OPERATIONS ROUND COLESBERG--DECEMBER 16th, 1899, TO FEBRUARY 6th,
1900.[259]
[Footnote 259: See maps Nos. 9 and 16.]
[Sidenote: French's operations during Lord Roberts' voyage.]
[Sidenote: He worries Schoeman out of Rensburg.]
[Sidenote: and pursues him to Colesberg.]
Whilst Lord Roberts was on his voyage to the seat of war, the three
portions of the army which had sustained severe checks were chiefly
employed in recuperating and receiving reinforcements. General French,
on the other hand, was continuing his successful operations. These,
therefore, with the exceptions mentioned in the last chapter, alone
represent the active work in the field in South Africa between the time
of the decision of the Cabinet appointing the new Commander-in-Chief and
his arrival at Cape Town. The task of General French at Arundel was now
as important as the strength of his command seemed inadequate to perform
it. The enemy on his front formed one of four invading columns, three of
which had already been victorious. Schoeman had, therefore, strong
reasons for wishing to emulate the prowess of Cronje at Magersfontein,
of Botha at Colenso, and of the fortunate trio at Stormberg. French had
to deal with an opponent whose confidence must now be presumed to be at
its height. Moreover, reinforcements might reach the Boer leader at any
moment. It had become more than ever necessary to paralyse him before he
could initiate even the semblance of an organised incursion into
territory where disloyalty might largely increase his numbers in a
night. Only by incessant activity could French hope to attain this
object, and fortunately the force under his command, if small, was
suitable both in composition and spirit to that most difficult of
military operations, the surveillance and protection of a large area by
mobility alone. His dispositions, detailed in Chapter XVII., whilst they
denied a front of nearly forty miles to the enemy, effectually covered
the Hanover Road-Naauwpoort-Rosmead line of railway. The area occupied
by the Boers round Rensburg was, like that of the British, bisected by
the railway. It was roughly as follows:--On the west of the line lay
some 800 Transvaalers with a long-range gun; on the east about 2,000
Free Staters, with two guns, were partly entrenched, whilst 600 burghers
guarded the Boer Headquarters at Colesberg and their line of retreat.
Against the enemy, thus distributed, French now began a series of
reconnaissances and rapid movements in force, which, directed against
Schoeman's flanks and rear, and often against his convoys, left him no
peace. Some of these expeditions, notably an attack by the New Zealand
Mounted Rifles and a battery R.H.A. on December 18th against the Boer
left rear, led to brisk skirmishing; but the British losses were always
trifling, and Schoeman, continually forced to show his hand, eventually
wearied of his insecurity. On the 29th he abandoned Rensburg, and fell
back by night upon Colesberg. At daybreak on the 30th, French followed
in pursuit with the Carabiniers, New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and two
guns R.H.A. and, reaching Rensburg at 7 a.m., soon regained touch with
the enemy upon the ridges south-west of Colesberg. A demonstration by
the artillery disclosed a strong position, strongly held. Colesberg town
lies in a hollow in the midst of a rough square of high, steep kopjes,
many of them of that singular geometrical form described in Chapter III.
Smaller kopjes project within rifle range from the angles of the square,
whilst 2,000 yards west of its western face a tall peak, called Coles
Kop, rises abruptly from the encircling plain, and dominates the entire
terrain. The isolation of this hill was doubtless the reason why it was
not occupied by the Boers. They were in strength everywhere along the
hilly ramparts around Colesberg. French, therefore, perceiving the
formidable nature of this "natural fortress,"[260] contented himself
with seizing a group of hills (Porter's Hill) 2,000 yards south-west of
the south-western angle. Here he planted artillery, and, leaving Porter
with the above mounted troops in observation, himself returned to
Rensburg siding, which he made his Headquarters, calling up the main
body from Arundel.
[Footnote 260: Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.]
[Sidenote: French decides to attempt Colesberg.]
The rearward concentration of the enemy at Colesberg, in itself a
partial triumph for the British Commander, had now cleared the
situation, and opened to General French the final object defined by
his instructions.[261] The arrival of reinforcements, moreover, seemed
to warrant a serious attempt upon Colesberg. The third squadrons of
the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons and 10th Hussars, which had been
wrecked in the transport _Ismore_, had joined on the 18th and 21st
December, the 1st Suffolk regiment from Naauwpoort on the 26th, and
Rimington's Guides (173 strong) on the 28th, the 1st Essex regiment
from De Aar relieving the Suffolk at Naauwpoort.
[Footnote 261: "To seize and hold Naauwpoort, and whenever
possible to push on and gain possession of Colesberg."
Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.]
[Sidenote: Dec. 31st/99 to Jan. 1st, 1900, makes night attack on
McCracken's Hill and takes it.]
At daybreak on the 31st the General made in person a close
reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and at noon he issued orders
for an offensive movement. The most vulnerable, indeed, the only
vulnerable portions of the bulwark of hills, seemed to be the kopjes
previously described as projecting from the square, especially those
upon the western face. These gained, it would be possible to push
northward along the flank, threatening the Colesberg road bridge and
the enemy's line of retreat, regarding the safety of which the Boers
had shown themselves peculiarly sensitive. Seeking a base from which
to attack these outlying kopjes, French settled upon Maeder's farm,
lying five miles west-south-west of Colesberg, and at 4 p.m. a
squadron 10th Hussars moved thither as a screen to the main body,[262]
which marched an hour later, and arrived at the farm between 8 p.m.
and 9 p.m., the troops bivouacking there under arms. At midnight the
men were roused, and at 12.30 a.m., January 1st, the column, led by
the wing of the Royal Berkshire, set out in thick darkness towards the
enemy.[263] The route taken ran for two and a half miles on Colesberg,
and then north-east across the veld, past the east of Coles Kop. The
infantry marched in profound silence; even the regimental carts were
dropped behind, lest the noise of the wheels should betray the design.
It was not until the leading companies at 3.30 a.m. were close to the
base of the hill to be attacked, that a loud shout and a scattered
fire of rifles from the right front broke the stillness, and showed
that the enemy had detected the advance. Major McCracken, who had so
organised the march of the Berkshire as to be ready for this, extended
his ranks to two paces interval, and, without awaiting his supports,
which had been delayed by the darkness, ordered the charge. Thereupon
the enemy's piquet fled, and the Royal Berkshire, just as day dawned
on January 1st, 1900, gained, without opposition, the crest of the
hill, henceforward to be known as McCracken's Hill.
[Footnote 262: Composition:--Inniskilling Dragoons, 10th
Hussars, ten guns R.H.A., one company M.I., with four
companies, 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment, under Major F. W. N.
McCracken, the whole under command of Lieut.-Col. R. B. W.
Fisher, 10th Hussars. Two days' supplies, went with the force
and half the infantry were carried in wagons.]
[Footnote 263: Order of march:--Point of M.I., half battalion
R. Berkshire, remainder M.I., 10th Hussars, R.H.A.,
Inniskilling Dragoons.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 1st, 1900. Colesberg is shelled whilst Fisher works
round the north towards the bridge road on Boer right, and Porter acts
against their left.]
This point being won, General French immediately despatched Colonel
Fisher on from the place, where he had halted with his cavalry, past
Coles Kop towards the north-west corner of the heights encircling
Colesberg, with orders to establish a squadron at the corner, and to
work round the northern face against the Boer right. In this duty
Fisher was only so far successful as to get his patrols astride the
track to Colesberg road bridge, failing to secure the hills commanding
the northern exits from the town. To distract attention from this
movement, and to clear the kopjes on McCracken's front, ten guns had
previously been placed opposite the western face of the Colesberg
heights, and as soon as it became light enough, these opened a heavy
bombardment. The enemy responded at once with field guns and a pom-pom
from higher ground, and for three hours the batteries endured a
galling fire of great accuracy, the Boer pom-pom especially
bespattering the line of guns with a continuous stream of projectiles.
Not until the Horse artillery had expended 1,043 rounds of shrapnel
did the enemy's gunners desist. During this time Colonel Porter, based
on Porter's Hill, was operating vigorously against the enemy's left.
He had moved out overnight with two squadrons 6th Dragoon Guards
(Carabiniers), one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and two guns,
R.H.A. Reinforcing these mounted troops, Porter made a determined
effort against the outworks of the Schietberg at the south-western
angle of the Colesberg heights. But the Boers were here in strength,
and the New Zealanders, after a gallant attack up the stiff slopes,
were compelled to fall back upon Porter's Hill, whence for the rest of
the day Porter engaged, though he could not dislodge, large numbers of
the enemy.
[Sidenote: Boers try to retake McCracken's Hill, but fail.]
Meanwhile the wing of the Royal Berkshire regiment had not been left
in peaceful possession of McCracken's Hill. To the east, and between
this hill and Colesberg, another height of similar command was
strongly held by the enemy, who not only opened a troublesome fire at
daybreak, but a little later attempted first a counter-attack up the
steep re-entrants to the north-east, or left, of the infantry, and
next an enveloping movement around the right.
[Sidenote: The first attempt stopped by Fisher's appearance, after
evacuation of the hill had been ordered.]
[Sidenote: Rimington's Guides and Porter's men stop the second.]
Both enterprises finally failed; but about 7 a.m., so insecure seemed
the situation of the Berkshire, that the General sent orders to
McCracken to evacuate. At that moment Fisher's appearance upon the
heights to the north-west somewhat after relieved the pressure, and
McCracken, receiving to his satisfaction permission to retain what he
had won, soon had his command so safely entrenched against musketry
and shell fire, that, for the next forty-three days, during which it
never ceased, his casualties numbered but eighteen. So passed the day
without further incident until, late in the afternoon, Schoeman
suddenly led a column, about 1,000 strong, out of the south-eastern
corner of the Colesberg _enceinte_, making as if to envelop the
British right. Fortunately, Rimington's Guides, who had been posted
overnight at Jasfontein farm, six miles east of Rensburg, to watch
this flank, detected the Boer advance. Simultaneously the troops at
Porter's Hill saw it also, and Schoeman, confronted by both
detachments, retired to Colesberg. Thus by evening French, though
disappointed with the results north of the town, where he had hoped to
secure "Grassy" (later Suffolk) Hill, had cut off Colesberg from the
rest of the colony on the south and west. His intercepting line ran
north as far as Kloof camp.[264] As all the troops were thus fully
occupied, French asked for reinforcements with which to "manoeuvre the
enemy out of his position." Schoeman himself, at the same time, was
demanding assistance from the Boer Headquarters to enable him to hold
his ground.[265]
[Footnote 264: Casualties, January 1st:--Killed, one officer;
wounded, six officers, twenty-one N.C.O.s and men; missing,
one man.]
[Footnote 265: The former received the 1st Essex regiment,
two companies 1st Yorkshire regiment, 4th battery R.F.A., and
the Household cavalry composite regiment; the latter the
Johannesburg Police under Van Dam, and a commando under
Commandant Grobelaar. The reinforcements reached the two
opponents on January 4th, 5th and 6th.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 4th, 1900. Schoeman attacks French's left, obtains a
momentary advantage, but completely fails.]
Next day (January 2nd) General French delegated the command of the
left attack to Major-General Brabazon, with Headquarters at Maeder's
farm, and relieved the cavalry at Kloof camp by four companies of the
1st Suffolk regiment, one squadron alone remaining there to act as a
screen to the northern flank. This day and the next passed
uneventfully. Early in the morning of the 4th, Schoeman, baulked in
his attempt of the 1st January against the British right, dashed
suddenly from his lines with a thousand men against the left, and all
but rolled it up. Eluding the cavalry piquets posted on the outer
flank of the Suffolk, the burghers galloped for a line of kopjes which
ran east and west across the left and left rear of Kloof camp, into
which they therefore looked from the flank, and partially from the
rear. The enemy's artillery at once opened fiercely from their main
position upon the entrenchments of the Suffolk, who, assailed from
three directions, were for some time seriously threatened. Much
depended upon the action of the next few minutes. French's front line
was for the moment truly outflanked, and, were the enemy to establish
himself where he was, nothing would remain but a speedy and difficult
evacuation of the ground hitherto held, right back to Porter's Hill.
The tables were quickly turned. General French, who was riding up from
Rensburg, at this moment reached Porter's Hill, and immediately
telegraphed to Maeder's farm for all the troops to turn out and move
on Coles Kop. He also ordered two companies of the Royal Berkshire
regiment from McCracken's Hill to reinforce the threatened point, and
the 10th Hussars, a squadron 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, and two guns
R.H.A. to advance upon the right of the Boer attack. Four guns had
already opened against their centre from in front of Coles Kop. These
movements chilled the Boers, who, especially alarmed at the approach
of the cavalry from the direction of Windmill camp, abandoned the most
advanced points they had reached, hotly pursued by the 10th Hussars on
one flank and "B." squadron Inniskillings on the other. Yet some of
them soon turned, and, standing on rocky hills, attempted to cover the
flight of the rest, by checking the 10th Hussars. Colonel Fisher
thereupon dismounted his men, and leading a charge on foot,
brilliantly drove off the Boer rearguard and sent them after their
comrades, whilst the Inniskillings continued the pursuit, getting
amongst the fugitives with the lance. Still a part of the enemy, about
200 in number, clung stoutly to the broken hills in spite of the
severe cross fire of the artillery. About 1 p.m., therefore, the
General ordered Capt. H. de B. de Lisle to dislodge this remnant with
200 mounted infantry. De Lisle, using all the advantages of the
ground, skilfully manoeuvred his men, mounted, till he was within a
distance convenient for attack. His dismounting was the signal for
another break away of at least half of those fronting him, and the
mounted infantry, in open order, scaled the hill with fixed bayonets
against the remainder. There was a short encounter, but De Lisle's men
were not to be denied, twenty-one prisoners falling into their hands
as they cleared the summit. The rest of the Boers scattered in flight,
and by 2 p.m. Schoeman's attempt was over. His failure had cost him
ninety killed and wounded, and the loss of some forty prisoners.[266]
[Footnote 266: Casualties, January 4th:--Killed, one officer,
six N.C.O.s and men; wounded, two officers and thirteen
N.C.O.s and men.]
[Sidenote: French, Jan. 5th, issues orders for attack on Grassy Hill
next day.]
During this (January 4th) and the two following days, the requested
reinforcements, in number some 1,500 men of all arms, arrived. With
this accretion of strength it was now possible to renew the offensive,
and General French at once turned his attention to the capture of
Grassy Hill (Suffolk Hill on map No. 16), which he had early marked as
the key to the Boer stronghold. This height lay at the junction of the
roads leading respectively to Colesberg road bridge and to Norval's
Pont, both of which it commanded. Fisher's operations on the left
flank on January 1st had been designed to seize this important point,
and without it there was little hope of forcing the enemy from
Colesberg. On the 5th, whilst all the artillery shelled the hill,
French made a personal and careful reconnaissance,[267] and on his
return to Headquarters issued orders for an attack next day. It was to
be based on Kloof camp, whence a force of all arms[268] under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. W. Eustace, R.H.A., was to be in
readiness to start at 5 a.m. As before, the 1st cavalry brigade and
the post at Porter's Hill were to co-operate to the southward, both to
divert attention from the true attack, and to prevent the enemy
withdrawing his guns.
[Footnote 267: During the reconnaissance, Lieutenant Sir J.
P. Milbanke, Bart., 10th Hussars, the General's A.D.C., was
severely wounded whilst rescuing a dismounted trooper under
heavy fire, an act for which he subsequently received the
Victoria Cross.]
[Footnote 268: Composition:--
10th Hussars, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, eight guns R.H.A.
4th battery Royal Field artillery, three companies M.I.
Detachments 1st Suffolk and 2nd Royal Berkshire regiments.]
[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Watson volunteers to take the hill, and is granted
leave to try.]
[Sidenote: Watson during night, 5th to 6th Jan. attacks and fails.]
Lt.-Colonel A. J. Watson, commanding the 1st Suffolk regiment at Kloof
camp, who had frequently reconnoitred Grassy Hill in company with
General French, had from the first expressed his belief that he could
capture it with his battalion. On the previous day (5th January) his
remaining half-battalion had joined him, and during an interview with
Eustace in the evening regarding the arrangements for next day, he
asked the latter to obtain from the General leave for him to rush the
position in the night with four companies. Eustace, though he did not
share the confidence of the infantry commander, nevertheless carried
the request to Headquarters. As a result, about 8 p.m., a message was
sent to Watson authorising him to attack the hill if he saw a
favourable chance. He was first, however, to inform the General and
all troops in the vicinity of his intention. No more was heard of
Watson and the Suffolk regiment until, about 3 a.m. on the 6th, a
crash of rifle fire, breaking the silence from the direction of Grassy
Hill, proclaimed that the attack had been delivered. The sound was
clearly heard by General French and his staff who were riding up from
Headquarters to witness the day's operations. Halting below Coles Kop,
French immediately sent Eustace forward to get the guns into action,
but soon afterwards received intelligence that the Suffolk were
returning to camp, and that their colonel and 120 officers and men
were missing. The attempt on Grassy Hill had failed, and the plan for
the day was shattered before it had been properly set on foot.
[Sidenote: Watson's attempt.]
Having obtained the General's sanction, Watson, overlooking perhaps
the attached conditions, had eagerly prepared to avail himself of it.
The key of the whole situation seemed to be within his reach, and he
determined not to lose the chance of seizing it. Not until 11.30 p.m.,
when they were roused from sleep to form up their companies, had even
his own officers any inkling of the project on foot, and when, an hour
later, under cover of profound darkness, four companies (305 officers
and men) moved noiselessly out of camp, the soldiers for the most part
marching in soft deck shoes, the least sanguine felt assured at least
of secrecy. The formation was quarter-column in the following order of
companies, "H." "D." "A." "B."; the men's bayonets were fixed. The
Colonel, who was carrying a long white stick as a distinguishing mark,
moved in front of his command and felt for the route. When about half
way, a halt was called and Watson, sending for his officers, told them
for the first time on what they were bent, and ordered, as the attack
formation, column of companies at fifty paces distance. The advance
was then resumed. The march seemed unduly long. The route to Grassy
Hill from the British lines was more than twice the supposed length.
In the darkness and over the difficult ground, it was impossible to
maintain distances for any time at all, so that column had again
contracted to quarter-column before the hill was reached. Arrived at
the foot, there was a short halt in a donga. Then the ascent, which
from the halting-place was at once very steep and covered with
boulders, was essayed. Higher up, more gentle gradients led to the
summit. Scarcely had the leading companies, somewhat disordered by the
severe climb, emerged upon the easier ground near the top, when a
single shot from a Boer sentry rang out close in front of the foremost
files. It was instantly followed by a blaze of musketry which leaped
from the whole crest. A volley so sudden and heavy could only come
from men prepared for action; it was evident that the advance of the
Suffolk was not only detected but awaited. Nevertheless, "H." company,
supported by "D.," immediately dashed forward, at once losing both its
officers and many men, the regimental adjutant and another officer
being struck down at the same moment. Watson, recognising the
preparations made to receive him, seeing from the confusion which had
arisen the futility of so informal an attack, directed a retirement,
intending, doubtless, no more than that his men should temporarily
seek the cover of the dead ground from which they had just climbed.
But such instructions, at such a time, were more easy to obey than to
understand. Whilst some fell back but a short distance, many made
their way to the foot of the hill, and so to the camp. Some again were
unable to retreat under the tremendous fusilade, and together with
those who had not heard the word of command, or did not credit it,
held on in front, and suffered losses rapidly. In short, for a few
moments, though the officers worked hard to restore regularity,
confusion reigned in the column, whilst the Boer fire continued to
rake it without cessation. Watson then desired the commander of the
third company, ("A."), to support "H." company upon the crest. Captain
C. A. H. Brett, having extricated about half his men from the press,
pushed out to the right flank and advanced. A storm of fire, delivered
at a few yards' range, met this attempt, and here, as before, all the
officers (three) and many of the rank and file fell before they could
close. Still Watson, whose gallantry compelled order wherever his
influence could be felt, strove to retrieve the situation. Going back
a little, he called up the rear company ("B.") and led it forward in
person, making for the right front. Again a murderous fire shattered
the effort, and no sooner had Watson disposed the remnants of "B."
company on the crest, than he himself fell dead just as dawn appeared.
Only about 100 officers and men were now scattered over the hill, many
of them wounded, but opposing as hot a fire as they could deliver to
the invisible enemy who was firing point blank into them. The pouches
of the dead were rifled for cartridges with which to continue the
struggle; but no hope remained; even the shrapnel of Eustace's
artillery, which now opened from Kloof camp, became an added danger:
while the Boers, aided by the increasing light, shot with
ever-increasing accuracy. About 4.30 a.m. the survivors, ninety-nine
in number, of whom twenty-nine were wounded, surrendered.[269]
[Footnote 269: Casualties, January 6th:--
Killed: Five Officers; thirty-two N.C.O.s and men.
Wounded and taken prisoners: Three Officers; twenty-six
N.C.O.s and men.
Unwounded and taken prisoners: Two Officers; sixty-eight
N.C.O.s and men.
Wounded and returned to camp: One Officer; twenty-two
N.C.O.s and men.
The Boers stated their losses as one officer and eight men
killed, seventeen men wounded.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 6th.]
In the evening the 1st Essex relieved the 1st Suffolk at Kloof camp,
the latter battalion being sent first to Rensburg, and subsequently to
the lines of communication to be re-officered.
[Sidenote: Jan. 7th, 1900. French reconnoitres Boer left.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 9th. Slingersfontein Farm on Boer left occupied.]
It was now evident to General French that the Boer right was so strong
and so watchful as to be proof against either stratagem or open
attack. He therefore turned at once to the other flank for
opportunities, seeking by a reconnaissance on the 7th January a
suitable point to the eastward from whence to threaten the enemy's
rear along the line of the Norval's Pont railway. The operation, which
was carried out under long-range fire both of artillery and
rifles,[270] disclosed the fact that owing to lack of water none of
the kopjes that were near enough to the line were tenable as
permanent posts. At Slingersfontein farm, however, eleven miles
south-east of Colesberg, and seven miles from the nearest point of the
Norval's Pont line, an excellent position was found. On January 9th it
was occupied by two squadrons Household cavalry, three squadrons the
6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), the N.S.W. Lancers and four guns,
under command of Colonel Porter. To divert attention from this
movement, the whole of the enemy's western flank was bombarded by
twelve guns disposed from Kloof camp to Porter's Hill, whilst a
section R.H.A. and a squadron 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons made an
attack on the southern front above Palmietfontein farm, drawing in
reply the fire of two field guns and two pom-poms.[271]
[Footnote 270: Casualties, January 7th:--One officer and four
men missing.]
[Footnote 271: Casualties, January 9th:--Two men wounded;
seventeen battery horses were struck by shells during this
engagement.]
[Sidenote: Feeling the enemy's left, Jan. 11th.]
During the 8th and 9th the 1st Yorkshire regiment arrived, and was
posted at Rensburg. On the 10th Schoeman also received reinforcements
from Norval's Pont, and these he placed so as to cover the railway
south of Joubert siding, opposite to Porter, who turned out his men at
Slingersfontein to stop further advance southward. French, on the 11th
January, made a reconnaissance, employing the whole of Porter's force
in an attempt to turn the left of this new development of the enemy.
But the Boers, after a short retirement, received further strong
reinforcements from Norval's Pont, and prolonging the threatened left,
showed a bold front. French, therefore, who had no intention of
becoming seriously engaged, ordered Porter to return to
Slingersfontein. An attempt by Major A. G. Hunter-Weston, R.E., to
reach the railway line round the enemy's left flank, and destroy the
telegraph wire, was foiled at Achtertang when on the very point of
success. A Boer laager was in fact close at hand. At the same time
Captain de Lisle, pushing out from the extreme left towards Bastard's
Nek, reconnoitred the country to the northward, and found the enemy in
strength along the line Bastard's Nek--Wolve Kop--Spitz Kop--Plessis
Poort.[272]
[Footnote 272: Casualties, January 11th:--Wounded, five men;
missing, one man.]
[Sidenote: Butcher places 15-pr. on precipitous height. Jan 11th.]
Whilst these affairs were in progress, a feat astonished both sides
alike by its triumph over difficulty. Major E. E. A. Butcher, R.F.A.,
commanding the 4th Field battery, placed a 15-pr. gun upon the peak of
Coles Kop, a kopje already described as standing by itself in the
plain to the west of Colesberg. Rising to a height of 600 feet, its
sides varying from the almost perpendicular to a slope of 30°, and
covered with boulders, the hill presented a formidable climb even to
an unhampered man, and its use for any purpose but that of a look-out
post seemed impossible. Nevertheless, aided by detachments of the
R.A., R.E., and Essex regiment, Butcher had his gun on the summit in
three hours and a half. The supply of ammunition for it, and of
rations for the gunners, were more serious problems even than the
actual haulage of the piece itself. These were ingeniously solved by
the installation of a lift composed of wires running over
snatch-blocks affixed to standards, which were improvised from steel
rails, and driven in, in pairs, five yards apart, both at the top and
bottom of the kopje. Those at the top were wedged into natural
fissures in the rocks, the bottom pair being driven twelve inches into
the ground, and held upright by guy-ropes fixed to bollards or
anchorages. To the top of each upright was lashed a snatch-block, over
which, from summit to base of the hill, were stretched the carrying
wires. Along these, suspended by blocks and tackle, loads up to thirty
pounds in weight were hauled by means of a thin wire, which was wound
upon a drum fixed between, and passed through, pulleys attached to the
top of each of the two upper standards. The lift was so contrived as
to be double-acting, the turning of the drum and a ratchet causing one
wire bearing its load of supplies to ascend, whilst another descended,
the hill.
[Sidenote: It has immediate effect. Jan. 12th.]
At 6 o'clock next morning this gun opened upon a laager in the very
midst of the enemy's main position. The effect was instantaneous; the
Boers, thunderstruck by the sudden visitation of shrapnel, which came
they knew not whence, abandoned their camp and fled to the kopjes for
shelter. Another laager, 2,000 yards more distant, then became the
target with the same result, the enemy's doubt as to the situation of
the gun being deepened by the simultaneous practice of two 15-prs.
fired from the plain below the kop. A few days later Butcher succeeded
in getting a second gun up the hill, and by means of his great
command, forced the Boers to shift every laager into sheltered kloofs,
and caused them considerable losses.
[Sidenote: Jan. 14th. A flying column under Allenby threatens Boer
connection with the bridge.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 15th. Boers attack Slingersfontein.]
[Sidenote: The Boers are repulsed.]
On Jan. 14th, a flying column[273] under Major E. H. H. Allenby
(Inniskilling), marched northward along the Seacow river. Turning to
the east, he demonstrated against the enemy's communications at the
Colesberg road bridge, at which about twenty shells were fired at
5,000 yards' range. The Boers thereupon appeared in three bodies in
greatly superior numbers, and Allenby, having taken five prisoners,
fell back, easily avoiding an attempt to cut him off. This
reconnaissance had the effect of causing the enemy to cease to use the
wagon road for transport purposes. Next day (15th) the Boers
retaliated by a determined attack on the isolated post at
Slingersfontein, held on that day by a half company 1st Yorkshire
regiment,[274] commanded by Captain M. H. Orr and a company (58 men)
New Zealand Mounted Rifles under Captain W. R. N. Madocks, R.A.
(attached). These had their trenches above the farm, the New
Zealanders upon the eastern and the Yorkshire upon the western sides
of a steep and high hill, the lower slopes of which were largely dead
ground to those in the defences. Other kopjes, accessible to the
Boers, were within rifle range. The position was thus to the Boer
rifleman an ideal one for the most exceptional of his fighting
practices, the close offensive. In the subsequent attack, every detail
was typical of his methods on such occasions. At 6.30 a.m. a
long-range sniping fire began to tease the occupants of the hill. They
vainly searched amongst the broken kopjes for sight of an enemy.
Growing, certainly, but almost imperceptibly, in volume and accuracy,
this fire was directed chiefly at the New Zealanders on the east, and
by 10 a.m. had become so intense that an attack in that direction
seemed imminent. Meanwhile, a body of the enemy had been crawling from
exactly the opposite quarter towards the western side, upon which they
succeeded in effecting a lodgment unseen. They then began to climb,
scattering under cover of the boulders. Not until they were close in
front of the sangars of the Yorkshire regiment was their presence
discovered by a patrol which Madocks had sent from his side of the
hill. Thereupon the Boers opened a hot fire, striking down both the
officer and the colour-sergeant of the Yorkshire, whose men, taken by
surprise and suddenly deprived of their leaders, fell into some
confusion. The Boers then occupied the two foremost sangars. The hill
seemed lost. Then Madocks, hearing the outburst on the further side
from him, took a few of his men and hurried round to assist, appearing
amongst the Yorkshire just as the enemy were all but into them.
Rallying the soldiers, and perceiving the Boers a few yards away
behind the rocks, he immediately ordered a charge, and followed by a
few, cleared the enemy out of the nearer of the two abandoned sangars.
The Boers continued to shoot rapidly from the wall beyond, and
Madocks, a few moments later, charged again. Accompanied this time by
but three men, he closed to within a few feet of the more distant
sangar. Two of the men with him were here killed, and Madocks, seeing
the uselessness of remaining, made his way back again to the sangar in
rear with his sole companion, called together the rest of the
Yorkshire detachment, and began hurriedly to strengthen the wall under
a searching fire. At this moment a party of his own New Zealanders,
for whom he had sent back, doubled up to the spot, and led by himself,
whilst a storm of bullets broke over them from the surrounding kopjes,
charged down on the Boers with fixed bayonets. The enemy fled at once,
rising from behind the stones upon the hillside. Pursued by volleys
from the crest of the British position, they made their way back to
their lines, leaving twenty-one dead upon the field.[275]
[Footnote 273: Composition: One squadron 6th (Inniskilling)
Dragoons, one squadron 10th Hussars, two companies M.I., and
two guns R.H.A.]
[Footnote 274: This battalion had joined on January 8th and
9th. On January 12th, 1st half-battalion Welsh regiment and a
squadron 10th Hussars had also arrived; they were followed on
the 14th by half a battalion, 2nd Worcestershire regiment.]
[Footnote 275: Casualties, January 15th:--
Killed, six N.C.O.s and men; wounded, one officer, five
N.C.O.s and men. Boer losses: twenty-one killed: about
forty wounded.]
[Sidenote: Arrival, Jan. 15th, of Clements, and fresh troops then and
later to Jan. 21st, causes changes in dispositions.]
Whilst this affair was in progress, a welcome reinforcement arrived.
Major-General R. A. P. Clements brought with him the 1st Royal Irish
and the remainder of the 2nd Worcestershire of his brigade (12th), in
all an addition of 18 officers and 874 men. Clements was immediately
placed in command of the Slingersfontein area.[276] This increase of
strength enabled French to extend his right still further by moving
Porter's command[277] south-eastward to Potfontein farm, and that of
Rimington,[278] hitherto stationed at Jasfontein farm, to Kleinfontein
farm, five miles north of Porter. For a time Rimington was able to
station some Household cavalry in close touch with the enemy at
Rhenoster farm, on the Bethulie road, but it was thought prudent to
withdraw them on January 21st, as a commando of 1,000 men had gathered
opposite the post. A demonstration by Porter towards Hebron farm on
the 19th disclosed, about Keerom, south of Achtertang, a large Boer
laager, which was shelled with effect. A deserter reported the enemy
in this direction to consist of 6,000 men. During the next two days
the following reinforcements reached the camp:--2nd Bedfordshire
regiment, 2nd Wiltshire regiment, detachments of the 1st Essex and 1st
Yorkshire regiments and details of Royal engineers and Army Service
Corps, a total accession of about 50 officers and 1,900 men. Two
howitzers,[279] which had come up on the 18th, shelled Grassy Hill on
the 19th and following days with effect, their fire being directed by
telegraph from Coles Kop.
[Footnote 276: With the following:--1st Royal Irish and 2nd
Worcestershire regiment, one squadron cavalry, one company
New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and four guns.]
[Footnote 277: Three squadrons Carabiniers, two squadrons
Household cavalry, N.S.W. Lancers, one company New Zealand
Mounted Rifles and four guns.]
[Footnote 278: Rimington's Guides, one squadron Household
cavalry, one company New Zealand Mounted Rifles.]
[Footnote 279: A section of the 37th Howitzer battery, from
Modder River.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 24th. French seizes Bastard's Nek.]
Recognising that he was blocked to the eastward by the superior and
apparently constantly increasing commandos, French now turned once
more to the westward for a chance of gaining commanding positions,
such as alone could enable him to manoeuvre the enemy from Colesberg.
An opening seemed to offer, because of the reported partial or entire
abandonment of the important defile known as Plessis Poort, through
which ran the road from Colesberg northward to the bridge and Botha's
Drift. The possession of this pass would not only cut the Boers' line
of retreat and northerly communications, but would seriously imperil
those leading to Norval's Pont; for high ground, running
south-eastward from the Poort, in parts parallel to the road and
railway, in parts impinging on them, practically commanded both for a
distance of some twenty miles from Colesberg. French, therefore,
determined to lose no time in reconnoitring and, if possible, seizing
on so valuable a point, and on the evening of January 24th, despatched
de Lisle to occupy Bastard's Nek, a defile cutting the same range as
Plessis Poort, and five miles to the westward of it. This being safely
effected, early on the 25th a strong column[280] concentrated at the
Nek. French's plan was as follows:--
[Footnote 280: Composition:--6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons,
10th Hussars, a battery R.H.A., under Major-General Brabazon;
four companies 1st Yorkshire, four companies 1st Essex, the
2nd Wiltshire regiment, the M.I., and a field battery, under
Colonel T. E. Stephenson, 1st Essex regiment.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 25th. He strikes at Plessis Poort.]
[Sidenote: French avoids a trap, and returns to camp.]
Whilst the infantry, covered by a cross fire of artillery, pushed
along the high ground towards Plessis Poort, the cavalry, diverging
north-eastward, were to turn the Poort by the Boer right, and at the
same time watch for any counter attack from the direction of the road
bridge. To draw attention from these movements, demonstrations were to
be made from every part of the British lines about Colesberg. As soon
as it was light these operations began. Whilst McCracken, under cover
of the howitzers and the two guns on Coles Kop, advanced from Kloof
camp, whilst Clements, pushing out from Porter's Hill and
Slingersfontein, shelled once more the laager at Keerom, and Porter
from Kleinfontein, made as if to fall upon the railway towards Van Zyl
siding, Brabazon's mounted force drew out to the northward, and
Stephenson sent the infantry, the Essex leading, along the ridge
towards the Poort. By 10 a.m. the four R.H.A. guns were in action
against the Poort at a point 2,400 yards north-west of it. Brabazon's
cavalry started late, owing to a delay on the part of the battalion
told off to relieve the intermediate posts: the enemy, getting wind of
his presence, advanced from the north with two guns, and from the
east, and so delayed him that his turning movement was completed too
late in the day to be utilised. Meanwhile the infantry, covered by the
fire of the 4th battery, worked rapidly towards the Pass, driving
scattered parties before them, and by 2 p.m. had reached favourable
ground within 1,500 yards of it. Here Stephenson deployed the 2nd
Wiltshire regiment, and sent it forward with orders to establish
itself within 800 yards of the enemy, unless heavily fired upon whilst
advancing. This the Wiltshire, moving in six lines 100 yards apart,
did without loss, under a fire so trifling that the enemy seemed to be
falling back, and Stephenson sent word to the General requesting
permission to push the attack home. But French, who knew his
opponents, had grown suspicious because of their silence. The hour was
late, the cavalry turning movement had not been carried out, and
finally instructions from the Commander-in-Chief had enjoined him to
avoid serious fighting.[281] At 4 p.m., therefore, he gave the order
to retire, and the Wiltshire firing lines rose to obey. Scarcely had
they done so, before a burst of fire, both of rifles and guns, from
the enemy's ridges, showed the nature of the trap that had been
prepared. But in spite of the heavy fusilade which followed them back,
the Wiltshire, retiring as steadily as they had advanced, rejoined the
column with a loss of but ten men wounded. The whole force then
returned to its bivouacs.
[Footnote 281: See pages 434-5.]
[Sidenote: French, Jan. 29th, is summoned to Cape Town.]
This reconnaissance, though it failed to give General French the
Poort, succeeded in disclosing to him the nature of the enemy's
dispositions in this neighbourhood, especially of those behind the
hitherto impenetrable Grassy Hill. Such knowledge might have gone far
towards a solution of the problem which had so long engaged his
energies, the ousting of the Boers from their stronghold on British
territory. The more vital portion of his task, the prevention of a
further inroad into the colony, he had already performed. He was now
to be called away to a wider field. On January 29th he went down to
Cape Town to receive instructions from the Commander-in-Chief. He
returned to Rensburg on the 31st to break up his command. On February
6th he finally left Rensburg, after issuing an order in which he paid
full tribute to the courage and energy of staff and troops, who had so
long held in check "an enemy whose adroit skill in war demands the
most untiring vigilance."[282] With French went all the Regular
cavalry, except two squadrons, and also the 1st Essex and 1st
Yorkshire regiments, the half-battalion 1st Welsh regiment, and O. and
R. batteries, R.H.A. Major-General Clements was left at Rensburg with
the remainder.[283]
[Footnote 282: Despatch, February 2nd, 1900.]
[Footnote 283: General Clements' command was as follows:--
Two squadrons 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons.
J. battery, R.H.A.
4th battery, R.F.A.
A section, 37th Howitzer battery, Royal Field Artillery.
The Australian M.I. (490 men).
The Victorian M.I. (175 men).
Mounted infantry (450 men).
2nd Bedfordshire regiment.
1st Royal Irish regiment.
2nd Worcester regiment.
Half battalion 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment.
2nd Wiltshire regiment.]