HALT ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN.[195]
[Footnote 195: Map No. 13 and freehand sketch.]
[Sidenote: Reasons for the halt on the Modder.]
The Modder River battle (November 28th, Chap. XV.) had placed the 1st
division within twenty miles of Kimberley. Signals were made to that
town by a Naval searchlight fitted "with a flasher."[196] Lord
Methuen[197] halted for a short time on the banks of the Modder.
Horses and men, worn out by the fighting and marching of the last six
days, required rest. Reinforcements of troops and supplies were on
their way to him along the lines of communication with the coast.
Moreover, before he could attempt to carry out his orders to remove
the non-combatant population of 8,000 Europeans and 25,000 natives
from Kimberley, it was necessary to restore or replace the railway
bridge which had been wrecked by the Boers. A message from Colonel
Kekewich, who commanded at Kimberley, reached the General on the 4th
December. It was to the effect that the town could hold out for forty
days more. His fears for the immediate safety of the place thus
allayed, Lord Methuen was able to concentrate his energies on the
construction of the temporary (or "deviation") bridge across the Riet.
He also threw up a series of redoubts on both sides of the river to
enable a small garrison to defend the bridge when the column should
resume its march on Kimberley. By dint of great exertions on the part
of the Royal engineers and the infantry employed with them, the
temporary bridge was completely finished by the 10th December.
[Footnote 196: It was not until the 3rd December that the
signals were clearly understood, and an exchange of messages
properly established.]
[Footnote 197: Wounded at the action of the Modder on 28th,
he left hospital on 29th, but had to return there from 2nd to
6th December.]
[Sidenote: Boers select their position for stopping further advance.]
[Sidenote: Its nature.]
After the engagement of the 28th November, Lord Methuen had reason to
believe that the Boers would make their next stand at Spytfontein,
twelve miles south of Kimberley. This was at first their intention,
but on the 29th November a Boer council of war was held at Jacobsdal,
at which two different plans of action were discussed. P. Cronje
wished to take up a flank position at Jacobsdal, so as to compel the
British troops to attack him, and thus diverge from their direct line
for Kimberley. With the Boers so placed, if Lord Methuen had marched
straight upon the town, he would have exposed himself to the danger of
being cut off from his line of supply over the Modder bridge. De la
Rey, on the other hand, desired to make one more effort to bar the
direct road, and his scheme was eventually adopted. At first the
heights of Spytfontein were chosen. Preparations for their defence
were taken in hand on the afternoon of the 29th, when Cronje and the
bulk of his force arrived from Jacobsdal. But De la Rey realised that
if the heights of Magersfontein, which lay between Spytfontein and the
river, were allowed to fall into the hands of the British, Lord
Methuen could utilise them as artillery positions for a bombardment of
the Spytfontein range. Under cover of this he would be able to deliver
an infantry attack. De la Rey suggested that the Magersfontein heights
should themselves be held as the cornerstone of the defence. His views
prevailed, and the fortification of a position nearly nine miles in
length was at once begun. The fight at Modder River had demonstrated
the advantage of placing the main firing line so that it should just
be able to graze the surface of the country over which the British had
to advance. He therefore proposed to hold the ground, now to be
occupied, in a similar manner. In the centre, Magersfontein Hill, a
grim and rock-bound kopje, rises precipitously from the veld and
dominates the plain, six miles in width, which stretches from its foot
to the Modder River bridge. From this hill the Boer line extended five
miles north-west to Langeberg farm along the foot of a series of
kopjes, in some places sufficiently well defined to be marked on map
No. 13, in others mere hillocks, but together forming a continuous and
formidable line of defence across the railway. From the south-east of
Magersfontein Hill a low scrub-covered spur, or ridge, three miles in
length, runs southward to Moss Drift on the Modder. Though not of
sufficient height to be fully shown upon the map, it exercised an
important influence upon the course of the battle. From the river the
ground rises gradually towards the heights of Magersfontein. There are
two well-marked knolls upon its surface; one, equidistant between the
kopjes and the railway bridge, was chosen by Lord Methuen to be his
Headquarters for the coming battle; the other, about a mile to the
southward of the main hill, was held by the Horse artillery battery
during the engagement. The greater part of the plain was comparatively
free from scrub, but in the neighbourhood of the low ridge the bush
was thick enough to retard the movement of the troops, and in places
it was so dense as to limit the range of vision to a few yards. Nor
was the scrub the only obstacle for the assailants--two high wire
fences crossed the plain; one, stretching away towards the north-east,
marked the frontier of the Orange Free State; while the other ran
across the trenches which guarded the centre of the Boer position. The
reproduction of the freehand sketch of Magersfontein will show the
strength of the ground taken up by the enemy.
[Sidenote: Boers gather from all quarters. Their occupation of the
ground.]
During the twelve days which elapsed between the engagement at the
Modder and the battle of Magersfontein large reinforcements reached
General Cronje. These additions to his army were chiefly due to the
energy of President Steyn, who ordered up every available burgher to
oppose the British advance. Parties of men summoned from the commandos
watching the Basuto border; the Bloemhof and Wolmaranstad commandos,
and detachments of Free Staters, were marched southward from the
investment of Kimberley; and the Heilbron, Kroonstad, and Bethlehem
commandos, detached from the Boer camps in Natal, increased Cronje's
righting power. Nor were the exertions of the President of the Orange
Free State confined to hurrying fresh troops to the point of immediate
danger, for realising that the _moral_ of the Boers had been shaken
by the losses they had already sustained, he went down to the laager
on the 5th December, and by his fiery eloquence infused fresh life
into the somewhat depressed burghers. By the 10th December the right
and centre of the enemy were entrenched along the line of kopjes which
runs south-east from Langeberg farm on the west to Magersfontein Hill
on the east; their left held the low scrub-covered ridge which extends
from Magersfontein Hill to Moss Drift on the Modder. Owing to the fact
that many of the Boer field-works at Magersfontein were constructed
after the battle of the 11th December, it is impossible to describe
with accuracy the defences which they had thrown up before that date.
On the right and centre these appear to have consisted of narrow
trenches, dug about 150 yards in front of the hills. They were three
or four feet in depth, and owing to the peculiar nature of the soil it
was possible to make them with perpendicular sides--mere narrow slits
in the ground which afforded complete protection from shrapnel fire.
These trenches were not in one continuous line, but were dug along the
waving foot-line of the hills, and so arranged that they flanked one
another. The parapets, slightly raised above the ground, were well
concealed by bushes and stones. On the Boers' left but little work had
been done, and the men who held this section were largely dependent on
natural cover. Cronje's dispositions were as follows: When the action
of the 11th December began, the right was held by part of the
Potchefstroom commando, who were soon afterwards ordered to reinforce
the left wing. The works in the right centre were manned by another
detachment of the Potchefstroom and part of the Fauresmith commandos;
while further to the south-east the Ladybrand, Hoopstad, Kroonstad,
Bloemhof, and Boshof commandos defended Magersfontein Hill. The
Scandinavian corps, about sixty strong, connected the centre with the
left wing, which was posted on the low ridge running southward to the
river. The remainder of the Fauresmith and the Wolmaranstad commandos
held the northern end of this low ridge, the centre of which was
occupied by those of the Potchefstroomers who were transferred from
the right wing. The south end was defended by the men of Lichtenburg,
while across the Modder river near Brown's Drift was posted a
detachment of 200 Jacobsdalers with a gun, under Albrecht. On the
right the supervision was entrusted to A. Cronje, on the left to De la
Rey, while the supreme command was vested in Piet Cronje. As regards
the Boer numbers there is the usual conflict of evidence. A Boer
general says that there were from 5,000 to 6,000 burghers present; an
ambulance officer reckons them in all at 7,000; while two commandants
estimate them at 4,000. The Boers had five field guns, distributed
along their line; two pom-poms were posted on Magersfontein Hill;
while three more pom-poms were allotted to the defence of the low
ridge.
[Sidenote: Lord Methuen's reinforcements and detachments.]
By the 10th December all the reinforcements expected by Lord Methuen
had gradually reached the Modder River camp. These consisted of the
2nd battalion Black Watch and the 2nd battalion Seaforth Highlanders,
who, together with the 1st battalion Highland Light Infantry[198] and
the 1st battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, composed the
Highland brigade, commanded by Major-General Wauchope. The 12th
Lancers, G. battery R.H.A., the 65th (Howitzer) battery R.F.A., and
some details of mounted infantry, also joined the relieving column.
Drafts of sailors and marines raised the strength of the Naval
brigade, now under command of Captain Bearcroft, R.N., to 375 officers
and men, with one 4·7-in. gun, and four 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval guns. The
latest arrival, that of the 1st battalion Gordon Highlanders, placed
under Lord Methuen's command a total of about 15,000 officers and men.
The lines of communication with Orange River were held by the 2nd
battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 2nd battalion
Shropshire Light Infantry, and part of the 1st battalion Royal Munster
Fusiliers, strengthened at various points by sections of P. battery
R.H.A. The Royal Canadian regiment of infantry garrisoned Belmont, and
a mixed force of Australians, consisting of a detachment of Victorian
Mounted Rifles, and infantry companies from Victoria and South
Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia, occupied Enslin.
[Footnote 198: This battalion reached the Modder battlefield
on the evening of the 28th November.]
[Sidenote: Minor engagements.]
During the halt on the Modder river small affairs had been of daily
occurrence. The patrols had frequently come into collision with the
enemy. On the 7th December, Prinsloo, the Free State Commandant-General,
with about a thousand Boers and three guns had attacked Enslin station,
which at that time (prior to the arrival of the Australians) was held by
Captain H. C. Godley, with two companies of the Northamptonshire.
Prinsloo did not press home the assault, and when the 12th Lancers and
the 62nd battery arrived from the camp on the Modder, followed by an
armoured train carrying the Seaforth Highlanders, he withdrew to
Jacobsdal. Some damage was done by the enemy to the railway and
telegraph lines, but this was quickly made good.
[Sidenote: Lord Methuen's information Dec. 10th.]
When Lord Methuen, on the 10th December, issued orders for an advance,
the information which he had been able to obtain from a reconnaissance
by Major G. E. Benson, D.A.A.G., and from the reports of scouts,
patrols, and strong reconnoitring parties, showed that the enemy's
main line of defence ran along the foot of the hills stretching from
Langeberg farm to Magersfontein Hill. It was known that the Boers had
outposts on the low ridge, that they held Moss Drift, that they had
detachments to the south of the river, and that near Langeberg farm
and Brown's Drift were laagers of considerable extent. The General
estimated the numbers opposed to him at 12,000 to 15,000 men, with six
or eight guns.
[Sidenote: Plans proposed and rejected.]
Various projects for the further movement upon Kimberley had been
weighed and found wanting. A purely frontal attack upon the kopjes
between Langeberg and Magersfontein Hill involved the crossing of a
wide extent of open and level ground, with the danger of a
counter-attack by the enemy from the low ridge held by the left wing
of Cronje's army. To the west of Langeberg farm the country was so
waterless as to preclude any attempt in that direction. A flank march
up the Modder river to Brown's Drift, and thence to Abon's Dam, about
16 miles N.E. of Jacobsdal, seemed feasible, for the British column
would turn the works of Magersfontein and then fall upon the eastern
flank of Spytfontein, the northern of the two lines of heights which
lay athwart the railway between the Modder and Kimberley. But before
the relieving column could thus swing clear of Magersfontein and
strike off thirteen or fourteen miles to the eastward through a
country cut up by wire fences, the consequent exposure of Modder River
camp, with all its accumulation of stores and its newly-restored
railway bridge, had to be taken into account. Lord Methuen considered
its safety, and that of the line of communication along the railway to
the nearest post at Honey Nest Kloof, essential to his enterprise. Now
the adequate defence of the station and this section of the railway
required a far larger detachment than he could spare from his division
engaged in making a flank march and an attack on Spytfontein. The idea
of assaulting the left flank of the Boers was discussed, but
abandoned, because it was thought that the bush-covered ground would
diminish the effect of the artillery and cause an undue loss of life
among the infantry. Therefore, it was finally decided to carry the
heights of Magersfontein, and after their occupation and entrenchment
to make a turning movement against the left flank of the Spytfontein
range. The tactics of Belmont were to be repeated. After a vigorous
bombardment of the hill of Magersfontein in the late afternoon of the
10th, the Highland brigade was to march at night to its foot, and at
dawn on the 11th attack this, the key of Cronje's position.
[Sidenote: The plan finally chosen for Dec. 10th night attack.]
Lord Methuen's orders, which are textually quoted at the end of the
chapter, may be thus summarised. A preliminary bombardment of the main
Boer position was fixed for the afternoon of the 10th; and to
facilitate this a column, consisting of the 9th Lancers, mounted
infantry, G. Battery R.H.A., the 18th, 62nd and 75th Field batteries,
the 65th (Howitzer) battery, the Highland brigade, and the 2nd
Yorkshire Light Infantry, was to move forward from the Modder river
towards the southern end of Magersfontein Hill. The main body of
infantry was to halt behind Headquarter Hill, while the 2nd Yorkshire
Light Infantry was to proceed to Voetpads (or Bridle) Drift, and
entrench there against attack from all sides. The cavalry and mounted
infantry were to cover the advance on a line from the railway to the
river. After the reconnaissance they were to retire to the right of
the Highland brigade, protect it, and leave a party to watch the outer
flank of the artillery. Major-General Pole-Carew, with two battalions
of the 9th brigade (1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd
battalion Northampton), was to move with the 4·7-in. Naval gun, which
from a position west of the railway was to co-operate with the
artillery engaged in the bombardment. Major Rimington, with his
Guides, was to guard the left of this column. On the following morning
(the 11th December) fire was to be re-opened, care being taken that
the guns were not directed against Magersfontein Hill, the point at
which the Highland brigade was to break into the enemy's line. The
camp on the Modder river was to be garrisoned by the half-battalion of
the North Lancashire regiment, by details, and by the greater part of
the Naval brigade, whose four 12-pr. guns were mounted in the works on
the south side of the river. The supply column, with five days'
rations, under the escort of half the Gordon Highlanders, was to move
off at 4 a.m. on the 11th December, and to follow the route taken by
the Highland brigade for two miles. Major-General Colvile, with the
12th Lancers, the 7th company Royal engineers, the Guards' brigade,
with its Bearer company, the Field Hospitals of the Guards' and
Highland brigades, and the ammunition column, by 3 a.m. on the 11th
was to be 500 yards to the left rear of the ground to be occupied by
the brigade division of Field artillery, _i.e._, somewhat in rear of
Headquarter Hill.
[Sidenote: Wauchope with Methuen, Dec. 9th.]
On Saturday afternoon, December 9th, Major-General Wauchope had a
conversation with Lord Methuen in the hotel which was used for
Headquarters. When he came out he said to Colonel Douglas, Lord
Methuen's Chief Staff Officer: "I do not like the idea of this night
march." Colonel Douglas urged him to see Lord Methuen again and
frankly tell him so. He, however, did not go back again to Lord
Methuen. The written orders for the march were received at General
Wauchope's quarters at 7 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 10th. Later
in the day, Major-General Wauchope assembled the officers commanding
the four battalions of his brigade, and explained to them the manner
in which he proposed to carry out his mission. The brigade was to form
a mass of quarter-columns, the battalions marching in the following
order. The Black Watch was to lead, with the Seaforth and the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders following in succession. The Highland Light
Infantry was to close up the rear. The deployment from mass for attack
was to be to the left. The Seaforth would thus be on the left of the
Black Watch, the Argyll and Sutherland on the left of the Seaforth.
The Highland Light Infantry was to remain in reserve.
[Sidenote: Wauchope issues his orders.]
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Dec. 10th.]
[Sidenote: Metheun sees Wauchope again.]
Late in the afternoon of the 10th December, the preliminary
bombardment took place. The 4·7-in. gun came into action to the west
of the railway, near the Ganger's Hut, two miles and a half north of
Modder River bridge. The Howitzers went to a point near Headquarter
Hill, the three field batteries took up a position somewhat more
forward and to the east. As the artillery was brought into action the
infantry was withdrawn, and the guns shelled Magersfontein Hill for
two hours. At 6.30 p.m. Lord Methuen ordered the fire to cease. Soon
after the bombardment was over he visited General Wauchope at his
quarters. Shortly afterwards he told Colonel Douglas that General
Wauchope thoroughly understood his orders and appeared to be quite
satisfied with the work he had to do. Though his guns had provoked no
reply from the Boers, Lord Methuen felt confident that they had not
only inflicted loss, but had produced considerable moral effect on the
Boer commandos. This, however, was not the case. The fire had but one
important result, that of warning the enemy that an attack was
imminent.
ORDERS FOR ATTACK ON MAGERSFONTEIN RIDGE.
1. Enemy in occupation of kopjes to N. and N.E. of camp and also high
ground between Modder and Riet rivers.
2. It is intention of G.O.C. to hold enemy on north, and to deliver an
attack on southern end of Magersfontein ridge (see map). On the
afternoon of 10th December the position will be bombarded; it will be
assaulted on the 11th. With this end in view three columns will be
formed.
[Sidenote: No. 1 Column.]
3. No. 1 Column will assemble on ground N.E. of 9th brigade camp at 3
p.m. on 10th December in following formation:--
9th Lancers.
Mounted Infantry.
G. Battery R.H.A.
Brigade Division R.F.A. and Howitzer Battery.
Highland Brigade (in mass).
Bearer Company, Highland Brigade.
2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.
Sec. T.B., R.E.
Balloon Sec. R.E.
The C.R.A. will arrange for a portion of the ammunition column to
accompany this force.
4. The advance will be directed on the southern end of Magersfontein
ridge.
5. At 3 p.m. the R.H.A., cavalry and mounted infantry will advance
covering the front from railway to Modder river; the mounted infantry
forming escort to R.H.A. After the reconnaissance the cavalry will
withdraw to the right flank of Highland brigade and protect that
flank, leaving a party to watch the left of artillery.
6. At 3.10 p.m. the remainder of the column will advance on the
southern end of Magersfontein ridge, keeping well under shelter of
Outpost ridge (concealed from view of enemy) in following order:
Advance Guard--half-battalion; followed at 2.30 p.m. by
half-battalion, R.F.A., remainder of force (except 2nd Yorkshire L.I.)
in the order of parade.
7. The R.F.A. will, when within range, open fire on the ridge,
applying to G.O.C. Highland brigade for an escort.
8. The remainder of column will form up concealed to right rear of
artillery in action.
9. The 2nd Yorkshire L.I. will proceed from place of assembly along
the northern bank of Modder river (under guidance of Rimington's
Guides) to Bridle Drift[199] four miles up river, where they will
entrench themselves against attack from all sides--especially from
north-east to south.--Entrenching tools to be carried. Signal
communication to be established (if possible) with Highland brigade,
and with Modder River camp.
[Footnote 199: This was another name for Voetpads Drift; the
latter name is used on map No. 13.]
10. The Sec. T.B., R.E., will lay a field cable from 9th brigade camp
to Highland brigade as they proceed.
11. G.O.C. will receive reports at head of main body of Highland
brigade.
12. Half rations for 11th December will be carried in haversacks; and
half forage for animals on them. These rations and forage not to be
consumed before 11th.
13. One blanket per man will be carried (rolled by dismounted troops).
Great coats will not be taken, but will be stored in tents or brigade
stores, under charge of details left behind.
14. Tents will not be struck.
15. All horses will be watered immediately before starting.
[Sidenote: No. 2 Column.]
16. On the 10th December No. 2 Column, under the command of
Major-General Pole-Carew, C.B., composed of 1 battalion, 9th brigade,
Naval brigade (with 4.7-in. gun), and Rimington's Guides, will
assemble at such hour and place as may be fixed by him, so that the
column will be in position at 4 p.m. to co-operate with No. 1 Column,
making a diversion against Magersfontein ridge (along the railway).
This force will remain in position on the night of 10th, and will
recommence the bombardment on the morning of 11th; but the fire is _on
no account to be directed on the southern end of the ridge which the
infantry will be assaulting_.
[Sidenote: No. 3 Column.]
17. No. 3 Column, under command of Major-General Sir H. Colvile,
K.C.M.G., C.B., composed as under, will assemble on the same ground as
No. 1 Column at such hour as the commander will direct, so as to
enable the column to reach 500 yards to the left rear of the R.F.A.
brigade division position (of No. 1 Column) by 3 a.m. on the 11th
December, where the commander will report to an officer of the
Divisional Headquarter Staff sent to meet the column. A Staff Officer
of No. 3 Column will accompany No. 1 Column to ascertain the position
of artillery brigade division.
The orders regarding great coats, blankets, and tents (paragraphs 13
and 14) for No. 1 Column will apply to No. 3 Column.
No. 3 Column will consist of 12th Lancers, No. 7 Field Company R.E.,
Guards' brigade, Bearer Company Guards' brigade, Field Hospitals
Guards' and Highland brigades and divisional troops, ammunition
column.
[Sidenote: Supply column.]
18. The Supply Column (with five days' rations), escorted by half
Gordon Highlanders, will assemble at the place of assembly of Nos. 1
and 3 Columns at 4 a.m. on the 11th December, and will follow the
route taken by No. 1 Column for two miles, and await orders.
[Sidenote: General.]
19. The Divisional Signalling Officer will arrange for signalling
communication being kept up between Nos. 1 and 2 Columns on the 10th
December.
20. Outposts protecting Modder River camp will be taken over by 9th
Brigade at 8 a.m. on 10th December.
21. No light is to be lit or smoking allowed from 7 p.m. on 10th to 4
a.m. on 11th.
22. During the absence of the Lieut.-General Commanding, the command
at Modder River will, after departure of No. 3 Column, devolve on
Major-General Pole-Carew, C.B., details of Nos. 1 and 3 Columns being
attached to 9th brigade.
23. Arrangements will be made by G.O.C. Cavalry brigade for the care
of all horses belonging to Nos. 1 and 3 Columns left at Modder River.
Horses and men of Divisional Headquarter Staff left behind will be
attached to 9th brigade.
24. If any of these orders are not understood, a Staff Officer should
attend at Divisional Headquarters.
By Order,
C. W. DOUGLAS, Col., C.S.O.
Modder River, 10th December, 1899.