LORD ROBERTS' APPOINTMENT TO THE COMMAND IN SOUTH AFRICA.
[Sidenote: Realisation at home of the magnitude of the task before the
country.]
[Sidenote: Danger of possible Boer offence.]
After three reverses at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso, it was
clear to all that forces far larger than had been estimated would be
now required for the war. Much had already been done before the news
of Colenso arrived. Another division--the 5th--prepared at home early
in November for service in South Africa, was due in a few days' time
at Cape Town. A sixth division had been mobilised at the end of
November and was on the point of embarkation,[244] and the
mobilisation of a seventh had been ordered as soon as the news of
Stormberg and Magersfontein had reached England. Yet there was cause
for anxiety. Until the 5th division actually landed, not a man was
available to be sent forward to reinforce either Lord Methuen on the
Modder, or the troops under Sir R. Buller's immediate command facing
the Tugela. After Stormberg, Sir W. Gatacre had been strengthened with
the 1st Derbyshire from the lines of communication. He had now a weak
brigade to cover all the eastern province, from Queenstown northwards.
Lt.-General French had, it is true, successfully checked the Boer
advance into the Colesberg district, but his success had been due to
skilful tactics and audacity, not to any superiority in strength. The
true strategy for the enemy would be to assume the offensive, and,
using his superior mobility, attack the lines of communication with
the coast of one or more of the three British columns in Cape Colony,
each of which was in fact in a sense isolated. Bold raids executed for
this purpose would have probably secured the active support of a large
number of disaffected colonists, whose loyalty had been seriously
impaired by the recent victories of their kinsmen. The attitude of
many in the districts through which the Cape lines of communication
passed was already very unsatisfactory.
[Footnote 244: The despatch of a 6th division to South Africa
had been offered to, and accepted by, Sir R. Buller. His
telegram is dated 1st December, 1899. He wished this division
to arrive in Cape Colony on 1st January, by which date he
then hoped to begin his advance into the Free State by
Bethulie.]
[Sidenote: Dec. 15th, after Colenso Buller sends message home, "I
ought to let Ladysmith go."]
Nor was this all: for the moment Sir R. Buller thought that, by direct
order of the Cabinet, the 5th division had been assigned to the task
of relieving Kimberley,[245] and he judged that without reinforcements
the relief of Ladysmith was impracticable. Late, therefore, in the
evening of the 15th December, when the work of that exhausting and
disheartening day was drawing to a close, he telegraphed in the
following terms to the Secretary of State for War:--
"My failure to-day raises a serious question. I do not think I am
now strong enough to relieve White. Colenso is a fortress, which
I think, if not taken on a rush, could only be taken by a siege.
There is no water within eight miles of the point of attack, and
in this weather that exhausts infantry. The place is fully
entrenched. I do not think either a Boer or a gun was seen by us
all day, yet the fire brought to bear was very heavy. Our
infantry were quite willing to fight, but were absolutely
exhausted by the intense heat. My view is that I ought to let
Ladysmith go, and occupy good positions for the defence of South
Natal, and let time help us. But that is a step on which I ought
to consult you. I consider we were in face of 20,000 men to-day.
They had the advantage both in arms and in position. They admit
they suffered severely, but my men have not seen a dead Boer, and
that dispirits them. My losses have not been very heavy. I could
have made them much heavier, but the result would have been the
same. The moment I failed to get in with a rush, I was beat. I
now feel that I cannot say I can relieve Ladysmith with my
available force, and the best thing I can suggest is that I
should occupy defensive positions, and fight it out in a country
better suited to our tactics."
[Footnote 245: On 14th December Lord Lansdowne had
telegraphed to Sir F. Forestier-Walker: "On arrival, Warren
is to be sent immediately to assume command of the forces
under Methuen. Buller will be informed of this by telegraph."
This telegram did not prescribe the disposal of the 5th
division, but that of Lt.-General Sir C. Warren, its
commander.]
[Sidenote: Sir R. Buller's arrangements for Natal;]
[Sidenote: for the western theatre of war.]
In pursuance of this policy Sir R. Buller sent Sir G. White, next
morning, a cipher message, which, with the reply, will be recorded in
another chapter.[246] He also directed the Natal line of communication
staff to select, on the route Eshowe-Greytown-Estcourt, positions for
camps, which the Natal army could occupy "until the weather is
cooler." As regards the western theatre of war, he was more sanguine.
On receiving the news of the repulse at Magersfontein he had, it is
true, at first considered that, if the British troops remained on the
Riet, they might be enveloped by Cronje's force, with disastrous
results. He sent instructions, therefore, to Forestier-Walker that
Lord Methuen must be told either to attack Cronje again or to fall
back at once on the Orange river. This order was received with dismay
by Lord Methuen, for, after consultation with his brigadiers, he was
convinced that, until reinforcements arrived, his force was not in a
fit state to resume the offensive. He prepared to fall back. But in a
telegram, dated 14th December, Sir F. Forestier-Walker urged Sir
Redvers to support Methuen with the 5th division[247] and with a
brigade of cavalry from Naauwpoort, so as to enable him promptly to
relieve Kimberley. He added: "Methuen reports his force in safe
position, and well supplied. His communications are held by
detachments posted at no great distance apart, and can be further
protected by mounted troops. The effect of retirement upon the spirit
of Methuen's force after such hard fighting, and upon the general
military and political situation, appears to me to justify my placing
this alternative before you." Forestier-Walker's proposal was
immediately accepted by Sir Redvers, with the exception that he forbad
the reduction of French's strength at Naauwpoort. A telegram to that
effect had been despatched from Headquarters at Chieveley to the
General Officer Commanding Cape Colony the evening before the day of
Colenso.
[Footnote 246: See Vol. II. Siege of Ladysmith.]
[Footnote 247: Sir R. Buller had directed, on 9th December,
that a brigade and a battery of this division should be sent
to East London to reinforce General Gatacre, and that the
remainder should disembark at Port Elizabeth and proceed to
Rosmead junction.]
[Sidenote: The Cabinet answers Sir Redvers' proposal to give up
Ladysmith, Dec. 16th, 1896.]
Meantime the Cabinet had received and considered General Buller's
suggestion that Ladysmith should be abandoned. They felt that to leave
the invested troops to their fate would be equally injurious in its
strategical, political, and moral effect on South Africa; a blow to
British prestige throughout the world. Sir R. Buller was therefore
informed by a cipher telegram, dated 16th December, that "Her
Majesty's Government regard the abandonment of White's force and its
consequent surrender as a national disaster of the greatest magnitude.
We would urge you to devise another attempt to carry out its relief,
not necessarily viâ Colenso, making use of the additional men now
arriving, if you think fit." A War Office telegram of the same date
advised Sir Redvers that the embarkation of the 6th division for South
Africa had already begun, that the 7th division would begin to embark
on the 4th January, that another cavalry brigade would be sent out as
soon as ships could be provided, and that additional field artillery
would replace the guns lost at Colenso. In reply to a request made by
him that morning by telegram that 8,000 irregulars "able to ride
decently, but shoot as well as possible," should be raised in England,
the General Commanding-in-Chief was told that "a considerable force of
militia and of picked yeomanry and volunteers will also be sent."
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, being promised reinforcements, prepares for
new effort.]
These promises, and the assurance that the 5th division was at his
free disposal, though that had always been the home view, greatly
strengthened Sir Redvers Buller's hands. He decided to make another
effort to break through the barriers round Ladysmith. He therefore
ordered Warren's division to Natal. Warren himself, with two
battalions of the 10th brigade, had disembarked at Cape Town, and been
despatched by train up country. These battalions, the 1st Yorkshire
and 2nd Warwick, were subsequently, at Forestier-Walker's request,
left in Cape Colony for duty on the line of communication at De Aar.
The rest of the 5th division, together with Sir C. Warren and his
staff, went to Durban.
[Sidenote: The nation roused.]
The immediate response made by the Cabinet to Sir R. Buller's request
for reinforcements, and their instant rejection of the proposal to
abandon Ladysmith, expressed the spirit in which the nation received
the news of "the black week"[248] in South Africa. The experiences of
such contests as had been waged by Great Britain since the great
Indian mutiny had led public opinion to expect, in time of war, no
strain on the national resources, no call for national effort. War was
regarded as a matter for which the War Office and the army should make
preparation, but not the nation. The despatch of the largest British
Army ever sent across the seas had been regarded as ensuring rapid
success. A decisive termination of the campaign before the end of the
year was anticipated. The disappointment of these hopes at first
caused dismay; but this was quickly replaced by a stern determination
to carry through the South African undertaking, and, at all costs, not
to shirk troublesome responsibilities in that sub-continent. It was
realised that the task to be faced was serious, and that the time had
come to devote to it the best resources of the Empire. The manhood of
the country was eager to assist by any possible means, and therefore
learnt with satisfaction that not only would the 6th and 7th divisions
be sent out at once, but that nine militia battalions had been asked
to volunteer for foreign service, and that yeomanry and select
companies of volunteers had had their eager demands to be allowed to
help gladly granted. With even greater pleasure was the announcement
received, two days after the battle of Colenso, that the General in
command in South Africa had been given _carte blanche_ to raise mounted
troops locally; that the self-governing Colonies, again with true
patriotism rallying round the mother country, had proposed to send
further military contingents, and that these also were to join in the
struggle.
[Footnote 248: The popular name for the week in which
occurred the defeats of Stormberg, Magersfontein and
Colenso.]
[Sidenote: Lord Roberts is appointed to command, Dec. 16.]
The action of the Cabinet in dealing with the difficult question of
the command, in South Africa was prompt. The size of the army which
would in a few weeks be assembled at the seat of war, and the nature
of the work which lay before it, made it necessary that an officer of
the highest standing and experience should be selected for the supreme
control. It was apparent that the direction of the operations for the
relief of Ladysmith would absorb all the attention and energies of
Sir R. Buller. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C., then commanding the
forces in Ireland, was therefore asked to undertake the duty of
Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, a responsibility which he
instantly accepted. As Lord Roberts' Chief of the Staff the Cabinet,
with the Field-Marshal's approval, recommended to the Queen the
appointment of Major-General Lord Kitchener, who was still serving as
Sirdar of that Egyptian army with which, stiffened by British troops,
he had destroyed the power of the Mahdi little more than a twelve
month earlier. The decision to make these appointments was notified to
Sir R. Buller, in the telegram quoted below.[249] Sir Redvers, to use
his own words, had "for some time been convinced that it is impossible
for any one man to direct active military operations in two places
distant 1,500 miles from each other."[250]
[Footnote 249: "In Natal and in Cape Colony distinct
operations of very great importance are now in progress. The
prosecution of the campaign in Natal is being carried on
under quite unexpected difficulties, and in the opinion of
Her Majesty's Government it will require your presence and
whole attention. It has been decided by Her Majesty's
Government, under these circumstances, to appoint
Field-Marshal Lord Roberts as Commanding-in-Chief, South
Africa, his Chief of Staff being Lord Kitchener."]
[Footnote 250: See letter from Sir Redvers Buller to
Under-Secretary of State for War, dated 20th December, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Lord Roberts embarks Dec. 23/99.]
Within a few days Lord Roberts nominated the rest of his staff,[251]
and, accompanied by the majority of them, embarked for South Africa on
23rd December, arrangements being made for Lord Kitchener to join him
at Gibraltar.
[Footnote 251: In a telegram dated 21st December, Sir R.
Buller recommended that Lord Roberts should bring out a fresh
Headquarter staff, reporting that there was already a lack of
senior staff officers throughout the theatre of war. His own
Headquarter staff left Cape Town to join him in Natal at the
end of December.]
[Sidenote: Weakness of defence in Cape Colony.]
The fact that it had been decided to send the 5th division to Natal
involved in Cape Colony the resumption of the policy of bluff which
had proved so successful earlier in the war. It was now attended with
greater risk, owing to the spread of disaffection amongst the
sympathisers with the Boer Republics. Three distinct areas in the "old
colony" were already in the actual occupation of the enemy, and had
been annexed by Boer proclamations. The first of these areas included
Griqualand West, Barkly West, Taungs, Vryburg, and Mafeking districts,
in fact, with the exception of the besieged towns of Kimberley,
Kuruman,[252] and Mafeking, the whole of the colony north of the Riet
river and of the Orange river below its junction with the Riet. East
of this came the Boer enclave round Colesberg, the extent of which was
being much diminished by General French's operations. Further east
again, the north-east angle of the colony, including the districts of
Herschel, Aliwal North, Barkly East, Wodehouse, and Albert, had for
the time being become _de facto_ Free State territory. Kruger
telegraphed to Steyn on the 20th of December: "I and the rest of the
War Commission decide that every person in the districts proclaimed,
so far as the annexed portions shall extend, shall be commandeered,
and those who refuse be punished. So say to all the officials south of
Orange river and in Griqualand West, that while we are already
standing in the fire they cannot expect to sit at home in peace and
safety." In all these areas, therefore, extraordinary pressure was
placed on the colonists to renounce their allegiance and take up arms
against their Sovereign. Indeed, but six weeks later the whole of the
inhabitants of the Barkly West district who refused to be commandeered
were, irrespective of nationality, removed from their homes by the
Boers' Landrosts and thrust across the Orange river in a state of
absolute destitution.[253] The number of recruits which had accrued to
the enemy's commandos by these means was already, by the end of
December, considerable; it was assessed at the time by the British
authorities as high as ten thousand. But the danger for the moment was
not so much the numerical strength of the actively disloyal as the
attitude of the disaffected in the districts which the enemy had not
reached. Here, again, the areas which caused special anxiety fell into
three groups. In the eastern province certain of the farmers of the
Stockenstroom and adjacent districts had gathered together in a laager
on the Katberg Pass across the Winterberg Mountains, a strong position
some forty miles in rear of General Gatacre at Queenstown. In the
thinly-populated and backward regions bordered by the Orange river on
the north, the Roggeveld and Nieuwveld Mountains on the south, and the
main line from Cape Town to De Aar on the east, racial feeling was
known to be greatly inflamed, and it was reported that, if a few
recruiters crossed the Orange river from the districts occupied by the
enemy to the north of the river, a rising would probably take place.
Even nearer to Cape Town, in the fertile and wine-producing districts
of Stellenbosch, Paarl, Ceres, Tulbagh, and Worcester, all most
difficult to deal with, owing to the broken character of the ground
and its intersection by rough mountain ranges, a portion of the
inhabitants had shown signs of great restlessness. If even small bands
of insurgents had taken up arms in these parts, the British lines of
communication would have been imperilled. A very large force would be
required for their protection.
[Footnote 252: A detachment of thirty-five Cape police and
thirty-three civilians made a gallant defence of Kuruman,
under Capt. A. Bates, against a Boer commando much superior
in strength. The garrison held out from 12th November until
their last redoubt was destroyed by artillery fire on 1st
January (see General map of South Africa and map No. 17).]
[Footnote 253: For the details of this wholesale eviction see
article in _Cape Times_, dated 16th February, 1900, enclosed
in High Commissioner's despatch No. 85, dated 21st February,
1900 (p. 194-195 of C.O. White Book Africa 629).]
[Sidenote: The enthusiasm of the loyal furnishes large numbers of
Volunteers.]
On the other hand, although the loyalty of a portion of the population
was shaken, there were large numbers not only steadfast in their
allegiance, but anxious to fulfil the duty of good citizens.
Considerable advantage had already been taken of this patriotic
spirit. Practically the whole of the Volunteer forces of the colony
had been called out in the first phase of the war and were still under
arms. The good services of the South African Light Horse and of
Brabant's Horse, raised respectively in the western and eastern
province, showed that the time had now come to make fuller use of the
admirable recruiting material that was available.
[Sidenote: Full advantage taken of this by Sir A. Milner and Sir
Redvers.]
On the 17th December Sir A. Milner telegraphed to Sir Redvers: "As
rebellion in the colony is still spreading and our latest
reinforcements are wanted elsewhere, I hope you will authorise G.O.C.
here to raise all the men he can get in loyal districts. Mounted
corps are being increased, and are no doubt what we most want. But for
defence of ports, which we must hold at all costs, and of places like
King William's Town and Grahamstown, even unmounted men, if otherwise
fit, will be useful, and I think considerable numbers might be
obtained. Where resistance is at all practicable I think it should be
offered, if only to gain time." This suggestion that a large increase
should be made in the forces raised locally was not a new one. Sir
Redvers had already been in communication on the subject with the War
Office, and had been informed by the Secretary of State, in a
telegram, dated 16th December, that: "I hope that you understand that
we are greatly in favour of the policy indicated in your telegram
(10th December) of raising local mounted corps and that you are free
to carry it out." On receipt of the High Commissioner's message
General Buller gave Forestier-Walker a free hand to raise both mounted
and dismounted men for the defence of Cape Colony, directing him to
consult Sir A. Milner as to details. On the 27th of December the
General Commanding-in-Chief was in a position to telegraph to Lord
Lansdowne that, exclusive of the colonial troops belonging to
Kimberley and Mafeking garrisons, 2,100 mounted and 4,300 dismounted
irregulars were under arms in Cape Colony besides a Railway Pioneer
regiment, 500 strong, in process of organisation.[254]
[Footnote 254: The strength of the corps was soon afterwards
raised to 1,000, and eventually expanded to four battalions.]
[Sidenote: Large numbers of Volunteers.]
He hoped to increase still further these numbers by 2,000 mounted and
2,000 dismounted men. In Natal the Volunteers who had been called out,
and the special service corps enrolled since the war, numbered in all
6,700 men, and efforts were being made to raise another 700.
Including, therefore, the 4,000 colonial and local troops besieged in
Kimberley, the 1,000 defending Mafeking, and 1,500 Southern
Rhodesians, there were at this time 20,000 South African colonists
employed in the defence of their country, and arrangements were being
made to augment this total to about 25,000 men. The men who thus
served their Sovereign were not all of British descent. Some were
loyal Dutchmen. The figures no doubt include as "South Africans,"
because present in local units, Johannesburg Uitlanders,[255] as well
as others who flocked to South Africa from various parts of the Empire
to fight for the maintenance of equal rights for all white men. These
large bodies might, had the Imperial Government thought fit, have been
almost indefinitely reinforced by native levies; but such a course was
impossible without danger to the future welfare of South Africa. It
was deemed legitimate to sanction the organisation of the tribes of
British Kaffraria, under Sir H. Elliott, for the defence of their own
homes against the Boer commandos.
[Footnote 255: The term used by the Boers for all
foreigners.]
[Sidenote: Methuen since Magersfontein.]
After withdrawing from the battlefield of Magersfontein, Lord Methuen
had directed the whole of his energy to strengthening his hold on the
Riet and establishing his troops firmly astride that river. General
Buller had finally decided to retain Lord Methuen in that forward
situation, for on reflection he perceived that a retirement would
leave Cronje free to concentrate his whole force against Kimberley.
Moreover, he foresaw that the so-called "Modder position" could be
utilised later on as a pivot of manoeuvre, or as a screen behind which
a turning offensive movement might be made to the east into the Free
State. With this end in view he proposed to begin constructing a
railway from Honey Nest Kloof to Jacobsdal, to be extended eventually
to Bloemfontein after the arrival of the 6th division. The occupation
of Jacobsdal would, General Buller anticipated, "frighten" Cronje out
of Magersfontein.[256] Lord Roberts, however, in telegraphing to Sir
Redvers from Gibraltar on 26th December his concurrence in the
retention of Methuen on the Modder, added: "As regards railway
extension, I fear that construction of line will so seriously
interfere with the utility of present working line that I should ask
you to consult Girouard[257] on this subject before coming to any
decision." The execution of this project was therefore suspended
pending Lord Roberts' arrival.
[Footnote 256: Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 23rd
December, 1899.]
[Footnote 257: Bt.-Maj. (local Lieut.-Col.) E. P. Girouard,
R.E., who had at the outbreak of the war been appointed
Director of Railways on the lines of communication staff.
After Lord Roberts' arrival the Director of Railways worked
under the immediate orders of the Chief of the Staff.]
[Sidenote: Cronje remains passive.]
Meanwhile, although with the mobile force at his disposal General
Cronje might have struck at the British communications, the Boer
commander remained passive, and devoted himself to the improvement and
extension of his defences. He was indifferent to the fact that his
line of supply to the eastward was exposed and almost entirely
unguarded. Enterprises proposed by De Wet and others of his
subordinates against the British connection with the sea he sternly
forbad.
[Sidenote: Activity in the west.]
[Sidenote: Pilcher's raid on Douglas.]
[Sidenote: Alderson threatens Prieska.]
In the more western theatre of war, on the contrary, the Boers made
some attempt to take advantage of the situation. Recruiting parties
were sent across the Orange river, and visited Prieska. The village of
Douglas, lying south of the Vaal, a little below its junction with the
Riet, and commanding the road from Griqualand West to Belmont, was
also occupied by a small commando. The section of Lord Methuen's line
of supply from De Aar to Honey Nest Kloof was at this time held by
some 11,000 men under the command of Major-General E. Wood.[258] The
greater part of this force was distributed in strong posts at Honey
Nest Kloof, Enslin, Belmont, Witteputs, Orange River bridge, and De
Aar. The garrison of Belmont was under command of Lt.-Colonel T. D.
Pilcher, and consisted of two guns of P. battery, R.H.A., a half
company of the Munster Fusiliers mounted infantry, 250 Queensland
M.I., two companies of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the
Royal Canadian regiment, amounting in all to about 1,600 men. General
Wood determined to use a portion of this garrison to brush away the
hostile gathering on the left flank. With this object, Colonel Pilcher
was directed to move out from Belmont on the afternoon of the 31st
December with a flying column, composed of the two guns of P. battery,
42 officers and men of the Munster Fusiliers M.I., 12 officers and 187
men of the Queensland M.I. under command of Lt.-Colonel P. R. Ricardo,
and a company of the Canadian regiment, the last-named unit being
carried in ten buck wagons with mule transport. The two companies
D.C.L.I. formed a supporting column and followed later. In order to
deceive the enemy, Pilcher on the previous day had made a feint from
Belmont towards the Free State, returning ostensibly on the ground
that a mistake had been made as to supply arrangements; the real
object of the column was Douglas, and it had been arranged to cover
Pilcher's right flank, by moving Babington with his mounted brigade
and G. battery westward from Modder camp. His left flank was protected
by the despatch of the Scots Greys from Orange River station to Mark's
Drift, a point close to the junction of the Vaal and Orange rivers. On
the night of the 31st December, Colonel Pilcher halted at Thornhill
farm, eighteen miles north-west of Belmont, and thence moved on the
following morning to Sunnyside, where in a cluster of kopjes a small
laager had been formed by an advance party of the enemy. This commando
(about 180 strong), was surprised, and defeated, with a loss of
fourteen killed and thirty-eight prisoners, after a brief engagement,
in which the Canadian and Queensland troops proved their fitness to
fight side by side with British regulars. On the 2nd January, the
flying column pushing on to Douglas, found the village evacuated by
the enemy. Meanwhile, a strong commando, detached by Cronje, had
eluded the cavalry brigade and crossed the Riet river near
Koodoesberg. Lt.-Colonel Pilcher had already fallen back on Thornhill
on 3rd January, and evading the enemy by a night march, regained
Belmont unmolested. Ninety loyalist refugees from Douglas accompanied
him on his return. Simultaneously with this successful raid, a patrol
of about a company of M.I. under Lieut.-Colonel Alderson had been sent
to Prieska from De Aar, and on the 3rd January exchanged shots at that
place with the enemy across the river, falling back subsequently on De
Aar.
[Footnote 258: Colonel H. S. G. Miles had been in command of
this section up to 26th December, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Wood seizes Zoutpans Drift.]
Lord Methuen now determined, in conjunction with Major-General E.
Wood, to demonstrate to the eastward against the enemy's line of
communication, which was known to run through Jacobsdal, Koffyfontein,
and Fauresmith. On the 7th January Major-General Wood therefore, with
a force of all three arms, seized Zoutpans Drift, a ford across the
Orange river twenty miles above the railway bridge. The ford had been
reconnoitred as early as 13th December. Here General Wood placed a
permanent post on favourable ground on a hill, to protect the drift
from the Free State side, and to command the road leading thence to
Fauresmith. A Boer detachment remained in observation of this post on
the adjacent farm of Wolvekraal, but did not attack. Further to the
north, reconnaissances into the Free State, made by the cavalry
brigade, and by Pilcher's troops at Belmont, ascertained that the
enemy was not yet in great strength on the right flank, but that
Jacobsdal was occupied. The Field Intelligence department at Cape Town
had already (3rd January) received information from a trustworthy
source that Cronje had at and near Magersfontein 8,000 to 9,000 men,
and that he was relying on being attacked there. The report stated:
"An advance on Bloemfontein up the right bank of Riet river by
Kaalspruit would draw off the main Boer forces towards Bloemfontein.
President O.F.S. is stated in district to have said that he 'could not
cope with such a movement.' ... Bloemfontein is undefended except by
two forts, the guns of which have been moved to Kimberley."