TALANA HILL.[86]
[Footnote 86: See maps Nos. 3, 5, and the panoramic sketch.]
[Sidenote: Connection with Chap. II.]
The last four chapters have dealt with subjects affecting the whole
course of the war, the theatre of operations, the two opposed armies,
and the British navy. The present one, which describes the first
action in the campaign, connects immediately with the second, that on
the outbreak of the war, taking up the narrative from the time when,
as a consequence of the conference at Maritzburg between the Governor
(Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson), Sir George White, Sir A. Hunter and
Maj.-Genl. Sir W. Penn Symons, the latter officer had been despatched
to take over the command at Dundee while Sir George White had gone to
Ladysmith.
[Sidenote: Arrival, Oct. 12th/99 of Symons at Dundee.]
On October 12th, the day when the British agent quitted Pretoria,
Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons arrived at Dundee, and took over
command of 3,280 infantry, 497 cavalry and eighteen guns from
Brigadier-General J. H. Yule.[87] He had gained his point. Dundee was
to be held, and held by him. As early as the 13th news came that a
strong commando was concentrating at the Doornberg east of De Jager's
Drift, and that small parties of the enemy had been sighted four miles
north of Newcastle, whilst to his left rear the Free Staters were
reported so close to Ladysmith, and in such strength, as to cause Sir
George White to recall one of Symons' own battalions, the 2nd Royal
Dublin Fusiliers, to strengthen a column which was pushed out on
October 13th towards Tintwa Pass to get touch with the enemy. This
column[88] failed, however, to observe even patrols of the enemy, and
the Dublin Fusiliers returned to Dundee by train the same night. On
this day the enemy fell upon a piquet of Natal Policemen posted at De
Jager's Drift, and made them prisoners. A patrol of the 18th Hussars
proceeding to reconnoitre the spot next day, the 14th, came upon a
scouting party of forty of the enemy a mile on the British side of the
Buffalo. On the 16th a fugitive from Newcastle announced the arrival
of a commando, 3,000 strong, before Newcastle, another in Botha's
Pass, whilst across Wools Drift, on the Buffalo, six miles of wagons
had been seen trekking slowly southwards. If the left, then, was for
the moment clear, it was plain that strong bodies were coming down on
Symons' front and right, a front whose key was Impati, a right whose
only bulwark was the hill of Talana.
[Footnote 87: For composition of this force see Appendix 3.]
[Footnote 88: Composition: 5th Lancers, detachment of 19th
Hussars, Natal Mounted Rifles, three batteries Royal Field
artillery, 1st Liverpool, 1st Devonshire, 2nd Gordon
Highlanders.]
[Sidenote: Oct. 12th Joubert also starts.]
Joubert quitted Zandspruit on the 12th October, and was at Volksrust
in the evening, with the forces of Generals Kock and Lukas Meyer
thrown widely forward on his right and left flanks respectively. Kock,
coming through Botha's Pass with his motley foreign levies,[89] halted
for the night at the mouth of the defile, whilst the units of the left
horn of the invading crescent, reinforced this day by the commandos of
Middelburg and Wakkerstroom, lay under Meyer some forty miles
eastward, some in Utrecht, some in Vryheid, and some already at the
concentration point, the Doornberg. On the 13th, whilst the wings
remained quiescent, Joubert, with the main column, occupied Laing's
Nek, having first, either by an excess of precaution, or from a fear
lest the gap between him and Meyer were too great, made good that
formidable obstacle by a turning movement around the left and over the
Buffalo at Wools Drift; this was executed by his advance guard
(Pretoria, Boksburg, part of Heidelberg, Standerton, Ermelo) under
Erasmus. But though a coal-truck drawn by cables through the long
tunnel, which penetrated the Nek, proved it to be neither blocked nor
mined, this stroke of fortune rather increased than allayed the
caution of the Boer General, to whom, grown old in Native wars,
nothing appeared more suspicious than an unimpeded advance against an
enemy. On the 14th he was still on the Nek, whilst Erasmus moved
timidly on Newcastle, and Kock, who remained on the Ingagane,
despatched a reconnoitring party of the German Corps along the
Drakensberg, to gain touch with Trüter's Free Staters at Müller's
Pass. This patrol, riding back next day, found Newcastle occupied by
the commandos of Erasmus. The little town was almost empty of
inhabitants, and the burghers wrought havoc amongst the deserted shops
and houses. Not all the remonstrances of their officers, nor the
general order from Headquarters, nor even the heavy wrath of their
Commandant-General, who arrived in the town on the 18th, could stop
their ruthless plundering, and by nightfall the township was a scene
of sordid devastation.
[Footnote 89: See Appendix 4.]
[Sidenote: Joubert's net.]
On the afternoon of the 16th Joubert called a council of war. So far
he had been without any settled scheme, and, owing to the straggling
and indiscipline of his burghers, the march was rapidly becoming
unmanageable. The commander, whose plans and army require
consolidation after but four days, may well look with foreboding upon
the campaign he has taken in hand, and Joubert was as little hopeful
as any invader in history. Nevertheless, at Newcastle he devised a net
which, had it been cast as he designed, might by entangling one
British force beyond salvation, have weakened another beyond repair
and perhaps have laid Natal at his feet. Whilst Erasmus with his 5,000
men moved straight down upon Dundee, Kock with 800 riflemen, composed
of Schiel's Germans, Lombard's Hollanders, and 200 men of Johannesburg
under Viljoen, with two guns, was to reconnoitre towards Ladysmith,
gaining touch with the Free Staters at Van Reenen's and the other
passes of the Drakensberg. He was then to take up a position in the
Biggarsberg range, cutting the railway between Dundee and Ladysmith.
Thus isolated, the garrison of Dundee appeared to be at the mercy of
a combined attack by Erasmus from the north, and Lukas Meyer from the
east.
[Sidenote: Slow movement of Boers.]
Kock and Erasmus had left the neighbourhood of Newcastle on the 17th,
and on the afternoon of the 18th the latter's advance guard came into
collision with a squadron of the 18th Hussars, from Dundee, north of
Hatting Spruit. Meanwhile Meyer, who was much behindhand with his
concentration, lay so close in his camp at the Doornberg, that the
British patrols scouted up to De Jager's Drift again without
opposition. Meyer still lacked two commandos (Krugersdorp and Bethel)
and four guns, and as his transport animals were in a deplorable
condition, it was with relief rather than with impatience that he
watched the tardiness of his coadjutors. His missing units arrived in
the evening, however; Erasmus' advanced guard was close behind Impati
on the morning of the 19th, and Meyer then issued orders for a march.
[Sidenote: Sir George White recalls Dundee detachment.]
Meanwhile, on the 15th October, an officer of the Headquarter staff
visited Dundee, and on his return to Ladysmith was questioned by Sir
G. White as to the state of the defences existing at the post. To his
surprise he learnt that, properly speaking, no defences existed at
all--no position, no entrenchments, and, most important of all, no
assured and defended supply of water. His instructions, in short,
conditional upon which alone he had consented to the retention of
Dundee, had not been carried out. Not until three days had elapsed,
however, did he telegraph to Sir W. Penn Symons that, failing an
assurance of compliance, Dundee must be evacuated at once. In answer,
Symons admitted that he could not give the required assurance, and
must therefore carry out the order to retire. At the same time he
stated his requirements in the matter of rolling-stock for the
withdrawal of military stores and the non-combatant inhabitants of
Dundee. This reply raised a new point. To send the whole of the
rolling-stock--and nothing less would suffice--would be to expose it
to the gravest danger, for the railway line was in hourly insecurity.
Two hours after the despatch of his first telegram, therefore, Sir
George White sent a second, which became the determining factor of
subsequent events.
"With regard to water, are you confident you can supply your camp for
an indefinite period? The difficulties and risk of withdrawing of
civil population and military stores are great. The railway may be cut
any day. Do you yourself, after considering these difficulties, think
it better to remain at Dundee, and prefer it?"
[Sidenote: Cancels recall.]
Sir W. Penn Symons replied as follows: "We can and must stay here. I
have no doubt whatever that this is the proper course. I have
cancelled all orders for moving."
The question thus finally decided for good or ill, Sir George White
sent a third telegram:
"I fully support you. Make particulars referred to by me as safe as
possible. Difficulties and disadvantages of other course have decided
me to support your views."
[Sidenote: Symons faces a known situation.]
Sir W. Penn Symons, his only fear about Dundee--that of being
withdrawn from it--thus finally removed, turned to the front again to
face the converging enemy with equanimity. His information continued
to be full and accurate. Erasmus' advance, Meyer's concentration at
the Doornberg, Kock's circuitous passage over the Biggarsberg, were
all known to him. On October 19th he received detailed warning that an
attack was to be made on him that very night by Erasmus from the
north, Meyer from the east, and Viljoen from the west. By midday,
communication by rail with Ladysmith was cut off--not, however, until
a party of fifty of the 1st King's Royal Rifles had returned in safety
from a visit to Waschbank, where they had rescued some derelict trucks
left by a train, which, having been fired on at Elandslaagte, had
dropped them for greater speed. Three companies 2nd Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, which had been railed to the Navigation Collieries,
north-east of Hatting Spruit, at 3 a.m., to bring back eight tons of
mealies which the General was unwilling to leave for the enemy, also
returned in safety.
[Sidenote: Meyer Oct. 19th moves forward.]
[Sidenote: Oct. 20th, 2.30 a.m., seizes Talana.]
At sundown on October 19th, Lukas Meyer left his bivouac with about
3,500 men and seven guns. De Jager's Drift was crossed about 9 p.m.;
then, pressing through the Sunday's[90] river south-west of Maybole
farm, Meyer's force emerged on to the bleak expanse of veld stretching
east of Dundee. The Boer scouts, moving parallel to and north of the
Landman's Drift road, drew with great caution towards Talana. At 2.30
a.m. a party of burghers came upon a British piquet of the Dublin
Fusiliers mounted infantry, commanded by Lieut. C. T. W. Grimshaw, at
the junction of the road with the track to Vant's Drift. Shots were
exchanged, the piquet disappeared, and the Boer advance guard was upon
the flat summit of Talana an hour before dawn, with Dundee sleeping
five hundred feet below. Close on the heels of the scouts pressed the
Utrecht and Wakkerstroom commandos, under Commandants Hatting and
Joshua Joubert, of about 900 and 600 men respectively, with some 300
Krugersdorpers under Potgieter in addition, and a few men of the
Ermelo commando. The rest of the main body, consisting of the Vryheid
commando (600 men, under Van Staaden), the Middelburg commando (some
900 men, under Trichardt), portion of the Swazi Police, portion of the
Piet Retief commando (170 men, under Englebrecht), and odd men of the
Bethel and other absent commandos, made their way rapidly across the
Dundee road, and took up position on the heights south of it. Of the
artillery, two field-pieces (Creusot 75 m/m) were hauled into a
depression nearly at the rear edge of the top of Talana, a "pom-pom"
(37·5 m/m Vickers-Maxim) pushed forward to the advanced crest of the
same eminence, and the remainder, consisting of two Krupps (75 m/m)
and two more pom-poms, sent across under charge of the Vryheid men to
their position to the south.
[Footnote 90: See map No. 5.]
[Sidenote: The ground of Talana.]
Talana Hill, situated about 5,000 yards east of the British camp, from
which it was separated by the wire-intersected environs of Dundee and
by the sunken bed of the Sand Spruit, was peculiarly adapted for
defence. From the summit a precipitous rocky face dropped on the
Dundee side to a nearly flat terrace, 160 feet below it, whose fifty
to eighty yards of width were commanded throughout by the
boulder-strewn brow of the mountain. A low stone wall bounded this
terrace at its outer edge, immediately below which the hillside again
fell suddenly, affording from ten to fifteen yards of ground dead to
the crest directly above it, but vulnerable to fire, both from Lennox
Hill, a slightly higher eminence on the other side of a Nek to the
south-east, and from a salient protruding from the northern extremity
of the hill. From the wall bounding the upper terrace, however, other
walls, running downhill, intersected this face of the mountain at
right angles, and served as low traverses affording some protection
from flanking fire. These formed the enclosures of Smith's farm, a
group of tree-encircled buildings around an open space at the base of
the mountain, near its centre, and some 400 feet below its summit.
Below, and on either side of the homestead stood copses of eucalyptus
trees, which, roughly in all some 500 yards square, occupied the top
of the glacis whose base was the Sand Spruit, which 800 yards of bare
and open grassland separated from the edge of the wood.[91]
[Footnote 91: A sketch of the position, as seen from the side
of the British advance from Dundee, will be found in the case
of maps accompanying this volume.]
[Sidenote: Symons receives the news.]
Such was the position crowned by the Boer commandos in the first light
of October 20th. Swift as had been its captors, news of their success
was at once in the hands of the British commander. At 3 a.m. a
sergeant from Grimshaw's piquet, which had been surprised at the cross
roads, hurried into camp and reported the approach of the enemy in
force across the veld. Sir W. Penn Symons thereupon ordered two
companies of the Dublin Fusiliers to turn out in support. The rest of
the camp slept undisturbed, and the two companies, stumbling through
the dark and obstructed suburbs of Dundee, gained the shelter of the
Sand Spruit, where they found Grimshaw already arrived. The first
shots had stampeded his horses, which had galloped back to Smith's
Nek, the col between Talana and Lennox Hills. Retiring on foot, the
piquet had gained the Nek, recovered its horses, and making its way
first to Smith's farm, and thence to the cover of the Sand Spruit, had
turned and faced the enemy as he appeared over the crest of Talana
Hill.
[Sidenote: The morning parade dismissed.]
At 5 a.m. the British troops stood to arms as usual. It was a wet and
misty morning. As the men, few of whom knew of the occurrences of the
night, waited in quarter-column, to a few keen ears came the fitful
sound of musketry from the east. It was the fire of Grimshaw's piquet
just then at bay below Talana. The parade having been dismissed, at
5.20 a message from Headquarters assured commanding officers that all
was clear. A few companies moved directly from their lines for
skirmishing drill around the camp, the men of others hung about in
groups expecting the word to fall in for a similar purpose; the horses
of two of the three batteries, and all the transport animals, filed
out to water a mile and a half away. Suddenly at 5.30 a.m., the mist
upon Talana, wasting before the rising sun, lifted and revealed the
summit alive with figures.
[Sidenote: The Boers make their presence known.]
Ten minutes later the report of a gun sounded from the top, and a
projectile fell into the western enclosures of the town. Others,
better aimed, followed in quick succession; the camp came under a
rapid bombardment, accurate but harmless, for the small common shell
from the enemy's field-pieces failed to explode on impact with the
sodden ground. The cavalry and the mounted infantry, whose horses had
remained in camp, moved out of sight behind a stony kopje in front of
it; the infantry, already equipped, fell rapidly into their places,
each company before its own line of tents, and were immediately
marched at the "double" into the shelter of a ravine some 200 yards to
the south of the camp, where fighting formations were organised.
[Sidenote: Symons prepares to clear Talana.]
The General had already decided upon an assault. Before the infantry
were clear of camp he called out the artillery. Whilst the 67th
battery, whose horses were now hurrying back from water, replied to
the Boer shells from the gun-park itself, the 69th battery, already
horsed, waiting neither for its wagons nor an escort, galloped out
along the road to the railway station, swept through the town, and
swinging sharply to the right at the south-eastern extremity, came
into action on a roll of the veld immediately west of the colliery
extension railway line. As it advanced the Boers turned their guns
upon it, but within twenty minutes of the falling of the first shell
in camp, the 69th commenced a rapid and effective fire at 3,750 yards
upon the crest. Ten minutes later the 13th battery wheeled into line
alongside the 69th. In five minutes more the practice of the Boer
ordnance dropped to spasmodic bursts; in five more it was temporarily
silenced. Meanwhile the General, who had ridden out soon after the
batteries, had set his infantry in motion, and so fast did they go
forward that before the 69th had ended its first round they were
already almost beyond Dundee.
[Sidenote: He guards against Erasmus and gives orders for attack.]
To the 67th battery and the 1st Leicestershire regiment, with one
company from each of the other battalions, was now entrusted the
defence of the camp from the expected attack of Erasmus from Impati.
An officer of the King's Royal Rifles carried the orders to the
cavalry from the General: "Colonel Möller is to wait under cover, it
may be for one or two hours, and I will send him word when to advance.
But he may advance if he sees a good opportunity. The M.I. are to go
with the 18th Hussars." The Royal Dublin Fusiliers were first in the
bed of the spruit at about 6.30 a.m., picking up the two companies
which had lain there since 4.30 a.m. in support of Grimshaw's piquet.
By 7 a.m. the whole of the infantry were in security in the same
shelter, 1,600 to 2,000 yards from the crest of the position. General
Penn Symons himself then rode down thither, and sending for commanding
officers, detailed orders for the assault. The Dublin Fusiliers were
to form the first line, with the King's Royal Rifles in support, the
Royal Irish Fusiliers in reserve. Brigadier-General Yule would command
the attack.
[Sidenote: Infantry push up the hill.]
[Sidenote: A treacherous donga.]
At 7.20 a.m. the right-hand company of the Dublin emerged from the
Sand Spruit, the men extended to ten paces interval, and steadily in
quick-time moved towards the boundary of the wood. The other
companies, advancing in order from the right, soon followed. Before
the last of them was fairly clear, the King's Royal Rifles were
released and pressed forward. On the appearance of the first lines, a
hot fire, direct from Talana itself and crosswise from Lennox Hill on
the right, quickly caused casualties. Eager to be at closer quarters,
the men increased their pace, breaking from quick-time into the
double, and from that to a swift run upon the edge of the wood. A low
stone wall, topped by a broken-down fence of wire which ringed the
copse on this side, was tumbled flat, and the foremost soldiers of
the Dublin, pouring through the thicket, penetrated to the wall and
hedge on the farther side. Here their line was prolonged by the King's
Royal Rifles, who had come through the wood on the right. In front of
this line the crest of Talana was 550 yards distant. With the Dublin
Fusiliers, the general trend had been towards the left; now after a
short pause at the edge of the plantation they attempted to push on in
that direction. Enticed by a donga, which, quitting the wood at its
northern angle, looked like a covered way towards the crest of the
hill, the three leading companies ("A." "F." and "G.") worked steadily
along it in hopes of arriving within striking distance of the enemy
under comparative shelter. But the watercourse not only faded to
nothing before it reached the terrace wall, but was open to the
enemy's view and enfiladed by his musketry throughout its length. A
storm of bullets descending into it when it teemed with men, brought
down many and checked further progress.
[Sidenote: K.R.R. and Dublin reach edge of wood.]
[Sidenote: K.R.R. hold Smith's farm.]
Of the King's Royal Rifles, four companies, under Colonel R. H.
Gunning, advancing through the right-hand half of the plantation,
found themselves amongst the Dublin Fusiliers at its forward edge, and
became in part intermingled with them. The three remaining companies
moved upon the buildings of Smith's farm, and gained the front and
right edges. Somewhat ahead of the general line, this portion of the
force was enfiladed from the crest of Talana on its left, and from
Lennox Hill on its right, and received so hot a cross-fire that it was
ordered to fall back to the cover of the farm walls. This it did with
the loss of three officers and many men; but from their more secure
location the Rifles here began a telling reply, both upon the crest in
front and upon the clouds of sharpshooters which hung upon the summit
and slopes of Lennox Hill.
[Sidenote: "B." and "H." of R.I.F. on left of wood.]
[Sidenote: Maxims at S.E. angle.]
Lieut.-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers,
immediately on entering the plantation, had detached two of his
companies ("B." and "H.") to line the left face of the wood, whence
they could watch the open ground beyond that flank. These sent volleys
against the enemy's right upon Talana. The remainder were held in
reserve, as ordered, amongst the small dongas and depressions in the
wood. The Maxim guns of all three battalions moved to the
south-eastern angle of the wood, and opened at 1,700 yards upon
Smith's Nek and Lennox Hill to their right front and right, doing much
to alleviate the musketry which came incessantly from these flanking
and partially invisible eminences.
[Sidenote: 69th and 13th batteries change their ground.]
[Sidenote: Reduced fire.]
[Sidenote: Symons gives impulse.]
[Sidenote: He receives his mortal wound.]
Such was the situation at eight o'clock. At that hour the 69th and
13th batteries, quitting the position from which they had silenced the
Boer artillery, moved through the town, and unlimbered on rising
ground between the eastern boundary of Dundee and the Sand Spruit.
Thence they opened again, the 69th upon Talana at 2,300 yards, the
13th upon Lennox Hill at 2,500. Though they and their escort of King's
Royal Riflemen were targets for both hills, their practice was
admirable, and had it been more rapid, must speedily have smothered
the enemy's fire. But the artillery commander, fearing to run short,
and knowing his inability to replenish, was obliged continually to
check expenditure.[92] For a time the fight remained stationary. The
momentum of the attack had died away, and Yule found it impossible to
get it in motion again at once, in spite of numerous messages he
received from Sir W. Penn Symons urging immediate advance. At 9 a.m.
the infantry being still inert, the patience of the General was
exhausted. Despite the remonstrances of his staff, he, with three
staff officers and orderlies, rode into the wood, and, dismounting,
hurried into the foremost lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, at its
northern angle. Calling to these to "push on!" he then pressed along
inside the boundary, animating by word and gesture all the troops he
passed, and halted for a moment to face the hill a little beyond where
the afore-mentioned donga disappeared into the wood. Here Major F.
Hammersley, of his staff, was wounded, and, immediately after, the
General himself was shot in the stomach. Directing Brigadier-General
Yule to proceed with the attack, he turned and walked calmly to the
rear. Then, meeting his horse, he mounted, and not until he had passed
entirely through the troops was any sign of suffering allowed to
escape him. At the station of the Bearer company he dismounted, and
was carried to the dressing station in a dhoolie. Five minutes later,
at 9.35 a.m., the surgeon pronounced his wound to be fatal, and the
news was telegraphed to Ladysmith.
[Footnote 92: There were for each gun 154 rounds, including
60 reserve.]
[Sidenote: His impulse tells.]
[Sidenote: K.R.R. seize wall of upper terrace.]
[Sidenote: R.I.F join and also threaten Boer right.]
The life of the General was not thrown away; his action had immediate
effect. Before he had quitted the wood a dying man, parties of
soldiers were already pushing forward from its front wall across the
100 yards of bullet-swept flat intervening between them and the first
slopes of Talana proper. On the right, the first to break cover, four
and a half companies of the King's Royal Rifles emerged in small
parties from Smith's farm. Leaving there two companies in support,
they pushed up along the right side of the transverse wall, in full
view of Lennox Hill, and suffering from its fire. So rapid were their
movements that the Boer shooting was hasty and ill-aimed, and the
losses were but few. Some distance forward they leapt across to the
left of the transverse wall, and reconnoitring that bounding the upper
terrace, found it, to their surprise, unoccupied by the enemy.[93]
Other groups, in response to signals, then worked their way upward,
until soon a considerable number of Riflemen were under the wall. On
their left the Royal Irish Fusiliers supported the attack. Two and a
half companies ("E.," "F." and half of "C.") of this battalion had,
when General Symons came to the front, been sent to the edge of the
wood, and these, seeing what the Rifles had done, streamed straight up
to the wall. "A." and half of "D." companies, which had been boldly
and independently handled wide on the left, avoiding the dongas,
pushed on gradually to well within five hundred yards of the enemy's
extreme right, on which they brought their rifles to bear. The other
half of "C." company, with men of other battalions, amounting to about
one hundred in all, had lain with the three companies of King's Royal
Rifles in the enclosure of Smith's farm, and advanced with them. One
company ("B.") Royal Irish Fusiliers had been ordered forward on the
left by General Symons himself immediately he arrived in the wood.
This company, perceiving the fallacious donga winding apparently to
the front, had dropped into it, and following it up with the same
expectations as had encouraged the Dublin Fusiliers, was speedily in
the same predicament at its open extremity. Another company ("H."),
taking this route with many losses, was similarly blocked at the same
point. But with the exception of these two companies, which could not
move for a time, the advance of the King's Royal Rifles to the wall
was strongly backed by the Royal Irish Fusiliers, whose men appeared
from all the near parts of the hill to join in with the rest. With
them ran many of the Dublin Fusiliers. This regiment, much entangled
in the watercourse already mentioned and in others equally exposed and
useless more to the right, could not progress, and, though a few men
managed to reach the upper wall direct, it was only possible to do so
by first going back to the edge of the wood, an attempt of great
hazard.
[Footnote 93: The omission of the Boers to man this
breastwork, situated as it was within 400 yards of the edge
of the wood, and commanding every inch of the ground in
front, was not owing to any fears on the part of Lukas Meyer
as to its not being tenable. The orders of that general had
been plainly that the wall was to be held, but as he did not
remain to see them carried out, the burghers, fearing to hold
what appeared to them isolated and inadequate cover,
neglected it entirely.]
[Sidenote: Two hours check.]
[Sidenote: Guns gallop forward.]
[Sidenote: The Infantry dash in.]
[Sidenote: The onslaught having weakened, the Artillery opens fire
again.]
The battle came to a standstill once more. The upper wall was won, but
the heavy and incessant fusilade directed upon it and upon the ground
below it, rendered its occupation precarious, and reinforcement a
matter of extreme difficulty. Not until two hours had passed were
sufficient men collected under it to render the last stage possible,
and the long delay cost many casualties. At 11 a.m. the officer
commanding the artillery received a request by flag-signal to cease
firing, as the assault was about to be delivered. He did so; but time
to acquire strength was still needed, and the artillery, itself
harassed by musketry, re-opened. At 11.30 a.m. the order was repeated,
and once more Colonel E. H. Pickwoad stopped his guns. Immediately
after, the batteries galloped forward, awaking against themselves the
full energy of all parts of the Boer line. They crossed a wide donga
and came into action again on the flat plain between the Sand Spruit
and Talana, sending their shells clear over and past the left edge of
the wood at a range of 1,400 yards from the crest of the enemy's
stronghold. Under the rapid bombardment the Mausers slackened and at
last were silent. For the third time the order was signalled to cease
firing. It was duly obeyed. Colonel Gunning, of the King's Royal
Rifles, who had called up his two supporting companies from Smith's
farm, passed the word, "Get ready to go over!" The men rose to their
knees; then, at the command "Advance!" scrambled and fell over the
obstacle. A blaze burst from the crest as the first figures wavered on
the wall, and many fell backward dead or wounded. Some could not
surmount the obstruction, which in parts was over-high for vaulting;
some, falling on the far side, picked themselves up and were struck
down in the first leap of their charge. A few, more fortunate, held
on. But the onset had not much weight, and losses quickly lightened it
still further. Many of the Boers had fled at the first sight of the
soldiers rushing forward, but of those who remained, not a few
actually came towards them, and shot rapidly point-blank at the
assailants, who were clawing their way up the last precipitous rampart
of the natural fortress. The artillery, therefore, knowing only that
the onslaught had been checked, about 12.30 p.m. re-opened with quick
and devastating rounds. But during the charge, the light had been bad,
and the gunners had not all observed the foremost groups of their
comrades lying amongst the rocks close to the crest. Soon shell after
shell burst amongst the latter.
[Sidenote: It checks both sides.]
A signaller of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, standing up near the top of
the hill, attracted the attention of the artillerymen, but was unable
to make them understand his message. Another of the same regiment
failed similarly from the wall. As the discharges, destroying both
combatants alike, became more overwhelming, both drew back. On the
extreme right a few of the Rifles still clung on. At first the Boers
melted from the front alone, but the shrapnel beat all over the hill,
and the retreat became a run before the rear edge was reached.
[Sidenote: The final charge.]
Behind the wall the regimental commanders, taking the cessation of
Boer fire as signal for a last successful attack, met in hasty
conference, and agreed to lead their men forward simultaneously. Soon
after 1 p.m. the whole British line surged over the wall, and
clambering up the hill, flooded its flat summit from end to end.
[Sidenote: The Boers abandon Lennox Hill.]
[Sidenote: Cavalry and guns both fail to make defeat crushing.]
[Sidenote: A fatal error.]
From Lennox Hill this final charge was marked, and in a few moments
it, too, was empty of Boers. Before 2 p.m. the entire position was
won, and Brigadier-General Yule, to whom the loss of General Symons
had given the command, at once ordered the artillery to the summit of
Smith's Nek, from whence they might shell the now flying foe. The
cavalry, looked for amongst the defeated Boers, who covered the plain
for miles in the direction of the Buffalo river, were nowhere to be
seen. On the guns then rested the last hope of confirming the victory,
but they, having gained the Nek, were, to the wonderment of all,
pointed silently at the receding commandos. Doubt had at this critical
moment assailed the artillery commander. Just before the final stroke,
about 1.30 p.m., a message, purporting to come from Lukas Meyer,
proposing an armistice to look for the wounded, had passed through his
hands on its way to the General. No authoritative information as to
its having been accorded or not having reached him, he, with other
officers, became uncertain as to the propriety of continuing the
battle. At this time a bystander exclaimed that the Boer hospital was
retreating before him, and believing that he himself saw red-crossed
flags waving over the Boer column moving slowly away within shrapnel
range, his hesitation deepened. He refrained from opening fire, and
the Boer army, defeated, but not crushed, made despondently, but
without further losses, for the laager under the Doornberg, from which
it had marched the night before.
[Sidenote: The return to camp.]
Brigadier-General Yule, beset with anxiety concerning the Boer army,
which had menaced his flank all day from Impati, had no thought but to
secure his men in quarters before night and the still expected attack
fell upon them together. The infantry, therefore, after searching the
hill for wounded, were sent from the field. By 6 p.m., as evening fell
amid a storm of rain, all were back in camp. The mounted troops alone,
unseen since the early morning, did not return to their lines, nor was
there any sign of them until, at 7 p.m., two squadrons of the 18th
Hussars, under Major Knox, reported themselves. No more came in that
night, nor next morning, nor at any time.
[Sidenote: Möller's disastrous day.]
The brief orders given to Colonel Möller at the commencement of the
action have already been detailed, and even before the enemy's guns
were silenced that officer began to put them into execution with
promise of brilliant results. As early as 5.45 a.m. he despatched a
squadron of the 18th Hussars, with instructions to move round the
northern extremity of Talana, and report if it were possible to take
ground on the flank from which the enemy's retreat or, at least, his
loose ponies might be threatened. The reconnaissance was perfectly
successful. Moving northwards a mile down an arm of the Sand Spruit,
under the harmless fire of two guns, Major E. C. Knox guided his
squadron across the watercourse, and hidden, by the mist from Impati,
by a spur from Talana, turned north-east. Then crossing the main
spruit, above the point where its northerly trend is deflected by the
spurs of the two mountains, he swung boldly south-east and,
unperceived by the enemy, seized a kopje from which he could actually
look into the right rear of their position upon Talana, only 1,200
yards distant to the south-west. Behind the mountain stood herds of
saddled ponies, whose masters lay out of sight in action along the
western crest. A message despatched to Colonel Möller informing him of
this achievement, and asking for reinforcements, brought to the spot
another squadron of the 18th and the regimental machine gun, with the
section of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry. These made their
way at first through a sharp fire from the pom-pom near the northern
end of Talana, but, like their predecessors, were neglected as soon as
they moved out of sight around the spur swelling up from the Sand
Spruit to the right flank of the Boer fastness. Shortly afterwards, in
response to a message from the General, who thought that the enemy's
guns, now suddenly silent, were being withdrawn, and that a general
retreat would shortly follow, Colonel Möller himself hurried after
with the remaining squadron of the 18th and the mounted infantry
company of the Dublin Fusiliers. The cavalry were now in rear of the
flank of an enemy already wavering, and certain to fly shortly, whose
lines of retreat would be at their mercy, whose means of retreat, the
ponies, they could already partially destroy. But here, Möller,
refusing the requests of his subordinates to be allowed to open fire
on the closely-packed ponies on Talana, first despatched a squadron
under Major Knox towards the rear of Talana, then himself quitted his
vantage ground and lined up his force in some plough land towards
Schultz' farm, and later in the open veld astride of the Landman's
Drift road, two and a half miles in rear of the centre of the Boer
position. Whilst moving in accordance with these dispositions, a
section of the Dublin Fusiliers mounted infantry, turning aside to
assail a party of Boers in a small farmhouse on the flank, captured
seven of them.
[Sidenote: Knox's happy charge.]
Meanwhile the squadron under Knox, reconnoitring towards the rear of
Smith's Nek, had been harassed by hostile patrols on its left flank.
These were speedily dispersed with a loss of ten prisoners by the
charge of a troop. But other and stronger patrols coming up from the
direction of Landman's Drift hung so persistently on the flank that a
charge by the whole squadron was necessary. It was completely
successful, two of the enemy being killed and about twenty-five
captured. The other patrols then drew off, and the squadron, finding
nothing more to do, returned to hand over the prisoners. But Möller,
seeing the enemy swarming about the rear of Lennox Hill, at once
ordered Knox out again in that direction, this time with two squadrons
and a troop, directing him to get behind the hill, which, in
prolongation of Lennox Hill to the south, overlooks the coalfields on
one side and on the other abuts on the heights of Halifax.
[Sidenote: Möller's surrender.]
He himself remained out in the open with his diminished force of
mounted infantry and two troops of cavalry. Now the enemy were
quitting Talana and Lennox Hills in numbers which increased
momentarily, and when the mounted infantry opened fire upon them, they
began to converge on the insignificant party which barred the road to
safety. Möller at length perceived his danger, and commencing a series
of rapid retirements towards the northern spur of Impati, fixed his
only hope on the possibility of riding completely around that
mountain, outwork though it was of the main Boer army in its descent
from the frontier. In a spruit, a branch of the Sand river, which runs
through Schultz' farm, the Maxim, outpaced and overdriven, stuck fast,
and it was promptly attacked and captured by a party of twenty-five of
the enemy who had descried its plight from Talana, its detachment
holding out until all were killed or wounded. In this affair nine Boer
prisoners were also released. About 1.15 p.m., a party of two hundred
Boers was seen descending Impati through the collieries at its
northern extremity. The mountain already held the enemy's van;
Möller's retreat was cut off. Adelaide farm lay close ahead, and here
for the first time he faced about for a stand. The men of the 18th
Hussars, with the section of the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry,
and one of the Dublin mounted infantry, lined the farm walls; the
remaining two sections of the mounted infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers
held a small kopje, two hundred yards from the building. The Boers
closed around in force and poured a bitter fusilade upon the troopers.
A gun, which had opened ineffectively from the colliery, was then
brought forward to 1,400 yards, and its projectiles shattered the
buildings, and scattered the horses. In a few moments another gun
opened more to the left and 1,100 yards distant. At 4 p.m. the white
flag was by Möller's order waved in the farmyard, and he capitulated
to Commandant Trichardt. Nine officers and 205 men laid down their
arms after a loss of 8 men killed, 3 officers and 20 men wounded. This
affair all but doubled the day's casualties, which now numbered
500.[94]
[Footnote 94: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.]
[Sidenote: Knox wins his way home.]
Meanwhile Knox's two squadrons were in little less danger in the
opposite direction. Attempting to intercept with dismounted fire
parties of the enemy, who were retiring towards Halifax, the little
force became the focus of every wandering party of the enemy, not only
of those evacuating the positions of Talana and Lennox Hill, but also
of many riding in from the Buffalo. For the hills and plain were full
of Boers who had taken no part in the battle. But Knox was not to be
trapped. Moving swiftly towards Malungeni, and favoured by a slight
mist, he slipped away, though nearly surrounded, and halted for half
an hour under cover. Then, whilst the Boers were puzzled by his
circuitous track, he dashed westwards through their intervals and
escaped.