SECTION IV. THE ASSISTANCE OF THE NAVY ON SHORE.

[Sidenote: The Navy on shore.]

This is incorporated in the accounts of the several campaigns and

battles, but there were certain preparations made beforehand on

board-ship which must here be recorded. During a cruise up the east

coast in the month of July, 1899, Admiral Harris, the Naval

Commander-in-Chief, was convinced that there would be war and that the

Boers were only waiting till the grass was in fit condition for their

cattle, to invade the colonies. He therefore took steps to have all

the ships ready for service. He concentrated the fleet within easy

reach of call. Early in October he sent to the G.O.C. at the Cape a

list of small guns, etc., which he could furnish if needful. He was

then told that it was not anticipated that such assistance would be

necessary. Nevertheless, a Naval brigade of 500 men was exercised and

prepared for landing. When the ultimatum was delivered it was clear

enough that the troops were not in adequate strength to resist the

forces the Boers could place against them, and that the enemy were

bringing into the field guns of unusual calibre and range. The utmost

numbers which it was possible to land were about 2,500, but heavy guns

were the very weapons with which the sailors were most familiar. It

seemed likely that these might prove to be of great value. On

September 19th, the Admiral was informed that the _Terrible_, which

was to have relieved the _Powerful_, viâ the Canal, would, instead,

meet her on her voyage home at the Cape. On the 14th October the

_Terrible_ reached Simon's Bay. By October 21st, Captain Scott, her

commanding officer, had devised a field mounting for a long-range

12-pr. and, having put it through a satisfactory firing trial, was

authorised by the Commander-in-Chief to make several more. When, on

October 24th, the Admiralty telegraphed that the War Office would be

glad of all the assistance that the Navy could render, and that all

was to be given that would not cripple the ships, the order had been

so far anticipated that the upper decks of the _Terrible_, _Powerful_,

_Monarch_ and _Doris_, as well as the dockyard itself, had already

assumed the appearance of a gun-carriage factory.

[Sidenote: Preparation of heavy guns for landing.]

On October 24th, the day when this message was received from home, the

Admiral arranged with Sir A. Milner that the _Powerful_ should go to

Durban on the 26th. On October 25th the Governor of Natal telegraphed

to the Admiral that "Sir George White suggests that, in view of the

heavy guns with Joubert, the Navy should be consulted with the view of

sending a detachment of bluejackets with long-range guns firing heavy

projectiles." He also revealed to the Admiral the gravity of the

situation, and the scanty means available for defending Maritzburg and

even Durban itself. The Admiral replied at once, saying, "_Powerful_

arrives Durban 29th. She can on emergency land four 12-prs. and 9

Maxims." He then saw Captain Scott of the _Terrible_, and enquired if

he could design a mounting to take a 4·7-in. and have two ready for

the following afternoon, 26th. This Captain Scott did. By the next

evening two such mountings had been put on board the _Powerful_, and

before midnight she sailed for Durban. These 4·7-in. mountings were

meant for use as guns of position, and not as field guns. They

consisted--briefly described--of four 12-in. baulks of timber 14 feet

long, bolted together in the form of a double cross. This made a rough

platform to which was secured the plate and spindle which was used to

carry the ordinary ship mounting of the 4·7-in. guns. They were

intended to be placed in a hole in the ground 15 feet square and 2

feet deep, and the ends of the timber baulks were to be secured with

chains to weights sunk in the ground. But this securing of the timbers

was found to be quite unnecessary when a mounting of this kind was put

through a firing trial near Simon's Town, and so it was not

subsequently employed with these "platform" mountings, as they came to

be called. Sir George White, in Ladysmith, to which place the first

two "platform" mountings had been promptly taken by the _Powerful's_

Naval brigade, was, on October 30th, informed by telegram of the

result of the firing trial, also that no moorings had been found

necessary.

[Sidenote: Scott's travelling carriage.]

Captain Scott now obtained permission to make a travelling carriage

for a 4·7-in. gun. It consisted of a double trail of 14-inch timber

fitted with plates and bearings to carry the cradle of the ordinary

ship mounting. A pair of steel wheels and a heavy axle were required,

and all the work was done in the dockyard under Captain Scott's

supervision. This mounting was satisfactorily tried and embarked on

the _Terrible_ for Durban on November 3rd.

In giving this brief description of the mountings which enabled

long-range guns to be put at the disposal of the General Officer

Commanding-in-Chief, the events which led to their use have been

anticipated. The foregoing explanation is necessary, because, though

the warships were already supplied with field mountings for the 12-pr.

8-cwt. and some smaller guns, and these were therefore available, and

to a certain extent were used during the war, yet when more powerful

guns were required it became necessary to extemporise a carriage for

them.

[Sidenote: Numbers employed.]

The first long 12-pr. was tried on October 21st, and by November 3rd

there were already prepared for use, or actually in use:--

21 field mountings for 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns.

3 platform mountings for 4·7-in.

1 travelling carriage for 4·7-in.

[Sidenote: Later developments.]

This number was, soon afterwards, largely increased, and a 6-in. Q.F.

7-ton gun was also mounted on a travelling carriage at the Durban

Locomotive Works under Captain Scott's supervision. As more mountings

were made and other people's ideas were enlisted, modifications were

introduced; some mountings, entirely of steel, were indeed used for

4.7-in. guns; but in the main these mountings resembled those which

were so hurriedly prepared in the last ten days of October.

To resume the sequence of Naval events at the Cape.

[Sidenote: Difficulties of Naval C.-in-C.]

The Commander-in-Chief found himself, when war broke out, with his

small squadron of ships ready for any service, and a Naval brigade of

500 of their crews ready whenever called for. He had informed the

military Commander-in-Chief to what extent he could give help on

shore, and his squadron was shortly increased as told above. He was

none too strong for the purely Naval duties which war would involve,

though a sufficient staff of officers was sent out to relieve him to a

large extent of the Sea Transport duty. Still he found himself with

the considerable responsibility of keeping the seaports--Table Bay,

Simon's Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban, secure and

available for our troops, and in the case of Durban, as the situation

developed, this promised to be no light matter. The timely

distribution of the coal supply, both for his own reinforced squadron

and for the transports, had to be arranged. At one time the

unfortunate grounding of a transport, the _Ismore_, caused extra work

and anxiety. The enemy's supplies by sea had also to be stopped. There

were precautions to be taken for the safety of H.M. ships while lying

in harbour, for the arriving transports, and the Naval establishments.

Later on there was the care of a considerable number of Boer prisoners

until regular camps could be formed for them. Altogether, therefore,

if the squadron was to be kept always fit for sea, some circumspection

was required when determining to land men and guns for service on

shore.

[Sidenote: The Naval brigades.]

Although in detail the record of the services of the men actually

landed falls into its place in the course of the campaigns, it should

here be noticed that these contingents resolved themselves eventually

into three Naval brigades.

[Sidenote: Western brigade.]

First, the Western brigade, a force of 357 of all ranks and two short

12-pounders under Commander Ethelston of the _Powerful_. This was

originally employed to garrison Stormberg, was then withdrawn to

Queenstown, and finally recalled to Simon's Bay viâ East London, to be

reorganised, strengthened, and sent up under Captain Prothero with

four long 12-prs., and about 400 men, to join Lord Methuen's force for

the relief of Kimberley. It left behind two short 12-pr. field guns at

Queenstown for the use of the Army. After Graspan, where it suffered

considerably, Captain J. E. Bearcroft was sent to replace Captain

Prothero, who was wounded, and the brigade was much augmented. It then

accompanied Lord Roberts' main advance; parties with guns being sent

on various detached services--until by 17th October, 1900, the men of

this brigade had all been recalled to their ships.

[Sidenote: Ladysmith brigade.]

Second, the Ladysmith brigade. The _Powerful_ having been sent to

Durban to comply with Sir George White's request for guns, there were

landed on arrival on October 29th, and taken at once to Ladysmith, two

4·7-in. guns on platform mountings, three long 12-pounders, one short

12-pounder, and four Maxims, with 283 of all ranks under Captain the

Hon. Hedworth Lambton. They arrived on the 30th October, 9.30 a.m., in

time to take part in the action of Lombards Kop, and remained in

Ladysmith during the siege.

[Sidenote: Natal brigade.]

The third, or Natal brigade, had its origin in the _Terrible_ being

sent to Durban, where she arrived on November 6th. Her Captain, Percy

Scott, at once became Commandant and organised--from the _Terrible_,

_Thetis_, _Forte_, _Philomel_, and _Tartar_, the defence of that town.

Over thirty guns were placed in position and put under the command of

Commander Limpus, of the _Terrible_, while a pair of 12-pounders,

drawn from the _Powerful_, had been pushed on to Maritzburg and placed

under Lieutenant James, of the _Tartar_, with the men of that ship

already up there. It was from this force that, as troops arrived, Sir

Redvers Buller drew the Naval brigade which accompanied the Ladysmith

relief column. Captain E. P. Jones, of the _Forte_, commanded this

brigade, with Commander A. H. Limpus, of the _Terrible_, second in

command. After the relief of Ladysmith, Captain Jones reorganised the

Naval brigade with ranks and ratings from the _Forte_, _Philomel_, and

_Tartar_. The _Terribles_ and _Powerfuls_ rejoined their ships by

March 13th. So reconstituted, the brigade served on with the Natal

Field Force until June 24th, 1900, when all but the _Philomel's_ and

_Tartar's_ men, under Lieutenant Halsey, were recalled to their ships.

Lieutenant Halsey, with four officers and thirty-eight men of the

_Philomel_, one officer and eighteen men of the _Tartar_, remained

until October, 1900, when they also returned.

[Sidenote: All Naval brigades within recall.]

Essential as were the services rendered on shore[84] it was always

arranged that, if it had become advisable at any time to recall

officers and men to their ships, they should be able to rejoin them

long before their presence was needed on board. Also as soon as any

article, including guns and ammunition, was landed from the fleet it

was replaced from England. When it became clear that the safety of

Durban was assured, its naval defence force was re-embarked; but

Captain Percy Scott remained on shore with his staff as Commandant

until 14th March, 1900. His work there, in preparing and sending

additional guns to General Buller--among them a 6-in. gun on a wheeled

carriage--and also as an able Commandant of Durban under martial law,

was highly appreciated.[85]

[Footnote 84: See despatches giving the views of Sir Redvers

Buller, etc., on these.]

[Footnote 85: See despatch from the Governor of Natal to

Admiral Harris, dated 9.3.00, and letter from the Colonial

Office to the Admiralty, dated 7.5.00.]

[Sidenote: Natal Naval Volunteers.]

A welcome addition was made to the strength of the Natal brigade by a

party of Natal Naval Volunteers, under Lieutenants T. Anderton and

Nicholas Chiazzari, who with forty-eight men of all ratings, joined

Captain Jones' force at Frere on 10th December, and reinforced the

crews of the 4·7-in. guns. Lieut. Barrett, N.N.V., also joined the

Naval brigade with the Natal Field Force after the relief of

Ladysmith. The Natal Naval Volunteers proved to be a most valuable

addition to the brigade, composed as they were of intelligent,

resourceful men, who were familiar with the ways of the country, and

many of whom spoke both the Taal and native languages. They were part

of a corps which had its origin in the previous scheme for the

defence of Durban, and possessed muzzle-loading 9-prs.

[Sidenote: Why they joined.]

They had been stationed at Colenso when the southward advance of the

Boers compelled the evacuation of that position on 3rd November, 1899.

Although told to abandon their guns they had carried them bodily away

with them in the retirement. Forced to recognise that such guns were

quite useless in the field, and unable to obtain better weapons

locally, they had eagerly volunteered to join the Naval brigade under

Captain Jones. Fortunately they obtained their wish, and the Naval

brigade gained the services of a body of men who soon proved their

sterling worth, and whose traditions will henceforth always be closely

associated with those of the Royal Navy.

History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4) Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government · 第 4 / 25 章