face, I am prepared to assert, and I think prove, that man, so far from
being conscious that he has by nature adequate power to serve God, is
conscious of the very reverse of this. What truly awakened sinner has
not a deep conviction of his utter helplessness? How many experiences of
intelligent and pious Calvinists could I quote on this point? As a
specimen take that of the Rev. David Brainerd, who stands high in the
Church, not only among Calvinists, but among all Christians who know
him. I quote a passage from his experience quoted by Dr. Griffin: "I saw
that it was utterly impossible for me to do any thing toward helping or
delivering myself. I had the greatest certainty that my state was for
ever miserable for all that I could do, and wondered that I had never
been sensible of it before."--This passage is very strong; too
unqualified, perhaps, but it is the natural language of a weak sinner,
convinced, as all must be before they _can become strong_, of their
utter helplessness without grace. How fully does such a one prove the
truth of Scripture, that "the _natural_ man receiveth not the things of
the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither _can_ he
know them, for they are spiritually discerned;" that "no man knoweth the
Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him." Hence the
necessity that "the Spirit should take of the things of Jesus Christ,
and show them unto them." Indeed, but for this darkness and weakness of
the understanding, the penitent sinner would not feel the necessity of
the agency of the Spirit: nor would it in fact be necessary. It is on
this ground that the doctrine of natural ability has led to the idea of
conversion by _moral suasion_. Thus it is evident that a man may be
conscious of having an understanding, but at the same time be as _fully_
conscious that that understanding is too dark and weak for holy
purposes, unaided by grace. The same is also true of conscience.
Experience teaches us that it often becomes languid or dead, and needs
quickening. Hence the Christian often prays--
"Quick as the apple of an eye,
O God! my conscience make;
Awake my soul when sin is nigh,
And keep it still awake."
Hence also we pray God to alarm the conscience of sinners. So also we
learn from Scripture and experience that the conscience needs purging
"from dead works," for the very object that we may be able "to serve God
with filial fear;" we learn also that we may have "defiled consciences,"
"weak consciences," "seared consciences," &c. And here let it be
noticed, that whether we understand these passages as applying to the
regenerate or unregenerate, to derived depravity or contracted
depravity, the argument against the objector will in every case apply
with resistless force, viz. it shows that this faculty of the soul may
become so disordered as to have its original healthy action impaired,
and that in this case nothing can give it its original sensibility and
strength but the God who made it. If sin does disorder the conscience,
it disordered Adam's: and if he begat children in his own moral
likeness, then his posterity had a similar conscience. And therefore it
is necessary that, as by the offence of the first Adam sin abounded, so
by the obedience of the second, grace may abound in a way directly to
meet the evil.
Let us next examine the will. Are we not conscious that this also is
weak? How repeatedly does the awakened sinner resolve and fail! until he
becomes deeply impressed that he is "without strength!" He tries to keep
the law, but cannot; for he finds that "the carnal mind is not subject
to the law of God, neither indeed _can be_." Hear his complaint! and
that we may be sure of taking a genuine case, let us select a Bible
experience from Rom. vii; "I am carnal, sold under sin." (How much
liberty to serve God has a bond slave to sin?) "That which I do I allow
not; for what I would do that I do not, but what I hate that do I." "To
will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find
not," &c. (See through the chapter.) Hear him finally exclaim, in self
despair, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Why, Saul
of Tarsus! are you not conscious that you have understanding,
conscience, and will? Why make such an exclamation? Who shall deliver
you? _Deliver yourself_. No! such philosophy and such theology were not
known to this writer, neither as a penitent sinner, nor as an inspired
apostle. "I thank God, through Jesus Christ my Lord."--"The law of the
spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law [the
controlling power] of sin and death."
Should any one say that the apostle was not describing his _conversion_
here, but his experience as a Christian believer, I reply: If any thing,
_that_ would make the passage so much the stronger for my present
purpose; for "if these things are done in the green tree, what shall be
done in the dry?" If a saint--one who has been washed and renewed--finds
nevertheless that his will is so weak as to need the continued grace of
God to enable him to do the things that he would, much more is this true
of the unrenewed sinner. If this account of the apostle's experience
means any thing, _it is as express a contradiction of the doctrine, that
we have natural strength to serve God, as could be put into words_. And
I am bold to say that this is the experience of all Christians. And it
presents an argument against the doctrine of natural ability which no
metaphysical reasoning can overthrow--not indeed an argument to prove
that we have not understanding, conscience, and will; but to show that,
having these in a disordered and debilitated state, grace is
indispensable to aid them, in order to an efficient holy choice. How
often soever the judgment may be brought to a preference of the Divine
law, it will as often be carried away by the strength of the unholy
passions until it is delivered by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.
_We are conscious therefore that we have not natural power to keep the
Divine law_.
3. But it is objected again, "that the Scriptures require us to use our
natural faculties in the service of God;" and hence the inference is,
that these faculties are adequate to this service.
It is certainly no objection to our doctrine, that the Scriptures,
dealing with man as he is, require him to use his natural powers to
serve God. With what other powers should he serve him? I again repeat
that the question is not, whether we have _mental faculties_, nor
whether man may or can serve God with these faculties, but simply
whether the command to obey is given independently of the considerations
of grace. We say it is not; and in proof refer to the Scriptures, which
give a promise corresponding with every command, and assurances of
gracious aid suited to every duty--all of which most explicitly imply,
not only man's need, but also the ground on which the command is
predicated. And with this idea agrees the alleged condemnation, so often
presented in the Scriptures: "This is the condemnation, that light has
come into the world, and men have loved darkness." "He that believeth
not is condemned already." "But they grieved his Holy Spirit, therefore
he is turned to be their enemy." "How shall we escape, if we neglect so
great salvation." These, and many other passages, show that the turning
point of guilt and condemnation is not so much the abuse of natural
powers, as the neglect and abuse of grace bestowed.
This point may be illustrated by Christ's healing the withered hand. He
commanded the man to stretch it forth. What was the ground of that
command, and what was implied in it? The ground of it was, that aid
would be given him to do it; otherwise the command to stretch forth a
palsied limb would have been unreasonable. And yet it was understood
that the man was to have no new muscles, or nerves, or bones, to
accomplish this with; but he was to use those he had, assisted, as they
would be, by the gracious power of God. So man, it is true, is commanded
to use his natural powers in obeying God; but not without Divine aid,
the promise of which is always either expressed or implied in the
command.
4. "The Scriptures ascribe no other inability to man to obey God, but
that which consists in or results from the perversion of those faculties
which constitute him a moral agent."
It is true, the Scriptures blame man for his inability--for inability
they certainly ascribe to him, and why? Because where sin abounded grace
has much more abounded. That sinners are perverse and unprepared for
holy obedience up to this hour is undoubtedly their own fault, for grace
has been beforehand with them. It met them at the very threshold of
their moral agency, with every thing necessary to meet their case. It
has dug about the fruitless fig tree. It has laid the foundation to say
justly, "What more could I have done for my vineyard?" If the sinner has
rejected all this, and has increased his depravity by actual
transgression, then indeed is he justly chargeable for all his
embarrassments and moral weakness, for he has voluntarily assumed to
himself the responsibility of his native depravity, and he has added to
this the accumulated guilt of his repeated sins.
5. It is farther objected, with a good deal of confidence, that
Arminians, after all, make man's natural power the ground and measure of
his guilt, since "no part of his free agency arises from furnished
grace, but it consists simply inability to use or abuse that grace, and
of course in an ability distinct from, and not produced by the grace."
Let us see, however, if there is not some sophistry covered up here.
Arminians do not mean that man's ability to use grace is independent of,
and separate from the grace itself. They say that man's powers are
directly assisted by grace, so that through this assistance they have
ability or strength _in those powers_ which before they had not, to make
a right choice. To talk of ability to use gracious ability, in any other
sense, would be absurd. It would be like talking of _strength_ to use
_strength_--of _being able to be able_. This absurdity, however, appears
to me justly chargeable upon the natural ability theory, taken in
connection with the Scripture account of this matter. The Scriptures
instruct us to look to God for strength; that he gives us "power to
become the children of God;" that he "strengthens with might in the
inner man, that we may be _able_," &c. This theory, however, tells us
that we have an ability back of this; an ability on which our
responsibility turns, and by means of which we can become partakers of
the grace of the Gospel. This is certainly to represent the Divine Being
as taking measures to make _ability able_, and adding power to make
_adequate strength sufficiently strong_.--Such is the work of
supererogation which this theory charges upon the Gospel, for which its
advocates alone are answerable; but let them not, without better ground,
attempt to involve us in such an absurdity. But the strongest
objections, in the opinion of those who differ from us, are yet to come.
They are of a doctrinal, rather than of a philosophical character, and
are therefore more tangible, and will, for this reason, perhaps, be more
interesting to the generality of readers. Let us have patience, then, to
follow them out.
6. _Doctrinal Objections_.--On the ground of gracious ability it is
objected that, 1. "As the consequence of Adam's fall, Adam himself and
all his posterity became incapable of committing another sin." 2. "Every
sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of Adam, has been
the effect of supernatural grace." 3. "Man needed the grace of God, not
because he was wicked, but because he was weak." 4. "The moral
difference between one man and another is not to be ascribed to God." 5.
"The posterity of Adam needed no Saviour to atone for actual sin." 6.
"This opinion is inconsistent with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There can
be no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "Is
not this grace a greater calamity to our race than the fall of Adam?"
I have thrown these objections together, and presented them in
connection to the reader, for the reason that they all rest mainly on
one or two erroneous assumptions, to correct which will be substantially
to answer them all.
One erroneous assumption of this writer is, that "there is no free
agency to do wrong, which is not adequate to do right." This writer
seems to think this a self-evident proposition, which needs no proof;
for although he has used it in argument a number of times, he has left
it unsustained by any thing but his naked assertion. This proposition
has already been denied, and an unqualified denial is all that in
fairness can be claimed by an antagonist to meet an unqualified
assertion. Our object, however, is truth, and not victory. Let me
request you then, reader, to look at this proposition. Can you see any
self-evident proof of this assertion? If the Creator should give
existence to an intelligent being, and infuse into his created nature
the elements of unrighteousness, and give to his faculties an
irresistible bias to sin, and all this without providing a remedy, or a
way for escape, then indeed all our notions of justice would decide that
such a being ought not to be held responsible. But this is not the case
with any of the sinful beings of God's moral government.--Not of the
fallen angels, for they had original power to stand, but abused it and
fell--not of fallen man, for in the first place his is not a created
depravity; but, in the case of Adam, it was contracted by voluntary
transgression when he had power to stand; and in the case of his
posterity, it is derived and propagated in the ordinary course of
generation: and in the second place, a remedy is provided which meets
the exigencies of man's moral condition, at the very commencement of his
being. This it does by graciously preventing the imputation of guilt
until man is capable of an intelligent survey of his moral condition;
for "as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto
condemnation: even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came
upon all men unto justification of life." And when man becomes capable
of moral action, this same gracious remedy is suited to remove his
native depravity, and to justify him from the guilt of actual
transgression; for "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to
forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness." It does
not appear, then, either from the obvious character of the proposition
itself; or from the condition of sinful beings, that "the same free
agency which enables a man to do wrong, will enable him also to do
right." Hence it is not true that Adam, by the fall, lost his power to
sin, or that there is now no sin in the infernal regions. It is true,
the writer tries to sustain this idea farther, by asserting that "_that_
ceases to be a moral wrong which is unavoidable; for no being can be
held responsible for doing what is unavoidable." This is little better,
however, than a reiteration of the former assumption. If the character
and conduct of a being are not _now_, and never _have been_ avoidable,
then indeed he ought not to have guilt imputed to him. But to say that
there is "no moral wrong" in the case, is to say that characters and
actions are not wrong in themselves, even where it would not be just to
impute guilt. And this is an idea which is implied also in another part
of this writer's reasoning; for he tells us that, according to the
doctrine of gracious ability "every sinful action performed in this
world, since the fall of Adam, has been the effect of supernatural
grace;" and that "man needed the grace of God, not because he was
wicked, but because he was weak," &c. This reasoning, or rather these
propositions, are predicated on the assumption, that there is no _moral
wrong_ where there is no _existing_ ability to do right: in other words,
that dispositions and acts of intelligent beings are not _in themselves_
holy or unholy, but are so only in reference to the _existing_ power of
the being who is the subject of these dispositions and acts.
But is this correct? Sin may certainly exist where it would not be just
to impute it to the sinner. For the apostle tells us that "until the law
sin was in the world;" and yet he adds, "Sin is not imputed (he does not
say sin does not exist,) where there is no law." The fact there are
certain dispositions and acts that are _in their nature_ opposite to
holiness, whatever may be the power of the subject _at the time_ he
possesses this character or performs these acts. Sin is sin, and
holiness is holiness, under all circumstances. They have a positive, and
not merely a relative existence. And although they have not existence
abstract from an agent possessing understanding, conscience, and will,
still they may have an existence abstractly from the power of being or
doing otherwise at the time. If not, then the new-born infant has no
moral character, or he has power to become holy with his first breath.
Whether the subject of this unavoidable sin shall be responsible for it,
is a question to be decided by circumstances. If a being has had power,
and lost it by his own avoidable act, then indeed he is responsible for
his impotency--his very weakness becomes his crime, and every act of
omission or commission resulting from his moral impotency, is justly
imputed to him, the assertion of our objector to the contrary
notwithstanding. Hence it is incorrect to say there is now "no guilt in
the rebellion of the infernal regions." It is of little consequence
whether, in this case, you assume that all the guilt is in the first
act, by which the ability to do good was lost, or in each successive act
of sin, which was the unavoidable consequence of the first. In either
case, the acts that follow are the measure of the guilt; and hence,
according to the nature of the mind, the consciousness of guilt will be
constantly felt, as the acts occur. For all practical purposes,
therefore, the sense of guilt, and the Divine administration of justice
will be the same in either view of the subject. The writer supposes the
case of "a servant's cutting off his hands to avoid his daily task," and
says, "this he is to blame, and ought to be punished;" but thinks he
ought not to be punished for his subsequent deficiencies. But I ask, How
much is he to blame, and to what extent should he be punished? His guilt
and punishment are to be measured, certainly, by the amount of wrong he
has done his master--that is, by every act of omission consequent upon
this act, which rendered these omissions unavoidable. Therefore he is
justly punishable for every act of omission; and you may refer this
whole punishment to the first act exclusively, or to all the acts
separately: it amounts to the same thing in the practical administration
of government and of justice. Indeed, to say that each succeeding act is
to be brought up and taken into the estimate, in order to fix the
quantum of punishment, is to acknowledge that these succeeding acts are
sins; else why should they be brought into the account at all, in
estimating guilt and punishment? Take another case. The drunkard
destroys or suspends the right use of his reason, and then murders. Is
he to be held innocent of the murder because he was drunk? or was the
whole guilt of the murder to be referred to the act of getting
intoxicated? If you say the former, then no man is to be punished for
any crime committed in a fit of intoxication; and one has only to get
intoxicated in order to be innocent. If you say the latter, then, as
getting drunk is the same in one case as another, _every_ inebriate is
guilty of murder, and whatever other crimes drunkeness _may_ occasion,
or has occasioned. Is either of these suppositions correct? Shall we not
rather say that the inebriate's guilt is to be measured by the aggregate
of crimes flowing from the voluntary act of drowning his reason? And so
in the case before us. Instead then of saying, that on our principles
"there is no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions," I
would say that their present rebellion is the fruits and measure of
their guilt. Thus we see, that a being who has had power and lost it, is
guilty of his present acts.
And by examination we shall find that by how much we enhance the
estimated guilt of the first act, it is by borrowing so much from the
acts of iniquity which follow. And will you then turn round and say, the
acts which follow have no guilt? Why have they no guilt? Evidently
because you have taken the amount of that guilt and attached it to the
first act. And does this make these acts in themselves innocent? The
idea is preposterous. As well may you say that the filthy streams of a
polluted fountain are not impure in themselves, because but for the
fountain they would not be impure; as to say that the current of unholy
volitions which unavoidably flows from a perverted heart is not unholy
and criminal.