FIRST CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON IN WAR.
(1795.)
Toward the end of June, 1795, it became evident that the British
commanders, having failed to obtain peaceable possession of the Cape
colony, meant to use all the force necessary to carry out their
purpose.
On the 24th of June, three Dutch merchant ships lying in Simon’s Bay
received instruction from Commissioner Sluysken to proceed to Table
Bay, but Admiral Elphinstone forbade them to sail. On the 28th of June,
two small vessels sailing under American colors anchored in Simon’s
Bay. One of these—the Columbia—carried Dutch dispatches from Amsterdam
to the Cape and Batavia. The English admiral promptly placed the
Columbia under guard and seized her mails. Such letters and dispatches
as related to public affairs were either suppressed or mutilated, and
measures were taken to prevent newspapers from reaching the shore. A
single paper, however, was smuggled into the hands of a Burgher, and
was the means of conveying astonishing news to the colonists. The most
startling of its contents was an official notice by the States-General
of Holland, under date of the 4th of March, 1795, absolving from their
oaths of allegiance to the Prince of Orange all his former subjects,
both in the Netherlands and in the Dutch colonies.
From this notice and from hints left in mutilated letters to private
individuals it was learned that so far from being a conquered country
under the heel of a rigorous French military administration, Holland
was a free and independent republic; that the Stadtholderate had been
abolished by the free-will action of the nation, and that France was in
friendly diplomatic relations with the Dutch Republic.
Thereupon, the Commissioner and his council determined that it was
their duty to hold out against the English. They reasoned that, should
the colonial forces be overpowered in the end, the Netherlands would
have a better claim to the restoration of the country when peace should
be made than would exist if the protection of Great Britain had been
accepted without a struggle. They saw a bare possibility that the
British force might be starved into departure by refusing to furnish
them with provisions. Moreover, aid from Europe might then be on the
way and might reach them in time to save the colony to Holland. In any
case, they judged, there was nothing to lose in opposing the British
but the control of the colony, whereas, they might lose their heads as
traitors should a combined Dutch and French fleet arrive and they be
found to have surrendered to the British without a show of resistance.
They decided that both duty and personal interest required them to make
what preparation they could for defense.
By order of the council, on the night of the 29th of June, Simonstown
was abandoned as untenable. All the provisions there were destroyed,
the guns were spiked, such ammunition as could not be carried away was
thrown into the sea and the troops joined the force at Muizenburg. Not
being able to evade the ships blockading Table Bay, the council
chartered a cutter then lying at anchor in Saldanha Bay and sent her
with dispatches to Batavia informing the Dutch colonists there of the
state of things both at the Cape and in Holland.
When the call to assemble at the Cape was signaled to the country
Burghers, only seventy men from the Swellendam district responded. The
nationals, who had been in revolt against the Dutch East India
Company’s government, declined to obey. Further appeals by letter
failed to bring any more of them in. At last, on the 7th of July, in a
written communication, it was proposed by the nationals that they would
rally to the defense of the country if the government would grant them
amnesty for the past and pledge a reasonable redress of their
grievances as soon as possible. Among the principal stipulations were
these: The nationalists were to be exempted from direct taxation and to
have free trade; the cartoon money—a depreciated currency—was to be
withdrawn from circulation, and they were to be granted permission to
hold in perpetual slavery all Bushmen captured by commandos or
individuals.
The nationals had no sooner dispatched the letter containing their
overture than it occurred to some of them that their claims would
surely be ignored if the British obtained control of the colony.
Therefore, without waiting for a response from the government, they
resolved to aid in the defense of the country, and at the same time
continue to assert their right to self-government. In accordance
therewith a company of one hundred and sixty-eight mounted men was
organized under Commandant Delpont and at once set out for Cape Town.
The rally from the country districts of Swellendam, Stellenbosch and
Drakenstein brought together a force of eleven hundred and forty
horsemen. Two hundred of these were added to the post at Muizenburg.
The rest were stationed at Cape Town and along the road to the camp as
pickets.
Hostile operations came on very slowly. Admiral Elphinstone seized
three more Dutch merchant ships that were lying in Simon’s Bay on the
9th of July. On the 14th he landed four hundred and fifty soldiers, who
occupied Simonstown, and strengthened the post a week later by adding
four hundred marines.
Strangely enough, neither the English commanders nor Commissioner
Sluysken chose to regard these movements as acts of war. The
Commissioner had been careful to order that no attack should be made on
the English, and that nothing whatever should be done that would
provoke retaliation or furnish grounds for them to throw the blame of
opening hostilities on the Dutch. It was not until the 3d of August
that any act was committed which was by either party construed into an
act of war. On that day a Burgher officer fired at an English picket
and wounded one of the men. For this he was reprimanded by the
Commissioner. General Craig reported it in his dispatches as the
beginning of hostilities.
The time soon came when the British officers thought an advance might
be made. The Dutch had been remiss in not strengthening their earthwork
defenses toward the sea. They had permitted English boats to take
soundings off Muizenburg unmolested. And the English commanders had
been encouraged to hope that the nationals in the colonial force did
not intend to seriously oppose the British advance—that in all
probability they would come over in a body to the British side as soon
as the first engagement opened. On the other hand, the invading army
was utterly without field guns and could not muster more than sixteen
hundred men. Re-enforcements were on the way, but no one could foretell
the time of their arrival. To advance any part of their military force
beyond the range of the guns on the ships would expose the whole
expedition to destruction in the event of a French squadron appearing
in Table Bay to co-operate with the Dutch colonists. In view of all the
circumstances the British commanders determined to capture Muizenburg,
to reopen negotiations with the Cape government from that position and
to attempt no further aggressive movement until the arrival of the
expected re-enforcements.
On the morning of the 7th of August it became evident to the Dutch
officers at Muizenburg that the British were about to attack. A column
of sixteen hundred infantry and marines was advancing from Simonstown.
Two small gunboats, and the ships’ launches, carrying lighter guns,
moved close in shore about five hundred yards in advance of the column,
to keep the road open. The war vessels America, Stately, Echo and
Rattlesnake were heading for Muizen Beach.
The Dutch camp was at the foot of the mountain facing False Bay on the
west, the camp looking south and east, for it was at the northwest
angle of the bay. They had planted eleven pieces of artillery so as to
command the road from Simonstown, which ran along the west coast of
False Bay. From Kalk Bay to Muizenburg the roadway was narrow, having
the water on one side and the steep mountain, only a few paces away, on
the other. The mountain terminates abruptly at Muizenburg, where begin
the Cape Flats, a sandy plain stretching across from False Bay to Table
Bay. Near the north end of the mountain is a considerable sheet of
shallow water called the Sandvlei, fed in the rainy season by an
intermittent brook called Keyser’s River, emptying into the north side
of the vlei.
As soon as they came within range of the post at Kalk Bay the British
ships opened fire and the picket stationed there retired over the
mountain. On coming abreast of Muizenburg the fleet came to anchor and
delivered their broadsides at easy range upon the Dutch camp. The
thunders of the first fire had hardly ceased when the national
battalion of infantry, and a little later the main body thereof, led by
Colonel De Lille, fled from the post through the Sandvlei. One company
under Captain Warneke retired more slowly and in a little better order.
Many of the artillerymen followed, leaving only a single company under
Lieutenant Marnitz to work the two twenty-four pounders. These, being
planted on loose soil, were thrown out of position by the recoil of
every discharge and could not be fired again until they had been
handled back into place. The firing was, therefore, slow and with
uncertain aim. Two men were killed, four wounded and one gun disabled
on the America, and one man was wounded on the Stately, by Lieutenant
Marnitz’s fire. Whether it was through bad marksmanship or by design
one can hardly decide, but the English guns were aimed so high that the
shot passed over the camp and lodged in the mountain behind it. Marnitz
soon perceived that the post could not be held, and, first spiking the
cannon, retired before the charge of the British column. Nothing was
saved from the camp but five small field pieces.
The English followed the retreating burghers with a cheer. As soon as
they were out of range of the British ships the Dutch endeavored to
make a stand, but were quickly driven from it by a bayonet charge.
After gaining the shelter of the mountain the Dutch again faced their
pursuers, this time with the support of guns brought to bear on the
English from the opposite side of the Sandvlei, and with such effect
that they fell back to Muizenburg. In this second collision one English
officer, one burgher and two Dutch artillerymen were killed and one
pandour was wounded.
Instead of rallying his men and making a stand behind the Sandvlei, as
he might have done with a well-protected front, De Lille continued his
flight to Diep River, where he arrived with a fragment of his command,
not knowing what had become of his artillerymen and burghers.
As soon as news came that the English were advancing, a detachment of
five hundred burgher horsemen was hastened forward from Cape Town to
Muizenburg. On the way they learned from the fugitives that Muizenburg,
the camp and everything in it had been taken by the British. Then they
halted and encamped on the plain in small parties.
Next morning, the 8th of August, De Lille made some show of rallying
and returned to the head of the Sandvlei leading a part of the infantry
that had been discomfited the day before. The 8th became a day of
general panic. The English advanced in column to attack De Lille at the
head of the vlei—wading through water that, in places, came above their
waists. Notwithstanding the advantage this gave him, De Lille and all
his command fled precipitately on their approach. As the British issued
from the water and pursued them across the plain they observed a party
of burghers coming from behind some sandhills on their flank—the
detachment that had come from Cape Town and camped on the plain during
the night. Assuming that the flight of De Lille and the movement of
this body were in the carrying out of an ambuscade, the British fled,
in their turn, and were pursued by the Dutch until they came under the
fire of their own cannon, spiked and abandoned by Lieutenant Marnitz,
but drilled and placed in service by General Craig. While the English
were being driven in by the Cape Town detachment, De Lille and his
command fled all day in the opposite direction, and in the evening
camped within a mile of the camping ground of the night before, near
Diep River.
De Lille’s conduct in the field caused widespread indignation. In a
formal document drawn up by a number of burgher officers and forwarded
to the Commissioner, he was charged with treason. The fiscal who
investigated the case acquitted De Lille of treason, there being no
proof that he had conspired with the British to betray his trust. And
yet he was neither a coward nor an imbecile. His conduct can be
explained in no other way than to say that he was a devoted partisan of
the House of Orange, that he regarded the nationals as traitors to
their legitimate ruler and that he believed the English were the loyal
friends of the rightful sovereign and the ancient government of the
Netherlands. For these reasons he would not fight against the British.
He held that success in repelling them would result in handing the
country over to the colonial national party and to republicanism, which
would be an offense against the divine rights of the Prince of Orange.
Later he took service with the British and was made barrack master in
Cape Town. Thereafter he wore the Orange colors, and openly vented his
abhorrence of all Jacobins—whether French, Dutch or South African.
On the 9th of August the expected British re-enforcements began to
arrive. On the 12th Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig wrote the
Commissioner and his council announcing that already they had received
an accession of strength, and that they expected the immediate arrival
of three thousand more soldiers. They also repeated the offer to take
the Cape colony under British protection on the same terms as were
proffered at first, and added, as a threat, that their men were
becoming exasperated at the resistance offered and it might become
impossible to restrain their fury.
The letter of the British commanders was laid before the Commissioner’s
council, the councillors representing the country burghers and the
burgher militia; and these were all requested to express their judgment
and their wishes freely. With a single exception they were unanimous in
adopting a resolution declaring that the colony ought to be and would
be defended to the last. In accordance therewith the Commissioner
transmitted to the British officers the decision of the people,
notifying them that the colony would still be defended.
Notwithstanding the brave front thus presented to the invaders,
influences were at work which tended toward the rapid disintegration of
the burgher forces. It was being rumored among them that the Bushmen
were threatening the interior, and that the Hottentots in Swellendam,
and the slaves in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, were about to rise in
revolt. True or false, these alarming rumors caused many burghers to
forsake the ranks and go to the protection of their homes and their
families. In July the burgher cavalry numbered eleven hundred and
forty; by the first of September it was reduced to nine hundred.
Efforts to keep up the original strength by the enlistment of foreign
pandours, native half-breeds and Hottentots were unsuccessful. Only the
burgher infantry, numbering three hundred and fifty, remained
intact—being composed of residents of the town.
The colonists were further dispirited by an abortive attempt to capture
certain English outposts on the Steenberg. The attack was gallantly
made by the burgher militia and pandours, but being unsupported by
regular troops and field artillery they were repulsed. On the same day
the pandours mutinied. One hundred and seventy of them marched in a
body to the castle and made complaint that their families had been
ill-treated by the colonists, that their pay was inadequate, that they
were insulted by abusive remarks, that a bounty of £40 promised them
for good conduct had not been paid, and that their rations of spirits
were too small. Commissioner Sluysken so far pacified them with
promises of redress that they returned to the ranks, but from that time
they were disaffected and sullen, and their service was of little
value.
The Dutch officers had planned a night attack in force on the British
camp at Muizenburg. When they were about to attempt it, there arrived,
on the 4th of September, a fleet of East Indiamen bringing the main
body of the British re-enforcements. These consisted of infantry of the
line, engineers and artillerymen, numbering, in all, three thousand
troops under the command of General Alured Clarke. This had the effect
of so completely discouraging the burgher cavalry that many of them
gave up hope and returned to their homes. By the 14th of September only
five hundred and twenty-one of this branch of the colonial force
remained in the ranks.
Once more, on the 9th of September, the British commanders issued an
address to the colonists calling upon them to give peaceable admission
to the overwhelming force now at their gates, and warning them that,
otherwise, they would take forcible possession. Commissioner Sluysken
replied, as before, that he would hold and defend the colony for its
rightful owners, for so he was bound to do by his oath of office.
The English army in two columns, between four and five thousand strong,
marched from Muizenburg to attack Cape Town, at 9 o’clock in the
morning of the 14th of September. This movement was signaled to the
colonial officers at the Cape, who ordered all the burgher cavalry,
with the exception of one company, to the support of the regular troops
at Cape Town. A part of the burgher force was sent out to strengthen
the Dutch camp at Wynberg, about half way from Muizenburg to Cape Town
on the route of the British. Some attempt was made to harass the
columns on the march, but with so little effect that only one was
killed and seventeen were wounded.
Major Van Baalen, then in command of the regular troops at Wynberg,
arranged a line of battle that was faulty in the extreme, and planted
his cannon in such position that they were practically useless as
weapons of offense against the advancing army. Certain officers of the
artillery and of the burgher militia contingent remonstrated against
his plan of battle, but it was in vain, and when the English came
within gunfire he retreated with the greater part of the regulars. Then
followed a scene of confusion. The burghers protested, and cried out
that they were being betrayed in every battle. One company of infantry
and most of the artillery made a brief stand and then retreated toward
Cape Town, leaving the camp and all its belongings to the British.
It had now become clear to the burgher cavalry that Commissioner
Sluysken, Colonel Gordon, and most of the officers of the regular force
intentionally fought to lose—that so far as the republican government
then prevailing in Holland was concerned they were traitors at heart,
and that they were willing—after a mere show of resistance—to let the
colony fall into the hands of the British in order to have it held in
trust by them for the fugitive prince of Orange. The burghers,
therefor, not being willing to risk capture or death in battles that
were not meant to win by those who directed them, dispersed and
returned to their homes. Meantime a British squadron was threatening
Cape Town, but keeping out of range of the castle guns.
The commissioner’s council was convened at six o’clock in the evening
of the 14th of September to consider a very serious situation. A
British force of over four thousand men, thoroughly disciplined and
equipped, was then in bivouac at Newlands, less than ten miles from
Cape Town. The colonial force was only about seventeen hundred strong
and nearly half of these had that day retreated before the enemy
without giving battle; the remainder were distributed among the
fortified posts at Hout Bay, Camp’s Bay and Table Valley. If these were
all loyal and united in a determination to fight to the last they would
certainly be overpowered in the end. But they were not at one in their
loyalty. Some were for the deposed and banished prince of Orange, and
therefore favorable to the English who professed to be his friends.
Others were strong in their preference for the new republican
government in the Netherlands. While thus divided in political
sentiments they were without leaders in whom they could place
confidence. Further effort at defense seemed unjustifiable in view of
certain defeat, and of the useless destruction of property and life it
would cause.
One member of the council, Mr. Van Reede von Oudtshoorn, stood out
against capitulation, offering to take, with the corps of pennists he
commanded, the brunt of a final battle with the English. The other
members were unanimous in deciding to send a flag of truce to the
British at Newlands, asking for a suspension of hostilities during the
next forty-eight hours in order to arrange terms of surrender. General
Clarke consented to an armistice of twenty-four hours only, beginning
at midnight on the 14th of September.
As a result of conference between the representatives of the Cape
government and the British commanders the following terms of
capitulation were agreed to: The Dutch troops were to surrender as
prisoners of war, but their officers might remain free in Cape Town or
return to Europe on their parole of honor not to serve against Great
Britain during the continuance of hostilities. No new taxes were to be
levied, and the old imposts were to be reduced as much as possible in
order to revive the decaying trade of the colony. All the belongings of
the Dutch East India Company were to be handed over to the English, but
private rights of property were to be respected. The lands and other
properties of the Dutch East India Company were to be held in trust by
the new authorities for the redemption of that portion of the company’s
paper currency which was not secured by mortgage.
Early in the morning of the 16th of July these terms of surrender were
officially completed by the signing of the document in which they were
written by General Clarke and Admiral Elphinstone. At eleven o’clock on
that day the council ordered the publication of the articles, and that
official notice of what had been done be sent to the heads of
departments and other officers in the country districts. Then the
council formally closed its last session and its existence.
The ceremonial in connection with the capitulation took place at three
o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, the 16th of September, 1795.
Twelve hundred British infantry and two hundred artillerymen under
command of General Craig drew up on the open grounds in front of the
castle. The Dutch troops marched out of their late stronghold with
colors flying and drums beating, passed by the British line, laid down
their arms and surrendered as prisoners of war. Some of them did so in
great bitterness of soul, muttering and calling down curses upon
Commissioner Sluysken and Colonel Gordon for having betrayed and
disgraced them. Lieutenant Marnitz, in writing of these events,
emphasized the fact that the only occasion on which the head of the
colonial military establishment, Colonel Gordon, drew his sword in the
conflict with the English was when he gave the order for the troops he
had commanded to lay down their arms.
Thus it was, after an almost bloodless war, that Cape Colony, founded
by the Dutch and governed continuously by the Netherlands for one
hundred and forty-three years, passed into the possession of Great
Britain and became a crown colony thereof. The charges made by some
that Commissioner Sluysken and Colonel Gordon were either imbeciles or
traitors may not be quite in accordance with the facts. Certainly there
is a wide disparity between the always strong and defiant words in
which they announced, to the last moment, their determination to defend
the colony, and the puerile efforts they made to do so. The only
rational explanation of their conduct is that they preferred yielding
to the British, after making a show of resistance, to accepting in the
colony the new regime of republicanism that prevailed in the mother
country. In all probability their secret thought was that by prolonging
a nominal resistance they might gain time enough for something to occur
in Europe—where events were moving with bewildering rapidity—something
that would reinstate the Prince of Orange as Stadtholder of the
Netherlands, and so leave the British no pretext for seizing the colony
in his interest.
This chapter may fittingly close with a few brief records of events
that lead up to the first trek northwards of the Africanders.
The Cape colony was restored to the Dutch on the conclusion of the
peace of Amiens, in 1802. When war broke out afresh in Europe, in 1806,
the English again seized the Cape to prevent Napoleon from occupying so
important a naval station and half-way house to the British possessions
in India. The second seizure was accomplished after a single engagement
with the Dutch. In 1814 the colony was formally ceded to the British
crown together with certain Dutch possessions in South America, by the
reinstated Stadtholder of the Netherlands, who received in return
therefor a money consideration of thirty million dollars.