STORMBERG.[189]
[Footnote 189: See maps Nos. 9 and 14.]
[Sidenote: The Boers occupy Stormberg, Nov. 25/99.]
President Steyn early in November ordered an invasion of the
north-eastern portion of Cape Colony. In doing so he acted against the
advice of a Krijgsraad held at Bethulie to discuss the project. A
considerable party of the Free State burghers was, in fact, opposed to
an offensive plan of campaign, but the President held that success in
the struggle against Great Britain could not be attained without
enlisting in his favour all the external support he could obtain. The
mission of the invaders was therefore to incite the discontented in
the colony to open rebellion. Under these circumstances, although many
communications passed between the disaffected amongst the local
farmers and Olivier, the commandant of the Boer contingent which had
crossed Bethulie bridge early in November, the movements of the
burghers were at first slow and hesitating. Aliwal North was occupied
on the 13th, and Burghersdorp--a town without any great reputation for
loyalty--two days later. The districts of Aliwal North, Albert and
Barkly East were at once proclaimed to be Free State territory. It was
not until the 25th that the Boer commando seized the important railway
junction of Stormberg, from which the British garrison had three weeks
earlier been withdrawn by Sir R. Buller to Queenstown.[190]
[Footnote 190: Chapter XI.]
[Sidenote: Sir W. Gatacre reaches East London, Nov. 16th.]
Lieut.-General Sir W. Gatacre, with the staff of the 3rd division, the
two brigades of which had been sent on to Natal, disembarked at East
London on 16th November. The tasks assigned to that General were to
prevent British subjects from being persuaded or compelled to take up
arms against their Sovereign, to encourage and protect the loyal, and,
so far as possible, to stem the Boer invasion until the return of Lord
Methuen's division from Kimberley enabled the country south of the
Orange river to be swept clear of the enemy, preparatory to the
general advance through the Free State.
[Sidenote: Moves to Queenstown. His available strength.]
Sir W. Gatacre moved immediately up to Queenstown, taking with him the
2nd Royal Irish Rifles (898 all ranks), who had landed the same day at
East London. On arriving at Queenstown he found at that station the
half-battalion and a mounted company of the 2nd Berkshire regiment
(strength, 574 all ranks), a small detachment of Royal Garrison
artillery, and a half company of Royal engineers, which, with the
Naval contingent, had formed the original garrison of Stormberg. The
_personnel_ of the Naval contingent had been ordered to return to Cape
Town, but had left with the Royal artillery their two 12-pr. guns.
Besides these, the gunners had two obsolete field guns belonging to
the armament of the naval base, but owing to the lack of mules and
equipment none of the guns were mobile. In addition to these troops
the local volunteers, consisting of the Kaffrarian Rifles, the
Frontier Mounted Rifles (about 229 strong), and the Queenstown Rifle
Volunteers (285), had been called out; a corps of mounted infantry was
being raised locally from the farmers of the Eastern province by
Colonel Brabant, and a contingent of the Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape
Police had been placed at the Lieut.-General's disposal. The
Kaffrarian Rifles, 285 all ranks, held the base at East London. The
remainder of the local troops, except some posts of observation at
Cathcart, Indwe and Molteno, were concentrated at Queenstown. An
armoured train, commanded by Lieutenant F. J. Gosset, 2nd Berkshire,
patrolled the railway.
[Sidenote: Pushes on to Putterskraal, Sterkstroom.]
[Sidenote: and Bushman's Hoek, Nov. 27th-28th.]
For the moment it was obvious that no forward movement could take
place; indeed, a telegram despatched by Sir R. Buller to General
Gatacre, on 18th November, reminded him that "the great thing in this
sort of warfare is to be perfectly certain that one position is safe
before you advance to another, and that we are not yet strong enough
in troops to play tricks." Yet patrols, furnished by the Cape Police,
were sent out to Dordrecht, Stormberg and Tarkastad, and the
employment of reliable native scouts was arranged. In a telegram,
dated 21st November, Sir Redvers suggested that a portion of General
Gatacre's force might be moved to Stormberg for the purpose of
covering the coal mines at Indwe. Sir W. Gatacre replied on the same
day that he had not sufficient men as yet to advance to Stormberg,
but, as soon as more troops arrived, he intended to occupy that
junction and clear the country round it. Meanwhile, as a result of a
personal reconnaissance of the district, he proposed to occupy
Putterskraal, a position which, with outposts at Bushman's Hoek and
Penhoek, would "command Sterkstroom junction with the colliery line,
reassure loyal farmers, and steady disloyal men." The arrival from
England of two companies of mounted infantry (part of the mounted
infantry of the cavalry division), under Capt. E. J. Dewar, King's
Royal Rifles, on the 22nd, and of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers on
the 27th November, enabled a concentration of all the mounted troops,
the detachment of Royal Garrison artillery, the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers, and the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, to be effected at
Putterskraal on the latter date. Sterkstroom was also occupied as an
advanced post, and on the following day the Berkshire mounted
infantry, four companies of the Irish Rifles, and the Kaffrarian
Rifles, brought up from East London, were pushed on to Bushman's Hoek.
[Sidenote: Situation graver. Buller suggests closing with enemy.]
The enemy was becoming bolder. A considerable number of disaffected
farmers had joined the commando at Burghersdorp; more were known to be
on their way up from Cradock, while at Barkly East a disloyal field
cornet was issuing Government arms and ammunition to rebels. The Boer
occupation of Stormberg on the 25th was followed immediately by the
destruction of the railway and telegraph line to the westward. Thus
French's force at Naauwpoort and Gatacre's troops at Putterskraal were
cut off from each other, and the latter were left for the moment
entirely dependent on their own resources. Sir Redvers, who was kept
daily informed of these developments, felt "anxious," and telegraphed
orders from Maritzburg on 26th November to Sir F. Forestier-Walker:
"Caution Gatacre to be careful. I think he is hardly strong enough to
advance beyond Putterskraal, until Methuen's return;" and on the
following day he telegraphed instructions to reinforce General Gatacre
by one, or, if possible, by two battalions, "and any mounted men that
can be spared." Barkly East was reported to be in open rebellion,
although Sir H. Elliott's action in defending the passes leading south
to Griqualand East continued to be effective.[191] The "annexation" of
Dordrecht to the Free State, proclaimed officially on its occupation
by the enemy, further complicated the situation. General Gatacre
accordingly telegraphed direct to the General Commanding-in-Chief:--
[Footnote 191: Chapter XI.]
"Military situation here requires dealing with extreme
carefulness. Boers have occupied Dordrecht and enemy is advancing
in a southerly direction, evidently pointing for Queenstown. I
have two British regiments only, and I am 33 miles to the north
of Queenstown--I am holding Bushman's Hoek range to endeavour to
prevent descent into Queenstown district, which would mean
general state of rebellion of Dutch. Force will be strengthened
at Queenstown by next British regiment which should arrive at
Queenstown 5th December, but Queenstown is indefensible position.
Are there any orders especially as regards my movements?"
Sir Redvers replied the same day (2nd December) from Maritzburg:--
"Your No. A 514. We have to make the best of the situation, and
if the enemy is advancing by Dordrecht, the importance of
Bushman's Hoek is diminished. You have a force which altogether
is considerably stronger than the enemy can now bring against
you. Cannot you close with him, or else occupy a defensible
position which will obstruct his advance? You have an absolutely
free hand to do what you think best."
[Sidenote: Gatacre seizes Molteno and Penhoek, Nov. 29th.]
Meanwhile, on the 29th November, a raid by train had been made from
Putterskraal on Molteno, and a large amount of corn removed from a
mill which it was feared might fall into the enemy's hands. An officer
and 50 men of the Cape Police were left in observation at Molteno, and
detachments of Cape Mounted Rifles and of the newly-raised corps,
Brabant's Horse, of a total strength of 400 men, was pushed out to
Penhoek, a pass through the hills ten miles east of Sterkstroom.
[Sidenote: Dec. 7th Gatacre tells C.O.s of intended night march.]
By the 6th December, Sir W. Gatacre had been reinforced by two
batteries of his divisional artillery, the 74th and 77th, the
divisional ammunition column, the 12th company R.E., the 1st Royal
Scots, the 33rd company Army Service Corps, and 16th Field Hospital.
The greater portion of his detachment was unfortunately only just free
from the confinement of the voyage from England. Every effort had been
made on board ship to keep the infantry in good condition by
gymnastics and physical drill, but they were naturally not in the best
trim for a long march. The horses of the artillery had suffered from a
somewhat stormy passage of 31 days, during which 14 had died of
influenza. They, too, therefore, were hardly yet ready for hard work.
Nevertheless, the G.O.C. considered that, in the existing strategic
situation, any further prolongation of the defensive attitude he had
hitherto been obliged to maintain would be injurious.[192] He
determined, therefore, to take advantage of the free hand left to him
by Sir R. Buller, and to follow the further suggestion that he should
close with the enemy. On the evening of the 7th he informed the
commanding officers of units that he intended to make a night march on
Stormberg and attack the Boer laager. It will be seen from map No. 14
that the buildings and sheds which mark the railway junction lie at
the foot of a steep razor-back hill, called Rooi Kop, and on the
eastern edge of a valley or vlei, about two miles in length from north
to south, and one in breadth. This vlei, in which the enemy's main
body was known to be, is shut in on the east by the Rooi Kop, which
dominates all of the surrounding country. To the south and south-west,
it is enclosed by a lower hill, named the Kissieberg, and on the north
by a flat-topped kopje on which forts had been constructed by the
British garrison when in occupation of the junction. Between this
kopje and the northern point of the Kissieberg, there is a gap of a
mile through which pass out the spruit, which drains the vlei, and
the branch line to Naauwpoort. The railway from East London to
Bloemfontein and the main road from Molteno to Burghersdorp, viâ
Stormberg, cross a Nek between the Kissieberg and Rooi Kop,
subsequently skirting the latter hill very closely. This Nek, on which
the intelligence scouts reported the Boer guns to be posted, and the
Rooi Kop, Sir W. Gatacre planned to seize before dawn on the morning
of the 9th by a night march from Molteno. He proposed to employ on the
enterprise the whole of the mounted infantry, one field battery, the
R.E. company, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Royal Irish Rifles,
and a detachment of Cape Police. The mounted troops from Penhoek were
also to co-operate on the right flank. Arrangements were also made
with Sir H. Elliott for an advance of the Headquarters of the Cape
Mounted Rifles in the direction of Dordrecht. By concentrating at
Molteno late on the day previous to that chosen for the attack,
General Gatacre hoped to surprise the enemy. Owing, however, to some
difficulties in obtaining rolling stock, the movement was postponed
till the 9th.
[Footnote 192: The Intelligence reports of General Gatacre's
staff show that they at this time believed that Olivier was
expecting a large reinforcement from the Transvaal.]
[Sidenote: Move postponed to Dec. 9th.]
[Sidenote: Concentrates at Molteno, Dec. 9th.]
Early on the morning of that day, camp was struck at Putterskraal, and
the baggage packed, the wagons being ordered to travel by road to
Molteno. The assembling of the troops at that village was effected
during the afternoon in the following manner:--
_By Train from Putterskraal._
Divisional Staff.
R.A. Staff, 74th and 77th batteries R.F.A.
R.E. Staff, 12th company R.E.
2nd Northumberland Fusiliers.
Headquarters and 4 companies Royal Irish Rifles.
Field Hospital and Bearer company.
_By Train from Bushman's Hoek._
4 companies Royal Irish Rifles.
_By Road from Putterskraal._
2 companies mounted infantry.
42 Cape Mounted Police.
_By Road from Bushman's Hoek._
1 company Royal Berkshire mounted infantry.
Besides these, three companies Royal Scots were sent by rail from
Putterskraal. One of them was dropped at Bushman's Hoek, the other two
being taken on to Molteno. The units that went by train had with them
their first line transport. Although the entraining of the troops
began about 12 noon, it was not completed till after 5 p.m., owing to
the lack of sufficient sidings. The movement to Molteno was covered by
the armoured train, and was carried out without interruption. The
detachments of Brabant's Horse and Cape Mounted Rifles ordered in from
Penhoek to Molteno failed, however, to appear. A message to the
officer commanding at Penhoek, conveying the order, had been handed in
at the telegraph office at Putterskraal at midnight on the 8th, but
owing to some carelessness had not been forwarded by the telegraph
clerk. The precaution of demanding an acknowledgment of the receipt of
this important order, or of sending a duplicate, does not appear to
have been taken by the divisional staff.
[Sidenote: Arrangements for feeding men.]
The troops had dined before leaving Putterskraal, and took with them
one and a half day's rations, the half ration to be eaten in the train
on the way to Molteno, and the remainder to be carried by the men on
the march. The preserved meat had been issued in 6lb. tins. These were
very inconvenient. Therefore many of them were thrown away.
[Sidenote: Dec. 9th, 1899. Orders for night march issues. Lack of
maps.]
On arriving at Molteno, Sir W. Gatacre assembled the commanding
officers and issued personally to them his orders for the movement
against Stormberg. His Intelligence staff had ascertained that the
actual strength of the Boers in laager at that moment was about 1,700,
and that the southern face of the Kissieberg and the Nek between that
hill and Rooi Kop were entrenched. The General, on receipt of this
information, determined to modify his original plan. Although
Stormberg had been occupied for more than a month by British troops,
no systematic sketching of the surrounding country had been
undertaken. Except a plan made more than a year before of the ground
in the immediate neighbourhood of the junction, and reproduced in one
of the Intelligence handbooks, the only map at the disposal of the
Staff was the Cape Survey, the scale of which, 12-1/2 miles to an
inch, was too small for tactical purposes.
[Sidenote: The method of march.]
The local Cape Police, the Berkshire mounted infantry, and others were
very well acquainted with the country; and, after a personal
examination of Sergeant Morgan, Cape Police, and several native
policemen, who had previously been selected as guides, Sir W. Gatacre
determined to move his force out from Molteno by the Steynsburg road,
and to diverge from that road by a cross track, leading northwards
from a point near D. Foster's farm to Van Zyl's farm,[193] which was
situated immediately in rear of the western face of the Kissieberg.
Thus the position on the Nek would be turned. The distance to be
covered during this flank march was said by his informants to be about
nine miles. The actual distance was about ten miles. Allowing for
intermediate rests for the men, the General anticipated that he would
be able so to order the time as to place his men in a position to rush
the Kissieberg with the bayonet before dawn, and then, as soon as
daylight appeared, to plant the guns on that kopje, thus commanding
the whole of the Stormberg valley. Sir W. Gatacre informed commanding
officers verbally of these intentions, and arranged the following
succession:
[Footnote 193: It will be observed that four houses marked
Van Zyl's are shown in map 14, but, except when otherwise
specified, the most northern of these is the one referred to
throughout in the text.]
Royal Irish Rifles.
Northumberland Fusiliers.
74th and 77th batteries, escorted by
Two companies M.I. and the Cape Police.
Berkshire M.I. company.
Machine guns, ammunition reserve, and
Field Hospital, escorted by 12th company R.E.
[Sidenote: Dependence on guides.]
The column was to move off in three echelons, the first consisting of
the divisional staff and the infantry, the second the artillery and
mounted infantry, and the third the field hospital, machine guns, etc.
Guides were allotted to each unit. Complete reliance was placed on the
efficiency of these guides, and the precaution of causing the road to
be previously reconnoitred by a staff officer had not been taken. Both
Sir W. Gatacre's intelligence officers, one of whom knew the ground
intimately, had duties on the line of communication, and were thus
unable to accompany the column. The General, with all the rest of his
staff, took his place at the head of the leading battalion, which was
preceded by eight infantry scouts under a subaltern. The remainder of
the infantry marched in fours. The batteries were in column of route.
The wheels of the 77th were covered with raw hide. The wheels of the
74th had not been so padded, as that battery was only added to the
column at the last moment. The hide proved to be of but little value
for the purpose of deadening the sound, and only made the draught
heavier.
[Sidenote: Mistake at starting.]
The head of the column moved off about 9 p.m., somewhat later than had
been originally planned. The artillery and mounted infantry followed
in due course along the Steynsburg road, but the machine guns, field
hospital, and R.E., owing to a lack of staff supervision, took the one
direct on Stormberg, and, finding that there were no troops in front
of them, halted where they were until daylight, having first
ascertained from the officer left in command at Molteno that he did
not know the route by which the main column was advancing.
[Sidenote: The guides miss the road.]
Meanwhile, the infantry of that column had pressed on with the
keenness of soldiers eager for their first fight, and at 1 a.m. a
homestead, which proved to be that of Mr. J. Roberts. The guides had
in fact passed the branch road leading to Van Zyl's farm, but on being
interrogated, the head guide, Sergeant Morgan, assured Sir W. Gatacre
that he and his assistants knew the way perfectly, and that they were
leading the column by a road which, though slightly longer than that
originally selected, avoided wire and a bad piece of track which the
guns would have found it difficult to cross at night. They added that
they were within one and a half miles of the spot, to which the
General desired to be guided. The map and freehand sketch show that
the guides now proposed to lead the column to the rear of the
Kissieberg by the wagon-track which leaves the Steynsburg road at
Roberts' homestead, and after crossing the Bamboosberg Spruit and the
colliery branch line, strikes, near Van Zyl's house, the track by
which General Gatacre had intended to approach the enemy's position.
The distance still to be traversed was, as will also be noticed, not
one and a half, but about two and a half miles. Moreover, after
crossing the spruit and the railway, the track traverses the northern
slopes of a stony irregular underfeature which guards the approaches
to the Kissieberg from the south and west. Progress over this ground
was unlikely to be rapid. Roberts' homestead is 10-1/2 miles from
Molteno. The troops had, therefore, already marched rather further
than was originally anticipated; and, as they had halted for a short
time every hour, their rate of marching had been fast for night-work
over such country. The men were somewhat weary owing to the march.
They were out of condition. They had been engaged on heavy fatigue
work on the morning of the 9th. Whether, therefore, the guides had
missed the true road in the dark, a supposition which is favoured by
the fact that they had previously assured the General that the whole
route was fit and easy for wheeled transport, or whether, not
realising the importance in military operations of obedience to
orders, they had, on their own judgment, diverted the column to the
longer route in the belief that it would be easier, the effect on the
General's plan of attack was serious. Sir W. Gatacre, nevertheless,
decided that he would give his men an hour's rest, and then push on.
[Sidenote: The march resumed. Column arrives at dawn at destined
spot.]
About 2 a.m. the march was resumed in the same order as before, except
that the guns and mounted infantry had closed up to the infantry. But
after crossing the railway the roughness of the ground added to the
fatigue of the troops; moreover, doubt as to the manner in which the
column was being guided had spread discouragement. The General, moving
at the head of the leading battalion, constantly questioned the
guide, but was as constantly assured by Sergeant Morgan that the right
road was being followed, although the distance was greater than he had
estimated. The column, therefore, trudged on until at length, as the
first signs of dawn were beginning to appear, it reached the cross
roads near Van Zyl's house, and thus was on the very ground from
whence General Gatacre intended to make his assault on the Kissieberg.
If the assault had been delivered at once, the ridge might have been
carried and command over the Stormberg valley have been thus secured.
[Sidenote: Boers quite unprepared for the surprise march. All
circumstances favourable.]
[Sidenote: The column is taken away two miles further. _En route_ it
is surprised.]
The Boers in and near Stormberg on the morning of the 10th December were
under the command of Olivier: they consisted of about 1,700 burghers of
the Bethulie, Rouxville and Smithfield commandos, with two guns and a
Maxim. A detachment under Commandant Swanepoel, with one gun, held the
Nek between the Kissieberg and Rooi Kop. A piquet of about fifty men was
stationed on the western ridge of the former hill, and another piquet
watched the north end of the vlei; the remainder of the burghers slept
on the lower inner slopes of the two hills. The Boer accounts of the
fight all agree in stating that Gatacre's night march was a complete
surprise to them. So secure did Olivier feel in his position that on the
9th he had detached a commando of colonial rebels, amounting to some 500
or 600 men, under Grobelaar and Steinkamp, to Steynsburg to beat up more
recruits in that direction. In consequence of a dispute about a gun,
which was referred to President Steyn by telegram for settlement,
Grobelaar had outspanned for the night some seven or eight miles away on
the Stormberg-Steynsburg road, and his commando lay about a mile
north-west of Roberts' farm. Sir W. Gatacre's information, therefore, as
to the strength of the Boers in the Stormberg valley was accurate, their
dispositions favoured the plan he had formed for a surprise, and the
British assailants, notwithstanding the circuitous march, had now
arrived in time, though only barely in time, at the spot for its
execution. But either the chief guide did not fully comprehend the
General's intentions, or he had lost his bearings, for he pointed to a
kopje nearly two miles off, and said that that was the real place. The
wearied men continued to trudge along the road, which, skirting the
lower western slopes of the Kissieberg, leads to Stormberg junction. Day
was breaking,[194] but no change was made in the formation of the
troops. The infantry remained in fours, with no flankers out, and still
only eight men were in front as an advance guard. The Boer piquet on the
Kissieberg saw the grey thread as it wound its way slowly along the foot
of the hill within effective range of the crest. A single shot echoed
through the valley, and a corporal of the leading company of Irish
Rifles fell dead. A rapid fire, although from but a few rifles, was then
opened on the British troops at a range of about 400 yards. It was
impossible to convey orders to a long column of route, thus taken at a
disadvantage. Each company officer had to act on his own initiative, and
as few, if any of them, knew where they were, or where was the enemy
they were required to attack, confusion inevitably arose.
[Footnote 194: The sun rose at Stormberg on December 10th at
4.38 a.m. (Cape Government Railway time).]
[Sidenote: A confused attack on Kissieberg.]
The three leading companies of the Irish Rifles, under their
commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Eagar, front-formed, extended
rapidly at right angles to the road, and dashed forward and seized the
underfeature +a+ (map No. 14), which faces the extreme northern spur
of the Kissieberg. In pushing on towards this point, the men were much
exposed to enfilade fire from their right, and a good many casualties
occurred. The other five companies of the Irish Rifles and the
Northumberland Fusiliers faced to the right, confronting the main
ridge, against which they scrambled upwards by successive stages. The
companies extended as they moved on, and gradually opened out into
firing line and supports. The western face of the Kissieberg was found
to be exceedingly steep and difficult to climb. A series of krantz, or
perpendicular walls of rocks, barred the ascent, except at certain
gaps, while between these krantz were interspersed bushes and large
boulders. The company officers ordered their men to unfix bayonets,
and to help each other up the rocks. The enemy's fire for the moment
had ceased to be effective, as the British soldiers were more or less
under cover of the krantz, but the clamber through the gaps in the
first barrier, nearly twelve feet high, took a considerable time. On
the top a halt was made to let men get their breath, and then began
again the onward advance of small groups of twos and threes in the
direction of the shoulder of the hill, where the burghers had managed
to place a gun. The Boers' shooting from the crest now again became
effective, whilst they themselves, carefully concealed, offered no
target to the British rifles. The rocks and bushes made communication
between the different parts of the line of the attack very difficult.
[Sidenote: Artillery come into action. A gun lost.]
At the moment when the first shot killed the corporal, the batteries,
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Jeffreys, had rapidly moved
off to the left by sub-divisions for about 1,000 yards, and then
onward up the valley. There was no good position for the British guns,
except the ridge 2,000 yards to the west of the Kissieberg. But the
infantry's need of immediate support was too pressing to allow time
for that ridge's occupation. Lieut.-Colonel Jeffreys therefore, by the
direction of General Gatacre, caused the 77th battery to come into
action near kopje +a+, the 74th unlimbering on the open veld to the
westward. The mounted infantry continued to escort the batteries. In
getting into place a gun of the 74th battery had stuck in a donga,
owing to a horse being struck. It was smothered by a hail of bullets.
The three drivers were almost immediately wounded, and all the rest of
the team were shot down. The gun had therefore to be abandoned, part
of its breech mechanism being first removed.
[Sidenote: The course of the attack on Kissieberg.]
[Sidenote: Retreat.]
Meanwhile the three companies of the Irish Rifles, which had seized
kopje +a+, had made their way step by step up the northern extremity
of the Kissieberg, and had struggled on to within close proximity of
its crest line. The Boers from the main laager had now manned the
hill, but the British artillery was bursting shells on the threatened
crest, and a Boer gun which had come into action was for a time
silenced. The attack had lasted about half an hour, and progress up
the hill was being slowly made by the British infantry, when the five
companies of the Northumberland on the right of the line were ordered
to retire by their commanding officer. He considered that his
battalion must leave the hill. The three foremost companies, who were
nearly on to the summit, did not hear of this order, and, under the
command of Capt. W. A. Wilmott, remained with the Irish Rifles,
clinging on as they were. The fire of the enemy appeared to be
slackening, and for the moment the groups of British officers and men
were convinced that, if they were supported, they could gain the
crest. But the withdrawal of a portion of the attacking line had made
any further success impossible. Nor was that all. Seeing the five
companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers falling back to the west,
the batteries conceived that all the assailants were retreating, and
exerted themselves to the utmost to cover the movement by their fire.
The sun was now rising immediately behind the western face of the
Kissieberg, so that all the upper part presented to the British guns a
black target, on which neither friend nor foe could be distinguished.
Thus a fatal mischance came about. A shell fused for explosion just
short of the Boer defensive line burst over the foremost group of the
Irish Rifles, and struck down Lieut.-Colonel Eagar, Major H. J. Seton,
the second in command, Major H. L. Welman, Captain F. J. H. Bell, and
three men. A conference had a few moments before been held between
Lieut.-Colonel Eagar and Captain Wilmott as to the steps which should
be taken to protect the men from the shells of their own gunners. The
former officer had stated that as the situation of the infantry was
evidently unknown to the batteries, and was masking their fire, it was
necessary to fall back. Captain Wilmott, on the other hand, urged that
if the men were once ordered to withdraw it would be very difficult to
get them up the hill again. Colonel Eagar replied that there was no
help for it. Therefore a general retirement now began from the main
ridge of the Kissieberg downwards towards the rising ground a mile to
the westward. The movement was made by rushes. The enemy had been
reinforced by Swanepoel's detachment from the Nek, and coming down the
slopes of the hill poured in a hot fire on the retiring infantry. The
material effect of this was not great, because the Boers' shooting
throughout the day was remarkably indifferent. But under its
influence a large proportion of the British troops took cover in the
donga which drains the valley between the Kissieberg and the height to
the westward. As an eye-witness describes it:--
[Sidenote: Word-sketch of retreat.]
"This donga was too deep to be used as a line of defence, being
six feet deep at least, with both banks washed away underneath,
and with nothing for the men to stand upon to enable them to
bring their rifles to bear. It was here that the trouble in the
retirement commenced. The men retiring from the hill rushed to
this donga for cover from the heavy rifle-fire, and on getting
into it, and thinking they were safe from immediate danger, laid
down and many went to sleep, and the greatest difficulty was
experienced to get them on the move again and to leave the donga.
Many men were by this time thoroughly done up and did not appear
to care what happened to them. Many men still remained on the
hill, some because they had not heard the order to retire, and
some because, utterly weary, they had sunk down in sleep in the
dead angle at the foot of the height."
[Sidenote: Stages of retreat.]
On the extreme left the retreat to the western ridge was effected in
good order, the three companies of the Irish Rifles moving back first,
then the batteries in succession, the mounted infantry covering the
first stage, and remaining in close touch with the enemy, until
Colonel Jeffreys was able again to bring his guns into action on the
spur marked +b+ on the map. During this withdrawal, Major E. Perceval
was severely wounded, but continued to command the 77th battery until
the close of the day's operations. The artillery held this second
position for over an hour, the infantry forming up in rear. The enemy
now re-opened with a very long range gun, which made excellent
practice, but fortunately the large majority of its shells only burst
on impact, or not at all.
[Sidenote: New foes appear, but are driven off.]
[Sidenote: An ill-starred order.]
At about 6 a.m. a further development began, one which might have
proved fatal to the British force had the Boers then possessed the
discipline and vigour in counter-attacks they acquired in the later
stages of the war. Grobelaar and Steinkamp with the Burghersdorp
commando had been roused by the sound of the guns from their bivouac
on the Steynsburg road, and, riding back, lined the crest of the hill
to the west of Bamboosberg Spruit, and thence opened a long-range fire
threatening the line of retreat. Against this fresh enemy five guns of
Major Perceval's battery were brought into action facing west, and
with well-directed shrapnel at a range of 1,200 yards, drove back the
dangerous force. The remaining gun of that battery and the 74th
battery continued to check the Boers' pursuit from the eastward. Yet
it was evident that the whole plan had failed, and that the troops
were not in a physical condition to renew the attack on the
Kissieberg. Sir W. Gatacre therefore decided to retire on Molteno, and
directed the retreat on Van Zyl's farm, 1,200 yards to the north-west
of D. Foster's homestead, the mounted infantry and artillery covering
the retirement. The General, when he gave this order, had received no
report that a considerable proportion of the infantry had failed to
rejoin their proper units. He had remained with the mounted infantry
throughout the action, and having seen numbers of men of both
regiments crossing the valley, was under the impression that the
battalions were now intact behind the western ridge. An extraordinary
number of them were, in fact, still missing. The largest proportion of
these had probably never left the Kissieberg. The equivalent of two
companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers are known to have been taken
prisoners there. Of those who had retired, some had remained in the
donga. Besides all these, there was a considerable number of officers
and men dispersed about the valley, and particularly in the enclosures
near the northern Van Zyl's farm. It seems possible that, if the
general retreat from the position at +b+ could have been delayed even
for a comparatively short time, some of the scattered parties of men,
who were afterwards taken prisoners, might have rejoined their
battalions.
[Sidenote: The course of the retreat.]
The line of the retreat to Molteno was to the west of the ridge which
rises between the colliery line and the Kissieberg, and so gave some
shelter from the enemy's fire. The minished battalions struggled
along, some of the companies being able at first to keep their
formation, though, long before they arrived at Molteno, almost all had
fallen into disarray. The fatigue of the men had reached its climax,
and most of them could hardly keep on their feet. Whenever there was a
necessary halt, not a few fell down, asleep almost before they
reached the ground, and it was with difficulty that they could be
again roused. They suffered very much from thirst as there were no
water-carts, and they had had no opportunity of drinking during many
hours. The batteries of artillery remained in action at +b+ for some
time. They then retired alternately, and by their steadiness and the
excellence of their practice held the enemy at bay.
[Sidenote: Boers gain a second gun, but do not seriously pursue.]
The Boers followed in the rear sufficiently close to necessitate the
abandonment of a second gun, which stuck in a water course, but there
was no determined attempt at vigorous pursuit, and when once the
kopjes had been passed, the mounted infantry were able to keep at a
distance those of the enemy who did not linger in the valley to loot.
[Sidenote: Distribution of troops after action.]
The various units of Sir W. Gatacre's force reached Molteno between 11
a.m. and 12.30 midday. In the evening they were moved as follows:
_To Cypher Gat:_ Divisional staff and Royal artillery, by train;
mounted infantry, by road.
_To Sterkstroom:_ Northumberland Fusiliers and Royal Irish Rifles, by
train.
_To Bushman's Hoek:_ Royal engineers and two companies Royal Scots, by
train.
[Sidenote: British losses, Dec. 10th/99.]
The British casualties in the action at Stormberg were:
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Officers --- 8 13
Other Ranks 25 102 548
--- --- ---
Total 25 110 561
--- --- ---
Colonel Eagar, Royal Irish Rifles, died some months later of the
wounds received in this action.
[Sidenote: Boer losses.]
The casualties of the Boers were 8 killed and 26 wounded. Commandant
Swanepoel afterwards died of his wounds.
[Sidenote: Points to be noted.]
Sir W. Gatacre's decision to advance on Stormberg was fully justified
by the strategical situation. General Buller's telegram, although it
left him a free hand as to time and opportunity, had suggested that
operation. The plan, though bold, was sound in its design, and would
have succeeded had not exceptional ill-fortune attended its execution.
Several of the causes of failure stand out conspicuously in the
narrative: the mistake of the guides in taking the longer route, which
unduly fatigued the men; the failure to realise that the Kissieberg
was within striking distance, when the cross roads near Van Zyl's farm
were reached; the premature withdrawal of the five companies of one of
the battalions from the attack, and the subsequent shelling of the
British infantry who still clung to the hill. Without these
accumulated mishaps a blow would in all probability have been struck
at the enemy, such as would have had an important influence on the
general situation in South Africa. Yet it cannot be held that chance
was alone responsible for this miscarriage. A long night march to be
followed by a night attack involves, under the most favourable
circumstances, a considerable element of hazard, and it is therefore
essential that every possible precaution should be taken to obviate
mistakes and to ensure that the column should not, in its mission to
surprise, be itself taken at a disadvantage. Careful reconnaissance by
the staff of the route to be followed can, therefore, never be
neglected with impunity. If a staff officer had examined beforehand
the Steynsburg road, at least as far as the branch track which it was
intended to follow, and if he had been made responsible for the
supervision of the guides, the mistakes as to the route would in all
probability have been avoided. This omission is the more remarkable in
that one of the Intelligence staff, upon whom the duty of this
reconnaissance would naturally have devolved, was well acquainted with
the ground in the neighbourhood of Stormberg. It is perhaps doubtful
whether in view of the fatigue shown by the troops on their arrival at
Roberts' farm, and the uncertainty of the staff as to the situation,
it was wise to persist in the enterprise. In any case, it is clear
that the neglect to change the formation of the column, and to send
out flank and advance guards when dawn appeared whilst the movement
was being carried along a road surrounded by hills, was a dangerous
and unnecessary risk. Finally, the abandonment of large detachments of
infantry, when retreat was ordered, implies a serious lack of
supervision both by the staff and by the officers then left in command
of the battalions. Yet in weighing the responsibility for these
errors, it must be borne in mind that the units composing the force
had only just come together for the first time, that General, staff,
and troops were all new to one another, and that the men engaged were
not yet in hard condition.