OPERATIONS ROUND COLESBERG UP TO THE 16th DECEMBER.[185]
[Footnote 185: See maps Nos. 9 and 16.]
[Sidenote: Schoeman at Norval's Pont Nov. 1st.]
[Sidenote: Colesberg Nov. 14th, is annexed.]
A Boer force seized the passage of the Orange river at Norval's Pont
on the 1st November.[186] It consisted of the Philippolis and Edenburg
commandos, with a detachment from the Bethulie district and some
burghers from the Transvaal, and was commanded by a Transvaaler named
Schoeman. Schoeman's subsequent advance was extraordinarily cautious
and hesitating, a caution probably more due to the existence amongst
the Free State burghers of a strong party opposed on political grounds
to the invasion of the colony than to strategical considerations.
Although on the withdrawal of the British garrison from Naauwpoort on
the 3rd, there was for the moment not a single British post between
Port Elizabeth and the frontier, it was not until the 14th that the
little town of Colesberg was occupied by the enemy. That this Boer
force was not the advance guard of any large army had been shown by
the destruction on the 5th of two railway bridges, at Van Zyl and
Achtertang, between Colesberg junction and Norval's Pont; on the other
hand, the aggressive intention of Schoeman's movement had been
demonstrated by the issue on the 9th of a Boer proclamation, declaring
the Colesberg district to be Free State territory. The main object of
this proclamation, as well as of similar announcements made in the
Aliwal, Albert, and Barkly East districts, was to apply the Free State
commando laws to British subjects, and under that legal pretext force
them to join the invading columns. Nor did this policy at first lack
encouragement, for a public meeting held at Colesberg on the day of
its occupation passed a resolution in favour of throwing in its lot
with the Orange Free State. These facts were duly reported to the
Intelligence staff at Cape Town. The strength of Schoeman's column was
variously assessed, one report placing it as high as 3,000, but the
estimate considered most reliable stated that the Boer commandant had
at this time under his orders 1,200 men, two field guns, and a Maxim.
On the 17th the Intelligence department was informed that the column
intended to occupy Naauwpoort, and there divide into two sections, one
pushing across country to the south-west for the purpose of cutting
the railway at Richmond Road, and the other moving south on a
recruiting mission to Middleburg.
[Footnote 186: See page 198.]
[Sidenote: Danger of the raid. French ordered to check it.]
A series of boldly-conducted raids on the long line of railway from
Cape Town to De Aar might at this period have paralysed Lord Methuen's
advance on Kimberley, while a Boer column in the central districts of
the Colony would have formed a nucleus round which the disaffected and
lawless might have rallied, before the loyal farmers could be armed
and organised to defend their own homes. It was thus evident that
immediate steps must be taken to check the commando at Colesberg, and
it was for these reasons that the orders, already mentioned,[187] were
issued by Sir R. Buller for the re-occupation of Naauwpoort by a
half-battalion of the 2nd Berkshire, a half-battalion of the Black
Watch, the New South Wales Lancers (40 all ranks), 25 Cape Police, and
a party of Royal Garrison artillery manning two 9-pr. R.M.L. guns, and
for the despatch of Lieut.-General French to organise as a combined
force these and such further troops as Wauchope could spare, so as to
oppose Schoeman's operations.
[Footnote 187: See Chapter XI.]
[Sidenote: French confers with Wauchope Nov. 19th.]
General French, accompanied by Major D. Haig as his Chief Staff
Officer, and Captain the Hon. H. A. Lawrence as Intelligence Officer,
left Cape Town by train on the evening of the 18th November, reaching
on the following night De Aar, where he had been instructed to confer
with Major-General Wauchope (at that time commanding the lines of
communication from De Aar to Orange River) as regards the plan of
campaign and as to the units that could be given him. In telegraphic
orders sent to French on the 19th Sir R. Buller laid down his mission
in the following terms:--
[Sidenote: French's instructions, Nov. 19th.]
"I shall reinforce you as rapidly as possible; meanwhile do your best
to prepare for a flying column, strength say, nearly 3,000 men, with
which as soon as I get more troops, I mean you to attack the Boers
about Colesberg. I think such an attack should be based on Hanover
Road. Do all you can to reconnoitre the country, to obtain guides and
information, and to be prepared to start; keep your men in condition,
and exercise horses and mules."
[Sidenote: French reports on situation, Nov. 20th.]
As a result of his conference with Wauchope, General French reported
to Headquarters on the 20th that Naauwpoort, which had already been
re-occupied by the troops above-named, would be a better base than
Hanover Road for a movement on Colesberg, considering both the
flatness of the country, the fewer wire fences, and the railway and
direct road. But for the moment Wauchope could spare no more troops
except two companies of M.I. The telegram added that arrangements were
being made for the formation at Naauwpoort of a depôt containing
thirty days' supplies for 3,000 men, 600 horses, and 500 mules. After
the despatch of this report General French, accompanied by his staff,
proceeded by train to his destination, and immediately on his arrival
issued orders for a reconnaissance on the following day.
[Sidenote: Nov. 21st. French reconnoitres towards Colesberg. He asks
for reinforcements.]
On the morning of the 21st, the General Officer commanding pushed
forward up the railway with the N.S.W. Lancers, followed by a section
of infantry in a train. The line was found to be broken one mile north
of Tweedale siding, but the cavalry advanced to within eight miles of
Colesberg without meeting the enemy (see map No. 10). On reporting by
telegram the result of this reconnaissance, General French added that,
on the arrival from De Aar of the two companies M.I., he proposed to
occupy a strong position north of Arundel, and that he considered
that, with a view to an attack on Colesberg, he should be reinforced
by two and a half battalions and a few squadrons of cavalry, "most
necessary for reaping fruits of victory in this country." The same
afternoon R. battery R.H.A. and an ammunition column reached
Naauwpoort by train from Cape Town. The two companies M.I., under
Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Tudway, marched in from De Aar, but were found to
be so insufficiently trained in their mounted duties that they were as
yet unfit to take the field as complete units against the enemy.[188]
[Footnote 188: These two companies were part of the M.I.
battalion of the cavalry division, and were composed of
sections drawn from various infantry battalions, and trained
in different districts in different ways.]
[Sidenote: Steps taken Nov. 22nd and 23rd. Reinforcements arrive.]
On the 22nd, culverts north of Tweedale siding were repaired, and an
obstruction on the line was removed. A patrol of the N.S.W. Lancers
was pushed on to a kopje north of Arundel, but no sign of the enemy
was seen. On the 23rd the other half-battalion Black Watch came in
from General Wauchope, and a reconnaissance of New South Wales Lancers
and a picked detachment of the M.I., supported by a company of
infantry in a train, was despatched up the line towards Arundel, with
a view to observing by patrols the vicinity of Colesberg; the kopjes,
however, north of Arundel station were found to be now occupied by the
Boers in sufficient strength to check further progress. In reporting
this to Cape Town by telegraph, General French stated that he did not
think that the enemy intended to attack Naauwpoort, but considered
that the Boers should be dislodged from Colesberg as soon as possible,
as they were obtaining recruits there. Naauwpoort had meantime been
placed in a thorough state of defence.
[Sidenote: French's command extended.]
Reconnaissances continued to be made almost daily towards Arundel.
Meanwhile General French's sphere of command had been increased by the
addition to it of the central line of communication down to Port
Elizabeth, volunteer corps, including the Prince Alfred's Guards, of a
strength of 900 all ranks, being placed at his disposal. Some
difficulty, however, arising as to the movement of these colonial
troops north of Cradock, detachments of regulars were sent temporarily
from Naauwpoort to hold Rosmead Junction and the railway bridges near
it against small rebel parties, which were reported to be under arms
in that neighbourhood. The force at Naauwpoort was gradually augmented
by the arrival of the 12th Lancers on the 25th, and O. battery R.H.A.,
and another ammunition column on the 27th. On the other hand, by the
1st December the whole battalion of the Black Watch had been, at the
urgent request of Major-General Wauchope, returned to Orange River to
replace infantry sent forward to Lord Methuen. The 1st Suffolk
regiment arrived at Naauwpoort that afternoon, and on the 2nd December
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, a fine corps 400 strong, and the 26th
company R.E., joined General French.
[Sidenote: Nov. 26th to Dec. 7th. The "policy of worry."]
[Sidenote: Arundel occupied, Dec. 7th.]
On the 26th November Sir R. Buller had telegraphed to Sir F.
Forestier-Walker: "French should attack Arundel as soon as he feels
strong enough, but not before, and he should be sure that he is strong
enough. We can now afford to wait;" and on the following day he added:
"Tell French to maintain an active defence, not running any risk." On
the 30th another despatch from the General Commanding-in-Chief to
General Forestier-Walker ran: "suggest to French that a policy of
worry, without risking men, might have a good effect on the enemy at
Colesberg and keep him occupied." Meanwhile the constant appearance of
patrols from Naauwpoort had not only completely chained to the
vicinity of Colesberg the main body of the enemy, but had made him
nervous for the safety of his advance party on the kopjes north of
Arundel station; and on the 29th November a squadron of the 12th
Lancers discovered that those kopjes had been evacuated. On this, two
days later, two squadrons of that regiment were sent forward to
Arundel station to bivouac there that night with a view to a
reconnaissance being pushed on to Colesberg on the following morning.
But at 10 p.m. the Lieutenant-General received a telegram from the
Chief of the Staff ordering the 12th Lancers to join Lord Methuen on
the Modder river. The squadrons were, therefore, recalled from Arundel
and the regiment entrained for the Modder on the following day, as
soon as sufficient rolling-stock could be obtained. Its departure left
French for the moment with insufficient mounted men to keep touch with
the enemy, but the arrival of the New Zealanders on the 2nd December
enabled active operations to be renewed, and on the 5th the
Carabiniers, commanded by Colonel T. C. Porter, increased the
Naauwpoort force sufficiently to warrant the adoption of the "policy
of worry" suggested by Sir R. Buller. Moreover, arrangements had now
been completed for the protection of the railway line from Cradock to
Rosmead by part of the Port Elizabeth Volunteer Corps. The details of
the Suffolk regiment and M.I., which had been guarding these
localities, were thereupon recalled to Naauwpoort and rejoined on the
afternoon of 5th December. On the 6th orders were issued for the
occupation on the following day of a position near Arundel with
mounted troops "with the object of pushing forward detachments to
observe the enemy, and clear up the situation near Colesberg next
day." In pursuance of these orders the New Zealand Mounted Rifles
moved out to the ridge to the south of Arundel early on the morning of
the 7th, and later in the day the Carabiniers, mounted infantry (less
a detachment holding Hanover Road station), the N.S.W. Lancers, a
detachment of the R.E. company, and Field Telegraph section were
brought out by train from Naauwpoort under the command of Colonel
Porter; and, having detrained at Hartebeestfontein farm, covered by
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, advanced with that regiment to Arundel
without meeting any opposition. There the force bivouacked for the
night, the enemy's piquets watching them from a ridge three miles
north of the station.
[Sidenote: Dec. 8th to Dec. 11th, 1899. Schoeman's strength
ascertained. French seizes hill north of Arundel.]
At dawn on the 8th, Colonel Porter sent forward his mounted infantry,
with some cavalry, and seized a hill three miles north of Arundel.
General French, accompanied by his staff and two Berkshire companies,
arrived at Arundel by train from Naauwpoort at 6 a.m., and by his
orders the reconnaissance was then pushed home. The Boers were found
to be now occupying a series of kopjes called Taaiboschlaagte which
run in a south-easterly direction from Rensburg, and extend to the
westward, across the line. The cavalry was sent round both flanks of
the enemy, while the mounted infantry held him in front. This movement
caused the Boers to fall back and disclose a second position athwart
the railway, with a wide frontage both to the east and west. Artillery
fire was opened on the British troops from three points of this new
post, and a large gun was seen being dragged into action near
Rensburg, which appeared to be the centre of the Boer line. It was
estimated that the opposing commando was on this occasion about 2,000
strong. A prisoner was captured, who alleged that he was adjutant to
the officer commanding a reinforcement just arrived from Pretoria. He
stated that the total force under Schoeman's orders was now 3,000,
exclusive of local rebels, that it included four field guns and three
smaller pieces, and that Grobelaar's commando of 1,700 men at
Burghersdorp would shortly receive a reinforcement of 600 men from the
Free State and intended then to co-operate with Schoeman. A telegram,
despatched by Major Haig in the evening to Cape Town, reported the
above information and the day's operation, adding: "General French
desires me to say that in face of attitude of enemy to-day he cannot
do more than reconnoitre with forces here." The mounted troops, who
had now been joined by R. battery R.H.A., continued in occupation of
the kopjes north of Arundel, and on the 11th December, the railway
having been repaired, three companies of the Royal Berkshire, under
Major McCracken, were moved by train to that station, and a detachment
of 50 M.I. was sent to Tweedale to patrol and guard the line; the
remainder of the troops continued to garrison Naauwpoort under command
of Lieut.-Colonel A. J. Watson, 1st Suffolk regiment.
[Sidenote: French seizes Vaal Kop and repels Boer advance. Dec 11th.]
Two squadrons of the Inniskilling Dragoons reached Naauwpoort on the
10th, and with two squadrons of the 10th Hussars, arriving on the
11th, were sent on to Arundel. Early on the morning of the 11th the
British patrols reported that the Boers had seized Vaal Kop, an
isolated hill some six miles west of Rensburg, with open ground all
round it, and Kuilfontein farm, one and a half miles to the north-west
of the kop. By the Lieut.-General's directions a squadron of the 10th
Hussars and two Horse artillery guns were sent out against these
detached posts, and having forced the enemy back remained in
possession of Vaal Kop. Some anxiety was still felt as regards
Schoeman's designs on his left side, as it was surmised that his
continued occupation of a position so much in advance of Colesberg was
probably due to an intention of holding out a hand to Grobelaar in the
Burghersdorp district. Colonel Porter was, therefore, ordered to
patrol widely to the east and north-east to discover whether any
movements were taking place in those quarters. Early on the morning of
the 13th his patrols reported that about 1,800 Boers were leaving
their laagers in three detachments and pushing southward towards
Naauwpoort. By 7 a.m. Colonel Porter had made the following
disposition to meet this development--Vaal Kop on his extreme left was
still occupied by a squadron and two guns, and the kopjes to the north
of Arundel were held by the three companies of the Berkshire and two
9-pr. R.M.L. guns, supported by the M.I. on the right and the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles on the left, with the N.S.W. Lancers at the Nek
near the railway. The main body of the cavalry (six squadrons) with
four guns of R. battery was concentrated on the threatened flank two
to three miles to the east of the remainder. In a skirmish which
ensued, the enemy brought up two guns, but these were quickly silenced
and the Boer commandos were driven back by the cavalry. By 2 p.m. the
bulk of the enemy's forces had returned to their old ground; a party,
which about that hour occupied Kuilfontein farm on the western flank,
was driven away by the shell fire of the two British guns on Vaal Kop,
suffering considerable loss. The British casualties during the day
were limited to one officer and seven men wounded. A congratulatory
telegram, received by General French from Sir R. Buller next day,
commented: "You are following the right policy. Worry them." The
tactics prescribed by General French at this period can be best
realised from the following extract from the instructions issued by
his Chief Staff Officer on the 14th to Major-General Brabazon, who, on
his arrival on that date, was placed in command at Arundel:--
[Sidenote: French's method.]
"Your task is to prevent the enemy moving from his present
positions closer to Naauwpoort, or reaching the railway
connecting that place with Arundel. The Lieut.-General
Commanding considers that the best method to pursue to attain
this end is:
"(a) Hold Arundel as a pivot.
"(b) Using that as a pivot, act energetically with your mounted
troops against any of the enemy's detachments which may leave his
main position and cross open ground.
"(c) Select and hold certain points (such as Vaal Kop), to retain
the enemy and make him fear an offensive movement against his
line of retreat; (which is viâ Colesberg wagon bridge)."
[Sidenote: French, because of effect of "Black Week," takes command at
Arundel and reorganises. Dec. 16th.]
[Sidenote: Dec. 17th.]
On the 16th, however, notwithstanding these instructions, the officer
commanding the detachment on Vaal Kop fell back from that post on its
being threatened by distant artillery fire, and the whole of the
troops at Arundel were turned out on a false alarm that the enemy was
advancing. The defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso,
recorded in later chapters, had meantime darkened the prospect, so
that manifestly the utmost care must be taken by all commanders to
obviate mistakes which might lead to further misfortunes. General
French, therefore, moved his Headquarters to the front, and assumed
personal command of the troops at Arundel. He had telegraphed on the
previous day offering to despatch all his cavalry to the Modder river,
but this suggestion was negatived "on account of scarcity of water."
He reorganised the Arundel command into a division as follows,
appointing Major-General Brabazon second in command:--
_1st Cavalry Brigade (under Colonel T. C. Porter)._
The Carabiniers.
New South Wales Lancers (40 men),
1 company mounted infantry.
_2nd Cavalry Brigade (under Lieut.-Colonel R. B. W. Fisher)._
The Inniskilling Dragoons (2 squadrons),
10th Hussars (2 squadrons),
1 company mounted infantry.
_Divisional Troops._
Brigade division R.H.A. (under Colonel F. J. W. Eustace).
New Zealand Mounted Rifles.
R.E. company.
Bearer company.
Half-battalion Royal Berkshire }
regiment. } under Major F. W. N.
2 guns R.G.A. } McCracken.
[Sidenote: French pivoting on certain strong points continues "policy
of worry." Dec. 16th-17th 1899.]
Major McCracken was directed to fortify the kopjes north of Arundel,
and to hold them "at all costs" as a pivot of manoeuvre. The country,
for purposes of reconnaissance, was divided into two zones, the
railway being taken as the line of demarcation. The 1st brigade was
assigned to the western zone, the 2nd to the eastern; the Brigadiers
were instructed to occupy certain tactical points towards the front
and flanks, and were made responsible that the enemy was not allowed
to establish himself unmolested on any kopje south of the Arundel
ridge. The Horse artillery and New Zealand Rifles were kept in reserve
under the personal orders of the General Officer Commanding. With
these arrangements the Lieut.-General felt assured that his position
was secure, and hoped to be able to continue to pursue a bold and
aggressive policy, a duty to which he was now able to devote his whole
attention, as other arrangements had been made for the command of the
lines of communication to Port Elizabeth.