THE RAID ON SOUTHERN NATAL.[179]
[Footnote 179: See map No. 4.]
[Sidenote: The relation of Ladysmith to the defence of Natal.]
Throughout the operations in Natal during the opening phase of the
war, Sir G. White had held that a mobile force, concentrated north of
the Tugela, afforded better protection to the central and southern
portions of the colony than any number of detachments stationed on the
lines of communication. Face to face as he was with an enemy in
superior strength, the retention with his field force of every
available unit was essential to the British commander's plan of
striking at his opponents whenever an opportunity offered. Sir W.
Hely-Hutchinson, although anxious as to the security of Maritzburg and
Natal from Boer raids, accepted Sir George's decision, telegraphing to
the General on 26th October: "I shall do my best in consultation with
General Wolfe Murray.... I think we shall be able to deal with any
small raid, but a raid in force, especially if supported by guns, will
be a serious matter. We must take the risk, and hope for the best." On
October 30th, the date of the battle of Lombards Kop,[180] the only
regular unit on the Natal line of communication was the 1st Border
regiment, which had arrived at Maritzburg that morning from East
London. Detachments of colonial troops held Colenso bridge and
Estcourt. To the eastward the Umvoti Rifles, a mounted corps rather
more than one hundred strong, had been ordered to fall back from
Helpmakaar and watch the ferry, by which the Dundee-Greytown road
crosses the Tugela. A battalion of mounted infantry was being raised
at Maritzburg by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, Royal Scots Fusiliers,
and another at Durban by Lieut.-Colonel Bethune, 16th Lancers.
[Footnote 180: See Chapter X.]
[Sidenote: Threatened siege changes situation.]
The result of the battle of 30th October made it probable that the
field force at Ladysmith would be soon cut off from its
communications. To keep the road open to the south, Sir George White
that evening reinforced the garrison of Colenso by despatching thither
by rail from Ladysmith the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, a company of
mounted infantry, and the Natal Field battery, whose obsolete
7-pounder guns had been grievously outranged at Elandslaagte. On
arrival at Colenso, the commanding officer of the Dublin, Colonel C.
D. Cooper, assumed command of that post, finding there one squadron of
the Natal Carbineers, one squadron Imperial Light Horse, a party of
mounted Police, and the Durban Light Infantry (about 380 strong), and
a detachment (fifty strong) of the Natal Naval Volunteers, with two
9-pounder guns. The total strength of the command, including the
reinforcements from Ladysmith, was approximately 1,200 men. The Natal
Royal Rifles (150 strong) were encamped at Estcourt, twenty-five miles
in rear.
[Sidenote: An anxious fortnight, Oct. 31st-Nov. 14th.]
On the following day General White telegraphed to the Governor of the
colony: "My intention is to hold Ladysmith, make attacks on the
enemy's position whenever possible, and retain the greatest number of
the enemy here." Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson and the officer commanding the
Natal line of communication, Brigadier-General J. S. Wolfe Murray,
were thus confronted with a difficult and anxious situation. It was
obvious that, having regard to the numerical superiority and greater
mobility of the enemy, the British force at Ladysmith would, in all
probability, be unable to retain the whole of the Boer army. A raid on
southern Natal was therefore to be expected immediately, and the
strength of that raid might well be such as to overwhelm, or, at any
rate, to ignore, the weak garrisons which so imperfectly covered
Maritzburg and Durban. Moreover, General Murray was aware that even if
Sir R. Buller should think fit to divert from Cape Colony any portion
of the expeditionary force now on the high seas, a fortnight must
elapse before a single man could be landed at Durban.
[Sidenote: Provisional steps in case of Boer raid.]
Maritzburg, from its topographical environment, is even less adapted
by nature for defence than Ladysmith. Lying in a deep depression
surrounded by high hills, the positions covering the capital of the
colony are so extensive that a very large force would be needed for
their effective occupation. Nevertheless, after consultation on the
afternoon of 31st October with the Governor and the Prime Minister of
the colony (Colonel Hime), the Brigadier-General decided that,
although it was impossible to protect the town itself, it was
advisable to prepare the cantonments, so-called "Fort Napier," for
defence, and for that purpose to borrow Naval guns from the ships at
Durban. As regards Durban, a telegram was received from Sir Alfred
Milner stating that arrangements had been made by Sir Redvers Buller
with the admiral for the immediate despatch to that port of H.M.S.
_Terrible_ and _Forte_ as a reinforcement to the _Tartar_ and
_Philomel_, already in the harbour, and suggesting that in the case of
a complete disaster to Sir G. White's force it would be wise to retire
on the seaport and there make a stand.
[Sidenote: Changes of stations, Nov. 2nd and 3rd, in expectation of
raid.]
But the responsible military authorities were by no means inclined to
take a pessimistic view of the situation. The final instructions,
dated 1st November, received from Sir G. White's Chief of the Staff,
directed General Murray "to remain and defend Maritzburg to the last,"
and on the following day Sir R. Buller telegraphed from Capetown that
a division would be despatched as soon as possible to Natal, adding:
"Do all you can to hold on to Colenso till troops arrive." Meanwhile,
a warning had been received from the Intelligence staff at Ladysmith,
that a considerable body of Free Staters was moving on Colenso, and
Brigadier-General Murray, realising that the situation of Colonel
Cooper's force at the bridge, commanded by the heights on the northern
bank of the Tugela, was becoming precarious, directed that officer to
fall back on Estcourt, should he consider his position no longer
tenable. On the afternoon of November 2nd, telegraphic communication
between Colenso and Ladysmith was cut off by the enemy, and a large
Boer commando, having occupied the high ground near Grobelaars Kloof
(map No. 15), opened fire on the two little works, Forts Wylie and
Molyneux, which had been constructed by the Natal Volunteers on the
left bank of the Tugela to cover the crossings of that river, and the
approaches to Langewacht Spruit. The Natal Field battery and Natal
Naval Volunteers' guns were again seriously outranged by the Boer
artillery, and Colonel Cooper decided that, having regard to his
instructions, he must fall back on Estcourt. The withdrawal to that
town was effected on the night of November 2nd-3rd without molestation
from the enemy, the infantry being conveyed in special trains, the
mounted troops and field artillery moving by road. The 1st battalion
Border regiment was simultaneously pushed forward by rail from
Maritzburg to Estcourt, and Brigadier-General Murray proceeded, on 3rd
November, to the latter station to take personal command of the force
there concentrated, which now amounted in all to about 2,300 men. With
this force, weak though it was in guns and mounted troops, he intended
to dispute the Boer advance from the north, falling back, if
necessary, on the prepared position at Maritzburg. A telegram, dated
4th November, conveyed General Buller's approval of these
dispositions, but added: "Do not risk losing Durban by over-prolonged
defence of Maritzburg, but hold the latter so long as you safely can.
I fear it will be at least ten days before I can send you substantial
assistance."
[Sidenote: After much delay, on Nov. 13th/99, 4,200 Boers under
Joubert and Botha reach Colenso.]
Fortunately, until the last but one of these ten days, the enemy held
back on the north bank of the Tugela. A Krijgsraad, at which all the
Boer generals and commandants attended, had assembled in front of
Ladysmith on 1st November to decide whether the main effort of the
Boer army should be concentrated on the attack of that town, or
whether, leaving a detachment to hold Sir G. White's troops, they
should at once advance on Maritzburg and Durban. Some of the younger
leaders, including Louis Botha, as yet only plain commandant, were in
favour of the latter course. The majority of the council decided that,
so long as 12,000 effective British troops remained at Ladysmith, the
commandos were not numerous enough to allow them to win the
much-coveted prizes of the capital and seaport of Natal. It was
believed that General White's troops would be unable to withstand an
assault. On the 9th November, therefore, an abortive and ill-arranged
attack was made. It sufficed to show that the Ladysmith garrison was
by no means disposed to yield, and that a formal and perhaps prolonged
investment would be needed to weaken its powers of resistance. To this
task, therefore, the main body of the Boer commandos was assigned;
but, as an erroneous report had come in that 5,000 English troops had
concentrated at Frere, it was decided that a strong reconnaissance,
under the personal command of General Joubert, should cross the Tugela
to ascertain the disposition and strength of the British column. On
the evening, therefore, of the 13th November, a force about 4,200
strong was assembled at Colenso with orders to push to the south. As
agreed, Joubert, although Transvaal Commandant-General, went with it.
Louis Botha, promoted to the rank of "Fighting General," was second in
command. There is reason to believe that the presence of the senior
General was due to a desire to restrain the impetuosity of his
subordinate.
[Sidenote: Defensive measures taken during the time of grace given by
Boer delay.]
The fifteen days' breathing space which the authorities in southern
Natal had thus been given, after receipt of the disquieting
intelligence of the battle of Lombards Kop, had been of great value.
Captain Percy Scott, H.M.S. _Terrible_, had reached Durban on November
6th, and was appointed commandant of that town. A defence scheme was
prepared and a battalion of "Imperial Light Infantry" was raised to
assist the Naval contingent,[181] and guns (including two 4.7-in. guns
and sixteen 12-pr. 12-cwt.) were landed for its protection. At
Maritzburg a position in the vicinity of Fort Napier had, under the
supervision of Col. C. C. Rawson, C.R.E., been prepared for defence,
the work being executed by a hastily improvised Pioneer Corps of
artisans, assisted by native labour. In selecting this position and
planning its defence, it was assumed that if the force at Estcourt
fell back on Maritzburg, 4,000 men in all would be available for its
occupation. Meanwhile, in addition to Thorneycroft's corps, the
recruiting and training of which were proceeding satisfactorily, a
provisional garrison was arranged for Maritzburg by the despatch of
two 12-pounders and a Naval detachment from the fleet at Durban, by
the withdrawal of the detachment of the Naval Volunteers from
Estcourt, and by the organisation into a Town Guard of all able-bodied
citizens willing to carry a rifle. Moreover, some 150 loyal and
zealous Natal colonists volunteered for scouting duties, and were
formed into a corps under the command of the Hon. T. K. Murray,
C.M.G., finding their own horses, saddlery, and rifles, and serving
without pay. This body of patriotic men did useful work to the north
of Maritzburg, in the neighbourhood of Mooi River, from the 4th to the
16th November, when on the arrival of reinforcements from the Cape
they were released from further duty, and thanked in General Orders
for their "excellent service."
[Footnote 181: This contingent consisted of parties from the
_Terrible_, _Forte_, _Thetis_, _Philomel_ and _Tartar_, of a
total strength of 35 officers and 423 men. Commander Limpus,
R.N., was placed in command of the guns (see p. 120).]
[Sidenote: Nov. 11th/99. Reinforcements begin to disembark. Sir F.
Clery takes command, Nov. 15th.]
On 11th November General Murray, with the approval of Sir R. Buller,
handed over the command of the Estcourt garrison to Colonel Charles
Long, R.H.A., and returned to Maritzburg to direct personally the
heavy work falling on the line of communication staff in arranging for
the disembarkation and equipment of the reinforcements, whose arrival
at Durban was now hourly expected. He had been warned by Headquarters,
on the 7th, that these reinforcements would be made up to three
brigades and divisional troops, and that Lieut.-General Sir C. F.
Clery would be sent in command. On the evening of the 11th the first
battalion, the 2nd West Yorkshire, arrived at Durban with the
Brigadier of the 2nd brigade, Major-General Hildyard, and was sent on
the following day to Estcourt, accompanied by two naval 12-prs. and a
7-pr. manned by a detachment of bluejackets under the command of Lt.
H. W. James, R.N.[182] These units reached Estcourt on the 13th.
Lt.-General Clery reached Durban on November 15th, and assumed command
of the troops south of the Tugela. By the 17th five more battalions
and a brigade division of field artillery had landed at that port. The
British troops in southern Natal were thus in numerical superiority
to the Boer column, moving south of the Tugela. The dates of the
disembarkation of the remaining units of the corps for the relief of
Ladysmith, to which a fourth brigade was ultimately assigned by Sir R.
Buller, are shown in Appendix 7.
[Footnote 182: The 12-prs. were replaced at Maritzburg by two
others sent up from Durban under command of Lieut. A. Halsey,
R.N.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 14th. The raid begins.]
On the morning of the 14th November, Joubert's men crossed the Tugela
and off-saddled on the Colenso plain, pushing patrols forward to Frere
and finding there only an observation post of eight of the Natal
Mounted Police. These patrols, as well as the large number of horses
grazing near Colenso, were observed and reported by the armoured
train, which, according to the daily practice of the Estcourt
garrison, was sent up the line to reconnoitre in the direction of the
Tugela. No mounted troops accompanied these train reconnaissances, but
doubtful ground was, as a rule, made good by flankers on foot,
detailed when required from the infantry in the train.
[Sidenote: Nov. 15th. Disaster to the armoured train.]
Early on the following morning, 15th November, the armoured train,
carrying a 7-pounder M.L. gun, manned by five bluejackets, one company
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and one company Durban Light Infantry, was
again despatched to reconnoitre northward from Estcourt. Captain J. A.
L. Haldane, Gordon Highlanders, was placed in command. The train,
after a brief halt at Frere to communicate with the police post,
pushed on to Chieveley station. No flanking patrols appear to have
been sent out; but as Chieveley station was reached a party of 50
Boers was seen cantering southward about a mile to the west of the
railway. An order was now received by telephone from Estcourt: "Remain
at Frere, watching your safe retreat." The train accordingly commenced
to move back on Frere, but on rounding a spur of a hill which commands
the line, was suddenly fired at by two field guns and a pom-pom. The
driver put on full steam, and the train, running at high speed down a
steep gradient, dashed into an obstruction which had been placed on a
sharp curve of the rails. A detachment of about 300 men of the
Krugersdorp commando had concealed themselves and their guns behind
the hill during the train's outward journey, and blocked the line in
its rear by filling the space between the doubled rails at the curve
with earth and small stones, thus forcing the wheels off the metals.
[Sidenote: The reconnoitring party with train suffers severely.]
An open truck and two armoured trucks were derailed, one of the trucks
being left standing partly over the track. An engagement ensued, in
which the British troops fought under great disadvantages. Mr. Winston
Churchill, a retired cavalry officer, who had been allowed to
accompany the train as a war correspondent, having offered his
services, Captain Haldane requested him to endeavour, with the
assistance of the Durban Light Infantry company, to clear the line.
Haldane meanwhile with the naval gun and the Dublin kept back the
enemy. The naval gun was almost at once put out of action. After an
hour's work under a heavy shell and rifle fire, Mr. Churchill
succeeded in his task, but the coupling between the engine and the
rear trucks had been broken by a shell, the engine itself injured, and
its cab was now filled with wounded. Captain Haldane accordingly
ordered the engine to move back out of fire towards Frere, and,
withdrawing his men from the trucks, directed them to make a dash for
some houses 800 yards distant, where he hoped to effect a further
stand. During this movement across the open veld two privates, without
orders, held up white handkerchiefs; the Boers ceased fire, galloped
in on the retreating soldiers, and called upon them to surrender. Thus
Captain Haldane, a subaltern of the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, Mr. Winston
Churchill, and 53 men were captured. One officer and 69 men succeeded
in making their way back to Estcourt, their retirement being covered
by a detachment of mounted troops sent out to their assistance. The
remainder of the 4 officers and 160 men, of whom the original party
consisted, were killed or wounded. General Buller, in commenting
subsequently on this unlucky affair, recorded his opinion that the
officer in command "acted in trying circumstances with great judgment
and coolness." A Boer account mentions that the British troops fought
"with exceptional gallantry."
[Sidenote: Joubert divides his column and pushes south.]
Emboldened by this success, General Joubert determined to carry
onwards his raid to the south. For this purpose he divided his force
into two columns, 3,000 men being retained under his personal orders
to operate on the west side of the railway, and 1,200 detached to the
eastward under the command of his son, David Joubert. The western
column reached Tabanhlope, a hill thirteen miles west of Estcourt, on
the 16th, and there remained for two days, reconnoitring Estcourt with
patrols. The eastern column occupied Weenen on the 18th, and on the
following day both columns continued their movement southward,
inclining somewhat towards each other. On the 20th Piet Joubert
arrived at Hlatikulu, and, having halted there a night, he further
divided his command, sending forward a detachment with a field gun
towards Mooi River, where they skirmished at long range on the 22nd
and 23rd with the force which, under Major-General Barton, had
recently been concentrated at that station. Some scouts of this
detachment even pushed on as far as Nottingham Road. The remainder of
the Commandant-General's column moved eastward, seized the railway
between the Highlands and Willow Grange, and joined hands with David
Joubert's commando, which since the 19th had remained halted at Warley
Common, a farm three or four miles to the east of Highlands station.
[Sidenote: Situation. Night of Nov. 22nd.]
The situation, therefore, on the night of the 22nd was remarkable. The
British collected at Estcourt, whither General Hildyard had been sent
on the 15th to take command, now amounted to 800 mounted troops
(including Bethune's newly-raised battalion), one battery of R.F.A.,
the Natal Field battery, two naval 12-prs., and 4,400 infantry.
Major-General Barton, who had reached Mooi River on the 18th, had, by
the night of the 22nd, under his orders Thorneycroft's mounted
infantry (490 strong), a battery and two sections of R.F.A., and about
4,000 infantry. Estcourt and Mooi River stations are 23 miles apart.
Although, therefore, the Boers had cut the railway and telegraphic
communication between the two stations, yet the situation of Gen.
Joubert (halted between two British forces, each equal in strength to
the two Boer commandos), was audacious, if not dangerous. Moreover, in
rear of Mooi River, further British reinforcements were disembarking
at Durban, and being pushed up to the front in a continuous stream.
The composition and exact distribution of the troops actually in
southern Natal on the 23rd November is given in Appendix 8. The
pendulum had thus swung completely over. The armoured train incident
was of no importance either tactically or strategically, and that
momentary success was the only one achieved by Joubert. The slow and
hesitating movements of the Boer columns had but hastened the
disembarkation and concentration of the troops destined for the relief
of Ladysmith. Finally, a tardy fit of rashness had induced the old
Commandant-General to place his burghers in peril.
[Sidenote: Exaggerated estimate of Boer strength causes hesitating
British action.]
The danger of Joubert's situation was not fully realised by the
British staff. The strength of the enemy's invading columns had been
magnified by rumour to 7,000, and the number of their guns doubled.
Moreover, the units at Mooi River, and in a lesser degree those at
Estcourt, had for the most part only just arrived from a long sea
voyage, and as yet lacked the organisation, transport, and physical
fitness necessary for rapid movements in the field. At Mooi River,
General Barton was without Intelligence staff, guides, or even a map.
Under these circumstances, the instructions issued by General Clery
from Maritzburg to his subordinate commanders were based on a policy
of cautious defensive, although he hoped that in a few days an
opportunity for striking at the enemy might arise. Thus, the six days,
from the 17th to the 22nd, were marked on the British side by advances
to, and withdrawals from, posts between Estcourt and Mooi River, which
showed a strong desire to avoid all risks. A detachment of the West
Yorkshire, with some mounted men, was despatched from Estcourt on the
17th to occupy Willow Grange, and on the following day a similar mixed
garrison was sent up to the Highlands from Mooi River; but on the
20th, under instructions from Maritzburg, both these garrisons were
withdrawn. The position of David Joubert's laager to the east of
Willow Grange was ascertained by the mounted troops of both Barton's
and Hildyard's forces, and on the night of the 20th the latter
despatched to Willow Grange eight companies of infantry and 430
mounted men under the command of Colonel Hinde, 1st battalion Border
regiment, intending an attack. But the enemy was judged by General
Hildyard to be too strongly posted, and the party was withdrawn to
Estcourt on the following day.
[Sidenote: Hildyard sends force against Brynbella, Nov. 22nd, under
Col. W. Kitchener. Action of Willow Grange.]
[Sidenote: Kitchener seizes Brynbella.]
On the morning of the 22nd, it was reported that the Boers had
occupied Brynbella, a commanding hill to the south of Estcourt about
700 feet above the level of the surrounding plateau, as an advanced
post. General Hildyard considered that this development offered a good
opportunity for striking a blow at the enemy, and he determined to
attempt the capture of the post, and of some guns it was reported to
contain. That afternoon, therefore, he moved a Naval 12-pr., the 7th
Field battery, a half-battalion 2nd West Surrey, 2nd battalion West
Yorkshire, Durban Light Infantry, and seven companies of the 2nd
battalion East Surrey regiment, to a height called Beacon Hill, which
lay between Estcourt and the enemy's position, about 3,000 yards
distant from the latter. Colonel W. Kitchener was entrusted with the
command of this force and directed to seize Brynbella by a night
attack. Beacon Hill was occupied without opposition, and the Naval
gun, Field battery, and 2nd Queen's were detailed to hold it as a
support to the attack; to these was subsequently added the 1st Border.
A thunderstorm of great severity now delayed the advance upon
Brynbella; the night was intensely dark; the rocky nature of the
ground and the absence of beaten tracks made the task of assembling
the troops and directing their movements extremely difficult. It was
not, therefore, until after midnight that the column, led by Colonel
Kitchener, moved forward under the guidance of a Natal colonist, Mr.
Chapman, who was unfortunately killed in action after he had
successfully accomplished his task. The march was made in column of
double companies. Owing to the darkness of the night and the broken
ground, the difficulty of keeping touch between the companies was
great; firing had been forbidden, but when half the distance had been
covered, a company reached a wall and rushed it, thinking that it was
the enemy's position; the next company was thrown into confusion, and
a third in rear and on higher ground opened fire and began cheering.
Colonel Kitchener with great coolness succeeded in restoring order,
but not before eight soldiers had been hit by bullets from their
comrades' rifles. The advance was then continued and Brynbella Hill
was occupied at 3.30 a.m. without further casualties. The Boer party,
which consisted of eighty Johannesburg policemen, under Lieut. van
Zyl, retired to a ridge about 1,500 yards further to the south. A
Creusot field gun had been withdrawn the previous evening after a
brief exchange of shots with the Naval gun on Beacon Hill.
[Sidenote: He falls back to Estcourt, Nov. 23rd.]
At daybreak next morning Kitchener's men came under the fire of the
Boer commando holding the southern ridge, and after some two hours'
skirmishing at long range the enemy began to creep forward, and the
rifle and gun fire gradually became very effective. Kitchener,
perceiving that no supports were being sent forward to him, decided to
retire, and in this carried out the Major-General's intentions. A
gradual withdrawal from the hill in groups of two or three was
therefore commenced. Mounted troops, which had left Estcourt at
daybreak under command of Lt.-Colonel C. G. Martyr, were now
protecting Kitchener's right flank; the squadron of Imperial Light
Horse, under Capt. H. Bottomley, dismounted and ascended Brynbella
Hill, where with much coolness and gallantry they covered the
retirement of the infantry. The Border was also moved forward from
Beacon Hill to support the retreating troops. In this manner the whole
was withdrawn and subsequently fell back on Estcourt, General Hildyard
having decided that it was better to keep his brigade concentrated,
ready to move in any direction that might be necessary. The total
British loss in this action was eleven men killed, one officer and
sixty-six men wounded, and one officer and seven men taken prisoners.
A considerable portion of these losses was due to the attempts of
combatants to assist the wounded to the rear during the
retirement.[183]
[Footnote 183: This practice had grown up in the British
service through the large number of wars with savages, who
killed the wounded and mutilated the dead.]
[Sidenote: Joubert, Nov. 25th, retreats.]
The action of Willow Grange brought home to Joubert the fact that his
commandos were in a hazardous situation, and in that way, therefore,
tended to clear south Natal of the enemy. If the Estcourt and Mooi
River forces could have closed on the Boer laager simultaneously, it
is probable that more important results would have been achieved. To
gain this object Major-General Hildyard despatched on the 22nd a
written message to Major-General Barton, stating his plan of attack,
and asking for his co-operation. Unfortunately this message was not
sent in duplicate, and the native to whom it was entrusted did not
deliver it until 10.30 a.m. on the following morning; by that time
Hildyard's troops had withdrawn from Brynbella, and were retiring on
Estcourt. The Boer Commandant-General was not disposed to run any more
risks, and by the 25th the burghers were in full retreat back to the
Tugela, taking with them much cattle and many valuable horses, which,
in spite of the vehement remonstrances of Piet Joubert, had been
looted from the rich grazing grounds of central Natal. The main body
of the Boers moved eastward to gain the crossing of Bushman's river at
Weenen. A small detachment passed round Estcourt about twelve miles to
the westward.
[Sidenote: Boers escape over Tugela unscathed. Nov. 28th.]
A reconnoitring column, consisting of about 300 of Thorneycroft's
regiment and four guns, with two infantry battalions left close to the
camp, in support, was pushed out on the 24th November by General
Barton from Mooi River to feel for the Boers. It came in touch with
the enemy, but the force was not deemed sufficiently strong to press
an attack. On the 26th General Hildyard, with the bulk of his troops,
advanced to Frere, hoping to intercept the Boers' eastern column, and
on the following day General Barton marched from Mooi River to
Estcourt. But the burghers, now disorganised and alarmed, fell back
too fast to be seriously molested, and on the 28th, when Lord
Dundonald advanced with a field battery and all available mounted
troops on Colenso, the Boer rearguard merely withdrew across the road
bridge. The demolition that evening of the railway bridge was a proof
that any lingering hope, which the Boers may up to that date have
cherished of mastering southern Natal, was abandoned.
[Sidenote: Boers on east hold Helpmakaar and patrol from it.]
On the eastern side of northern Natal,[184] a Boer force about 800
strong, under Commandant Ferreira, consisting of the Piet Retief and
Bethel commandos, and about 120 Natal rebels, was still in occupation
of Helpmakaar, patrolling country on the left bank of the Tugela from
below Colenso. They went as far as Rorke's Drift. One of these patrols
attempted to cross the river at the Tugela Ferry on the 23rd November,
but was repulsed by the Umvoti Rifles, commanded by Major Leuchars.
Further east again small parties of Boers had raided into Zululand,
but their movements were of no importance.
[Footnote 184: See map No. 3.]