Interesting as is the campaign that now began, to the student of

military history, it will be impossible to describe it at any length in

these pages. It must suffice to say that, at the end of the year, the

results in Asia were unimportant. There were victories on both sides,

but no great progress was achieved by either of the combatants. It was

different in Europe, for there, thanks to the skill and energy of Omar

Pasha, and to the gallantry of his troops, the Turks gained many and

considerable advantages. Crossing the Danube at Turtukai, they secured a

position on the northern bank of the river at Oltenitza, in the face of

superior forces, and repulsed every attempt to dislodge them. Again,

having established themselves firmly at Kalafat, opposite Widin, they

attacked and dealt a crushing defeat (early in January, 1854) on a

strong corps, which had entrenched itself in their vicinity near Citate.

The Ottoman troops were everywhere victorious in this theatre of

operations; the Russians, on the other hand, were beaten and

disorganized, their _morale_ shaken, and their losses, on their own

admission, amounted to 35,000 men.

While these successes were being won, an incident occurred which caused

the war to spread, and drew England and France into its meshes. A small

Turkish squadron of a few frigates and smaller vessels lay at anchor at

Sinope; whereupon, a far more powerful Russian fleet, consisting of

heavily armed and large ships, approached under cover of a fog,

surprised them, and completely destroyed them (November 30th). The

attack was conducted under circumstances of considerable barbarity; no

quarter was given, the ships were sunk, the wounded and the helpless

were not spared, and 4000 men were slaughtered or drowned. When the news

of this action reached Europe, indignation, already aroused by previous

events, could not be restrained in England, and so strong was the

feeling evoked in the country, that war could no longer be avoided. At

first sight it may appear strange, that the story of useless butchery,

perpetrated in war time, should produce so violent a resentment; but

when events are reviewed, the reasons for it will be perceived. It is

necessary to glance at these events, in order to understand some

features connected with subsequent operations.

The guiding line of thought that influenced the statesmen of the two

Powers, interested in curbing the aggression of St. Petersburg, was the

conviction that Russia was at that time overwhelmingly powerful, and

that the Ottoman Empire was in the last gasp of impotence and

decrepitude. The Emperor Nicholas had for long fostered this idea, and

had carefully instilled it into our Government. With this object, he

made a journey to this country as early as 1844, and he pressed it upon

our Ambassador at his Court, in secret communications held in the spring

of 1853, before the actual crisis had taken place. We were then told

that Turkey was “a sick man—a very sick man” who might at any moment

“die upon our hands,” and that it was therefore advisable to divide his

inheritance; and our cupidity was tempted by the offer of Egypt, and

even of the island of Crete, if we would take these bribes, and give

Russia a free hand. We believed these assertions of omnipotence on the

one hand, and of prostration on the other, though needless to say we had

no desire to share in the spoils. Our minds instantly recurred to the

campaigns of 1828-29, when the Russians crossed the Balkans, and forced

a disastrous treaty upon the Sultan at Adrianople. We dwelt upon these

results, showing only Russian victories and Turkish defeat, and we drew

our conclusions therefrom. But we forgot a few historical facts

connected with that war.

We forgot that the Russians could only undertake a successful invasion

of Turkey, when they had the command of the Black Sea, and that we

ourselves had secured this for them, in 1828, by annihilating the

Turkish fleet the year before (August, 1827), at the unfortunate victory

of Navarino. We forgot, also, that the Balkans do not form the last line

of defence, but that the difficulties of an invader increase materially

as he approaches the Sea of Marmora. In 1829, the Russian army had

achieved a great deal, but it had not attained to victory. It was

exhausted, and unable to maintain itself at the end of a long line of

communications; while Turkey, on the other hand, was gathering her

forces together. We surely, then, failed to recollect, that we seized

the opportunity at that very critical moment to force the Sultan to make

a shameful peace; thereby saving the aggressor from disaster, and

securing to him advantages which otherwise he could never have hoped to

gain.

As a consequence of the exaggerated dread inspired by the great Northern

Power, the Turks were not allowed to act in their own defence in 1853;

they were obstructed by severe diplomatic pressure, and harassed by

vexatious interference. At last, after the _fiasco_ at Vienna, they

could no longer be restrained by their timid friends, and, in spite of

them, they at length declared war, in the autumn of 1853. Now, when the

Emperor Nicholas ordered an advance into the Ottoman Empire (viz. the

Danubian Principalities), in July, and when the Porte, dissuaded from

using force to repel the invasion, was obliged to allow her enemy

quietly to consolidate himself therein, Russia, to appease Europe, made

an announcement that she intended only to seize a material guarantee,

and would engage in no further offensive operations. She would only meet

any assault directed against her. England and France had sent their

ships to a port near the Dardanelles (September 11th), and, as soon as

the Sultan commenced hostilities, they ordered them up to

Constantinople, to protect Turkey from Russian aggression (October

22nd). Conscious of the dangers surrounding the small Turkish squadron

in the Black Sea, very urgent requests were made, that the friendly

fleets should pass through the Bosphorus, to prevent its falling into

the power of the enemy. But these applications were all peremptorily

refused.[186] To make the matter very much worse, and, indeed, to render

the whole course of action unintelligible, _the Turkish fleet itself_,

by the strong representations of the Sultan’s Western advisers, was also

kept back idly in the Bosphorus, and was prevented from sailing to the

support of the exposed squadron![187] Hence the disaster at Sinope

became inevitable. When this state of affairs was realized in

England,—when it was seen that our diplomatic skill was again at fault,

that the assurances of Russia were not to be relied upon, and that our

naval demonstrations were held in contempt,—then the natural

consequences followed, and the British people, their Government

notwithstanding, determined that the disturber of the peace of Europe

should be punished.

-----

Footnote 186:

“Our last information from St. Petersburg, still represents Russia as

desirous to treat, and as determined, above all, to assume the

offensive in no quarter. This confidence explained why our fleets did

not move” (_M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski_, Paris, Dec. 15,

1853).

Footnote 187:

See _Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin

and Greek Churches in Turkey_ , part ii., pp. 248-258. Writing from

Therapia, November 5, 1853, to Lord Clarendon, Lord Stratford de

Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, says, “I have

succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of

line-of-battle ships and sailing frigates into the Black Sea at this

moment” (_ibid._, p. 250).

-----

Early in 1854, the English, French, and Turkish fleets entered the Black

Sea; but the Russian flag had everywhere disappeared. The victorious

Admiral at Sinope,—never dreaming that our extreme caution and fear of

giving offence to his Imperial Master would prevent us from taking some

action, or from giving the Sultan leave to pursue and capture him,—had

betaken himself back to Sevastopol with the utmost speed; he only waited

to make the necessary repairs to secure a safe passage, for “the Russian

squadron had suffered considerably.” Nor was the Emperor Nicholas cast

down by recent events, except for the fact that Omar Pasha was steadily

destroying his military prestige on the Danube, and was revealing to the

world the real weakness of his supposed power in the field. He ordered

his Ambassadors in London and Paris to demand their passports, and they

left those capitals on the 6th of February. Meanwhile the tedious and

fruitless negotiations continued at Vienna, and Russia, far from showing

any conciliatory disposition, increased her demands. But these

conferences came to nothing, and on the 13th the British Ambassador was

invited to quit St. Petersburg.[188] An Ultimatum followed, calling upon

the Tsar to evacuate the Principalities, and the formal declaration of

war was issued on the 28th of March.

-----

Footnote 188:

The French Ambassador in Russia thereupon applied for his passports.

-----

Before this date, preparations for the coming strife had already been

made. Treaties of alliance were concluded with France and Turkey, and

the expeditionary force was sent to Malta. On the 10th of February a

Brigade Order was issued, whereby a Brigade of Foot Guards, consisting

of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalions Coldstream and

Scots Fusilier Guards, were to be held in readiness to proceed on

foreign service by the 18th, each Battalion to be completed to 40

sergeants, besides the usual Staff-sergeants, and 850 rank and file. The

1st Coldstream, then quartered at St. George’s barracks, were sent on

the 14th of February to Chichester, where the 2nd Battalion were

stationed,[189] there to be made up to field strength, and to transfer

weakly or unfit men to the latter. This was the first movement of the

troops in London, and the people, eager for war to commence, and ever

ready to welcome their brave defenders, hailed the appearance of the men

with unbounded enthusiasm. A contemporary writer thus describes the

scene:—

“It was just noon when the Battalion left, ... the whole line of

streets, from the barracks, along the Strand, over Waterloo Bridge, to

the terminus of the South Western Railway, was literally blocked by

multitudes, all eager to show some token of sympathy. Many a hand was

stretched out to the brave fellows as they passed, which they had

never clasped before—men of the humblest station grasped hands in

which the best blood of England flowed. 'Fair women and brave men'

waved their parting adieus. The windows and even the housetops were

peopled with spectators, whose cheers, and waving of hats, and

kerchiefs, testified their interest in the scene. Many of the Officers

were young-looking men, and the rank and file seemed to be in the very

bloom of youth and manhood, and to have attained that soldierly

bearing which only a perfect discipline, united to professional pride,

ever thoroughly forms.”[190]

-----

Footnote 189:

The 2nd Battalion proceeded to Windsor, and on the 28th to Wellington

barracks.

Footnote 190:

Nolan, _History of the War against Russia_ , i. 92.

-----

The Battalion, having been inspected at Chichester on the 17th,

proceeded to Southampton, and, amid the hearty cheers of a dense crowd,

embarked on board the steamship _Orinoco_ (22nd) for Malta. Arriving

there after a prosperous voyage, on the 4th of March, they were

stationed at Fort Manoel (4 companies), Fort Tigne (1 company), and in

the Lazarette (3 companies). The strength was 35 Officers, 919 men, and

32 women, the average age and service of the men being twenty-nine and

seven years respectively.[191] The following Officers embarked:—

Colonel C. Hay (_Commanding Battalion_).

Colonels W. Codrington; and G. Drummond (_Mounted_).

Lieut.-Colonels W. S. Newton; Hon. V. Dawson; M. Tierney; T.

Crombie; and H. Cumming.

Captains C. Cocks; J. Cowell; L. D. MacKinnon; W. Dawkins; H. Jolliffe; C.

T. Wilson; Hon. A. Hardinge; Hon. Percy Feilding (Adjutant); Charles

Baring; Hon. G. Eliot; H. Bouverie; H. Cust; H. Armytage; and Hon. H.

Byng.

Lieutenants A. Thellusson; P. Crawley; Sir James Dunlop, Bart.; G.

Goodlake; Lord Bingham; F. Ramsden; H. Tower; Hon. R. Drummond; and P.

Wyndham.

Battalion Surgeon J. Skelton. Assistant Surgeons F. Wildbore; and J.

Wyatt.

Quartermaster A. Falconer.

-----

Footnote 191:

John Wyatt, Battalion-Surgeon, _History of the 1st Battalion

Coldstream Guards during the Eastern Campaign, from February, 1854, to

June, 1856_ , p. 1 (1858).

-----

The three Guards Battalions reached Malta about the same time, and were

commanded by Colonel Bentinck (Coldstream Guards), who was appointed

Brigadier-General, February 21st. There they remained for about seven

weeks, awaiting events; while other troops, all infantry, poured into

the island, without General Officers, Staffs, or Departments, wherewith

to form an army. At first it seemed somewhat doubtful whether they would

go further. Our Government at home still dreamt of peace, and could not

make up their minds that war was upon them; they even seemed to have

thought that, though a naval demonstration had signally failed at

Constantinople, a military display in the Mediterranean might frighten

the Russians! The interval, however, was not misspent; it was utilized

in preparing the men for active service, principally in the exercise of

musketry, which was practised without interruption. With reference to

this important subject, the following, written by a Coldstream Officer

(Colonel Wilson), who was present with the Battalion, will be of

interest:—

“When the Household Brigade was ordered abroad, the military Court of

Chancery had come to no decision relative to the suitableness of the

Minié rifle for the general use of infantry. As yet that amazing tool

was in the possession of only a few _select_ men in every

regiment.[192] Hence, Lord Hardinge, who, it must be confessed, did

much for the improvement of English small arms, judged it expedient

that the Guards should take 'Brown Bess' to Malta; but, at the same

time, he despatched thither cases of Miniés, under the charge of a

competent instructor of musketry, Captain Lane-Fox [now General

Pitt-Rivers, late Grenadier Guards].... Thanks to Captain Fox’s

exertions in favour of modern betterment, and a few experiments, a

right verdict was at length delivered. At Scutari, old Brown Bess was

marched off ignominiously to the Ordnance stores, and the Minié maiden

became the faithful consort of every foot soldier. How completely have

subsequent events substantiated the truth of Fox’s arguments!”[193]

-----

Footnote 192:

The Battalions of the Brigade proceeding on foreign service, started

with 200 stand of Minié rifles and 650 percussion muskets (_Brigade

Order_ , Feb. 21st). Even as late as February, 1854, the respective

merits of these two firearms were so little determined, that we find

parties from each Regiment of the Brigade, ordered to fire 100 rounds

“of the common balls out of the old musket,” and to report upon the

comparative accuracy of the fire (_ibid._, Feb. 8th).

Footnote 193:

“A Regimental Officer” (Colonel C. T. Wilson, late Coldstream Guards),

_Our Veterans of 1854, in Camp and before the Enemy_ , p. 15 (London,

1859). The exchange of these firearms was not effected in the

Battalion till the end of May, 1854.

-----

Towards the end of March our French allies, already formed into fighting

units, began to appear in Malta on their way to Gallipoli, when they

fraternized freely and cordially with their British friends. A few days

later, Lieut.-General Sir George Brown reached the island, and started

for the same destination, where he was joined by five battalions of

infantry. Shortly afterwards, Scutari, opposite Constantinople on the

Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, was occupied by our troops, and the

British forces in the East began to collect there. The Guards Brigade

left Malta on the 21st of April, in three ships, seven companies of the

Coldstream embarking on H.M.S. _Vulcan_, the eighth accompanying the

Grenadier Guards on board the _Golden Fleece_; and, landing at Scutari

on the 29th, they encamped there. Next day a General Order was issued,

which announced to the troops the arrival and appointment of General

Lord Raglan, G.C.B., to the command of the army in Turkey,[194] whose

composition into divisions and brigades, “to replace the provisional

arrangement hitherto made by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown,” was also

notified. The organization and strength of the Allies will be given

later, when they were more complete, but it may be stated here, that

Captain F. Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards) was appointed

Brigade-Major of the Guards Brigade, and that the following Officers

belonging to the Coldstream were placed upon the Staff: Lieut.-Colonel

T. M. Steele, Military Secretary, and Lieut.-Colonel P. Somerset,

Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan; Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, Deputy Assistant

Adjutant-General, First Division; Captain Hon. H. Byng, Aide-de-camp to

Brigadier-General Bentinck; and Lieutenant Lord Bingham, extra

Aide-de-camp to Major-General Earl of Lucan.[195]

-----

Footnote 194:

See Appendix No. IX.

Footnote 195:

The following also eventually served upon the Staff as Coldstream

Officers: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Burghersh, Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan;

Lieut.-Colonel J. Airey, A.Q.M.G. Light Division; Captain Hon. H.

Campbell, Aide-de-camp to Major-General Codrington.

-----

“The army, or rather the infantry element of an army,” writes Colonel

Wilson, “accumulated apace. Most mornings saw leviathian steamers

letting go anchor in the Bosphorus; and an evening seldom passed

without a fresh uprising of tents. But cavalry, artillery, military

stores of all sorts, were yet afar off, tossing somewhere in sailing

transports. In too many quarters, indeed, there were indications that

the administration still clung to the fatal hallucination of peace,

when there could be no peace,—still tried to believe that a

demonstration within a mile of Constantinople, must be successful.

'Floriana and its parades failed,' some said, 'because Malta is so

distant from the Pruth; but this concentration of ours at Scutari has

a real business look, which _must_ tell!' Unluckily, the Tsar knew

that the government of England was built up of incoherent materials.

He had faith in his old familiar friend, '_ce cher_ Aberdeen.' His

Greek spies informed him, how on the heights of Chalcedon stood no

army ready to combat, only a stout corps of the unrivalled British

Foot; therefore, he stayed not his hand. Old birds are not to be

caught with chaff.”[196]

-----

Footnote 196:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 20.

-----

The six weeks spent at Scutari passed pleasantly enough. The scenes

around them were new to the rank and file, and many, in the Household

Brigade certainly, had never dreamt of the East and its marvels. There

was much to excite the interest of the men, and little to mar their

enjoyment. British sports and pastimes were freely indulged in; the food

was good; stores of groceries and other material comforts were provided;

no hardships were endured; the heat was not too oppressive; the military

authorities even relaxed some of their old-fashioned and most cherished

regulations, and the dog collar, called the stock, which then throttled

our soldiers, was happily discarded. Cavalry and artillery began,

moreover, to arrive in camp, and we seemed at length to be consolidating

into a field army. The troops were turned out on the Queen’s birthday,

and again on the 31st of May, for the inspection of the Sultan; and, as

usual, they presented a splendid appearance, both in physique and

discipline; moreover, they also began to look like an organized force.

Still there was no transport, and the medical service left much to be

desired. With no efficiency in these departments, how was war to be

conducted? And as the deficiency was absolute, did our Government really

mean that we should take the field? At last a makeshift was proposed,

which is best described in Colonel Wilson’s words:—

“The utter insufficiency of means of land-transport greatly perplexed

the authorities, and, judging from the ever-varying complexion of the

memoranda, orders, and notifications on the subject, which issued

continually from the bureaux of Selimnieh, it was unlikely a

satisfactory solution of the problem would be promptly reached. At one

moment, we were assured that the commissariat (hapless institution!

doomed from the very beginning to be the scape-goat of every

administrative failure or shortcoming) would provide for the

conveyance of tents, sick, baggage, and the like; an hour afterwards,

it was noised abroad that that department declined to engage in such

duties, that the poor Treasury camel, starved and cuffed about as it

was, had quite enough to do to provide the troops with daily bread,

without undertaking any fresh burdens. Then did a public-spirited man

in authority, hit upon the policy of making the Captains responsible

for the carriage of the _impedimenta_ of their respective companies;

naturally enough, this scheme was unfavourably received by those so

seriously menaced in that delicate point—the pocket. The intended

victims remonstrated, inquiring whence the purchase-money of so many

horses and mules was to be derived? how losses were to be indemnified?

meekly adding, that the project was unprecedented in military finance.

These objections silenced the prescriber of the nostrum. The alarmed

centurions heard no further about the matter.”[197]

-----

Footnote 197:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 23.

-----

After this, orders were issued to all Officers to provide themselves

with bât-horses.[198] Twenty-one were allotted to each battalion, of

which two belonged to every company for the transport of tents (_General

Order_ , June 1, 1854). Baggage parades frequently took place, to

instruct the men how to pack the loads, and to accustom the animals to

carry them.

-----

Footnote 198:

_Battalion Order_, May 25, 1854: “Officers are to provide themselves

with animals for the conveyance of their baggage without delay.”

-----

During the stay at Scutari, the question arose as to what further should

be done, and, to resolve it, the British and French Commanders-in-chief

proceeded to visit Omar Pasha in Bulgaria. The latter naturally desired

to have the Allies at his back, and he urged that they should occupy

Varna. This was agreed to, and the armies of England and France were at

last to be transferred to the seat of war. On the 29th of May, Sir G.

Brown’s division began to move, and a fortnight later (June 13th), the

Guards and Highland Brigades, forming the First Division, steamed up the

Bosphorus for their new destination. The Coldstream were conveyed there

in the steam-transport _Andes_. The men started in light order; a

reduced kit was carried in the knapsacks, the great coats, smock frocks,

and blankets rolled on the top, but the rest of the clothing and

necessaries were packed in the squad bags and left behind.[199]

-----

Footnote 199:

_General Order_, May 25th. “There will be no store of any kind at

Varna. Everything not intended for the field must be left here in

store” (_Battalion Order_, 26th).

-----

It may strike the modern reader as strange, that a proportion of women

were allowed to accompany their husbands belonging to the force destined

for the East. In Scutari they were lodged in huts in the camp, and

though inadequately provided for, badly housed, and subject to

inconveniences which could not be permitted in the present day, their

existence still was tolerable. But seeing how incomplete were the

transport arrangements, our astonishment must be extreme, when we learn

that the British army, about to take the field in a quarter where no

depôt or base of operations existed, was to be accompanied by these

women, whose presence under such circumstances, could not fail to be a

misery to themselves, as well as a serious burden to our defective

military organization. Yet this was done, and we find two tents per

battalion, making a total of ninety-six, allotted for their

accommodation. In the subsequent operations these unfortunate women, as

might have been easily anticipated, suffered considerably. They remained

in camp until the embarkation for the Crimea took place. A few were even

allowed to sail with the army to that coast, and during the passage the

wife of a sergeant of the Coldstream gave birth to a daughter, who was

appropriately christened “Euxina.” Fortunately they did not all

land.[200] They were sent back to Scutari, where the main depôt and

primary base of operations of the army in the East was formed, of which

a Brevet Major of the 30th Regiment was appointed Commandant.[201]

-----

Footnote 200:

At least some of the men’s wives (none belonging to the Brigade, as

far as can be ascertained) accompanied their husbands into the Crimea,

and remained there, during the course of the campaign. When we come to

the winter of 1854-55 (Chapter X.), it will be seen what hardships

they had to suffer. In mid-winter a letter, dated December 31st, was

published in Orders, stating that some women’s clothing had arrived,

and would be issued upon the production of a certificate that the

women applying were fit persons to receive it.

Footnote 201:

_General Order_, June 8, 1854. Subsequently a smaller depôt was also

formed at Varna, under command of a Captain of the 50th Regiment

(_General Order_ , June 30, 1854).

-----

Arriving at Varna (June 14th), the 1st Coldstream landed late in the

evening, and had to pitch their camp in the dark. The site was

unfortunately selected, both for the Brigade and for the rest of the

British army, being situated on a slimy flat, close to a large lake of

stagnant water, three-quarters of a mile from the town. Before a week

elapsed, the intense heat, bad water, indifferent and insufficient food,

and the monotony of inaction began to tell upon the men; they were

afflicted with diarrhœa and other ailments, so that the health of the

troops, hitherto entirely satisfactory, rapidly deteriorated. The

French, on the other hand, had taken greater care of themselves; they

occupied higher ground, and they suffered less. During the stay

there—about a fortnight, for, on the 1st of July, an advance was made to

Aladyn, some ten miles in the interior—the masses of the allied soldiery

met each other for the first time, and the warmest good-fellowship

existed between them. The French Chiefs, Marshal St. Arnaud and General

Canrobert, often rode through our camps, and the men invariably turned

out and cheered them with the utmost heartiness and good will—a welcome

which was always much appreciated. In spite of the sickness that

oppressed our troops, the Officers amused themselves, as they are always

sure to do, in various ways, not least of which was a hunt, extemporized

(but without hounds), after the wild mongrel dogs that were driven out

of the town, and infested the district. In the month of June, the armies

continued their concentration in Bulgaria; and by the 21st the bulk had

arrived there, when, in addition to the detachments of Turkish and

Egyptian troops that were stationed in the neighbourhood, they mustered

some 60,000 men.[202]

-----

Footnote 202:

Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 201.

-----

Meanwhile the forces under Omar Pasha were seriously engaged with the

enemy, and a few words will be necessary to explain briefly the military

events that took place. After the victory at Citate, there was a pause

in the operations till the middle of February, owing to the severity of

the winter and to the temporary illness of the Turkish Commander. The

Russians made strenuous efforts to repair their failures and their

losses sustained in 1853, and they poured large reinforcements into the

Principalities. In March, the Ottoman troops gained several successes.

On the 4th, they crossed to the northern bank of the Danube and made a

raid on Kalarashi; they repulsed an attack at Kalafat on the 11th, and

on the 15th they prevented a passage at Turtukai, while a like attempt

upon Rustchuk was also defeated. But the enemy, under General Luders,

succeeded about the same time in crossing the river lower down, near its

mouth, at Galatz, and invaded the Dobrudsha—an unhealthy district, full

of swamps, and badly suited to military operations. Overjoyed with this

advantage, Gortchakoff now reinforced Luders. After a series of

well-contested engagements, at the price of great losses, the principal

fortresses of the province, as far as Trajan’s wall (which extends from

Rassova to Kustendji, on the Black Sea), were reduced; while Omar left

them to their fate, and took no steps to retrieve the fortunes of the

campaign in this quarter. These reverses, however, were partially

compensated by another victory near Kalafat, and, as the Russians

retired before the Turks in this direction, Krajova was occupied by the

latter. This retreat was in reality a change of plan, for the enemy

moved a portion of his forces to the east, and pressed on the right of

Omar’s line, with the design of establishing himself between Varna and

Silistria.[203] His design was now to lay siege to the latter place,

which interposed, and which he had to take, if he meant to try and

establish a footing in Eastern Bulgaria.

-----

Footnote 203:

Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 127, etc.

-----

The protracted siege of Silistria has become famous in the annals of the

war, indeed in the history of military achievements. Space does not

allow a proper description of the gallant and desperate resistance,

which was then made by the Turks against overwhelming odds; but the

principal points connected therewith may be glanced at in this work, if

only because the British Officer, Major Butler, to whom, with Major

Nasmyth, great glory is due for the defence, was transferred to the

Coldstream Guards, as a reward for his brilliant services, though he

never belonged to the Regiment, for his death occurred before he was

actually gazetted.[204]

-----

Footnote 204:

Captain J. A. Butler, from half-pay, Ceylon Rifles, was gazetted

Lieutenant and Captain Coldstream Guards, July 15, 1854; he was

promoted Brevet-Major; and, on the 28th following, Lieutenant Ramsden

was appointed Lieutenant and Captain, _vice_ Brevet-Major Butler,

“died of his wounds.” His death took place on June 22nd, but his

appointment was never cancelled.

-----

Silistria was attacked on the 14th of April, but it was three weeks

later before a partial investment of the place was effected. The

Russians were determined to take the place at any cost, and they made

desperate efforts to accomplish their object; they brought up all their

available forces, and placed their most renowned and capable Officers in

command. During the siege, the war seemed almost everywhere else to

stand still in Eastern Bulgaria, and all eyes were fixed on the

memorable drama, that was being enacted in this part of the theatre of

operations. The garrison was weak, and the indifferent works were only

hastily repaired and strengthened; but the defenders were well led,

while the matchless bravery and the military virtues of the Turk were

fully displayed. Among the leaders, Mussa Pasha, the Commander, stood

pre-eminent for intrepidity and firmness. He was admirably supported by

the two British Officers, Captain Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, whose

scientific knowledge, ardent valour, and cool judgment made their

services of the utmost value, and gained for them undying renown. The

enemy having drawn his lines as close as possible to the fortifications,

resorted to every art to carry them. His principal efforts were directed

towards an open work, called Arab Tabia, whose fall would have

disconcerted the whole defence. Time after time, during the month of

May, the besiegers bombarded the stronghold, sapped up to it, tried to

mine it, and assaulted it both by day and by night. All to no purpose;

every attempt was repulsed with slaughter and disgrace. The Turks held

fast to their entrenchments, repaired them, met the enemy underground by

countermines, and made continual sorties, which they always pressed

home. Nowhere was a lodgment made; the troops of the Tsar gained no

single advantage, but were harassed and beaten. During this time Omar

Pasha was at Shumla, only some fifty miles distant, at the head of a

formidable corps. Contrary to his well-known character and to his

previous conduct in the war, he unaccountably remained inactive, and his

subordinates near him followed his example. But in the beginning of

June, he broke loose from the fetters that seemed to numb his faculties,

and once more began to display something of his wonted energy. He

ordered attacks to be made on various points of the Danube, which were

successful; and he pushed a brigade to Silistria, which entered it and

reinforced it. The Russians were now thoroughly disheartened, and, under

cover of a final assault, they raised the siege on the 23rd of June, and

fled in disorder from the scene of their disaster. In the siege alone

they lost as many as 12,000 men, and all their principal leaders were

severely wounded. Of the Turks, 4000 to 5000 men fell, but among them

were counted the brave Mussa and the heroic Butler, who succumbed to his

wounds on the 22nd, the day before victory crowned his noble deeds.[205]

-----

Footnote 205:

Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 214, etc.; Alexander W.

Kinglake, _The Invasion of the Crimea_, ii. 48, etc.

-----

Nor was this the only success gained by the Ottoman troops. During May,

the Turkish army based on Western Bulgaria, and operating from Kalafat,

was not idle, and defeated the enemy in several engagements, pushing him

back towards the east. By the end of the month, this advance began to

have some effect on the fortunes of the siege, and to be inconvenient to

the communications of the Russians. When, therefore, the latter gave up

all hope of taking Silistria, and left it in despair, they also soon

after evacuated all the strong places they had taken in the Dobrudsha,

and, re-crossing the river, they abandoned that province. This event was

followed by an attack on Giurgevo, opposite Rustchuk, where the Russians

still endeavoured to maintain a position; but the Turks drove them out,

and forced them to fall back towards Bucharest, in the middle of July.

Shortly afterwards, the enemy made a disorderly retreat towards the

Pruth, pursued by the victorious Turks, who entered the Roumanian

capital in triumph on August 8th.

“The retreat of Gortchakoff was neither dignified nor skilful; his

whining appeals to the inhabitants for mercy, and his haste to get his

troops beyond the reach of their enemies, contrasted ludicrously with

the braggart bulletins and proclamations which were so profusely

scattered, when there was no armed foe to dispute the seizure of the

'material guarantee.'”[206]

-----

Footnote 206:

Nolan, i. 236.

-----

N^o. 2.

[Illustration:

BLACK SEA

AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY

A.D. Innes & C^o London.

]

About this time another element was introduced into the tangled web of

Eastern affairs, which had great influence over the course of events,

and over the future conduct of the Anglo-French Allies. Austria now

intervened; and her action at this juncture led to important results.

This action must be taken briefly into consideration before we can

understand the causes that led to the invasion of the Crimea. The

geographical position of this Empire necessarily exercises a deciding

control over the communications of an army entering the Ottoman

territory from the north. Austria, in short, commands the lid of the

Turkish box; she can open it, and she can shut it, and prevent the hand

of Russia from trying to snatch the prize—Constantinople—which lies at

the bottom. In 1853, she held the lid wide open; but in 1854 another

course was adopted, more pleasing to the Allies, though not less

gratifying to the Tsar. It would not have suited the Government of

Vienna to run directly counter to the two maritime Powers of Europe, and

to declare themselves openly on the side of Russia; a diversion in Italy

might have been serious to their prosperity. So the plain policy of

opening the lid could no longer be maintained with safety. They

therefore concentrated a force of observation on the south-eastern

frontier early in spring, and, having prudently made an offensive and

defensive treaty with Prussia, whom they did not trust, they calmly

awaited events; and nothing was done till the summer. Austria then

prepared for future contingencies, by inducing the Porte to sign a

convention (June 14, 1854), by which she undertook to make Russia

evacuate the Principalities, and to occupy them herself while

hostilities lasted. Still she avoided any dispute with the Emperor

Nicholas; she remained inactive, until the fortunes of the war should

decide which of the belligerents was going to win in the field. On the

20th of August, however, when victory had declared itself entirely on

the side of the Ottoman armies, then, and then only, her forces entered

the Principalities, under the agreement that had been already signed,

and thereby she rendered several important services to the Russians. She

protected their retreat, saved them from disaster, and enabled them to

proceed undisturbed into the Crimea, by preventing the Turks from

pressing upon them, during their unfortunate march to the Pruth. She

became a barrier in the way of the Allies should they deem it necessary

to invade Bessarabia, and take a “material guarantee” for the repression

of future encroachments in Turkey. And, lastly, she upheld the false

prestige of the Tsar’s omnipotence, by making it appear that the

Russians had evacuated the Danubian Principalities, not because they

were forced to do so by the unaided valour of the Turks, but because the

strategic position of the Austrian Empire had obliged them to retire.

Meanwhile, little or nothing had been done by the Allies. Their fleets,

indeed, found no enemy to oppose them. Except, therefore, bombarding

Odessa (April 22nd) to avenge an outrage on a flag of truce, and

destroying batteries erected at the mouth of the Danube, there is

nothing of interest to record. It is to be noted that we neither

utilized, nor assisted the Turks to utilize, this great and important

river—over which our naval superiority gave us considerable power—for

the purpose of the war; but if our Ministry had the intention of

remaining inactive in Bulgaria, the want of all enterprise is easily

understood, and was the natural result of the policy pursued in London.

In the military sphere, a few squadrons, under Lord Cardigan, were sent,

in the end of June, when the fighting was all but over, to reconnoitre

towards the Dobrudsha, and returned about the 10th of July. They

acquired no information that could be of service, but, owing to the

heat, exposure, and insufficiency of food, many of the horses perished

or were disabled, and our small body of cavalry was uselessly weakened.

After their return, a large French force was pushed forward from Varna

as far as Kustendji. There was obviously nothing to be done in this

quarter at this period, so no advantage was or could be gained; but

cholera attacked the expedition, causing enormous loss, and they, too,

were needlessly weakened.[207]

-----

Footnote 207:

On August 8th it was computed that 10,000 lay dead or were stricken

down by sickness (Kinglake, _Crimea_, ii. 133).

-----

We left the Guards Brigade at Aladyn, close to Varna, which they reached

on July 1st. Here a halt was called, and the humdrum of camp life was

resumed. In the morning, the men were drilled, they practised musketry,

made fascines and gabions, or threw up earthworks; in the heat of the

day they lay about and slept; in the evening, the more energetic

endeavoured to obtain some addition to the ordinary scanty and insipid

supper. The peasants were conciliated, and a bazaar was established,

under the auspices of Colonel Gordon Drummond of the Coldstream, which

was fairly successful. It may be also noted that, after some discussion,

the old-fashioned regulations were further relaxed at this time, and,

shaving being dispensed with, beards were at length allowed to be worn

in the field.[208]

-----

Footnote 208:

This change had probably a wider bearing, if we may judge by the

following Regimental Order (London, July 25, 1854): “The moustache

will be taken into wear by the Coldstream, commencing to-morrow

morning.”

-----

The Brigade was inspected by Omar Pasha on the 6th of July, and his

presence inspired the men with genuine admiration. Here at last, was a

General who had really seen the Russians, who had fought against them,

and who had beaten them. The sight of such a leader gladdened our

gallant soldiers not a little; for they were sadly disappointed with

their forced inaction in Bulgaria,—so close to scenes of martial glory.

Now at last they buoyed themselves up with hope; they would move to the

front and take the field in earnest against the enemy. But this, alas!

was not yet to be, and before their warlike ardour was to be satisfied,

many trials were still to be endured.

Next day, the Brevet, dated June 20th, arrived in camp, and made

considerable changes in the Coldstream. By this gazette,

Brigadier-General Bentinck and Colonels Hay and Codrington were promoted

Major-Generals. The first of these Officers continued to command the

Guards Brigade in Turkey; the second, appointed to the Mauritius,

returned home; while General Codrington remained at the seat of war, and

shortly afterwards obtained a brigade there;[209] and before the peace,

he became Commander-in-chief of the British army in the Crimea. Owing to

these changes, Colonel Hon. A. Upton became Lieutenant-Colonel of the

Regiment, while Colonel Hon. G. Upton was posted to the command of the

1st Battalion, and Colonel G. Drummond to the 2nd Battalion. The latter

accordingly, as soon as he was relieved, was ordered to proceed to

England, as also were the following Officers, who were transferred on

promotion to the home Battalion: Lieut.-Colonel Newton, Captains

Halkett, Cowell, and Lieutenant Thellusson. By Brigade Order (London,

June 6th) a draft of 150 men for each Battalion in Turkey, was held in

readiness to proceed to the East on the 1st of July. The Coldstream

detachment, under the command of Colonel Hon. G. Upton and nine other

Officers, including a Medical Officer, embarked in H.M.S. _Vulcan_ on

the 27th, and reached Aladyn on the 20th of July. About the same time,

on the promotion of Captain F. Stephenson, Captain Hon. P. Feilding

temporarily took his place as Brigade Major, and Captain Hon. G. Eliot

became Acting Adjutant of the Battalion.[210]

-----

Footnote 209:

Vacant by the appointment of Major-General R. Airey as

Quartermaster-General on Lord Raglan’s Staff, _vice_ Major-General

Lord de Ros, invalided home.

Footnote 210:

The Officers of the Battalion were posted as follows: Commanding

Officer, Colonel Hon. G. Upton; Acting Adjutant, Captain Hon. G.

Eliot; Quartermaster, A. Falconer; Medical Officers—Battalion Surgeon,

J. Skelton; Assistant Surgeons, F. Wildbore, J. Wyatt, J. Trotter.

Company. Lieutenants. Ensigns.

No. 1. ... Capts. H. Jolliffe. Lts. F. Ramsden.

C. Baring.

No. 2. Colonel Lord F. Paulet. L. D. MacKinnon. Hon. R. Drummond.

Hon. W. Wellesley.

No. 3. Lt.-Col. T. Crombie. H. Armytage. H. Tower.

No. 4. Lt.-Col. Hon. R. Boyle. Capts. W. Dawkins. Lts. Sir J. Dunlop, Bart.

Percy Wyndham.

No. 5. Lt.-Col. C. Cocks. H. Bouverie. P. Crawley.

A. J. Fremantle.

No. 6. Lt.-Col. M. Tierney. C. Strong. H. Cust.

E. A. Disbrowe.

No. 7. Colonel W. Trevelyan. Lord Dunkellin. G. Goodlake.

No. 8. Lt.-Col. Hon. V. Dawson. C. T. Wilson.

Hon. G. Eliot.

-----

The camp at Aladyn was placed near the lake of Devna in a singularly

beautiful spot, “the seventh heaven of the artist;” but it was terribly

unhealthy, and entirely unsuited to a military station.[211] Sickness,

in the shape of typhus, dysentery, and ague, was not long in appearing

among the troops. It assumed increasing and alarming proportions, and it

was found very difficult to restore the strength of those who were once

attacked. During July, about a fifth of the Battalion were admitted into

hospital; the men lost their elasticity, and their spirits drooped. On

the 27th of the month, it was determined to move to a higher situation

near Gevreklek, a village about three miles away. It was hoped that the

change would produce an improvement, and everything was done to

endeavour to stay the disorders that had broken out; but without avail,

and cholera appearing, added its ghastly horrors to the general

distress. In spite of the efforts of the military authorities, and the

devotion of the doctors, the medical department was unable to bear the

strain thus suddenly put upon it, and the sick, placed in small bell

tents, and unprotected from the scorching heat, suffered terribly. The

rest, weakened by disease, awed by the plague that burst upon them, and

doomed to passive inactivity, were depressed and nerveless.

-----

Footnote 211:

This remark does not apply only to this camp, but to every camp

occupied by the British army in Bulgaria at this time. The evils that

befell the Brigade of Guards were reproduced with greater or less

intensity, at each of our military stations in this Turkish province.

-----

“A heavy torpor hung about the camp, voices rarely to be heard, except

when the sergeants warned the duties, or summoned a funeral party to

turn out. The poor men lounged about pallid, gloomy, depressed, and,

worst of signs, their appetites were remarkably affected; not half of

their daily portion of pork or beef could they consume; and yet, with

strange perversity, the authorities chose this moment as the apt time

for superadding an extra half pound of meat to the rations—the

original allowance being overmuch for our feeble digestions, we were

to get still more!”[212]

-----

Footnote 212:

_Our Veterans, etc._, 81.

At length the stricken troops were moved out of the pestilential place

in which they were stationed; a new decision was made, and the British

army was to be taken back to Varna. The Brigade left Gevreklek early on

the 16th of August, and such was the condition to which they were

reduced, that three days were required to accomplish a distance of less

than fifteen miles; the health of the men was so entirely broken down,

that they were unable to carry their packs during the short stages of

five miles each.

“Seldom has there been a more dismal march. The men, very ghosts of

the rosy giants who, but six short months before, had stepped so

cheerily across Waterloo Bridge, now plodded along in gloomy silence.

Not the most tremulous version of a song, not the feeblest effort at a

joke proceeded from the haggard ranks; and, worst sign of all, even

tobacco had fallen to a discount; ... and yet 'twas the flesh alone

that ailed, the spirit was willing as ever; ay, that it was!”[213]

-----

Footnote 213:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 91

-----

During the period the Battalion was stationed in Bulgaria, 57 men died

in the camp hospital, 28 of them from cholera and 25 from typhus fever.

The chief mortality occurred among the men lately arrived from England,

who appear to have been very young, with an average age and service of

21¾ and less than 2 years respectively. Many Officers were also affected

by the pestilence, and the Regiment had to mourn the loss of two among

them—Colonel Trevelyan, and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Boyle, M.P. Five

others were invalided.[214]

-----

Footnote 214:

Wyatt, p. 15. Lieut.-Colonels Tierney and Crombie, Lieutenants Wyndham

and Fremantle, and Assistant-Surgeon Wildbore. Lieut.-Colonel Cumming

had been invalided from Scutari in May, and Captain Hon. H. Byng,

Aide-de-camp to General Bentinck, was sent home in July, on account of

ill-health.

-----

Arrived at Varna, the sea breezes, the prospects of at last getting a

glimpse of the enemy, and possibly the new site selected for

encampment—away from the influence of the plague-breeding lake, in the

position which Omar Pasha had originally advised before the British army

left Scutari—produced beneficial effects upon the men. Though they were

still sickly and weak, and cholera lurked among them, their health

improved, and their spirits revived.[215] On the 29th of August, the

Brigade embarked for the much talked of invasion of the Crimea, but the

start was not made till some days later. The Coldstream, 26 Officers and

737 men, were divided into two wings; the left wing and head-quarters on

board the _Tonning_, the right in the _Simoon_ with the Grenadier

Guards. From the latter, to prevent overcrowding, two companies, under

Colonel Lord F. Paulet, were subsequently trans-shipped to the

_Vengeance_, and, on the 4th of September, to H.M.S. _Bellerophon_. The

sick of the Battalion, 89 in number, and 30 convalescents, were left

behind in the camp hospital, in charge of Assistant-Surgeon Trotter;

shortly afterwards they were sent to Scutari with the same Medical

Officer, who rejoined the Battalion on the 9th of November. A Brigade

detachment, moreover, consisting of three Officers (under a Captain and

Lieutenant-Colonel), four sergeants, and 100 rank and file, selected

from convalescents and those unfit for active service, were left behind

at Varna; of these the Coldstream furnished a sergeant and 33 rank and

file, under Captain MacKinnon, who rejoined the Battalion in the Crimea,

on the 4th of October.

-----

Footnote 215:

“At last the order to embark for the Crimea arrives. We are wild with

delight at the prospect of being shot at instead of dying of cholera!”

(Colonel Tower, late Coldstream Guards, _Diary_, Aug. 28, 1854).

-----

The fleet weighed anchor on the 7th of September, and, getting into

communication with our French and Turkish allies, the united armada

started on its errand to the Crimea. The events that now took place will

be described in the next and subsequent chapters, but, before concluding

this one, it will be necessary to give some idea of the forces and

organization of the Allied hosts that sailed on this memorable occasion

to invade the Empire of the Tsar of All the Russias.

The British army, under the command of General Lord Raglan, consisted of

five infantry divisions and of one cavalry division, each of two

brigades. The First Division, under Lieut.-General H.R.H. the Duke of

Cambridge, consisted of the Guards (3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and

1st Scots Fusilier Guards, Major-General Bentinck), and the Highland

brigades (the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments, Major-General Sir Colin

Campbell), and of two field batteries of artillery. The Second Division,

under Lieut.-General Sir de Lacy Evans, consisted of Major-General

Pennefather’s (30th, 55th, and 95th Regiments), and Brigadier-General

Adams' brigades (41st, 47th, and 49th), and of two field batteries. The

Third Division, under Lieut.-General Sir R. England, consisted of the

brigades of Brigadier-Generals Sir J. Campbell, Bart. (1st, 38th, and

50th), and Eyre (4th, 28th, and 44th), and of two field batteries. The

Fourth Division, under Lieut.-General Hon. Sir G. Cathcart, was still

incomplete, as two battalions had not yet arrived; the remainder was

formed of the 20th, 21st, 63rd, 68th Regiments and the 1st Battalion

Rifle Brigade, together with one field battery; the brigades being

commanded by Major-Generals Arthur Torrens and Goldie. The Fifth or

Light Division, commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown, was formed of

the brigades of Major-General Codrington (7th, 23rd, and 33rd), and of

Major-General Buller (19th, 77th, and 88th), also of the 2nd Battalion

Rifle Brigade, and of one troop horse artillery, and one field battery.

The Cavalry Division, under Lieut.-General Earl of Lucan, was formed of

the Light (4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 8th and 11th Hussars, and

the 17th Lancers, Major-General Earl of Cardigan), and of the Heavy

brigades (4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, and 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots

Greys, and 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, Major-General Hon. J. Scarlett),

also of one troop of horse artillery. General Scarlett’s brigade left

Varna later than the rest of the army, and reached the Crimea in

October. A siege train had also been provided; but it was temporarily

left behind. Each division was about 5000 men strong, and the English

army numbered altogether some 26,000 infantry, nearly 2000 cavalry, and

60 guns.[216]

-----

Footnote 216:

General Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B., _The War in the Crimea_ , pp. 31,

112 (London, 1892).

-----

The French, under the command of Marshal St. Arnaud, were formed into

four infantry divisions, each about 7000 strong, commanded by:—Generals

Canrobert 1st Division; Bosquet, 2nd; Prince Napoleon, 3rd; and Forey,

4th Division. At first they brought no cavalry with them to the Crimea,

but they had 68 guns. They were also accompanied by some 7000 Turks,

who, commanded by Suleiman Pasha, were attached to the French Marshal’s

army.

CHAPTER VII.

THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

Small results gained by the Allies—Sudden determination to

attack Sevastopol—Russian position in the Trans-Caucasian

provinces—Conditions under which the Crimea was invaded—The allied

Armada sails from Varna to Eupatoria—Landing effected at “Old

Fort”—The move to Sevastopol; the order of march—The enemy on the

Alma river, opposes the advance of the Allies—Description of the

field of battle; strength and position of the enemy—Commencement of

the battle of the Alma—Advance of the Light and the Second

Divisions—Deployment of the First Division—Advance of the Guards and

Highland Brigades—Defeat of the Russians—No pursuit—Losses—Bravery

and steadiness of the British troops—The Allies lose valuable time

after the battle—Arriving at last before their objective,

Sevastopol, they refuse to attack it—General description of

Sevastopol.

Hitherto the Anglo-French Allies had done nothing in the great struggle,

which had been raging between Russia and Turkey since the autumn of

1853, though they had been officially at war with the former for more

than five months, and were preparing for the strife before hostilities

had been declared. There was much cause for disappointment at this

inglorious result; and it was humiliating to the gallant armies of the

two foremost nations of Europe, to be sent to the East, merely to eat

out their hearts in inactivity, when feats of valour against the enemy

were performed almost within earshot of their camps. Nor was the excuse

put forward for this apathy—the want of transport—of any value; for

every member of the Government knew that transport is indispensable to

an army’s motion, and that without it no campaign is possible. That it

could have been obtained is not to be denied; and the conclusion is

irresistible, that the intention of taking the field in earnest, did not

enter into the calculations of our Cabinet. But now, when the enemy,

driven out of the Principalities, effected his escape under the friendly

cover of an Austrian force, when the Tsar, moreover, in no mood to sue

for peace, still breathed defiance, our Government were placed in a

difficulty. They had undertaken to make Russia submit; but their

diplomacy was unsuccessful, and their demonstrations were disregarded;

added to these failures, valuable time had slipped away, and the season

was wasted. Something, then, had to be done at once to retrieve the

past, for the country was losing its patience, and would brook no

further vacillation. Hence a change in policy became inevitable.

The Government had been cautious, not to say timid; but they now

entirely altered their demeanour. They suddenly became bold to the verge

of rashness, and resolved at any price to take Sevastopol by a _coup de

main_. It is true they were in complete ignorance of the strength,

defences, armament, and capacity of that fortress; they knew little of

its position, and nothing of the peninsula in which it is situated; and,

while the transport of the army was more than defective, the

commissariat and medical services were not in a much better condition.

But these things seem to have pressed them lightly. Their opinion was

strong, that Sevastopol was sure to fall, directly the Allied forces

appeared before its ramparts; and its destruction, they doubted not,

would bring about a peace, and cause the Tsar to relinquish his arrogant

pretensions. As soon, therefore, as the raising of the siege of

Silistria put an end to the war on Ottoman territory, they hastened to

frame a despatch to Lord Raglan, dated June 29th, directing that an

expedition against Sevastopol should be prepared. The despatch was so

worded, that it left the British Commander little option but to comply.

He therefore accepted the arduous undertaking which was pressed upon

him, though he did so very much against his better judgment, and he

announced his intention to the Government in a letter, dated July

19th.[217] It was early in September, as we have seen, before the armada

was ready to sail from Varna.

-----

Footnote 217:

Kinglake, ii. 115, etc. It is not without interest to observe, that

the draft of the despatch of June 29th, was submitted to the Cabinet

the day before, and that it passed without modification or even

comment. Mr. Kinglake tells us that the Ministers, upon whom devolved

the momentous duty of directing the course of military operations at

this critical time, “were overcome with sleep; ... the despatch,

though it bristled with sentences tending to provoke objection,

received from the Cabinet the kind of approval which is often awarded

to an unobjectionable sermon” (_Ibid._, 94).

-----

There can be no doubt, that it was anomalous and very inconvenient to

send out a military expedition to check Russian aggression with no

rational plan of action. In the beginning of the year, the terror which

the supposed omnipotence of the Emperor Nicholas inspired, made us

believe that all our efforts would be required to save Turkey from

certain and swift destruction. We even imagined that Constantinople was

in imminent danger; and the French rushed to Gallipoli, to take up a

flanking position against the hostile columns, which were almost

immediately expected to assault that city. This was our only plan, and

we trusted to events to develop another for us, should it be required.

When, therefore, we found that the result of the war on the Danube had

overturned all our preconceived ideas, we were unprepared for such an

event; and we drifted towards the first plausible scheme put forward,

irrespective of ways and means. Hence, the descent on Sevastopol was in

the nature of an afterthought: a crude design, hastily proposed and

rashly adopted, without reflection or calculation, and concerted without

reference to the Commanders at the seat of war, who, nevertheless, were

forced to accept it, and were held responsible for its execution.

After the collapse of the campaign in the Principalities, the urgent

question naturally arose—where was Russia to be attacked, and how was

she to be coerced by the Western Powers? There were vitally delicate

joints in the armour of that Empire, not inaccessible to our resources,

in Poland and in Finland. But the resuscitation of the oppressed

northern nationalities formed no part of our policy; they were held to

be beyond the scope of our aspirations. So we confined ourselves to a

few inconclusive descents on the coast of the Baltic, and the enemy had

no serious cause of disquietude in this important portion of his

dominions. Our intervention, therefore, in these quarters need not

further be discussed.[218] The army being in the Levant, principal

operations were to be conducted there.[219] The Crimea, no doubt,

occupies an important position in the Black Sea, and its conquest would

necessarily cramp the future plans of Russian aggrandisement. But who

was to hold it, if it were taken? Sevastopol, also, situated in the

peninsula, is a land-locked harbour, and a base of naval operations,

defended from the sea, and, in 1854, it was partially protected, on the

land fronts, by some indifferent works. If there were a good prospect of

rapidly capturing it, the design to do so had much to recommend it. Such

an event would injure the prestige of Russia, on which she greatly

relies for acquiring power; it would temporarily put an end to a secure

harbour suitable to maintain her fleet in the Black Sea, and it would be

one step towards the conquest of the Crimean Peninsula. But was the

chance—the slender chance—of prompt success worth the risk? Why enchain

our whole forces before the walls of a single and isolated fortress, if

the _coup de main_ were to miscarry, and a lengthened siege became

necessary? Was not the Euxine in our sole possession, and, as long as

this remained so, was not Sevastopol outside the sphere of military

operations, and entirely innocuous?

-----

Footnote 218:

The overwhelming catastrophe that overtook Napoleon I. in 1812, when,

in spite of his military genius, he lost his whole army of 500,000 and

his great power in Europe, calmed the impetuosity of those who might

have hoped to invade Russia, as if she were an ordinary European

nation. Yet the object-lesson could have been, and it is feared was,

pushed too far. Napoleon’s disaster was due to his own perversity and

to his military pride; for had he been content to re-organize and

emancipate Poland, and avoid the snow-covered and barren steppes of

the interior, his success, in destroying the sources of the power of

Russia, could not have failed to be complete, and the tide of her

encroachments must have rolled back for generations.

Footnote 219:

See Map No. 2, p. 149.

-----

Austria had been allowed to close the western theatre of operations

against the belligerent Powers. But it never seemed to have occurred to

them to cast a thought on that other theatre of war, which still lay

open to their attack in Asia. During 1854, the Turks were in disorder

there; acrimonious quarrels broke out among the leaders of their forces,

and, though the Russians made no great progress, the fortunes of the war

were deciding against our allies, to the detriment of the cause we had

undertaken to defend. In this quarter, moreover, we had every prospect

of success; we should have exposed ourselves to the least risk, and, if

victory crowned our efforts there, we should have secured the most

brilliant results. This field of operations, not distant from the

Crimea, offered ample scope for our energies, and, as we approached it

in 1855, though we did not avail ourselves of its advantages, a brief

allusion to it must here be made.

The Caspian Sea is connected with the Euxine by a chain of lofty

mountains (the Caucasus), which runs from Baku, on the former, to near

Poti, on the latter, and then, taking a north-westerly direction, skirts

the shore as far as Anapa, close to the straits of Yeni-kale. The

Caucasus forms the natural southern limit of Russia, but, in the course

of years, by the incomparable ability and, perhaps, by the unscrupulous

character of the policy pursued at St. Petersburg, the frontiers of the

Empire have been pushed south of these mountains, pressing upon Persia

on the Araxes, and on the Ottoman Empire in Armenia. Now, communications

with these Trans-Caucasian provinces (Mingrelia, Georgia, etc.) were

insecure in 1854; for, inhabiting the northern slopes of the great range

were vigorous, unsubdued races of hardy mountaineers, called by the

general name Circassians, who for years had preserved their liberties

and independence, in spite of the efforts of the Tsar to enthrall them.

This eastern Switzerland had some claim upon our sympathy, if not

because of the cause of freedom for which the people struggled, at least

on account of the peculiar position they occupied on the Russian line of

communications. Nor should it be forgotten that the subjugation of these

mountaineers affected, in no slight degree, the tranquillity and the

future security of India; for, until they were overcome, the systematic

advance of Russia into Central Asia was not easily accomplished.

Operations to support the Circassians and the kindred tribes in the

Caucasus, had the advantage, then, of directly protecting, in the far

East, those interests, to secure which, we had embarked in the war; and,

if they had been successful, as they could not fail to be successful,

even by the employment of a moderate force, the enemy must have lost

Trans-Caucasia. The Russian Empire, considered to be safe from attack,

was very vulnerable in this quarter, at a time when the mountain region

was still unsubdued; and a blow struck there, making the Allies masters

of the situation, would necessarily have enabled them to settle the

Eastern Question as they thought best for the welfare of Europe. But the

influence which was exercised over the Tsar’s aggressions in Turkey, by

the brave races, who for so long held the passes against tremendous odds

in defence of their homes, was scarcely recognized and hardly noticed in

the West in 1854.[220]

-----

Footnote 220:

Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, K.C.B., _England and Russia in the

East_, p. 272 (2nd. edit.; London, 1875). The writer doubts if the

fall of Circassia has ever been properly understood. He alludes to the

great efforts made by Russia immediately after the Crimean war to

subdue these tribes; she practically accomplished this difficult task

in 1859, when Shámil was taken prisoner. A year or two later, the

extinction of the Circassian nationality was achieved. This “was the

turning-point of Russian Empire in the East.” The regular and

successful advance in Central Asia took place after this event,

beginning in 1863. Since then, but only since then, this advance has

been rapid, and has proceeded without a check, until, in spite of

“neutral zones” and “buffers,” the present commanding position has

been gained in Asia, almost within sight of our Indian frontiers.

-----

We have already seen that, owing to the benevolence displayed by Austria

to the Russians, the latter were enabled to retire from the Danube into

Bessarabia unmolested by the pursuing Turks. This act on the part of a

Power regarded as a friend by Great Britain, cost us dear shortly after

this time. Its immediate consequences were, however, not unnoticed, and

it was plain both to the allied Governments and to the Commanders, that

the enemy would push his forces into the Crimea, without delay, if he

got an inkling that an attempt on Sevastopol were imminent.

Unfortunately the enemy got more than a hint as to our intentions. In

order to prepare for the success of a _coup de main_ on a position, it

is evident that one essential condition to be observed is secrecy; nor

is it immaterial to mislead the enemy by false attacks, alarms, and

reports. But exactly the reverse took place. No demonstrations were

made, and we blazoned our design to the whole world; the English press

spoke of it freely and openly, since the end of June; and Marshal St.

Arnaud had the imprudence to issue a vainglorious proclamation to his

army, on the 25th of August, which ended with the following inflated

words: “Bientôt nous saluerons ensemble les trois drapeaux réunis

flottant sur les remparts de Sévastopol de notre cri national, Vive

l'Empereur!”

A plan, previously concerted with the Officers who were to carry it out,

upon so difficult a subject as the operation in hand, could not have

been matured and adopted, unless the means of isolating the Crimea from

the rest of Russia, had also been considered. There are two principal

lines by which the peninsula is fed from the main land. The isthmus of

Perekop and the Sea of Azof. The former, unconnected with the great

river system of the Empire, was of service mainly to bring portions of

the army of Bessarabia to the neighbourhood of Sevastopol. The latter,

however, receiving the waters of the Don, served to take down

reinforcements and supplies from the interior to the new seat of war.

The despatch of the 29th of June already alluded to, contains a passage

on this matter: “As all communications by sea are now in the hands of

the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all

communication by land, between the Crimea and the other parts of the

Russian dominions.” It would have been fortunate if, in accordance with

these instructions, we could have seized the narrow isthmus of Perekop,

but we did not do so, and it remained open to the enemy. On the other

hand, a small body of troops could have gained a footing near Kertch,

and have maintained itself there; for, the Allied naval resources were

more than ample to support it, to occupy and dominate the Sea of Azof,

and to cut the Crimea off completely from the supplies sent down the

river Don, from the large depôts and magazines established in its

vicinity. Such an expedition, moreover, would have served to blind the

enemy as to the intentions of the invaders with regard to Sevastopol,

and have made him uncertain whether the ultimate aim was not to operate

in the neighbourhood of the Caucasus. Having much to lose in this

quarter, he was all the more sensitive to pressure there, and greater

deception could thus have been practised on his fears.

That these expeditions did not take place at that time, is probably to

be ascribed to the belief of the Commanders that the whole force was

little enough, in order successfully to carry Sevastopol by storm. The

orders they received from home did not contemplate a lengthy operation.

Not for an instant did any one suppose, that it could last through the

winter. It was late in the year; barely six weeks, or at least two

months, of good weather could be expected to continue. It was known that

the winter in the Black Sea region was intensely severe and cold; there

was no provision made for the army against the terrible hardships which

the snow, frost, and hurricanes of the Crimea must entail. The plan

proposed to the allied Commanders was a short operation, and by them it

was so accepted; it was a descent upon a coast, a march, and an assault.

Fixing their eyes intently upon this plan, the importance of attacks on

the enemy’s communications, dwindled in their estimation, and lost much

of its value. Expeditions of this nature, were fitted rather to a

regular siege, which might be expected to last for many months, and were

scarcely essential to carry out the object which was then in hand, viz.

to bring up every available battalion to the point, where a

ready-prepared and decisive victory was to be gained.

These preliminary observations are necessary to a Regimental history, as

an introduction to the events which are now to be recorded. For if they

were not stated, it would be impossible for the reader to understand the

reasons for the hardships, which our troops had soon to suffer, or to

appreciate the glorious part they played in a calamitous war, where

their fortitude and courage not only saved, but enhanced, the military

greatness of Great Britain, and stood out in bright relief to so much

that was unfortunate and damaging to our reputation as a nation of the

first magnitude in Europe. It may in truth be stated, that to the

British soldiers, and to the Officers who led them, the country owes it

that a national catastrophe did not occur. Their discipline and dogged

resolution never wavered for an instant, and they carried England

unscathed through the ordeal. A history dealing with the actions of a

Regiment engaged on that memorable occasion, would be sadly incomplete,

if it failed to show this truth, or to describe the false positions in

which the vital interests of this country became unhappily involved, and

from which it was extricated solely by the manly bearing, and

unflinching self-sacrifice of the army.

The armada, which left the shores of Bulgaria on the 7th of September,

did not immediately sail to its destination; part of the Allied fleet

had started before that date, but the whole met together on the 8th, and

next day the British portion anchored in deep water some miles east of

the Isle of Serpents. Lord Raglan now left to reconnoitre the coast, and

to select a landing-place. His French colleague was ill, and could not

accompany him. Proceeding from Balaklava to Eupatoria, he finally

selected a stretch of sandy beach, covered by lagoons, at a spot marked

on the maps as “Old Fort,” situated some twelve miles south of the

latter town, and about twenty-five from Sevastopol.[221] Meanwhile, the

Allied flotilla again got into communication, the slower sailing ships

coming up to the _rendez-vous_. On the 12th, the magnificent and orderly

array of the united fleets, occupying nearly nine miles of sea room,

approached the Crimea, and converged on Old Fort; and then our men got a

first welcome glimpse of the strange and unknown country they were about

to invade. Next day, Eupatoria was summoned, and surrendered without a

shot being fired; and on the 14th, exactly the forty-second anniversary

of the triumphant entry of Napoleon I. into Moscow, the Allies began to

land, the Turks on the right, then the French, and the British on the

left.

-----

Footnote 221:

See Map No. 3, p. 165.

-----

The sea voyage braced up the health of the men; they were fast losing

the lassitude and despondency that so lately oppressed them, and were

regaining their usual strength, elasticity, and good spirits.

“Notwithstanding there is no casting loose the foul fiend—cholera,” and

many casualties were reported; but the Coldstream seem to have been

spared by the scourge during the passage, though eight sick were unable

to disembark, and were sent to the _Simoon_. A foretaste of cold weather

was also unexpectedly experienced, for on the 12th, there was a

hail-storm “abundantly accompanied by snow.”[222]

-----

Footnote 222:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 102.

-----

Before leaving their ships, the troops had the temporary character of

the expedition brought strongly before their imagination. The

bât-horses, collected with difficulty at Scutari, were left behind in

Bulgaria; there was no transport for regimental baggage, except an

animal to carry the medicine-panniers. Officers loaded their haversacks

and their persons with three days' salt pork, biscuit, and such

indispensable articles, that a short campaign required. Dressed in

tight-fitting swallow-tailed coatees, resplendent with gold lace, now

sadly tarnished, their clothing was scarcely adapted to the harsh trials

of actual warfare; added to which, they were weighted and encumbered,

and had the appearance of “animated lumps of undigested packages, all

cloak, bundle, and hairy cap.” Nor did the men fare any better. It

appears that the only heavy part of the knapsack was its wooden frame,

and this had been discarded some weeks before; when this was done, it

served as a light and fairly good valise in which to carry the necessary

kit safely and secure from rain. At the last moment, however, it was

feared that the men were still too weak to carry even their lightened

packs. But, instead of reducing the articles to be taken therein to a

_minimum_, this _minimum_, in the shape of a pair of boots, a pair of

socks, a shirt, and a forage cap, was ordered to be wrapped in the

blanket and great coat; while the knapsack itself, designed to hold

them, was left behind on board ship, together with all other articles of

private property brought from Varna. Thus an unsightly and most

inconvenient bundle was formed, ill-adapted to its purpose, and a

doubtful place for the safe keeping of the few articles that were

considered indispensable to the soldier’s welfare.[223] Three days'

rations, some cooking utensils, wooden water-kegs, and sixty rounds of

ammunition completed the personal equipment brought into the enemy’s

country.

-----

Footnote 223:

It appears that the two companies of the Coldstream which were on

board H.M.S. _Bellerophon_, under the command of Colonel Lord F.

Paulet, retained their lightened knapsacks (Wyatt, p. 19). The reader

will be interested to learn that the men left Varna dressed in white

trousers; the order to take cloth trousers into wear, is dated Sept.

15th.

-----

N^o. 3.

[Illustration:

COUNTRY BETWEEN

EUPATORIA AND SEVASTOPOL

_Compiled from_ Hamley’s Crimea _by kind permission_.

]

From the 14th to the 18th, the disembarkation of the Allies continued,

observed by Cossack horsemen until driven away, and interrupted only by

the rolling waves, which, tumbling on the beach, made it sometimes

unsafe to land the horses and guns. The Light and First Divisions were

on shore on the 14th; the Guards Brigade, remaining in formation till

the afternoon, marched inland for about three miles, after the Light

Division had started, where they bivouacked for the night. The morning

was fine, but the evening turned very cold, the wind rose, and the rain

came down in torrents, drenching all ranks and conditions, from the

Divisional Commander, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, to the youngest

drummer. It was an inhospitable welcome that awaited our first night on

the Crimean coast, but the men were in good heart, and made light of

their misfortunes. On the 16th, a few tents were landed, but, for want

of transport, they had to be returned on board the following day,—except

one, which was retained for the sick, and was to be carried between the

medicine-panniers on the hospital bât-horse. The story of the halt near

Old Fort, would not have been complete had there been no “scare” to

record. Was it ever wanting among troops, who for the first time await

the approach of an enemy? Here it took place about midnight on the 16th,

when an alarm was raised of the approach of Cossacks, and the troops

turned out hurriedly; nor was it unlikely that the Russians would

endeavour to attack the Allies, before they were ready to advance from

the coast. Upon this occasion, however, a false report only had gained

credence; there was no enemy in the vicinity, and the occurrence, though

startling for the moment, doubtless, eventually served to steady the

nerves of men who had never yet heard a shot fired in anger. In one way,

things went smoothly enough, at all events in the camp of the Brigade,

who, placed near a friendly Tartar village, bought small sheep at two

shillings each, and fowls for fourpence or fivepence; but the dreaded

cholera still hovered about, and one man of the Battalion died, after a

few hours' sickness, on the 17th.

At last, early on the 19th, all arrangements being completed, the

troops, horses, and guns landed, a small number (250) of country carts

collected, and some cattle, sheep, and other supplies procured from the

neighbourhood, the Allies began their march to Sevastopol, supported by

the fleets that steamed slowly along the coast in the same direction.

They numbered rather less than 60,000 men and 128 guns, and as the

French and Turks had no cavalry with them, the united army had only one

brigade (Lord Cardigan) to rely on. Marshal St. Arnaud marched near the

sea; Bosquet’s division was in front, followed by Prince Napoleon on the

left, by Canrobert on the right, and by Forey in rear; and, lastly, the

Turks and the baggage and reserve ammunition, were in the open space

which was surrounded by these four divisions. The British army moved on

the left of the French, and were thus placed on the exposed flank; the

Second and Light Divisions leading, the former nearest our allies,

followed respectively by the Third and First Divisions, the Fourth

marching after the First. The guns were on the right of their divisions,

the infantry in double column of companies from the centre of

battalions, and the cavalry divided, two regiments on the left flank,

two covering the advance, and one in rear. This formation was adopted,

because, the left of the Allies being undefended, it was not improbable

that the enemy might venture to make an onslaught upon that flank from

Simferopol. The weather was sultry, and the advance lay across a vast

rolling plain, destitute of trees and shrubs, and swept bare of

inhabitants and supplies by the Russian cavalry. After two hours, the

heat affected some of the men, and, the ever-recurring plague of cholera

still dogging their footsteps, victims to its ravages began to fall out.

“And now an astounding fact became patent to all—we had no ambulance!

We had invaded an enemy’s country without means of transporting the

sick and wounded, beyond a few stretchers in the hands of bandsmen and

drum-boys! The sick and wounded of 27,000 British soldiers were to be

carried bodily over burning steppes, where water was not, by drummers

and fifers! These lads being physically unequal to the duty expected

of them, we endeavoured to supply their places with files of the

heavy-weighted soldiery: but of course this hard expedient broke down

too; the work could not be done by human muscle, in fact; hence, tall

fellows, not a few, were left behind, to take their chance of being

picked up—God help them!”[224]

-----

Footnote 224:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 122. Kinglake tells us that, in the evening,

a force was sent to bring in the stragglers, who were very numerous

during the march (_Invasion of the Crimea_, ii. 209).

-----

But in the afternoon the attention of the troops was diverted from these

scenes of suffering; shots were heard in the front. The enemy was

expected to take up a position near one of the rivers that flow at right

angles across the Eupatoria post-road, on both sides of which the Allies

were advancing; and here, at length, on the Bulganak, the divisions in

rear thought that they were going to try conclusions with the enemy. In

a very short time, however, the firing proved to be but a skirmish; for,

after the expenditure of a few rounds, the Russians—6000 infantry, 2000

cavalry, and two batteries—moved back, before they had made us deploy

much of our force, and left us in possession of the stream without

further resistance. There we bivouacked for the night, in the full

assurance that a great action would be fought on the following day.

According to an estimate of the enemy’s forces in the Crimea, made by

the Foreign Office at home, it was computed that there were some 45,000

men near and in Sevastopol, excluding troops which might be drawn from

the Caucasus and Bessarabia. Of this estimate Lord Raglan had been

informed, but it seems he placed no great reliance upon it. He knew,

however, that the Russians were relatively strong in cavalry, and that

their army was commanded by Prince Menshikoff.

It was between nine and ten before the Allies moved from their bivouacs

on the morning of the 20th, the British army bringing their left

shoulders up, to get into closer communication with the French. On

reaching the top of a grassy ridge which looks over the valley of the

Alma, the position taken up by the enemy on the heights above that

stream, first came into sight, and immediate preparations were made to

dislodge him. The field of battle is a sloping plain from the north to

the river, which is fordable in summer, from whence springs abruptly on

the south bank, to a height of 300 to 400 feet, a commanding range of

hills overlooking the plain, and running from the sea, for a distance of

five miles, to a bluff called Kurgané Hill.[225] The river makes a

trifling bend, forming a slightly re-entering angle towards these

heights, on the western side of the Kurgané; and here the post-road

crosses the stream, close to the village of Burliuk, by a wooden bridge,

which had not been destroyed. This point marked the junction of the

English right and the French left. On the French section of the field,

the heights press close and cliff-like to the river, but they recede and

become more accessible for a mile to the west of the angle mentioned.

Roads available for guns ascend the hills at the mouth of the Alma, at

the village of Almatamak, at a farm a mile further up, and again close

to Burliuk, where, on the Russian side, the ground is more practicable;

this last road leads to a height known as the Telegraph Hill. On the

English section, the heights are further from the river, and the ascent

is everywhere easy for all arms; but on that very account it was the

more difficult to storm, for here the ground could be swept with fire,

and the defenders had every facility for making counter-attacks. The

tops of the hills form a wide plateau, stretching southwards towards the

Katcha river, indented only near the angle, by a depression between the

Kurgané and Telegraph Hills, through which the post-road rises, as it

proceeds to Sevastopol.[226]

-----

Footnote 225:

See Map No. 4, p. 174.

Footnote 226:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 47, etc.

-----

The Russian army, numerically weaker than the Allies, being 33,000

infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 120 guns, occupied the plateau. The main

portion, 21,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 84 guns, was placed on

Kurgané and on the post-road, opposite the English section; the

remainder, 12000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 36 guns, near the post-road

and on Telegraph Hill, were opposed to the French. The cavalry took post

on the enemy’s right and rear, supported by horse artillery; but no

troops were further to the west, where the ground was under fire from

the war-ships. Menshikoff, however, forgot, though he had time at his

disposal, to block the roads which ascend the cliff and the rough

precipitous hillsides opposite the French position. Nor did he construct

fieldworks on his front and right flank, contenting himself with only

two gun-epaulments on Kurgané, one of which, about 300 yards from the

river, was armed with 14 heavy guns of position.

There was a pause when the Allies approached the position they were

about to assail, during which the troops refreshed themselves with cold

pork and biscuits, after their march on a warm and glorious morning. In

the interval, all eyes were turned to the heights that frowned in front,

and saw in the distance the hostile sharpshooters extended along the

river, in the vineyards and gardens, through which the advance was about

to be made. Nor were we unconscious that the whole of our force was

easily to be discerned, and our intentions to be divined by our

antagonist; for we halted boldly on the sloping plain, in full view of

the enemy, who, perched on the higher ground, was enabled to make his

observations and to conceal much of his own order of battle from our

anxious gaze. Meanwhile, the two Commanders-in-chief were concerting

their plans. They had met before, but this was their final consultation.

St. Arnaud had fixed and strong ideas on the situation; he was voluble

in expressing them, and, though zealous and brave, he was somewhat

shallow and self-opinionated. Lord Raglan’s first care was to insure a

good understanding with his impetuous colleague. He was hampered by the

alliance; and there was no supreme Commander to give a decision at this

moment when unity of action was indispensably necessary. The Chiefs

parted, and came to no definite conclusion; unless a hazy understanding

can be called so, that the French were to try and turn the Russian left,

but that the British could not do the same thing on the other flank

“with such a body of cavalry as the enemy had in the plain.”[227]

-----

Footnote 227:

Kinglake, ii. 239, etc., 250.

-----

At one o’clock Bosquet’s division advanced. One brigade with the

artillery, pushed through Almatamak and up the road there; the

remainder, and the Turks, some 10,000 men, crossed the Alma near its

mouth, and, ascending the pathway that leads thence to the cliff, found

themselves far from the battle-field, and never fired a shot during the

action. Canrobert took his division along the road at the farm, and

debouched on the plateau a mile to the west of Telegraph Hill; but his

own artillery followed that of Bosquet, and were with the latter’s left

brigade, a mile still further to the west. Prince Napoleon’s division

was on Canrobert’s left, and made for Telegraph Hill; while Forey was in

second line, in reserve. As the Turks were 7000 strong and the French

28,000, Marshal St. Arnaud had only 25,000 men and 68 guns in action.

The original formation of the British army had not been altered: the

Second Division was on the right, the Light on the left, both in the

first line, followed by the Third and First in the second line, the

Fourth Division in reserve; four regiments of the cavalry covered the

left, one followed in rear. The whole, 23,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry,

and 60 guns—for part of the Fourth Division were still on the road from

Old Fort—covered by the Rifles, now moved forward straight for the

enemy’s strong position on Kurgané, the right being directed upon

Burliuk. The Russian skirmishers retired, setting fire to that village

as the first line approached; while the latter, coming nearly within

range of the hostile artillery, deployed. But too little ground had been

taken up, and, in spite of every effort to rectify the mistake, the

battalions overlapped, and were dangerously crowded. Lord Raglan, in

pursuance of the arrangement already made with St. Arnaud, now delayed

the attack until the French had time to complete the movement they had

begun; but the Marshal was impatient, and before his troops could

produce any impression on the enemy’s left, he urged his colleague to

wait no longer. In response to this strong request, Lord Raglan ordered

his first line to advance.

The Second Division (Sir De L. Evans) was delayed by the conflagration

raging in Burliuk; but the Light Division (Sir G. Brown), breaking

through the vines and fording the river, gained a footing on the south

bank, disordered by the obstacles they met, by the want of space, and by

the hot fire poured upon them. General Codrington, heading his brigade

and two battalions that joined him—one of Buller’s and one of the Second

Division—led them boldly up the slope under the fire of the battery

behind the epaulment; while the rest of Buller’s brigade covered his

left flank from a threatening movement observed in that direction. On

his right were three of Evans’s battalions; the other two, under Adams,

having crossed the Alma, below the burning village, pushed into the

space to the west of the post-road. The Russians, seriously alarmed at

Codrington’s impetuous onslaught, withdrew their heavy guns from the

epaulment, except two, which they could not get away, and which were

captured. Cheered by this retreat, the British gained the breastwork,

and took possession of it; but they now found themselves face to face

with large masses of the enemy’s infantry and cavalry, supported by

field-guns. The gallant rush in the face of a tremendous fire had come

to an end; it was the moment for supports to arrive; but as they were

not close enough to be available at this critical moment, the attacking

brigade was soon afterwards forced back to the foot of the slope.

Meanwhile, the First Division (Duke of Cambridge) deployed and halted

just beyond effective range, watching with enthusiastic animation and

breathless interest, the movements of their comrades in front of them.

There was more room for them, as they were not overcrowded by the Third

Division (Sir R. England), which took up a position somewhat in rear. On

the right stood the Guards Brigade in their usual order—Grenadiers on

the right, Coldstream on the left, and Scots Fusiliers in the centre;

the Highlanders were formed on the left of the division. While they

waited, spent round shot came bounding through the ranks like cricket

balls. The men, longing to take part in the fray, were in exuberant

spirits; the least trifle amused them, and a little Maltese terrier

called “Toby,” belonging to the Coldstream drummers, drew loud laughter

from the light-hearted soldiery as it gave chase to the Russian round

shot which rolled slowly along the smooth ground.

At length Lieut.-Colonel Steele brought the order to advance, and never

was it obeyed with greater alacrity and spirit, the whole division

moving forward with admirable precision. Approaching the vineyards, the

enemy directed his artillery upon our men; but they quickly pushed their

way through the tangled shrubs, and over a low wall obstructing their

path up to the Alma, which they immediately crossed, and here they found

shelter from the fire of the Russians. As it had been impossible to

reconnoitre the ground, each regiment had to take its chance of finding

a favourable spot, or the reverse, for its passage; and it happened that

the Coldstream reached the river, where it makes a large S-shaped bend,

so that the greater part of the Battalion had to go through the water

three times. Owing to the many obstructions in their way, all three

Battalions were in considerable confusion when they arrived at the foot

of the southern bank, and they at once began to reform their ranks.

Colonel Upton, having halted the Coldstream, called out the markers to

the front, quickly assembled the companies upon them, and then wheeled

the Battalion into line, before making any further advance, in a manner

that would have satisfied the most exacting drill-sergeant on parade in

Hyde Park.[228]

-----

Footnote 228:

See _The Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ (by General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C.,

G.C.B.), p. 55 (London, 1895).

-----

Meanwhile Codrington’s brigade were still in front, clinging to the

epaulment they had captured, and engaged in a very unequal struggle with

the enemy. Their distress was apparent from the river, and General

Bentinck immediately ordered the Scots Fusilier Guards to hurry to their

relief before there had been sufficient time to reform their line, and

while their ranks were still disordered and their companies mixed up. As

they moved forward, they met General Codrington’s Aide-de-camp, who was

sent to beg them to hasten to the front as quickly as possible, and they

eagerly complied. Just at this moment a series of untoward circumstances

occurred. The backward rush of some of the Light Division struck them

with tremendous force; an order intended for the 23rd Fusiliers, “Retire

Fusiliers!” was heard in the field, and was believed by many of the

Fusilier Guards to apply to them; the enemy was close, and in hot

pursuit, and his artillery was firing furiously upon them. It was a

critical moment, and one that would have been fatal to any but the best

troops; but in spite of the gallantry of the Officers, who, running

forward, endeavoured to rally the men, two or three companies were swept

back by the retreating brigade, and were carried away with them towards

the river, while the remainder halted, opened fire, and held their

ground.[229]

-----

Footnote 229:

The following extract of a letter written by General Codrington, on

September 27th, will be read with interest: “We were borne back, and

when I saw we could not long bear up in these groups (from which I

could not get them), I sent young Campbell [now Lt.-Col. Hon. H.

Campbell, late Coldstream Guards] to the rear to the Battalion of

Guards which I saw, to beg them to hurry their advance, otherwise we

must lose all we had gained.... I saw the line of Guards coming up,

though they were further off than I wished, and than they ought to

have been in such a crisis; it was the Fusiliers in my rear to whom I

sent, and I tried hard to keep our position, though in our irregular

order, till they came; but I could not, the fire was heavy, the men

collected in instinctive heaps and were borne back on the advance of

the left wing of the Fusiliers, carrying, in fact, three or four

companies back with them down the slope to the rocky shelter.... When

the two or three companies of the Fusiliers were borne back with us,

the right wing went on gallantly.” The losses of this Battalion were

very heavy, and amounted to 11 Officers and 170 men during the day.

Among the many acts of bravery performed by Officers and men during

the crisis, Lieutenant R. Lindsay (now Lord Wantage) gained the

Victoria Cross for his intrepid conduct.

-----

As this was going on, the other two Guards Battalions, now completely

reformed and in proper order, advanced steadily forward up the hill.

Coming into alignment with the Scots Fusilier Guards, and perceiving the

hot engagement that was still raging, the left company of the Grenadiers

was wheeled back, and fired across the front, while the Coldstream,

without changing position, opened upon the Russians as soon as they got

the opportunity, and the latter retired. Though there was a gap in the

Brigade which could not be immediately closed, the Guards—

“continued to advance in lines absolutely unbroken, except where

struck by the enemy’s shot; such French Officers on the hills on the

right as, in an interval of inaction, were free to observe what our

troops were doing, spoke of this advance of the Guards as something

new to their minds, and very admirable.”[230]

-----

Footnote 230:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 59.

-----

Soon they reached the epaulment, firing as they advanced, the enemy

giving way before them, and as they came up to the crest of the hill the

three companies, previously mentioned, rejoined their Battalion, and the

whole Brigade was again complete.[231] To our left, protecting the left

flank of the British army, were the Highlanders in echelon of battalions

from the right; and this magnificent corps, handled with great ability,

fired into the hostile columns that passed them on their way to the

epaulment (round which the fight centred in this quarter of the field),

and contributed in no small degree, to lighten the task of the

Guards.[232]

-----

Footnote 231:

A point connected with this phase of the battle may be noted. The

British soldier had never been trained to advance firing, and at first

there was some difficulty in preventing him from halting to load,

especially as the repeated cheering of the men drowned to a

considerable extent the orders of the Officers. Many of the latter,

however, springing to the front, showed by their example that the

advance was on no account to be checked, and the line thereafter did

not halt. Sir Colin Campbell drilled the Highland Brigade to advance

firing, the morning after landing at Old Fort, and instructed them to

open out, so that they should not crowd upon each other or interfere

with each other’s movements when loading and firing.

Footnote 232:

Of the Coldstream, it is written that the Battalion was “drawn up in

line with beautiful precision; because of the position of the ground

on which it advanced, it had been much less exposed to fire and

mishaps than either of the other Battalions of the Brigade, and it had

not been pressed forward, as each of the other two Battalions had

been, to meet any special emergency occurring on its front. Therefore

it was that it fell to the lot of the Coldstream to become an almost

prim sample of what our Guards can be in the moment which precedes a

close fight. What the best of battalions is, when, in some Royal Park

at home, it manœuvres before a great princess, that the Coldstream

was now on the banks of the Alma, when it came to show its graces to

the enemy. And it was no ignoble pride which caused the Battalion to

maintain all this ceremonious exactness; for though it be true that

the precision of a line in peace time is only a success in mechanics,

the precision of a line on a hill-side with the enemy close in front,

is the result and the proof of warlike composure” (Kinglake, ii. 426).

-----

Nor had the British artillery been inactive; pressing forward, they took

up positions wherever they were to be found, whence they fired either

upon the enemy’s guns or into the solid masses of his infantry. At the

moment when the Duke’s division appeared upon the slope, three of

Evans’s battalions were engaged near the post-road; two more, under

Adams, were further to the right, moving up the hill; England’s Division

was crossing the river, and the Fourth Division (Sir G. Cathcart) was

still in rear, as a reserve. The first onslaught of the Light Division

had shaken the enemy; and now, when opposed to the steady advance of the

Guards and Highlanders, he did not long maintain the contest. The

Russians were unable to fight in line; they remained throughout the

whole day in dense columns.[233] This faulty formation, adopted to suit

the quality of their troops, gave them greater weight had they been able

to come to close quarters with their antagonist, but it prevented them

from using their muskets, and offered a large target to our fire. On the

other hand, the fire of the two British brigades was fully developed.

Moving as if on parade, the Guards in line kept up a continuous and

well-aimed stream of lead, at short ranges, into the masses in front of

them, while the Highlanders in echelon succeeded in striking the right

flank of the enemy.[234] Unable to bear down on the thin lines that

opposed them, the Russians wavered, and, with a ringing cheer, our men

charged home, and drove them from the field. The English army had

cleared the formidable position held by the enemy on Kurgané, as well as

from that hill to the eastern slopes of the Telegraph, where the French

had now arrived. Menshikoff’s troops fled from the field, and their

retreat was so precipitate that it was not even covered by cavalry or

artillery. For a short time our batteries played upon their ranks; but

Lord Raglan’s request that Marshal St. Arnaud might complete the rout by

sending forward his comparatively fresh troops, was met by a frivolous

excuse, and there was no pursuit.

-----

Footnote 233:

“They had a curious formation of close column, with swarms of

skirmishers on each side; they seemed to run out of the ranks to fire,

and then take refuge in their columns again; they would have been much

safer outside altogether” (Tower, _Diary_).

Footnote 234:

“Scarcely a man had seen a shotted musket fired before, except at a

target, and yet they looked as cool and self-possessed as if 'marking

time' in an English barrack square” (_Our Veterans, etc._ , 133). “We

soon drove the enemy before us up the hill and through the epaulment,

but the guns had been taken out [except the two previously captured],

and a regiment was retreating out of the rear of the work in very

tolerably good order, firing at us, and in no confusion or disorderly

haste. We gave them two or three steady volleys before they were out

of shot; our men fired wonderfully steadily all the time. We fired

sixteen rounds going up the hill” (Tower, _Diary_).

-----

The British losses amounted to 106 Officers, 121 sergeants, and 1775

rank and file, total 2002, of whom were killed 25, 19, and 318

respectively. The French, who played a minor part in the action,

exaggerated their casualties, which really numbered only 60 killed

(including three Officers), and 500 wounded. The Russians put their

losses at nearly 6000, but this was probably less than the truth. The

Coldstream and the Highlanders had been protected to a great extent by

the folds of the ground, and they were fortunately not under the direct

fire of the Russian guns, as the other two Battalions of the Division

had been. The casualties of the Scots Fusiliers have been already given;

those of the Grenadier Guards amounted to 4 Officers and 137 men; the

Highland Brigade (three battalions) lost 90 of all ranks. In the

Coldstream there were two Officers and 27 men wounded,—of the former,

Captain Cust, who succeeded Captain Byng as Aide-de-camp to

Major-General Bentinck, died of his wounds immediately after the action;

the other, Captain C. Baring, had his arm amputated.

N^o. 4.

[Illustration:

BATTLE

OF THE

ALMA

A.D. Innes & C^o. London

]

Military critics are disappointed with this battle, and condemn both

sides for displaying little tactical knowledge or talent. Menshikoff

left almost everything undone, to enable him to make a stand on the

ground he had himself selected for barring the march of the Allies. The

influence of St. Arnaud, who at this time was in bad health, seemed to

damp the usual ardour of the French; and on this occasion they hardly

maintained the high standard of their brilliant military reputation. We

have seen that Lord Raglan and the Marshal had formed no definite plan

of action before the fight began. If they intended to turn the enemy’s

left, and drive him off the road to Sevastopol into the interior, the

English attack was too soon delivered; and if they hoped to push him

towards the sea, they took no measures to effect that object. They

pursued neither of these courses, and a mere frontal attack was

undertaken, which resulted in dislodging the Russians, but which, in the

absence of a vigorous pursuit, involved them in no serious disaster.

Lord Raglan, moreover, having ordered the first line to advance, took up

a position well in front of his own army, within the ground occupied at

that time by the enemy; in this exposed place he watched the course of

the battle, but he ceased to be able to control it. Hence the

co-operation between his divisional commanders, necessary to the attack,

was wanting, and we missed the opportunity of inflicting a greater

defeat upon the enemy than we succeeded in doing. Of the bravery of both

the Officers and men, of the steadiness and discipline under fire of the

rank and file, who for the first time were in action, but one opinion

has ever been expressed.

“All, therefore, that we had to be proud of was the dash and valour of

the regiments engaged. These were very conspicuous, and worthy of the

traditions of the Peninsular days. A French Officer, who was viewing

the field, where our men lay, as they had fallen, in ranks, with one

of our naval Captains, observed to him, 'Well, you took the bull by

the horns—our men could not have done it.'”[235]

-----

Footnote 235:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 65.

-----

As has been said, there was no pursuit after the battle, and the enemy

was allowed to leave the field unmolested. This was the more

unfortunate, since the retreat of the Russians degenerated into a rout.

But worse followed, for the morning of the 23rd dawned before we stirred

from the scene of our success, and two of the most valuable days of the

campaign were irretrievably lost to the Allies. The fault was St.

Arnaud’s, whom nothing could shake in his determination to remain where

he was. Happily the strain of the alliance touched not the troops of

either nation, and among them existed warm feelings of an honest

_camaraderie_. Just as the First Division was about to fall in, a French

brigade passed by on its southward march, and friendly expressions of

mutual recognition and of good will were heard; from us, by lusty cheers

and waving of bearskins and bonnets, and from them by hearty cries of

“Vivent les Anglais! Vivent les Montagnards!”

Leaving the Alma, the approach to Sevastopol was made by easy stages. On

the 23rd a halt was called at noon on the Katcha, where we had the

mortification of learning that the heavy field-pieces, which had done us

so much damage on the Kurgané heights, had left but four short hours

before our arrival. Next day, we reached the Belbek, thirteen miles from

the late field of battle, and within striking distance of Sevastopol,

the goal of our ambition. And now a strange thing happened. Far from

attacking the very position we had come to assail, we even refused to

make a reconnaissance to ascertain the nature of its defences, and the

force and quality of the enemy holding it.

The expedition, we have seen, was expressly designed to be a speedy

operation, and every step taken with respect to it was governed by that

one idea; otherwise, it would never have been undertaken in the autumn

of 1854. Hence, a coast destitute of secure harbours wherein to form a

base of operations, was not considered unsuitable as a landing-place;

communications between the Crimea and the rest of the Russian Empire

were not intercepted; a line of advance exposed to attack by a relieving

army was not rejected; a late season of the year did not put an end to

the enterprise; and hence, also, there was no provision made for the

winter. These conditions were none of them in accordance with sound

military science or practice; but they were accepted, and they led the

army to the north side of Sevastopol—to the objective which the Allies

designed to reach when they landed at Old Fort. Arriving there, the

Anglo-French armies came face to face with an obstacle, some works

loomed in the haze before them, and they began to deliberate.

Counsellors, not consulted when the expedition was planned, were now

admitted as advisers, and they naturally viewed the problem without

reference to the past. We had lost touch with the defeated Menshikoff,

and it was thought that he probably had his army safe behind the

entrenchments in front; the attack might not succeed, a delay might

occur, and at any rate it was dangerous to wait when we had no secure

base in our rear. In short, the hazardous nature of the expedition which

had been forced upon the allied Commanders from home, suddenly burst

upon them with a vivid light never experienced before, and they had to

recognize, although unfortunately they did not yet acknowledge, that the

surprise had failed, that a lengthened siege was inevitable, and that

the descent on the fortress, as originally conceived, was a snare and a

delusion.

And yet, had the position been reconnoitred, some interesting facts

would have been revealed. We should have found the defences weak,

imperfectly armed, and garrisoned only by 11,000 men, whose weapons for

the most part were antiquated flint-locks, while others were only

provided with pikes or cutlasses.[236] The field-force that fought on

the 20th was not there at all; it had hastily retired to the south side

to re-organize itself after the disaster it had suffered.

-----

Footnote 236:

Kinglake, iii. 43.

-----

The possession of the north side of Sevastopol offered the Allies

considerable advantages.[237] The town, barracks, dockyards, and arsenal

are built on the south side of an extensive creek, deep enough to float

the largest ships of war, which runs from the sea in an easterly

direction four miles inland, 1000 to 1200 yards in breadth. This inlet,

forming the roadstead or harbour of Sevastopol, is defended at its mouth

by several strong forts, some of those on the north side being perched

on cliffs 100 feet high. The northern bank entirely commands the south

side, and rises from the water’s edge more abruptly than the latter.

These things were known to the Allies before they landed in the Crimea.

It is obvious that, if the invaders could have established themselves on

this northern bank, they would have taken the town and some of the forts

in reverse; and that, if they could have brought up sufficient guns of

the requisite calibre, the fortress itself would have been untenable,

and the destruction of the ships in the harbour ensured by the force of

plunging fire directed upon them.

-----

Footnote 237:

See Map No. 5, p. 182.

-----

While we lingered on the Alma, General Menshikoff had not been idle, and

he determined to secure all the advantages which the Russian fleet of

the Black Sea might be able to confer. It was hopeless to suppose that

this fleet could cope with our own magnificent ships which lay outside

the harbour; and indeed, ever since the battle of Sinope, it had been

carefully kept out of harm’s way. The only use to which it could be put,

was to convert it into an addition to the land defences of Sevastopol;

but even then, it would be exposed to danger, for the enemy had a

wholesome dread of what the historic daring of British seamen is capable

of achieving when directed by an enterprising commander. On the night of

the 22nd, therefore, he effectually barred the entrance of the roadstead

by sinking seven vessels, and by constructing a boom across it, and thus

he secured his shipping from any direct attack which our navy might have

contemplated. Hence, the Russian war-ships became stationary floating

batteries, and their function was to play their guns upon the ground

that bordered the roadstead. For this device, also, the Allies must have

been prepared, and might have taken it into consideration before even

they started on the expedition. Now, the plateau on the top of the

heights overlooking the town from the north, was much less (if at all)

exposed to the enemy’s naval artillery than the ground over which the

invaders must advance, if they meant to deliver their attack from the

south; and the fire directed upon this plateau would be uncertain and

inefficient, since considerable portions of it were out of sight of the

ships below.

The British Admiral, Sir Edmond Lyons, at that time second in command,

never lost sight of the original plan of invasion: he advocated strongly

an attack upon the north side, and was prepared to take a prominent part

in the action he expected to follow. If successful, the closing of the

harbour was of trifling moment. This powerful co-operation was

impossible on the south side. Lord Raglan agreed with the Admiral, and

was also in favour of striking a blow from the north, as had always been

intended. But he was in a position of great difficulty. Some of his own

advisers were against the proposal, and the French Marshal, always

unfavourable to activity in this quarter, was sinking under a disease

that carried him off before the end of the month. The question whether

this attack from the Belbek river would have brought about the immediate

fall of Sevastopol, need not be further discussed; no attempt was made

to ascertain whether it was practicable. Suffice it to say that General

Todleben, who defended Sevastopol, afterwards expressed his deliberate

opinion, and elaborately argued it out, that the northern plateau was

untenable by the Russians, and that operations conducted against it

would have led the Allies to a speedy success. Nevertheless, it is

important to notice that the original design of taking Sevastopol by a

_coup de main_ under the effects of a surprise, was given up before even

a reconnaissance was made to ascertain the strength of the objective, to

which the Allies were committed by that very design. We shall now see

that, refusing to pursue their plan, on account of the serious military

errors it disclosed, the Allies were forced to adopt another plan, which

equally, if not in a greater degree, violated the canons of the science

of war.[238]

-----

Footnote 238:

The late Sir E. Hamley holds that General Todleben was wrong, and

writes: “But he [Todleben] says the enemies' [allied] ships,

approaching the shore, could batter the fort almost with impunity,

[_i.e._ the Star-Fort, or the principal work on the north side of

Sevastopol, which the Allies would have had to attack]. The

impossibility of this is best shown by the fact that, in the

subsequent engagement between the fleets and forts, one of the

batteries on the cliffs (100 feet high) of the north side disabled

several of our ships without receiving a shot in return, although they

made it the object of their fire, and that the Star-Fort is distant

inland from this battery 1000 yards. Thus, according to Todleben, the

ships, while themselves under the fire of the coast batteries, which

they could not injure in return, were to bombard a fort 1000 yards

beyond these batteries, and which would be invisible from the sea”

(Hamley, _War in the Crimea_, p. 71).

The bombardment spoken of, in which the English ships were injured,

was only directed against the forts situated at the entrance of the

harbour. From that point, no doubt, the Star-Fort could not be seen;

but still Todleben made no puerile suggestion with respect to the

geography of a place every inch of which he had good reason to know

intimately. The Russian entrenchments on the north plateau could be

reached by the guns of our fleet, from another spot off the coast,

just round the promontory on which the coast batteries were built, and

where our ships would be to a great extent (if not entirely) sheltered

from the fire of the latter.

-----

h2 CHAPTER VIII. | BEFORE SEVASTOPOL.

Predicament in which the Allies found themselves—Flank march round

Sevastopol—Occupation of Balaklava by the British and of Kamiesh Bay

by the French—The Allies refuse to assault Sevastopol; they prefer

to bombard it—Depression of the Russians, who fear a prompt

assault—Description of the defences round the south side of

Sevastopol; successful efforts of the enemy to strengthen

them—Description of the upland of the Chersonese, occupied by the

Allies; their position and labours—First bombardment and its

results—No attack; a regular siege inevitable—Draft of Officers and

men to the Coldstream arrive in the Crimea—Establishment of the

Regiment—Russian reinforcements begin to arrive—Battle of Balaklava;

Cavalry charges—_Sortie_ of the Russians against the British right

flank; its failure.

The Allies, at this juncture, found themselves placed in a strange

predicament. Their plans had hitherto been successful, and nothing

remained to be done except to justify their first resolutions by

standing firm to their original purpose. The critical moment at length

arrived, and then, in the very presence of the enemy, they changed their

minds. They would not operate against the north of Sevastopol; they

would attack it from the south, and form a secure base in the harbours

of Balaklava and Kamiesh, that indent the coast of the upland plain,

called by the ancients the Chersonese. In order to accomplish this new

design, they had to march the united armies from the Belbek to the

south-west corner of the peninsula, quite close to the fortress they

intended to capture. Added to this, the ground over which they had to

pass was unknown; they left behind them the broad, open, and treeless

plains, where they could march in battle array, ready for emergencies;

they now approached a woody, difficult, and intersected country, and had

to adopt long columns of route in moving across it. According to the

information in their possession, moreover, a hostile army was sheltered

somewhere within the lines of Sevastopol; it was believed to be securely

posted behind the entrenchments on the northern plateau. They did not

wish to meet it there, and, to avoid doing so, they were obliged to have

recourse to the only alternative, and to commit a bad military error.

They exposed the right of their long columns and their rear to imminent

danger, and, courting disaster, invited the Russians to fall upon them,

in a position where partial defeat must prove fatal to their existence.

On the 25th the main body, preceded by a regiment of cavalry, a troop of

horse artillery, and a battalion of Rifles, left the Belbek, and the

perilous flank march commenced. It was carried out in a manner which

would have given the fullest advantages to the enemy had he availed

himself of them. The general direction was kept, often by consulting the

compass; but the difficulties of the country, the thick woods, and the

haste which urged us forward, disarranged the order of the troops. At

one moment, indeed, the head-quarters, leading the whole advance, were

followed by a long procession of thirty guns without supports, and

offered a tempting and easy reward to Russian enterprise. But, slow

though we may be to recognize it, a miracle does sometimes take place,

and in this case it showed itself in the fact, that the extraordinary

march proceeded onwards without the slightest mishap. Not only this, but

the British even captured some twenty carts from the enemy, though they

failed to get hold of the horses, which were cut away directly we came

into sight. This meeting came about in a curious way. It happened, as we

have seen, that Prince Menshikoff, far from taking post on the north

plateau, was refitting his defeated army in the town of Sevastopol south

of the roadstead. He came to the conclusion that he ought to preserve

his communications with the interior of the Crimea, and support the

advance of the reinforcements he expected to come from Bessarabia. At

dawn on the 25th, therefore, he, too, emerged from his retreat, crossed

the Tchernaya at Traktir Bridge, and, advancing to Mackenzie Farm,

marched towards Bakshiserai. Thus it came about that the two contending

armies, moving on the same day, and for some time advancing towards one

another by the same road, crossed each other’s path, and that neither

had the least conception of what the other was doing. It was fortunate

that, in this curious game of blind man’s buff, Menshikoff did not

strike our columns of route full in the flank; as it was, we just

happened to drive our ram into the tip of his tail; for, as the

head-quarter Staff, stumbling suddenly on the last portion of the

enemy’s baggage train as it passed unconsciously by, stood wondering at

the sight, a few of our guns hurried up to the rescue, unlimbered, and

secured some of his unhorsed carts. Among the booty was a carriage

belonging to one of the Russian Commanders, in which were stars,

crosses, medals, uniform, French novels, and a portfolio “of coloured

prints, the morality of which will not bear discussion.”

The experiences of the First Division on this march should not be

omitted. After waiting ready equipped for two hours, the men at length

moved off, at 8.30 in the morning, and plunged almost immediately into

the forest.

“Everybody who has seen beaters pushing their way through a thick

cover, may form a faint idea of the difficulties which beset, and the

obstacles which retarded our progress. The heat was overpowering, not

a breath of air percolated the dense vegetation. You scrambled on with

arms uplifted to protect the face against the swinging back-handers

dealt by the boughs; now your shakoe was dashed off, now the briars

laid tenacious hold on your haversack, or on the tails of your coatee.

It was as much as you could do to see the soldiers immediately on your

right and left. For the time, military order was an impossibility,

brigades and regiments got intermixed. Guardsmen, Rifles, and

Highlanders straggled forward blindly, all in a ruck. There was much

suffering, and some stout soldiers dropped involuntarily to the rear,

to be heard of no more.”[239]

-----

Footnote 239:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 163.

-----

N^o. 5.

[Illustration:

SKETCH MAP OF COUNTRY

NEAR

SEVASTOPOL

_Compiled from_ Hamley’s Crimea _by kind permission_.

A.D. Innes & C^o. London.

]

After four hours or more, the troops emerged on a lane blocked by the

cavalry and baggage, and squeezed through. A little later they heard an

explosion, and, pushing forward, they came upon the scene of the

singular meeting that took place between the head-quarter Staff and the

rear of the enemy’s army. Continuing along a tolerably good road, they

approached the valley of the Tchernaya after dark, and, crossing it at

Traktir Bridge, they finally bivouacked near the village of Tchorgun, at

ten o’clock at night, “completely exhausted, parched with thirst, and

their clothes much torn by struggling through the wood.” Indeed, they

were fortunate, for it was one in the morning before the last British

division reached its halting ground. The French, who followed their

English allies, remained for the night midway on the wooded heights near

Mackenzie Farm, where they suffered much from want of water. Next day

the movement continued; and the cholera, that accompanied our troops

without intermission, burst out with renewed malignity, and struck its

victims down on the roadside along our line of march. After three hours,

the division reached Kadikeui, about half a mile from Balaklava; while

our ships, approaching, threw a few shells into an old Genoese fort,

which commanded the harbour, and which was held by a handful of Greek

troops in the Russian service; after a mere show of resistance, they

surrendered without difficulty. The French also moved forward on the

26th, and established themselves on the Fediukhine heights near the

Tchernaya. The Fourth Division, under Sir G. Cathcart, had been left

behind on the Belbek, to embark the sick that remained there; on the

same day (26th) he, too, started from his bivouac on the north of

Sevastopol, and, following the track of the Allied armies, arrived on

the Tchernaya without misadventure.

Thus the flank march was completed, and during the whole of the

difficult and dangerous operation, lasting two days, the Russians stood

by absolutely passive, and the Allies were entirely unmolested. Not a

company was cut off, nor was a gun taken. This was the more remarkable

since, perceiving the movement from a high tower in Sevastopol, they

were accurately informed of our plan at midday of the 25th; General

Menshikoff must also have known it, from the meeting that took place

between the hostile armies near Mackenzie Farm. It was, indeed,

fortunate that we had so forbearing an enemy.

Communications having now been fortunately re-established with the

fleet, the British occupied the Bay of Balaklava, the French that of

Kamiesh, where their respective bases of operations were formed. Thus we

were placed on the right of the new line fronting northwards, and we

were again posted upon the exposed flank. About this time, an event of

importance occurred to the French. Marshal St. Arnaud got so ill, that

he was obliged to give up his command, and to leave the seat of war. He

was to be taken to Scutari, but he died on the passage. General

Canrobert succeeded him—a valiant, honourable, and straightforward

soldier, but one little fitted to take upon himself the onerous

responsibilities of his new position.

The Allies now found themselves occupying a fertile country, almost

entirely denuded of inhabitants, who fled at their approach, covered

with highly cultivated gardens, orchards, and vineyards, which teemed

with vegetables and fruit in great abundance. Never were troops so amply

supplied as during the first few days of their stay in this land of

plenty; but the good things did not last, they were soon exhausted, and

could not be replaced. The men were not easily restrained from enjoying

to the full the luxurious feast which lay before them, after the

fatigues of the forced flank march; though it is to be feared they

suffered from its effects, and from the fact that they were still

without tents. Cholera continued, and diarrhœa (its pilot-fish)

increased considerably.[240]

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Footnote 240:

Of 76 cases of sickness that occurred in the Battalion in the month of

September, 30 were fever, 24 diarrhœa, and 7 cholera (Wyatt, p.

24).

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