-----

Footnote 293:

Tower, _Diary_ . All the Guards Officers were buried in this spot.

During the winter of 1855, more than a year later, their bodies were

exhumed, and were properly interred on Cathcart’s Hill, where they now

lie.

Colonel Upton, though badly hurt, was able to remain at his post till

the middle of November, and he assumed the command of the Brigade,

_vice_ General Bentinck, wounded, and of the First Division from the

7th, when the Duke of Cambridge was sent to Balaklava, on the sick list.

The command of the Battalion thus devolved upon Colonel Lord F. Paulet.

The Coldstream was, in truth, a mere skeleton of the fine body which

embarked at Portsmouth in the spring of 1854. It only mustered now 11

Officers and 307 men, while no draft,—except a small one of 58 men,

which, having left London on the 26th of October, reached the Crimea on

the 22nd of November,—was on the road to compensate for this serious

deficiency of strength in the field. When news of the battle arrived in

England, strenuous efforts were made to fill up the attenuated ranks of

the army, by sending out fresh battalions and reinforcements to those

already at the seat of hostilities. But the campaign, ever since July,

when we were first encamped near the pestilential lake of Devna, had

sadly drained our resources—far more rapidly, indeed, than the home

authorities had anticipated,—and though recruiting had been actively

going on, the large demands which this war created could not be

satisfied. In this way, the next draft sent to the Coldstream only

amounted to 153 men, and could do little to restore our depleted ranks

to an efficient state. This draft started on the 24th of November, and

arrived in the Crimea on the 18th of December.[294] In France, however,

there was not such a dearth of fighting men as seems to have been the

case in England, and considerable reinforcements were despatched to the

east, so that somewhat later (in February) our allies were able to

extend the siege-works that surrounded the south side of Sevastopol.

-----

Footnote 294:

The average age of the small draft of 58 men reaching the seat of war

in November, was twenty-one, and their service nearly two years. The

averages of the next draft arriving in December, were twenty-one and a

half years and eight months, respectively. Lieutenants Whitshed and

Julian Hall accompanied the first; and Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett,

Captains F. Burton and J. Le Couteur, and Lieutenants G. Wigram, A.

Lambton, G. Rose, and G. Ives the second. Assistant-Surgeon C. V. Cay

reached the Crimea on November 28th.

-----

We have seen that the omission to strengthen the unguarded flank at

Inkerman by earthworks had led to serious consequences. The critical

nature of the battle made this so clear, that, when the fight was over,

though we had fewer men to spare than were available before, this vital

position was at once placed in a state of defence. English, French, and

even Turks—held hitherto to be an incumbrance—were set to perform this

duty, and Fore Ridge and Shell Hill were soon crowned with works,

commanding the approaches to the scene of the recent struggle, and

securing it at last, as far as possible, from further molestation.[295]

-----

Footnote 295:

Recent events having opened the eyes of authority, the shoulder was

put vigorously to the wheel. Hence the fortification of an

all-important point which, previous to the battle, had either been

considered unnecessary, or had been pronounced impossible of

achievement with the means at disposal, was actually executed with

sorely straitened means after the battle. In a word, few hands

contrived to do what comparatively many hands had been judged

incapable of doing. “Where there’s a will there’s a way” (_Our

Veterans, etc._ , p. 325).

-----

The ordinary routine of siege life had hardly recommenced after the rude

shock which interrupted it on the 5th, when the winter burst upon the

Crimean peninsula with a suddenness and violence that marked a distinct

feature in the story of the war, and brought innumerable troubles upon

the Allies engaged in it. The weather lately had been cold and stormy,

varied upon occasions by short gleams of sunshine and partial warmth. At

daybreak on the 14th, however, a violent hurricane, accompanied by a

deluge of rain, unexpectedly arose, and swept with terrific force over

the country, and not only blew away every tent standing on the upland,

scattered the stores upon which the army depended, and stopped all

communications, but also dashed to pieces or disabled much of the

shipping laden with supplies that were then very urgently needed.[296]

The ground was speedily converted into a deep and impassable sea of

sticky mud, which flew about in large quantities; the temperature fell,

and snow came down. The men of the various regiments huddled together

like sheep, behind bushes or rocks, or wherever they could find some

protection against the violence of the elements. The condition of the

houseless troops was miserable in the extreme, both during the day and

long afterwards, for they had nothing wherewith to repair their losses;

but it was worse with the sick and wounded, who were exposed to the full

force of the cyclone, and to the cold and the rain. A considerable

amount of shipping had been left outside the harbour of Balaklava,

instead of being safely berthed inside the landlocked bay. Of the

vessels anchored in this dangerous position, many went to pieces on the

rocks forming the iron-bound coast; altogether twenty-one were sunk, and

their valuable cargoes were all lost. H.M.S. _Retribution_, with the

Duke of Cambridge on board, narrowly escaped destruction. On that fatal

first day of a severe Crimean winter, the troops were deprived of vast

quantities of ammunition, food, clothing, and forage, and there was no

reserve at hand from whence they could be replaced.

-----

Footnote 296:

It is said that only three tents remained upright in the English camps

(Nolan, i., p. 650). But a fourth, belonging to Lieut.-Colonel

Carleton, also survived, and it was the only one that did so in the

Guards camp. The Turkish tents, placed in a sheltered position, made a

better resistance than ours, and comparatively few were swept away.

-----

The difficulties and sufferings that now overwhelmed the army began with

this storm, but they are clearly to be traced to the aimless manner in

which the campaign had been conducted. The original intention had been

to surprise Sevastopol, but it soon disappeared out of sight, and no

step was taken to capture the town in accordance with the conditions

under which the expedition landed on Russian soil. On the contrary, a

regular siege was gradually commenced, and a completely new plan was

thereby adopted. But the change was never recognized, its bearing upon

the fortunes of the war was not appreciated, and no stores were

accumulated at the base of operations to meet the requirements of the

lengthy proceedings into which the invaders had drifted. This was the

more unfortunate, since, when the allied Commanders undertook the flank

march, and shifted their ground from the north to the south side of

Sevastopol, they found themselves obliged to operate upon a barren

upland which afforded no supplies, and very soon they even lost the

advantage of drawing forage from the valley of the Tchernaya. Thus,

after the 25th of October, if not before, nothing whatsoever was to be

obtained from the land in which the army was established, and every

single article had to be transported by sea from a distance. The battle

of Inkerman at last revealed the true position in which we stood; but it

was then too late, and when the storm destroyed the vessels lying

outside the harbour, which contained considerable addition to our scanty

stores, it must be acknowledged that this position was indeed

deplorable.

Nor should it be forgotten that requisitions put forward were

imperfectly attended to by the authorities in England, and that there

was often confusion at the base (Scutari and Balaklava), which appears

to have been incompletely organized. Owing to these circumstances, many

misfortunes overtook the British army, some of which may be cited.

Though a request was made early in September for 2000 tons of hay, only

228 tons were received in the Crimea by the 1st of February, 1855.[297]

In November an application was forwarded for 3000 tents, and for a steam

mill and bakery, but more than six months elapsed before they arrived at

the seat of war.[298] Again, we have seen that a substantial portion of

the kits were left behind in the squad bags, at Scutari, at the end of

May; also that, on landing at Old Fort, the packs were taken away from

the men. The former seem to have been allowed to remain where they were

stored. But an effort was made in the middle of October, just a month

after they had been left on board ship, to recover the knapsacks, though

apparently with very indifferent success; and the troops remained,

exposed to the severe inclemency of the weather, without any change of

clothing, in the worn-out and tattered garments that had uninterruptedly

done duty day and night from the beginning of June, when they landed at

Varna. Lastly, biscuit and salt pork formed the usual, indeed the

never-varying ration served out to the British soldier. This diet was

his only food, and it produced scurvy, as was only to be expected. To

counteract this plague, limejuice and vegetables were thus urgently

required, but neither was available. It is true that small quantities of

vegetables were sometimes to be had, but then they were sold to the

starving men at famine prices.[299] A tardy requisition was made in

October for limejuice, and half the quantity demanded (20,000 lbs.)

reached Balaklava on the 19th of December; but there it remained almost

unnoticed, and this antidote against the scourge of scurvy was only

unearthed on the 29th of January following; nor was it apparently

ordered to be issued to the troops as a ration, until the middle of

February.[300]

-----

Footnote 297:

Kinglake, vi. 128, note.

Footnote 298:

_Ibid._ , pp. 98, 138.

Footnote 299:

_General Order, Memo._ , Nov. 1st: “Commanders of divisions will send

to-morrow at 9 a.m. to the Quartermaster-General’s office, on the

wharf at Balaklava, for potatoes.... They must be paid for at the spot

at the price of £1 1_s._ per cwt.” _Ibid._ , Nov. 6th: “Those corps or

divisions which desire potatoes should send to Balaklava for them; the

price is £1 1_s._ per cwt.... The money required to pay for them must

be sent at the same time.” It appears that later, after December 10th,

whenever vegetables were available they were supplied to the men

gratis; but as they had to fetch them from Balaklava under

circumstances of extreme difficulty (as will presently appear), it is

scarcely to be wondered that the wearied troops did not always avail

themselves of the boon (see Kinglake, vi. 138, note). It should

further be stated here, that Lord Raglan, “in consideration of the

length of the siege operations, the constant labour the men have been

called upon to perform, the inclemency of the weather, and the

cheerfulness and good will they have manifested in discharge of their

duty,” granted the unusual issue of working pay to the troops employed

in digging, etc., in the trenches, at the rate of, for

Non-commissioned officers as overseers, one for every twenty men,

1_s._ by day, 1_s._ by night; for rank and file, 8_d._ by day, 10_d._

by night (_General Order_ , Nov. 14, 1854).

Footnote 300:

Wyatt, pp. 41, 55. Limejuice, after February 16th, was issued three

times during the month.

-----

Arising directly out of the incomprehensible manner in which this

extraordinary war was conceived and carried on, another circumstance,

more powerful for evil than the apathy with which the necessities of the

army were regarded by the Government, caused famine and distress to

oppress our troops. We had no road between Balaklava and the front; and

hence, when supplies reached the former place, we were without means of

conveying them to the spot where they were to be consumed. And yet the

distance to be traversed was under eight miles. It has been shown that,

of the two roads connecting the English before Sevastopol and the base,

one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled; the other, over the Col, was but

a mere pathway or cart-track: also that on the 25th of October, we lost

the use of the former, and were restricted to the latter. During the

autumn this pathway was serviceable; indeed, so firm and open was the

country, that waggons and guns could easily move across it anywhere. But

when the torrents of rain flooded the ground on the 14th of November,

the whole aspect of the upland became altered, and the track as well as

the plain were converted into a deep morass, over which communications

were rendered almost impossible. The French, with proper forethought,

constructed a good road between Kamiesh Bay and their camps, directly

they occupied the Chersonese; but as all the British troops were

required to push forward vigorously the siege-works, and as we indulged

in the misplaced confidence that Sevastopol would fall immediately after

the bombardment of the 17th of October, we never even thought of

securing our communications, until after the 5th of November, when it

was decided to winter in the Crimea. The rejected Turks, offered by Omar

Pasha, might certainly have performed this important service while the

weather was clear and dry, but the prejudice against them has already

been mentioned, and their assistance was refused. After the battle of

Inkerman we took measures to construct the road, and we acted as we did

with respect to the defences near Home Ridge; tools were hastily

procured from Constantinople, and Turks were at last employed. But it

was then too late. The unfortunate men were unprovided with food and

shelter, and the weather was severe; they died so rapidly that the

living were all required to bury the dead, and in a short time this

ill-fated contingent disappeared altogether.

The scarcity of forage and the want of a road acted and reacted on each

other, and formed the principal causes of the winter troubles. The

horses and mules died of starvation, and it was useless to replace them,

as there was not wherewithal to feed them. The transport, miserably

insufficient as it always had been, dwindled into nothing, and all but

disappeared; troop horses of the cavalry were impressed into this

service, but they too perished. Carriage traffic soon ceased, and an

attempt was then made to convey supplies on the backs of the wretched

beasts that survived. This expedient also failed; the quagmire of

tenacious clay intervening between the port and the front, the famine,

and the exposure to cold and wet, all operated together, and the animals

could work no more. Thenceforward there was nothing for it but to make

the men themselves wade through the deep mud, and fetch up such things

from the base as they required, to keep body and soul together. The duty

was no inconsiderable addition to their ordinary toil, for while they

were decreasing fast in numbers, the labour in the trenches did not

abate. The journey also sometimes took twelve hours to accomplish, and

during the time it lasted they were without food, shelter, or rest.[301]

This miserable makeshift was, of course, entirely inadequate to supply

the troops, and the more bulky or heavy articles, however necessary to

the well-being of the army, could not be brought to camp at all. The

serious error by which magazines had not been established in time at the

seat of war, was repaired quickly by the great energy displayed at

head-quarters, and in December considerable quantities of every kind of

stores were available at Balaklava, but there most of them remained

unused, because, as Government would not supply forage (and it seems it

was not easily procured out of England), there was no transport, and as

there was no road to span the morass, means did not exist of crossing it

and of reaching the front.

-----

Footnote 301:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 170.

-----

The winter all through Europe was a peculiarly severe one, and there was

no exception to its inclemency in the Crimea, where the season was

specially cold. All the combatants suffered from its effects; even the

Russians felt it acutely, though housed and provided with a tolerably

fair transport service from their well-stored magazines on the Sea of

Azof. Our French allies also underwent many privations, due to the

general difficulties that affected the invaders established on the

barren upland and exposed to the wind, the snow, and the rain; but more

especially on account of the small _tente d’abri_ which sheltered them

at night, and which was not so useful as our bell tent. But the British

army suffered most. Like the French, our men were sent to trenches

filled with water, where they remained wet to their knees for many hours

during the day and night; but, unlike them, these hardships were of

constant recurrence. Reinforcements were rapidly sent to General

Canrobert, and his force was strong enough to enable him to give his

soldiers rest when their tour of service in the siege-works was

finished. But the British had no such exemption; their numbers were

insufficient for the purposes of the campaign; and they practically were

always at work. Lord Raglan computed that they were “on duty five nights

out of six, a large proportion of them constantly under fire.”[302] If

we add, that they were seldom dry; that they had little or no fuel

except brushwood and roots; that they could not cook their food; that

the coffee served out was in the form of the green unroasted berry;[303]

that the ration of rice failed from the 15th of November to the end of

December; that the boots were defective and bad; and that there was no

warm clothing available until the beginning of the latter month;—it will

be readily seen that the hardships undergone were of no trivial

character.[304]

-----

Footnote 302:

Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 26th.

Footnote 303:

Many of the men now existed almost entirely upon the biscuit and

ration of spirit; the camp was often strewed with portions of uncooked

salt meat, and partially roasted or green coffee (Wyatt, p. 40). The

green coffee ceased on February 22nd, and compressed vegetables were

supplied for the first time on the 26th (_ibid._, p. 56).

Footnote 304:

In the Coldstream some warm clothing and blankets were issued to the

men early in December, more were obtained later, and in January a

further supply was procured. Lord Raglan directed (January 6th) that

each soldier should receive a pair of boots gratuitously (_General

Order_ ). The following is the clothing served out to the Battalion

(including the Regimental hospital) between the 6th of December and

the 28th of February: Great coats, 392; trousers, 100 pairs; sheepskin

coats, 459; tweed coats, 29; fur caps, 503; flannel shirts, 147;

jersey frocks, 861; pairs of socks, 1527; flannel drawers, 994; mitts,

993; boots, long and short, 532; comforters, 446; gregos, 55 (Wyatt,

pp. 41, 45, 57). The long boots appear to have given little

satisfaction. On account of the cold—the thermometer sometimes ranging

from eleven to fifteen degrees Fahrenheit,—it was not easy to make the

men take off their boots at night; their wet feet often being swollen,

were pressed by the leather, and thus frost-bite was induced (_ibid._,

p. 42).

-----

Nor did the men’s sufferings end here, for when exhausted by toil and

privations there was no alleviation to those whose health and strength

had given way. So badly organized were the hospital arrangements, that

we are told the climax of misery was only reached in the places set

apart for the sick. Circumstances necessarily made the field-hospitals

in the front rude habitations for numerous patients seized and tormented

by painful complaints.[305] The transport of invalids to Balaklava was,

moreover, a difficult proceeding and an agonizing ordeal; but arrived at

the port, their troubles should surely have come to an end. It was not

so, however, for such was the confusion prevalent at the time, so great

the number of the sick, that they were subjected, if possible, to worse

treatment during the voyage across the Black Sea and in the great

hospital established at Scutari. In short, this hospital was a loathsome

lazarette, “crammed with misery, overflowing with despair,” until Miss

Nightingale and a number of Nuns and Sisters, having arrived on the

scene early in November, acquired such influence and acted with such

admirable prudence and energy, that gradually—the evil was too great to

be arrested at once—order was restored, sanitary conditions were

introduced, and the sick were well tended and cared for by the gentle

and able nursing of kindly ladies.[306]

-----

Footnote 305:

The indefatigable Surgeon of the Coldstream in the Crimea, Dr. Wyatt,

tells us that a marquee was applied for (November 17th) to replace the

ill-ventilated bell tents used as a Regimental hospital. It arrived

next day, but without ropes, and these, though repeatedly demanded,

were only obtained a fortnight later, through Colonel Steele, Lord

Raglan’s Military Secretary, who at last procured them from a

man-of-war. On the 18th of December another marquee was required (the

sick were becoming very numerous), and it arrived on the 29th, also

without ropes and deficient of five pieces of canvas; in this case the

error was only rectified on the 30th of January.

Footnote 306:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 172, 179, etc. After the battle of

Inkerman, the depôt which had been established at Scutari early in

June, was re-organized and placed under the able command of Colonel

Lord William Paulet (November 23rd), through whose energy many

improvements in the hospitals were effected (see Kinglake, vi. 437).

An acting Sergeant-Major (Sergeant White of the Coldstream) was

appointed there (November 19th).

-----

The British forces before Sevastopol were rapidly melting away in

consequence of the combination of misfortunes that overwhelmed them.

Diseases of a violent type broke out, and cholera, typhus, diarrhœa,

dysentery, scurvy swept away the ranks; frost-bites were common, and

even men reported fit for duty, were so weakened as to be scarcely able

to continue their labours under the hard circumstances that surrounded

them. The drain was excessive upon our strength in the field, and the

small army was in truth threatened with extinction. Between the 1st of

November and the 28th of February we lost as many as 22,506 men, not

including the killed in action; of whom 8898 had died in hospital, while

the remainder, 13,608, were lying there sick on the latter date. In

spite of fresh regiments and drafts which reached the Crimea after

Inkerman, the total effectives all told at the seat of war, reckoning

the troops at Balaklava, amounted then to only 17,311 men. In January

there would have been about 3000 to 4000 men of the infantry available

to repel another attack of the enemy, had he attempted to repeat the

operation of the 5th of November.[307] The British would have had a

smaller force at the end of February.

-----

Footnote 307:

Kinglake, vi. 202, etc.

-----

The Coldstream shared to the full the calamity which has just been so

imperfectly described. Taking part in the constant duty which exhausted

the army, exposed to the cruel suffering that the winter brought about,

and conspicuously displaying the virtues of strict discipline and of

uncomplaining fortitude which enabled our men to preserve a bold and

defiant front against the Russians, the lot of the Battalion can

scarcely be separated from that which afflicted and honoured its

brethren in arms standing before Sevastopol. Its fate was the same as

theirs, its sorrows were equally acute, its bearing likewise was proud

and dauntless, its glory bright and lasting. But its losses were heavy,

as the following table will show:—

┌────────────────┬────────────────────┬─────────────┬────────────────────────┐

│                │Regimental Hospital.│    Sick     │       Remarks.         │

│                ├───────────┬────────┤ Transferred │                        │

│                │Admissions.│ Deaths.│ to Scutari. │                        │

├────────────────┼───────────┼────────┼─────────────┼────────────────────────┤

│Nov. (including │    277    │   22   │     153     │ Eight died of cholera  │

│  at Inkerman)  │           │        │             │  and eleven of wounds. │

│December        │    221    │   17   │      99     │          ——            │

│January         │    186    │   37   │      91     │The average daily       │

│                │           │        │             │  sick was more than    │

│                │           │        │             │  sixty-three per cent. │

│                │           │        │             │  of strength present.  │

└────────────────┴───────────┴────────┴─────────────┴────────────────────────┘

On the 1st of November the effective strength of all ranks in the field

was 600 Officers and men; 1st of December, 451; 1st of January, 353; 1st

of February, 173; and at the end of February there were fewer than

100.[308]

-----

Footnote 308:

Wyatt, p. 58. It should not be forgotten that the two drafts which

reached the Battalion on November 22nd and December 18th, numbered

together 211 men. It appears that there was considerable sickness and

mortality among the young and unseasoned soldiers who composed the

drafts. Of the Officers invalided during the winter (November to

February), were Captain Wilson (November 22nd) and Captain Strong

(January 1st); Captain Hardinge, moreover, had to leave the Crimea on

account of his health (December 24th), and returned the following May.

-----

But there was an end at last to these mournful circumstances that

oppressed our forces fighting in the Crimea; and with the first peep of

spring a new era of hope dawned upon the army. The news of the winter

troubles roused a strong feeling in England, and the nation was stirred

to its depths with sympathy for its brave and suffering soldiers, of

whom no country had more reason to be proud, and with resentment against

the supposed delinquents who were accused of bringing about the

disaster. Greater activity and energy were displayed at home, and a

railway was begun to connect Balaklava with the front, so that by the

end of March it reached the Col on the edge of the upland, at a time

when the road, constructed by ourselves and the French, was made to the

same place. A Land transport service was also at length organized.

Subscriptions were collected, and clothing, food, stores, and even

luxuries poured into the Crimea, and into the hospitals established at

and near Scutari. The Government was overturned, and a Commission of

inquiry was instituted, both in England and at the seat of hostilities,

to report upon every circumstance connected with the war. The result of

these investigations, as well as the conclusions arrived at by another

that sat later (in 1856), need not be alluded to in this volume. But one

point cannot be omitted which deals with the conduct of the troops, who,

in the dark hour of trial, did honour to their Queen, to their country,

and to their noble profession.

“Great Britain,” says the report of the Commissioners sent to the

Crimea, “has often had reasons to be proud of her army, but it is

doubtful whether, the whole range of military history furnishes an

example of an army exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities

as high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan’s command.

The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching,

exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never

failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in

those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were

reduced by disease and by casualties to a handful of men, compared

with the great extent of the lines which they constructed and

defended, yet the army never abated its confidence in itself, and

never descended from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men

and Officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the

lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and

perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount

of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground

against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that,

perhaps, no other troops would even have made the attempt. Suffering

and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other

communities, but offences of a serious character have been unknown in

the British army in the Crimea ... intemperance has been rare. Every

one who knows anything of the constitution of an army must feel that,

when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the

Officers must have done their duty and set the example.”[309]

-----

Footnote 309:

First Report, 1855, pp. 2 and 3.

-----

The Russians, on the other hand, except for the great labour and care

expended on the fortress, remained almost quiescent during the winter

months. Restricting their energies to the defences of Sevastopol and to

the annoyance of the besiegers, they made the fortress exceedingly

strong, and pushed advanced works in front of the line they had already

occupied. The greater portion of their field army was brought into the

town to reinforce the garrison, the remainder being quartered in the

neighbouring villages, or in the Tchernaya Valley. But no offensive

operations were undertaken, notwithstanding their immensely superior

numbers; and this was the more fortunate, since in the midwinter our

forces were so weakened that the English trenches were guarded by only

350 men. This extraordinary inactivity on the part of the enemy has

excited astonishment, and it may well be asked—

“how it was that an enemy who possessed such enormously superior

forces in men and material, and who could, at any time during a period

of months, have directed on some selected point of the siege-works

thousands of troops that would have found only hundreds to meet them,

did not muster the courage for such an enterprise, when it promised

deliverance to the fortress and ruin to their foes.”[310]

-----

Footnote 310:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 194. Whether the Russians were

destitute of the necessary courage to take advantage of the obviously

favourable chances that the winter offered them of sweeping away the

feeble residue of frozen and plague-stricken Englishmen that still

survived before Sevastopol, or whether their conduct was the result of

a deliberate design, may perhaps be revealed at some future time, when

eventual consequences of the Crimean war have been fully developed. It

may easily be imagined that the Government of St. Petersburg shrank

from converting the existing war of cabinets, hitherto purely local,

into a general struggle of nations and principles (Klapka, _War in the

East_ , p. 101). For had Great Britain been driven from the Crimea,

she would surely have taken her revenge, and have removed the contest

from a barren and useless fortress, where unhappily she became

involved, to a vital point in the armour of her foe. If there were to

be a war at all, it is obvious that the struggle for Sevastopol was

the least expensive and the most advantageous form of hostilities that

the Tsar could engage in; he lost comparatively little if the contest

should prove adverse to his arms, more especially if he could prolong

his resistance against the united efforts of the two great Powers of

Europe. The more he succeeded in doing this, the more he gained a

fictitious prestige, the more he exhausted our resources, by the

dissolving process which the winter must surely effect, and the more

he made the Western nations beware for the future how they again

attempt to thwart his plans.

-----

On the part of the Allies, the approaches to the fortress were pushed

forward with considerable activity, both by ourselves and by the French,

but there was little actual fighting except what was brought about by

the siege operations. In the beginning of February, the French, who,

thanks to the liberal supply of men sent to the seat of war, were

growing in numbers, undertook to extend the siege-works on our

right;[311] thus continuing the line of trenches towards the roadstead

of Sevastopol. Bosquet’s Corps was employed for this purpose. Another

element of strength was brought into the field during the winter, to

which brief allusion must be made. It was at last determined that Omar

Pasha’s army should be removed to the Crimea from Bulgaria, where it was

unable to influence the course of hostilities; the concentration was

effected at Eupatoria, and, on the 17th of February, before the movement

was complete, the Turkish force there amounted to 23,000 men. The

Russians, having reinforced the troops they had in this part of the

peninsula to 20,000 men, attacked the place on that date, and were

repulsed with a loss of some 800 men. This success seems to have been

decisive, in so far that the Allies now held firmly a point within

striking distance of the enemy’s communications through the isthmus of

Perekop; but its value was considerably lessened by the following fact.

In the autumn of 1854, General Menshikoff was dependent upon this line

to draw reinforcements from Bessarabia, and, as he found it open, he

advanced freely along it, and reached Sevastopol before the 5th of

November, as has been already related. This advantage gained, the road

through Perekop became of comparatively minor importance, and the enemy

thenceforward relied upon the line from the Sea of Azof. His

communications in this quarter could, of course, only be threatened by a

force based somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kertch; but that place was

avoided, and Eupatoria was selected. Hence the achievement of the 17th

of February, while it might have been followed by satisfactory results

had it taken place early in October, was, to a certain extent, a barren

victory, and served only to show that our Turkish auxiliaries were

capable of performing some service in the war.[312]

-----

Footnote 311:

Our allies had 56,000 men in the Crimea in November, 65,000 in

December, and 78,000 in January (Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p.

176).

Footnote 312:

Colonel (now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn) Simmons was present with Omar

Pasha as British Commissioner with the Turkish army. He served in that

capacity from the summer of 1853, until the end of the war.

-----

The Guards Brigade, having suffered so severely at Inkerman, and being

the only infantry force in the front composing the First Division (the

Highlanders occupied Balaklava since the 25th of October), it was

necessary to reinforce that division by adding thereto the 97th Regiment

(November 23rd). This regiment was armed with the old smooth-bore

musket, but as sickness diminished the ranks, the Minié rifles of

non-effective Guardsmen were handed over to the survivors of the 97th

and of other corps similarly situated. On the 22nd of November the

position of the camps of the Grenadiers and Scots Fusiliers were moved

to the spot where the Coldstream was established. Two days later, a new

disposition of the piquets was ordered; of the eight furnished by the

division, six were found by the Brigade and two by the 97th. The

strength of these piquets, 50 men each, allowed a double sentry every

fifty paces of the entire front; three piquets were placed in reserve,

and all were “to be encouraged in making fires, as it is desirable that

our full strength should be estimated.”[313] On the 25th of December the

piquets were reduced to 30 rank and file each.

-----

Footnote 313:

_Divisional Memo._ , Nov. 24, 1854.

-----

During Colonel Upton’s absence at Balaklava on sick-leave, Colonel

Lockyer commanded the Division until the 15th of January, when the

former returned to the front; the senior Guards Officer present

commanded the Brigade during this interval. Colonel Lord Frederick

Paulet was also away on the sick-list until the 16th of January, and the

Battalion during this time was under Lieut.-Colonel Newton; Captain

Armytage was appointed acting Adjutant, vacant by the death of Captain

Eliot. On the 17th of January the Brigade lost the services of their

Paymaster, Captain South (late 20th Regiment), who, having been present

with them ever since they left England, was obliged to leave the Crimea

through ill-health. His duties were undertaken by a committee, composed

of Colonel Hamilton (Grenadiers), president, and Lieut.-Colonel

Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards), and Captain Sir J. Dunlop

(Coldstream), members.

On the 26th of November the Household Brigade furnished a detachment of

200 men, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, to the neighbourhood of

the monastery of St. George, on the coast west of Balaklava, for the

purpose of making gabions, which were required for the siege-works. Of

these, the Coldstream provided 70 men with Officers, and

Non-commissioned officers in proportion. The detachment was relieved by

a similar party on the 21st of December, and again on the 20th of

January by 150 men, each Battalion finding a Subaltern Officer and 50

men, with the usual number of Non-commissioned officers.

Major-General Lord Rokeby arrived in the Crimea on the 2nd of February,

and assumed the command of the First Division and of the Brigade, when

Colonel Upton reverted to the Battalion. But not for long, for, owing to

the promotion of the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment (Colonel Hon. A.

Upton), he was gazetted to that command (February 20th), and left soon

after to take up his duties in London.[314] By this change Lord

Frederick Paulet

-----

became Major of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Gordon Drummond obtained

the command of the 1st; at the same time Lieut.-Colonels Daniell and

Perceval were posted to the latter, and Newton to the former (Acting

Majors, mounted).[315]

-----

Footnote 314:

In parting from the Battalion when it was still before the enemy, and

after having held the command during a very eventful period, Colonel

Upton issued an order of which the following is an extract: “He has

known their gallantry and firmness before the enemy, their endurance,

and their discipline under every trial and pressure.... To the young

soldiers one word at parting: let them ever hold in view the conduct

and bearing which have characterized their older comrades, that they

in their turn may pass them on to others, and so uphold and carry

forward the name of the distinguished Regiment of which they now form

a part.”

Footnote 315:

Lieut.-Colonel Stepney, Captains Markham, Blackett, and Caulfeild, and

Lieutenant Lane-Fox, joined the Battalion in January, February, and

March.

-----

When the sick of the Battalion left the front for Scutari, no

information regarding them was obtained by the Regimental authorities,

and to correct this serious inconvenience, a Captain and

Lieutenant-Colonel from each Battalion of the Brigade was sent to

inspect the hospitals where Guardsmen were treated, and to arrange a

more proper system for future adoption (February 16th). Lieut.-Colonel

Dudley Carleton, who represented the Coldstream, reported that the

admission of men into hospital, as well as the patients' death or

discharge, were imperfectly registered:

“their kits were either stored or condemned without regular authority,

or were left in the hold of transports, carried up and down during

many voyages, and not unfrequently plundered. When a man died, no

regular record was kept or transmitted to his regiment, although

professedly done. No returns whatever had been sent to the Battalion

of men dead, invalided home, or otherwise employed.”[316]

-----

Footnote 316:

Wyatt, 53. The three Officers were, Lieut.-Colonels Hon. C. Lindsay,

D. Carleton (now Lord Dorchester), and Hon. S. Jocelyn (now Earl of

Roden).

-----

Colonel Carleton remained absent six weeks, and during this time he

established a system of fortnightly returns, which thenceforward were

regularly despatched to the Crimea, and he placed a sergeant of the

Coldstream on the staff of the hospital at Scutari to carry it out.

It has already been mentioned that the winter troubles added to the

losses incurred at Inkerman, and, in the absence of sufficient

reinforcements from home, had destroyed the efficiency of the Brigade at

the seat of war. At the end of January the three Battalions could hardly

muster a tenth of their proper strength, and numbered only some 312 men

able to do duty.[317] Lord Rokeby seems to have been so struck with

their exhausted appearance, that he endeavoured to obtain for them an

exemption from trench duty for a time; but as the Order book shows them

to be still continually at work, it is evident that it was not possible

to comply with the proposal. Towards the end of February, however, it

was found absolutely necessary to make a complete change, and to move

them to Balaklava, there to rest and to recruit their strength after the

very arduous labours in which for so long they had been engaged.

Accordingly, on the 22nd, the Grenadiers marched there, followed by the

Coldstream on the 24th, and by the Scotch Fusilier Guards about the same

time. In the Regiment there were less than 100 men of all ranks on

parade. For some time previously it had become manifest that, if the men

continued to live under existing conditions, it was but a question of

time how long the Battalion could survive except on paper. Of the sick

left behind, 41 followed on the 27th, and 75 were conveyed next day by

French mule transport (the usual conveyance lent us by our allies, and

indeed the only transport procurable, since our own arrangements had

broken down), but the last detachment was not removed to Balaklava until

the 28th of March.[318] The Guards remained at the base till June, 1855,

and though absent more than three months from the front, they missed

little chance of performing any useful military service.

-----

Footnote 317:

Kinglake, vi. 204, quoting from the _Report of the Sevastopol

Commission_ .

Footnote 318:

Wyatt, pp. 54, 65.

-----

[Illustration:

REGIMENTAL

1669

COLONEL LIEUT: COLONEL MAJOR N^o. IV COMP^S.

1684

COLONEL LIEUT: COLONEL N^o. VI COMPANY

1685

N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.

Chromo.

]

CHAPTER XI.

THE FALL OF SEVASTOPOL.

Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava—Improvement in the condition of the

men—Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th—Changed aspect of

affairs before Sevastopol—Review of events during the time spent at

Balaklava—Second bombardment—Interference by Napoleon III. in the

course of the war; operations paralysed—General Canrobert resigns,

and is succeeded by General Pélissier—Energy displayed by the

latter—Third bombardment—Fourth bombardment; assault on

Sevastopol—Its failure—Death of Lord Raglan; succeeded by General

Simpson—Siege operations continued—Battle of the Tchernaya—Fifth

bombardment—Sixth bombardment; second assault—The Malakoff is

captured—Fall of the south side of Sevastopol—The Russians evacuate

the town, and retreat to the north side—State in which the Allies

found Sevastopol.

There are few incidents of Regimental interest to record during the stay

at Balaklava. The men were lodged in huts, but as these were situated

near a burial ground and close to the stables of the Land Transport

Corps, the advantages gained by a change from the fatigues and hardships

of the siege to the base of operations were sadly diminished, and

several cases of maculated fever for the first time appeared. In March,

another site having been selected on the west side of the harbour, in a

more favourable and sanitary position, and huts having been constructed,

the Battalion moved there towards the end of the month. The better food,

the shelter, the increased comfort, and the rest now enjoyed by the men,

produced a satisfactory effect upon their health, to which the

improvement in the weather also contributed; for, the short, though

terribly severe winter had passed away, and with the spring the

temperature became warm and pleasant. During March, 101 men were

admitted into hospital, of whom 24 were suffering from typhus, and the

mortality amounted to 10; while next month, 53 men only were admitted,

and but 5 deaths occurred.[319]

-----

Footnote 319:

Wyatt, p. 65.

-----

The Battalion were employed principally in the ordinary duties performed

at the base of operations, guarding the stores and buildings or other

places set apart for the use of the army, and unloading the ships that

arrived in Balaklava. Drills were carried out, and the troops practised,

in occupying the trenches at night, to meet any sudden attack which the

enemy might contemplate. The danger of such an attack was lessened by

the fact that the enemy had relaxed his hold, as far back as the end of

December, upon the heights on the left bank of the Tchernaya, captured

by him on the 25th of October, though he continued to occupy the line of

the river. It was still necessary to restrain his activity in this

quarter, and several reconnaissances took place to prevent his advance.

As was only natural, the Officers at Balaklava, when off duty, rode

frequently to points where operations of interest were being undertaken,

but the Brigade itself was not engaged at this period.

The gabion-making detachment was continued near Balaklava, to supply the

siege-works before Sevastopol.

Early in March, convalescents from Scutari, wounded at the Alma and at

the Inkerman, returned to the Battalion, but the next draft did not

arrive until the 1st of May, when 7 Officers and 307 men, whose average

age and service were 22-1/12 years and 7 months respectively, landed in

the Crimea.[320] Owing to the Regimental promotion which had taken

place, Colonels Lord F. Paulet (commanding the 2nd Battalion) and

Newton, and Lieut.-Colonel Wood were now ordered home to the 2nd

Battalion; while Colonel Gordon Drummond assumed the command of the 1st

Battalion, Colonels Daniell and Perceval being Acting Majors (mounted),

as has already been stated. About this time, also,[321] Officers were

posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Captains F. Burton, H. Tower, and C. Blackett.

(Subsequently Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy.)

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain M. Heneage; Lieutenant

St. V. Whitshed.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stepney; Captain Le Couteur;

Lieutenant Rose.

No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel W. Dawkins; Captain Hon. R. Drummond;

Lieutenant H. Lane.

No. 5 Company: Major P. Crawley; Lieutenants A. Lambton, Lane-Fox.

No. 6 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop; Lieutenant A. Adair. (Subsequently

Major C. Baring.)

No. 7 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Cocks; Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenant

G. Ives.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton; Captains A. Thellusson,

Gerald Goodlake; Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.

-----

Footnote 320:

The Officers were: Colonels Gordon Drummond, Daniell, and Perceval;

Lieut.-Colonel Cocks; Captain Thellusson; and Lieutenants Adair, and

Lane. Shortly afterwards Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy (wounded at

Inkerman) and Major C. Baring (wounded at the Alma) reached the seat

of war; Assist.-Surgeon T. Rogers arrived on June 15th.

Footnote 321:

_Battalion Order_ , May 4, 1855.

-----

As the summer approached, the weather became extremely hot, and towards

the middle of May, 90 degrees were registered in the shade. Cholera

again broke out among the troops, but, warned by the visitation of this

plague in the previous year, every precaution then known to medical

science was taken to avert it. The number of sick increased during May

and June, the admissions into hospital being in the first month 134, and

the deaths 5, and in the second month 267 and 36 respectively; of the

latter, 24 men died of cholera.

On the 16th of June, the Brigade returned to the front to join in the

operations which were intended to be undertaken by the Allies on the

18th, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.[322] The Battalion was

488 strong (excluding Officers). Three Officers and 61 men were left

behind sick, as well as 15 convalescents; altogether 111 men were

abstracted from the effective strength. On reaching the upland the old

positions were scarcely to be recognised by the rank and file who had

remained more than three months at Balaklava. The French having already

extended the British Right Attack, occupied the ground in front of the

Karabelnaya from the Dockyard Ravine, past the Careenage Ravine, and

along Mount Inkerman to the heights overlooking the roadstead.

Innumerable siege-works cut up the plateau, the lines were pushed

further forward, a large force was concentrated on the spot, and the

face of the country—so bleak and barren in February—was now covered with

the green carpet of a luxuriant vegetation.

-----

Footnote 322:

The Highland Brigade marched up with the Guards, and thus the First

Division, under Lieut.-General Sir Colin Campbell, was once more

complete before Sevastopol. Shortly afterwards the following changes

were made in the British army. The Highlanders were separated from the

Guards, and having several battalions added to them, formed the

“Highland Division,” commanded by Sir Colin Campbell. Lord Rokeby,

promoted locally Lieut.-General, commanded the First Division, formed

of the Guards Brigade, under Brigadier-General Craufurd; and of the

2nd Brigade, viz. a battalion of the 9th, 13th, 31st Regiments, and of

the Rifle Brigade, under Colonel Ridley. About the same time, the

Second, Third, Fourth, and Light Divisions were commanded by

Major-Generals Markham, Eyre, H. Bentinck, and Lieut.-General Sir W.

Codrington respectively. The Cavalry, under Lieut.-General Sir J.

Scarlett, was divided into three brigades: the Heavy, Light, and

Hussar brigades.

-----

We must now take a hasty glance at the state of affairs prevailing

before Sevastopol and elsewhere, which controlled the war, while the

Guards were at Balaklava. In spite of the united efforts of the British

and French occupying the ground before the Malakoff, the enemy succeeded

in extending his works to his front, and in materially strengthening the

lines that covered the Karabelnaya. The fact was becoming more apparent

that General Canrobert, gallant soldier though he was, was not disposed

to risk the chances of making a bold move against the Russians; and that

the latter, under the distinguished leadership of Colonel Todleben, were

enabled thereby to prolong the struggle.

But Canrobert was not entirely his own master in this matter, for

towards the beginning of the year 1855 the Emperor Napoleon interfered

with the conduct of the operations in the Crimea, in a manner to impede

seriously the progress of hostilities. Declaring himself to be

dissatisfied with the course pursued, the Emperor conceived the idea of

delaying the siege until he could isolate Sevastopol from the rest of

the peninsula; and he even proposed to go himself to the Crimea to carry

out his design. He was happily dissuaded from undertaking this latter

part of the project—dangerous both on account of his inexperience in

war, and because of the instability of his authority in Paris,—and it

was finally abandoned, after he had been received as a guest at Windsor

(April 25th); but he still adhered to his determination to enforce some

hazy plan which his vanity had formed, and thereby he increased

considerably the difficulties of the Allies.

Added to this, there was a renewal of negotiations at Vienna. The Tsar

Nicholas died early in March, and though his successor Alexander II. was

clearly in the hands of the war faction, some feeble attempt was made to

patch up a peace. The negotiations failed; but the events alluded to

could not but exercise some influence over the fortunes of the war, by

fettering the action of the French army engaged in it.

This appears to be shown by the results that followed the second

bombardment of Sevastopol, which commenced on the 8th of April. Immense

preparations had been made to ensure its success, and it was confidently

expected by the Allied hosts that this bombardment would at last lead to

an immediate and triumphal assault of the fortress.

“Ten days did the terrific storm of iron hail endure; ten days did the

Russian reliefs, holding themselves ready to repel attack, meet wounds

and death with a constancy which was of necessity altogether passive.

On the 19th they saw the fire of the Allies decline, and settle into

its more ordinary rate; they saw too, that the sappers were again at

work with their approaches, and reading in this the signs of a

resumption of the siege, and the abandonment of the policy of assault,

they once more withdrew their sorely harassed infantry to places of

shelter and repose. Then they began to reckon their losses, which

amounted for the ten days, in killed and wounded, to more than 6,000

men. The French lost in killed and disabled, 1,585 men; the English,

265.”[323]

-----

Footnote 323:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 212.

-----

All this expenditure of lives and of war _matériel_ effected just

nothing, nor was anything even attempted against the enemy; for the

French, though having an opportunity to assault, not possessed at that

time by their British allies, were “kept waiting for Louis Napoleon, and

were restrained from engaging in any determined attack.”[324]

-----

Footnote 324:

Kinglake, vii. 195; compare Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 225.

-----

In order to accomplish the views of the Emperor Napoleon, a French army

of reserve was being collected near Constantinople, and as it was

expected soon to reach the Crimea—to undertake the plans which had been

sketched out in Paris,—two important operations against the enemy were

delayed. First, a further bombardment, arranged to take place at the end

of April, and to be followed by an assault, was put off; and secondly,

an expedition, at last agreed to, against the Russian communications in

the Sea of Azof, and which had actually started to Kertch (May 3rd), was

recalled.[325] Both these events caused much embarrassment to Lord

Raglan, who, understanding imperfectly even then the Emperor’s

proposals, found his own plans thwarted by the supine and unintelligible

conduct of his colleague. The confidence reposed in the latter was

naturally shaken; and when, a few days later, Napoleon’s scheme was

fully revealed to the allied Commanders, was discussed, and was found to

be impossible of execution, General Canrobert felt his position to be

intolerable, and he resigned the chief command of the French army. It is

right to add that, though Canrobert’s character unfitted him to direct

the difficult operations which lay before him, he was well suited to

assume the lower functions of a commander of a division or army-corps.

Being of a loyal and soldierlike disposition, and unwilling to leave the

seat of war, he begged that he might revert to the position he

originally occupied in the French army when the war broke out, and

recommended that General Pélissier (who had reached the Crimea in

January) should be appointed the new Commander-in-chief. These proposals

were sanctioned in Paris by telegram, and were immediately carried into

execution (May 19th).

-----

Footnote 325:

“I merely record that both armies were certainly, if not discontented,

amazed, when an expedition which started on the 3rd of May to Kertch,

to destroy Russian magazines and stores, was recalled three days

later, on the receipt of a telegram from Paris” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854

and 1894_ , p. 264).

-----

The change in the French command completely altered the state of affairs

in the Crimea. The vacillating weakness of Canrobert and his

subserviency to the foibles of his Imperial Master, were at last

replaced by the hardy daring of Pélissier and by his manly disregard of

an ill-timed interference in the conduct of the war, which could only

end in disaster. The forces fighting against Russia, moreover, were

increasing; while the strength of that Empire was ebbing fast. In April

nearly half of Omar Pasha’s Turks, about 45,000 strong, were taken from

Eupatoria to the Chersonese, and next month a compact division of 15,000

Sardinians—who had joined the confederacy against Russia—landed in the

Crimea, under the command of General La Marmora. The enemy about this

time, by reason of his immense losses, had little more than 100,000 men

in the peninsula; the Allies were more numerous, and could dispose of

about 180,000 men.[326] Thus, it was becoming apparent, that by

vigorously pushing on the siege, Sevastopol must fall, and that the

resources of Russia—so fatally allowed to accumulate in the early stages

of the war—were beginning to fail.

-----

Footnote 326:

English, 28,000; French, 100,000; Turks, 45,000; Sardinians, 15,000

(Kinglake, viii. 7).

-----

Immediate arrangements were made to storm the advanced works which

Todleben had constructed, to occupy the Tchernaya and the plain of

Baidar that lay beyond it, and to attack Kertch and the Russian base of

supplies formed on the coast of the Sea of Azof. On the 23rd of May,

after severe fighting, the French gained an important advantage over the

enemy near Quarantine Bay; and, two days later, he was also attacked on

the Tchernaya and driven out of Tchorgun. About the same time, the

expedition to Kertch, composed of 15,000 English, French, and Turks,

started for its destination. Operations in this quarter were entirely

successful, and by the middle of June the Allies, having struck deep

into the resources of the Russians, cut their chief line of supply, and

in no small degree carried out practically the policy of investment

which the Emperor professed to desire.[327]

-----

Footnote 327:

Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 242. Established now at last on the shores of

the Sea of Azof, the Allies might even at this late period have

inflicted a crushing blow on the enemy in the direction of Circassia,

and so have brought about the end of the war, and a severe check to

Russia’s advance through Central Asia and towards India—the objects

that Great Britain had in view when she undertook to curb the Tsar’s

pretensions in the East. It appears that the attention of the Foreign

Secretary (Lord Clarendon) was directed at that time to this most

important point; but there was a difficulty with the French, who,

conceiving that they would be giving assistance to a purely English

policy, would not concur in any such scheme (see Rawlinson, _England

and Russia in the East_ , 272 note). It must not be forgotten that

Louis Napoleon disapproved of the expedition to Kertch—the one

operation in the war which was crowned with complete and immediate

success, and which cost the Allies nothing,—and that he peremptorily

ordered Pélissier to take no part in the attack on Anapa on the

Circassian coast (Kinglake, viii. 79).

-----

The allied Commanders now directed their efforts to the Russian advanced

works covering the Karabelnaya, and, determining to attack them, they

prepared for the assault by a fierce cannonade (the third bombardment),

which opened on the 6th of June with tremendous violence and effect, and

lasted until the 10th. On the evening of the 7th, the French advanced

against the White works (situated on Mount Inkerman, to the east of

Careenage Ravine), and the Kamskatka Lunette (on the Mamelon, covering

the Malakoff and some 500 yards in front of it); and the English moved

against the Quarries (covering the Redan and about 400 yards from it).

These attacks were successful, and the enemy, driven from all these

outworks, was restricted to his main line of defence. The captured

positions were occupied and held by the Allies. Between the 6th and the

10th the Russians lost altogether, in killed, wounded, and prisoners,

8500 men and 73 guns; the Allies nearly 7000 men.

These advantages were now to be pressed home, and a great effort made to

assault the main line round the Karabelnaya; the Malakoff and the Redan

were to be attacked, and the fortress so long besieged was at last to

fall. The final act of the long drama was fixed for the 18th of June,

when the Anglo-French allies, having shared so many dangers and

hardships in common, might reap the reward of their arduous labours, and

obliterate the memories of the day of Waterloo.

The fourth bombardment opened on the 17th, and the fleets once more

joined their fire to the numerous great siege guns planted before

Sevastopol. The devastating force of the artillery soon obtained a

mastery over that of the fortress, and the usual results followed: the

enemy’s works were knocked to pieces, his defences ruined, and he lost

4000 men. Now, therefore, was the time for the assault to take place,

and, as we have seen, the Guards Brigade were brought up to the front

from Balaklava to participate in the operations about to ensue. But the

ardent expectations of the besiegers were not yet to be realized, and

the attack ended unfortunately. Neither in the Malakoff nor in the

Redan, were the French or ourselves able to effect a lodgment; the only

consolation was the capture of a position in front of our Left Attack.

Among the blunders that occurred to account for the failure, perhaps the

most unfortunate was that of Pélissier himself. It had been settled that

the bombardment was to continue for two hours after dawn on the 18th, so

as to shatter the repairs which the Russians invariably made to their

works during the night, and that then the assault was to commence at

about 5.30 in the morning. But this plan was altered at the last moment,

by Pélissier, who wished the advance to begin at dawn, without any

previous preparation by artillery fire. Lord Raglan was not consulted,

and, when he heard of it, he submitted to the change most reluctantly.

The enemy, therefore, was ready, behind parapets hastily renewed and

armed with field guns during the night, and thereby he was enabled to

repel the attack. That this was probably the main cause of the failure,

may perhaps be inferred from the fact that when, after the assault, the

bombardment recommenced, the soldierlike spirit of the Russians gave

way, and many of them, unable to stand against the terrific fire poured

upon them, fled to the harbour, and endeavoured to escape to the north

side of Sevastopol.[328] The Guards Brigade were not engaged upon this

occasion; they remained in reserve, and were not brought forward. In

fact, the attack had failed, and further expenditure of lives had to be

avoided. The losses were great on that fatal day; that of the English

amounted to 1500, of the French to 3500, and of the enemy only to 1500.

-----

Footnote 328:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 261.

-----

Two Officers occupying very conspicuous positions in their respective

armies disappeared from the scene of their labours about this time.

General Todleben was slightly wounded on the 18th, and more gravely hurt

a few days later, so that he had to leave Sevastopol, and the Russians

lost the services of that master mind to whose conspicuous ability,

energy, and courage the prolonged and successful defence of the fortress

was primarily due. The Allied armies also were plunged into mourning by

the unexpected death of Lord Raglan, who never recovered from the grief

and disappointment which oppressed his mind after the events of the

18th. This reverse, added to the labours and anxieties of the previous

fifteen months, during which time he discharged his high but onerous

duties without intermission, undermined his constitution, and he died on

the 28th, surrounded by his personal friends and his military staff. He

was succeeded by General Simpson.[329] His body was removed to England,

and was taken to the Bay of Kazatch with full military honours, on the

3rd of July; and, in accordance with General Orders, the troops not

engaged in the funeral or on duty in the field, remained in their tents

during the afternoon. While the ceremony lasted, the Allied forces

before Sevastopol were passive in the trenches, and, whether owing to

chance or to a graceful act of courtesy on the part of the Russian

Commander, the guns of the garrison also kept silence.[330]

-----

Footnote 329:

See Appendix No. X., containing General Orders on Lord Raglan’s death.

Footnote 330:

Kinglake, viii. 299.

-----

The siege was pushed forward with great activity after the 18th, and in

this portion of the weary operations the Guards Brigade took their full

share. Seeing the mistake committed by advancing over open ground for a

distance of 400 to 500 yards, against the _enceinte_ covering the

Karabelnaya, General Pélissier now proposed to sap up close to the

fortress. The soil near his own siege-works favoured such an

undertaking; but not so, that which lay in front of our positions, where

a thin layer of earth only covered the solid rock. Thus, while the

French were able to get close to the ramparts of the Malakoff, the

British were prevented from pushing through the ground much beyond the

Quarries, or from lessening to any considerable extent the distance that

separated them from their objective—the Redan.

These siege operations lasted without intermission until early in

September. On the night of June 18th, the Brigade found 30 Officers and

1000 men for the trenches, of which the Coldstream, furnished 8 Officers

and 263 men; and so on, from day to day, in varying numbers, according

to the requirements of the moment. It was ordered on the 21st, that “in

future the proportion of Officers and men in the trenches will be one

Captain and one Subaltern to every 100 men;” and also “should any part

of the guard of the trenches be called upon to work, they are positively

forbidden to take off their accoutrements or to go far from their

arms.”[331] Commencing July 10th, the duties were found by divisions—the

First, Second, and Light in the Right, the Third and the Fourth in the

Left Attack,—and during that night the Battalion furnished 7 Officers

and 312 men, also 21 men more as a special working party.[332]

-----

Footnote 331:

_First Divisional Morning Order_ , June 21st.

Footnote 332:

Special and other working parties and shot-loading fatigues in the

trenches were frequently ordered at this time. The following, relating

to the duties in the trenches, may be of interest:—

_Head-quarter Memo._  , July 10th: “General Officers of divisions will

be so good as to detail not less than a Brigadier-General, three Field

Officers, and two Adjutants for duty in the trenches on the days that

their divisions furnish the guard, Right Attack.”

_Divisional Order_ , July 12th: “The troops will be told off to their

places in the trenches before they leave their camp, and they will

move off from the parade in front of the camp, after being so told

off, at 6.15, so that they may all be in their places in the trenches

and the relief completed by 8 o’clock, according to the General Order

on the subject.”

_Head-quarter Memo._ , July 24th: “Until further orders the guard in

the trenches by night, will be 2400 men, under a General of the day

with three Field Officers; of this number 600 men will work if

required by the Royal Engineers, from 4 to 8 a.m., and return to their

camp at 8 a.m. if it should seem prudent to the senior Officer in the

trenches to dispense with them.... The remainder of the guard will

furnish working parties as usual during the day, when required by the

Royal Engineers.... There will be a special working party, consisting

of 400 men under a Field Officer, independent of the guard of the

trenches, except in case of an attack, when they will be available to

be called upon by the Officer commanding in the trenches.... General

Officers of divisions furnishing the guards in the trenches are to

consider the remainder of their division as a support ready to

reinforce the guard, with which they will proceed in case of alarm,

and resume the command of the whole force in the trenches.”

Later, in the middle of August, a reserve of 600 men was ordered “to

remain in the trenches the twenty-four hours, and will be planted

during the day in such spots in the 1st parallel or other places of

security as may be pointed out by the Generals of the Attacks. Troops

not on duty are to remain in camp till further orders” (_Head-quarter

Memo._ , Aug. 16th).

_Head-quarter Memo._ , Aug. 17th: “A steady fire of musketry, by

riflemen and good shots, must be kept up during the night, from the

advanced trenches of both Attacks on the Redan and works in rear and

flank. The object being to prevent the enemy from repairing the damage

done to their works. The artillery should assist this as much as

possible by throwing light balls.”

Colonel Tower says that, on August 21st, he was in the 5th parallel,

and that he was ordered to keep up a heavy fire all night on the

embrasures. 75,000 rounds were fired from the trench in which he was

stationed. He also says that the custom in the middle of August, was

to withdraw the guards of the trenches to a position in rear, and to

leave an Officer and small party in the advanced line to watch the

enemy’s works, and to fire at the embrasures when any one showed

himself (Tower, _Diary_ ).

Towards the end of August, and during the beginning of September, more

men were employed. There was a party for the trenches 2800 strong, the

guard as before 2400, and the special working party, 400 men. During

this period, more than one division furnished the necessary daily

number required.

-----

It should be noticed here, that the Guards Brigade, on August 31st,

exchanged the whole of their arms and ammunition for the new Enfield

rifle then introduced, and that, at this time, there were two patterns

in use by the troops of the British army standing before

Sevastopol.[333]

-----

Footnote 333:

“After 5 p.m. on the 28th inst. the small-arm ammunition magazine on

the right of the eight-gun battery in the Right Attack will contain

only Enfield rifle ammunition, pattern 1853, bore ·577; the three

other magazines will still be supplied with Minié rifle ammunition,

pattern 1851, bore ·᛫702.”

-----

Notwithstanding the interest which the operations undertaken between

June and September excited, and the high hopes generally entertained

that the fortress would soon fall, the little-varying duty in the

trenches became monotonous in the extreme, and all wished earnestly that

this phase of the war might quickly pass away. Some cricket matches

served to while away a few of the weary hours; but the weather was

extremely hot and oppressive, and the season was sickly. There was, of

course, much to distract the minds of men who, for the first time, found

themselves in the presence of an enemy; but it was different for those

who had been almost constantly at work for many months on the same spot

and at the same object, and thus even these distractions lost much of

their novelty and interest.

“The siege was really getting too fearfully tedious now,” writes

Colonel Tower, about August 28th. “The weather was hot and sultry; our

camp was a long way from the works. We used to parade about 5 p.m.,

having crammed in all the victuals we could get. We toiled down three

miles in the sun, carrying great coat, haversack, revolver, and

defiled into the zigzags before sundown; all night (if in the advance)

we were straining our eyes over the parapet, momentarily expecting a

sortie, being graped and shelled the whole time, and losing a good

many of our party. The sun got up very early, and often a breeze with

it, and from sunrise to sunset we had to sit in a dusty ditch, being

shelled, our food—salt pork and biscuit—covered with dust and sand.

The men could not show their noses over the parapet.... The deep blue

sea stretching away, dotted with ships coming in and going out, looked

so cool and nice in the distance, I used to think of home far away,

and long for the siege to be over. It really seemed now as if it were

drawing to a close. The bridge across the harbour had been constructed

some time, and could be for no other purpose than as a means for the

enemy to retire. The French pressed the enemy at the bastion Du Mât

[the Flagstaff Battery] and the Malakoff; I used to spend a good deal

of time in the French trenches, and knew the whole position as well as

any one in the army.”

The casualties in the Battalion were not very severe during these three

months, and amounted to 47 wounded, of whom 6 died of their injuries.

Besides this number, an Officer of the Regiment, Captain Hon. R.

Drummond, was wounded, on August 25th, in the trenches, having been shot

through the chest; he left the Crimea on September 6th, but died before

he reached England, unfortunately, indeed, just before the steamer

anchored at Spithead. The general health of the Battalion may be seen

from the following table:—

+————-+——————————————-+————————+ | |Admissions into Hospital from|

Deaths from | | |———————+———————+————————+ | | Disease. | Wounds.

|Disease.|Wounds.| +————-+———————+———————+————+———-+ |July | 138 | 20 |

8 | 1 | |August | 132 | 15 | 5 | 3 | |September| 65 | 12 | 2 | 2 |

+————-+———————+———————+————+———-+

Between June 20th and September 21st, 78 men returned to duty from the

hospital at Balaklava; but, _per contra_, 95 men were sent down from the

front for treatment during the same period.[334]

-----

Footnote 334:

Wyatt, p. 86.

-----

The Russians could do little to resist the formidable preparations made

by the Allies to bring about the capture of Sevastopol. They lost

heavily every day, even under the ordinary fire which the besiegers

poured upon them, and, perceiving that the end of the long struggle was

imminent, they resolved to make one final effort to free themselves from

the forces that were closing nearer and nearer to their defences. After

much consideration, General Michael Gortchakoff[335] determined to bring

down the field army, which was established on the Mackenzie heights and

on the Belbek, into the valley of the Tchernaya, and to attack the

French, Sardinians, and Turks holding that portion of the field. On

August 15th, accordingly, a general action took place in that quarter,

known as the battle of the Tchernaya, between a Russian army of 48,000

infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 272 guns, and a somewhat smaller force of

the Allies, who, though they massed as many as 60,000 men, did not

deploy their whole strength upon that occasion. The enemy displayed much

bravery, but showed little skill; he was routed, and fell back slowly

towards Mackenzie Farm, losing 69 Officers and 2300 men killed, 160

Officers and 4000 men wounded, and 31 Officers and 1700 men

missing—total 8260. The French had 1500 killed and wounded, and the

Sardinians 200.[336] The besieging armies expected that this battle

would be accompanied by a general sortie from Sevastopol; but it did not

take place, for, the Russians were getting exhausted, and their

resources were almost entirely at an end. In order to prevent any such

attempt, and also to enable the French to sap up quite close to the

defences of the Karabelnaya opposite to them, the Allies opened another,

though only a partial, bombardment (the fifth) on August 16th, and

continued their fire for some days with great violence; but no assault

followed, for they were not yet ready to enact the final scene that was

soon to begin.

-----

Footnote 335:

General Menshikoff had been replaced in his command in the Crimea by

General Gortchakoff in the spring of 1855; the same who fought on the

Danube, and whose curious movements, on the day of Inkerman, have

already been adverted to.

Footnote 336:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 271.

-----

General Gortchakoff might now have yielded the fortress which had been

held so tenaciously and gloriously by the armies of the Tsar; but, after

a full inspection of the town, of its ruins, and of the miseries and

horrors it contained, he came to the resolution that it was to be held

to the last extremity, and that the honour of his Sovereign prevented

him from either evacuating it or capitulating. He determined, therefore,

to bring into Sevastopol all he could spare of his field army, and to

resist to the end. Hopeless as the outlook was at this moment, he still

professed to believe that he could hold out for another month.

The last and sixth bombardment commenced on September 5th, and

continued, if possible, with even greater fierceness and intensity than

before, till the 8th, the day set apart for the grand assault. Pélissier

guarded himself this time against advancing at dawn; and, having

observed that at noon the Malakoff was usually more weakly occupied than

at any other hour of the day or night, he resolved to take advantage of

this circumstance, and to deliver the attack then. At noon therefore,

the French, under Bosquet, were to storm the Malakoff, the Curtain near,

and the little Redan; while the English, under General Codrington, were

to attack the Redan. The town defences, moreover, were to be assailed by

the French opposite to them, aided by a Sardinian brigade under General

Cialdini; but this movement was subject to further orders.

A very fierce fight took place at all these places, of which one alone

was successful; for the French, having entered the Malakoff, secured a

firm footing there, and gained that important position in the enemy’s

main line. Their losses were immense, not less than 3087 in killed and

wounded out of 7446 men engaged in this portion of the battle-field.

Everywhere else the assaults were beaten back, and the Allies could only

believe at first that they had but gained an indecisive victory.

The attack on the Redan was made, as has been seen, under very

difficult—almost impossible—circumstances; but, if it was only

undertaken to relieve the pressure which the enemy brought to bear upon

our allies near the Malakoff, our purpose was fulfilled. It is, however,

difficult to believe that a diversion was all we intended to effect,

since this assault was to be the final act of the great military drama

which had been going on for a whole year in the Crimea, and which

riveted the eyes of Europe upon Sevastopol. The troops engaged comprised

the Second and Light Divisions, 6200 strong—1700 in the first line, 1500

in support, and 3000 in reserve in the 3rd parallel; the Third and

Fourth Divisions formed a main reserve; but neither the Highland nor the

First Division, to which the Guards Brigade belonged, was called up to

share in the action. The Brigade was posted in rear, about half a mile

from the Malakoff, where a splendid view of the fighting was obtained.

There was much regret among all ranks composing it that they were not

allowed to advance and take part in the attack; more especially since,

when the French (according to Colonel Tower) asked General Simpson to

send some of his troops to help them to hold the Malakoff, the request

was refused, and the First Division, or, at least, the Guards, who were

close by, were not told off to perform this duty. If this is more than

camp gossip, it is, indeed, to be regretted that no British troops were

enabled to participate in the glory of inflicting a final reverse upon

the enemy’s position in the Karabelnaya.

General Simpson explains that he determined to give the honour of

leading the assault to the Second and Light Divisions, because they had

defended the trenches and approaches to the Redan for many months, and

because of the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground. Military

critics believe that this was a “cruel kindness to the army.” The two

divisions were exhausted by the siege, and the knowledge of the ground

is considered upon this occasion to have been a positive disadvantage,

“for, in acquiring it, the troops generally lost the dash which is

essential to success.” Moreover, these divisions were now filled with

young and only partially trained soldiers, “who paid no attention to the

orders that were given;” “the companies lost all formation and cohesion

from the irregular manner in which they ran forward, and they stood in

confused groups behind the parapets;” “the battalions got mixed up;” in

fact, “the young, raw recruits failed to follow their leaders in the way

in which the soldiers had done at the Alma and Inkerman.”[337] On the

other hand, there were fresh troops available; the Guards had only

shortly before come up to the front from Balaklava, where they passed

three and a half months, and the Highlanders had been there between

October and June. Neither, as we know, were employed in the assault,

much to their disappointment and chagrin.

-----

Footnote 337:

Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , pp. 370-378.

But all this is only one side of the story. The task before the British

was, under any circumstances, most difficult to fulfil. They had to

advance over the open for a considerable distance, against a strong

work, covered in front by obstacles, whose rear was unenclosed, and

whose fire was unsubdued. It had been impossible to construct _places

d’armes_ in our trenches, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, and

hence the reserves could not be concentrated in suitable positions

whence to push forward at the proper moment and feed the attack.

Nevertheless, the leading British troops advanced with the utmost

gallantry and spirit, notwithstanding the furious fire to which they

were exposed; they penetrated into the Redan, and clung to the position

they had gained. But they could not maintain themselves there; for, the

Russians, hurrying up in immense numbers, forced them to retire before

the reserves—hampered in the narrow trenches—were able to advance to

their support. The French, moreover, having spiked the guns they found

in the Malakoff, had none to turn

-----

upon the enemy as he entered the Redan in force to drive out our

storming parties. After this failure, the attack was put off to the

following day; our losses amounted to 2271 Officers and men, those of

the French to 7567, and of the Russians to 12,913.[338]

-----

Footnote 338:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , pp. 278-285. The 23rd Royal Welsh

Fusiliers, in support, lost, in killed and wounded, 15 Officers out of

18, and 197 men out of five companies (Wood, _Crimea_ , loc. cit.).

-----

But there was no necessity to renew the combat; for the enemy, aware of

the strength of the Malakoff position, which commanded the whole of the

defences of Sevastopol, evacuated the south side during the night of the

8th-9th, and withdrew to the northern bank of the roadstead, blowing up

their magazines, and firing the town in several places. The Allies had

thus early intimation of the impending fall of the fortress which for so

long had withstood their valour; but the full extent of the victory was

scarcely appreciated before the morning of the 9th, when the enemy’s

retreat became known to the armies engaged. The evacuation of the Redan

was first ascertained by some Highlanders in the trenches in the night,

who, stalking up to the ditch and abatis that was near it, found the

work tenanted only by spiked guns and by dead men.

“N——, who knew my wandering tendencies, came to me in the middle of

the night before daybreak, and told me to get up at once, that some

one had come out of the trenches, and that the Redan was evacuated. I

got on Bono Johnnie and galloped off about daylight. I arrived at our

trenches, which I found occupied by the Highland Division; they were

fast putting out a line of sentries to prevent any one going over to

the Russian works.... I went across the hill towards the Malakoff, the

ground literally paved with iron; the great high parapet was already

broken down, and in the afternoon the ditch was filled in with gabions

and a regular road made into the work. Dead and dying inside the work;

such a scene of devastation and confusion impossible to conceive: guns

broken and upset; powder in the embrasures, two or three inches deep,

all loose on the ground; wounded men, French and Russians, still

crawling about, and the trenches full of Russians who had crept in....

From the top of the parapet our trenches were spread out like a map. I

was wild with delight at thinking the siege was over, and all the

country opened to us. I posted off to the White barracks, and

ransacked the whole place, coming back through the Redan.”[339]

-----

Footnote 339:

Tower, _Diary_ , Sept. 9, 1855.

-----

The Allies did not enter the town on the 9th, for Sevastopol was a

blazing mass of ruins, and the frequent explosions showed the place to

be undermined: the garrison having escaped under cover of the night,

when we were unaware of their intention, could not be further pressed at

that moment, so there was no object to serve by sending the troops into

a fire-trap. A terrible conflagration raged, and to this was added the

burning and the final destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The

minds of our men could be well filled with awe and joy at the wonderful

sights that met their gaze—awe at the fiery furnace the enemy kindled to

mark his departure from the stronghold he had held so audaciously and

bravely, and joy that the protracted siege was at last concluded.[340]

Early on the 10th, the fires had ceased, and the conquerors, advancing

to secure their prize, found one great building intact. Having

penetrated into it, they were amazed to discover that it was a hospital

containing no less than 2000 dead and dying men, who had been left to

their fate without food or treatment for two days and nights, in the

midst of the dire confusion and chaos that prevailed in the town; among

them were three English Officers.[341] At midday on the 13th, a fatigue

party of 500 men of the First Division, under Major Ponsonby, Grenadier

Guards, were ordered into the town to help to cleanse it, and to bury

the numerous dead. The duty was a disagreeable one, as may well be

imagined; it was well performed, as can be seen from the following

Divisional Memorandum, dated September 15th:—

The General Commanding the Forces expresses, through Lieut.-General

Lord Rokeby, his regret at being obliged to employ the Brigade on the

disagreeable fatigue duty of Thursday last, but which, for the health

of the army, was absolutely necessary; and he was fully satisfied with

the manner in which that duty was performed.

-----

Footnote 340:

The Battalion Order dated the 9th, “The Battalion will parade for

inspection of necessaries at 9 a.m. to-morrow, Officers in blue coats,

etc.,” shows that the ordinary routine of military duty was never

relaxed.

Footnote 341:

Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 286; Nolan, ii. 473.

-----

The French now occupied Sevastopol, and the English the Karabelnaya,

where regular guards were established. The British troops (500 each day

from the Brigade) were employed, with a working pay of 1_s._ 6_d._ a

day, in making a main road from Balaklava to the front, and others in

the neighbourhood, under the superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. A.

Hardinge, Coldstream Guards.

It should be stated here, that, on the 27th of August, Lord Stratford de

Redcliffe, Ambassador at Constantinople, reached the Crimea for the

purpose of investing several Officers with the Order of the Bath. The

ceremony took place at the British head-quarters, in the presence of

General Pélissier and his Staff. The Guards Brigade furnished a Guard of

Honour; the Coldstream, the Queen’s Colour, the Ensign and Lieutenant

(Lieutenant Whitshed), and 50 men; and the Scots Fusilier Guards, the

Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, the Lieutenant and Captain, and 50 men.

Among those on whom the honour was conferred, connected with the

Regiment or to be connected with it, were Lieut.-Generals Sir Colin

Campbell, Sir H. Bentinck, and Sir W. Codrington.

The Brigade paraded in review order on the 20th of September, for the

purpose of receiving medals and clasps, which were distributed to the

Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men who had landed in the

Crimea before the 1st of October, 1854.

Early in October, 1855, new reinforcements reached the Battalion. On the

2nd, 24 convalescents arrived for duty from Balaklava, as against 7

invalids sent to England next day. On the 4th, the fifth draft landed

from home, consisting of 8 Officers and 207 men, whose average age was

24 years, and service 15 months. “They were principally volunteers from

the Militia, and a remarkably fine body of men, not so tall as the

original Guardsmen, but in every way better adapted for the exigencies

of active service.”[342] Officers were posted to companies as follows,

October 7th:—

No. 1 Company: Major C. Baring, Captain H. Tower, Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett, Major Lord Bingham, Lieutenant

Julian Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert-Stepney, Captain C. Blackett,

Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Le Couteur, Captain Lord E. Cecil, Lieutenant

Whitshed.

No. 5 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop, Lieutenant A. Lambton.

No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate, Captain W. Reeve, Lieutenant

H. Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major H. Armytage, Captain Hon. W. Feilding, Lieutenant

Godfrey Wigram.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, Captain Heneage,

Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.[343]

-----

Footnote 342:

Wyatt, 86.

Footnote 343:

A few days later, Majors Baring and Armytage were invalided to

England, and Captains Hon. H. Byng and Jervoise joined the

Battalion—the former from home, the latter by transfer from the 42nd

Highlanders.

-----

[Illustration:

COLONEL

1750

LIEUT. COLONEL MAJOR

QUEENS COLOUR 1^{ST}. BATT^L. 1893.

N.R. Wilkinson del. A.D. Innes & C^o. London. Mintern Bros.

Chromo.

]

CHAPTER XII.

THE END OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

Home events during the war—Sympathy of Her Majesty with her Crimean

soldiers—Badges of distinction added to the Colours—Inactivity of

the Allies after the fall of Sevastopol—Expeditions against the

Russian coast—Sir W. Codrington succeeds Sir J. Simpson as Commander

of the Forces—The winter 1855-56—Negotiations for a peace, which is

concluded, March 30th—Events after the cessation of hostilities—A

British cemetery in the Crimea—Embarkation and return home—The

Crimean Guards Brigade at Aldershot; visit of Her Majesty the

Queen—Move to London, and cordial reception there—Distribution of

the Victoria Cross—Summary of events connected with the

war—Losses—Appointment of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge as

Commander-in-Chief, and of Major-General Lord Rokeby to command the

Brigade of Guards.

The details of the great struggle in the Crimea have necessarily

occupied so much of the space of the last few chapters, that there has

been little opportunity to allude to the occurrences connected with the

Regiment which took place at home during this eventful period. It will

therefore be well to pause in the narrative of the war, and to devote a

few lines to that subject.

As soon as the Guards Brigade started for Malta in February, 1854, the

public duties in London were reduced; and later in the year, when the

requirements of active service necessitated a still further reduction,

they were fixed at 1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, 9 sergeants, 10 corporals, 6

drummers, and 144 men, to furnish the Queen’s Guard, Buckingham Palace,

the Tylt, the British Museum, and the Magazine Guards; and at 1

Subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 20 men, to furnish the Bank

piquet.[344]

-----

Footnote 344:

_Brigade Order_ , Nov. 23, 1854.

-----

The principal duty of the home Battalion was naturally at this moment to

train and supply men to the 1st Battalion in the Crimea, and we have

already seen something of the quality of the drafts that were sent out

to the East.[345] But as the ordinary recruiting was not sufficient to

maintain the forces at the seat of war in a proper state of efficiency,

the militia—the true reserve of the British army at that time—was called

upon to perform its functions in the emergency. Not only was a portion

of the militia embodied and employed as garrisons in those places where

regular troops were not available, but volunteers were obtained from its

ranks to fill up the gaps which the war created in the active army

fighting before Sevastopol. In this manner men of good physique and

trained to military service were obtained, and were drafted into the

regular army. In April, 1854, the Non-commissioned officers and men of

the Brigade told off to assist in training militia regiments, were

ordered to use their best exertions to induce men to volunteer for their

Regiments.[346] In December, 1854, Officers of the Brigade were employed

to superintend recruiting from the militia. Men were also obtained from

the Irish Constabulary, and it was settled, December 18, 1855, that

volunteers to the Guards from that corps might reckon their previous

police service as military service.

-----

Footnote 345:

See Appendix, No. XI.

Footnote 346:

_Brigade Order_ , April 1, 1854.

-----

It appears that there was an intention to form a Brigade depôt at Malta,

in March, 1855, the companies to form which, were to be borne on the

strength of the Battalions in the East, from the date of embarkation.

But this plan was not carried out, and the home Battalions remained all

through the war with twelve companies, as against eight companies

belonging to the service Battalions; the drafts to the latter were

always furnished direct from London.

As soon as the three Guards Battalions had left England, the other four

were stationed in the West-end (St. George’s, Portman Street, and

Wellington barracks), and there they remained (subject to the ordinary

half-yearly change of quarters) until January, 1855, when the Tower was

again garrisoned by the Brigade. In May, room had to be found for 500

men of the Line passing through London, and a portion of the 2nd

Battalion Grenadier Guards then in Wellington barracks, were put into

billets in Westminster, for four days. This probably is the last time

that any men of the Brigade have been billeted in London. On the 13th of

June, the 2nd Battalions of the Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards

proceeded to Aldershot Camp, then newly established, until the 27th of

August, when they were relieved by the two Grenadier Battalions, left in

England.[347] The latter remained there until the middle of December,

when Windsor was again occupied by a Battalion of Guards, and there were

then less than three Battalions of the Brigade stationed in the

West-end, the head-quarters of one being in the Tower, with a detachment

only, in Portman Street.[348] During the absence of a portion of the

Brigade in Aldershot, the Depôt of the 66th Regiment furnished a part of

the public duties in London; but at the end of August, most of these men

having been moved out of town, temporary reductions in the duties were

made (September 16th, and October 9th) until the return of the

Grenadiers.

-----

Footnote 347:

The following order was published upon this occasion, Aug. 27th: “The

Major-General Commanding, [at Aldershot] desires to express to the

Commanding Officer his sense of the general good conduct of the

Battalion and the attention they have paid to their drill during the

time they have been under his command, and to request them to accept

his thanks accordingly.”

Footnote 348:

For stations occupied by the Coldstream, see Appendix No. XV.

-----

It has been already stated that the Emperor Napoleon visited England in

April, 1855, where a cordial welcome awaited him and the Empress, who

accompanied him. A detachment of a Subaltern and 25 men from each

Battalion, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Grenadier

Guards (with the Queen’s Colour belonging to that Battalion), proceeded

to Windsor on the 14th, and were stationed there until the 19th, during

the period of the French Sovereign’s visit to the Queen. Numerous Guards

of Honour attended upon His Majesty, two of which were found by the 2nd

Battalion, both at Bricklayers' Arms Station, on the 16th and 21st, on

the arrival at, and departure from London, of the Imperial guest. On the

19th, the Emperor went to Guildhall, and the streets were lined by the

two Grenadier Battalions as he went to the City and returned back to the

West-end. Another Royal visit of one of Her Majesty’s Allies took place

on the 1st of December, when the King of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel,

arrived in London, and went to Windsor. Of the Guards of Honour

furnished upon that occasion, the Coldstream found four—two on the

arrival of the King at Bricklayers' Arms Station and at Paddington

Station on the 1st, one at Lord Palmerston’s house in Piccadilly on the

4th, and one at Bricklayers' Arms Station on the 6th, in the early

morning.

The dress of the Brigade occupied the attention of the military

authorities at this time. The white summer trousers were exchanged for

another pattern made of a light grey stuff; the coatee was done away

with, and the tunic was introduced (April, 1855). Epaulettes ceased to

be worn, and thereby the badge of the Rose, still worn by the men,

disappeared from the uniform of the Officers of the Coldstream. The

tunic at first was a double-breasted garment, but a year later (March,

1856), when Officers required new red coats, they were ordered to supply

themselves with single-breasted tunics, such as are still worn in the

Brigade. The bearskin caps had been cut down early in 1854, to nine

inches in height, and the plume was not to exceed six inches. Also, by

an order dated October 7, 1854, peaks to caps were to be discontinued by

sergeants, and were only to be worn by the Sergeant-Major, the

Quartermaster-Sergeant, the Armourer Sergeant, the Regimental Clerk, the

Drill Sergeants, and the Drum Major—a custom which still prevails in the

Brigade.

A curious means taken to test beer may be gathered from the following

Brigade Order, dated April 18, 1854, and shows the practical, though

perhaps unscientific, manner in which our predecessors went to work when

they wished to ascertain a matter of sanitary importance to the men:—

Each Battalion will send to Wellington barracks on Thursday morning,

to receive from the Quartermaster of the Scots Fusilier Guards some

beer, which is to be delivered to six sergeants, who must undertake

not to taste any other malt liquor during the time (10 days) they will

be supplied with it, the object being to test its wholesome qualities.

The Field Officer requests to be furnished with a report from each

Battalion at the expiration of the period specified above.

We find that a few days previous to this order (April 13th), a committee

of Officers was appointed to consider the question of the general

introduction of gas into barracks.

Later (July 17, 1855), a Field Officer of the Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel

Wood, Grenadier Guards) was sent to the “end of Commercial Road,

Pimlico, near to the projected Chelsea Bridge, there to view, in

conjunction with a Medical Officer, a site for a barrack.” It will be

seen that this was the first step taken to construct Chelsea barracks,

which, when completed, removed the Foot Guards from the cramped quarters

in Portman Street and St. George’s barracks, which they occupied at this

time.

The Enfield rifle (pattern 1853), issued, as we have seen, to the

Brigade in the Crimea at the end of August, 1855, was served out to the

Guards Battalions on home service on the 26th of October of the same

year. Nine hundred and one stand constituted the armament of the 2nd

Battalion, and “on their receipt the smooth bore now in possession,

including the sergeants' fusils, are to be returned into the Ordnance

stores.”

It is well known to all her subjects that Her Majesty the Queen followed

the varying fortunes of the Russian war with the utmost attention,

interest, and concern; and that to none was her warm sympathy more

heartily and graciously expressed than to her gallant army, who, amid

unparalleled privations and difficulties, maintained intact the glory of

the British Crown and of the country. Frequently did Her Majesty,

surrounded by the Royal Family at Buckingham Palace, personally see such

of her wounded soldiers as were able to be brought into the presence of

their Sovereign, and there praise them for their merit, and condole with

them on their sufferings. This honour was freely bestowed on the men of

the Brigade, and on many occasions the Commanding Officers of Regiments

were ordered to furnish lists of Guardsmen who were well enough to

participate in it. In 1855, the Queen’s birthday was celebrated on the

18th of May, and on the Horse Guards parade, Her Majesty presented

medals for service in the Crimea to all Officers and to three

Non-commissioned officers and twenty privates per Regiment of the

Brigade, entitled to receive them. Next day the following Order was

published:—

“The Field Officer in Brigade Waiting is commanded to express to the

Officers and soldiers of the Brigade of Guards who were present

yesterday at the ceremony of the presentation of medals, Her Majesty’s

solicitude as to whether they have suffered from the effort which

evidently many of them made, at the cost of much suffering and

inconvenience, and requests that Officers Commanding Battalions will

make the necessary inquiries, and forward the result of them to him

with as little delay as possible.”

When the fall of Sevastopol was known in England, there was much

rejoicing that the Allied arms had captured the enemy’s stronghold and

great naval arsenal in the Black Sea. But hostilities were not at an

end, nor was an immediate peace in prospect. Nevertheless, certain

distinct stages in the war were concluded, and victory had more than

once smiled upon our standards. A General Order, therefore, was issued

on the 16th of October, 1855, giving authority to inscribe the words

“Alma,” “Inkerman,” “Balaklava,” and “Sevastopol” upon the Colours of

the regiments taking part in these actions and in the siege. On the

following December 28th the three badges of distinction, “Alma,”

“Inkerman,” and “Sevastopol,” were inscribed upon the Colours of the

Regiments of Foot Guards.

The Allied armies, having captured the fortress that so long resisted

their skill and courage, found themselves placed in considerable

embarrassment. The question naturally arose as to what should now be

done. But that question was not readily answered, because no steps had

been taken beforehand to decide it. The northern side was still held by

the Russians, and their forces there were closely united to their field

army, which occupied defensive positions on the Mackenzie heights. The

undertaking to clear the two banks of the Sevastopol roadstead of the

enemy, and to drive him out of the peninsula had the outward appearance

of a difficult operation, and no measures had been concerted to proceed

with it.[349] The Anglo-French armies made no attempt to follow up the

victory of the 8th of September, but hung listlessly on the ground they

had won, deliberating as to their future movements, and doing nothing to

secure success. In short, though the capture effected brought prestige

to the besiegers, and placed in their power the fleet, the docks, and

most of the forts at Sevastopol, no further advantage seemed likely to

accrue, and we found ourselves almost as far as ever from exercising a

coercive control over the councils of the Tsar.

-----

Footnote 349:

It will be remembered that the north side of Sevastopol commands the

south side. The capture of the former would have jeopardized the

latter; but the fall of the south side left the other intact.

-----

As a matter of fact, General Gortchakoff was by no means as strong as he

was supposed to be, and could scarcely have maintained himself in the

Crimea had he been vigorously attacked by the brave forces that had

invariably beaten his troops whenever they met them in the field. His

position, indeed, was very precarious—so precarious was it, in the

opinion of his own Government, that he had the fullest liberty given him

to evacuate the peninsula if he found it necessary to do so. But he was

not obliged to resort to this painful and humiliating measure; for the

Allies never pressed him. Far from making any effort to dislodge him, or

from even manœuvring against him to ascertain how he was

circumstanced, they kept almost entirely aloof, and they left him alone

in peace.

The British Government, sincerely desirous to achieve a more important

success than had been gained, urged that the war should be vigorously

prosecuted. They poured troops into the Crimea, so that our army there

in November numbered as much as 51,000 men, of whom 4000 were cavalry,

and 96 guns, besides a Turkish legion, raised by England, of 20,000, and

a German legion of 10,000. The transport was now completely

re-organized, and the medical service in good working order; and, added

to this, the fleet, always overwhelmingly strong, was more powerful than

it had been before.[350] A campaign was now at last possible against an

enfeebled enemy under far better conditions than had been the case in

the same season of the previous year, when we invaded Russia, whose

resources then were practically unimpaired. The English people, also,

were at one with their Government, and were anxious for a vigorous

prosecution of hostilities, if the enemy could not be otherwise

subjugated. But they and their rulers could effect nothing, for our

allies would not move, and above all things was it necessary that the

alliance should be cordially maintained. Hence, our political relations

with the French interfered with our national interests, and controlled

our military operations against the enemy: and, as has happened in the

past, and will again happen, in wars conducted by several nations, the

common foe reaped no inconsiderable benefit by having a confederation of

Powers ranged against him.

-----

Footnote 350:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 296. These forces continued to

increase, and by Christmas, 1855, the British army in the Crimea was

still more numerous than is stated in the text, and there were 120

guns; besides, a reserve force was collected at Aldershot, and

amounted to over 18,000 men in April, 1856; at which time it appears

we had in the East about 60,000 men (excluding transport, etc.).

-----

In short, the fall of Sevastopol practically brought the drama to a

close. The efforts of the besiegers to take the town, after they had

allowed it to grow into military importance, seemed to exhaust the

further zeal and ardour of the Emperor Napoleon: it was impossible for

us to re-kindle them into activity. Nor could Marshal Pélissier be

roused to action; his enthusiasm for the success of the struggle had now

grown cold, and his former energy had evaporated. His troops had taken

the Malakoff, the key of the fortress, and, proud of their victory over

the enemy, the French were content with the glory their army had

achieved. So, also, had the Emperor gained all he wanted to secure; and,

the war having established him firmly on the throne, he was anxious for

peace with Russia, and for some new and more profitable adventure.

And yet something had to be done to preserve the semblance of war. The

Turks, already at Eupatoria, were therefore reinforced, and some

successful reconnaissances were effected in that important quarter:

operations were, moreover, continued on the shores of the Sea of Azof,

with advantage to the Allies; and lastly, after threatening Odessa, a

descent was made upon Kinburn and its neighbourhood. These desultory

expeditions served to keep up the illusion that the fight was still

earnestly maintained. But they led to no permanent results, and they

need not be further described; because, under the circumstances and

conditions in which they were undertaken, they only exercised, and could

only exercise, a very minor influence on the war. Omar Pasha had at last

(end of September) been allowed to take a portion of his hitherto

inactive army—chained for no useful purpose in the Crimea—to attempt the

relief of Kars, a Turkish stronghold in Armenia, then besieged by the

Russians. He was only barely supported by the Allies, if indeed he was

not hampered by them, and he failed to accomplish his object. Kars fell

on the 28th of November, and the victory gained there by the enemy

compensated him not a little for the reverse he sustained at Sevastopol.

The French might view the incident with unconcern; but to England,

having vital interests in Asia, the loss of this place was of far

greater moment.[351]

-----

Footnote 351:

While this important event was taking place, the bulk of the British

army was engaged in improving the communications of the Chersonese—a

work which cost us much labour and was of little use to us, though

shortly afterwards, when the peace was signed, it was of great value

to the Russians.

-----

Officers of the 1st Battalion were posted to companies as follows on

December 17, 1855:—

No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captain H. Jervoise;

Lieutenant G. Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain Whitshed; Lieutenant

Hall.

No. 3 Company: Major Thellusson; Captain Blackett; Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Reeve; Captain Heneage.

No. 5 Company: Captain Hon. H. Byng; Lieutenant A. Lambton.

No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate; Captain Lord E. Cecil;

Lieutenant Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major Le Couteur; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding;

Lieutenant Wigram.

Colonel Gordon Drummond still commanded the Battalion, while Major Lord

Bingham was appointed Adjutant about that time (21st December).

The Brigade remained on the upland of the Chersonese, with the bulk of

the British army, guarding the Karabelnaya, constructing roads,

drilling, practising musketry, and performing the ordinary duties of

camp life.[352] A tent had been converted into a Crimean Guards Club,

“where we used all to meet, read the newspapers, talk, and smoke,” and

there the first anniversary of the battle of the Alma was duly

celebrated by a dinner. There were races at Kamara on the 17th of

October, shooting expeditions, and other expedients to pass away the

time. Occasionally an interchange of shots took place across the

roadstead that divided the hostile armies; but they were rather signals

to show that the war had not yet officially come to an end than anything

else, and they never produced any important results.

-----

Footnote 352:

The duties in the Karabelnaya district were composed of seven guards,

amounting all told to 2 Captains, 4 Subalterns, 12 sergeants, 2

drummers, 12 corporals, and 249 privates.

At first the Brigade supplied 500 men daily for road-making; but later

in the year these parties were frequently double that strength. It

also furnished large fatigue-parties of several hundred men to bring

up huts from Balaklava, wherein to lodge the troops.

Musketry was carried out with considerable energy during the winter

months, and special orders on the subject were issued by the Commander

of the Forces.

-----

The monotony of these proceedings during an inactive campaign, and in

the presence of an unsubdued enemy, was one day electrified into new

life by a terrible explosion that occurred in the lines of our allies.

On the 15th of November, 100,000 lbs. of powder blew up in the French

artillery park, and kindled a fire that placed one of the principal

English magazines in imminent danger. Looking from the British camp, a

huge column of smoke was seen to ascend high in the air; it then spread

out like a tree,[353] broke, and sent down a shower of iron, stones,

rubbish, broken side arms, guns, gun carriages, and every conceivable

appurtenance of war; shells burst in all directions, and other

combustibles added their flames to the conflagration. Happily the fire

was got under without further mishap, but many Officers and men, mostly

French, were killed and wounded.[354]

-----

Footnote 353:

Pliny describes the great eruption of Vesuvius which overwhelmed

Pompeii, as having at first the appearance of a gigantic pine tree

emerging from the volcano.

Footnote 354:

Nolan, ii. 638. Assistant-Surgeons Wyatt and Trotter of the Coldstream

gained the special thanks of the French authorities for the assistance

they afforded to the wounded upon that occasion.

It appears that our troops had cause to be somewhat accustomed to this

class of misadventure. Under date Nov. 14th, Colonel Tower writes, “On

guard in the Redan; as I was walking about inside the works, I met two

of my men who were off duty, with pipes in their mouths, wandering

about. I cautioned them, and told them there had been many accidents.

A short time afterwards my sergeant came rushing up to me with all his

eyebrows singed off, to tell me Goodram and Bates (the two men) were

buried alive in a Russian magazine. I got Engineers, and we dug for a

long time in smoking ruins; at last we came upon them, burnt to

cinders, and hardly a bone in either of their bodies that was not

broken.... They died soon after we got them out. Goodram was a most

gallant fellow, and would have got the V.C. for going into the Redan

with the assaulting party on the 8th of September. They had trodden on

a fougasse left, probably on purpose, by the enemy when he evacuated.”

Private Goodram, it appears, slipped out of camp at night, September

7th-8th, crept close to the Redan in the dark, and joined the leading

files of the storming party. He greatly distinguished himself during

the assault, and is said to have been the first man to reach the

parapet of the work.

-----

On the 11th of November, a few days before the accident just mentioned,

General Sir James Simpson having resigned, Lieut.-General Sir William

Codrington was appointed by Her Majesty the Queen to the chief command

of the British army in the Crimea. This Officer, a Coldstreamer, served

in the Regiment from 1823 until July, 1854, when, as junior Acting-Major

of the 1st Battalion, and present with it in Bulgaria, he was promoted

Major-General. Remaining at the seat of war, he very soon obtained the

command of a brigade in the Light Division, as has been previously

recorded. At the head of this gallant brigade he greatly distinguished

himself at the battle of the Alma by his cool and intrepid bearing; the

part he played at Inkerman has already been mentioned. He was with the

army from start to finish of the war against Russia, being present on

the upland before Sevastopol throughout the whole of the first severe

winter (except once for the space of a very few days, when on the sick

list), and engaged in all the fights (usually in executive command) that

took place round and in the Redan. Few Officers in the British army were

more exposed to the dangers and the privations of this war than Sir W.

Codrington, and he survived both without a scratch and without even a

temporary illness of a serious nature.

The second winter was now approaching, and hostilities, while they

showed no sign of coming to an end, still languished. But it was passed

under very different conditions to those which prevailed during the

terrible season that overtook us in 1854-55. The autumn was fine and

enjoyable, and the real cold weather was not felt until the end of

November. We were then quite prepared for it, so that the army did not

suffer. The health of the troops was excellent, and for some time prior

to the end of 1855 there was such an abundance of every kind of supply,

that scarcely any requirement remained for the Medical Officer in charge

to suggest.

“During the six months which ensued from the commencement of January,

1856, until the period of embarkation from the Crimea to England, the

condition of the men, in every respect, both as regards amount of

sickness and duties performed, was so much allied to a similar period

passed in any garrison, that a detailed notice would be useless,

except so far as it would display an almost unprecedented amount of

good health, compared with a period passed at any of the out-quarters

at which the Guards are stationed in England, and far better than

obtains in the close and confined barracks of the Metropolis.”[355]

-----

Footnote 355:

Wyatt, 91. Written in 1858, before the small barracks in Portman

Street and St. George’s ceased each to contain the head-quarters and

the main portion of a Guards Battalion.

-----

Both in respect to the comfort and the good administration which our men

now enjoyed, we contrasted very favourably with the French, who, though

they were better off than we had been in the winter 1854-55, did not

improve their services as we had done; they consequently fared worse

than the British army in the cold season of 1855-56, and suffered

considerably in the spring of 1856.

When Sevastopol was in the power of the Allies, they destroyed its

value, as much as they could, as a naval arsenal, and thus the docks,

all the forts in their possession, the barracks, and the aqueducts that

led into the town were demolished. These tasks were accomplished in the

mid-winter.

On the 1st of March the sixth and last draft reached the 1st Battalion,

consisting of 8 Officers and 263 men, whose average age and service

amounted to 23½ years and 18 months respectively. The men were stout and

robust, and, like the preceding draft, well adapted for all the possible

requirements of active service.[356]

-----

Footnote 356:

_Ibid._ , p. 91.

Next day Officers were posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captains Tower;

Jervoise; Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Burdett; Major Crawley; Captain Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Newdigate; Captain Hon. H. Byng;

Lieutenant A. Adair.

No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Reeve; Captain Lord E. Cecil; Lieutenant

Sir W. Forbes, Bart.

No. 5 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins; Captain G. FitzRoy; Lieutenant S.

Mainwaring.

No. 6 Company: Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenants W. Seymour; Hon. E.

Legge.

No. 7 Company: Majors Armytage; Thellusson; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkelin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding;

Lieutenant Lane.

Ever since the capture of Sevastopol, the work of diplomacy had again

been active at Vienna; and with some additional advantage this time to

the Russians, for it succeeded in partially alienating the Emperor

Napoleon from the alliance. In form that Sovereign remained true to

Great Britain; but it was clear that, as far as he was concerned, the

war was at an end, and that the Tsar had no more to fear from his

animosity. This facilitated the action of Austria, and under her

mediation a project of peace was accepted by the Russians on the 16th of

January, 1856. A month later a Conference sat in Paris to settle an

immediate armistice and to conclude a general peace. The Treaty of Paris

was accordingly signed on the 30th of March, and it put an end finally

to the war that had lasted two years. By the terms of this agreement,

which yielded back to their original Sovereigns all territories in

possession of either of the combatants, an important article was

included, viz. the Black Sea was neutralized, its waters and ports were

“formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war,” naval

arsenals on its shores were not to be maintained, and ships of war were

forbidden to enter or pass through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It

is of interest to record the fact that this article, to gain which

England had expended so much blood and treasure, was infringed by Russia

in 1859, who, with no one to interfere in the neutralized sea, blockaded

the Circassian coast, and at last overcame the stubborn resistance of

the liberty-loving tribes of the Caucasus that for so long checked her

progress in Central Asia. Having accomplished this work, she then boldly

repudiated the article, with scarcely a protest on our part, in the

beginning of 1871, when we were at peace with her, just fifteen years

after the conclusion of the Crimean war; and again she prepared her

forces to effect another development of the Eastern Question.

On the 2nd of April official tidings of peace were communicated to the

several armies engaged in the struggle, by a salute fired upon the

upland. Thenceforward the contending forces, drawn together by that

mutual respect and esteem with which brave men regard one another,

looked upon each other as friends, and all traces of hostility vanished

as if by magic. British and Russian soldiers were to be seen in scores

on their respective sides of the Tchernaya, conversing as best as they

could, and exchanging presents. The thoughts of our men, however, were

now naturally turned towards home; but two months were still to elapse

before the Coldstream quitted the soil on which they had for so long

lived and suffered, and where their military virtues had been so

conspicuously displayed.

About this time the French appointed a special mission to inquire into

the relative sanitary conditions of the English and French field

hospitals in the East, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyatt was sent to aid in

the investigation made.

“The whole of the Field hospitals,” says Dr. Wyatt, “were inspected,

and the most satisfactory conclusions drawn by the Inspector in favour

of the detached system of Regimental hospitals in the English army,

compared with the congregated ambulance arrangements of the French; he

was very favourably impressed with the Field hospitals of the Guards,

which he examined most minutely in all their details.”