premises is, to maintain that "the infant, from his birth, is a
voluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful." And
would you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort to such
an idea for the sake of helping out a theory? _And yet it is even so_. A
paper lately published under the sanction of the New Divinity,
purporting to be an inquiry into "what is the real difference between
the New-Haven divines and those who differ from them," says, "The ground
has of late been taken (if we understand the discussions on this
subject) that mankind are literally _at birth_ voluntary and accountable
agents, and actual sinners against God; that the new-born infant is a
responsible subject of God's moral government, and actually sins with a
knowledge of his duty, and in the same sense with the adult sinner
violates moral obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to
change its moral character." And as a proof that this is the ground now
assumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, who
has been one of the most active in this state in opposition to the
New-Haven divines, in which he says, "A moral being, for aught we know,
may commence his existence in an _active_, _voluntary_ state of the
will; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and thus, in fact, to
a certain extent sinful, and that without supposing that _depravity is
seated in any thing but the will_." This same writer also states that
Dr. Spring, in a treatise on "native depravity," a work which I have not
at hand, has advanced and defended the sentiment of "_actual_ sin from
birth." And has it indeed come to this at last, that this natural
ability, for which Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing
more than the power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the
one hand, or "make himself a new heart" on the other! Alas for
Calvinism! To what miserable shifts--yes, I must call them _miserable_
shifts--is this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself
in accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent,
learned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains me
in this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite theory, is
however in strict accordance with the known obliquity of the greatest
and purest minds. But while we respect the authors of such a theory, and
while we feel the necessity of taking heed to ourselves, lest we also
fall by the same example of prejudice, we cannot suffer our common sense
to be imposed upon by such gross absurdities. In this, however, we see
that, as before, in trying to maintain their _ability_, they gave up
their _depravity_: so here, in trying to establish their _depravity_,
they destroy their _ability_. Nay, what is still worse for this theory,
this very attempt to prove that infants are "_actual_ sinners from their
birth," is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. Why
do these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, in order
to show that men are _guilty_ from their birth, which is an
acknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only by
proving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently it is a
concession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of their guilt.
This is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to save itself, has
gone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can the reader see the
difference between this doctrine of actual sin from the birth, viewed in
connection with its origin and bearings, and the New Divinity, which
makes sin consist exclusively in moral exercise? Let these old-side
Calvinists, then, sheath the sword of controversy which they have drawn
against their brethren, and join in with them to defend, if possible,
the Pelagian doctrine which, it would seem, after all, they hold in
common stock. Has the Rev. Mr. Harvey been so active in getting up an
opposition theological school in Connecticut to teach that the infant
"commences his existence in an _active voluntary_ state of the will, and
is thus (_on this account_) to a certain extent sinful?" This is clearly
a work of supererogation--a useless expenditure of money and of talents.
The New-Haven Theological School is capable--alas! too capable of
carrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will
cease their opposition, and unite in their assistance. Does Mr. Harvey
fear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their "_moral exercise_"
early enough to make it _natural depravity?_ They have given assurances
that they will not be particular on that point. Only allow that there is
no sin previous to the first intelligent act of choice--previous to the
corresponding power to make themselves new hearts, and they will be
satisfied. They have said already that "this capableness of sinning, if
it is not at the exact moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it
is not,] commences so early in their existence, that it is proper, for
all the great purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from
the beginning of their days." Hence we see nothing between these
gentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be
important that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral
suasion should not put the commencement of these "moral exercises" so
far back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; otherwise they
may yet get into another difficulty as serious as the one they are
trying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very distinctly shown,
I think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists themselves, and from the
nature of the case, that there can be no such intermediate theory as
they contend for, between the native impotency of old Calvinism and
Pelagianism. But as this is an important point, I will illustrate it
farther by an examination of the _seat_ of this Calvinistic depravity.
It is seen, by the quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers
"depravity as seated in nothing but the will." And this is avowedly the
sentiment of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural
ability. It is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, "You can
if you will;" "There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse
will." It is on this ground, also, that they tell us "a right choice is
conversion." They do not say a right choice is a _condition_ or a fruit
of the new birth; but _it is itself the new birth_. But to understand
this subject clearly, it is important to know what they mean by the
will. It appears to me they use this term with great indefiniteness, if
not latitude of meaning. If they mean by this what I understand to be
the legitimate meaning of the term "the mental power or susceptibility
of putting forth volitions;" then to say that all depravity is seated in
the will, is to be guilty of the gross absurdity of teaching that the
affections have not a moral character. If by the will, however, they
mean, as they frequently seem to mean, the affections themselves going
out in desire after some proposed good, then indeed they establish the
New-Haven theory, that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by
placing all depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of
willing, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case,
exclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm the
doctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something
different from either of the above definitions, then I frankly confess I
know not what they mean. Should they however, change their ground, and
place the seat of this depravity in the constitution of man's moral
nature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, then and in that
case they throw the subject back on the old ground of natural impotency;
for to talk of a natural power to change the moral constitution, as it
existed prior to choice, and which constitution must, by the law of its
nature, exercise a controlling influence over the mind, is the same as
to talk of a natural power to alter one's own nature, or to unmake and
remake himself. In this case we must have supernatural aid, or we must
remain as we are.
We shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject until
we have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is the precise
meaning that we are to attach to the terms, _natural_ and _moral
ability_, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I have examined
such authors as I have had access to, with care; and I have been
particular to consult _recent_ authors, that I might not be accused of
charging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; and _various_
authors, that I might ascertain any varieties that appertain to the
different Calvinistic schools. In particular, the author of "Views in
Theology;" Dr. Griffin, in a late work on "Divine Efficiency;" Rev.
Tyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; and a doctrinal tract,
entitled, "Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," written,
it is presumed, by one of the divines of the New-Haven school have been
consulted. There is among them all a remarkable uniformity on this
point. If I understand them, the substance of what they say is, "Natural
power consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will;
and moral power is the _exercise_ of these faculties." Mr. Thatcher says
this in so many words.--The tract alluded to gives this definition of
natural power. Dr. Griffin says "their [sinners'] faculties constitute a
natural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve God, if their
hearts are well disposed." It certainly must appear, at the first
glance, very singular to every mind not embarrassed by theory, that
either the _possession_ of faculties, or the _exercise_ of faculties,
should be called _power_. The idea of _power_ is supposed, by the best
philosophical writers, to be undefinable, from the fact that it is a
simple idea; but here, strange to tell, we have it analyzed in two
different forms. Faculties are power--the exercise of faculties is
power. Now, although we cannot define power, every one doubtless has a
clear conception of it; and I humbly conceive that the common sense of
every man will decide that neither of the above definitions embraces the
true idea of power. The _exercise_ of faculties _implies_ power, it is
granted; but every one must see that it is not power itself. And
although the _faculties_ of the mind are sometimes called the _powers_
of the mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the
limbs or muscles are called the _powers_ of the body, yet it requires
very little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of
the body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to some
of their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers or
faculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that moral
strength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of these
faculties does not even _imply_ power adequate to a holy choice; much
less are they _power itself_. I marvel therefore at these definitions of
moral and natural power, and am thereby confirmed in the opinion
advanced in my former number, viz. "That the whole of this distinction
(of natural and moral ability) and the reasoning from it, proceed on the
ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind, and an unwarranted
definition of terms." This may seem a strong statement from so humble an
individual as myself, in view of the many able minds that have adopted
the opinions here opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh
much, in this controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments;
and by such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look
then, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself seems
to be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When he wishes
to oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their error, he says,
"If you mean by power, an ability that works without Divine efficiency,
I hope I shall be the last to believe that." "And every body knows that
the mass of the New-England divines, from the beginning, have
acknowledged no such doctrine."
And why is _Divine efficiency_ necessary?--Because man has no ability
that will "work," without it. Thus the moment he sets up a guard against
Pelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our doctrine, or upon
the old Calvinistic doctrine of "native impotency." There is no standing
place any where else. The New-Haven divines are right, if natural
ability is right; and the time cannot be far distant when the love of
consistency will drive all, who hold to natural ability, either on to
the New Divinity ground, or back to old Calvinism. From this remark the
reader will see how much depends, if my views are correct, upon the
proper adjustment of this question. It is in fact the turning point,
which is to give a character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not
then be in haste to pass over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. "Now if you
ask me what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine
efficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, it
is the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision of
common sense, must be called a power." The doctor had a little before
told us, that this power was faculties--he is not satisfied with this;
and what well instructed mind, like the doctor's, could be? It is
something that forms the "basis of obligation," he knows not what it is.
He merely infers there is such a power, because men are held
responsible. But this inference will flow quite as naturally, by taking
the Arminian ground of gracious ability, and save the other difficulties
beside. At any rate, it will save the absurdity of holding to an
ability, that will not "work," without being strengthened by Divine aid,
and yet that this same ability is sufficient for all purposes of
obligation without that aid.
We shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this
definition of _moral_ power. It is "the exercise of natural power." But
these same writers tell us that, while we have this natural power
sufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, "we are
entirely dependent upon God's grace for moral power"--in other words,
according to the definition of moral power, we are dependent upon grace
for the _exercise_ of our natural power--and since natural power means
the faculties of the understanding, will, and conscience--the statement
is simply and evidently this: we are dependent upon Divine grace for the
exercise of our understanding, conscience, and will, in making a holy
choice. Why? Because the understanding, conscience, and will are so
depraved by nature, that it is not in their nature to "work" in this
exercise, without this Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious
ability after all? Is it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in
another place--"They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at
once, _but they are not bound to go_ alone: it is their privilege and
duty to cast themselves _instantly_ on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a
single step in their own _strength?_" Or is it any wonder that the
Christian Spectator should say, that "this statement of Dr. Griffin
brings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?" And is
this the ability that "the mass of the New-England divines have held to
from the beginning?" Not exactly. They only slide over on this ground
occasionally, when they are pressed hard with Pelagianism on the one
hand, and the old doctrine of passivity on the other. For the truth is,
as before remarked, they have not a single point to balance themselves
upon between these two, only as they light upon our ground.
There is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is called.
It implies the absurdity, that power to obey God is obedience itself.
For a right exercise of our natural powers is obedience. But the right
exercise of our natural power is moral power--therefore
Our moral power to obey God is obedience!! And this will give us a clue
to the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic
saying--"You have power to obey God, if your heart is rightly disposed,"
or in short hand--"You can if you will." Now the verb _will_ here
evidently means the right _exercise_ of the natural faculties--that is,
as shown above, it means obedience. Hence the whole and proper meaning
of this notable saying is--"You have power to obey God, _if you obey
him_." "You _can_ if you _do_." This is a sort of logic which, when
scanned down to its naked character, one would get as little credit in
refuting, as its abettors are entitled to for its invention and use. And
yet this is the logic which, in its borrowed and fictitious costume has
led thousands in our land to suppose that Calvinism, as it is now
modified, is the same, or nearly the same with Methodism.
There is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with
this definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual existence,
until the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of cause and effect,
natural power effects the act of obedience; and this effect of natural
power, producing obedience, gives existence to moral power. Thus we have
power to obey, super-added to the power that has actually obeyed! If,
however, Calvinists say this is treating the subject unfairly, because
their very definition shows that they do not mean by it any thing which
_enables_ man to obey--I answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground,
that it was what they call it--_power;_ and if they do not mean power,
that is only acknowledging the position I started upon, that this
Calvinistic power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of
candour, What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What
confusion and error may not be introduced by applying common and well
defined terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are
applied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are worse
than useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct way to
bring Christian theology and Christian ministers into distrust and
reproach.
One thought more, with respect to this moral power, and I will pass on.
The doctrine of Calvinism is, if I understand it, that God controls the
natural power of men, by means of their moral power. This some of them
expressly affirm. And to show that I am not mistaken with respect to the
others, let the reader carefully attend to the following considerations.
What is it secures the fulfilment of the Divine decrees, in respect to
the elect and the reprobate? Why do not some of the reprobates, in the
use of natural ability, repent and get to heaven? Because they have not
the moral power. Why do not some of the elect, in the use of the same
ability, fall into sin and finally perish? Because God makes and keeps
them willing in the day of his power--that is, he irresistibly imparts
to them this moral power. Thus, by means of this, which he keeps in his
own hands he executes his decrees. For God, of set purpose, so
constituted this natural power, that it does not "work" without Divine
efficiency. By moral power; therefore, natural power is controlled. Now,
to say nothing here of the absurdity of efficiently and irresistibly
controlling one power by another, and yet calling that other the essence
of free agency, and the basis of obligation--look at the absurdity in
another point of view. Since moral power is the exercise of natural
power, the former must be the _effect_ of the latter. And since,
according to Calvinism, natural power is controlled by moral power, it
follows conclusively; that the effect controls its cause!! And since the
cause must act, before the effect is produced, it follows that the
effect, before it has an existence, acts upon its cause to produce its
own existence!!! This is certainly a nullification of both cause and
effect: Such are some of the difficulties of these definitions of
power--definitions as contrary to the common understandings of men, and
the common laws of language, as they are to sound philosophy--definitions
which, if they were always understood, when the terms were used; would
make the propositions in which these terms are found, sound very
differently to the common ear. I trust therefore it has been made to
appear, that "this distinction of natural and moral ability, and the
reasonings upon it, are founded on a most unphilosophical analysis of
mind and an unwarranted definition of terms," and that, after all the
efforts of the Calvinists to find out another alternative, they will be
under the necessity, if they would be consistent, either of going back
to the old Calvinistic ground, of remediless impotency, or of advancing
on to the Pelagian ground of the New Divinity; or they must accept of
the Arminian theory of gracious ability. And that the reader may be
prepared to make his selection, I will here remind him of the arguments
adduced in favour of the latter doctrine, in the last number, while I
next proceed to answer more specifically the objections that have been
urged against it, which however for an obvious reason must be withheld
until the next number.
NUMBER XII.
OBJECTIONS TO GRACIOUS ABILITY ANSWERED.
In consulting different authors to find the strongest objections that
have been urged against our doctrine of ability by grace, I have fixed
upon the doctrinal tract, already alluded to, entitled, "Man a Free
Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," as concentrating in a small
compass, and in a clear and able manner, the sum total of these
objections. I may not follow the precise order of this writer, and
possibly shall pass over some of his remarks as of minor importance; but
the substance of his reasoning shall receive such notice as I shall be
able to give it.
1. The first objection is, in substance, this: that without being a free
agent man cannot be _man;_ that free agency in fact enters into the very
definition of an intelligent, morally responsible being; and therefore
he must be such by nature.
This objection gains all its plausibility from the writer's definition
of free agency. "It consists," he says, "in the possession of
_understanding_, _conscience_, and _will_." Now we grant that the being
who possesses these is an intelligent voluntary agent. But these
faculties, as we have seen, may be disordered, so that, for all holy
purposes, they may be defective. The understanding may be darkened, the
conscience may be seared, the power to choose good may be weakened
either positively or relatively. _Liberty_ is a distinct faculty of the
soul; and as such is as subject to derangement as any other mental
susceptibility. It has, we say, suffered materially by the fall; so that
man has not his original aptitude or facility to good. And whether we
consider this as a weakness appertaining directly to the faculty of the
will itself, or whether we consider it a relative weakness, (which is
probably the more philosophical,) resulting from the loss of a moral
equilibrium in the mind, by reason of the uncontrolled sway of the
passions, in either case the primary cause and the practical result are
the same. Sin has perverted the soul, and given it an unholy declination
from righteousness to an extent which none but God can rectify. With
this view of the subject, the writer may call man a free agent if he
pleases; but he is only free to unrighteousness, and not to holiness.
Our objector was aware that his argument might be disposed of in this
way; and hence in a note he says, "Some writers speak of man, in his
natural state, as _free only_ to evil. But in what does such freedom
differ from mere instinct? With no power to do otherwise, how is he who
murders a fellow creature more criminal than the tiger, or even a
falling rock that destroys him?" The fallacy of this argument consists
chiefly in a misrepresentation of our theory. Instead of holding that
man "has no power to do otherwise," we believe, as much as this author,
that man has ample power at his command to do otherwise; but that this
power is of grace, and not of nature. Any farther supposed difficulties
growing out of this view of the subject will be explained, I trust
satisfactorily, as we advance.[6]
2. "Every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties which
constitute free agency."--Here again we must keep in view the writer's
definition. We shall find no difficulty in granting that every man is
conscious that he possesses the faculties of understanding, conscience,
and will; but that these, unaided by grace, constitute man free to a
holy choice, is denied; and this is the very question in debate. To
affirm it therefore in argument is begging the question.
It however, the author means to say, as his reasoning on this point
seems to imply, that man is conscious of being a free agent, in the
responsible sense of the term, this is also granted; but then this does
not touch the question whether this power is of grace or of nature. But,
says the writer, "When man, under the influence of grace, does choose
the good, he is not conscious of any new faculty or power to choose, but
only he uses that power in a different manner. The power or faculty
which chooses evil and which chooses good, is the same power differently
used." Whoever disputed this?--understanding by power a faculty of the
soul, as this author evidently does. We all acknowledge that the soul
gets no new faculties by grace; but we believe that the mind, in the
exercise of its natural faculties, is assisted by grace to make a right
choice. But, says the writer, in this connection, "Power to choose
between two objects is power to choose either." If the writer means to
say that power to choose either the one or the other of two objects _is_
power to choose either--this is an identical proposition: it is only
saying, _If a thing is, it is_. But if he means to say, when two objects
are presented to the mind, and the mind finds itself possessed of a
power to attach itself voluntarily to one, that therefore it has the
_same power_ to attach itself to the other, this is denied; and as no
proof is given or pretended by the objector, nothing but a denial is
necessary. On this point the founder of the Calvinistic school was
undoubtedly correct--philosophically and theologically correct--when he
said, "Man has not an equally free election of good and evil."