SIR REDVERS BULLER IN FACE OF COLENSO.[213]
[Footnote 213: See maps Nos. 3, 4, 15, and freehand sketch.]
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, 25th Nov./99, to 6th Dec./99, in Natal.]
[Sidenote: The force available for him at Frere.]
Sir Redvers Buller reached Durban on 25th November. He was greeted by
the good news that the invaders were falling back from Mooi river,
that Lord Methuen had driven the Boers from Belmont and Graspan, and
that Generals French and Gatacre were holding their own at Naauwpoort
and Queenstown. He spent a few days at Maritzburg in inspecting this
advanced base of the Natal army, and in directing preparations for the
reception of a large number of wounded. He then pushed on to Frere,
reaching that place on 6th December. The enemy's raiding columns had
now retired across the Tugela, and by the 9th a well-equipped British
force of all three arms was concentrated at Frere. The mounted
brigade, commanded by Colonel the Earl of Dundonald, consisted of the
Royal Dragoons, 13th Hussars, Thorneycroft's and Bethune's
newly-raised regiments of mounted infantry, the South African Light
Horse, also only just enlisted and brought round from Cape Town, a
squadron of the Imperial Light Horse, detachments of the Natal
Carbineers and Natal Police, and one company of British mounted
infantry. The Naval brigade, commanded by Capt. E. P. Jones, H.M.S.
_Forte_, was composed of detachments (or landing parties) from H.M.S.
_Terrible_, _Forte_, and _Tartar_; to it were attached the Natal Naval
Volunteers; its armament consisted of two 4.7-in. and fourteen 12-pr.
12-cwt. guns. The Field artillery consisted of the 1st brigade
division (7th, 14th, and 66th batteries) under Lt.-Col. H. V. Hunt,
and the 2nd brigade division (64th and 73rd[214]) under Lt.-Col. L.
W. Parsons. The infantry formed four brigades: the 2nd brigade, under
Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard, consisting of the 2nd Royal West
Surrey, 2nd Devonshire, 2nd West Yorkshire, and 2nd East Surrey; the
4th brigade, under Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, comprising
2nd Scottish Rifles, 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Durham Light
Infantry, and 1st Rifle Brigade; the 5th brigade, under Major-General
A. FitzRoy Hart, composed of 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1st
Border, 1st Connaught Rangers, and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the 6th
brigade, under Major-General G. Barton, formed of the 2nd Royal
Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and
2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 17th company R.E. and A. Pontoon troop
were with the command.
[Footnote 214: The 3rd battery of this brigade division had
not yet arrived, having been shipwrecked on its voyage out.]
[Sidenote: Tabular statement of strength.]
The following table shows the approximate strength of the force:--
Arms. Officers. Other Horses, Guns
Ranks. Riding & Naval. Naval Field Machine.
Draught. 4·7-in. 12-pr. 15-pr.
Staff 34 137 123 -- -- -- --
Naval brigade 31 297 6 2 12 -- --
Mounted Troops 126 2,561 2,700 -- -- -- 2
Royal Artillery 39 1,074 869 -- -- 30 --
Royal Engineers 14 419 255 -- -- -- --
Infantry(4 brigades) 416 13,521 716 -- -- -- 16
A.S. Corps 16 217 550 -- -- -- --
R.A.M. Corps 30 464 336 -- -- -- --
Total 706 18,672 5,555 2 12 30 18
[Sidenote: On line of communication.]
Two battalions of regular infantry (the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers and
the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry), and three Colonial corps (the Natal
Royal Rifles, the Durban Light Infantry and the Imperial Light
Infantry), with four Naval 12-pounders, manned by detachments from
H.M.S. _Philomel_ and _Forte_, and the Natal Field battery, held the
line of communication with Durban.
[Sidenote: Method of issuing orders.]
Although Sir Redvers Buller had assumed personal command, it was
arranged that, in the absence of the Headquarter staff, his orders
should be issued by the divisional staff of Lieutenant-General Sir C.
F. Clery, who had hitherto been the senior officer south of the
Tugela.
[Sidenote: Boers in the Natal region Dec. 6th-Dec. 14th.]
In the chapter dealing with the constitution of the Boer army, it has
been pointed out that any statement of the strength of a Boer force at
a particular period is quite misleading, if regarded like a formal
"daily state" of a European force in the field. Subject to this
reservation, the aggregate strength of the original commandos, which
invaded Natal on the outbreak of war, has already been assessed at
23,500, and it has been stated that Transvaal reinforcements,
amounting to some 3,000 men, had subsequently been added; but this
increase was reduced by the departure at the end of November of three
Free State commandos to oppose Lord Methuen's advance on Kimberley.
The commandos remaining in Natal were, moreover, much weakened by the
practice of burghers returning to their farms to visit their families
without leave, and, although some Natal Dutchmen had been commandeered
to take up arms, the total Boer forces actually serving in Natal at
this period did not probably much exceed 20,000 men. A detachment of
800 was at Helpmakaar,[215] watching the Tugela Ferry and the western
frontier of Zululand, from which, throughout the middle of the month,
the Boer Intelligence department expected an attack. Another
detachment of 500 piqueted the river from the Tugela Ferry up to
Colenso. To the west four commandos were stationed near Potgieters and
Skiet's drifts, and detachments watched the intermediate crossings.
The attacks of the Ladysmith garrison on Gun Hill and Surprise Hill
and the destruction of the Waschbank bridge produced a considerable
feeling of uneasiness at Boer Headquarters soon after Sir Redvers
reached Frere. Their own official records show that there was a
reluctance to detach any more burghers than were deemed absolutely
necessary to the Tugela. Having regard to these facts, although no
exact figures can be given, it is probable that an estimate made on
13th December by General Buller's Intelligence staff, that about
6,000 to 7,000 men had been concentrated under Louis Botha in the
neighbourhood of Colenso, was not far from the mark. On the other
hand, the Boer official telegrams of that date put the number as low
as 5,000.
[Footnote 215: Map No. 3.]
[Sidenote: Close connection between Boer main army in Natal and
Botha.]
Botha's detachment and the Boer main army were, however, within an
hour's ride of each other, and thus could readily render mutual
assistance, unless an attack from the south should be combined with an
exactly-timed sortie by the Ladysmith garrison. Yet the Boers had
reason to fear this combination against them. The troops under Sir
George White were still mobile, and the enterprises against Gun Hill
and Surprise Hill, in the second week of December, had shown that both
officers and men were keen to be again let slip at the enemy.[216]
Moreover, the large number of mounted men, who, though shut up in
Ladysmith, were in fact astride of the Boers' lines of communication,
both with the Transvaal and with the Free State, would be likely to
prove a serious danger in the event of Botha's defeat by Sir Redvers.
[Footnote 216: See Volume II.]
[Sidenote: A formidable natural fortress.]
Nevertheless, the task which the British commander-in-chief had decided
to undertake was not an easy one. From Potgieters Drift on the west to
the junction of the Tugela with Sunday's river, about 30 miles east of
Colenso, a ridge of hills, broken only by narrow kloofs and dongas, line
like a continuous parapet the northern bank of the former river.
Westward the ridge is connected by the Brakfontein Nek with that spur of
the Drakensberg which is entitled the Tabanyama Range. This was
destined, a month later, to bar the advance of the relieving army on
that side. The eastern flank was guarded by the lower slopes of the
Biggarsberg, which run parallel to Sunday's river and fill the area
lying between that stream and the Buffalo. The approaches to the
beleaguered town from the south were thus covered by an immense natural
redoubt. Opposite to the very centre of the front face of this redoubt
lay Colenso. Behind this centre, and at right angles to the parapet, a
cluster of hills was flung back to the ridge of Cæsar's Camp,
immediately to the south of Ladysmith. Through this confused mass of
broken ground, so favourable to the methods of fighting of its
defenders, ran the three roads which connect Colenso and Ladysmith. Of
these roads the western passed over three very strong and presumably
entrenched positions. The central had become by disuse impassable.[217]
Much of the eastern was only fit for ox-wagons. Along the face of this
strategic fort ran the Tugela, an admirable moat, as completely
commanded by the heights on its left bank as is the ditch of a permanent
work by its parapet. West of Colenso this moat was traversable by guns
and wagons at only five places, _i.e._, Robinson's, Munger's, Skiet's,
Maritz, and Potgieters drifts. Of these the four first named were
difficult for loaded wagons. Eastward of Colenso the only practicable
drift was that by which the Weenen road crosses the river. Other fords,
through which single horsemen or men on foot, breast-high, could wade,
existed both to the east and to the west, but with the exception of a
bridle drift near Colenso they were not marked on the maps in possession
of the troops, and could only be discovered by enquiry and
reconnaissance.
[Footnote 217: This central road, or old track, is not shown
on maps 3 and 4, but is shown on map 15.]
[Sidenote: Botha depends on mobility for holding his long line of
defence.]
The commandos assigned to General Louis Botha for the defence of the
line of the Tugela were obviously insufficient to man the whole of
this immense position; yet he was able to rely on the mobility of his
burghers; and on this, also, that he was so situated that his
assailant would, in order to attack him anywhere, have to traverse
distances greater than Botha need cover to reinforce from the centre
either flank as soon as threatened. Moreover, not only did the heights
he held afford a perfect view for miles over the country to the south,
but the Tugela hills are precipitous and rocky as to their southern
faces, while the approaches to them from the north present, as a rule,
easy slopes and gentle gradients.
[Sidenote: Difficulty of finding out where the Boers were.]
In ascertaining the exact localities occupied by the enemy, Sir
Redvers Buller was handicapped by many circumstances. A considerable
space along the river could in the daytime only be approached by
reconnoitrers under the close view and fire of the picked riflemen of
the veld. The whole of the original Intelligence staff and the
subordinate personnel of scouts and guides, organised for the Natal
Field Force before the outbreak of the war, had been left locked up
with the troops in Ladysmith. The nucleus of a fresh Intelligence
staff had, however, been started by 2nd Lieut. A. N. Campbell, R.A.,
and was subsequently taken over by Mr. T. K. Murray, C.M.G., after the
disbandment of his corps of scouts. The reports of Mr. Murray, who was
subsequently created a K.C.M.G. for his services, as well as
information sent out by runners, heliograph, and pigeon post from
Ladysmith, agreed that the main body of Botha's force was concentrated
immediately in front of Colenso. A reconnaissance, suggested by a
Ladysmith message, dated 17th November, had been conducted by Captain
H. De la P. Gough towards Potgieters drift on the 29th November, but
had failed to get touch with the enemy. Intelligence scouts had,
however, reported the Boer commandos at Potgieters and Skiet's drifts,
and it was also known that Boer patrols were watching the intermediate
crossings. It might therefore be assumed that the whole line of the
river was kept under Boer observation.
It will be seen that the topographical conditions, though not at the
time fully known, made it impossible to turn either flank of the great
crescent of hills which barred an advance on Ladysmith. On the other
hand, it seemed probable that a sudden march, eastward or westward,
would find some passage of the river, and of the natural parapet
beyond, unentrenched and but slightly guarded. An examination of the
map, and a study of the country to the eastward, showed that a flank
movement in that direction would be compelled to follow a circuitous
route, and to traverse broken ground, covered with bush and
exceedingly favourable to ambuscade and to surprise attacks. Sir
Redvers judged that to commit troops, untrained to manoeuvre over
terrain of this description and hampered by many ox-wagons, to a
rather long flank march in presence of a mobile enemy, would be too
dangerous an enterprise. Moreover, the ground to the east was
unfavourable for any sortie from Ladysmith, and in a telegram dated
the 30th November, Sir George White had definitely reported that he
could give most help to the relieving force if it advanced viâ
Onderbrook Spruit (_i.e._, by the western of the two possible
Colenso-Ladysmith roads) or viâ Springfield and Potgieters drift.
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers' view of the choice open to him.]
Sir Redvers thought that he must either assault the strongly
entrenched position of Colenso or make a flank march to Potgieters. If
that drift and the Brakfontein Nek were seized, the way would be
opened to the rolling plain which lies westward of Ladysmith, between
that town and the Tabanyama range. This course, though it presented
difficulties of its own, was tactically by far the easier method of
attempting the task before him. On the other hand, this flank movement
would, for some days, expose the British line of communication with
the coast.
[Sidenote: He decides to march by Potgieters, 7th Dec./99.]
A review of all these considerations led General Buller to decide in
favour of the route viâ Potgieters drift, and on the 7th December he
so informed Sir George White. He told him that he hoped to start on
the 12th, and would probably take five days in bringing the operation
to a successful conclusion. Sir George, in reply, reported by
heliograph that he proposed to sally out from Ladysmith the night
before the relieving force attempted its crossing of the Tugela at
Potgieters, and to "work towards you as far as I can." He added: "As
time is an all-important factor in co-operation, you will, I am sure,
inform me of any change." On the 11th December, Sir Redvers answered
that he could not be certain of his dates till his transport arrived,
so that Sir George had better not try to help him until the relieving
force had reached Lancer's Hill,[218] a point about six or seven miles
west of Ladysmith, "unless you feel certain where I am." This limit
was imposed by General Buller, as he was unwilling that Sir G. White's
troops should be committed to a serious action against the enemy until
his own army was within supporting distance. On the 12th December Sir
Redvers moved the 6th brigade, accompanied by two 4·7-in. and six
12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns, to a camp two miles north of Chieveley, so
as to cover the flank march to the west. He sent that day a despatch
to the Secretary of State reporting that, after a careful
reconnaissance by telescope, he had come to the conclusion that "a
direct assault upon the enemy's position at Colenso would be too
costly," and that he had therefore decided to "force the passage of
Potgieters drift."
[Footnote 218: See map No. 3.]
[Sidenote: News of Magersfontein and Stormberg changes his purpose,
Dec. 13th.]
Only a few hours later telegrams, reporting the serious check suffered
by Lord Methuen at Magersfontein, were placed in his hands. This
disquieting intelligence, coupled with news of the reverse at
Stormberg, in the opinion of Sir Redvers Buller, so entirely changed
the situation that he no longer considered the movement by Potgieters
advisable. "This operation," he told the Secretary of State, "involved
the complete abandonment of my communications, and in the event of
want of success, the risk that I might share the fate of Sir George
White, and be cut off from Natal. I had considered that, with the
enemy dispirited by the failure of their plans in the west, the risk
was justifiable, but I cannot think that I ought now to take such a
risk. From my point of view it will be better to lose Ladysmith
altogether than to throw open Natal to the enemy."[219]
[Footnote 219: See despatch, Sir R. Buller to Secretary of
State for War, dated 13th December, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Informs Sir George that Dec. 17th is probable date of
attack on Colenso. Sir George prepares to sally out.]
Accordingly, on the 13th December he heliographed to Ladysmith: "Have
been forced to change my plans; am coming through viâ Colenso and
Onderbrook Spruit"; and later on the same day, in reply to an enquiry
from Sir George White as to the probable date of his advance, he
informed that officer: "Actual date of attack depends upon
difficulties met with, probably 17th December." On receipt of these
messages the commander of the Ladysmith garrison, after detailing some
weak detachments to continue manning the defences, prepared the whole
of the rest of his troops for fighting their way out southward under
his personal command, at the moment of the attack on Colenso by the
relieving army. No further notification of the date of that attack
reached him until the 16th, when he was informed by the
Commander-in-Chief that he had "tried Colenso yesterday and failed."
The sound of very heavy artillery firing on the 15th was, it is true,
heard in Ladysmith, but the Colenso position had been shelled by the
Naval guns on the two previous days, and in face of Sir Redvers'
message that the actual attack would probably be made on the 17th,
there was doubt whether the firing heard on the 15th might not be
merely a continuation of the preliminary bombardment. A premature
sortie before the signal had been given might seriously hamper, or
possibly entirely frustrate, concerted action between the two forces.
[Sidenote: Features of Colenso position.]
Map 15 and the hand sketch show that the hills facing Colenso from the
north form a great amphitheatre, the western horn of which reaches
down to the river near E. Robinson's farm about four miles due west of
the village, the eastern horn being Hlangwhane. Immediately after
completing the loop in front of the village, in which lie the
road[220] and railway bridges, the Tugela turns sharply to the north
for two miles, and then dashes north-eastward down a series of rapids
through an abrupt gorge in the hills, ultimately resuming its course
towards the east.
[Footnote 220: Shown on map No. 15 as the Bulwer bridge.]
[Sidenote: Hlangwhane.]
[Sidenote: The Colenso kopjes.]
[Sidenote: Fort Wylie.]
Hlangwhane, the eastern horn of that amphitheatre, which, with its
included area, formed the Boer position, lies on the southern bank of
the river; and, as soon as the occupation of Chieveley by Barton's
brigade denied the use of the Colenso bridges to the enemy, was for
the time only accessible to the Boers by two bridle drifts near the
rapids. It was not until after the Colenso fight that a bridge was
thrown across the river near its junction with the Langewacht Spruit.
The northern portion of the hollow of the amphitheatre is crossed from
west to east by the Onderbrook Spruit. To the south of this spruit
stand the Colenso kopjes, described by Sir Redvers as "four
lozenge-shaped, steep-sided, hog-backed hills, each, as it is further
from the river, being higher and longer than the next inner one."[221]
The southernmost of these kopjes, Fort Wylie, had been used as a
bridge-head by the British troops prior to their retirement from the
Tugela. The Onderbrook road to Ladysmith runs north-west from the
bridge across the arena of the amphitheatre and then ascends through
the steep gorge of Grobelaar's Kloof, a defile of forbidding
appearance. The other road and railway run north, following at first
the general trend of the great bend of the Tugela, then penetrating
the mass of hills and making their way eventually into the Klip
valley.
[Footnote 221: Sir R. Buller's despatch, dated 17th December,
1899.]
[Sidenote: The river as known, and unknown to the staff.]
In this section of the Tugela, the only crossings which seem to have
been known to Sir Redvers Buller's staff, before the battle, were the
two bridges, the drifts immediately above and below that over which
the road passes, and the "Bridle Drift" four miles up stream to the
south-east of E. Robinson's farm. There were other fords which will be
mentioned later; but the river, in consequence of the difficulty of
approaching it, had not been systematically reconnoitred, nor had the
known drifts been tested, although, as elsewhere in South Africa, they
are subject to sudden variations, here dependent on the rainfall in
the Drakensberg. The Tugela is, as a rule, fordable at this season of
the year at the regular passages, and has an average breadth of some
120 to 150 yards. The banks, fringed in places with low bushes, are
near Colenso twenty feet above the summer level of water. Immediately
to the south and to the south-west of the bridges the ground runs down
to the bank in gentle glacis-like slopes, which, except where the
Doornkop Spruit and a few dongas traverse them, afford no cover to
troops advancing towards the river. East of the railway the terrain is
more broken, and the fringe of bush country is soon reached. For this
reason, but still more on account of its isolation on the south bank
of the river, Hlangwhane Hill, which looked down on the Colenso
kopjes, was tactically weak and has generally been regarded as the
true key of the whole position. Nevertheless, even if Hlangwhane and
the crossings close to Colenso had been captured, only one stage of
the task would have been accomplished. Further severe fighting would
have been necessary before the defiles and the very difficult country
to the north-west or north could have been forced.
[Sidenote: The Boer defences.]
[Sidenote: Their occupation.]
[Sidenote: The story of the Boers on Hlangwhane. 1st stage.]
The whole of the mountain redoubt had been elaborately fortified under
the personal direction of General Louis Botha. A special commission,
consisting of Generals Erasmus and Prinsloo, had been nominated by a
Krijgsraad, held on 2nd December, to supervise the defence
arrangements on the Tugela, but the commission made but one inspection
and Louis Botha was given practically a free hand. Three weeks of
incessant labour had been spent on this task, the work being continued
up to the very eve of the battle. The trenches had been constructed
with remarkable ingenuity, so as to be almost invisible from the south
bank. They ran for the most part along the lower slopes of the great
hills on the west and across the flats round which circled the
amphitheatre. The only part of these defences which caught the eye
from the far side of the river were the tiers of entrenchments
covering the Colenso kopjes, and especially Fort Wylie. Emplacements
had been constructed in many more places than there were guns
available to fill them, and, in order to ensure that the exact
positions from which shells would be actually thrown should be unknown
to the British commander, the guns were shifted from gun-pit to
gun-pit the night before the battle. The artillery at the disposal of
General Botha was far less numerous than that of his opponent. On the
day of the fight a 120 m/m howitzer was mounted on the crest of
Vertnek (or Red Hill) on the right, a field gun being posted lower
down on its south-eastern slope. Two field guns were placed in pits in
proximity to the western Ladysmith road. This group of four guns was
intended to command the crossings in, and near, the western salient
loop of the river, including the Bridle Drift, a mile to the west of
that loop. Four or five 75 m/m field guns and one or two pom-poms,
posted on the Colenso kopjes, swept the bridges and drifts in front.
The whole of these guns were under the command of Captain Pretorius,
Transvaal Staats Artillerie. General Botha had placed his riflemen as
follows:--on his right, which extended to the west of H. Robinson's
farm, was stationed the Winburg commando of Free Staters under van der
Merwe, supported by detachments of Ben Viljoen's Johannesburgers, and
of the Middelburg commando; east of these, men of the Zoutpansberg,
Swaziland, and Ermelo commandos, under the orders of Christian Botha,
continued the line to the head of the western loop of the Tugela,
where a donga enters the river on its left bank. The eastern face of
this loop was also manned by portions of the Ermelo, Standerton, and
Middelburg corps. The ground intervening between the two re-entrants
was considered to be sufficiently protected by the unfordable river in
its front, save that a small detachment was posted in the building
shown as "Barn" on map No. 15, thus acting as a connecting link. The
centre, facing the Colenso crossings, was very strongly held. Here lay
the Boksburg and Heidelberg commandos, the Johannesburg Police, and
the burghers of Vryheid and Krugersdorp districts, the two last-named
units being placed in the trenches along the flats immediately in
front of Fort Wylie. Neither on the centre nor on the right were there
any men posted to the south of the river. The story of the successive
changes in the garrison of the eastern extremity of the crescent of
hills, across the river on the left of the Boer position, is a curious
one, and shows forcibly how much the element of chance at times
influences the operations of war. From the 30th November to the 13th
December, Hlangwhane, which was known to the Boers as "the Boschkop,"
had been occupied by part of the Wakkerstroom commando under a
commandant named Dirksen. A Boer deserter informed Sir Redvers' Field
Intelligence department on the 9th December that the strength of this
detachment was then about 700; but the real numbers were not more than
400 to 500. The arrival of Barton's brigade at Chieveley intimidated
the commando, and on the night of the 13th the burghers, against
Dirksen's orders, withdrew across the river. Botha at first acquiesced
in this abandonment, but Dirksen himself telegraphed to Kruger what
had happened. "If we give this Kop over to the enemy," he added, "then
will the battle expected at Colenso end in disaster."
[Sidenote: 2nd stage.]
The acting commandant-general, Schalk Burger, supported Dirksen's
appeal,[222] and, as a result, a Krijgsraad was held the same evening,
at which, with the concurrence of General Botha, it was unanimously
resolved that Hlangwhane should be re-occupied. A fresh garrison about
800 strong, chosen by lot from the Middelburg, Ermelo, Standerton,
Wakkerstroom and Zoutpansberg commandos, was therefore placed under
the orders of Commandant J. J. Joubert, and moved to the hill during
the night of the 14th. The burghers, on whom this duty fell, accepted
it with much reluctance as they feared that they would be cut off from
their main body. In a Boer official telegram dispatched during the
battle of the 15th, Hlangwhane was referred to as "the dangerous
position."
[Footnote 222: A telegram despatched by Schalk Burger to
Botha on 14th December directed that "Under no circumstances
must Dirksen's position be abandoned.... If this position be
abandoned, all others are endangered." President Kruger
telegraphed the same day to Botha, through Burger: "The Kop
on the other side of the river must not be given up, for then
all hope is over.... Fear not the enemy, but trust in God."]
[Sidenote: The Boers hide themselves and reserve their fire.]
The details of the Boers' line of battle would have been difficult to
discover even by the fullest reconnaissance and by the best trained
Intelligence department. General Louis Botha was so sanguine of
success that he had even proposed at a Krijgsraad, on 9th December,
that a detachment of burghers should be sent again across the river to
entice the British troops to advance against the prepared positions;
but the Council held that this device was unnecessary, as the British
commander was "bound to attack, and it was thought better to await the
attack." The Boer commander so fully realised the advantage of
reserved fire, that, giving effect to a telegram from General Piet
Joubert,[223] he had issued stringent orders to ensure that his men
indulged in no casual shots. He made no reply whatever to a heavy
bombardment maintained by the British Naval guns during the 13th and
14th December, intended to compel him to disclose his dispositions.
The same system of silence was to be adopted when the real attack was
delivered. Not a shot was to be fired against the British advance
until he himself had given the signal by firing the great howitzer. He
even hoped to be able to allow portions of the attacking columns to
cross the river, and there to overwhelm them utterly by well-sustained
fire at close range. The use of the Naval guns on the 13th and 14th
and the accumulation at Chieveley, had convinced General Botha that a
frontal attack was about to be made. Although his burghers were
anxious, and even inclined to be despondent, Botha himself hoped not
only to repulse the British troops, but also to envelop them with
counter-attacks, from Hlangwhane on the east and the Wagon Drift on
the west.
[Footnote 223: 7.12.99. Telegram despatched by
Commandant-General P. Joubert to Assistant-General Botha:--
"I cannot neglect to reiterate pointing out to you and
begging you to insist sternly with the officers and men
against wild firing at long and almost impossible
distances. Our greatest good fortune in the Freedom war
was the immediate nearness (of positions), so that the
smoke from the two forces made one cloud through which
our men were better enabled to defeat the enemy. It was
always my endeavour as long as the enemy blustered with
his guns to conceal my men as much as possible and to
strengthen them in their positions till the enemy's guns
were tired and they then advanced and attacked us; then
and not before, when they were between their own guns
and our men, the burghers sprang forwards and shot them
away by batches. Now our burghers with their rapid-fire
rifles begin to shoot at so great a distance, and it is
much to be feared that in a fierce fight lasting a whole
day, they fire away all their ammunition to no purpose
without hurting the enemy, and the enemy is then able to
make use of lance and sword after exhausting their
ammunition. Warn your men thus and work against this
error. You must also take good thought for your reserve
ammunition, and its position and the way it can be
brought up to firing line. You know yourself how often
we have already captured the English ammunition mules;
do not let the same take place with ours. Now secondly,
I am certain Buller will not operate against you with
his whole force at once; he will place supports in his
rear and again and again bring up fresh men. His cavalry
will wait as far as possible, to make their attack from
the rear, or to try to move round to our rear. So be on
your guard. Place your supports so that at such times
new forces can advance; let some one be just on some
high and visible place so as to send support in time to
the spot where it is required. It is bitter to lie here
on my back and think and advise from such a distance,
but God's Will be done, just in Heaven as on Earth. Best
wishes."]
[Sidenote: The army, in full view of the Boers, gathers for the fray.]
The advance of Barton's brigade on the 12th had been unopposed, and
during the two following days the remainder of the Natal army was
moved up to the north-west of Chieveley, and collected in a large camp
on the western side of the railway, near Doornkop Spruit. It was, of
course, impossible to conceal this movement from the Boer commander on
the heights north of the river.
[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, Dec. 14th, issues his orders for attack.]
On the afternoon of the 14th Sir Redvers Buller, who had spent the
earlier part of that day in examining the enemy's positions through a
telescope, assembled his subordinate commanders and their staffs, to
communicate, and personally explain to them his instructions for the
operations of the following day. His plan was to try to force the
passage of the river by direct attack. The written orders signed by
the Assistant Adjutant-General of the 2nd division were not issued
until late in the evening, and did not reach the Brigadiers until
about midnight. They will be found at the end of this chapter. The
first paragraph of these orders appears to imply that the enemy's
entrenchments were limited to the Colenso kopjes; at any rate, it is
clear that the extent and strength of the Boer entrenchments westward
were not then known. These kopjes were selected as the object of the
main attack, and this duty was assigned to the 2nd brigade
(Hildyard's). The crossing of this brigade "by the iron bridge," that
is, the Bulwer bridge, was to be prepared by the fire of No. 1 brigade
division Royal Field artillery, less one field battery which was
replaced by six Naval guns. This artillery preparation was to be
assisted by the fire of the remaining Naval guns, two 4·7-in. and four
12-pounders,[224] and by that of the 2nd brigade division, which was
instructed to "take up a position whence it can enfilade the kopjes
north of the iron bridge." This latter artillery unit was also to "act
on any orders it receives from Major-General Hart."
[Footnote 224: Two Naval 12-prs. had been left at Frere; the
remaining two 12-prs. were placed on Shooter's Hill, at a
distance of about 6,000 yards from the bridge.]
[Sidenote: Orders for Hart.]
To Major-General Hart's brigade (the 5th) had been assigned a special
rôle; it was ordered to cross the river at the "Bridle Drift,
immediately west of the junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela,"
and subsequently to move down the left bank of the river towards the
Colenso kopjes. The Commander-in-Chief hoped that this supplementary
crossing would be accomplished before the central attack was
delivered, and that the 5th brigade would thus be able to render
substantial assistance in the assault on the bridge; even if General
Hart did not succeed in passing his battalions across the river, Sir
Redvers anticipated that he would, in any case, be able at least to
cover the left flank of the main attack by engaging the enemy on the
western side.[225]
[Footnote 225: See despatch to the War Office, dated 17th
December, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Orders for right flank.]
[Sidenote: and for watching left flank.]
The right flank of the main attack was to be guarded by the 6th
brigade (Barton's), less half a battalion on baggage guard duty, and
the mounted brigade. Lord Dundonald, who was in command of the latter
unit (the total effective strength of which was about 1,800), was
instructed to detail 500 men to watch the right flank of the enemy,
and 300 to cover Buller's right flank and protect the baggage. With
the remainder of his brigade, and a battery detached from No. 1
brigade division, "he will," said the order, "cover the right flank of
the general movement and will endeavour to take up a position on
Hlangwhane Hill, whence he will enfilade the kopjes north of the iron
bridge."
[Sidenote: for 6th brigade.]
The 6th brigade was further charged with covering the advance of No. 1
brigade division.
[Sidenote: for 4th brigade.]
The 4th brigade was directed to remain in reserve midway between the
left and main attacks, ready to support either if required.
[Sidenote: for ammunition columns, pontoons, hospitals, engineers,
bearer companies.]
The ammunition columns and Pontoon troop were to be parked in the
first line of the baggage in rear of Shooter's Hill, behind which the
four Field Hospitals were also pitched. Two sections of the 17th
company R.E. were attached to General Hart's brigade, the remainder of
the company being allotted to General Hildyard's. The Bearer companies
marched with their brigades.
Verbal instructions were given to general officers at the conference
that if the Colenso kopjes were carried the force would bivouac among
them on the night of the 15th.
ORDERS BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS CLERY, K.C.B., COMMANDING SOUTH
NATAL FIELD FORCE.
Chieveley,
14th December, 1899. 10 p.m.
1. The enemy is entrenched in the kopjes north of Colenso bridge. One
large camp is reported to be near the Ladysmith road, about five miles
north-west of Colenso. Another large camp is reported in the hills
which lie north of the Tugela in a northerly direction from Hlangwhane
Hill.
2. It is the intention of the General Officer Commanding to force the
passage of the Tugela to-morrow.
3. The 5th brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4.30
a.m., and march towards the Bridle Drift, immediately west of the
junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The brigade will cross at
this point, and after crossing move along the left bank of the river
towards the kopjes north of the iron bridge.
4. The 2nd brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4
a.m., and passing south of the present camping ground of No. 1 and No.
2 Divisional troops, will march in the direction of the iron bridge at
Colenso. The brigade will cross at this point and gain possession of
the kopjes north of the iron bridge.
5. The 4th brigade will advance at 4.30 a.m., to a point between
Bridle Drift and the railway, so that it can support either the 5th or
the 2nd brigade.
6. The 6th brigade (less a half-battalion escort to baggage) will move
at 4 a.m., east of the railway in the direction of Hlangwhane Hill to
a position where it can protect the right flank of the 2nd brigade,
and, if necessary, support it or the mounted troops referred to later
as moving towards Hlangwhane Hill.
7. The Officer Commanding mounted brigade will move at 4 a.m., with a
force of 1,000 men and one battery of No. 1 brigade division in the
direction of Hlangwhane Hill; he will cover the right flank of the
general movement, and will endeavour to take up a position on
Hlangwhane Hill, whence he will enfilade the kopjes north of the iron
bridge.
The Officer Commanding mounted troops will also detail two forces of
300 and 500 men to cover the right and left flanks respectively and
protect the baggage.
8. The 2nd brigade division, Royal Field artillery, will move at 4.30
a.m., following the 4th brigade, and will take up a position whence it
can enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge. This brigade
division will act on any orders it receives from Major-General Hart.
The six Naval guns (two 4·7-in. and four 12-pr.) now in position north
of the 4th brigade, will advance on the right of the 2nd brigade
division, Royal Field artillery.
No. 1 brigade division, Royal Field artillery (less one battery
detached with mounted brigade), will move at 3.30 a.m., east of the
railway and proceed under cover of the 6th brigade to a point from
which it can prepare the crossing for the 2nd brigade.
The six Naval guns now encamped with No. 2 Divisional troops will
accompany and act with this brigade division.
9. As soon as the troops mentioned in preceding paragraphs have moved
to their positions, the remaining units and the baggage will be parked
in deep formation, facing north, in five separate lines, in rear of
to-day's artillery position, the right of each line resting on the
railway, but leaving a space of 100 yards between the railway and the
right flank of the line.
In first line (counting from the right):--
Ammunition column, No. 1 Divisional troops.
6th brigade Field Hospital.
4th brigade Field Hospital.
Pontoon troop, Royal Engineers.
5th brigade Field Hospital.
2nd brigade Field Hospital.
Ammunition column, No. 2 Divisional troops.
In second line (counting from the right):--
Baggage of 6th brigade.
Baggage of 4th brigade.
Baggage of 5th brigade.
Baggage of 2nd brigade.
In third line (counting from the right):--
Baggage of mounted brigade.
Baggage of No. 1 Divisional troops.
Baggage of No. 2 Divisional troops.
In the fourth and fifth lines (counting from the right):--
Supply columns, in the same order as the Baggage columns in second and
third lines.
Lieut.-Colonel J. Reeves, Royal Irish Fusiliers, will command the
whole of the above details.
10. The position of the General Officer Commanding will be near the
4·7-in. guns.
The Commander Royal Engineers will send two sections 17th company,
Royal Engineers, with the 5th brigade, and one section and
Headquarters with the 2nd brigade.
11. Each infantry soldier will carry 150 rounds on his person, the
ammunition now carried in the ox wagons of regimental transport being
distributed. Infantry greatcoats will be carried in two ox wagons of
regimental transport, if Brigadiers so wish; other stores will not be
placed in these wagons.
12. The General Officer Commanding 6th brigade will detail a
half-battalion as Baggage Guard. The two Naval guns now in position
immediately south of Divisional Headquarter camp will move at 5 a.m.,
to the position now occupied by the 4·7-in. guns.
BY ORDER,
B. HAMILTON, Colonel,
Assistant Adjutant-General,
South Natal Field Force.