was difficult to ascertain their relative
positions or to form with their accustomed regularity, whilst the Sikh
cavalry, hovering in the vicinity, threatened momentarily to charge.
The infantry, being ordered to deploy, effected that movement with
as much regularity as the ground permitted, whilst the cavalry were
directed to attack and turn the Sikh flanks, and to disperse the hordes
of Goorcheras[23] who infested the jungle. The gallant 3rd Dragoons,
sweeping the Goorcheras from before them, penetrated the heavy covert,
and, riding through the Sikh artillery, silenced their fire for a time;
but the enemy's matchlock men, from behind the hillocks and bushes, and
many of them perched amongst the branches of the low trees, whence they
could act with impunity, inflicted a severe loss on the Dragoons. When
this fact was ascertained, the pistol and carbine were brought into
play with some effect on these jungle fowl, but many a gallant fellow
was stretched on the ground in this unequal contest.
The Sikh artillery, having again opened fire, continued to tell with
murderous effect, and did material damage to our Light Artillery, whose
horses, wearied with a long march, were not in the best condition for
hard work.
Meanwhile, our infantry, having approached the Sikh position, poured in
a steady rolling fire, which was, however, as steadily met, whilst the
grape-shot from their battery in the centre caused fearful gaps amongst
the British ranks.
The enemy, under cover of the hillocks and thick patches of jungle,
maintained his post with the utmost resolution, whilst the declining
light favoured this mode of warfare on the part of the Sikhs. Our
troops continued gradually to advance, whilst the enemy, falling back,
and having abandoned his heaviest battery, was not disposed to await
the issue of the bayonet, when the choice rested on his side.
A bright December's evening enabled the contending parties faintly
to distinguish each other's outline, but the Sikhs had now suffered
severely; and, having failed in their main object of surprise, Lal
Singh conveyed the orders to his troops to retire. The enemy therefore
abandoned the field to the British, having been compelled to suffer a
loss of fifteen guns and to cast others into the wells in the village
in rear of his position.
When it was ascertained that the Sikhs had finally retired, the men
rested themselves for the first time during that toilsome and eventful
day; but bodily fatigue was a trifling evil when compared with the
parching thirst from which all had long suffered, and from which there
was yet no relief. But if those who escaped unharmed had undergone
incredible hardships, the agonies of the wounded can scarcely be
conjectured, as only partial relief could be afforded amongst the
crowds of sufferers.
The enemy having made no demonstrations of renewing the attack, the
troops were withdrawn, about midnight, to their encampments at Moodkee.
The forces engaged on the British side, during this action, amounted
to something less than ten thousand men and forty-five guns. The return
of losses gives two hundred and fifteen killed and six hundred and
fifty seven wounded.
The enemy's force encountered at Moodkee was estimated, in the
despatches, at fifteen thousand Infantry, as many cavalry, and
forty guns.[24] Of course it is necessary to form some estimate of
the enemy's force on such occasions; but though always a difficult
operation with regard to native armies, in this instance it could be
no more than mere conjecture, for the jungle prevented the chance of
giving anything resembling an accurate judgment.
The enemy's loss was never ascertained; but, judging from the bodies
scattered over the country, the number of killed may be set down at
about three hundred. Their wounded were carried to Ferozeshuhur and
the villages in the neighbouring country, so that the Sikhs themselves
were, doubtless, never aware of the actual amount.
Amongst the officers who fell in this action was the gallant Sir Robert
Sale, whose leg was shattered by a grape shot. The shock proved fatal
to him in the course of the night of the 18th.
Ever foremost in the numerous actions in which he was engaged, it is
only a matter of wonder that so fearless a soldier should so long
have been spared. The battle-field was his element; and had the fates
permitted him to select his last resting-place, he would have asked no
other than the path of victory, beneath which he sleeps. The combined
roar of eighty pieces of cannon saluted the parting spirit of the hero
of Jellalabad on the field of strife; and though his remains rest
on the far-distant eastern plains which have witnessed his warlike
achievements, yet will his name descend to posterity bright in the
ranks of England's departed heroes.
Sir Hugh Gough heartily congratulated the troops on their gallantry.
Such an eulogium is valuable, coming from a veteran, whose undaunted
bearing and personal example (on every occasion in the front, or "where
death came thickest,") was the universal theme of applause in the army.
When we consider the position and the circumstances under which the
action was fought, the principal difficulty that presents itself
for explanation is the extreme alacrity manifested to commence the
engagement before the whole army was prepared. It has long been the
practice in India to hasten forward under all disadvantages, and attack
an enemy when once within reach; but, although this system has often
been successfully practised, under the impression that such active and
bold measures inspire confidence and daring amongst our native army,
it becomes a critical experiment when brought into play with a more
enterprising foe.
After crossing the Sutlej, the Sikhs, leaving a small force to watch
Ferozepore, advanced more than twelve miles into our territories, and
occupied a position, which they speedily entrenched, at Ferozeshuhur.
From the latter place a division of their army was detached to Moodkee,
with the evident intention of surprising the Governor-general's camp,
after a long march.
On the arrival of the Governor-general at Bussean, it is probable
that the enemy's spies gave intelligence of the Loodiana force being
at Bussean with the Governor-general; and the enemy, unaware of the
junction which had been arranged with Sir Hugh Gough, conceived that
when the force advanced to Moodkee a master-stroke might be effected,
at the outset of the war, by surprising and capturing Sir Henry
Hardinge, and destroying the force which accompanied his excellency
as an escort. Had they imagined that the main body of the army were
advancing on Moodkee, the enemy would surely have attached a larger
force of artillery, on which arm, as before stated, they place their
main confidence.
At two P.M. on the day of the battle--viz., at the time our troops
turned out to attack, the cavalry and artillery had just arrived,
much jaded after their long march, and the infantry brigades had not
all arrived, but received their orders whilst on the line of march,
to hasten forward with all possible speed, and take up their posts on
the field of action. On riding over the ground, some time after the
action was fought, it appeared to me that the fortified village of
Moodkee would have afforded an admirable position to be occupied by
such portion of the wearied infantry and artillery, as had arrived on
the ground; and their numbers would have been concealed from the enemy.
This would have afforded them rest, and water, of which there was an
abundance around the village; and our cavalry pickets, falling back,
would have drawn the enemy most probably upon the open ground, which
he had then nearly reached; and, being emboldened by perceiving few
of the British forces, and those not advancing, is it not reasonable
to conclude that he would have become the assailant? Had the Sikhs
attacked us while so posted, the force in Moodkee might have engaged
the attention of the enemy, whilst our cavalry and rear brigades of
infantry, by making a trifling detour in the jungle, would have taken
the Sikh forces in reverse, and probably given them more cause to
regret their advance from Ferozeshuhur than as matters actually befel.
Had the Sikhs not attacked when our cavalry pickets retired upon
Moodkee, our forces would have been fresh, and better prepared for
action the following morning; and the 19th of December ought to have
yielded more favourable results, under such circumstances, than the
18th.
Taking, as a third supposition, that the Sikh force would have fallen
back during the night on their main column at Ferozeshuhur, the
conclusion is, that there would have been no battle of Moodkee, and
that Ferozeshuhur might have been fought on the 20th, in lieu of the
21st and 22nd of December, in neither of which cases can I see any
ground for supposing that our interests would have suffered.
I have heard it suggested, that if the enemy had not been engaged
at Moodkee, there was a probability of his turning our flank, and
threatening the provinces; if such had been his intention, it is
probable that he would have taken another line of country, and not
the road by which our forces were advancing, for the country affords
anywhere a ready passage for troops, and they are not confined to any
particular track, as in inclosed countries.
RETURN OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE ACTION OF MOODKEE, DEC. 18, 1845.
+-----------------------------+------------------------+------------------------+
| | KILLED. | WOUNDED. |
| +------+-------+---------+------+-------+---------+
| |Offi- |Native |Privates.|Offi- |Native |Privates,|
| | cers.|& non | | cers.|& non |Fifers, &|
| | |commis-| | |commis-|Drummers.|
| | |sioned.| | |sioned.| |
+-----------------------------+------+-------+---------+------+-------+---------+
|Personal staff | 2 | -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- |
|General staff | 1 | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- |
| | | | | | | |
|Artillery Division. | | | | | | |
| (Col. Brooke, com.) | | | | | | |
| Horse | 2 | 3 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 19 |
| Foot | 1 | 1 | 2 | -- | -- | 8 |
| | | | | | | |
|Cavalry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Brig. White.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | -- | -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- |
| H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons | 2 | 5 | 53 | 3 | 3 | 29 |
| Body-guard (natives) | 1 | -- | 6 | 2 | 2 | 15 |
| 4th Native Cavalry | -- | -- | 2 | -- | -- | 4 |
| 5th ditto | -- | -- | 8 | 2 | 1 | 16 |
| 9th ditto Irregulars | -- | 1 | 3 | -- | 1 | 7 |
| | | | | | | |
|1st Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Sir Harry Smith.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | 1 | -- | -- | 4 | -- | -- |
| 1st Brigade, H.M. 31st Rgt.| 1 | 2 | 22 | 7 | 4 | 121 |
| " 47th Native Infantry | -- | -- | 6 | 1 | -- | 8 |
| 2nd ditto H.M. 50th Rgt. | 1 | -- | 11 | 5 | 5 | 87 |
| " 42nd Native Infantry | 1 | 1 | 25 | 1 | 6 | 55 |
| " 48th ditto | -- | 2 | 5 | -- | 7 | 28 |
| | | | | | | |
|2nd Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Gen. Gilbert.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | -- | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- |
| 45th Native Infantry | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- | 1 |
| 2nd ditto | -- | -- | 14 | 3 | 6 | 48 |
| 16th ditto | -- | 1 | 2 | -- | 9 | 32 |
| | | | | | | |
|3rd Infantry Division. | | | | | | |
| (Sir J. M'Caskill.) | | | | | | |
| Staff | 1 | -- | -- | | | |
| H.M.'s 9th Regiment | -- | -- | 2 | 1 | 2 | 47 |
| 26th Native Infantry | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 3 |
| 73rd ditto | -- | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 5 |
| H.M.'s 80th Regiment | -- | 1 | 3 | 1 | -- | 19 |
| 11th Native Infantry | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 41st ditto | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
+-----------------------------+------+-------+---------+------+-------+---------+
Killed.
European officers 13
Native ditto 2
Non-commissioned officers, privates, &c. 192
Syces, followers, &c. 3
---
Total 210
Wounded.
European officers 39
Native ditto 9
Non-commissioned officers, privates, &c. 588
Syces, drivers, &c. 21
---
Total 657
LIST OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.
Killed.
Head 2nd staff Major-General Sir R. Sale.
" Major Herries, A.D.C.
" Capt. Munro, A.D.C.
Artillery Captain Trower.
" Lieut. Pollock.
3rd Light Dragoons Capt. Newton.
" Cornet Worley.
Body-guard Lieut. Fisher.
Staff Capt. Van Homrigh, 48th N.I.
H.M.'s 31st Lieut. Hart.
H.M.'s 50th Assistant-Surgeon Graydon.
42nd N.I. Lieut. Spence.
3rd Division Major-General Sir J. M'Caskill.
Wounded.
Head 2nd staff Major Grant, D.A.G., dangerously.
" Capt. Hillier, A.D.C., severely.
" Capt. Edwards, A.D.C.
" Capt. Dashwood, since dead.
" Lieut. Cox.
Artillery Lieut. Wheelright.
" Lieut. Bowie.
" Brigadier Mactier, severely.
" Brigade-Major Capt. Harrington, do.
3rd Light Dragoons Lieut. Fisher, ditto.
" Lieut. Swinton, ditto.
" Lieut. Cureton, ditto.
Body-guard Capt. Dawkins, ditto.
" Lieut. Taylor, ditto.
5th Cavalry Major Alexander.
" Lieut. Christie.
1st Division Brigadier Bolton, since dead.
" Brigadier Wheeler, severely.
Engineers Lieut. Nicolls, ditto.
H.M.'s 31st Captain Lugard.
" Lieut.-Col. Byrne, since dead.
" Capt. Willis, dangerously.
" Capt. Bulkeley, ditto.
" Capt. Young, ditto.
" Lieut. Pollard.
" Lieut. Brenchley, since dead.
47th N.I. Lieut. Pogson, dangerously.
H.M.'s 50th Capt. Needham, severely.
" Lieut. Bishop, ditto.
" Lieut. Young, ditto.
" Lieut. Montmorency, ditto.
" Lieut. Carter.
42nd N.I. Lieut. Holt.
H.M.'s 9th Assist.-Surgeon Gahan, dangerously.
" Lieut. Hanham, slightly.
Staff Major Codrington, severely.
2nd N.I. Captain Bolton, ditto.
" Captain Gifford, ditto.
H.M.'s 80th Ensign Walden, ditto.
" Colonel Bunbury, ditto.
RETURN OF ORDNANCE CAPTURED AT MOODKEE.
+---------+-----------+---------+----------+----------+
| | | | | Weight |
| Number. | Ordnance. | Metal. | Calibre. | of shot. |
+---------+-----------+---------+----------+----------+
| | | | in. tenths. |
| 6 | Guns | Brass | 4 6 12 pr. |
| 1 | Howitzer | Ditto | 6 5 6-1/2 |
| 4 | Guns | Ditto | 4 2 9 pr. |
| 3 | Ditto | Ditto | 3 6 6 pr. |
| 1 | Ditto | Ditto | 2 9 3 pr. |
| -- | | | |
| 15 | | | |
+---------+-----------+---------+---------------------+
It was impossible to compute the metal in these guns; but it was
evident they were heavier than those of similar calibre in the Bengal
artillery.
The carriages all in good repair, except one or two, struck by our
shot. The whole were destroyed, and the guns left at Moodkee.
Four guns, reported to have been dismounted, and left on the ground by
the men of the Horse Artillery, for want of means to bring them away.
(Signed) G. Brooke,
Brigadier, Artillery.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 16: H.M. 39th. The 61st Regiment landed in December, and were
immediately ordered up the country.]
[Footnote 17: Governor-General to the Secret Committee. Letter No. 9.]
[Footnote 18: Vide Governor-General's Minute, dated, "Camp, Umbala,
Dec. 4, 1845."]
[Footnote 19: H.M.'s 9th Lancers were actually moved about this time,
_by mistake_, but, three days afterwards, were counter-marched to
Merut again, the commander-in-chief's measures being cancelled. Sir H.
Gough's letter to Major Broadfoot, Nov. 20, 1845.]
[Footnote 20: The few men incapable of severe duty were left in the
fort of Loodiana. The cantonments were unoccupied.]
[Footnote 21: Some petty chiefs manifested their hostility by shutting
their gates and refusing supplies, but were speedily brought to
submission.]
[Footnote 22: Captain Biddulph, who was taken prisoner at Moodkee, was
restored, two days after the battle, having undergone great hardships.]
[Footnote 23: Sikh irregular horse.]
[Footnote 24: I was informed, at Lahore, that their whole force at
Moodkee was under twenty thousand men; but it was only the bare
assertion of a Sikh officer, and may be taken at its value.]