THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONSTEIN.[200]
[Footnote 200: See maps Nos. 13, 13(a), 13(b) and free hand
sketch.]
[Sidenote: The 1st Division takes up assigned places, Dec. 10th, for
night march.]
The preliminary movements for the attack on Magersfontein Hill, the
orders for which are given at the end of the last chapter, were duly
executed. Major-General Wauchope's brigade spent the first part of the
night of the 10th December bivouacked near the dam behind Headquarter
Hill. Close to the Highlanders lay the artillery, the 9th Lancers, the
detachment of New South Wales Lancers, the Balloon section, R.E., and
the mounted infantry. The covering outposts were furnished by the
mounted infantry and the Seaforth Highlanders. The brigade of Guards
in the evening crossed the Modder and halted on its northern bank,
while the 12th Lancers remained south of the river until midnight,
when, though originally directed to accompany the brigade of Guards,
they joined the 9th Lancers at their bivouac in accordance with a
later order.
[Sidenote: Highland Brigade starts 12.30 a.m. Dec. 11th.]
The night was of a darkness such as might be felt. A drizzle in the
afternoon had been succeeded by pouring rain, and a thunderstorm was
imminent before the start was made. The ground between the bivouac and
Magersfontein Hill was known to be obstructed by boulders, ant-heaps,
and patches of bush. These various conditions strengthened
Major-General Wauchope in his conviction that for the Highland brigade
to advance in any but the most compact formation was impossible. At
12.30 a.m. he therefore marched from his bivouac in mass of
quarter-columns--or in other words in a column of thirty[201]
companies, one behind the other. To minimise the chances of loss of
connection during the night, the ranks were closed up as densely as
possible, and each soldier was ordered to grasp the clothing of his
neighbour. As an additional precaution, the left guides (_i.e._, the
non-commissioned officers on the left of each company) held ropes
which ran from front to rear of the mass. At the head of the column
was Major-General Wauchope with part of his staff, all afoot. The
mounted officers' horses were led by grooms in rear. Major Benson,
D.A.A.G., during his reconnaissances of the enemy's position, had
taken the compass bearing of Magersfontein Hill, and to him was
assigned the duty of guiding the troops to the foot of this kopje,
towards which the march was made. On the directing flank, the
brigade-major, Lt.-Colonel J. S. Ewart, continually passed up and
down, having the names of the officers repeated to him in an
undertone, so that he might identify the several companies, and see
that they were not losing close touch.
[Footnote 201: The two companies of Seaforth Highlanders, who
had been on outpost, did not accompany their battalion, but
worked their way to the front later in the day.]
[Sidenote: The Highland Brigade night march.]
To maintain regularity in the march occasional short halts were
necessary; but at 2 a.m. there was a more serious check. The
torrential rain had clogged Major Benson's compass, and he became
uncertain whether the column had not trended away towards the left.
Major-General Wauchope sent back for Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart. After a
brief consultation, a slight change of direction to the right was
made. In daylight and on a level parade ground this is a very simple
matter; but in darkness and during a South African tempest, it was by
no means easy. The inclination to the right was given to the column.
The advance was resumed. Nothing else occurred seriously to retard
progress until, just as the top of Magersfontein Hill was first made
visible by the lightning, a growth of mimosa bush brought the brigade
to a standstill. Major-General Wauchope, had already decided to
deploy. To hasten this, he himself led the Black Watch in single file
through the bush, and desired Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart to guide the
remainder of the brigade round the obstruction. The three battalions
in rear, easily avoiding the small patch of thorny shrubs, rejoined
more quickly than had been expected, and soon fell into their proper
places. When the brigade-major reported their arrival, Major-General
Wauchope issued instructions for deployment on the Black Watch, but
not in the same order of battalions as he had laid down on the
previous day.[202] The Seaforth Highlanders were now to come up on the
left, the Argyll and Sutherland on the right, of the battalion of
formation. Major-General Wauchope had originally intended that both
the Seaforth and the Argyll and Sutherland should prolong the left of
the Black Watch, each having two companies in the firing line, two in
support and four in reserve. According to this design the twelve
reserve companies were to have been formed in two ranks, and were to
have occupied approximately the same space from flank to flank as that
covered by the six companies in the firing line. The Highland Light
Infantry was intended to act as the reserve to the brigade. The
presumption is that he changed his plan at the last moment, in the
hope of ensuring that his right should completely overlap the eastern
flank of Magersfontein Hill.
[Footnote 202: See p. 312.]
[Sidenote: 4 a.m. the Boers smite the brigade in the act of deploying.
The consequent rush forward.]
At about 4 a.m., almost before the officers commanding battalions had
issued executive orders for the deployment, a well-sustained fire from
the Boer trenches a few hundred yards away, at the foot of
Magersfontein Hill, was suddenly poured into the serried ranks of the
Highlanders. The brigade was thus assailed at a most inopportune
moment, when in the act of changing from mass of quarter-columns into
fighting formation, a manoeuvre which under the most favourable
circumstances always requires time. To carry it out under the close
range of magazine rifles was impossible. By a common impulse, such
officers and men as were able to extricate themselves from the mass
rushed towards the enemy. In the confusion caused by the unexpected
bullets, and by the partial disintegration of the column, due to the
onward dash, battalions became intermixed, and regular formation,
though not discipline, was lost. Though the dull grey of early dawn
nearly put a stop to all supervision, though the Major-General, while
leading the two foremost companies of the Black Watch,[203] was almost
instantly shot dead, and no one knew who was present to assume the
chief command--the crowd pushed forward. A mixed body of soldiers from
various battalions succeeded in making their way to within 200 or 300
yards of the enemy. Then, unable to advance further, they flung
themselves on the ground behind such scanty cover as there was, and
opened fire. In the centre of the group were many of the Black Watch.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. L. J. Goff, who commanded the Argyll and
Sutherland, was killed, but his officers and men came up, some on the
left, some on the right. Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Hughes-Hallett, in
accordance with his instructions, brought the greater portion of the
Seaforth towards the right. Such was, broadly speaking, the character
of the movement, though all were greatly intermixed. The result was
that Magersfontein Hill, originally assigned as the object to be
assailed, had now an irregular line of Highlanders in the plain at its
foot, lapping round its eastern extremity and spreading somewhat to
the west of it. Those of the Highland Light Infantry who had not
joined the men in front, extended as a reserve in rear.
[Footnote 203: These companies of this, the leading battalion
of the brigade, had actually deployed when the Boers opened
fire.]
[Sidenote: The course of The Highlanders' attempt on Magersfontein
Hill.]
The Scandinavians, posted on the level ground at the junction of the
Boer left and centre, had, from the first, enfiladed the British
troops. When some of the Highlanders came round the foot of the hill
the opposing forces were at close quarters. The Scandinavian commando,
resisting bravely, was destroyed by mixed detachments as they pressed
onwards. Having thus succeeded in getting round the key of the whole
position, Magersfontein Hill itself, these composite parties several
times attempted to storm it. Some ninety or a hundred of the Black
Watch, under Captain W. Macfarlan, made some progress up its steep
slopes. A body composed of Seaforth and Black Watch, perhaps a hundred
in all, under Lieut. R. S. Wilson, was also struggling upwards, as was
Lieutenant E. Cox, with another party of the Seaforth. It was now
daylight, and the British artillery, knowing that the Highland brigade
had sustained a check, and unaware that their comrades were on the
kopje, scourged the Boer position with shrapnel. Some of the shells
burst over the assailants. Though, owing to this mischance, the rest
of the stormers could not advance further, the men under Lieutenant
Wilson, probably less exposed to the guns, pressed onwards till they
were unfortunately taken in flank. Cronje, who had been sleeping at a
farm six miles from the centre of his line, was aroused by the sound
of battle, and galloping to the hill, chanced to arrive at this
moment. The rifles of his escort suddenly smiting Wilson's men from an
unexpected direction at short range, checked them and possibly changed
the issue of the day. At the same time Boers from the northern end of
their left wing, who had hurried up to fill the gap caused by the
destruction of the Scandinavians, between the low ridge and the hill,
opened upon Wilson's detachment from the rear. Thus assailed from two
quarters at once, the attack withered away and all fell back. Some
were captured; the remainder made good their retreat to the right of
the brigade. The Boers, following up this success, pressed the right
wing of the most advanced Highlanders in flank, and gradually drove it
back.[204] The brigade came to a halt, and, although the greater part
of the Highland Light Infantry was brought up on the right by
Lt.-Colonel H. R. Kelham, no further progress could be made. The front
line was now dissolved into groups of men, who lay grimly under the
storm of bullets poured upon them by the well-concealed riflemen four
or five hundred yards away. Then followed from time to time a series
of gallant but spasmodic efforts by successive detachments, who
attempted to storm as opportunity offered. Senior regimental officers
led some of these; subalterns rushed forward with others, but all were
equally unsuccessful. As soon as they moved they were fully exposed to
a hail of lead, and after a short rush were arrested under close fire
by the wire fence which ran across the central defences. Not a few as
they attempted to struggle through it were caught by their clothes and
accoutrements, and held there, targets for the defenders. The burghers
who manned the trenches, though greatly harassed by the artillery,
were therefore still able to hold their own against the troops who
faced them, and the attack was brought to a complete standstill. For
many hours this situation continued. The wearied soldiers remained,
fasting and without water, exposed to the blazing sun of a South
African midsummer's day and pinned to the ground by an unseen enemy.
[Footnote 204: An officer in the Highland brigade who took
the time fixes the hour of this retirement at about 8 a.m.]
[Sidenote: The artillery saves the brigade, and with other corps, the
division.]
The accurate and well sustained shooting of the artillery now saved
the brigade from destruction. The resolute action of the cavalry and
mounted infantry, of the brigade of Guards, and of the Yorkshire Light
Infantry on the right, prevented the reverse from becoming a disaster
for the whole division. The Naval 4·7-in. gun, under Captain
Bearcroft, R.N., with two officers and 80 men, occupied the same
ground as during the bombardment of the 10th, the ground, namely, on
the west of the railway near the Ganger's Hut. To its right front was
the Howitzer battery, while the three field batteries came into action
to the north-east of Headquarter Hill, at a range of 2,000 yards.
Their first target was Magersfontein Hill, on which they opened about
4.50 a.m., as soon as they could see to lay their guns, but the
officers, soon realising that the Boers were holding, not the kopje
itself, but trenches cut at its foot, reduced their range to 1,700
yards, with the result that the volume of the enemy's fire sensibly
decreased. Half an hour later the officer commanding the artillery,
Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, pushed the 18th battery to within 1,400 yards
of the entrenchments, and shortly afterwards supported it with the
62nd battery. There these two batteries continued in action for the
rest of the day and, thanks to a slight swell in the ground in front
of the guns and to a favourable background, with exceedingly small
loss. The 75th, which had been supporting the bombardment of the
trenches by the other two batteries, was despatched between 9 and 10
a.m. to reinforce G. battery Royal Horse artillery, whose movements
will now be recorded.
[Sidenote: Babington's mounted column on the east.]
Shortly before 4 a.m. Major-General J. M. Babington led the 12th
Lancers, with G. battery and the greater part of the mounted infantry,
to the eastward, hoping to turn the enemy's left flank. In a few
minutes the sudden roar from the trenches warned him that fighting had
begun, and soon afterwards his patrols were shot at from the low ridge
which stretches from Magersfontein Hill to the Modder. He accordingly
ordered G. battery to shell this ridge from the ground shown on the
map, No. 13. In twenty minutes, the defenders had been at least
temporarily silenced. About the time that G. battery opened
Major-General Babington sent the 9th Lancers also eastwards, with
instructions to force their way along the river to Brown's Drift and
thus turn the enemy's left. Very early in the morning they reached
Moss Drift, but their repeated efforts to advance further up the
Modder were beaten back by musketry. While G. battery was employed
against the low ridge, it became evident to Major-General Babington
that the Highlanders not only had failed to carry the Magersfontein
heights, but that they required instant reinforcement. He accordingly
desired Major R. Bannatine-Allason, the battery commander, to move
north-east over the scrubby ground, and not to come into action until
he was stopped by the bullets or could get a clear view of what was
going on at the front. The battery, with an escort of 12th Lancers and
mounted infantry, advanced at a trot, and its commander, having
obtained information from scattered Highlanders, pushed on towards the
low knoll called on the map Horse Artillery Hill, the name by which it
became known during the battle. Whilst the wire fence[205] which ran
sixty or seventy yards to the south of Horse Artillery Hill was being
cut to clear the way the battery came under infantry fire.[206] The
commander, on reconnoitring the knoll in preparation for the battery,
decided to run the guns up by hand and place them on the reverse
slope.[207] Having taken up this situation he was able to continue in
action there for twenty-four hours with the loss of only four men. The
selected spot was 2,200 yards from the Boer trenches at the foot of
Magersfontein Hill, and 1,400 yards from the low ridge, which was a
few feet higher than Horse Artillery Hill. In consequence of the
position being on the reverse slope there was, between the hill on
which the guns were, and the low ridge, "dead ground." That is to say,
that no shells from the battery could reach the space which lay
nearest in the valley below. Therefore, on the one hand, this could be
safely occupied by protecting troops, and on the other, unless some
were there, the Boers could almost without risk have assailed the
battery and perhaps have carried it by surprise. Before Major
Allason's arrival there were on this dead ground many of the Highland
brigade. Very soon after G. battery opened fire these men were
reinforced by part of two dismounted squadrons of the 12th Lancers
under Lieut.-Colonel the Earl of Airlie, who passed between the guns,
and by parties of mounted infantry who came up on the right under
Major P. W. A. A. Milton. During the early hours of the morning, Major
Allason distributed his shells over the trenches at the foot of
Magersfontein Hill and along the low ridge down to the river; but on
the arrival of the 75th battery R.F.A. on his left, the target was
divided. From that time, the 75th ranged upon the Magersfontein
trenches and the northern end of the low ridge, while the Horse
artillery battery kept down the musketry from its centre and south.
[Footnote 205: The fence which runs north-west from Moss
Drift.]
[Footnote 206: See map No. 13(a).]
[Footnote 207: See Footnote at the end of the chapter.]
[Sidenote: The night-march of the Guards and their entry into the
fight.]
At 1 a.m. the brigade of Guards fell in and moved towards its
rendezvous, near the previous bivouac of the Highland brigade; the two
battalions of the Coldstream were followed by the Grenadiers and the
Scots Guards. Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, the storm,
and difficulties similar to those experienced by Major-General
Wauchope's brigade, connection was not maintained in the rear half of
the column. The battalion of Scots Guards, in consequence of some
confusion during the march, which they attribute to the fact that two
companies of the regiment in front of them had lost connection, became
detached from the column, and therefore halted till dawn. The two
companies in question went on to the place ordered, but the Scots
Guards marched to Headquarters, where they were detailed to act as
escort to the Howitzers and Field artillery, and did not rejoin their
brigade until the 12th. The three other battalions pushed on to the
rendezvous which they reached about half an hour before the Boers
opened on the Highlanders. After Lord Methuen had realised that the
attack had failed, he ordered Major-General Colvile to occupy the
often mentioned low ridge, but to avoid committing himself to a
decisive engagement. Keeping the Grenadiers as a general reserve,
Major-General Colvile directed the two battalions of Coldstream, the
1st on the right, the 2nd on the left, towards Horse Artillery Hill.
The 2nd battalion moved in echelon from the right with four half
companies in the firing line, four half companies in support, and four
companies in reserve. The 1st battalion was in much the same
formation, but being on the immediately exposed flank, took the
precaution of posting two companies in echelon on the right rear. As
the brigade approached the low ridge it was seen that the 1st
battalion was in danger of being enfiladed. The direction was
accordingly changed to the right; and, as the new line of advance
would necessarily carry the brigade to the south of Horse Artillery
Hill and therefore connection with the Highland brigade would not be
established, unless special provision for it were made, Major H. G. D.
Shute was ordered to move half his company of the 2nd Coldstream to
the left, to keep touch with Major-General Wauchope's right. This
half-company reached Horse Artillery Hill, and passing the battery,
pushed forward against the ridge about the same time as Major Milton
with his mounted infantry and the dismounted 12th Lancers entered the
dead ground in front of the guns. At about 6 a.m. Major-General
Colvile was ordered to reinforce the right of the Highland brigade,
and accordingly sent forward the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream.
Several hours later he also sent two companies of the 1st battalion to
strengthen this part of the line. Lt.-Colonel the Hon. A. H.
Henniker-Major, who commanded the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream
Guards, received urgent appeals for help from the dismounted Lancers
and mounted infantry, then hotly engaged at very short range with the
enemy, who were hidden behind the bush and boulders on the northern
end of the low ridge. In order to enable them to retain this ground,
so important because of the protection its possession by infantry
afforded to the two batteries on the hill behind it, he was compelled
to send almost half of his battalion to their assistance. Later in the
day the 12th Lancers and M.I. were withdrawn. From that time onwards,
the portion of the 2nd Coldstream occupied the place hitherto held by
these mounted troops, and remained there until the next morning; the
rest of the 2nd Coldstream was more to the right, and like the 1st
battalion, which prolonged the line towards the river, was engaged
against the enemy's left wing until nightfall. During the course of
the day two companies of the Grenadiers were sent up to reinforce the
firing line, and to connect the 1st and 2nd battalions of the
Coldstream.[208] Many of the Guards, the dismounted cavalry, and the
mounted infantry, were fighting all day at exceedingly short range. In
some cases barely 100 yards separated the skirmishers from the Boer
riflemen, but Major-General Colvile had not sufficient strength to
push home a decisive attack upon the ridge, even had his instructions
not forbidden him to do so.
[Footnote 208: See map No. 13 (a).]
[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Barter and Major Little at Voetpads, Moss Drift
and elsewhere.]
The right bank of the Modder was guarded by the King's Own Yorkshire
Light Infantry. Early in the morning their commanding officer,
Lt.-Colonel C. St. L. Barter, whilst holding the works he had thrown
up at Voetpads Drift, ascertained that a commando was passing along
the left bank down stream towards Moss Drift, thereby threatening to
turn the right of the Guards' brigade. Though the letter of his orders
limited him to the defence of Voetpads Drift, he, on his own
responsibility, marched up the river with five companies towards Moss
Drift.[209] Owing to the severity of the Boer fire, the K.O.Y.L.I.
failed to reach this ford; yet their presence not only frustrated the
outflanking movement, but checked an intended demonstration on the
left bank, and set free two of the three squadrons of the 9th Lancers,
who, unable to make headway on horseback, had been fighting
dismounted. Major M. O. Little, who was thus released for more
suitable service, left one squadron to connect the K.O.Y.L.I. with the
right of the 1st Coldstream, and led the remainder of his regiment to
the neighbourhood of Horse Artillery Hill, where they remained until
ordered back to support the extreme right flank.
[Footnote 209: See map No. 13 (a).]
[Sidenote: Fresh troops available up to 7 a.m. Dec. 11th.]
[Sidenote: Pole-Carew's dispositions.]
[Sidenote: Lt.-Col. Downman leads half of Gordons to support Highland
brigade.]
[Sidenote: He is joined by Lt.-Col. Macbean and three more companies.]
Though the early failure of the attack had compelled Lord Methuen to
throw the Guards, his reserve, into the fight almost from its
beginning, a considerable number of his troops had not been engaged up
to 7 a.m. Major-General R. Pole-Carew, to whom had been entrusted the
double duty of guarding the camp and, without seriously committing
himself, of demonstrating along the railway line, had disposed of his
men in the following manner. The Headquarters of his brigade (the
9th), with the Northumberland Fusiliers and three companies of the 2nd
Northamptonshire regiment, were near the railway. The other five
companies of the Northampton remained in the camp, which was further
protected to the north-west by outposts of the half-battalion of the
Loyal North Lancashire regiment. Two companies of Royal Munster
Fusiliers guarded the armoured train. Besides these, three companies
of the Royal engineers and about 240 of the Naval brigade with four
12-pounder 12-cwt. Naval guns were available to man the works if
necessity should arise. Close to Headquarter Hill six companies of the
Scots Guards lay in rear of the field guns as their escort. A wing of
the Gordon Highlanders, under Lt.-Colonel G. T. F. Downman, detached
by Lord Methuen's orders from the original duty assigned to the
battalion, that of convoying the transport of the division, was also
at hand. On his arrival at Headquarter Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel
Downman was ordered to march this half-battalion towards the extreme
eastern point of Magersfontein Hill and to despatch a message to
Lieutenant-Colonel F. Macbean, who was in charge of the rear wing,
telling him to leave one company with the convoy and hasten with three
companies to Headquarters.[210] When within 2,200 yards of the enemy
Lieutenant-Colonel Downman extended, and in successive waves of
skirmishers passed through various parties of the Highland brigade. In
this formation he pressed forward until the leading line of the Gordon
was within 290 paces of the Boers, when further advance became
impossible, and a halt was ordered.[211] The supporting skirmishers
also halted, and joined the groups which were nearest to them. The
movement of these reinforcements across the plain attracted the
enemy's attention and caused a recrudescence of his fire, which had
been dying down. When the three companies of the rear half-battalion
reached Headquarter Hill they were sent to report to Major-General
Babington, then at Horse Artillery Hill. Finding that he was not
required there, Lieutenant-Colonel Macbean rejoined the remainder of
his corps.
[Footnote 210: This order was despatched to
Lieutenant-Colonel Macbean at 7.40 a.m.]
[Footnote 211: The distance is verified by Capt. W. E.
Gordon, V.C., Gordon Highlanders, who, while in the leading
line, fell wounded at a spot which many months later he was
able to identify. Thence he paced to the Boer trench. Lt. H.
E. M. Douglas, R.A.M.C., crept forward to inject morphia into
various wounded officers and men at this very spot. He was
awarded the V.C. for this act. This decoration was given to
Capt. E. B. Towse, Gordon Highlanders, and Corporal J. Shaul,
H.L.I., for gallantry during the action.]
[Sidenote: A grave misunderstanding takes Highlanders to rear of
guns.]
[Sidenote: Scots Guards protect dispersed Highlanders.]
About 1 p.m. the Boers began to outflank the right and right rear of
the Highland brigade. Colonel Hughes-Hallett, Seaforth Highlanders,
who was on this side of the line, thereupon gave orders to the men
near him, intending to throw back the flank so as to meet the
threatened attack. Colonel Downman, Gordon Highlanders, who was in the
centre, seeing what was Colonel Hughes-Hallett's intention, raised
himself to give to those in his neighbourhood the necessary directions
for its execution. He at once fell mortally wounded. The officers
strove hard to effect an orderly change of front; but their signals
were misconstrued by many of the rank and file, who began to retire.
First the right gave way; then at about 1.30 p.m. the movement became
general and, covered by a very rapid and well aimed hail of shells
from the Field artillery against the works at the foot of
Magersfontein Hill, nearly all the Highlanders who were immediately in
front of the Boers, gradually and with considerable loss, ebbed away
to the guns. The men were reformed at about 3.30 p.m. in rear of the
18th and 62nd batteries.[212] Some groups, however, perhaps altogether
amounting to two or three hundred officers and men, held on where
they were till nightfall. As soon as Lord Methuen saw the situation,
he sent forward the only formed unit that was near enough to the much
dispersed troops to cover their retirement. This was that body of six
companies of Scots Guards which had been detailed to act in support of
the Field artillery. Passing through the broken ranks they halted
about 1,500 yards from Magersfontein Hill.
[Footnote 212: During the battle the 18th battery fired 940
rounds, the 62nd about 1,000 rounds, the 75th, 721, G.
battery R.H.A., 1,179, and the Naval 4·7-in. 73.]
[Sidenote: A lost battle.]
The unfortunate incidents of the early morning had gravely compromised
Lord Methuen's battle array. The attack on the key of the enemy's
position, on the success of which his later combinations depended, had
failed. The brigade employed in it had fallen back with heavy loss,
and was for the moment not available for further employment. Of the
three battalions of Guards left to Major-General Colvile, two were
fully engaged in holding the right of the British line; the third, or
reserve battalion, could not be withdrawn from their support.
Major-General Pole-Carew's brigade was so weakened by the absence of
the K.O.Y.L.I., who were keeping the enemy back at Moss Drift, and by
the number of troops retained in the neighbourhood of the camp for its
defence, that it could not be called upon for reinforcements. To
oppose the centre of the Boer line Lord Methuen had to rely entirely
upon his guns, and on the battalion of Scots Guards which formed their
escort. The greater part of his cavalry was fighting dismounted in the
bush on his right flank, and of other infantry immediately available
he had none. Fortunately the Boers were unenterprising. After rapid
shooting at the Highlanders, while they were retreating, the hostile
musketry practically ceased, though against the right flank heavy
bursts of spasmodic energy occasionally broke out, notably at 5.30,
when for a short time it appeared as though an attack threatened
Major-General Colvile's brigade. As the afternoon wore on, it became
possible to withdraw the cavalry from their dismounted duties, and,
although the enemy suddenly opened fire with their guns and pom-poms,
these did but little damage before they were silenced by the British
artillery. Yet some shells fell among the Highland brigade during its
reorganisation behind the field batteries, and it was found necessary
to remove it to the original bivouac, which was well out of range.
[Sidenote: Arrangements for night of Dec. 11th.]
At nightfall the 75th battery was transferred from Horse Artillery
Hill to the left of the 18th battery. The guns of the brigade
division, and of G. battery R.H.A., which was left on Horse Artillery
Hill, were kept ready for instant action all night. The Scots Guards
established outposts within 1,100 yards of Magersfontein Hill, and the
2nd Coldstream continued to hold the ground they had gained during the
day's fighting. The mounted troops were withdrawn to the river, and
such of the Guards' brigade as were not on outpost bivouacked on the
field.
[Sidenote: The part of 9th brigade and use of the balloon on Dec.
11th.]
The 9th brigade were unable to play any important part in the battle.
Major-General Pole-Carew, hampered by the necessity of leaving a
considerable body of men to guard the camp, could only demonstrate
along the railway in small force. This feint caused Cronje no anxiety,
and did not prevent him from withdrawing many of the Potchefstroom
commando from his right to strengthen his left during the action. The
officer in charge of the balloon, despite a strong wind which impeded
his operations, observed and reported this movement. He also informed
Lord Methuen of the gradual trickling back of the Highlanders, and of
the arrival of reinforcements for the enemy from Spytfontein and the
north-east. Thanks also to the help of the balloon, the howitzer
battery obtained the range of Boer ponies, concealed behind the low
ridge, and accounted for more than 200 of them.
[Sidenote: British and Boer losses.]
The British casualties amounted in all to 22 officers and 188 other
ranks killed, 46 officers and 629 other ranks wounded, and 1 officer
and 62 other ranks missing. Of this total the Highland brigade lost 15
officers killed and 30 wounded, 173 other ranks killed, 529 wounded
and missing. Among the battalions engaged the Black Watch suffered
most severely: 7 officers were killed, and 11 wounded; 86 men were
killed, and 199 wounded. The Boers are believed to have lost 87 killed
and 188 wounded.
[Sidenote: Dec. 12th. Lord Methuen decides to fall back to Modder.]
Soon after daylight on the 12th, Lord Methuen made a personal
reconnaissance. He hoped to find that, as at Modder river, the Boers
had withdrawn before dawn. His own observations confirmed reports he
had received during the night, showing that the ground was still
strongly held. Major R. N. R. Reade, his intelligence officer,
accompanied by a colonial scout named Harding, making his way across
the battlefield, had investigated the Boer trenches, and found them
occupied. A patrol from the Scots Guards had been received with many
shots from the foot of Magersfontein Hill. The General then summoned
his brigadiers and the Headquarter Staff to discuss the situation.
Major-General Colvile suggested that the troops should continue to
retain what had been gained; but Lord Methuen, agreeing with the
remainder of his subordinates who took a different view, gave orders
for a retirement to the Modder River camp at noon. He left the
execution of the operation to Major-General Colvile.
[Sidenote: The gathering in of the wounded.]
While the dead and wounded were being gathered in, a messenger,
bearing a flag of truce from the Boers, arrived at the outposts of the
Scots Guards to say that the British might send ambulances for those
who were lying near the foot of Magersfontein Hill. This was done, and
the Royal Army Medical Corps worked side by side with the Boer
doctors. For a moment this unofficial armistice was broken by the fire
of a gun. The officer in charge of it had not been informed of the
suspension of hostilities. A medical officer was sent with an apology,
explaining the incident, and the labour of mercy proceeded unhindered.
[Sidenote: The retreat carried out by 4 p.m. Dec. 12th/99.]
When the truce was over, a rearguard, composed of the cavalry brigade
and mounted infantry, G. battery R.H.A., and the 62nd Field battery,
the Guards' brigade and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was
detailed to cover the retreat. The enemy's guns, which during the
battle had been notably silent, sent a few shells after the column,
but they were soon stopped by the batteries of the rearguard, and by
the 4·7-in. gun, which fired 50 rounds during the 12th. By 4 p.m. Lord
Methuen's division, not otherwise molested, was once more collected
round Modder River station.
* * * * *
The successful choice of the reverse slope at Horse Artillery
Hill by Major Allason raises a point of considerable interest.
During the war of 1870 the Germans habitually preferred the slope
facing their enemy. Though as yet we have not had sufficient
details as to the action of the Japanese to enable us to draw
definite conclusions, it is practically certain that they will,
at least at first, have followed their German instructors in this
matter. Yet the two experiences, those of Magersfontein and of
the greater wars, are not really in conflict. The reason of the
selection of the forward slope during these was that when the
battles began the two opposed artilleries were engaged against
one another. The shell taking the curve of the hill was found to
produce deadly effects both upon the guns, when placed on the
reverse slopes, and on the limbers and wagons in rear. The target
for the hostile layers against those placed on the slope nearest
to them was much more difficult. Moreover, the Germans wished to
be able to depend on the arm itself for the protection of its
immediate front. For that purpose it was essential that the guns
should be able to cover with their shells all the ground that lay
before them: there must be no "dead ground." But at Magersfontein
the Boer artillery was insignificant, the rifle fire exact and
deadly. The circumstances therefore bore no analogy to one
another, and Major Allason's judgment was unquestionably right.
The infantry were not about to carry out any aggressive movement,
and could without injury to the conduct of the whole operation
occupy the "dead ground," and so render the position safe.
Furthermore, the long array of the guns of a vast army affords
very much more security for the artillery front than is given to
a solitary battery which could be approached much more easily by
skirmishers, so that some independent guardians were needed. It
would, however, be a misfortune if this example were taken as one
of general application under conditions different from those of
this particular day.