and that he could not repent, without this, appears evident from the
Scriptural representation of the ground of man's responsibility. "If I
had not come," says the Saviour, "ye had not had sin." "This is the
condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men loved darkness
rather than light." "He that believeth not is condemned already,
_because_ he hath not believed in the only begotten Son of God."
"_Because_ I have called, and ye have refused, &c, I also will laugh at
your calamity." These and many other passages seem to imply that the
sinner is rejected on the ground of his neglecting offered grace. But if
this is the ground of his condemnation, it is not for the abuse of
natural power. I see no way for a plausible attempt even to get rid of
this argument, unless it should be attempted to raise a question
respecting the nature of this grace. It may be said that "these passages
only relate to gracious provisions, such as the atonement, the
Scriptures of truth, &c, and have no reference whatever to a gracious
influence upon the mind. The mind had sufficient strength to believe,
repent, &c, but something must be presented to believe in; and some
provision must be made to make repentance available." In reply I would
say, First, Even this shows that man could not have been saved from sin
without grace, and hence on this ground this theory would be involved in
the very difficulty which it attempts to throw upon our view of the
subject, viz., that grace is necessary to make men guilty, because none
can be guilty in a case where their course is unavoidable. But, leaving
this for another place, I would say farther, in reply to the above, that
the Scriptures do not represent this grace as confined to _external
provisions_, but on the contrary speak of it as operating upon and
influencing the mind, and that, too, in the very way for which we
contend. Look at a few Scriptural expressions, promiscuously selected,
and see how clearly they sustain our position. In the first place, to
give the argument full force, let us notice the Scripture account of
man's natural condition. He is "in darkness," "asleep," "dead," "without
strength," "sick," "deaf," "blind," "lame," "bound," "helpless;" and all
this in consequence of sin. Indeed, this is the very definition of his
sinful character and condition. If such language does not describe
_utter inability_ of the sinner to serve God, then no language can do
it. Now let us see what grace does. Its very design is to "awake the
sleeper;" to unstop deaf ears, and "open blind eyes;" to "lighten every
man;" to "strengthen with might by the Spirit in the inner man." "Christ
strengthens" the sinner, that he may "do all things." It is on the
ground that "God worketh in him to will and to do," that man is exhorted
to "work out his salvation with fear and trembling." "Thou
strengthenedst me with strength _in my soul_." But leaving farther
quotations of this kind, let the reader fix his attention on the stress
which the Scriptures lay upon the striving of the Spirit. All the
efficacy of the word is ascribed to the Spirit; and hence the apostle
declares that he "preached the Gospel, with the Holy Ghost sent down
from heaven;" that it "came, not in word, but in _power_." Indeed, "the
letter (of the word) killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." Hence the
frequent cautions not to "grieve" or "quench the Spirit." Now what, I
ask, can all these scriptures mean? Is there any plausibility in the
idea, that by such expressions nothing is meant but the general
provisions of grace in the Gospel economy? That no direct, gracious
influence of the Spirit upon the heart is intended? In fact, the new
idea of conversion by motives and moral suasion seems to be a device to
meet this very difficulty. The old Calvinists charge the advocates of
the New Divinity with holding that all the Spirit does in operating upon
the heart, is not by operating upon it directly, but indirectly _through
the truth_: which has given rise to the saying, "If I were as eloquent
as the Holy Ghost, I could convert souls as well as he." And if they do
hold this, it is no wonder, for indeed it is the legitimate consequence
of the doctrine of natural ability. They doubtless arrive at it
thus:--According to the Scriptures, man's responsibility turns on his
rejecting or improving the grace of God. That grace cannot be an
internal gracious influence upon man's moral nature, because that would
conflict with the notion of responsibility, on the ground of natural
power. These scriptures therefore can mean nothing more than that a
gracious atonement is provided, and a record of Divine truth made, and
now, in the use of his natural power, the sinner is required to judge of
and embrace this truth, which if he does, he in this sense improves the
grace of God, and is converted; but if he does it not, he grieves the
Spirit, and is condemned. Thus in the one case, if he is converted, it
is in the use of his natural power, "choosing in the view of motives;"
and in the other case, if he is not converted, it is in the use of his
natural power, refusing in view of motives. Is not this correct
reasoning? And ought not the New-Haven divines to be commended for
carrying out the system to its legitimate results? And ought not all to
follow them in this, who hold to natural ability? And yet no wonder that
they hesitate here, for cold and spiritless indeed must be that system
of religious experience that resolves the conversion of the soul into a
mere natural operation of choosing, through the influence of moral
suasion.
Leaving this system, therefore, to labour under its fatal
embarrassments, it may be seen, I think, that the system here vindicated
corresponds with the Scriptures and is consistent with itself; for it
makes man's responsibility turn upon grace improved or misimproved, and
it makes that grace an internal quickening influence, and a
strengthening energy upon the heart; and these different features of the
theory, when placed together, all seem at once to be compatible with
each other.
5. Express passages of Scripture teach the doctrine here maintained.
I need not now repeat the passages already referred to, in which the
state of the depraved heart is described, and which show, if any human
language can show it, that man is naturally "without strength." But my
object is to call the attention of the reader to some very direct and
express passages, to show that it is grace, and grace alone, that
enables the soul to do the will of God. "I can do all things," saith the
apostle, "through Christ who strengtheneth me." Query: would not the
apostle have thought it presumption to have said, I can do all things
without strength from Christ? Has he ever intimated such a sentiment in
all his writings? Does he not rather say, "We are not sufficient of
ourselves _to think any thing as of ourselves_, but our _sufficiency is
of God?_" This is the apostle's general language, and it is in perfect
accordance with the declaration of his Master, "Without me ye can do
nothing." "As the branch _cannot_ bear fruit of itself, except it abide
in the vine, _no more can ye_, except ye abide in me." "No man _can
come_ to me, except the Father draw him." "Likewise the Spirit Helpeth
our infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought." "My
grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in
weakness." "The God of all grace--stablish, strengthen, settle you."
"For this cause I bow my knees to the Father, &c, that he would grant
you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with
_might_, by his _Spirit_, in the _inner_ man," "according to the power
that worketh _in us_." It is useless to quote farther. If these passages
do not show that our strength to do good is of grace, then it appears to
me the Holy Spirit must fail of an _ability_ to communicate that idea
through human language. Will it be said that some of these passages
refer to the regenerate, and therefore are not in point to meet the case
of the unregenerate? I would ask, in reply, whether regenerating grace
takes away our natural ability? Certainly if the regenerate can neither
think nor do any thing acceptable without grace, much more do the
unregenerate need this grace to enable them to make a right choice. And
yet in the face of these most explicit scriptures, we are repeatedly
told that man has natural power to make himself a new heart!
To the foregoing considerations, I might add, if any farther proof of
our doctrine were necessary, and if this paper had not been extended so
far already, the universal experience of all Christians. This appears,
from their language, to be the experience of Bible saints, under both
the Jewish and Christian dispensations. And what Christian now living,
but feels now, and felt when he first embraced the Saviour, that the
strength to do this was from God--directly from God, through grace. Hear
his prayers--he pleads his weakness--he asks _for strength_. And what
does he mean by that prayer? Does he ask for some external accommodation
and aid? No; he wants strength, _by the Spirit, in the inner man_. And
this is the prayer of all Christians, whether they advocate this notion
of natural ability or not. The sayings and writings also of these very
advocates of natural ability, so powerful is this feeling of dependence,
are often in perfect coincidence, with the doctrine we defend. A most
striking instance of this is found in Dr. Wood's pamphlet (page 97) in
opposition to Dr. Taylor, as follows:--"The common theory (of
Calvinistic orthodoxy) leads us to entertain low thoughts of ourselves,
especially in a moral view; and to feel that we are not of ourselves
_sufficient for any thing spiritually good_, and that, for whatever
holiness we now possess, or may hereafter attain, we are dependent on
Divine grace." What stronger gracious ability do Arminians hold to, than
this? "Not of ourselves sufficient for any thing spiritually good." And
is this the common theory of Calvinism? Then Calvinism here, as in other
points, is divided against itself. Indeed one would be induced to think,
were it not for the context, either that Dr. Wood differed from his
brothers generally, on this point, or was off his guard at this moment.
But he tells us, in this very paragraph, that he "does not differ at all
from the generality of ministers, in New-England, respecting the natural
powers and faculties of man, as a moral and accountable being." But he
fears the "unqualified language" which Dr. T. "employs respecting the
natural state, the free will, and the power of man." On reading this
last passage, I confess I am at a loss to know what to say or believe of
this Calvinistic opinion of natural power. Dr. Taylor's "unqualified
language" respecting "the power of man," I take to be a frank statement
of Dr. Wood's opinion, and that of other Calvinists. Dr. T. says man has
natural power _sufficient_ to make a right choice. Does not Dr. Wood say
this? He says he does not differ from "the generality;" and it is
notorious that this is the doctrine of the generality of those
ministers. Dr. Tyler, of Portland, one of Dr. Wood's coadjutors in
opposing Dr. Taylor, says, in a sermon[5] on free salvation, "There is
no reprobation taught in the Scriptures, which destroys human liberty,
or which impairs the sinner's _natural power_. Every man is a free moral
agent. Life and death are set before him, and he is _capable_ of
choosing between them." What language can be more "unqualified" than
this? It teaches us that man has _natural power_, which renders him
_capable_ to make a right choice. It is true, Dr. Taylor, and "those who
believe with him," carry out this doctrine into its legitimate and
practical bearings. On the ground of this power, they exhort sinners "to
make themselves new hearts." One of them, as reported to me by a
preacher, went so far as to say, in a public address, that sinners ought
to be ashamed to ask the aid of the Holy Spirit to convert them, since
they had power to convert themselves. And what objection can any, who
hold to natural power to choose life, urge against this? If, as Dr.
Tyler teaches, in his "Examination of Dr. Taylor's Theological Views," a
right choice implies regeneration; and if every man is _naturally
capable_ of a right choice, as taught by this same Dr. Tyler, and the
"generality" of his brethren, then it follows conclusively, and I see
not how any sophistry can cover up the inference, these sinners have
natural power to convert themselves. Instead therefore of hypocritically
pleading their own weakness, before a _throne of grace_, and asking for
mercy and grace to help them in their time of need, they ought to be
crimsoned with shame, for their folly and hypocrisy, turn away from
their impertinent suit, throw themselves upon the _resources of nature_,
and regenerate their own hearts. If however these gentlemen believe it
impossible for sinners to do this, then, taking their whole theory
together, this power is no power, and community, up to this hour, has
been deluded by unmeaning words--words which only serve to conceal the
deformity of a theological system, which, when thoroughly examined, is
found after all, to teach that the poor reprobate has no adequate power
by nature, and receives no available aid from grace to choose salvation,
and must therefore, from the imperious necessity of his nature and
condition, go down to interminable death.
NUMBER XI.
SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
It is not pretended that there are no difficulties in our view of the
subject. What important theory is there in philosophy, politics, morals,
or religion, against which some apparently plausible objection may not
be urged? But the inquiry in each case should be, Are those objections
fatal to the system? Or are the difficulties in the proposed system
greater than in some other view of the subject? For reasonable men will
refuse to be driven into the vortex of skepticism merely because there
are some difficulties and obscurities in all subjects of faith, which
the limitations to human vision will not permit us to penetrate. To form
an enlightened comparative view in the case before us, it will be
important that we glance at the different theories on the subject of
depravity and the ground of responsibility.
1. One form in which this subject has been held is, "That the sin of
Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity
that it is impossible for his descendants to make any voluntary efforts
toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their
moral and religious character, and that faith and all the Christian
graces are communicated by the sole and irresistible operation of the
Spirit of God, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man."
This of course makes the elect entirely passive in their conversion; and
consigns the reprobate to destruction for the sin of Adam, which, it is
maintained, is imputed to him by virtue of a federal relation; or at
best gives him over to unavoidable personal and eternal condemnation for
possessing a nature which he had no agency in bringing upon himself, and
from which he has no power to extricate himself. The difficulties of
this system are so numerous and so palpable, whether it be tried by the
standard of Scripture, of reason, or of common sense, that I need not
here allude to them. Suffice it to say that they have pressed so heavily
upon the Calvinists themselves as to baffle all their ingenuity and
invention at defence, and have driven them finally into all those
changes and modifications so frequently alluded to in this controversy.
I will here say in advance that, in my opinion, this, after all, is the
strongest position Calvinism can assume. The moment its advocates depart
from this, they must either, to be consistent with themselves, verge
over into the other extreme of Pelagianism, or strike off into the
"golden mean" of Arminianism. This may be more clearly seen in the
sequel.
2. Pelagianism is another, and an opposite theory. It has a variety of
shades, called Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, &c. Its varieties, however,
relate to some minor modifications of the relation of the human family
to Adam, touching natural evil, the death of the body, and greater
exposure to temptation. But there is a uniformity in the essential part
of the theory, which is, that human nature is free from sin or guilt
until it becomes guilty by _intelligent, voluntary exercise_. The
objections to this theory are, among others, as follows. It is in direct
opposition to the Scripture doctrine of native depravity--a doctrine
which has been often and ably treated of and defended by Calvinistic
and, Arminian divines--a doctrine which is embodied in a palpable form
in every man's own experience--a doctrine which not only flashes upon
the mind of the student in every page of the history of man, but also
upon the mind of the unlettered nurse in the earliest emotions of the
infant that struggles in her arms.
Another objection to this theory is, that it gives to infants, previous
to intelligent voluntary exercise, no moral character. Hence, should
they die at this age, as multitudes doubtless do, they would not be fit
subjects either for the rewards of heaven or the pains of hell. At the
Judgment, as they will not be subjects of praise or blame, they will
neither be on the right hand nor the left, and of course will neither be
sentenced to "everlasting punishment," nor welcomed "into life eternal."
If, however, they by any means go into a state of punishment, their
sufferings will be unjust; or if they are admitted into heaven, it will
not be a salvation by grace, nor will it be preceded by regeneration,
nor will their song be, "Unto Him that hath loved us," &c. This is not
only contrary to the whole Gospel system, but also is in direct
opposition to many scriptures, especially Rom. v, 18: "Therefore, as by
the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; so, by
the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto
justification of life." It also leaves infants involved in the natural
evils of diseases, pains; and death, not only without any assignable
cause, but also in direct opposition to the cause assigned by the
apostle--"And so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."
A third objection to this theory is, that it destroys the Scripture
doctrine of regeneration. The Scripture account of this matter is, in
substance, that there is a radical change of our moral nature by the
efficient operations of the Holy Ghost. But as this doctrine makes sin
consist exclusively in exercise, so holiness must consist wholly in
exercise. The whole work, therefore, of regeneration is a mere change of
volition; and this volition is not the result of a preceding change of
moral constitution, but it is, like any other volition, produced by the
native power of the mind, under the exciting influence of motives. The
Holy Spirit, therefore, may well be dispensed with in this work. The
supernatural character of the change must be given up, and the whole
work is resolvable into a natural process. It is here worthy of remark
that this is not mere speculation. Such has, in fact, been the final
result of this theory, I believe, in every case where it has long been
defended. And hence, in close connection with this, the supernatural
efficacy of the atonement, and of course the Divine character of the
Redeemer, are found to be notions not at all essential to the system,
and somewhat discordant with the philosophy of its other parts, and are
therefore soon brought into discredit. And this, too, as may be seen by
the history of the Church, has been the practical result wherever
Pelagianism or Semi-pelagianism has been cherished. It has degenerated
into Socinianism. It may be said, then, in one word, that this doctrine
of Pelagianism does, in its teachings, tendencies, and practical
results, supplant and overthrow all the essential principles of the
Gospel system.
3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and human
responsibility is the one presented and advocated in the preceding
number. This system is presented, in part, in the very language in which
the Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as well as "Calvinists,
say that the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical
impotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants [who,
it is believed, are propagated in the moral likeness of their fallen
ancestor] to make any voluntary efforts [unassisted by grace] toward
piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral
and religious character." Thus far we go together; but this is a point
of divergency, from which we take very different directions. Instead of
going on to say "that the Christian graces are communicated by the
irresistible operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour or
concurrence on the part of man," we say that "the saving grace of God
hath appeared unto all Men;" and that this grace so enlightens,
strengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to make
that choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the soul's
salvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the man, when
he has this good will, is enabled "to work out his salvation" unto the
end. It is in this latter part of the statement that we are at issue
with the Calvinists; but we are at issue on both parts with the
Pelagians of every grade, including, of course, the advocates of the New
Divinity in our country.
To the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that we
believe that the merits of the atonement are so available for and in
behalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is not
imputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he makes
the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel;
and that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying infant is
entitled to all the promised blessings of the new covenant, and will, of
course, have wrought in him all that meetness necessary to qualify him
for the gracious rewards of the saints in glory. Thus, according to this
system, the dying infant, as well as the dying adult believer, is
sanctified by the blood of the covenant, and saved by grace.
These are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer after
truth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only alternatives
of choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, the doctrine of
_natural ability_ has been proposed as another alternative, holding an
intermediate place between the doctrines of native impotency as first
stated and of Pelagianism. And it may therefore appear to some, that I
ought, in my enumeration, to have given this as a separate and distinct
theory. My reason, however, for not doing this is, that there cannot, in
my opinion, be such a resting place between the doctrines of derived
constitutional depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any
thing more than a name--that is, in fact, an _ability_, destroys the
idea of constitutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more
than a name--that is, in fact, _constitutional depravity_, destroys the
idea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the fact
that a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic Churches who
have been most decided in preaching up natural ability, have gone over
and embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have seen, abjures the
doctrine of constitutional depravity. The New-Haven divines are
certainly gentlemen of talents and of close thought; and they have been
following up this doctrine for a number of years, and it has landed them
upon the logical conclusion that _there is no such depravity_. But we
need not trust to the conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show
that the notions of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and
sin necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists
left their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the dogma of
a natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there can be no
guilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of his nature is
unavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can have no guilt, and
by consequence _no sin_, until he is capable of an intelligent moral
choice. Again: this same theory tells us that where there is no natural
ability there is no moral character. But as the infant cannot be
reasonably supposed to have ability to put forth an intelligent holy
volition, he can have no moral character, and of course no sin.