COLENSO, DECEMBER 15th, 1899.[226]
[Footnote 226: See maps Nos. 15 and 15(a), and freehand
sketch.]
[Sidenote: The move begins. Power of the Naval guns.]
In the cool of the early morning of December 15th, 1899, while it was
yet dark,[227] the British troops were set in motion. The day was to
prove intensely hot, a sign, at this period of the Natal summer, of
the approaching rains. Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., commanding the Naval
brigade, moved with two 4·7-in. and four 12-pounder guns to a site
pointed out to him personally by Sir Redvers on the previous day, to
the west of the railway and about 4,500 yards from Fort Wylie. From
thence, at 5.20 a.m. he began to shell the kopjes on the far side of
the river. For more than half an hour no reply was made and, even when
the Boers opened fire, no guns appear to have been directed on Captain
Jones' six pieces until about 7 a.m. These Naval guns with their
escort, a company of the 2nd Scottish Rifles, remained on the same
spot until the close of the action, suffering no loss. Their
telescopes made it easy to see, their long range and powerful shells
to silence, guns unseen by others.
[Footnote 227: Sunrise at Colenso on 15th December is at 5
a.m.]
[Sidenote: The march of the 14th and 66th batteries and six Naval
12-pounders.]
[Sidenote: and 6th brigade.]
[Sidenote: Dundonald and 7th battery.]
[Sidenote: 2nd and 4th brigades.]
Meanwhile the larger units had begun to carry out their orders. The
14th and 66th Field batteries of No. 1 brigade division, under command
of Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, and six Naval 12-pounders, under the command
of Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, R.N., moved across the railway line at
3.30 a.m., accompanied by the officer commanding the whole of the
Royal Artillery then in Natal, Colonel C. J. Long, who had been
directed by General Buller personally to supervise the movements of
these batteries. East of the railway these guns joined the 6th brigade
and advanced at 4 a.m. with that unit, northward. Lord Dundonald's
brigade moved also at 4 a.m., accompanied by the 7th Field battery.
The 2nd brigade, at the same hour, left camp and marched towards
Colenso, followed at 4.30 a.m. by the 4th brigade.
[Sidenote: 5th brigade. 2nd brigade division.]
The 5th brigade moved off at the same time. Lieut.-Colonel Parsons,
commanding No. 2 brigade division, although directed by the written
operation orders to follow the 4th brigade (Lyttelton) in order to
enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge, had received verbal
instructions from Sir R. Buller through Colonel Long that at least one
of his batteries was to cross the river with Hart's brigade. He
accordingly marched with his guns on the right rear of the 5th
brigade.
[Sidenote: Hart's instructions, guide, and map.]
Major-General Hart had been provided with a tracing of a map, a Kaffir
guide, and a colonist as interpreter to assist him in finding "the
Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of the Doornkop Spruit
and the Tugela," by which he was to cross the river. This map was a
plane-table sketch, prepared by an engineer officer shortly before the
action. It was an attempt to fill into a farm survey, made for land
registration, as many of the topographical features as could be seen
from a distance. Unfortunately it had not been verified by any close
reconnaissance of the river, and thus both the sketch and the orders
were misleading. A Bridle Drift, used by natives in the dry season of
the winter but uncertain in the summer, did indeed exist, although on
that particular day it was unfordable. But the sketch, on which the
order relied, showed the Doornkop Spruit as running into the Tugela at
the western bend of the remarkable loop which that river makes to the
north-west, about one mile east of E. Robinson's farm; it showed,
moreover, the Bridle Drift close to the junction of the spruit, and
placed, also immediately to the west of the Drift, another loop of the
river. On all three of these points the sketch was defective. Only a
short but deep donga enters the river at this western end of the loop,
near 2 on map No. 15. The Doornkop Spruit joins the river at the
eastern, not the western bend of the loop. The Bridle Drift lies, not
near to the western bend of the loop, but a mile to the westward.
Finally, the Tugela makes no second loop for several miles to the
westward. The effect of these topographical errors in the map, and in
the written orders was further enhanced by another serious
misapprehension. Major-General Hart had been informed on the previous
evening that the Kaffir guide lived close to the drift where he was to
cross, and could be relied on not to make any mistake about it.
Unfortunately the native misunderstood his instructions, or had been
given wrong instructions, for he conceived that he was intended to
lead the column, not to the Bridle Drift, but to a point (marked 4 on
map No. 15) close to his own kraal, at the head of and inside the
loop, where, owing to the existence of rapids, the river was fordable,
breast-high, by men on foot. The practicability of this drift had been
personally verified by the native on the two previous nights, but no
staff officer had accompanied him. Another similar foot-ford might
have been found at point 6 immediately below the junction of the
Doornkop Spruit with the Tugela, but the existence of neither of these
fords was known to Major-General Hart or to the Headquarter
staff.[228]
[Footnote 228: General Buller's telegram to the War Office,
dated 15th December, 1899, states: "There are two fordable
places in the Tugela ... they are about two miles apart ...
General Hart was to attack the left drift, General Hildyard
the right."]
[Sidenote: The march of Hart's (5th) brigade.]
The 5th brigade marched from its parade ground in mass of
quarter-columns, the battalions being arranged in the following
order:--
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, commanded by Col. C. D. Cooper.
1st Connaught Rangers, commanded by Col. L. G. Brooke.
1st Border regiment, commanded by Col. J. H. E. Hinde.
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, commanded by Lt.-Col. T. M. G.
Thackeray.
Half of the 17th Company, R.E., under the command of Major H. H.
Massy, followed in rear. A squadron of the Royal Dragoons acted as
advance guard as far as Doornkop Spruit, where the cavalry moved off
to the left.
[Sidenote: Hart's intention.]
The Brigadier had informed the commanding officers on the previous
evening that he intended the leading battalion to line the right bank
of the Tugela, while the remainder crossed. After passing, the brigade
was to move eastward, and attempt to close the enemy into the Colenso
loop of the river.
[Sidenote: Hart plunges into the loop.]
[Sidenote: The Boer artillery opens fire, shortly after 6 a.m.]
[Sidenote: Unseen riflemen enfilade the attack.]
Hart, following the directions of the Kaffir guide, led his brigade in
a north-westerly direction to the first drift over the Doornkop
Spruit,[229] and thence northward, the formation of the leading
battalion being now changed to an advance in fours from the right of
companies at deploying interval, the three rear battalions continuing
in mass of quarter-columns. A few cavalry scouts preceded the brigade:
the main body of the Royal Dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel J. F.
Burn-Murdoch, watched the left flank, his officers' patrols moving
down to the river's bank, without provoking any fire. Colonel
Burn-Murdoch despatched three successive gallopers to inform General
Hart that these patrols reported the enemy in force on his front and
left. General Hart replied that he intended to cross by the drift in
front of him, and would ignore the enemy on his left, unless they
attacked in strength. The column, therefore, continued to move
steadily on the point, near to the western bend of the loop, where the
sketch had placed the Bridle Drift. But, as the brigade was crossing a
newly-ploughed mealie-field, within 300 yards of the entrance of the
loop, the Brigadier riding at its head perceived that the map was
misleading, and on enquiry, the Kaffir guide pointed up the loop, and
stated, through the interpreter, that it was in that direction that
the ford lay. Almost simultaneously a Boer gun opened on the column
from the underfeature below Grobelaar Mountain, and its shell, passing
over the whole depth of the brigade, burst behind the rear battalion.
A second shell, passing over the heads of the Dublin Fusiliers, fell
in front of the Connaught Rangers. A third almost immediately followed
and knocked over nine men of that battalion. These, the first shots
from the Boer side, were fired by their artillery, in disobedience to
the orders of Louis Botha, who had not given the signal, and hoped to
entice the attack to closer range. The time was now a little after 6
a.m. The Dublin Fusiliers immediately front-formed and extended to the
right; the battalions in rear were deployed to the left in single rank
in quick time, and were subsequently opened out with from two to three
paces interval, the enemy meanwhile continuing to shell them with
shrapnel. The ground on the far side of the river presented a
formidable appearance to these troops while deploying. It rose rapidly
from the left bank to a line of hills, which, towards their crest,
seemed steep, rugged, and inaccessible. After Hart had deployed, his
brigade moved on the same point by rushes, the right half-battalions
being directed on the gorge of the loop, while the left
half-battalions overlapped this gorge, and were cramped by the bank on
their western flank. As the brigade came near the river it was
subjected to a very heavy fire from the long Boer trench to the north,
occupied by the Standerton commando. The battalions were also
enfiladed from trenches on the right and left. At the time it was only
possible to guess from the course of the bullets where these shelter
trenches were. The left half-battalions temporarily obtained a certain
amount of cover from the bank of the river. The right half-battalions,
when a little further on, gained for the moment some shelter from a
long, narrow underfeature, towards the centre of the loop. With the
exception of the 1st Border regiment, which was on the extreme left,
the units rapidly intermingled. This mixture of commands was soon
increased when the left half-battalions of the Dublin Fusiliers and
Connaught Rangers, followed by two companies of the Border regiment,
came up. They had been ordered to cross the donga, near 2 on map No.
15, and move eastward in succession in support of those in front. The
passage to the flank in file of these half-battalions was carried out
under a severe and accurate cross musketry fire, while the Boer guns
continued to make excellent practice with shrapnel on the extended
British lines.
[Footnote 229: It is noteworthy that Major-General Hart is
emphatic in asserting that "he did not cross the Doornkop
Spruit." It will be understood from the explanation given in
the text that he did not cross what was marked for him on the
map as the spruit. The map was wrong. He crossed the spruit
shown as "Doornkop Spruit" on map 15.]
[Sidenote: The guide disappears.]
As the Kaffir guide had disappeared, the actual position of the ford
was unknown. Major C. R. R. McGrigor, King's Royal Rifle Corps,
General Hart's brigade-major, had ridden up the river in search of the
Bridle Drift, and, finding a spot where there appeared to be a ford,
entered the river on foot, but was soon out of his depth, and was
compelled to swim back to the right bank.
[Sidenote: Hart's brigade struggles forward up the loop.]
Meanwhile parties of the Connaught Rangers, the Dublin, and
Inniskilling, Fusiliers, had worked their way up the loop by a series
of rushes in extended order at about three to four paces interval,
suffering heavy loss. Each group followed the nearest officer,
irrespective of his corps, of its own volition, and worked forward, as
it were, automatically, the rushes, however, varying in length,
sometimes carrying the men through the group in front, sometimes not
reaching it. There was very little shooting, as nothing could be seen
to aim at. The enemy's fire was too heavy to allow of any combined
command of the movement. Nevertheless, there was little or no
confusion, and the advance continued with the steady progress of an
incoming tide. Eventually a detachment of the Dublin Fusiliers, under
Lieut. T. B. Ely, and Major M. G. Moore's company of the Connaught,
mingled with men of other regiments, reached the kraal, about two
hundred yards from the head of the loop; others of the Inniskilling,
and Dublin, Fusiliers and of the Connaught Rangers pushed on to the
river bank; there these handfuls of men remained for several hours,
little more than one hundred yards from the Boer trenches on the far
bank, but in face of the storm of bullets it was impossible to cross
the river, nor were either officers or men aware that they were near a
ford. The rest of the brigade, except the left half-battalion of the
Inniskilling Fusiliers and one or two companies of the Border regiment
who lined the river bank west of the loop, were on, or in rear of, the
knoll, the cohesion of units being now almost entirely lost. The
artillery and rifle fire, concentrated on the British troops from the
far bank, was too continuous and accurate to permit of any further
advance being attempted for the moment. The shrapnel of the two field
guns, posted in emplacements on the lower ridge to the north-west, was
particularly effective, and the Boer riflemen did not disclose whence
their deadly shots came. Volleys were fired from time to time by the
British infantry, but comparatively little ammunition was expended.
Yet, notwithstanding these trying conditions, the men clung on
steadfastly, each group being well under the control of the officer
nearest to them, whether of their own corps or of another.[230]
Meantime, Parsons' batteries, the 64th and 73rd, had come into action
on the right bank of the Doornkop Spruit, and were busily engaged in
shelling a kraal immediately in front of the loop, and in endeavouring
to silence the Boer guns. These somewhat outranged the Field
artillery, and an attempt to cross over the spruit so as to come into
closer action on its left bank was for the moment frustrated by a Boer
shell bursting on the team of the leading gun, killing two horses,
upsetting the gun, and thereby blocking the ford of this stream. On
this the two batteries re-opened fire from the right bank of the
spruit.
[Footnote 230: In consequence of the heavy losses suffered by
the commissioned ranks in previous actions all the +infantry+
officers had been ordered to discard their swords, and for
the most part carried a rifle and men's equipment.]
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers recalls Hart.]
Sir Redvers Buller had watched from Naval Gun Hill the original
advance of the 5th brigade. As soon as he observed the movement into
the loop, he despatched a galloper to order General Hart to halt; the
messenger was caught in a bog and failed to reach his destination. A
second officer was sent, but was unable to find the Brigadier.
Finally, when the brigade had become heavily engaged, Colonel Stopford
was instructed by Sir Redvers to direct Major-General Hart to retreat,
and to inform him that his retirement would be covered by artillery
fire. Major Cooper, A.D.C. to General Clery, conveyed orders to
Lieut.-Colonel Parsons to move his guns across the spruit and divert
the fire from Hart's brigade during the withdrawal. Subsequently,
fearing a flank counter-attack on the left, General Buller directed
Major-General Lyttelton to support the 5th brigade with two battalions
of the 4th.
[Sidenote: Barton's (6th) brigade marches.]
[Sidenote: Col. Long's guns move off with Barton, then diverge.]
Major-General Barton at 4 a.m. had moved off with the 6th brigade on
the east side of the railway in the following order: the 1st Royal
Welsh Fusiliers, with six companies in line, each company having a
sub-section in its front, and two companies in support; the
half-battalion of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers in echelon of
companies on the left flank, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers in echelon of
companies on the right flank, and the half-battalion 2nd Royal Irish
Fusiliers in rear, at a distance of 1,500 yards from the leading
battalion.[231] The direction of the brigade's advance was to the
north-east, towards Hlangwhane Hill, in conformity with the operation
orders of the previous evening.
[Footnote 231: The other half-battalion of the Royal Irish
Fusiliers, under command of Lieut.-Col. J. Reeves, was on
baggage guard. Headquarters and four companies of the 2nd
Royal Scots Fusiliers were at Frere.]
Colonel Long's guns accompanied the brigade for some distance, the
field batteries leading, with the Naval guns, dragged by spans of
oxen, in rear. After a time, however, the respective directions
assigned by Sir R. Buller to the guns and the infantry brigade were
found to diverge, and General Barton accordingly detailed two
companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers to continue with the guns as
escort. At 5.30 a.m. the Brigadier halted his command, his leading
battalion being then about two miles from the river.
[Sidenote: Col. Long's mission.]
The specific task assigned to No. 1 brigade division by the operation
orders was, "to proceed to a point from which it can prepare the
crossing for the 2nd brigade." Sir Redvers Buller, at the conference
of the previous afternoon, had thought it desirable to supplement and
anticipate this written order with verbal instructions as to the exact
point at which the batteries should come into action. He had intended
to convey to Colonel Long by these verbal instructions that the
purposed preparation should be carried out at long range. But the
impression left on the subordinate officer's mind, when he left the
conference, was that medium range was meant. As he rode therefore with
Lieut.-Colonel Hunt and Lieut. Ogilvy, R.N., at the head of the field
artillery, now marching in battery column, Long was on the look out
for a suitable position at a distance of not less than 2,000 yards and
not more than 2,500 yards from Fort Wylie, the southernmost of the
kopjes which had been pointed out as the brigade division's targets.
Had a site between those limits been selected, the batteries would not
have been seriously molested by the Boer riflemen entrenched on the
far bank of the river, and could, by superior strength, have crushed
the enemy's gunners posted among the Colenso kopjes.
[Sidenote: Long brings his guns into action, after Boer guns open on
Hart, _i.e._, about 6.15 a.m.]
It was not until after 6 a.m. that Long arrived at the distance from
the river at which he had intended to come into action. The batteries
were still at a walk, with the Naval guns in rear, when suddenly heavy
firing was heard on the left flank. It was evident that part of the
British force was closely engaged. Anxious to afford immediate
effective support, and deceived by the light as to his actual distance
from Fort Wylie, Long ordered Hunt's brigade division to push on, and
come into action at a point about eighty yards to the north of a broad
and shallow donga, which runs at right angles to the railway and was
just in front of his guns. Ogilvy's Naval guns were to follow with the
infantry escort and to unlimber on the left of the field batteries.
The ground scouts of the brigade division had by this time reached the
bush, lining the south bank of the river, and had ascertained that
this bank was clear of the enemy. A section of the infantry escort had
also been sent forward to reconnoitre Colenso. Not a sign had been
given by the Boer guns and riflemen concentrated in front of Hunt, on
the far side, for the defence of the Colenso crossings. As soon as the
batteries approached the spot selected by the artillery commander, it
proved to be within 1,250 yards of Fort Wylie, and not much more than
1,000 yards from the Boer infantry entrenchments between that work and
the river. Then Louis Botha, fearing that their further advance would
intimidate his inexperienced burghers, gave the order to fire.
Immediately a storm of bullets and shells burst on the British guns,
both field and Naval. The Boers knew the exact range from whitewash
marks on the railway fence and adjacent stones; their fire was
therefore from the outset accurate.[232] The field batteries, led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Hunt, continued to go forward at a steady trot and
came into action at the chosen place in an excellent line. The limbers
were taken to the rear and wagons were brought up in the ordinary
manner.
[Footnote 232: In addition to the field guns on the Colenso
kopjes, a heavy gun, north of them, was observed by the Naval
officers of Capt. Jones', R.N., battery.]
[Sidenote: The Naval guns also come into action.]
The two leading Naval guns, under Lieutenant James, R.N., had at this
moment just crossed the drift of a deep donga, about 400 yards behind
Hunt. The central section of the battery was still in the drift, and
the rear section on the south side. The leading section, by direction
of the battery commander, Lieutenant Ogilvy, moved a little to the
left and opened fire against Fort Wylie. The native drivers of the
ox-spans of the other four guns had bolted, and the central guns were,
for the moment, jammed with their ammunition wagons in the drift, but
eventually the oxen were cut loose, and the guns, together with those
of the rear section, brought into action on the south side of the
donga, whence they also fired on Fort Wylie. During all this delay the
enemy's artillery, and in particular a pom-pom, had maintained a
well-directed fire on the drift.
[Sidenote: The batteries suffer severely.]
[Sidenote: The arrival of fresh ammunition being delayed, the gun
teams are withdrawn to the donga.]
Meanwhile, the personnel of the field batteries in the open, 400 yards
in front of Ogilvy's guns, was beginning to suffer from the accurate
shrapnel and rifle fire concentrated on them. The escort of "A." and
"B." companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, under command of Captain
D. H. A. Dick, extended on the immediate left of Long's guns up to the
railway line; four companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, under Major
C. R. Rogers, were sent in extended order by General Barton, two
companies in advance and two in support, to aid this escort. Of these,
one company halted in rear of the Royal Scots Fusiliers companies; one
company remained in the donga near Ogilvy's guns, and the other two
lay down about 300 yards to the right rear of the field guns. The
Royal Scots Fusiliers companies[233] endeavoured to subdue the enemy's
riflemen, but unsuccessfully. After a few minutes Colonel Long was
very severely wounded. A little later Lieut.-Colonel Hunt was also
wounded, and the command devolved on Major A. C. Bailward. Casualties
amongst the men, especially in the centre gun detachments, were
frequent. Nevertheless, the batteries continued to be served with
great efficiency, the guns being worked steadily by sections with
accurate elevation and fuse. Notwithstanding the heavy fire of the
enemy, the second line ammunition wagons were brought up to the guns,
and the empty wagons removed in strict conformity with regulations.
The requisition, however, for further supplies for the batteries from
the ammunition column three miles in rear was delayed by the death of
Captain A. H. Goldie, 14th battery, and by the wounding of Captain F.
A. Elton, 66th Battery. Officers and men the while, soldiers and
sailors alike, fought their guns with the utmost determination, and
with great effect. Fort Wylie became a mass of bursting shell and red
dust, and for a time the Boer guns on the kopjes some 500 yards in
rear of that work were silenced. The infantry fire of the enemy had
been also greatly reduced,[234] but after being in action for an hour
the ammunition of the British batteries began to run short, each gun
having now fired from 80 to 100 rounds. Major Bailward therefore,
after first obtaining Colonel Long's approval, decided to withdraw the
gun detachments temporarily into the donga, and keep them under cover,
pending the arrival of reinforcements of men and ammunition.
[Footnote 233: The two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers
subsequently ran short of ammunition, but a further supply
was brought up to them under a heavy fire by Sergeant-Major
J. Shannon, 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers.]
[Footnote 234: Three burghers of the Krugersdorp commando,
who were manning the trenches near the river, stated
subsequently that it would have been impossible for them to
have maintained "any sort of fire" on the infantry, if these
had advanced while the guns were in action.]
[Sidenote: Two messengers sent to Sir Redvers.]
The effective strength of the detachments was by this time reduced to
an average of about four men per gun.[235] The remaining men were
accordingly formed up and marched quietly to the donga at about 7.15
a.m. All the wounded were placed under cover in small dongas, close to
the outer flanks of the batteries, but no attempt was made to disable
the guns, as the officer in command only awaited fresh supplies of men
and ammunition to open fire again. Captain G. F. Herbert, R.A.,
Colonel Long's staff officer, and an Australian officer attached to
his staff, were instructed to ride at once to Sir Redvers Buller and
report the situation and the needs of the batteries.
[Footnote 235: Exclusive of prisoners, the 66th battery's
losses throughout the day were 1 officer and 10 men killed,
and 2 officers and 30 men wounded; these casualties include
those incurred in the attempts to carry away the guns.]
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers receives various reports and leaves Naval Gun
Hill.]
Sir Redvers had already felt some anxiety as to Long's guns, as
Colonel Stopford had already pointed out to him that they were not in
the intended position. An aide-de-camp had been despatched to
ascertain their exact situation, and, having observed the guns in
action from a distance through field-glasses, that officer had
reported that they were "all right and comfortable," but under a
certain amount of fire. Sir Redvers' anxiety as to the guns was not
relieved, and a little later he left Naval Gun Hill with the intention
of seeing himself what was going on. On his way he met the Australian
officer, who stated that the batteries, including the Naval guns, were
all out of action, their ammunition exhausted, and every officer and
man of the gun detachments killed or wounded. Shortly afterwards
Captain Herbert rode up, and was understood by General Buller to
confirm the previous report, with the exception that he estimated that
six rounds per gun were still left. It was not until the following day
that the General Commanding knew that men had been all along available
to fight the guns. He had already ordered the retirement of Hart's
brigade, but, until hearing of this fresh mishap, had still hoped to
succeed with his main attack. The operation orders had contemplated
that the fire of the whole of the Naval guns and of both brigade
divisions of Royal artillery (amounting in all to 44 guns) should be
concentrated on the Colenso kopjes, so as to pave the way for an
attack upon them. The 2nd brigade division had been diverted to assist
Hart's brigade and, conceiving from the reports now made that the 1st
brigade division and six of the Naval guns were permanently out of
action for the day, Sir Redvers immediately decided that the artillery
left to him was insufficient and that "without guns it would be
impossible to force the passage of the river."[236] He determined,
before falling back, to make an effort to save Long's guns from what
seemed to him their desperate position.
[Footnote 236: See despatch to Secretary of State, dated 17th
December, 1899.]
[Sidenote: He decides to withdraw from the attack. 8 a.m.]
[Sidenote: The distribution of the troops at 8 a.m.]
He came to this decision, which marks the crucial point of the action,
a little before 8 a.m.[237] Hart's brigade was at that moment slowly
beginning to carry out the order to retire from the western loop of
the river. Barton's brigade, save the two companies Royal Scots
Fusiliers and the half-battalion Irish Fusiliers, which had been
pushed forward to support Long's guns, had not been engaged, although,
to meet any advance of the enemy from the bush near the river on the
right front, the Brigadier had moved the Royal Welsh Fusiliers some
1,000 yards beyond the point where they had first halted. Neither the
2nd nor the 4th brigade had yet fired a shot. The former had been
halted by Major-General Hildyard a little in front of Naval Gun Hill,
with its right on the railway and its left near some kraals, awaiting
the completion of the artillery preparation. Two battalions of the 4th
brigade, the 2nd Scottish Rifles and the 3rd King's Royal Rifles, were
lying close beside Hildyard's brigade, in rear of Captain Jones' Naval
artillery. Two other battalions, 1st Rifle Brigade and 1st Durham
Light Infantry, were moving in accordance with Sir R. Buller's orders
to the left flank to cover the withdrawal of the 5th brigade; one
company, however, of the latter battalion had been left with the Naval
guns. The mounted brigade, whose proceedings will be narrated later,
was advancing against Hlangwhane Hill, but no report of their progress
had yet reached Sir Redvers Buller.
[Footnote 237: The positions of the troops at this period of
the action are given in detail on map No. 15.]
[Sidenote: Hildyard moves 2nd brigade forward.]
[Sidenote: He occupies Colenso, and joins hands with Barton.]
He himself now considered it advisable to go in person to the critical
point, and ascertain by his own inspection the true facts about the
guns. On his way to the front, he informed Major-General Hildyard that
the attack, as originally planned, was to be given up, and instructed
him to advance two of his battalions to cover the extrication of the
guns, taking care not to get involved in any engagement with the enemy
that could be avoided. The G.O.C., 2nd brigade, had already extended
his two leading battalions, the 2nd Queen's and 2nd Devon, for the
attack on the bridge, as first ordered. Both these battalions being to
the west of the railway, Hildyard directed the 2nd Devon to pass
through the Queen's and cross over to the east side of the line. The
two battalions then advanced, the 2nd Queen's on Colenso and the Devon
on Long's guns, the formation adopted being columns of half companies
at from fifty to eighty paces distance, the half companies being
deployed in single rank, with six to eight paces interval. The 2nd
East Surrey formed a second line in rear; the 2nd West Yorkshire was
in third line. In this formation, the 2nd brigade moved forward across
the open plain under a heavy fire, experiencing but slight loss. By
9.30 a.m. five companies of the Queen's, under the command of Major W.
S. Burrell, had occupied the village of Colenso. About two sections of
"C." and "G." companies of the Devon, accompanied by their battalion
commander, Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Bullock, had reached the donga
immediately in rear of Long's guns, the rest of that battalion being
echeloned in the open, further back as a support. A little later "E."
and "F." companies crossed the railway, and seized some farm
buildings, close to the road near the village. Part of these were
already occupied by the 2nd Queen's. Between Bullock's two foremost
Devon sections and Burrell's five companies lay the companies of the
Royal Scots Fusiliers, which formed the original escort to the guns,
and behind them, in support, were those two other companies of R. S.
Fusiliers which had been despatched by General Barton, when he
observed that an attempt was being made to withdraw the field guns. To
the right, and on the left rear of Bullock, four companies of Irish
Fusiliers were still extended. At this time, therefore, nearly ten
companies of infantry were in the firing line. Three companies of the
Queen's, about seven of the Devon, two of the Irish, and two of the
Scotch Fusiliers were in immediate support, and the remainder of the
2nd and 6th brigades and a battalion of the 4th brigade (the King's
Royal Rifles) were near at hand in rear. During this period of the
fight, Lieutenant R. E. Meyricke, Royal Engineers, of his own
initiative, worked down the spruit above the Bulwer bridge to the
river, and thence along its bank to the bridge, which he tested under
heavy fire, and found not to be mined.
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, in zone of fire, orders Naval guns to retire.]
After giving his orders to General Hildyard's brigade, Sir Redvers
rode forward with Lieut.-General Clery and his staff into the zone of
fire, Captain M. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C., being killed, and Sir Redvers
himself hit by a shrapnel bullet. On reaching that donga, where
Lieutenant Ogilvy's Naval guns were still in action, General Buller
ordered their retirement. Two of these guns, whose oxen had been kept
at hand, went off to join the main Naval battery under Captain Jones.
The remaining four were withdrawn out of range one by one with the
help of artillery horses, and were eventually brought back to camp by
fresh spans of oxen. This withdrawal was covered by "C." squadron of
the 13th Hussars. The casualties among Ogilvy's party during the day
only amounted to three men wounded, and twenty-eight oxen killed,
wounded or lost.
[Sidenote: He stops despatch of ammunition to Long's guns.]
The field guns were still in the open, beyond the further donga, under
cover of which the surviving officers and men of the brigade division
were lying, hoping for ammunition to enable them to resume the action.
Major W. Babtie, R.A.M.C., who had volunteered to go forward to the
gun line, was attending to the wounded. Captain Herbert, on his
return, after his interview with the General Commanding-in-Chief, had
again been despatched to the rear by Colonel Long to seek for
ammunition. At his request Major W. Apsley Smith, commanding No. 1
ammunition column, ordered forward nine wagons, and to cover their
advance Captain Jones, R.N., concentrated the fire of his Naval guns
on Fort Wylie, but the wagons were stopped on their way by General
Buller.
[Sidenote: Gallant attempts to rescue guns.]
Sir Redvers, by the time he arrived at the Naval donga, had decided
that it was impracticable to re-man the guns of the field batteries.
Since the batteries ceased fire, Fort Wylie had been re-occupied by
the enemy, and the fire therefrom, and from the neighbouring trenches,
was so heavy that he considered that it was impossible that troops
could live in the open by the guns. He sanctioned a series of gallant
attempts being made by volunteers to withdraw them. Limber teams were
collected for this purpose, in the rear donga. The first of these
attempts was made by Captains Schofield and Congreve, both serving on
Sir Redvers' staff, Lieut. the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts (who was acting
as an extra A.D.C. to General Clery, until he could join Sir George
White's staff), Corporal Nurse and others, gathered from the drivers
of the 66th battery. Two guns were limbered up and brought back to the
rear donga under a very severe fire, but Lieutenant Roberts fell
mortally wounded, and was carried into some shelter on the left flank
by Major Babtie, R.A.M.C., Major W. G. Forster, R.F.A., and Captain
Congreve. One of the limbers which had been brought for the guns had
been reduced to a standstill by the enemy's fire. Lieutenants C. B.
Schreiber and J. B. Grylls, both of the 66th battery, accompanied by
Bombardier Knight and two gunners, thereupon made a valiant endeavour
to assist the endangered drivers. Schreiber was shot dead, and Grylls
severely wounded, but the bombardier and gunners succeeded in bringing
back two wounded men.
[Sidenote: The last effort.]
Later in the morning a final effort was made by Captain H. L. Reed, of
the 7th Field battery, who, with three wagon-teams, came across from
the eastern flank, but before the teams could reach the guns, Captain
Reed was wounded and his horse killed. Of his thirteen men, one was
killed and five wounded, while twelve of their horses were shot. After
this failure Sir Redvers refused to allow any more volunteering to
withdraw the guns.[238] Captain Reed, by General Buller's direction,
and with the assistance of Major F. C. Cooper, A.D.C., withdrew from
the rear donga the unwounded drivers and horses of No. 1 brigade
division, and took them back to the wagons of the 7th Field battery.
No order to retire appears to have been sent to the artillery officers
and men in the front donga. A written message--"I am ordered to
retire; fear that you cannot get away"--was sent by Lieut.-Col. E. O.
F. Hamilton, commanding 2nd Queen's, to the donga, addressed to
"O.C.R.A., or any other officer," but it did not reach an officer's
hands.
[Footnote 238: For conspicuous gallantry displayed in the
attempt to carry away the guns, the following were awarded
the Victoria Cross: Captain W. N. Congreve, Rifle Brigade;
Captain H. L. Reed, 7th battery R.F.A.; Captain H. N.
Schofield, R.F.A.; Lieutenant the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts,
King's Royal Rifle Corps (posthumous); Corporal G. E. Nurse,
66th battery R.F.A.; and Private C. Ravenhill, Royal Scots
Fusiliers. For devotion to the wounded under very heavy fire,
Major W. Babtie, C.M.G., Royal Army Medical Corps, also
received the Victoria Cross.]
[Sidenote: The mounted brigade.]
Whilst the fortunes of the day had thus been proving unfavourable to
the main attack, the mounted brigade had been endeavouring to carry
out its part in the programme. The 7th battery R.F.A., according to
orders, reported before daylight to Lord Dundonald. Lord Dundonald
detached the Royal Dragoons to watch the left flank of the general
advance, detailed Bethune's M.I. to act as baggage guard, and moved
off from his rendezvous on the west side of the railway at 4 a.m.
Crossing the line at the platelayer's cottage about 4.30 a.m., he
advanced on Hlangwhane, employing the Composite regiment[239] to
reconnoitre to the front and flanks.
[Footnote 239: This regiment was made up of one squadron
Natal Carbineers, a detachment of Natal Police, one squadron
Imperial Light Horse, and one mounted company formed from 2nd
King's Royal Rifles and Dublin Fusiliers; Major R. L. Walter,
7th Hussars, was on that day in command.]
[Sidenote: The mission of the mounted brigade.]
The Commanding Officers were informed by the Brigadier that their
mission was "to prevent the enemy working round on the right, to
occupy Hlangwhane Mountain if possible, and to assist the main attack
on Colenso by a flank fire." A little before 7 a.m., when the main
body of the brigade was still about two miles from Hlangwhane, the
scouts reported that the hill was held by the enemy. The 7th battery,
commanded by Major C. G. Henshaw, had already come into action, at
about 6 a.m., close to the right battalion of the 6th brigade, the
Royal Fusiliers, on an underfeature to the north of Advance Hill,
about 3,000 yards from Hlangwhane. The targets selected for the
battery were at first Fort Wylie and the other Colenso kopjes, the
range of the former being about 3,100 yards; but when Hlangwhane was
found to be occupied by the enemy, the fire of the right section, and
later on of another section, was directed on its south-western slopes
at a range of from 2,400 to 2,600 yards.
[Sidenote: It tries to capture Hlangwhane but finds Boers in full
possession.]
Meanwhile, the Brigadier had despatched the South African Light Horse,
under Lt.-Colonel the Hon. Julian Byng, to demonstrate against the
southern slope of the hill, and had directed Thorneycroft's and the
Composite regiment to work round by the Gomba Spruit, and to endeavour
to push through the dense thorn-bush up the eastern face. The 13th
Hussars were held in reserve close to Advance Hill. Deducting the
horse-holders, the force thus launched for the attack of Hlangwhane
was somewhat less in strength than the commando defending it; the
Boers were holding entrenched and well-concealed positions on the
lower southern slopes of the hill, with their left flank prolonged for
a considerable distance to the eastward. Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's
men gained ground to the north-east for about a mile, under cover of
the spruit, and then moved through the bush northwards until they came
in contact with the enemy at a distance of about 300 yards from the
base of the hill. The two leading companies of Thorneycroft's corps
still tried to push on, but they were stopped by finding that they
were outflanked by Boers occupying the ridge to the eastward. The
advance of the South African Light Horse against the southern spur of
the hill was also checked. It was now about 7.40 a.m.
[Sidenote: Dundonald asks for infantry support, but does not get it.]
On receiving Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's report that he could make
no further progress, and that the enemy was outflanking him, Lord
Dundonald sent "A." squadron of the 13th Hussars towards Green Hill to
strengthen his right flank, and asked Major-General Barton to support
his attack on Hlangwhane with some infantry. General Barton was unable
to comply with this request. The Royal Fusiliers were at this moment
his last reserve, and having regard to his instructions, the G.O.C.,
6th brigade, did not feel justified, without the specific sanction of
General Buller, in committing this battalion to what appeared to him a
doubtful enterprise on intricate ground.
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers decides that Hlangwhane would be useless
without Colenso.]
[Sidenote: The decision 11 a.m. to abandon the guns and return to
camp.]
On receipt of this reply, Lord Dundonald directed his troops to hold
on to the positions they were occupying, and reported the situation to
the General Commanding-in-Chief, who now (about 10 a.m.) had left the
donga and ridden over to the mission station at the cross roads
between Advance Hill and Hussar Hill. There he received Lord
Dundonald's and General Barton's reports; the former was of the
opinion that, with the help of one or two battalions, he could carry
Hlangwhane, while the latter considered that his whole brigade,
including the eight companies now in the firing line by Long's guns,
would be needed if the hill was to be taken. Sir Redvers decided that
the occupation of Hlangwhane would be useless unless he had first
forced the passage of the Tugela at Colenso, and of this he had
already relinquished all hope. He therefore ordered the Commander of
the mounted brigade to keep his men well in hand, and not to allow
them to become too closely engaged in the bush. As regards the 6th
brigade, General Buller considered the Royal Fusiliers already too far
forward on the right flank, and ordered that the battalion should be
drawn in. Five companies of the battalion were accordingly moved to
the south; the other three companies remained with the commanding
officer, Lt.-Colonel C. G. Donald, in support of Thorneycroft, and
were advanced to a point half a mile in front of the position of the
7th battery. General Buller now went back to the donga, and thence
watched Captain Reed's effort to save Long's guns. After its failure,
Sir Redvers, sending away his staff and escort, rode personally
through part of the extended battalions of the 2nd brigade, and formed
the opinion that the men were too exhausted with the extreme heat to
be kept out all day, with the probability at nightfall of a severe
fight at close quarters for the guns. He therefore decided to abandon
the guns, and to withdraw the whole of his force forthwith to camp.
The decision was given about 11 a.m.
[Sidenote: Parsons and Lyttelton successfully cover the retreat of
Hart's brigade.]
The retirement of the 5th brigade, which had been ordered more than
three hours earlier, was now approaching completion. Lieut.-Colonel
Parsons[240] had succeeded in moving the 64th and 73rd Field batteries
across the Doornkop Spruit, somewhat higher up than the place of his
first attempt; to afford the infantry better support, he advanced to a
low ridge near a kraal, as close in rear of the left of the brigade as
would permit of sufficient command to fire over them. Thence, at a
range of 2,800 yards, the batteries searched with shell the kopjes on
the north bank of the Tugela, and, assisted by the fire of Captain
Jones' Naval guns, silenced the two Boer guns near the Ladysmith road,
using for this purpose shrapnel with percussion fuse. Parsons'
batteries were at this time only 1,200 yards from the river, and came
under the rifle fire of the enemy. Their casualties were but slight.
The 1st Rifle Brigade and the 1st Durham Light Infantry, which, under
the personal command of Major-General Lyttelton, had gone to assist in
covering Hart's retreat, had reached the Doornkop Spruit. The 1st
Rifle Brigade and four companies of the Durham Light Infantry crossed
it and opened out to six or eight paces interval on the far side, four
companies of the Rifle Brigade and two of the Durham forming a firing
line at a distance of about 500 yards from the river. The three
remaining companies of the Durham Light Infantry lined the spruit.
[Footnote 240: See p. 357.]
[Sidenote: The retreat down the loop.]
The order to retire appears to have reached some of the units of the
5th brigade as early as 7.30 a.m., but under the heavy fire which
still continued, the transmission of orders up the long salient of the
loop was difficult, and the foremost detachments of the intermingled
battalions did not begin to fall back until nearly 10.30 a.m. One or
two small bodies of officers and men, who had reached the bank at the
farthest end, never received the order, and were so absorbed in their
duel across the Tugela that, failing to observe the withdrawal of
their comrades until too late, they were eventually cut off and taken
prisoners. The rest of the brigade retired slowly in small groups, the
1st Border regiment covering the movement. Thanks to the artillery
fire of No. 2 brigade division and the presence of the two battalions
of the 4th brigade, the Boers made no attempt at direct pursuit, and
many of the British rank and file thought that they were engaged in a
counter-march to bring them to another crossing, which their comrades
had already found. Others, especially the Irish soldiers, were with
difficulty induced to turn their backs on the enemy. Gradually the
whole brigade, except the unlucky parties already mentioned, passed
through the files of the Riflemen and Durham Light Infantry, and
formed up out of range. The battalions were then marched back to camp.
The men were in the best of spirits and eager for battle.
[Sidenote: Botha orders right wing to cross river and attack Hart's
brigade. They do not obey.]
Louis Botha had directed that the Middelburg and Winburg commandos,
who had been posted to the west of the salient loop, and had hardly
fired a shot all day, should cross higher up and attack the flank of
the Irish brigade as it fell back. The Free Staters, who at this
period of the war were inclined to resent the control of a Transvaal
Commandant, declined to take part in the enterprise. But as,
irrespective of the Irish brigade, a cavalry regiment, two batteries,
and two fresh battalions were available to repel any counter-attack,
it was perhaps fortunate for the Boer Commandant-General that his
orders were disregarded. A few Boers did actually pass the river, and
were seen working round Parsons' left flank, just as Hart's rear
companies came level with the guns. The work of the artillery as a
covering force was then finished, and Colonel Parsons recrossed the
spruit, moved somewhat to the eastward, and then again came into
action for a short time. Colonel Parsons subsequently moved his
brigade division further to the eastward, near Captain Jones' Naval
guns and remained with them to the end of the day, till ordered by Sir
Redvers Buller to return to camp. The gun of the 73rd battery, upset
in Doornkop Spruit at the commencement of the attack, was retrieved by
Captain H. S. White, of that battery, during the afternoon and brought
back in safety.
[Sidenote: Burrell asks leave to hold Colenso and recover the guns,
but the order to retire is general.]
The G.O.C. the 2nd brigade at 10 a.m. had sent written orders to his
two leading battalions that they were to retreat on the Naval guns, as
soon as the Field artillery had been withdrawn. Sir Redvers' order
that the guns were to be abandoned, and that the force was to return
to the camp of the previous night, was received by Major-General
Hildyard at 11.10 a.m., and was immediately sent by him to
Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton, commanding the 2nd Queen's, with instructions
to pass it to Colonel Bullock, commanding the 2nd Devon on his right.
Major Burrell had previously asked to be allowed to hold Colenso until
nightfall, in the hope of bringing away the guns; but in face of this
definite order to retire, the O.C. the 2nd Queen's felt unable to
sanction his request. The same difficulty in sending such messages
under modern quick-fire, which had made itself felt on the left flank,
again arose. Colonel Hamilton passed the order to the officer
commanding the rear half-battalion of the Devon, who received it about
12.30 p.m. and sent it on to the front companies, but it failed to
reach Colonel Bullock, who, with two sections of his battalion, the
remnant of the Royal Scots Fusilier companies, and the survivors of
No. 1 brigade division, was still in the donga, behind the ten guns
remaining in the open.
[Sidenote: The fate of those in the donga.]
[Sidenote: Hildyard's (2nd) brigade, 3.30 p.m., reaches camp except
Major Pearse's half-battalion which arrives 4 p.m.]
The remainder of the Devon conformed to the movement on their left. Of
the infantry scattered in the donga, the curves of which hid one small
party in it from another, some saw what was going on and also fell
back. The retirement was carried out with coolness and precision under
cover of the 2nd East Surrey, who were holding a shelter trench on the
west and a donga on the east of the railway. The officers and men of
the Queen's and Devon doubled back in small groups through their
files. By 2.30 p.m. the 2nd brigade, except a half-battalion of the
East Surrey, was beyond the range of the enemy's guns, and by 3.30
p.m. had reached camp. This half-battalion of the East Surrey, under
command of Major H. W. Pearse, remained for more than an hour in
position near the platelayer's hut, hoping to cover the withdrawal of
the detachments near the guns. Finally, finding that no more men fell
back, and that his command was becoming isolated, Major Pearse also
marched back to camp.
[Sidenote: Gen. Lyttelton's (4th) brigade falls back, covering the
rear.]
Of General Lyttelton's battalions, the 1st Rifle Brigade and the
Durham Light Infantry had already been drawn in from the left flank
after the completion of the duty of covering Hart's brigade. The
foremost of the two remaining battalions was the 3rd King's Royal
Rifles. This unit, about 8.30 a.m., had advanced and extended some 800
yards in rear of Long's guns. When the general retreat was ordered,
the senior officer with the battalion, Major R. C. A. B.
Bewicke-Copley,[241] was told to furnish the outposts. He therefore
held his ground. Each half company occupied a suitable knoll, with its
supporting half company in rear; the left of the battalion rested on
the railway. At 2 p.m. he was directed to fall further back. On this
Major Bewicke-Copley twice submitted a request to Lieut.-Colonel R. G.
Buchanan-Riddell that he might be allowed to stay where he was, with
a view to saving the guns, when dusk came. He was informed that Sir
Francis Clery had issued definite instructions that the battalion must
place all of the outposts further back and more to the west. The
battalion accordingly retired by companies to a line in the immediate
front of the camp. The Scottish Rifles on the left had covered the
retirement of the 2nd brigade, and as soon as the last battalion had
passed through its extended files, it also withdrew to camp.
[Footnote 241: Lieut.-Colonel Buchanan-Riddell was the
commanding officer of the 3rd K.R.R., but on the movement of
General Lyttelton to the western flank he had assumed command
of the battalions left in the centre (Scottish Rifles and
King's Royal Rifles).]
[Sidenote: Captain Jones' guns withdraw from Naval Gun Hill, 2.30
p.m.]
The Naval guns under Captain Jones received the order to retire at
12.40 p.m., but as they had to send back to Shooter's Hill for their
oxen, it was not until nearly 2.30 p.m. that the last gun limbered up
and moved off. The central Naval battery had during the day fired 160
rounds of 4·7-in. and 600 rounds of 12-pounder ammunition. Lieutenant
Ogilvy's six guns expended about 50 rounds per gun.
[Sidenote: Mounted brigade retreats, fighting.]
The order to retreat reached the officer commanding the mounted troops
about noon. The brigade was still hotly engaged with the enemy, and
its gradual disentanglement took nearly three hours. Colonel
Thorneycroft was told by Lord Dundonald to fall back slowly along the
Gomba Spruit, protecting the flank of the South African Light Horse.
His retreat, which was covered by the 13th Hussars and three companies
of the Royal Fusiliers, was a good deal harassed by the enemy, who
crept up through the bush on the east and on the north. The
well-directed fire of the 7th battery checked this attempt at pursuit.
Eventually, Lord Dundonald succeeded in extricating his whole force
safely, except a small section of two officers and sixteen men of the
South African Light Horse, who were taken prisoners. The Royal
Dragoons had been recalled from the left flank by Sir Redvers Buller
at noon, and were employed in conjunction with Bethune's mounted
infantry in screening the retreat of the centre.
[Sidenote: Barton's brigade reaches camp, 3.30 p.m.]
Major-General Barton began to draw back his brigade about noon, and
arrived with it in camp about 3.30 p.m. His order failed to reach the
detachment of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, the survivors of which, some
38 men in all, had about noon been placed under cover in the donga
behind Long's guns. After five and a half hours fighting in the open,
their ammunition, except the rounds in their magazines had been
expended.
[Sidenote: Boers hesitate to take guns till Naval guns are withdrawn.]
[Sidenote: Mounted brigade sees capture, but cannot fire because of
ambulances.]
[Sidenote: Mounted brigade reaches camp 4.30 p.m.]
But though the guns now stood unprotected on the open veld, save for
the handful of gunners, Devon, and Scots Fusiliers left in the donga
in rear, the Boers feared a trap, and could not at first realise their
good fortune. A telegram despatched at 12.40 p.m., by Botha to
Pretoria had reported that "we cannot go and fetch the guns, as the
enemy command the bridge with their artillery." When the Naval battery
had been withdrawn the burghers ventured across the river and made
prisoners of the party in the donga, Colonel Bullock making a sturdy
resistance to the last. Then the guns, with their ammunition wagons,
were limbered up and taken leisurely over the river as the prizes of
the fight. Lord Dundonald's brigade on its way back to camp had made a
detour northward to help in stragglers, and, approaching to within
2,600 yards of Long's guns, had observed the Boers swarming round
them. The 7th battery unlimbered and was about to open, when British
ambulances approached the donga, and men in khaki were seen
intermingled with the Boers. Under these circumstances it was judged
impossible to fire, and the mounted brigade withdrew to camp, arriving
there about 4.30 p.m. The 7th, Henshaw's, battery had expended 532
rounds in all.
[Sidenote: Casualties.]
The total casualties on the British side throughout were 74 officers
and 1,065 men; of these seven officers and 136 men were killed; 47
officers and 709 men were wounded, and 20 officers and 220 men
returned as prisoners or missing.[242] The Boer losses were six
killed, one drowned, and 22 wounded, the relative smallness of these
figures being largely due to their admirable system of entrenchment
and to the invisibility of smokeless powder.
[Footnote 242: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.]
[Sidenote: Two views of the course of the day.]
The British Commander's plan for the passage of the Tugela was
undoubtedly so hazardous that only the most exact sequence of the
phases of its execution, as conceived by Sir R. Buller, could have
brought it to a successful issue.[243] Imperfect knowledge of the
topographical conditions of the problem, and of the dispositions of
the enemy, combined with misapprehension of orders, sufficed to wreck
it at the outset.
[Footnote 243: This is Sir Redvers' own view. On the other
hand Botha, after the war, said that the loss of the guns and
the mistakes as to Hart's brigade deprived him of the
opportunity of inflicting a ruinous defeat upon the British
army. He had hoped to induce his assailants to cross the
river without a shot being fired.]
[Sidenote: Good points in a day of misfortune.]
The gallant conduct and bearing of the regimental officers and men
were conspicuous through this day of ill-fortune. The reservists, who
formed from 40 to 50 per cent. of the men of the infantry battalions,
displayed a battle-discipline which supported that of their younger
comrades, while the newly-raised colonial corps gave a foretaste of
the valuable services which such units were destined to render
throughout the war.
[Sidenote: The heavy Naval guns and telescopes.]
The influence of the telescopes and long-ranging heavy guns of the
navy has been noticed in the course of the narrative; but the subject
is an important one and it was not only at Colenso that this influence
was felt. It will be more convenient to deal with the general question
when other instances of the same kind have been recorded.