FIRST CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON IN DIPLOMACY.
(1795.)
Colonel Robert Jacob Gordon was in chief command of all the regular
military forces maintained in the Cape colony. These consisted of a
regiment of infantry numbering twenty-five officers and five hundred
and forty-six rank and file, an artillery corps mustering twenty-seven
officers and four hundred and three rank and file, fifty-seven men
stationed at the regimental depots Meuron and Württemberg and a corps
of mountaineer soldiers, called pandours, numbering two hundred and
ten.
It is important to remember that at this time the colonists were
divided in sentiment as to the government of the Dutch East India
Company, but united in loyalty to the States-General and the
Stadtholder of Holland. In the interior the people had risen up in a
mild revolt, had dismissed the local magistrates who were the
appointees of the Company, and had instituted incipient republics under
the government of representative assemblies. Even in Stellenbosch and
Cape Town the majority sympathized with these movements, and only
waited a favorable opportunity to declare against the Company’s rule.
It is equally important to know that the military, also, were divided
in sentiment on this subject. Of the infantry, the officers were loyal
to the Orange party, but the rank and file were mercenaries from nearly
every country in the north of Europe, and were zealous for that party
or nation from whom they could draw the highest pay. The artillery
corps, on the contrary, was composed almost entirely of Netherlanders,
with a few French and Germans. These men were attached to the mother
country. A large majority of them, however, sympathized with the
republican movement in Europe, and would have preferred alliance with
the French rather than with the English, for, at that time, the lead of
France was toward republicanism.
Thus weakened by internal divisions, the Colony presented an open door
to invasion by any power that might covet a point of so great strategic
importance on the ocean thoroughfare between Europe and the Orient.
The English government, when about to enter into hostilities with
France, became apprehensive that the French would perceive the value of
the Cape colony and instantly take forcible possession of it. This they
determined to prevent at any cost; for the military occupancy of the
Cape by the French would bring England’s highway to India under the
control of her hereditary foe.
As early as the 2d of February, 1793, negotiations were opened between
the British government and the Dutch home and colonial authorities
concerning a strengthening of the garrison at the Cape by a contingent
of British troops from St. Helena. The States-General and the Dutch
East India Company, in response to this proposal, signified their
desire for aid in the form of warships to guard the coast of the Cape
peninsula, and that in case such assistance could not be given they
would accept the offered troops.
While this correspondence was going on events were transpiring that
occasioned ill-feeling between the Dutch and the English, although they
were in alliance against the French. Being paralyzed by dissensions
among their own people, the States-General made urgent appeals to the
British government for more efficient aid in both men and money. To
these appeals the answer of the English authorities was a bitter
complaint that their troops were already bearing the brunt of the war
in defense of the Netherlands, and that the Stadtholder and his
government were not making proper exertions to raise men and money at
home.
In making such answer, the British ministers seemed to be willfully
blind to the prostrate condition of the Dutch government. The French
had put the army of invasion under the command of Pichegru, one of the
ablest generals of his time. One after another the Dutch strongholds
were falling before him. The province of Friesland was threatening to
make a separate peace with France if the States-General did not hasten
to act in that direction for all Holland. The patriot party felt such
antipathy to their English allies that it was difficult to get hospital
accommodation in Dutch towns for the wounded British soldiers. And
notwithstanding all these circumstances the English authorities
asserted that the Stadtholder’s failure to put in the field a large and
well-equipped force was due to apathy in his own cause rather than to
weakness. The one measure of additional help offered was that if the
Dutch government would furnish five hundred to a thousand troops for
the better defense of Cape Colony the English East India Company would
transport them thither free of charge. It being impossible for the
Dutch to furnish the men, the negotiations came to an end.
Meanwhile, as was signified in the attitude of Friesland, the Dutch
people were considering the question of changing sides in the war. That
fact—without the knowledge of the Stadtholder—was informally
communicated to the governor of Cape Colony in a letter written by the
chief advocate of the Dutch East India Company, with the approbation of
the directors. The letter reached the Cape on the 7th of February,
1795, informing the colonists that in all probability Holland might
soon dissolve the alliance with the English and make common cause with
France. The letter stated that matters at home were in an uncertain
condition; that the French armies were advancing and already had
occupied a part of the country, and that it would be necessary to be
vigilant so as not to be surprised by any European power. The warning,
though not specific as to what power, evidently referred to England.
Later reports informed the colonists that a French army under Pichegru
was besieging Breda and threatening the region across the Maas. But
these reports were not in the nature of official dispatches. They were
communicated verbally by Captain Dekker of the frigate Medemblik, which
arrived at the Cape on the 12th of April, 1795.
The next intelligence from Europe was calculated to perplex and alarm
the colonists to a high degree. On the 11th of June, 1795, successive
reports came by messengers from Simonstown to the castle to the effect
that several ships of unknown nationality were beating into False Bay;
later that the ships had cast anchor, and at ten in the evening that
Captain Dekker had sent a boat to one of the stranger ships to
ascertain particulars, directing the lieutenant in charge to wave a
flag if he found them friendly, and that no such signal had been made,
nor had the boat returned.
The situation so suddenly developed was, to say the least, disturbing.
The governor called his council together to consider it. After
conference the signals of danger were made summoning the Burghers of
the country districts to Cape Town. Lieutenant-Colonel De Lille was
ordered to proceed at once to Simonstown with two hundred infantry and
a hundred gunners to strengthen the garrison there. The troops left the
castle within an hour and reached Simonstown before noon of the next
day.
The council continued in session until past midnight, and after
adjournment remained at the castle in readiness to deal with any
emergency that might arise. At half-past two in the morning of the 12th
they were called together again to consider a letter just received from
Simonstown. The communication was from Mr. Brand, the official resident
at Simonstown, and contained interesting news. Captain Dekker’s boat
had returned from its long visit to the strange fleet. With it had come
a Mr. Ross, bearing letters for the head of the Cape government from
the English admiral, Sir George Keith Elphinstone and Major-General
James Henry Craig.
Mr. Ross, having been supplied with a horse and a guide, reached the
castle and delivered the letters in due time. They proved to be three
complimentary notes from directors of the English East India Company to
Commissioner Sluysken, governor of the colony. Mr. Ross also presented
an invitation from Admiral Elphinstone to the Commissioner and Colonel
Gordon to visit his ship, intimating that there they would receive
important information and a missive from the Stadtholder of the
Netherlands. It was noted that in the conversation Mr. Ross was careful
to evade all questions concerning the state of affairs in Europe and
the destination and business of the fleet.
While the council pondered these things, Lieutenant Van Vegezak, who
had visited the English admiral’s ship, arrived at the castle. He had
little information to impart. There were in the fleet three
seventy-four gun ships, three of sixty-four guns each, a frigate of
twenty-four guns, two sloops of war carrying the one eighteen and the
other sixteen guns; and there were troops on board under the command of
Major-General James Henry Craig, but how many he had not been able to
learn.
Now, the facts which accounted for the presence at the Cape of this
British naval and military force were unknown to the colonists. The
Stadtholder’s government had been overthrown. The democratic party in
Holland had received the French with open arms. The national government
had been remodeled. The States-General had abolished the
Stadtholderate. And the British ministers, alarmed for their vast
possessions in India, and realizing that they must now depend upon
their own exertions to keep the French from seizing the port which
practically commanded the sea route thither, had fitted out and
dispatched with all haste this expedition, with orders to
occupy—peacefully if they could, but forcibly if they must—the castle
and harbor of Cape Town. The fleet had made a rapid passage. One
division sailed on the 13th of March, the other on the 3d of April. The
two squadrons met off the Cape on the 10th of June and on the 11th cast
anchor in False Bay.
The colonial officers acted with marvelous caution, considering the
fact that they were in ignorance of the late events which had led to
the appearing of this formidable expedition in South African waters.
To the note inviting the commissioner and Colonel Gordon to visit the
English admiral on his ship, they courteously replied that it was
impossible for these officers to leave Cape Town, and begged the
admiral to send ashore a responsible representative with the promised
information and dispatch. They also instructed the resident at
Simonstown to permit the English to provision their ships, but to allow
no armed men to land. A force of eighty-four Burghers and thirty
gunners, with three field pieces, was posted at Muizenburg in a
position to command the road to Simonstown. On the 13th of June the
defensive works of Simonstown Bay were strengthened by additional
troops, and three hundred and forty infantry and artillerymen were sent
to further strengthen the post at Muizenburg.
On the 14th of June there came to the castle a deputation from the
Admiral, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel McKenzie, Captain Hardy of
the sloop Echo and Mr. Ross, secretary to General Craig.
Mr. Ross handed to Commissioner Sluysken a communication from the
prince of Orange—late the Stadtholder of the Netherlands, and supposed
to be so still by the colonists. The prince’s mandate, dated at Kew on
the 7th of February, 1795, ordered the Commissioner to admit the troops
of the King of England into the colony and the forts thereof and to
admit the British ships of war into the ports, and to treat the British
troops and ships of war as the forces of a power friendly to Holland
and sent to protect the colony against the French.
The deputation from the admiral also delivered to the Commissioner a
joint letter from Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig, in which was
written their account of the then condition of affairs in the
Netherlands. They informed him that the winter in Europe had been
exceptionally severe; that toward the close of January the rivers had
been frozen so hard as to make them passable for armies; that the
French had crossed on the ice into Utrecht and Gelderland and had
driven the English troops into Germany and compelled the Dutch forces
to surrender. They represented that it was a matter of only a few days
for the whole of the country to fall into the possession of the French
by forced capitulation, without any previous terms of surrender, and
that the Stadtholder only escaped capture by taking passage in a
fishing boat, which carried him from Scheveningen to England. They
further intimated to the Commissioner that this gloomy state of things
was only temporary; that Britain and her allies were preparing to enter
the field with overwhelming force, and were confident of being able to
drive the French out of Holland in the next campaign.
The letter stopped short of full particulars, leaving the colonial
authorities in ignorance of the cordial welcome given to the French by
the democratic party in Holland, and of the remodeling of the national
government and the abolition of the Stadtholderate. The impression the
British officers sought to make was that Holland had been overrun and
conquered, and was being treated with the utmost rigor by the French.
They carefully withheld the facts that the remodeled government of the
Netherlands was still in existence and that the French were regarded as
friends by a majority of the people. They wished the colonists to
believe that the Prince of Orange was still the Stadtholder of the
Netherlands, though temporarily a fugitive in England; that he would be
reinstated by the help of his faithful allies in the next campaign, and
that loyalty to his prince required the Commissioner of the Cape Colony
to throw open the ports and the forts of the colony to the friendly
occupation of the British forces.
The council decided that no immediate action should be taken on the
prince’s mandatory letter. It was the command of a fugitive in a
foreign land and lacked the indorsement of the States-General, and,
therefore, had no official force. They were loyal to the House of
Orange, but they felt that any present action would be taken in
ignorance of the true state of affairs. There was nothing to guide them
but this letter of their fugitive prince and the word of these armed
and interested visitors who sought to occupy their harbors and
strongholds at once. They decided to temporize as far as they could
without giving the strangers peaceable possession, hoping that more
complete and reliable intelligence from the Netherlands would reach
them.
The council’s answer to Admiral Elphinstone is an example of rare
diplomatic acumen. It assured him that the fleet would be permitted to
take in all necessary provisions, but requested that in doing so only
small bodies of unarmed men be sent ashore. It also expressed gratitude
to the British government for its evident goodwill, and intimated that,
while confident of their ability to resist any attack that might be
made, they would ask the British for assistance in case the French
should attempt to seize the colony. It further requested the admiral to
inform the council what number of troops he could furnish, if any were
needed. The admiral replied that General Craig would visit the
Commissioner in Cape Town and impart fuller information. Meanwhile the
arrival of Burgher forces from Stellenbosch enabled the council to add
two hundred horsemen to the post at Muizenburg.
On the 18th of June General Craig met the Commissioner at Cape Town.
The next day the general was introduced to the council, and laid before
the members the mission upon which he had been sent and his
instructions as to the manner of accomplishing it. He stated that the
fleet and the troops had been sent by his Britannic Majesty to defend
the colony against seizure by the French, or any other power, and that
the British occupancy was intended to last only until the government in
the Netherlands could be restored to its ancient form, when it was his
Majesty’s purpose to give up the colony to its proper rulers—the
Stadtholder and the States-General of Holland. He assured them that no
changes would be made in the laws and customs of the country, nor would
any additional taxes be levied without the expressed desire of the
people. The colonists would be required to bear no cost but that of
their own government as it then existed, and they would be at liberty
to profit largely by trade with England’s possessions in India. The
colonial troops would be paid by England, on condition that they take
an oath of allegiance to his Britannic Majesty—the obligation thereof
to last only as long as the British occupancy of the colony. The civil
service would remain as it was, and the present incumbents retain their
offices until his Majesty’s pleasure should be made known.
To this proposal the council made answer in writing, declining it, and
notifying the general that they would protect the colony with their own
forces against all comers.
Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig responded to this act of the
council by a general proclamation to the government and inhabitants of
the country, inviting and requiring them to accept his Britannic
Majesty’s protection in view of the certainty that the French would
endeavor to seize the colonial dependencies of the Netherlands.
Three days later the same officers published an address to the
inhabitants, in Dutch and German, renewing the offer of protection
under the conditions laid before the council by General Craig, and
inviting them to send a committee of their own selection to Simonstown
to confer with the heads of the British expedition. The address
emphasized the alternative before the people—a French or an English
occupation. The former, it affirmed, would introduce a government on
Jacobin principles, and would result in anarchy, the guillotine, an
insurrection of the slaves with all the horrors that had been enacted
at St. Domingo and Guadeloupe, isolation from Europe, the destruction
of commerce and a dearth of money and of the necessaries of life. But
the English occupation, it went on to say, would give them safety under
the wing of the only power in Europe that was able to assure protection
of person and property under the existing laws, or any others the
colonists might choose to enact; it would secure a free market for all
their products at the best prices; it would release their trade from
the heavy imposts of the Dutch East India Company; it would open and
promote commerce by sea and land between all parts of the colony, and
it would secure better pay for such of the colonial troops as might
choose to enter the British military service.
This appeal directly to the people over the heads of their chief
officials, and to the cupidity of their mercenary soldiers, was
resented by the council, who notified the British representatives
forthwith that further communication on the subject of British
occupancy was not desired.
Nevertheless, on the 26th of June, the admiral and the general sent the
colonial authorities another long letter, reiterating therein their
former statements to the effect that the Netherlands had been absorbed
by France; that if left to itself the Cape colony would be absorbed in
like manner, and adding the significant intimation that his Britannic
Majesty could not allow it to fall into the hands of his enemies.
The council responded to this letter by prohibiting any further supply
of provisions to the British force, and strengthening the post at
Muizenburg with Burgher horsemen, pandours and the entire garrison from
Boetselaar except one man; he was left to spike the guns in case the
English should land. The council also wrote the British commanders that
they noted the difference between proffered assistance against an
invader and a demand to surrender the colony to the British government.
When the real design of the English was revealed, the disaffected
Burghers of the Cape and of Stellenbosch ceased all opposition to the
government, and offered to do their utmost in defense of the colony.
When the Commissioner announced that the country would not be
surrendered to the English, the people cheered him rapturously in the
streets, and saluted him as Father Sluysken.
But notwithstanding these outward signs of unity the high officials and
the people were not quite of one mind. A majority of the Burghers had
adopted republican ideas, and, if they were to be left to themselves,
were ready to welcome the French. Such English visitors as had come to
the Cape had exasperated the colonists by boastfully predicting the
ultimate subjection of the colony to Great Britain. The Burghers
believed that they had now come in the guise of friendship to make good
the insulting prediction. On the other hand, the official heads of the
colony were lukewarm in doing what they knew and admitted to be their
duty for the defense of the colony. Colonel Gordon openly expressed his
readiness to admit the English troops whenever the French should
threaten an attack. He went so far as to say that even in existing
circumstances he would admit them if they would covenant to hold the
country for the Prince of Orange, but if their purpose was to take
possession of it for Great Britain he would resist them to the utmost
of his power. The colonel was a disappointment to the English, for they
had counted upon the Scotch strain in his blood and his well-known
Orange partisanship to bring him over to their designs at the first.
Thus three lines of cleavage militated against the perfect solidarity
of the colonists. A majority of the Burghers were prepared to resist
the British because they preferred the French, if there must be a
change of masters. Most of the lower officials and some of the town
Burghers were ready to accept the British occupancy, and went about
singing Orange party songs because they believed the English were
sincere in professing that it was their sole purpose to hold the colony
in trust for the Prince of Orange. As for Commissioner Sluysken and
Colonel Gordon, while it was their duty to defend the Cape interests
against any power that sought to subvert the rule of the Stadtholder
and the States-General of Holland, they were not quite sure of the
course they ought to pursue with reference to the English, who had come
to them professing loyal friendship to the fugitive prince and
accredited to them by his mandatory letter. There was possible treason
in either admitting or resisting them. These circumstances account for
some lack of energy on the part of the civil and the military heads of
the colony in defending it against the British attack that was soon to
follow.