The idea seems to have been pretty general among the troops that the

flank march was intended to shift the position of the united armies from

a strong front of Sevastopol to a weaker side, and that the attack was

only delayed until we got close to the southern defences of the town. It

was confidently expected that the assault would be soon delivered, and

the landing of the siege-train did not put an end to that hope. As days

went by, however, it began to be realized that operations of a slower

nature were to be begun, and that a siege, not an assault, was to be

undertaken. This surmise was entirely correct; though the Chiefs of the

armies still held to the belief that, when a bombardment by siege guns

had taken place, the defences would be destroyed, and the town would

then fall before the winter set in. Lord Raglan personally seems to have

been disposed to make an immediate attempt against the enemy’s lines,

without incurring this further delay; and this view was certainly shared

and supported by Sir George Cathcart, and was also advocated by Sir

Edmond Lyons. It was urged that the Russian fortifications were slight

and weak at the end of September, when the Allies got within striking

distance, and, though we should be stronger against them as soon as the

siege batteries were constructed and armed, yet the time required to do

so could be utilized by the defenders in so strengthening their works,

that the advantages of a delay would accrue to them, and to our

detriment. General Canrobert, however, was cautious, and was disinclined

to run any risks just as the supreme command was vested in him by the

French Emperor. Others, among the British advisers at head-quarters,

held the opinion that it was dangerous to deliver an attack unless

prepared by artillery fire; they feared that the attempt might cost us

500 men, which loss they hoped would not occur if a siege were opened in

the regular manner. Lord Raglan was forced to concur.

During this time the Russian commanders, left in Sevastopol after

General Menshikoff’s departure, were in a state of great depression, and

believed that the town could not hold out against a vigorous assault.

The entire garrison amounted to 35,850 men, made up of heterogeneous

elements—one single battalion of regulars (750 men), militia, gunners,

marines, seamen, and workmen. Of the latter, there were 5000—a useful

body to create a fortress, if time were granted, but useless to repel an

immediate attack. Of the sailors set free from the imprisoned fleet,

there were 18,500, of whom a fourth part only were well trained or even

decently armed.[241] The south side, moreover, does not lend itself

easily to a good defence.[242] A creek, hardly half a mile broad, called

the inner harbour, runs inland for nearly two miles from the main

roadstead, terminating in three ravines which ascend the upland of the

Chersonese. This inlet divides the town from a suburb, called the

Karabelnaya, and as both had to be held against the Allies, there was a

formidable obstacle obstructing communications between them. The French,

based on Kamiesh Bay, were opposite the western portion of Sevastopol,

that is the town itself, from the sea to the head of the inner harbour.

The British army on the right, faced Karabelnaya, and were responsible

for the ground from the inner harbour to Careenage Bay,—another inlet,

half a mile long, which also terminates in a ravine indenting the

upland,—where the enemy’s defences ended. The line held by the Russian

garrison was about four miles in length: two miles from the sea to the

head of the inner harbour, and the same distance onwards to Careenage

Bay. On the 25th of September, this long line was imperfectly defended.

On the French section, the gorges of the Quarantine and Artillery Forts

had been closed, and three bastions or redoubts had been constructed

between them and the head of the inner harbour, where the Flagstaff

bastion stood, connected, with but little interruption, by a naked

loopholed wall. On the British section, there were four works, which

were unconnected by wall or entrenchment, known as the Redan, the

Malakoff Tower, the Little Redan, and No. 1 Battery, near Careenage Bay.

Of these the Malakoff was “a mere naked tower, without a glacis, exposed

from head to foot, unsupported by the powerful batteries which were

destined to flank it, and uncovered as yet by the works which afterwards

closed up round its base.” The whole of the south side of Sevastopol,

moreover, was armed with 172 guns, of which by far the greater number

faced the French, and only a few the British position.[243]

-----

Footnote 241:

These numbers are taken from Hamley’s _War in the Crimea_ , p. 86.

Todleben says there were but 16,000 “combatants” (excluding artillery)

available for the defence of the south side (Kinglake, iii. 195).

Footnote 242:

See Map No. 6, p. 194.

Footnote 243:

Kinglake, iii. 123, etc., 194, 347. Sir Edmond Lyons urged the

immediate assault of the Malakoff hill, “then unoccupied, and advised

the immediate construction of a battery there, which would make it

necessary for the fleet to take care of themselves” (_Ibid._, iii.,

Appendix, p. 491). The capture of the Malakoff in September, 1855,

caused the immediate fall of Sevastopol.

-----

The serious and very reasonable apprehension entertained by the Russian

chiefs did not, however, prevent them from taking every measure to

fortify their position, directly they understood that the Allies were

approaching the south side in force. The greatest activity prevailed day

and night in the garrison and among the inhabitants, the women and

children taking their share of the labour, and thus the works designed

by the Russian Engineer Officer, Todleben, were rapidly thrown up. The

Anglo-French Commanders never interrupted these operations, nor did they

make any demonstrations to try the quality of the defences; they

contented themselves with distant reconnaissances, so that in a short

time the entrenchments were greatly strengthened, especially the

Malakoff, and began to look more formidable than had been the case

before; the armament also was being changed, the lighter guns giving

place to heavier ordnance drawn from the ships and arsenal.

The upland of the Chersonese, on which the Allies had established

themselves, is a sloping plain, trending from a line of hills called the

Sapuné Ridge, 500 to 700 feet high, that bounds it on the east, from the

head of the roadstead of Sevastopol to a point on the coast some four

miles west of Balaklava. The upland is scored by numerous ravines,

running from the ridge in a general north-westerly direction to the town

and coast; but on the eastern side of the ridge the ground falls

abruptly and almost in a cliff-like manner into the valley of the

Tchernaya river, which discharges itself into the roadstead. The

distance from Balaklava to Sevastopol is nearly eight miles. Of the two

roads connecting them, one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled, and,

proceeding along the Causeway Heights, formed the main communication

with the south of the Crimean peninsula; the other, a mere cart-track or

pathway, more to the south, ascended the ridge over the “Col de

Balaklava,” three miles from that place, and joined the Woronzoff road

two miles further on, on the upland.

This extended position had to be defended from attacks that were to be

feared from Menshikoff’s army. The latter, having left Sevastopol, was

in easy communication with the town and was securely posted on very

defensible ground, from whence it could advance upon the right of the

Allies or upon our base at Balaklava. Moreover, the Russians would,

before long, be strongly reinforced by troops which, as we have seen,

were hurrying without opposition from Bessarabia into the Crimea; but

when this event would take place was still uncertain. The Allies had

lost all touch with the enemy’s army they had defeated at the Alma, and

their hesitation to assault the weak defences that covered Sevastopol

directly after the flank march, was in a measure due to their ignorance

of what their opponent was doing. In reality he was then many miles

away, and had no intention of resuming hostilities without further

assistance; he was re-organizing his men, and waiting for the fresh

forces he expected from the north.[244] Only for the moment, therefore,

was the right flank of the invaders free from danger, and under no

circumstances could it have been left unguarded.

-----

Footnote 244:

Kinglake, iii. 215.

-----

The French divided their army into two Corps. The 3rd and 4th Divisions,

under General Forey, formed the besieging force, and took post before

Sevastopol, their right on the great ravine which runs into the inner

harbour, their left on Streleska Bay. The 1st and 2nd Divisions,

together with the Turkish contingent, constituted a Corps of

observation, under General Bosquet, and were entrenched on the Sapuné

Ridge, facing the east, between the Woronzoff road and the Col

previously mentioned. The whole of the British army was engaged in the

siege, before the suburb of Karabelnaya, the left on the ravine, in

communication with the French, the right upon ground not far from the

Sapuné heights. The defence of Balaklava was provided by the 93rd

Regiment (withdrawn for the purpose from the Highland Brigade), 1,000

Marines, a battery of Artillery, and a body of Turks (3,500 of whom had

been recently despatched to the Crimea, the remainder, two battalions,

being lent by the French). These troops, which included a provisional

battalion formed of 25 to 30 weakly men drawn from every regiment, were

placed under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, who was detached from

his brigade. In front of them, in the valley, was Lord Lucan’s cavalry

division.

These measures did not, however, secure the right flank of the British

siege-works. At this point, the cliff-like appearance of the heights

overlooking the Tchernaya partially disappears, and the upland falls

towards the roadstead and the river, in numerous spurs, intersected by

ravines. This broken country was known to the Allies by the name of

Inkerman, and along its foot there ran a road from Balaklava, which,

skirting the Tchernaya to the roadstead, proceeded to Sevastopol along

the southern shore of the latter. The river, moreover, was crossed at

its mouth by a bridge and a causeway, over which another road led to

Bakshiserai. This was a vulnerable point in the line adopted by the

Allies, who far from being able to invest the place they intended to

besiege, were too weak even to establish themselves upon the head of the

roadstead, and prevent an irruption from the town, or an attack from the

direction of Bakshiserai upon the right of their position. To guard this

vital point, only a strong piquet was employed, and a battery of two

guns of position, called the “Sandbag battery,” constructed to

strengthen it, had soon to be disarmed, as it was found impracticable to

support the guns by infantry. The flank, in short, was left undefended,

because the whole of the British army was required to undertake the

siege, and because Bosquet’s corps had entrenched themselves on an

inaccessible position on the ridge, where no enemy could attack them,

and where they could neither give efficient support to the defences of

Balaklava, nor be of any immediate use should an onslaught be made on

the unguarded spurs of Inkerman. In other words, we suffered from the

effects of a divided command.[245]

-----

Footnote 245:

Kinglake, iii. 291; Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , 124.

-----

We left the Guards Brigade, on the 26th of September, near Balaklava, at

the end of the flank march. For the first few days there was little

done. “Troops passive and grape-gorging, with the exception of strong

fatigue parties engaged in the slow and laborious office of landing the

siege guns from the transports, which now cram the harbour of

Balaklava.”[246] On the 2nd of October, the First Division marched to

the front, and about this time the British army was thus bivouacked

before Sevastopol. The Second Division on the right, with the First in

support, nearly a mile in rear; next came the Light Division, separated

from them by the Careenage Ravine. These three divisions manned the

British Right Attack. The Fourth and Third Divisions were posted

south-west of Cathcart’s Hill, and continued the line to the west, in

rear of the Left Attack, to the ravine, on the other side of which lay

the French siege corps, near Mount Rodolph. The work of bringing up the

battering train continued without interruption, and some heavy guns from

the ships were drawn to the batteries by sailors, who, forming a brigade

under command of Captains Lushington and Peel, took part in the

operations which were soon to commence.

-----

Footnote 246:

September 29th (_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 177).

-----

It was fortunate that tents were at last issued, on the 5th of October;

for the men, having been constantly bivouacked since the disembarkation

at Old Fort, nearly three weeks before, were again attacked by sickness.

Cholera reappeared on the day after the troops stood on the upland plain

before Sevastopol, and an Officer of the Coldstream, Captain Jolliffe,

died of it on the 4th. It seems that the delay in providing shelter,

even of an indifferent nature, was due to the want of transport, which

still failed us; nothing apparently could induce our Government to give

the army this indispensable requirement. The boon of again having a tent

to cover them in the chilly autumn nights of the Crimea, was keenly

appreciated by Officers and men; but comfort is a relative term, and,

judged from the ordinary standpoint, the slight shelter which was

supplied, was inadequate and insufficient.

On the 4th, Captain MacKinnon and a small detachment of convalescents,

who had been left behind at Varna, reached the Battalion.

The constant labour which the Russians devoted to the improvement of

their fortifications became apparent to regimental Officers, as they

anxiously scanned the enemy’s works during their leisure time.

“Within the last few days,” writes Colonel Wilson, on the 7th, “an

amazing change has taken place in the aspect of the town. The base of

the Great Tower (the Malakoff) is now 'shored up' with earthworks; and

defences of similar construction—some far advanced towards

completion—are being thrown up along the entire line commencing at

Careenage Bay on the east, and terminating near the cemetery on the

west [near the Flagstaff bastion]. Hence, in the course of a week, if

not sooner, Sevastopol will have assumed the likeness of a vast

entrenched camp.”

On the same day, it seemed to leak out, that “the place looked so much

stronger than had been anticipated, that perhaps we might not take it

this winter;” and it was devoutly hoped that precautionary measures

would be taken in time, against “the onslaughts of Generals Rain, Frost,

and Snow, no matter how great soever may be head-quarter confidence in

the overwhelming efficacy of our opening fire.”[247]

-----

Footnote 247:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 191, etc.

-----

It was, however, still officially considered that the projected

bombardment would shatter the Russian defences, and that the speedy

capture of Sevastopol would be the result. This opinion was also shared

by many of the Officers of the British army, and every nerve was

strained to make the operation a success. On the 10th we broke ground,

and began the construction of three batteries. Two, known as Chapman’s

and Gordon’s, called after the Engineer Officers in charge, were some

1400 yards from the Redan, and the trench connecting them became

eventually the first parallel. Chapman’s battery, 41 guns, was placed on

Green Hill, between two ravines that descend into the inner harbour,

viz. the valley of the Shadow of Death and the Woronzoff ravine.

Gordon’s battery, 26 guns, stood on Mount Woronzoff (also called

Frenchman’s Hill), between the Woronzoff and the Docks ravines. On the

next hill, between the Docks and the Careenage ravines, the Victoria or

Lancaster battery was built, armed with 6 guns (5 of the Lancaster

pattern), more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s lines. The French began

their siege-works on the 9th, on Mount Rodolph, and placed 53 guns in

battery, 1000 yards from the enemy’s fortifications. Thus the Allies had

126 guns in position, not counting the field artillery. The enemy had

118,—64 facing the French, and 54 the British,—besides 223 of lesser

calibre.

The Battalion, in common with the other troops stationed before

Sevastopol, took their full share in the construction of these

batteries, by supplying working parties and covering guards to resist

sorties. The operation was new to all ranks, who had received little

training in these special duties, the greater part of which had to be

performed at night. But any confusion incidental to the circumstances of

the case speedily passed away, and from start to finish the men stuck to

their work, and did it thoroughly, under a heavy and unreturned fire,

that constantly poured upon them from dawn to dark from the Russian

lines.

“On the 14th October,” Colonel Wilson writes, “the duties grew very

hard. For myself I have been at work four nights out of five, and so

have many others.... But in this respect, of course, the rank and file

are the principal sufferers. To what insignificance do our hardships

sink when compared with theirs! In the case of the private, downright

manual labour—picking, shovelling, dragging, lifting—is superadded to

watching. In his instance, no little dainties ... vary the nauseous

salt junk, and the wish-wash of green coffee. In his instance, the

tatters—which were a uniform once—only cover the wearer’s nakedness

imperfectly: that ragged patchwork has long ceased to combat with the

wind and rain.... Oh! what painful illustrations of the cheap and

nasty principle, are those filthy dangling shreds and bursted seams!

How one’s heart yearns toward the unflinching British 'common soldier'

so sternly superior to privation, so proudly reckless of his life!

Brave heart! unconquerable soul! Crimean hero, whom we cannot glorify

too much!”[248]

-----

Footnote 248:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 211.

-----

The excellence of the work performed by the Brigade is thus described in

a recent publication, already alluded to:—

“The spade work of the soldiers varied considerably, but from the

Royal Engineers' journal of work done in Bulgaria, and from what I saw

early in the siege, that of the Guards Brigade was undoubtedly amongst

the best. This may have arisen from the memory of instruction at

Chobham camp in 1853, or from regimental pride, or from both

causes.... By the end of August the infantry had made six thousand

gabions and seven hundred fascines; for every one of these passed as

serviceable, the soldiers received 14_d._ and 7_d._ respectively,

which included the labour of cutting and carrying the brushwood which

was close at hand. In the Guards Brigade each section of three men

produced three gabions daily; in the Line the average did not exceed

one gabion daily per section. Throughout the long ensuing siege, the

working parties in the trenches did well or badly in proportion to the

efficiency of the Officers. When they sat and smoked, paying no

attention to the men, the sergeants followed suit, and but little

progress was made. On the other hand, when the Officers, keen and

sympathetic, knew how to get cheerful work out of their men, the

spirits of the directing Engineer Officer rose considerably.”[249]

-----

Footnote 249:

Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_, p. 87. As the training at Chobham

camp lasted but a short time, and amounted in reality to very little,

and as the work performed in Bulgaria and before Sevastopol afforded

more practical instruction than could possibly have been given at

Chobham, does it not seem probable that the excellence, attributed to

the Brigade, arose much more from what is called regimental pride,

from the character of their system, and from the efficiency of their

Officers, than from any other cause?

-----

The following extracts from Colonel Tower’s diary, give, moreover, an

idea of the nature of some of the duties discharged by the men, and the

conditions under which they were performed:—

“_Oct. 14th._ Paraded at 3 a.m. for a covering party in rear of

Chapman’s battery. The enemy annoyed us very much all day, throwing

shot and shell, but, by dint of creeping about and keeping well under

the parapet, we all got safe back to camp at 6 a.m., after

twenty-seven hours in the trenches.

”_Oct. 16th._ On covering party in rear of the sailors' battery. There

was a large heap of stones, two to three feet high, behind which we

laid down as flat as we could; about 10 a.m. a red flag was hoisted on

the Redan, and immediately every gun they had mounted commenced

pitching into our battery, ... for about half an hour, evidently to

try their range. Every sort of missile they could cram into their guns

came whistling over us and knocking our heap of stones about. We lay

as still as mice, and the shot rattled about like hail, and went

bounding away over the hill in our rear towards the camp; Goodlake and

self, Francis Baring and Bob Lindsay were our party. In the middle of

the _jeu d’enfer_, old Gordon the Engineer appeared walking over the

open towards the battery, the shot striking the ground all round him;

he never quickened his pace, and seemed perfectly unconscious of his

imminent danger: but fortune favours the brave, and although he ought

to have been struck fifty times, he coolly walked up the hill with the

utmost indifference.”

In preparation for the bombardment, fixed to commence at 6.30 a.m. on

the 17th of October, the troops were held in readiness in their camps

to fall in at a moment’s notice, arrangements were made in case the

army was ordered to move forward to assault the Russian position,

scaling ladders, tools, etc., were collected, and a body of

sharpshooters was specially organized. In the First Division, the

latter were placed under Captain Goodlake of the Coldstream, whose

gallant services soon earned for him the Victoria Cross.[250] But the

first onslaught on Sebastopol failed to produce the results that were

expected from it. The Allies found the enemy placed in far other

circumstances than had been the case when they first presented

themselves before the south side on the 26th of September. At that

date the advantages gained by the battle of the Alma had not been

entirely dissipated: the Crimean field army, under Menshikoff, was

beaten, and was far away from the scene of hostilities, refitting and

awaiting reinforcements; the garrison of Sevastopol—composed of a mere

medley of details, imperfectly armed, and many of whom could scarcely

be called “combatants”—was physically and morally weak; the

entrenchments were slight and incomplete; the guns to oppose an attack

were light. On the 17th of October a great change had been effected.

The forces from Bessarabia were arriving; the Russians had been able

to reconnoitre the valley of the Tchernaya, and to threaten our

exposed right flank and our base of operations; they spared as many as

25,000 of the regular army to strengthen the garrison of the town; the

_morale_ of the latter had been raised; the defences were much

improved—they assumed the appearance of genuine fortifications; the

armament was greatly increased, and had been rendered formidable.

-----

Footnote 250:

By _First Divisional Order_, Oct. 16th, ten men and a Non-commissioned

officer from each battalion, good shots, volunteers preferred, were

selected to act as sharpshooters, under a Captain and a Lieutenant of

the Brigade of Guards, and a Lieutenant of the Highlanders. “The

sharpshooters will have to approach within 400 or 500 yards of the

enemy’s works, there to establish themselves in extended order (by

single men) under cover of anything which may present itself to afford

protection. They will endeavour to improve their cover behind any

obstacle by scraping out a hollow for themselves in the ground, and

they will carry with them provisions so that they will be enabled to

remain, being once under cover, for many hours (even twenty-four)

without relief. Whilst so established, they will endeavour to pick off

the enemy’s artillerymen in the embrasures. The approach of the

sharpshooters to the spot they must occupy, must be rapid, in a

scattered order; each man acting for himself, and exercising his

intelligence to the utmost of his ability. Each man will select the

spot which suits him best, and be guided only in that choice by the

cover he may find and the command it may give him of an effectual fire

into the embrasures.” It is to be noted that the Officers ordered to

perform this important duty were in no way “selected” for it, but were

taken by “roster.” In Crimean days, as well as during the Peninsular

war, it was considered that all Officers were fitted to discharge the

ordinary duties which their profession required of them.

-----

Nevertheless, the operation was an affair of great importance and

magnitude. The Allied fleets took part in it in full force, though it

was not possible for them to produce any real effect; for the land

defences were out of their reach, and the sea forts were extremely

strong. Still all the artillery the invaders could muster, discharged

their thunders upon the fortifications which covered the south side of

the town and the entrance of the roadstead. The French, subjected to a

hotter and closer fire than we, suffered severely, and between ten and

eleven in the morning, two explosions having occurred in their

batteries, their guns were silenced. The British, on the other hand,

were very successful. Directing their fire upon three of the enemy’s

works, they inflicted considerable damage on the Flagstaff battery,

silenced the Malakoff, and almost demolished the Redan, the salient of

which was blown to pieces by the explosion of a powder magazine. The

defences of the Karabelnaya were completely paralysed, an immediate

assault was expected, and the troops to oppose it being demoralized,

fell back in confusion.[251]

-----

Footnote 251:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 105.

-----

N^o. 6.

[Illustration:

SEVASTOPOL

_October 17^{th} 1854_

_By kind permission from_ Kinglake’s Crimea.

A.D. Innes & C^o. London

]

But no attack took place. The French were unable to advance against the

lines which had silenced their siege guns. It was too much to ask them

to allow us to go on, under cover of their friendly co-operation and

support. The enemy, in a word, gained by the Anglo-French alliance, and

the common interests were obscured under the pressure of inter-national

courtesy. Thus a severe strain was still to weigh down the resources of

the two Great Powers of Europe; an insignificant fortress was to baffle

their united efforts; their armies were to be destroyed on the upland of

the Chersonese by cold and famine; and, while our British Engineers

alone could survey with complacency the results of their skill,

evidenced by the speedy destruction of the defences around Karabelnaya,

the Allies were not one whit nearer the accomplishment of their object

than they had been before the bombardment began. Still the Chiefs of the

invading forces were sanguine that their fire at last would tell, and

would allow them to storm the place together, at points where each had

breached the defences opposed to them; but in this expectation they

were, as they deserved to be, disappointed. The bombardment was

continued on the 18th, and the British batteries alone took part in

it—for the French were not ready, and were improving their earthworks

after the disaster of the day before,—not, however, against the wreck

which we had created by the evening of the 17th, but on renewed and

freshly armed defences that were repaired in the night by the ceaseless

energy of the garrison, whose labours were undisturbed by any

countermove on our part. Again, on the 19th, the united artillery fired

on the hostile batteries with complete success on our side, but once

more the French guns were silenced. The bootless bombardment continued

till the 25th, ever with the same result: the lines covering the

Karabelnaya were open to attack, but the forts opposite Mount Rodolph

were unsubdued. Thus no advantage was gained, or indeed could be gained,

under the rule which the Allies had imposed upon themselves to the

benefit of the enemy, who, not slow to perceive the situation, took

every advantage therefrom. A great display, therefore, was all that took

place, which cost the Russians nearly 4000 men, while the Allies lost

less than a fourth part of that number.

As the fire proceeded from day to day, the attention of the First and

Second Divisions was directed to their right flank.

“Started an hour before daybreak on outlying piquet on the heights to

our rear, and was kept the whole day in a state of excitement by a

large force of Russians, cavalry and artillery, in the plain below;

some took up a position on the hills in front of Balaklava, and some

remained near where we bivouacked at the Tchernaya bridge, evidently

threatening Balaklava. Some of them advanced towards us, and brought

some artillery and opened fire. Presently a battery of ours unlimbered

in the bushes by my piquet, and got ready for action; the 2^{me}

Zouaves were also sent, and there was a report that the enemy was

advancing up the Inkerman gorges; in short, we thought we were in for

a scrimmage. But after a short time the Zouaves and artillery were

sent back to their quarters, and I was left face to face with the

Ruskis. After dark their fires blazed all over the plain, but nothing

occurred. I was with my sentries all night. They evidently intend

making an attack on Balaklava when we assault the town, which

doubtless must take place soon.”[252]

-----

Footnote 252:

Tower, _Diary_ , Oct. 18th.

-----

The enemy, seen upon this occasion, was again observed by a piquet of

the Coldstream on the 20th, among the Inkerman ruins (beyond the

Tchernaya), mounting guns. Towards evening he opened fire, and directed

his aim upon the camp of the Second Division, until the Sandbag battery,

previously mentioned, was constructed, and armed with two 18-pounders.

The British fire soon drove away the guns from the ruins, but the

18-pounders had to be removed to a less exposed position.

Nine Officers reached the Crimea and joined the Battalion on the 17th,

the first day of the bombardment, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Newton, Cowell,

and Halkett (who had left Bulgaria on promotion in July),

Lieut.-Colonels Mark Wood, Dudley Carleton, and Lord A. Charles FitzRoy,

and Lieutenants Heneage, Hon. W. Amherst, and Greville.

It should be stated here, that, on account of the war, the Regiment

received an augmentation, first on the 13th of February, and again a

little later. The establishments were as follows:—

Feb. 1st, Mar. 1st, Aug. 1st,

1854 ” ”

Colonel. 1 1 1

Lt.-Colonel. 1 1 1

Majors. 2 2 2

Captains. 16 16 20

Lieutenants. 20 20 24

Ensigns. 12 12 16

Adjutants. 2 2 2

Qr.-Masters. 2 2 2

Surgn.-Major. 1 1 1

Surgeon. 1 1 1

Assist.-Surgns. 2 3 4

Solicitor. 1 1 1

Sergeants. 72 88 118

Drummers. 37 37 46

Rank and File. 1280 1600 2200

2 Battns. 2 Battns. 2 Battns.

. 16 Cos. 16 Cos. 20 Cos.

Of the twenty companies, twelve were at home and eight at the seat of

war, but the latter were strong companies on paper, and the former weak;

it was further ordered that the service Battalion was not to bear upon

its strength less Officers than were required for 10 companies, the

Adjutant not included.[253] Hence the two mounted Officers who, before

the receipt of this order, were posted to companies in the field, were

placed upon the 1st Battalion establishment, and nominally belonged to

companies at home.

-----

Footnote 253:

_Brigade Order_ , London, Sept. 5, 1854.

-----

During the first few days of the operations against Sevastopol there

were several casualties among the Officers of the Grenadier Guards. On

the 16th, Captain Rowley was killed, and, two days later, the same fate

overtook Colonel Hood, the gallant Commanding Officer who had greatly

distinguished himself by his coolness and intrepidity at the Alma. The

losses of the Coldstream at this moment were happily less. It was not

till the 20th, that the first man was wounded in the trenches; but next

day, Lord Dunkellin was unfortunately captured. Commanding a working

party without arms—for at that time the men told off to dig were sent to

the front unarmed,—he lost his way in the darkness, and, stumbling upon

a piquet which he thought was English, he went forward by himself to ask

where he was. As it happened, he found himself within the enemy’s lines,

and was taken; his men, however, luckily escaped under cover of the

night.[254]

-----

Footnote 254:

This incident does not appear to have modified the rule by which

working parties were sent to the trenches at night, across an unknown

and intersected country, without arms or an escort, if we may judge

from the following General After Order of the 22nd: “The Commander of

the Forces directs that all parties, whether armed or on fatigue,

which may be ordered to the front, may be accompanied by a Staff

Officer competent to guide them.” On the 11th of November, however, it

was ordered that all working parties were to take their arms with them

(_First Divisional Pass Order_ ).

-----

Prince Menshikoff so far recovered from his defeat on the 20th of

September, that he occupied the hills in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie

Farm, and took possession of the roads leading therefrom into the valley

of the Tchernaya on the 7th of October. He had good reason to be proud

of the achievements of the garrison of Sevastopol, and to rejoice at his

own singular good fortune. The town was fast growing into a powerful

fortress, sufficiently strong to resist any sudden assault, and likely

for months to occupy the energies of a far more numerous force than

stood before it at that time. He himself was placed in an unassailable

position. Secure as regards his communications with the interior of

Russia and with Sevastopol, he not only received without difficulty the

fresh forces that were hurrying to his assistance; but he also hemmed

the invaders into a small corner of an exceedingly inhospitable country,

restricted their enterprise, and threatened them with destruction in

case a reverse were to happen to them. History, indeed, fails to record

any great genius in this Russian General, nor were his troops of that

high order to account for the immense advantages he gained at this

moment. He was simply fortunate in the Governments and in the leaders of

his antagonists, who, unable to combine to carry out any single plan,

continually changed their intentions, until a surprise on the north side

was converted into a lengthy siege (without investment) of the south

side.

The Bessarabian reinforcements began to reach Simferopol early in

October, and on the 15th, General Liprandi arrived there. A few days

later it was determined to make an attack on our base at Balaklava, with

some 25,000 troops (22,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 78 guns)

commanded by that Officer. The attack took place on the 25th, a day

immortalized in our military history by the bravery of the British

cavalry, particularly by the charge of the Light brigade, “one of the

most brilliant ever remembered in the annals of war,” though it resulted

in the destruction of that corps.[255]

-----

Footnote 255:

General G. Klapka, _The War in the East, from the year 1853 till July,

1855_ (translated by Lieut.-Colonel A. Mednyansky), p. 96 (London,

1855).

-----

Balaklava was covered by two defensive lines, the outer and the inner.

The outer line, more than two miles in length, running along the

Causeway Heights and near the Woronzoff road, had the support of a few

small earthworks, “mere scratches with the spade, a donkey might have

been ridden into some of them,” armed with only nine 12-pounder guns in

all, and occupied by about two battalions of Turks. The inner line, near

Kadikeui, was 3000 yards in rear, and was held by the 93rd Regiment, a

few invalids, the Marines, and the rest of the Turks. The Russians,

advancing in force at dawn on the 25th, brought 30 guns (some of them of

heavy calibre) against the earthworks on the Causeway Heights,—which

were isolated, entirely unsupported, and commanded by neighbouring

ground,—and captured two of them on the right of the line, after a

stubborn resistance; a third soon after fell into their hands. They then

pushed forward their cavalry, of which four squadrons reconnoitred

towards Kadikeui; the latter came within range of the 93rd, drawn up in

line, who received them with a volley, and with such determination that

they quickly wheeled about and fled to the rear. The rest, a solid

column, nearly 3000 strong, supported by 32 guns, moving in somewhat the

same direction, came suddenly close to the British Heavy cavalry

brigade, who, without the slightest hesitation, charged, and in a few

moments routed them, and sent them back in confusion, past the front of

the Light brigade. Unfortunately Lord Cardigan did not fall upon the

flying mass and complete their discomfiture; so they got away down the

valley that lay between the Fediukhine and Causeway heights, both of

which were held by the enemy’s infantry and artillery, and took up a

position about a mile and a quarter away, behind some Russian guns. And

now “some one blundered,” and the Light brigade made their famous

charge, over this dangerous ground, flanked on each side by well-posted

artillery, straight into the guns and the cavalry at the end of the

valley. The story of this gallant deed is well known. The Russian

gunners and cavalry were swept away, and forced to retreat before the

impetuous onslaught of our weak squadrons, but the brigade was broken,

and indeed destroyed. It numbered 670 sabres at the commencement of the

action, and at the conclusion its mounted strength was only 195. The

enemy was quite unable to cut off the retreat of the remnants of our

light horse, as they rode back after their desperate expedition, very

few prisoners were taken, and the French, making a spirited and

successful charge upon the Fediukhine Heights, prevented the Russians

from harassing our men from that quarter, as they emerged from the

deadly and unequal conflict.

Heavy firing had been heard in the British camps before Sevastopol at

dawn, and, when the serious nature of the attack was perceived, orders

were sent to the First and Fourth Divisions to march down to meet the

danger. Two of Bosquet’s infantry brigades, as well as the French

cavalry, which had by this time reached the seat of war, were also

brought to the field of battle. When our troops got to the Sapuné Ridge,

and looked on the plain beneath, they saw with breathless interest the

first encounter between the contending horsemen.

“The Heavy cavalry charge,” says Colonel Tower, “was just going on as

we came in sight of the Turkish redoubts; we could indistinctly see

the grey horses and bearskin caps [the Scots Greys] swallowed up in a

dense mass of grey-coated Russians, their sabres flashing in the

sun.”[256]

-----

Footnote 256:

_Diary_ , Oct. 25th. Readers of the late Sir Edward Hamley’s _War in

the Crimea_ , p. 113, will remember the vivid description which he has

given of this brilliant cavalry charge, as it appeared to him and to

the troops (among them the Coldstream) standing on the heights above.

-----

The subsequent charge of the Light brigade was not so apparent to our

infantry:—

“The threatened attack of Balaklava,” continues Colonel Tower, “turned

out to be nothing; and when it appeared to be all over, the Light

cavalry started on their suicidal expedition, we could see them over

the line of hills of the Turkish redoubts, and then they vanished to

be seen no more. When the remnants returned, I got leave to fall out,

and walked up to the Turkish redoubts, and almost the first thing I

saw was poor Nolan’s body, his chest knocked to pieces by a round

shot; the whole plain was dotted about with men and horses, some

struggling on the ground, some loose horses galloping about without

riders; a great many Russian cavalry were lying about where the Heavy

cavalry had driven them back,—our men had used their sabres with good

effect.”

Despite the glorious conduct of our troops upon this occasion, we lost a

good deal and gained very little. The eastern portion of an unsupported

advanced line of redoubts on the Causeway Heights was captured by the

weight of numbers, and the outer defences of Balaklava were occupied by

the enemy; but his further movements towards Kadikeni were crushed by a

handful of our Heavy cavalry, and our Light brigade proved their

superiority over him by a useless feat of daring which is unparalleled

in warfare.

Thus, though Balaklava was still safe, we were deprived of the use of

the Woronzoff road as a means of communication between our base of

operations and the upland, and we had only the unmetalled path which led

over the Col to rely on. We shall see that this result of the battle of

the 25th was a serious one for the British army besieging Sevastopol.

There was, indeed, some idea of turning Liprandi out of the Causeway

Heights; but had it been definitely formed, the infantry would have

descended from the ridge on which they stood by the Woronzoff road,

whence the object would have been more easily accomplished. Instead of

this, however, they were moved onwards to the Col, and remained during

the day covering Balaklava. No forward operation was undertaken, and it

was probably considered that we had not sufficient troops to hold the

outer line efficiently. So the main road was placidly given up to the

enemy, and at nightfall the Guards Brigade and the Fourth Division

returned to camp, while the remaining two Highland regiments were left

at Balaklava to strengthen the garrison at that important place.[257]

-----

Footnote 257:

The battle which deprived us of our principal road, cost the Allies—

English, 40 Officers; 386 sergeants, rank and file; 426 total

French, 2 ” 50 ” ” 52 ”

Turks, 9 ” 250 ” ” 259 ”

———

Total, 737 men,

and 409 horses. The Russians lost some 600 men, of whom the greater

number fell before the British Heavy cavalry. The latter suffered but

little in that superb charge, though they had many casualties when

shielding the recoil of the Light brigade (_Our Veterans, etc._, p.

255).

-----

The vulnerable point on the right flank of the British position has

already been adverted to, also the position taken up by the French Corps

of observation under General Bosquet. We have seen that this force could

not help the Allies to retain possession of the Woronzoff road, nor

could it, as we shall see, secure the right of their siege-works from

serious attack. The first attempt to disturb this flank was made at noon

on the 26th, when a force emerged from Sevastopol, of which 700 men

advanced up the Careenage Ravine, while the remainder, 4300 men and four

guns, crossed that obstacle, and directed themselves upon Shell Hill, in

front of the camp of the Second Division. The former column was met by

the sharpshooters of the Guards, under Captain Goodlake, who, drawing up

his insignificant detachment behind a ditch that ran across the ravine,

held the hostile column in check, and barred its further advance,—even

capturing several prisoners,—until, a little later, some men of the

Rifles appearing upon the scene, the enemy was driven back.[258]

-----

Footnote 258:

This was one of the acts of gallantry performed by Captain Goodlake

during the war, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

-----

The main column, endeavouring to reach Shell Hill, met the outposts of

the Second Division, some 250 strong, who, instead of retiring before so

superior a force, stubbornly resisted it, and held it at bay, until,

outflanked and pressed back by numbers, they retreated slowly and in

good order. But the Russians gained nothing, for the divisional

artillery, reinforced by a battery of the First Division, had time to

come into action, and when the enemy appeared upon the crest of the

hill, he was met by the fire of our guns, which speedily repulsed him,

and made him retire precipitately to the fortress, pursued by the

piquets, and under fire of the Lancaster battery. In this combat, where

the Russians acknowledge the loss of 270 men and 80 prisoners, as

against 12 killed and 77 wounded on our side, Lieutenant Conolly, of the

49th Regiment, greatly distinguished himself. He was promoted Brevet

Major, obtained the Victoria Cross, and a commission in the Coldstream.

The Brigade was not employed in this action; they stood in reserve out

of musketry fire, and watched the fight, ready for emergencies, but

their services were not required.[259]

-----

Footnote 259:

The Russians appear, upon this occasion, to have understated both

their strength and their losses.

-----

This sortie was intended, according to Todleben, to distract our

attention from Balaklava; and it may well be that Liprandi, knowing its

importance, was under grave apprehension lest the Woronzoff road might

be wrested from him. It has also been thought that the Russians were

endeavouring to effect a lodgment on Shell Hill, preparatory to the

attack they meant soon to deliver on our right flank at Inkerman, and

this is very likely. But, if so, they had an inadequate force to

accomplish such a purpose, and by this time they had ample experience of

the fighting qualities of the British troops, who, man for man, were

immensely superior to their own. Indeed we had every need of the

sterling bravery of our gallant soldiers, for a great crisis was at

hand. The strength of our Crimean army was becoming alarmingly weakened,

not only by the wear and tear of active service and losses incurred on

the field, but through the unusual amount of sickness that prevailed,

and the arduous nature of the campaign in which we had become engaged.

In the Coldstream there were 190 more admissions into hospital in

October than there had been in September.[260] On the other hand, the

actions of the 25th and 26th increased the confidence of our men when

opposed to the enemy. They felt themselves more than a match for him if

they could only get leave to be at him; but they little knew how severe

the trial would be that awaited them in a very few days.[261]

-----

Footnote 260:

Wyatt, p. 28.

Footnote 261:

Colonel Wilson, describing the excellent tone that prevailed among our

men at this time, notes the behaviour of the wounded on the 26th, as

they limped or were carried on stretchers past the Brigade. He says it

was “wonderful, the very reverse of what might have been looked for.

Far from drooping in spirits, most of them were in buoyant spirits.

Sometimes a fine youth with a badly fractured arm, hurraed lustily as

he passed; another, whose thigh a round shot had smashed, would—faint

as he was—raise himself up a little on his litter, and brandish his

rifle triumphantly. I observed that nearly every man, whether slightly

or sorely hurt, still clutched his musket.... A bullet through the

heart alone conquers such soldiers” (_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 266).

-----

On the night of the 28th, many of our camps were alarmed, and believed

they were about to be attacked. The outposts watching the plain of

Balaklava heard cavalry approaching, and a great deal of firing in the

dark took place—the sentries blazing away whenever they saw, or fancied

they saw, the phantom horsemen, “who seemed perpetually galloping, but

never coming any nearer. Staff Officers kept arriving to know what the

commotion was about. Of course I could give them no information.” A

regiment of Zouaves and the guns in a French redoubt poured volleys into

imaginary columns coming to storm our position. “The Russian drums all

along the Fediukhine heights beat to arms; and I sat down quietly on a

stone in advance of my sentries, and could hear nothing more, but made

up my mind Liprandi intended to give us a benefit in the morning.” When

the morning broke the mystery was cleared. It was found that a number of

Russian horses had stampeded from their lines, and that no enemy was

near. A hundred or more were caught, and served to mount a few of our

cavalry, while the remainder scampered back across the plain to their

legitimate owners.[262]

-----

Footnote 262:

Tower, _Diary_ , Oct. 28th.

-----

The weary monotony of the siege continued after the sortie of the 26th,

the troops being largely employed in the trenches, constructing

approaches or batteries, or acting as covering guards, generally under a

heavy fire from the fortress in front of them.

“The enemy is barricading the streets, and we shall have to fight

every inch of ground. I fear we have a great many of our sorrows to

come, more especially wintering here; too horrible to contemplate! An

army of 30,000 men in our rear with a large force of cavalry, and

Sevastopol, which seems to be getting stronger every day, in our

front. Any number of general actions is better than a siege. In the

trenches for twenty-six hours at a time (we used to mount now at 2

a.m., with nothing but biscuit and salt pork to eat), shells

constantly troubling one’s life, and showers of dirt covering you

every time a shot strikes the parapet.”[263]

-----

Footnote 263:

_Ibid._ , Oct. 27th.

-----

The French were sapping up towards the Flagstaff Battery with the

greatest energy. They were becoming strong enough to withstand the guns

of the garrison, and to retrieve their failure of October 17th-25th.

Another bombardment, to be followed by an assault, was contemplated, and

the allied Commanders had full confidence that this time, at least, the

effect would be decisive. They even agreed to meet on the 5th of

November to arrange the details of their projected operation. But

neglected opportunities too often rise in judgment against a General in

the field. The 5th was the day of Inkerman, and all our plans were

completely frustrated.

CHAPTER IX.

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

Large Russian reinforcements reach the Crimea—Position and strength of

the enemy; of the Allies—Description of the field of

Inkerman—Commencement of the battle, 5th of November—The progress of

the first part of the fight—The Guards Brigade advance to the scene

of action—The struggle round the Sandbag battery—Arrival of the

Fourth Division under General Cathcart—The manœuvre of the

latter, and its failure—The arrival of the French—Successes of the

British artillery—Repulse of the Russian attack; the retreat of the

enemy; there is no pursuit—Operations of the garrison of Sevastopol

and of the Russian force in the Tchernaya Valley during the

day—Great losses incurred on both sides—Reaction among the soldiery

after the battle.

The Russian reinforcements which, as we have seen, began to arrive in

the month of October, continued their advance upon the Crimea, so that

early in November the hostile forces at the seat of war amounted, all

told, to more than 120,000 men capable of taking part in the operations

of the campaign.[264] The moment had now come when the enemy determined

to deliver his well-prepared attack upon the invaders, and hoped to rid

the Crimea for ever of their presence. It must be confessed that he had

a good opportunity of accomplishing his object, and that every advantage

was on his side. He could choose his own time and place of attack; his

forces were far more powerful than those of the invaders, both in

numbers and in position; and, by the reconnaissance or sortie of October

26th, he found out (if he did not already know it) that our vulnerable

right flank was unsecured by any fieldworks to make up for our other

deficiencies. The onslaught, then, that was to drive us away from

Sevastopol, and to sweep us into the sea, was to be directed upon this

flank, upon ground which our soldiers called Mount Inkerman, and Sunday,

the 5th of November, was chosen as the day upon which to put the design

into execution.[265]

-----

Footnote 264:

Sir E. Hamley, in his _War in the Crimea_ , p. 129, estimates these

forces at 110,000 to 115,000, including the enemy’s sailors. He has,

however, apparently omitted to include men whom he previously counted

as part of the garrison at the end of September (see _ante_, p. 185).

Footnote 265:

See Map, No. 7, p. 216. Properly speaking, Inkerman was on the other

side of the Tchernaya, called by us Old City Heights.

-----

On the evening of the 4th, Prince Menshikoff established his

head-quarters near the mouth of the Tchernaya, and his troops were

posted as follows: The garrison was not increased beyond the numbers it

contained towards the end of October. General Dannenberg, head-quarters

on the Old City Heights, midway between Mackenzie Farm and the head of

the roadstead, commanded a corps of 50 battalions, 1 squadron, and 134

guns (of which 54 were guns of position). This corps was divided into

two columns, namely, General Soimonoff, 19,000 infantry and 38 guns (22

of position), whose troops were temporarily sheltered in the lines of

the fortress in the Karabelnaya; and General Pavloff, 16,500 infantry

and 96 guns (32 of position), concentrated on the Old City Heights. To

the left of Pavloff, there was another force of 16 battalions, 62

squadrons, and 88 guns (15,000 infantry), composed mostly of Liprandi’s

column, but now under Prince Gortchakoff, whose head-quarters were at

Tchorgun. Lastly, there was a body of 4000 infantry and 36 guns guarding

the road to Bakshiserai, somewhere near Mackenzie Farm. Thus, besides

the garrison which amounted to nearly 60,000 men, placed in what was now

a secure stronghold, amply covered and well armed, there was a force of

54,500 infantry, a powerful body of cavalry, and 258 guns available to

operate against the undefended flank of the Allies.

The latter, on the other hand, had received a few reinforcements, but

not sufficient to compensate for the immense losses to which they had

been subjected. On the evening of the 4th, they numbered but 58,000

infantry,—16,000 British, 31,000 French, and 11,000 Turks; and this

small force was further weakened by the fact that the allied Commanders,

totally unacquainted with the warlike qualities of their Ottoman

auxiliaries, would not allow them to develop their value, and left them

no chance to assist in the approaching battle. So far did Lord Raglan’s

prejudice go, that the 6000 attached to the British army, were not

suffered to take part as combatants, and when Omar Pasha proposed to

send him a further contingent he refused the offer.[266] Hence there

were practically only 47,000 British and French infantry left to meet

the grave crisis which now confronted us. These troops were disposed on

an irregular curve which stretched from Streleska Bay (north of Kamiesh

Bay) along the front of the enemy’s lines of Sevastopol to the heights

of Inkerman, thence southwards on the Sapuné Ridge to the Col, where it

ran more to the east, near Kadikeui, and covered Balaklava. This line

measured twenty miles in length, it was unsupported by any central

reserve, and was everywhere in contact with powerful masses of the

enemy.

-----

Footnote 266:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , 128; _Kinglake_ , v. 33, 34 note, 41

note. Sir Evelyn Wood says, in his recent publication, that he has

“never understood why these Moslems, who came out so grandly at

Silistria, were considered unfit to fight alongside the English and

French troops” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , p. 199).

-----

Menshikoff’s onslaught was to be delivered as the first gleam of light

appeared at dawn on the 5th, when his forces were to be before our

outposts, ready to press the advance home. The principal attack was

confided to Dannenberg’s corps, whose two columns were to converge upon

the British unguarded position at Inkerman,—that of Soimonoff, issuing

from the Karabelnaya by the road that skirts the south bank of the

roadstead, that of Pavloff marching down to the Tchernaya and crossing

the river by the causeway and bridge near its mouth. Gortchakoff was to

support this operation, and endeavour “to seize one of the ascents to

the Sapuné Ridge;” and the garrison was to “cover by its fire the right

flank of the assaulting columns, and, should there be confusion in the

enemy’s batteries, to storm those batteries.” The Russians were elated

by the bright prospects before them. “Future times, I am confident,”

wrote their Chief, “will preserve the remembrance of the exemplary

chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of the Allies.... Heaven

visibly protects Holy Russia. Have the kindness to bring this to the

knowledge of our august Sovereign for the great satisfaction of his

magnanimous heart.” Two of the Grand-Dukes, sons of the Tsar, arrived in

the Crimea, to encourage the Muscovite troops, and to bear witness to

the “exemplary chastisement” about to be inflicted; but the “magnanimous

heart” was not to be satisfied, for Menshikoff forgot to take into

account, what a handful of British soldiers are capable of doing when

sorely pressed, and when protecting the honour of their Queen and

country, even against overwhelming odds.

A general description of the ground known as Inkerman (or Mount

Inkerman) has already been given. The Lancaster battery, now nearly

dismantled, and holding but one gun, had been planted on the Victoria

Ridge between the Docks and Careenage ravines, and more than a mile in

rear, stood the camp of General Codrington’s brigade of the Light

Division. To the east, another main spur, jutting out from the upland,

fills up the space between Careenage Ravine and the Tchernaya, broken by

water-courses which descend into the ravine, the roadstead, and the

river. Into the ravine, there is one water-course, the Wellway, which

joins it 400 yards in rear of the Lancaster battery; and into the

Tchernaya there is another, the Quarry Ravine, through which a post-road

runs connecting the upland with the head of the roadstead. Between the

Wellway and the Quarry Ravine, the main spur is some 1300 yards broad,

and supports a rise, called Home Ridge, that bends to the north under

the name of Fore Ridge, and thence slopes away towards the Tchernaya, in

two spurs, which overlook the valley, and which are divided by St.

Clement’s Gorge, viz. Inkerman Tusk and the Kitspur. On the Kitspur the

Sandbag battery had been erected on commanding ground: it was a mere

short wall of earth, only eighteen paces in length, too high to shoot

over except where cut by two embrasures; it was unprovided with a

banquette, and at this moment it was vacant and unarmed. Astride the

post-road the Second Division was encamped, immediately behind Home

Ridge, in front of which the main spur is contracted to 250 yards in

breadth. But at a distance of 1400 yards from the ridge, the main spur

again widens out considerably, and here there is another rise, called

Shell Hill, flanked on each side by buttresses, West and East Jut, which

the enemy had vainly tried to capture on October 26th. About a mile in

rear of the Second Division, and always on the same main spur, near a

ruined windmill, stood the camp of the Guards Brigade, the Coldstream

being somewhat in rear, and separated from the rest by a narrow ravine.

Thus, in the first instance, available to resist an attack on Inkerman,

there was one division, viz. the Second, of 3000 men and 12 guns;

supported in rear by the Household Brigade, 1300 men, and 12 guns of the

First Division, and, on the left, though with a great obstacle

intervening—the Careenage Ravine—Codrington’s brigade, 1200 men. To the

rear, some two miles from the Guards, lay the northern portion of

Bosquet’s Corps of observation, which at this time was in closer

communication with the Highlanders and Marines, at Balaklava, than had

been the case before October 25th. To the left, were Buller’s brigade of

the Light, and the Fourth and the Third Divisions, distant respectively

from Home Ridge, 1½, 2½, and 3 miles. These latter troops were covered

by the defences which the trenches and batteries afforded, as was also

Forey’s French siege corps, which, as already mentioned, took up the

line from the British Left Attack to Streleska Bay. But no such

protection was available for the division and the two brigades more

immediately threatened in the vicinity of Inkerman.

Though both Commanders of the Allied armies felt anxiety on account of

this exposed flank, nothing was done to make it secure. General

Canrobert paid us the compliment of placing extraordinary reliance on

our troops,—especially the _bonnets de poil_, as he called the Guards;

on the other hand, Lord Raglan, weak in numbers, thought he could not

spare any of his men from the trenches. Still, the omission to safeguard

this vital position with earthworks has never been explained, for as

Turks could have been obtained for this purpose, and as Engineer

Officers were available, the excuse given, like many others put forward

to cover our deficiencies in this extraordinary war, can hardly be

deemed satisfactory. Of the value of works of defence to be occupied in

case of attack, it is sufficient to point out that, if we were

victorious without them, we should have been far stronger with them, and

the battle (if it had taken place at all under these circumstances)

could not have failed to result in greater disaster to the enemy, and in

much less loss to ourselves.

The Guards furnished piquets to watch the flank and rear of the British

army. On the 1st of November a stronger force was considered necessary

to accomplish this object, and the Brigade supplied eight piquets daily.

Six (numbered 1 to 6) mounted an hour before daybreak for twenty-four

hours, under the Field-Officer of the day while the other two (Nos. 7

and 8) were posted as a reserve from sunset until an hour after sunrise,

the whole during the night being placed under the command of a “full

Colonel of the Brigade.”[267] Besides finding three working parties in

the trenches, each 40 to 50 men strong under an Officer, the Coldstream

furnished, on the 4th, piquets Nos. 5 and 8, and again on the 5th, Nos.

3, 5, and 6. Thus before dawn on the morning of the battle, the

Battalion had two piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies) coming off, and three

(Nos. 6 and 7 companies) going on duty; so that four companies were

absorbed, and when the first alarm was given, only half the Battalion

(Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8 companies) were in camp. The Colonel on duty, during

the night 4th-5th, should have been Lord F. Paulet, but as he was

incapacitated by illness, Colonel Upton took his place; moreover,

Lieut.-Colonel Newton, detailed Field Officer of the day for the 5th,

had left long before daylight began to appear. The next senior Officer

was Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, and, when the first alarm was given, he

quickly formed up what remained of the Battalion, and immediately

marched them to the front where the battle was heard, to the support of

the Second Division, who were then seriously engaged with the enemy.

-----

Footnote 267:

_Brigade Order_ , Nov. 1, 1854.

-----

“MacKinnon, Ramsden, and I,” writes Colonel Tower, “were all three

living in one tent, and were awakened at daybreak, or soon after, by

firing in the direction of Inkerman; we thought little of it, as we

were accustomed to alarms, and the piquets constantly fired; but

presently a big gun or two told us it was more than piquets. The

bugles sounded in the camp, and 'fall in directly' was echoed by the

sergeants along the line of tents. We hurried on our arms, as we

always slept in our clothes, and found the Battalion falling in. Vesey

Dawson was in command, on a chestnut horse; Granville Eliot, Adjutant,

on his old grey arab, Bashi-Bazouk. It rained a great deal during the

night, and that memorable Sunday morning dawned a nasty damp foggy

day; the mist was rising from the ground and the brushwood was quite

wet; we could only see a few yards before us, but we could hear the

pattering of musketry, and the firing had been going on fully half an

hour before we came on the scene of action. We left camp in column of

fours, but before we got to the Second Division tents one or two round

shot came right through our ranks, and we began to have an idea how

close the enemy was, and of the serious nature of the business. We

formed line, and advanced through the Second Division tents, many of

which were knocked down and shot through.... We were the battalion on

the extreme right of the army, and my company (No. 1) was on the

extreme right of the Battalion.”[268]

-----

Footnote 268:

Tower, _Diary_ , Nov. 5th.

-----

Meanwhile, what had happened was this. Although we knew that an attack

was imminent, we were unable to tell the precise day on which it was to

take place. The night 4th-5th passed quietly, there was no firing, no

alarm, no spies came to warn us. The sentries on outpost, and the

piquets, heard a rumbling noise in the valley, but the sounds were

deadened by the heavy rain that fell during the 4th and throughout the

night, and they were not sufficiently distinct to induce us to concert

any definite arrangements to meet the emergency. In so far the enemy

acted with caution and ability; the attack came upon us as a surprise,

even though we expected it. He failed, however, to marshal his immense

masses to the best advantage. The orders given to Dannenberg’s forces

were vague, and there was a confusion as to whether both Soimonoff and

Pavloff were to operate on the eastern side of the Careenage Ravine, or

whether the former was to advance along the Victoria Ridge and the

latter against Inkerman. Obviously, had this plan been adopted,

Codrington’s brigade and Evans' division would both have been in

imminent danger; and had either been driven in, the results must have

been disastrous. Fortunately, the two unwieldy Russian columns jammed

themselves together on the broken ground east of the ravine, and

interfered by their numbers and proximity with each other’s movements.

Soimonoff, arriving on the ground a little before his colleague,

commenced the attack with his powerful column. Advancing cautiously and

silently in three lines covered by skirmishers, he had 6000 men in the

first line, followed by 3300 and his heavy guns, and 9000 with the light

artillery in reserve. The latter was the first hostile body perceived by

the British advanced piquets; who, though they could then see nothing,

heard their approach. On discovering them, they opened fire, and these

volleys were heard by General Codrington, who, according to his usual

practice, was near the Lancaster battery reconnoitring to the front with

his relieved piquets, before the day broke. He at once got his brigade

under arms, moved them to the edge of the ravine near the battery, and

lost no time in conveying the alarm to head-quarters and to the left.

Buller then moved out towards the threatened point, and the Fourth and

Third Divisions were in readiness to march.

The enemy soon pressed back the outposts of the Second Division, and the

camp being aroused, the troops formed on Home Ridge; while the 22 heavy

Russian pieces establishing themselves on Shell Hill, opened on the

ridge and on the ground in rear of it: by this means the Russians hoped

to crush the British supports that were supposed to be in their ordinary

place. But, as a matter of fact, we had none there, a single thin line

held the crest, and the fire beyond it succeeded only in destroying the

camp and the horses left behind. While this was going on, the twelve

field guns of the division were neither silent nor inefficient, and

General Pennefather (in command, Sir De Lacy Evans being at Balaklava,

on the sick list[269]) now pushed forward bodies of 200 to 500 men to

reinforce the piquets, who were slowly retiring before the advance of

the masses opposed to them. One of these detachments, 500 strong, under

General Adams, moved to the right, towards the Sandbag battery; and

another, hurrying to the left, soon came in contact with a huge hostile

column which bore down on them in the mist. The Officer in command had

just time to sing out, “Fire and charge!” and the men obeying with loud

cheers, the enemy was driven back, right through the line of his guns on

Shell Hill, before the impetuous onset could be arrested. The result of

this hand-to-hand encounter between a thin line of red-coats and a

strong column of the Russians, was often repeated during the day. The

battle, in short, resolved itself into a series of personal combats

between small British detachments and dense masses of the enemy; the

former, under the nearest Officers, dashing boldly, without supports,

against the latter wherever opportunity offered or danger pressed. There

was no central control, nor were manœuvres attempted; both were

impossible. But the activity, intelligence, and courage of the few—to be

counted by hundreds against thousands—never flagged for an instant, and

the unwieldy forces opposed to us, though so much more powerful in point

of numbers, were shattered and driven back in confusion.

-----

Footnote 269:

He came up later, but refused to take the command out of Pennefather’s

hands.

-----

“No doubt the mist was favourable to the fewer numbers, hiding from

the Russians the fact that there was nothing behind the English lines,

which came on as boldly as if strong supports were close at hand. It

needs some plausible supposition of this kind to account (however

imperfectly) for the extraordinary combats which ensued, where the

extravagant achievements of the romances of chivalry were almost

outdone by the reality.”[270]

-----

Footnote 270:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 141.

-----

Soimonoff, leaving 10,000 men in rear of his guns on Shell Hill, made

his first real assault with 9000 infantry, who, to avoid our artillery

fire, moved along the eastern slope of the Careenage Ravine. Part of

Pavloff’s corps, 6000 men, had by this time arrived on the scene, and

they got into the Quarry Ravine, and, bearing across Inkerman Tusk, made

for the Sandbag battery. Thus the narrow flat of the main spur,

connecting Home Ridge with Shell Hill, was swept with fire from the

enemy’s guns, and on one side of it (our left) were 9000 Russians

advancing, while 6000 more were threatening our right front at the head

of the Quarry Ravine and on the spurs in the vicinity overlooking the

Tchernaya. General Buller reached the field at this juncture, with 600

men and a battery from the Fourth Division. To meet the onslaught of

15,000 men suitably supported by artillery, against both our flanks,

Pennefather, therefore, had just 3600 men and 18 guns. Soimonoff’s

advanced troops on our left met with a transient gleam of success; they

captured three guns, which were hurrying into action, and they managed

to push into the Wellway. Had they been able to emerge on the plateau

near Home Ridge, they would have taken the British position in

reverse.[271] But this column was quickly discomfited by a gallant

charge of a few men of the 77th Regiment, and by a piquet of the

Grenadier Guards under Lieut.-Colonel Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar,

posted close by. Nor did the remainder of Soimonoff’s corps hold their

ground, for they also gave way when met by the steady line of British

infantry, and the whole attack upon our left was soon repulsed; indeed,

one of our groups, having driven in immensely superior forces, pursued

them, and halted not until Shell Hill was reached. The three English

guns taken by the enemy were speedily recaptured, and were found to be

uninjured; the Russian General, Soimonoff, moreover, was killed at this

period. Nor did Pavloff’s 6000 men fare any better, though they were

confronted by only 700 to 800 Englishmen. At the head of the Quarry

Ravine, the leading hostile battalions were charged by 200 men of the

30th Regiment, and were routed; while the rest, attacked by General

Adams and the 41st Regiment near the Sandbag battery, were also driven

back in confusion.

-----

Footnote 271:

Apparently this advanced column was composed of sailors or marines,

not reckoned in Soimonoff’s corps; they were, therefore, additional to

it (Kinglake, v. 117).

-----

It was now nearly 7.30 in the morning, and everywhere the struggle had

resulted in our favour. But the battle was only in its infancy.

Soimonoff’s reserve, 10,000 strong, was intact, and the remainder of

Pauloff’s corps, 10,000 men, had arrived, together with his long train

of artillery, which, placed on commanding ground, prolonged the line of

guns from Shell Hill to the end of East Jut. Dannenberg now assumed

command of these 20,000 infantry, and of the columns whose first attack

had failed. He determined to employ his masses against our right, and so

co-operate more closely with Gortchakoff, who, as we have seen, was

manœuvring in the valley, with orders to seize the Sapuné Ridge. This

latter corps had very early assumed a threatening attitude as far north

as the heights for which the Guards Brigade were responsible, and this

fact somewhat delayed their advance to the front;[272] but it was soon

perceived that the enemy in this quarter was making a mere empty

demonstration, that the real crisis was round Home Ridge, and that the

piquets were sufficient in the present emergency to guard the hills

overlooking the Tchernaya. The Grenadier and Scots Fusilier Guards,

encamped closer to the scene of action, were therefore moved forward to

take their share in it, followed soon after by the Coldstream (four

companies strong, under Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, as we have seen), and the

whole came into action about 7.30, when the introductory phase of the

fight was over, and just as the new attack was developing itself.

Shortly after the departure of the Regiment, the two relieved Coldstream

piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies), having been kept out somewhat longer

than usual, on account of Gortchakoff’s movements, came into camp, and,

finding it empty, advanced to the front, as did also Colonel Upton. The

strength of the Brigade was as follows:—

Officers. Sergeants. Drummers. Rank & Total.

File.

Grenadier Guards 22 24 17 438 501

Coldstream (6 companies) 17[273] 34 14 373 438

Scots Fusilier Guards 20 23 17 332 392

Brigade Staff 3 (Major-Gen. Bentinck; Capt. 3

Ellison, Bde. Maj.; & Capt.

Visct. Balgonie, A.D.C.)

Total 62 81 48 1143 1334

-----

Footnote 272:

See Kinglake, v. 70.

Footnote 273:

The names of these Officers are: Colonel Hon. G. Upton, commanding

Battalion; Captain Hon. G. Eliot, Acting Adjutant; Lieut.-Colonels

Hon. V. Dawson (commanding the four companies that first left camp,

viz. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 8), Lord C. FitzRoy, J. Cowell, and J. Halkett;

Captains L. MacKinnon, C. Strong, C. Wilson, H. Bouverie, P. Crawley,

F. Ramsden, and H. Tower; Lieutenants E. Disbrowe, Hon. W. Amherst,

and C. Greville; lastly, Captain Hon. P. Feilding (Acting D.A.A.G.

First Division) is here reckoned as a Regimental Officer, since early

in the day his horse was shot, and he then joined and fought with the

Battalion.

Belonging to the Regiment, and also actively engaged with the enemy,

were Lieut.-Colonels T. Steele and P. Somerset on the head-quarter

Staff; and Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, D.A.A.G. First Division.

On piquet, and holding the heights over the valley against

Gortchakoff’s demonstrations, were Lieut.-Colonels Newton in command,

Wood, and Carleton; Captains H. Armytage, and Sir J. Dunlop; and

Lieutenant Heneage; with Nos. 6 and 7 companies.

Of the Medical Officers, the Battalion Surgeon, J. Skelton, had been

invalided home, November 1st; Assistant-Surgeon Wyatt was present,

also Quartermaster Falconer.

-----

Dannenberg’s advance was directed against the Sandbag battery, a work,

although quite unfit for defence, and worthless when gained, yet served

as a rallying-point, which the enemy endeavoured to capture, and which

we determined to defend. Round it and near it, therefore, there surged

the bloody and lengthened contest in which the Brigade was about to take

a leading and conspicuous part. The attack was of a far more fierce and

formidable nature than those which preceded it, and which were almost as

child’s play compared with what followed. Instead of yielding to an

impulse to fly when the heads of their columns recoiled before our

impetuous charges, as had invariably been the case in the early morning,

the Russians, still assailed by the same dauntless and romantic British

courage, now fought with greater determination; they worked round our

flanks and rear, and refused to be carried back by the retreating bodies

which our men repulsed. The advance, in short, was better regulated,

better fed, and better covered by artillery.

Adams was still holding the Sandbag battery, and had received

reinforcements after his first success; our troops were also at the head

of the Quarry Ravine, where a short wall of loose stones, called “the

Barrier,” blocked the post-road. Little breathing-time was allowed them

after the repulse they had just inflicted on the enemy, and a desperate

struggle recommenced at these points. The small British detachments,

overpowered by numbers and threatened in flank, were forced back; they

retired fighting, and in good order, losing many men, among them General

Adams. Three guns, under Captain Hamley (the late Sir Edward Hamley,

whose book has been so frequently referred to), effectually checked any

desire the Russians might have indulged in to harass our retreat. At

this juncture the Guards Brigade arrived on Home Ridge; and it will be

useful to take a rapid glance at the position as it was at that moment.

On the left, General Codrington was chained to the slopes near the

Lancaster battery, and could not move therefrom without endangering the

whole line. He received, though unwillingly, slight reinforcements, and

his force then amounted to 1400. Later, additional troops reached him

from the Third Division, and some artillery, but the latter were

overpowered by heavier fire, and the one gun in the Lancaster battery

could not be used till near the conclusion of the battle. During the day

he held the ridge, maintained a heavy fire upon the enemy in Careenage

Ravine, and stood ready to oppose any hostile advance that might have

been contemplated up its course. His casualties amounted to about 180

men. Next, in and near the Wellway and in front of it, were the various

groups who had repulsed Soimonoff’s first attack, including the company

of Grenadier Guards previously mentioned; in all, about 1000 men—that

is, allowing for losses, less than a third of the whole force that held

Inkerman during the preliminary stage of the battle. It was not known

that the enemy meant to concentrate all his efforts on our right, and to

leave the other flank practically unmolested, so these men were also

chained to the places where they stood, expecting fresh adventure, and,

if any of them had to be moved to meet an emergency elsewhere, others

replaced them in the position they held. Of the rest, a proportion were

men exhausted or unrallied after their previous exertions, and it is

calculated that some 1400 men only remained to defend Home Ridge and the

Kitspur, 700 on each. As we have seen, those holding the latter were

slowly retiring. Of reinforcements arriving, the Guards, 1300, had just

reached the ridge, as well as 12 guns of the First and 6 of the Light

Divisions. The Fourth Division, 2000, under Sir G. Cathcart, was

approaching, so that some 4700 men and 36 guns might be reckoned upon

for immediate purposes, while 1600 French and other of Canrobert’s

troops were moving forward. On the other hand, the enemy was still very

strong, though he had lost part of the 15,000 troops that first

attacked, some of whom, indeed, were streaming away from the field

panic-stricken, down the Careenage Ravine into Sevastopol, and over the

Tchernaya bridge. But he had his powerful and numerous artillery

securely posted on West Jut, Shell Hill, and East Jut, and, besides the

greater portion of the 15,000 men, there were 20,000 fresh troops. Of

these latter, 10,000 were in reserve, and the other 10,000 in the Quarry

Ravine, in the neighbouring glens, on the post-road, and in the Sandbag

battery which they had just captured.[274]

-----

Footnote 274:

According to the theory of Mr. Kinglake (whose excellent work on the

Crimean War has been largely drawn upon, in preparing this part of the

present volume), the 15,000 men who attacked in the early morning in

two columns, one 9000 strong on our left and the other 6000 on our

right, were so completely shattered by their first encounter with the

detachments of the Second Division, that they _all_ fled away, and not

a man of them took any further part in the battle. Also that, of the

20,000 infantry remaining to the Russians, practically only 10,000

were engaged, the reserve of 10,000 being most of it kept back. Thus,

while 15,000 were dispersed into space with the utmost ease, in an

hour, by very few opponents, almost as if by magic, the 10,000 made so

good a resistance that they were with difficulty vanquished, in three

hours and a half, by the 4700 Englishmen who were on the scene at this

moment, aided by 1600 French, who appeared soon after, and by the

Algerines, Zouaves, and other troops of the same nation, 4000 strong,

who reached the ground between ten and eleven o’clock. Nor is it

alleged that the early attacks of the enemy were delivered by worse

troops than those who came into action at 7.30 a.m. This theory was

evidently not believed by some who fought at Inkerman, and Colonel

Tower is of opinion that when the Guards first entered into the

struggle, they met the Tarutin and Borodino regiments; that is, the

eight Russian battalions which formed the main portion of the first

attack made by the enemy with 6000 men on the Kitspur, and which, by

Kinglake’s account, were not only repulsed, but clean driven from the

field never to appear there again, by the bold onset of 700 to 800

Englishmen.

The losses during the day of the two Russian columns, that took part

in the first attack, before 7.30, amounted to some 5000 men; and this

fact seems to show conclusively that the 15,000 men continued the

fight, as stated in the text, long after the hour when Mr. Kinglake

says they disappeared from the battle-field. The casualties of the

10,000 men under Pavloff, who came into action at 7.30, were somewhat

greater, proportionately, than those of the first two columns. The

losses of the reserve (10,000 men), which to a great extent was kept

back out of the struggle, were proportionately much less. (P. Alabine,

_Notes of the Expedition in 1853-5_ , published in the Russian

language, at Viatka, 1861, gives the losses by Russian regiments.)

-----

The enemy had secured a footing on the plateau of the Inkerman main

spur, and the Guards Brigade, coming up at that instant, were launched

against him, the Grenadiers in front, then the Scots Fusiliers, the

Coldstream following a short distance in rear. The leading Battalion

charged, and drove the Russians back to the crest; the next formed on

its left, and Dawson prolonged the line to the right.

“Thus the narrow strip of height on the beak of which arose the

two-gun work [the Sandbag battery] was thinly edged by the _Tria

juncta in uno_, ranged two deep: the Duke of Cambridge and General

Bentinck in command.”[275]

-----

Footnote 275:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 287.

-----

Many of the rifles at first missed fire, for the incessant rain had

saturated everything; but by snapping off caps to dry the channel and by

other means the arms were got to work.[276] The failure to use their

weapons at this crisis caused great confusion, as may well be imagined,

for there was a dense mass of Muscovite grey coats and flat caps in

front, advancing against the Brigade.

-----

Footnote 276:

Some of the nipples had even to be unscrewed (Tower, _Diary_).

-----

N^o 7.

[Illustration:

INKERMAN

_about 8 A.M._

_This map has been drawn from_ Kinglake’s “Crimea” _by kind

permission_.

_The position of the troops has been slightly altered to suit the

hour._

A.D. Innes & C^o. London.

]

“We were almost among them _at once_, we were certainly not

twenty-five yards from them.... They yielded ground and we advanced a

little, showing a most decided front, but they kept pouring a most

deadly fire into our ranks, which began to tell fearfully. The enemy’s

artillery were posted on Cossack and Shell hills, and they had seventy

or eighty guns at least, but the mist prevented their laying their

guns properly for our lines, and they worked the Second Division

heights whilst we were far in advance of that; the road was also a

point on which they concentrated their fire. Big gaps began to be

visible in our line, our dark great coats and bearskin caps towering

above the bushes made our men conspicuous in the grey mist.... Several

times I saw heads of Russian columns coming swarming through the

bushes, the Officers in front waving their swords and shouting to the

men; but directly they saw us there was a hesitation, a huddling

together, an indecision, and a decided tendency _not_ to come on. They

fired quickly and nervously, and generally over our heads; they were

so close to us before they saw us, and they were on lower ground than

we were; if they had advanced in anything like a decided manner, we

_must_ have been entirely swamped and annihilated. But our fellows

stood their ground manfully, and the more the Ruskis came up, the

quicker our fellows rammed down their cartridges and blazed into

them.... Our men were getting very few and far between; our poor

company, No. 1, suffered terribly, but we yelled and screamed and

fired at the columns we saw in our front; they were immensely superior

to us in numbers, ten to one at least, and seemed now to stand their

ground very well; they pressed us _hard_. But determination and dogged

courage kept them back, and not a yard would we yield. The numbers in

front of us increased every second, and we were really hand to hand

with them; the bushes were full of English and Russians mixed up

together. The groans of the wounded, Officers yelling and screaming at

their men, the soldiers shouting at one another, and (I have no doubt)

using their favourite expressions, and the firing almost deafened one.

“The Brigade was getting very much mixed up now.... Several other

regiments and men of the Second Division piquets furnished us with

stragglers who were of the right sort. Our Brigade line, or remnant of

our line, was the rallying-point of everybody who was animated with a

right spirit. Oh, for breechloaders at this moment, how we could have

swept them off as they came up the hill!... I kept taking ammunition

out of dead men’s pouches to feed the pouches of the living, screaming

if I saw any fanatic Ruski that required shooting.... Some one behind

or in the ranks hallooed out, Charge! Granville Eliot galloped forward

right at the mass in front of him, Cowell, Bob Lindsay (Fusilier),

young Greville, and myself were all close together, and we ran forward

with all the men that were near us. It really was a critical moment in

the battle, at least in our _local_ part of the battle. Eliot fell

from his horse, shot through the head; Cowell staggered and fell by

the same bush; young Greville was shot through the body. The enemy was

frantic at this moment; the few men who charged with us were all shot,

and I found myself entirely surrounded by flat caps.... I could see no

one but Russians anywhere near; one fired at me, the powder almost

singed my cap. I could see some bearskins on my right through the

bushes, and accordingly made for them as hard as I could lay legs to

the ground, and I suppose Bob Lindsay and the men who were with us did

the same.

“There was a small two-gun sandbag battery on the crest of the hill,

into which the remnants of the Brigade were retiring; the Grenadier

Colours were already there: the Russians had been driven out of it

just before.[277] There were perhaps a hundred men of the three

Regiments in the little battery, and crowds of Russians hemmed us

nearly all round; we extended men on the left and rear to prevent

their cutting off our retreat and getting in behind us. Column after

column kept pouring up the hill, and every moment our chances of

retreat looked worse and worse. The parapet in front of us was too

high to fire over, and the enemy kept climbing into the embrasures and

up the exterior slope of the parapet; but one after another they fell,

shot by our men as they showed.... We could see lines of bayonets

outside the parapet, and could hear them howling and cheering one

another on; it was now _fearfully_ exciting.... We kept them at a

respectable distance; our line extended some way in the rear and left:

but they kept getting nearer, and our men fell very thick.... Vesey

Dawson I saw shot by a Russian creeping into the embrasure; Sir R.

Newman of the Grenadiers was also killed, and some other Grenadier

Officer fell wounded. Our ammunition was beginning to fail, some of

the men had not had a round of their own for a long time: the dead

furnished the living; but now even that began to fail, and the men in

their excitement threw stones, lumps of earth, anything they could

see, over the parapet among the Russians, and they came back again

amongst us with interest. One of the most remarkable things about

Russian troops is the noise they make in action, and I think it is

catching, as I never heard our men make such a yelling as they did all

this day; I know I was as bad as the rest, because I could not speak

for hoarseness that evening and the next day. How long the game of

throwing stones lasted I cannot say, but it seemed a long time. There

was a visible diminution of bayonets outside the battery, and we had

really driven the enemy back a great deal on our left; it was more

that they ceased coming on than that we were driving them back. We

were still surrounded by them, and they were firing into us as hard as

they could.

-----

Footnote 277:

For their gallantry upon this occasion, Colonels Lord Henry Percy

and Sir Charles Russell, Grenadier Guards, got the Victoria Cross.

-----

“Of course we could do nothing but retire; this we accordingly did,

the Grenadier Colours being our rallying point: but in our weak state,

with only a handful of men, _very_ few Officers, and very little

ammunition, retiring in the face of a body of the enemy was no easy

matter, although the enemy were not in the same strength they were,

nor did they seem to be animated with the same spirit they had shown

previously. They retired from outside the Sandbag battery certainly;

because I remember going outside the battery with several men and

pursuing, or rather firing into the enemy, as there were large bodies

of them below the battery amongst the bushes; I very nearly got killed

for my pains, as I got too far down the hill, and found the top above

me lined with Ruskis, and had to run the gauntlet through the bushes

along the side of the hill to rejoin the remnants of our Brigade with

the Grenadier Colours.... At this moment the _Indigènes_ [the

Algerines] came into action; they were the first individuals that

appeared on the stage, and well do I remember their black faces and

blue uniform coming tearing through the bushes.... When we got to the

Second Division heights we were given ammunition.... As to what

occurred in the front after this I cannot pretend to say, I only know

firing went on with considerable vigour for some time; but the battle

_had_ turned in our favour.

“The French troops advanced in masses down the road and over the

Second Division heights [Home Ridge], but the _real_ fighting all

along the line was over when we retired and when the _Indigènes_

advanced. Some heavy guns on the Second Division hills had cut up

their artillery on Cossack and Shell hills very much; the distant

rumbling of musketry was going on and some heavy firing still, but it

got further off.... I am _perfectly certain_ the brunt of the battle

was over when we were retiring out of Sandbag battery: the sun then

came out, and it was perfectly clear; our heavy guns began to tell

upon the enemy’s artillery on Cossack Hill. The fog having lifted, I

saw the whole battle for the first time when we retired out of the

Sandbag battery; before then, we had been entirely enveloped in mist

and fog. I put this period at about 8.30 or 9, perhaps a little later,

but no Frenchman appeared on the right of the battle till after this

time, 9.30.... I am perfectly confident the Russians were in retreat

when Bosquet’s _Indigènes_ came into the action.... When the

_Indigènes_ came through the bushes, some of our men joined them to

have a last shot at the Ruski, and they probably formed along the hill

in our old position, and peppered into the retreating columns as they

went down the hill.”[278]

-----

Footnote 278:

Tower, _Diary_ , Nov. 5, 1854.

-----

This account of the fierce struggle between the Brigade and overwhelming

masses of the Russians, written in the private diary of an Officer of

the Regiment, gives a few of the confused events that took place

immediately near him. Colonel Tower belonged to No. 1 company, and as

Colonel Wilson was with No. 8 company, a few words describing what

occurred about him may be also reproduced.

“Amid a dense fog raged wholesale murder; the mortal strife was hand

to hand, foot to foot, muzzle to muzzle, butt-end to butt-end. It must

not be supposed that we always stood rooted on our ground, that we

never budged. No, the fight rested not steadfast for an instant. It

was now backward, now forward, now sideways. Here, a Grenadier party,

after a frantic tussle, would be forced by overwhelming swarms out of

the battery; there, a knot of Coldstreamers would arrest the advance

of an entire Russian battalion; in another place, a cluster of

Fusiliers, rallying after a repulse, would fling themselves upon a

column, and with the sheer might of strong hearts, arms, and steel,

send it slap-dash over the height’s crest. This ceaseless wrestling to

and fro accounts for the Sandbag battery being occupied alternately by

men of the different Guards Regiments (or, more properly speaking, by

mixed parties of the three Regiments larded with brave Liners).

Whenever Pavloff succeeded in ousting one band of defenders from the

work, a comrade batch would rush in, and, by a combination of bullet,

bayonet, and gun-stock, thrust forth the intruders....

“Time marches so marvellously fast in battle, that it is utterly

impossible for men, plunged in the _mêlée_, to form an idea of how

they stand with the clock. I have therefore no notion at what period

reinforcements reached us. All I know is, that towards the end of the

fight I saw many Linesmen fighting intermixed with Guardsmen....

Despite melting ranks, despite fresh regiments which continued to

stream up the hillside, despite the growing scarcity of ammunition,

the English clung to their battery with the grip of despair. If, by

chance, the bull-dog’s hold was for an instant shaken off, the next

moment his teeth closed tighter than ever on the sandbags....

“The Russian Officers behaved like true soldiers. They ever were in

front of their less adventurous rank and file, urging them on with

voice and uplifted sword; nay, they rushed freely on certain death,

with the view of inflaming the sluggish spirit of their followers....

And now half the Brigade—a grandiose title for 1300 men—strewed the

ground; some slain outright, others bleeding to death, others vainly

imploring to be carried off the field. Oh! that I must write 'vainly,'

but in the devilish turmoil not a man whom God had shielded could be

spared to carry away the wounded. The honour of England, nay, the very

safety of the army, demanded that all living should be breast to

breast with the Russians.... Meanwhile the Guards seemed at their last

gasp, every minute found them less able—not a jot less willing—to

repel the enemy. Hardly a man tasted food that morning, hence

individual strength began to flag; where companies contended now only

subdivisions struggled, hence collective power was ebbing fast. Nor

was this all, ammunition had become frightfully scarce; in many cases,

indeed, the soldiers had none left, so they were reduced to rifling

the pouches of their fallen messmates; and when that resource failed,

to pounding away at the ugly Calmuck visages with stocks and

stones.”[279]

-----

Footnote 279:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 290, etc.

-----

It is unnecessary to proceed further with this account, for the writer

now gives his experiences, when his excited men, having forced a

superior number of Russians into hurried flight down the hillside into

the valley, rushed after them in pursuit, in spite of their Officer’s

efforts to call them back. It is sufficient to say that any description

of the struggle between the Guards and the masses which Dannenberg

brought against them is impossible. The combatants were in close

proximity, the contest was fought out in a thick fog, and on broken

ground covered with tough hornbeam bushes and oak scrub, so that our men

were speedily dispersed into groups, and few could really say what their

neighbours were doing.[280]

-----

Footnote 280:

The following extract, from an account furnished by a Coldstreamer

present at the battle, will be read with interest: _Sergeant W.

Wilden, No. 1 Company_ , writes:—“Suddenly the alarm came, 'fall in,'

every man rushed for his rifle and ammunition; the order was so sudden

many had not turned out, and several took their places in the ranks

only partly dressed; poor Captain Ramsden was killed in his brown

shooting-suit.... During the early part of the day, I should think

about 8 or 8.30, the atmosphere became so thick with fog, rain, or

mist, and the smoke from firing on both sides, I was not able to see

more than eight or ten of my comrades, and scarcely able to

distinguish the enemy, although within a few yards of him. At this

juncture an alarm ran through our shattered ranks that the enemy was

surrounding us. This turned out to be true, for he was working round

our right flank to obtain possession of the small Sandbag battery....

A terrible struggle took place for possession of this battery; the

enemy pushed his columns to the front in great numbers, and at the

same time his left flank was gradually working round and attacking our

right. At this time I should think about two companies of our

Battalion held the battery. Here our losses were very heavy. We held

it apparently for some time, and kept the Russian massive columns in

check, until an unfortunate crisis happened; our ammunition was

exhausted, and, as our ranks were so terribly shattered, we were

compelled by superior numbers to retire from the battery, or, in other

words, we were driven out, and left it in the hands of the enemy; but

only for a short time, for we rallied and charged the enemy at the

point of the bayonet and recaptured the battery. Here a dreadful

struggle ensued, a hand-to-hand fight took place, in which bayonets

were freely used on both sides, and at one period stones were resorted

to to beat the enemy back from the north-western embrasure....

Although several bayonet charges were made upon the enemy, we were

unable any longer to hold our ground against overwhelming numbers, and

greatly exhausted, we were compelled gradually to retire, at the same

time disputing every inch of ground. Here the enemy gradually

advanced, and many of our wounded comrades were bayoneted or killed by

the enemy. At this moment, the welcome sound of the bugles of the

gallant Bosquet’s division of Zouaves reached our ears; their numbers

enabled them to force the enemy back and regain the position we were

gradually losing. We then retired.... Two long 18-pounder guns were

about this time drawn by hand to replace those dismantled, and were

used until the close of the battle.”

-----

But the main features of the contest are fairly clear. The Russians,

securely posted in the Quarry Ravine, St. Clement’s Gorge, and on the

eastern slopes of the Kitspur, made their main attack against the

latter, and as their assaulting columns were driven from the crest, they

rallied again in the hollows beneath, and kept surging upwards, and

renewing the strife. For some time the Brigade drove back the successive

waves of the advancing enemy unassisted, except by the broken fragments

of Adams' men; but a little later, when Cathcart’s division approached,

some 500 of his troops were pushed forward, and joined in the fray,

while another portion moved to the head of the Quarry Ravine, and

regained the Barrier. The latter, reinforced from time to time, remained

there during the rest of the battle, and though the enemy passed them

by, now as he advanced and again as he retired, it seems he never closed

in on their rear or reconquered the post. Colonel Upton, reaching the

ground some time about 8 a.m., with No. 5 company and a company of the

Scots Fusilier Guards, also coming off piquet,[281] endeavoured to close

an undefended gap which existed between the Sandbag battery and the

Barrier, and he prevented the enemy from seizing its advantages at that

moment. But his force was insufficient to hold it for more than a brief

space, and his men were most of them drawn into the vortex of the

principal fight. Hence, it was not difficult for the Russians, pressing

through the gap, to work round the left flank of the Brigade, and to

penetrate to their rear. Most of the Fourth Division, having been split

up into fractions, were sent wherever the pressure of the battle

required their presence; but a residue of 400 men under General Torrens

remained, and with this force Cathcart hoped to relieve the Brigade in

their arduous struggle, and assail the enemy in flank by descending the

slopes on our right. The attempt, though successful at first, was not

fortunate, and it failed to accomplish the results that were expected

from it. The men soon dispersed in groups, were almost surrounded, and

had to fight their way upwards with the Russians above them. It was

here, moreover, that the valuable life of Cathcart was lost, and that

Torrens (some time in the Grenadier Guards) was severely wounded.

-----

Footnote 281:

It appears that No. 4 company moved forward separately, and joined the

main body of the Battalion.

-----

This manœuvre appears to have changed the principle on which the

Brigade had been resisting the hostile columns, and many who hitherto

never pursued the beaten bodies of the enemy beyond the crest, now

rushed after them down the slopes into the hollows beneath. In this way

the group near Captain Wilson got out of hand, and pursued far down into

the valley of the Tchernaya, where they were met by shots from

Gortchakoff’s riflemen, “who sprang up among the bushes, and blazed full

in our faces.” Meeting some stray groups of Cathcart’s submerged

detachment, the whole party reascended the heights, and lost heavily as

they climbed up. Here they found themselves between two fires, and

ascertained that the enemy was really above them, for at first they

thought they were mistaken for Russians, and were being shot at by

English soldiers. Avoiding this danger, by taking an upwards direction

to the left, they stumbled upon a dead ammunition mule, and eagerly

replenished their pouches, as for some time they had not had a round

among them. Having at last reached the top, they found that the fog had

lifted, that the Brigade was not where they had left it, and that

Zouaves and Algerines (the _Indigènes_) were approaching the ground, and

were driving the enemy back, as Colonel Tower has already told us.

Wilson and the last of his men joined this attack, and many fell; he

finally attached himself to the French 50th of the Line as they

advanced, and then finding he could do nothing more, he sought the

Coldstream, eventually falling in with them near Home Ridge, which he

reached before the shattered remains of the Battalion got there.

From the moment our men began to descend the slopes their means of

maintaining their post on the Kitspur seemed to diminish. Under any

circumstances, the struggle of the few against the many was gradually

exhausting the power of the former, and reinforcements were urgently

required. It was fortunate, therefore, that our allies now appeared upon

the scene. Bosquet, who for some time in the early morning had been

observing Gortchakoff, came speedily to the conclusion that that General

meant to remain quiescent; he therefore sent forward some of his troops

without delay, to Home Ridge, where the danger was most pressing. Two

Battalions, 1600 strong, arrived first; and one, the French 6th of the

Line, pushing towards the Kitspur, struck in flank the Russians, who,

advancing through the gap, which was ever getting wider, were

endeavouring to operate against our rear. This French battalion,

however, soon got into difficulties, and the other, the 7me Léger, was

sent to its support. But before this was effected another crisis

occurred; for, the enemy, urging forward his numerous forces up the

ravines which he occupied, brushed past the Anglo-French then on the

Kitspur, and made a very determined onslaught on Home Ridge itself. This

serious manœuvre was repulsed by the gallantry of a few British

detachments present on the spot, and of the 7me Léger; the defeated

column was driven back, so that the two French battalions were brought

together. It was now 10 a.m., and another French force, a brigade with

some artillery, led by Bosquet in person, reached the battle in two

columns: in the first, some rifles, a battalion of Algerines, and one of

Zouaves (1900); in the other, more Zouaves, and the French 50th of the

Line (2200). There was still a good deal of difficulty in forcing the

enemy to recede; for as the first column pursued him, they advanced too

far, and fresh hostile forces were able to move up the ravines leading

to the main spur, thereby threatening our allies in rear. But on the

arrival of the second column, the Russians, now thoroughly broken by

their losses and by the stubborn resistance which held them in check,

gave up the contest. They were finally driven off the Kitspur and out of

the ravines which had been so useful to them during the struggle, by

enabling them to re-organize after so many repulses inflicted by our

slender forces. Kinglake thus speaks of a band of the Coldstream during

this phase of the fight:—

“The Zouave battalion was advancing ... when the bearskin all at once

reappeared. It was from the wooded steeps of the hillsides that the

spectre uprose. Since the time when last we observed it, the small

band of Coldstream men collected by Wilson had remained in the

brushwood below, watching always for some such occasion as the one

that now offered. Amid a roar of joy and welcome—for the Zouaves and

the Guards were close friends—these Coldstream men joined the advance,

aligning on the right of the French.... What followed was

slaughter.”[282]

-----

Footnote 282:

Kinglake, v. 402.

-----

Meanwhile we had already gained an immense superiority over the enemy’s

artillery. As early as about 9.30, two 18-pounder guns of position had

been brought on Home Ridge, and after a short space of time the power of

the hostile batteries began to wane. The French guns, coming up, posted

themselves on our right, and the bombardment continued with increasing

advantage on our side, though the number of our pieces was not half that

of our opponents. Some of our men on the left and centre of our line

also advanced, and added to the misfortune of the gunners on Shell Hill.

The battle was really decided at eleven, though the artillery continued

to fire till much later. As soon as the bulk of the Household Brigade

returned to Home Ridge, and after ammunition had been served out, the

men were reformed, and were moved up to protect the guns against any

sudden assault. This duty was “worse than fighting the infantry, for we

got no revenge for the men we lost,” and we incurred casualties not a

few.[283]

-----

Footnote 283:

Letter of Mr. Taylor, late Quartermaster Somersetshire Militia, then

in the Coldstream; one shell killed and wounded eight men. Colonel

Upton was wounded at this period. See, also, _Our Veterans, etc._ , p.

299.

The action of the Guards at Inkerman seems to be imperfectly described

in Kinglake. According to that writer, the bulk of the Brigade came

out of action at 8.30; though he notes that the force under Wilson

joined the last attack undertaken by the French about 11 o’clock, and

allows that the companies which followed Upton were in the field as

late as 10. Giving Bosquet’s impressions of the scene presented to his

observation at that hour, he says, “High above on the right, where

there sauntered a red-coated Officer with the _bonnet de poil_ and a

singularly unconcerned air (Colonel Upton), some men of the Guards

could be seen lying down among the brushwood” (Kinglake, v. 382). Yet

Tower and Wilden, whose accounts have been given, state that they were

relieved on the Kitspur by the Algerines and Zouaves—that is, after 10

o’clock; and Wilson who, according to Mr. Kinglake, was on that

portion of the battle-field later than any other Guardsman, tells us

himself that he got back to Home Ridge _before_ the bulk of the

Brigade reached it. Some isolated groups, separated during the fierce

struggle in the fog and brushwood from the main body, possibly found

themselves on Home Ridge before; Taylor says he helped to pull up the

two 18-pounders, which, as we know, took place about 9.30.

-----

The retreat of the Russians commenced about one o’clock, and was covered

by a column of their reserve; which, attempting to advance, was quickly

dispersed by a few rounds of the 18-pounders. There was no pursuit. The

enemy slipped away, and “seemed to melt from the lost field; the English

were too few and too exhausted, and the French too little confident in

the advantage gained, to convert the repulse into a rout.” Our allies,

deducting losses, numbered at the end of the engagement some 7000

infantry, for, besides the troops already mentioned, three battalions

(2400) arrived on the ground at eleven; they also had 700 cavalry and 24

guns present. Lord Raglan was anxious to complete the victory by falling

on the rear of the flying Russians, but his cautious colleague would not

consent; for he still feared an attack from Gortchakoff’s untouched

forces, and was unwilling to expose his men to the fire of the ships

that were moored in the roadstead.[284]

-----

Footnote 284:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 157.

-----

While the battle was going on, the garrison of Sevastopol kept up so

poor a demonstration, that we were able to denude our camps of men, and

push them to Inkerman. Besides the men on duty in the trenches, the

greater part of the Third Division watched the fortress, and they were

subjected to no further inconvenience than that which the fire from the

place, intensified on this day, entailed. About 9.30, however, the enemy

made a sortie against Forey’s siege corps, under General Timofeyeff,

with 5000 men and 12 guns. The blow, though it met with some success at

first, failed, and the Russians were pursued by our gallant allies back

under the shelter of the fortress. Thus little was done by the garrison

to assist Dannenberg, and that little was of trifling value.

Gortchakoff’s operations during the day were still less effective. He

made a few feints, fired upon the Sapuné Ridge, and, it is said, did

lose 15 men. He thereby gave the companies on piquet (among them, Nos. 6

and 7 companies of the Coldstream) the opportunity of engaging him with

distant volleys, without apparently causing much, if any, loss to our

side. In short, he did nothing, when by attacking Bosquet, he would have

prevented that General from advancing to our assistance at Inkerman. His

orders were “to support the general attack, to draw the Allied forces

upon himself, and to try and seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné

Ridge.” Mr. Kinglake, however, tells us that these written orders were

explained away by “oral communications” into something different,[285]

and makes us believe that there is a mystery which has never been

explained, hanging over the operations of this Russian Commander, who

held so much power in his hands on that day. What we do know is that

Dannenberg, in spite of his overwhelming numbers, was unable to secure a

footing on the Kitspur, that this was due to the manner in which it was

defended by our scanty forces, and that in this defence the Household

Brigade played a glorious part, and suffered much in consequence.

-----

Footnote 285:

Kinglake, v. 59 (note), 69.

-----

The losses were very great on both sides: those of the enemy, who moved

in heavy columns, being more than those of the Allies, though

relatively, in proportion to numbers at the seat of war, he suffered

less than we did. The Russians had 10,729 killed, wounded, and

prisoners, including 256 Officers. The English 2357 of all ranks, of

whom 130 were Officers (or 39 Officers, and 558 men killed, and 91

Officers and 1669 men wounded). The French 929, among them 49 Officers

(or 13 Officers and 130 men killed, and 36 Officers and 750 men

wounded).[286] The Brigade lost nearly half its effective strength,

viz., out of a total of 1334:—

Killed 12 Officers, 9 Sergts., 1 Drumrs., 177 Rank & file, Total 199

Wounded 20[287] ” 20 ” 4 ” 357 ” ” 401

Missing — ” — ” — ” 4 ” ” 4

Total 32 ” 29 ” 5 ” 538 ” ” 604

-----

Footnote 286:

The above were the losses on the field of Inkerman. The total

casualties on the 5th of November amounted to: Russians, 11,959;

English, 2573; and French 1800 of all ranks (Kinglake, v. 443, 457).

Footnote 287:

Counting Major-General Bentinck, who was severely wounded. Of the

Coldstream Officers serving on the Staff on that day, none were

wounded; Colonel Somerset, however, had a horse shot under him.

-----

The Coldstream suffered in like proportion, but the casualties among the

Officers far exceeded those that occurred in the other Regiments. In

fact, almost all the Officers were swept away. Out of seventeen present,

four only escaped uninjured, viz. Captains Strong, Wilson, Crawley, and

Tower. Of the rest, eight were killed or died soon after of their

wounds, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Dawson, and Cowell, Captains MacKinnon,

Bouverie, Eliot, and Ramsden, and Lieutenants Greville, and Disbrowe.

The remainder were wounded; viz. Colonel Upton (slightly),

Lieut.-Colonels Halkett, and Lord C. FitzRoy, Captain P. Feilding, and

Lieutenant Amherst (all severely). The losses of the Battalion amounted

to—

Killed 8 Officers, 3 Sergeants, 73 Rank & Total 84

File,

Wounded 5 ” 11 ” 107 ” ” 123

Total 13 ” 14 ” 180 ” ” 207

The principal casualties were in the flank companies. No. 1 entered the

action with 50 to 60 men, and No. 8 was slightly stronger. The former

lost one sergeant and 43 rank and file, and the latter two sergeants and

41 men. No. 2 came next, losing 37 men. Where a Battalion has so freely

shed its life-blood in the stubborn defence of the position assigned to

it, it may seem strange that no official notice should be taken of the

death of the Officer who led it into action, and who directed its

movements until he fell, and more especially when in the Brigade to

which the Battalion belonged, no other Commanding Officer lost his life.

Yet this is what occurred with respect to the memory of the gallant

Colonel Dawson, and the feelings of his brothers in arms were not

inadequately expressed in the following lines, written by Colonel

Wilson:—

“The despatch which informed England of this dearly bought victory,

commended the services of many of the living and blazoned the merits

of many of the dead; but from that encomiastic scroll there was at

least one remarkable omission. To the memory of Colonel Vesey Dawson,

shot through the heart while in command of the Coldstream Guards, was

conceded not a passing word of eulogy or of regret. It is melancholy

to reflect that on this humble page should stand the only record of

how as brave a soldier as ever drew a sword, as noble a gentleman as

ever earned the respect of his fellow-men, fought and died.”[288]

-----

Footnote 288:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 306.

-----

We are told that this great victory caused no outward elation among our

troops. A reaction succeeded the excitement of the struggle; the danger

now past began to be realized for the first time; and the men, though

hardened to the miserable scenes which war creates, were almost awed by

the terrible carnage and devastation that met their eyes on the

hard-fought field. The Second Division camp was laid flat, the tents

uprooted and scattered, canvas saturated with blood carpeted the ground.

Our own camp swarmed with the wounded and the dying, and the sight sent

a chill of depression through the few survivors as they returned to

their bivouacs. Everywhere on the narrow space of the battleground the

victims lay thick, some killed, others groaning in agony, and nowhere

thicker than in and around the Sandbag battery, where the contest raged

the fiercest. Here the dead were literally piled up on one another as

they fell.

“The whole battle-field, which could all be seen at a glance, except

where concealed by brushwood, looked perfectly _covered_ with bodies;

between the Second Division hills and the crest of the Inkerman hill

is a very short distance, and the entire action having been fought on

that limited space, there was an awful scene of carnage upon it....

Before evening we got all our wounded off the field; the dead, of

course, remained there, and the poor wounded Ruskis who were a great

deal too numerous to take off.... From the heights I could see the

Russian army winding up the road; the whole country was covered with

troops straggling over the causeway over the Tchernaya marsh; they

were a long time crossing. Arabas full of wounded, guns, etc.,

lumbering up the way, but they had quite enough of it.... Our hospital

was a most piteous sight.... Our poor fellows were all dying or

dead.... The camp was miserable, and I could only thank God I was not

lying in the hospital tent with half my limbs smashed to pieces, or

lying on a stretcher ready to be buried.”[289]

-----

Footnote 289:

Tower, _Diary_ .

-----

Saddest of all, was the cruel thought surging in every mind that many of

our brave wounded had been basely bayoneted as they lay helpless on the

ground, by an uncivilized enemy, who, unable to drive off the few that

held the plateau against him, wreaked his vengeance on the defenceless,

as soon as they fell into his hands. We had ample evidence of this

savagery—established, moreover, by a special inquiry—that cast so black

a stain on the Russian army, for, when our men hurled the foe from a

corner from which he had driven us, we found our wounded stabbed to

death.

Thus was the battle of Inkerman fought and won by small bodies of the

British and French armies, over an overpowering hostile force of more

than 35,000 infantry, amply supported by artillery; who, having stolen

in during the night up to our outposts, endeavoured to break through the

Allied line round Sevastopol, at a point where we were weakest, and

where we had absolutely no defences.[290] The result proved the immense

superiority of our arms over those of Russia; so also does it give us

some indication of what would have happened if we had boldly attacked

Sevastopol at the end of September, before, or immediately after, the

flank march, or even during the bombardment in October. The British

fought with a valour and constancy that surpassed even the glorious

traditions of the past. Led by Officers who hurled themselves like the

old Knight Errants into the thick of every danger, they nobly followed

on with that unflinching steadiness produced by constitutional bravery,

by devotion to their leaders, and by the splendid discipline that was

the predominant characteristic of our Crimean troops. Their bold

extension and their courage in maintaining it, even without supports and

when opposed to heavy columns, made the Russians think that the line of

red-coats was but a fringe of our strength, and they hesitated when they

ought to have acted boldly. We were, moreover, provided with a superior

rifle, and so when the enemy, emerging from the ravines, found himself

met by a heavy and shattering fire, his columns were brought to a

standstill, and he lost the advantage which his solid formation might

have given him. He was far from being imbued with the spirit that

animated our men, and he lacked the determination to close with them.

-----

Footnote 290:

It cannot be insisted too often that the Sandbag battery was a battery

only in name; and that its importance consisted in the fact that it

served as a rallying-point, on account of its being a conspicuous

object, round which the main struggle on the Kitspur raged. Russian

exaggerations have given it a wholly fictitious value; even Todleben,

describing the fight a little after eight o’clock, says that the

Okhotsk regiment (3000 strong) attacked the Sandbag battery held by

their “worthy rivals—the intrepid Coldstream,” that they expelled the

latter, and that nine guns were the reward of this brilliant feat of

arms! (see Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 160).

-----

“Had he, at the commencement of the battle, pushed these columns

resolutely forward, it follows nearly as a matter of course that, by

sheer momentum of his heavy masses, the British lines would have been

broken through and trampled down utterly. It would have been a

question of weight alone. As it was, no devotion, no exertions on the

part of the Russian Officers, could at the outset spur their

battalions to one grand combined rush. Time was frittered away in a

series of persevering but desultory attacks, which were invariably

repulsed, thanks to English valour and English firearms.”[291]

-----

Footnote 291:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 309. It is proper to add that the Russian

Rifle corps, 1800 strong, were armed with as good a weapon as our

Minié, also that some of the British battalions (the 20th Regiment,

for instance, who distinguished themselves greatly in the battle)

carried the old smooth-bore musket, known as “Brown Bess” (see

Kinglake, v. 475).

-----

[Illustration: N.R. Wilkinson del. PRIVATE 1742. Mintern Bros.

Chromo.]

CHAPTER X.

THE WINTER OF 1854-55 IN THE CRIMEA.

Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman—Sevastopol not to

be taken in 1854—Tardy arrangements to enable the army to remain in

the Crimea during the winter—Violent hurricane of the 14th of

November; stores scattered and destroyed—The winter begins in

earnest—How the Government at home attended to the wants of army at

the seat of war—Absence of a road between the base at Balaklava and

the front—Miserable plight to which the army was reduced—Indignation

in England, and the measures taken to relieve the troops—Admirable

manner in which the misfortunes were borne by the British

soldiers—Operations on both sides during the winter—The Turks occupy

Eupatoria; successful action fought there—The Guards Brigade sent to

Balaklava.

The battle of Inkerman exhausted the energies of the combatants, and for

a few days they recoiled from each other, stunned by its effects. The

Allies had gained a Pyrrhic victory; another such victory, and their

forces must be annihilated. The enemy also had received a crushing

defeat, which shattered his military prestige and ruined the _morale_ of

his army. Neither side was in a condition to operate against the other,

and each faced his opponent listlessly, almost helplessly. But

Menshikoff, though disgraced in the field, deserved the gratitude of his

Imperial Master, and had every reason to be content with what he had

achieved; for, he had gained an advantage of supreme importance. He had

put it out of the power of the Anglo-French invaders to finish the war

during the year 1854, and thus, while chaining them fast to the bleak

and narrow upland of the Chersonese, he had the satisfaction of knowing

that they would be exposed to the rigours of the approaching winter.

This result was all the more disastrous to us, since, not having

foreseen it, we were in no position to meet it, and were unprovided with

the means of maintaining our troops in the inhospitable region to which

we had become committed. In short, the Allies were about to be handed

over to foes far more destructive and terrible than those they had

hitherto met. Instead of contending against Russian weapons, they were

now also to struggle with the forces of nature and the fury of the

elements. On the 6th of November it was finally determined to put off

the bombardment, and to winter in the Crimea. The Commissariat

Department, informed of this decision, was then, and then only, ordered

to make such preparations as would enable the army to remain on the

upland. But the tardy order came too late, for in less than ten days the

winter began in earnest, and nothing could then be got ready to save the

troops from the cruel trials that awaited them.

On the day after the battle, the Allies were engaged in burying the

dead, in removing the Russian wounded who still lay on the ground, and

in clearing the field of the traces of the struggle. An invitation

addressed to General Menshikoff to agree to a truce, and to send out his

men to bury their own dead, was refused, for that prudent commander was

naturally disinclined to give his troops so sombre and depressing an

object-lesson of their utter inefficiency in the field. His army,

however, met this invitation in another fashion, and, whether in error

or by design, they answered it by firing upon our burying parties. As

another attack was feared, the front was cleared of incumbrances as soon

as possible, and the wounded were promptly taken to Balaklava. Their

sufferings were considerable; there was a scarcity of hospital comforts

and appliances at the seat of war, and the ambulances in use were

unfitted for the purpose of conveying injured men.

Much affected by the heavy losses sustained by his “First Brigade,” the

Duke of Cambridge came early into the Guards camp, where the few men

present turned out to cheer him.

“Accompanied by his Aide-de-camp, the brave and popular Macdonald, the

Royal General was assiduous in his attentions to the wounded

Guardsmen, sympathizing in cheering tones with the livid wretches that

still breathed, and shedding tears of manly sorrow upon the mangled

clay of those who had completed their last tour of earthly duty.”[292]

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Footnote 292:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 314.

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The funeral of the numerous Coldstream Officers formed a most sad

procession. Seven—Dawson, Cowell, MacKinnon, Eliot, Ramsden, Disbrowe,

and Greville—were laid to rest in one grave, in a small rocky ravine

near the Windmill. Bouverie’s body was only recovered late on the 6th,

and he was buried by the side of Lieut.-Colonel Hunter-Blair of the

Scots Fusilier Guards, who survived the action twenty-four hours.

“It was really enough to unman anybody; poor fellows! far away from

all their friends and relations; poor Greville, whose death killed his

mother, everybody loved him; we laid them side by side, and I remember

the earth pattering on their poor bodies with dull hollow sound.”[293]