THE RETREAT FROM DUNDEE, AND THE ACTION OF RIETFONTEIN.[95]
[Footnote 95: See maps Nos. 3, 5 and 7.]
[Sidenote: Yule decides not to retreat, but shifts his ground.]
At 5, on the morning of October 21st, the troops again stood to arms.
There was no sign of life upon Talana; the cavalry scouted out
unmolested on that side. The mounted patrols, however, supported by
"F." company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, reconnoitring northward,
discovered the enemy on the Dannhauser road, and the foremost scouts
were driven in. At the same time information came of a hostile
movement to the westward. Whatever illusions may have existed
previously about the strategical situation, none now remained. General
Yule himself had at no time shared them; yet he was disinclined to
retreat. He re-created a staff,[96] examined a fresh defensive
position, and determined to stand his ground. Sending for his
commanding officers shortly after midday, he pointed out the new site
he had selected below the sloping shoulder of one of the foremost
spurs of Indumeni, about a mile south of their present camp, and
desired them to rendezvous upon it with their commands at 2.30 p.m.,
less, however, with any intention of occupying it definitely than of
seeing how the troops "fitted into the ground." In view of the
expected bombardment from Impati, the whole of the tents except those
of the hospital had previously been lowered, and in them the men's
kits had been left ready packed for a move. The cavalry and artillery
started at once. Before the hour appointed for the march of the rest
of the troops the enemy made his presence on Impati felt. At 1.35 p.m.
a squadron of the 18th Hussars, reconnoitring near the Dannhauser
road, came suddenly under the fire of four guns and many rifles from
the north-western slopes of the mountain.
[Footnote 96: Appointing Major A. J. Murray, Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, (late D.A.A.G.I.) as A.A.G., Lieut.
G. E. R. Kenrick, the Queen's Regiment, as acting D.A.A.G.,
Captain C. K. Burnett, 18th Hussars, as Brigade Major to the
8th infantry brigade, and Lieut. F. D. Murray, the Black
Watch, as A.D.C.]
[Sidenote: Yule asks for reinforcements.]
The Royal Irish Fusiliers led off towards the rendezvous at 2 p.m. By
3 p.m. all were in their places, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, Leicestershire regiment and King's Royal Rifles, in the
order named from right to left. It was cold and dull, and the slight
rain turned to a heavy downpour, which filled the shallow trenches as
soon as they were made. At 3.30 p.m. Yule, receiving reports from his
patrols that the enemy was mounting guns upon Impati, and realising
more fully his peril, despatched a telegram to Ladysmith reporting his
arrangements, declaring his expectation of being attacked from both
sides, and asking for reinforcements. Before the message had reached
its destination, a shell from a heavy piece upon the western shoulder
of Impati burst in front of the new line. Others followed quickly,
some into the deserted camp where the hospital tents stood up as a
target, some into the entrenchments, others into the cavalry, who had
taken ground in the rear of the line of defence, and further up the
slopes of Indumeni. One falling into a tin house, which lay behind the
left, killed Lieut. W. M. J. Hannah, of the Leicestershire M.I., who
was sheltering from the storm, and wounded two of his men; elsewhere a
gunner was killed and another wounded. Another and a smaller gun then
opened from a point below the western crest of Impati. The accuracy of
the piece and the smallness of its calibre challenged the British
batteries to reply. But the first shrapnel burst at the foot of the
mountain, far below the Boer artillery, and when sinking the trails
failed to give the necessary elevation by some two thousand yards, the
gunners desisted.
[Sidenote: Reinforcements cannot be sent.]
Shortly before 4 p.m. Brigadier-General Yule received the compliments of
Sir George White upon his appointment to the rank of Major-General. An
hour later, a second telegram from Ladysmith informed him that the
reinforcements, which at this juncture he desired more than promotion,
could not be sent. The troops at Ladysmith,--telegraphed the Chief Staff
Officer,--were engaged at Elandslaagte and the Commander-in-Chief was in
the field with them. General Yule's request would be submitted to him on
his return, but little hopes could be held out of its being complied
with.
[Sidenote: Yule will wait.]
Still the General was unwilling to retreat. Accompanied by his staff
officer, he was on his way to find new ground, out of range of Impati,
before that mountain had become indistinct in the twilight. He was
long in the saddle, examining the northern slopes of Indumeni for a
suitable spot. Night drew on, the rain increasing with the dying
light; the regular fire of the enemy's guns became intermittent, then
ceased, and darkness closed round the British force on the spur.
[Sidenote: He moves again.]
At midnight Yule gave instructions for a move at 3 a.m. to the spot he
had selected, a flat-topped foothill of Indumeni, on its northern
side, and some two miles south of the bivouac. Before that hour the
transport, escorted by the cavalry and mounted infantry, was quietly
withdrawn, and made its way safely to the place appointed, where it
found cover behind the reverse slopes. The remainder, marching
punctually, covered by a rearguard of the Royal Irish Fusiliers,
reached the new position at 5 a.m., and took up an open line along the
crest, facing generally north in the following order of units from
left to right: Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Leicestershire regiment, Royal
Irish Fusiliers and King's Royal Rifles.
[Sidenote: Receives news of Elandslaagte.]
At 8 a.m., October 22nd, two despatch riders arriving from Helpmakaar
delivered a message from the Prime Minister of Natal, announcing a
victory on the previous day at Elandslaagte. "The British force from
Ladysmith,"--telegraphed Sir Albert Hime,--"completely defeated Boer
force over a thousand strong at Elandslaagte, capturing guns, tents
and equipment. Cavalry in full pursuit."
[Sidenote: Yule marches to intercept fugitives.]
It was at once apparent to General Yule that he was directly on the
line of retreat of the Boers flying from Sir George White's cavalry,
and he determined to attempt to intercept them. Glencoe Junction, at
the mouth of the Biggarsberg, appeared to be the point most likely to
promise success; he immediately issued orders for a general march in
that direction.
[Sidenote: Catches a Tartar and returns.]
At 10 a.m. an advance guard of the 69th battery, the mounted infantry,
and the 18th Hussars moved off at the trot for Glencoe. A wounded
Boer, who had been pushed up along the railway from Elandslaagte on a
trolly, was their only capture, and less than a dozen rounds of
shrapnel at 3,800 yards dispersed the few scattered parties of the
enemy visible along the kopjes. The remainder of the column wended
their way across the lower spurs of Indumeni. Soon a portion of the
baggage, seeking an easier road too near the camp, was descried from
Impati by the Boer gunners, who turned their pieces on both camp and
troops, and opened a rapid fire. The 67th battery, which had
previously been directed upon the Glencoe kopjes, now endeavoured in
vain to silence the Impati battery from near the left of the Dublin
Fusiliers. The enemy's shooting was as accurate as it was impartial,
though it was singularly ineffective. Shells of 96 lbs. weight burst
between the guns of the 67th battery, amongst the troops and baggage,
and all over the camp, doing no other damage than to add to the
sufferings of the wounded lying, with the apprehension of helpless
men, in the field hospital.[97] The descent of mist, however, soon put
an end to the bombardment, and the mounted arms, pushing forward
towards Glencoe, endeavoured to carry out the original intention. But
instead of fugitives, they found the Boers showing a firm front on the
high land north and west of the station, and some slight interchange
of shots took place, during which a troop of the 18th Hussars,
reconnoitring too boldly, was cut off, and was seen no more that
day.[98] With the enemy in this attitude upon strong ground, General
Yule saw the inutility of further efforts of this kind, and gave the
order for retirement. At 1 p.m. the force was again below Indumeni, as
it had been in the morning, having effected nothing. As the men
climbed the last few yards of the precipitous ascent, the fog, rolling
for a short time from the summit of Impati, once more gave the Boer
artillerymen on their lofty platform a view of the plain below, and
again the sufferers in the hospital endured the explosion of the heavy
projectiles of the Creusot cannon close outside their shelter.
[Footnote 97: The Red Cross flag was so placed, and so small,
as to be invisible to the Boers.]
[Footnote 98: This patrol, finding its retreat impossible,
made straight for Ladysmith, where it arrived safely next
day.]
[Sidenote: Yule ordered to attempt retreat, prepares for it.]
Yule, whose health, previously bad, had given way under the toil,
anxiety and exposure, now unwillingly decided to retire on Ladysmith
whilst the road still remained open, and at 5.45 p.m. he dictated a
message acquainting Sir G. White with his determination. Before it
could be despatched, at 6.30 p.m. a telegram from Ladysmith was placed
in his hands. It was Sir G. White's reply to his request for
reinforcements, and it banished the last cause for hesitation. "I
cannot reinforce you without sacrificing Ladysmith and the Colony
behind. You must try and fall back on Ladysmith. I will do what I may
to help you when nearer." Acknowledging its contents, Yule prepared
for retreat.
[Sidenote: Retreat begins.]
No sooner had darkness fallen than Major Wickham, of the Indian
Commissariat, taking with him thirty-three wagons guarded by two
companies of the Leicestershire regiment, left the hill and moved with
great precaution into the deserted camp. The convoy performed its short
but dangerous journey without attracting the attention of the enemy, and
the wagons, after being quickly loaded with as many stores as the
darkness, the confusion of the levelled tents, and limited time made
possible, were drawn up on the outskirts to await the passing of the
column. At 9 p.m. the whole force fell in. The night was fine but
intensely dark, and the units had some difficulty in reaching their
stations in the carefully arranged order of march. At 9.30 p.m. all
being ready, the column, guided by Colonel Dartnell, went quietly down
the mountain side towards Dundee, the southern boundary of which it was
necessary to skirt to gain the Helpmakaar road. By 11.15 p.m. the last
company was clear of the mountain, and, striking the track to Dundee at
the foot of Indumeni, the troops passed close to the bivouac ground of
the 21st October. Outside the town Major Wickham's convoy stood
waiting, and when, at the right moment, the signal was given, the
above-mentioned wagons fell into their place in the line of march. The
pace was rapid, despite the impenetrable gloom. Skirting Dundee, the
route turned sharply south-east around the corner of the Helpmakaar
road. On the edge of the town the precaution was taken to cut the
telegraph wire to Greytown.[99] By 4.30 a.m. October 23rd, the leading
files having traversed safely the defile of Blesboklaagte[100], had made
good twelve miles of the road to Helpmakaar, fourteen miles from the
starting-point. Near Dewaas, Yule, sending a message to Ladysmith to
announce his progress, halted on open ground, over which piquets were at
once thrown out on every side, and the batteries formed up for action.
Ten a.m. was the hour of starting again, the Royal Irish Fusiliers
relieving the King's Royal Rifles as advance guard. A blazing sun
beating upon the treeless downs, and a rumour of the enemy having been
seen ahead, now made marching toilsome and slow. By 12.30 p.m., less
than five miles having been covered, Yule decided to halt again, until
darkness should arrive to lessen both the fatigue and the risk of
discovery by the enemy. His situation was hazardous in the extreme.
Behind him the Boers would be soon on his heels, if they were not so
already; before him lay a defile known as Van Tonders Pass, deep and
difficult, some six miles in length. But at the slow rate of movement,
necessitated by the nature of the route through it, the passage of this
dangerous ground would take so much time and cause such disorder, that,
balancing the evils, Yule, after reconnoitring the obstacle, bivouacked
at 2 p.m. on a high and open spur of the Biggarsberg, overlooking the
valley of the Waschbank river, two miles east-south-east of Beith, and
one mile west of the junction of the Helpmakaar and Ladysmith roads.
Here he waited anxiously for the night.
[Footnote 99: See map No. 4.]
[Footnote 100: See map No. 3.]
[Sidenote: The Boers occupy Dundee.]
Late on the morning of the 23rd the Boers, after reconnoitring the
camp and its vicinity as closely as they dared, opened once more from
Impati with their heavy gun. The first shell burst in the hospital
lines, and Major J. F. Donegan, the chief medical officer, who,
fearing to prejudice General Yule's operations, had done nothing to
inform the enemy that his marquees were the only inhabited tents, now
determined to spare the wounded the horrors of further bombardment.
Captain A. E. Milner was therefore sent with a white flag to ask that
the fire should be stopped. Thereupon Erasmus' men, to whom news of
Yule's evacuation was a complete surprise, filed down the mountain,
and approached, not without caution. There was soon no room for doubt;
Dundee had fallen, and Erasmus' prize was large in inverse proportion
to the share he had taken in capturing it. No sooner was the absence
of the British soldiers established beyond a doubt, than the burghers
made haste to sack the camp and town. In a short time every tent,
except those of the hospitals, which were scrupulously respected, was
ransacked, and every shop turned inside out. Commandant-General
Joubert now sent orders to Lukas Meyer to pursue Yule with a thousand
men. Meyer did so, but marching late and slowly, failed to come up
with the British.
[Sidenote: Night march Oct. 23rd Oct. 24th.]
At 11 p.m. Yule roused his men for a fresh effort. A hot day had given
place to a bleak and bitter night. But though the road was steep and
obstructed, and Van Tenders Pass plunged in profound gloom, the
column, headed by the Dublin Fusiliers, marched punctually and well.
By dawn the dangerous defile was safely threaded and the force
debouched on to the broad veld which rolls about the southern
buttresses of the Biggarsberg. At 6 a.m., October 24th, the vanguard
was at the Waschbank river, some thirteen miles from Beith, and on its
southern bank the troops were allowed to bivouac, the rearguard
closing up at 10 a.m., after ten weary hours' marching.
[Sidenote: Yule, Oct. 24th, moves to sound of guns.]
As they halted, heavy and prolonged reports of artillery sounded from
the westward. It was evident that Sir G. White was fighting an action
upon the flank near Elandslaagte or Modder Spruit, and, in response to
the urgent request of his senior officers, Yule determined to despatch
at once a portion of his command to co-operate. Yule himself, though
now almost prostrate with illness and fatigue, rode out westward at
the head of the 67th and 69th field batteries, two squadrons 18th
Hussars, and two companies M.I. The remainder of the troops were left
by the Waschbank under command of Lieut.-Col. Carleton, Royal Irish
Fusiliers, who took up a defensive position on the northern bank.
[Sidenote: Yule recrosses Waschbank Oct. 24th.]
Yule moved rapidly westwards over the shadeless tract lying between
the Sunday's and Waschbank rivers. Nine miles his mounted men pressed
towards the sound of the guns, but still the most advanced scouts saw
nothing, and when, about 2 p.m., the noise of the firing, still far
ahead, began to die away, he gave the order to retire to the
Waschbank. His men were back in bivouac at 4 p.m. No sooner had the
infantry from the height above filed over the muddy pools than a
storm, which had been gathering all day in the terrible heat, burst,
and cooled the sun-baked ground with a waterspout of rain. The
Waschbank, which had all but perished in the drought, in less than an
hour rose from three inches to a height of twelve feet of roaring
water, thirty-five yards in breadth. The rearmost infantry plunged
hurriedly across before it had attained its strength. A piquet of the
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and a patrol of the 18th Hussars, who had
covered the passage, found themselves cut off, and remained long on
the enemy's side of the river.
[Sidenote: Oct. 25 Yule gets touch with White.]
At 4 a.m. on the 25th the march was resumed along the southern and
least direct[101] of the two routes, which bifurcate at the Waschbank.
At 8.30 a.m. the advance guard was at and over Sunday's river, seven
miles further on, the rearguard crossing by the steep drift at noon,
and here the column rested. At 1 p.m. it was on the move again,
breasting the gentler ascent which swells upwards from the southern
bank of the stream, and after covering some four and a half miles, was
again halted at 3.45 p.m. upon the summit of a high ridge due north of
Kankana Mountain. Here preparations were made to pass the night; the
piquets went out, rations were distributed and cooked. At 5 p.m.,
however, a patrol of the 5th Lancers from Ladysmith rode up with
orders from Sir G. White. Behind them a column under Lt.-Col. J. A.
Coxhead, R.A., was on the way from Ladysmith to assist the Dundee
detachment over the last stage. There were reports that the enemy was
about to close in from every side. General Yule was to effect a
junction with Coxhead at once, and to proceed without another check
into Ladysmith.
[Footnote 101: The northern road had been reconnoitred and
found to be without water.]
[Sidenote: Night march Oct. 25th-26th.]
At 6 p.m. began a night march of great distress and trouble. Soon
after the advance guard moved off, a heavy downpour converted the road
into a sea of semi-liquid mire, which the transport ploughed into
waves and furrows. These, invisible in the black darkness, almost held
down the soldiers plunging knee-deep into them. The teams of mules,
exhausted by prolonged labour and insufficient food, impatient by
nature of wet and darkness, strove with much suffering to drag the
rocking wagons through the mud, and, as is their habit when
overmastered by their load, threw themselves often in confusion
athwart the track and enforced a halt. At 9 p.m. the whole of the
transport stuck fast for more than two hours. The rearguard closed up,
but the troops in front of the baggage, knowing nothing of its
misfortunes, and travelling on a road not destroyed by its struggles,
pushed on and left it. With great efforts it was set in motion again,
but some half-dozen of the wagons, being imbedded hopelessly, had to
be abandoned.[102] Half a mile further the convoy was again in
difficulties. From this point all cohesion was lost. Some of the
wagons passed on, some remained; it was impossible for their escorts
to tell which were derelict and which they must still consider as in
their charge.
[Footnote 102: They were recovered next day.]
[Sidenote: Coxhead's relief column.]
Throughout the night Lieut.-Col. Coxhead, R.A., who had left Ladysmith
at 9 a.m. on October 25th, lay waiting about a mile east of the Nek
between Bulwana[103] and Lombards Kop for the Dundee column to join
hands with his own. With him were the 5th Lancers, half a battalion
2nd Gordon Highlanders, half a battalion 1st Manchester regiment, the
21st battery R.F.A., and a convoy containing two days' supplies, which
General Yule had asked for, in a message despatched from the bivouac
at the Waschbank river on the 24th. Coxhead immediately gained touch
with Yule by means of his mounted troops, and learning that the food
would not be required, sent the wagons back. All day the troops from
Ladysmith remained on the Helpmakaar road. But night and torrents of
rain fell together, and Coxhead's men bivouacked in discomfort only
less than that of their comrades toiling towards them, still nine
miles distant.
[Footnote 103: Or Umbulwana.]
[Sidenote: The retreat ends Oct 26th.]
At 3.30 a.m. on the 26th, just as the Ladysmith garrison was getting
under arms, in case a sally to bring in Yule might after all be
necessary, the foremost of the mounted men from Dundee rode up to
Modder Spruit. An hour later the Leicestershire regiment and the
King's Royal Rifles arrived, much exhausted, but in good order. After
a brief halt they went on into the town, which they entered at 6 a.m.
The other regiments, with the transport which had delayed them, coming
up to Coxhead between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m., halted for two hours, and had
breakfast before pushing on.
[Sidenote: Cause of Rietfontein action, Oct. 24th.]
It is necessary now to revert to the action which had, on October
24th, been heard in the bivouac by the Waschbank, that action of which
a ride of nine miles westward had failed to disclose either the
purport or the scene. The arrival on the 23rd of Free State commandos
upon the heights north and west of the railway had redoubled Sir G.
White's already great anxiety for the safety of the retreat from
Dundee. In reality, the presence of the Free State forces on the
commanding ranges to the west of Elandslaagte was less dangerous than
it appeared, for Yule was marching in greater obscurity than either
he, or Sir G. White, imagined. When, indeed, on the morning of the
24th, the Free Staters saw troops issuing from Ladysmith, they
believed them to be the combined forces of Generals White and
Yule,[104] though the latter was at the moment still actually upon the
wrong side of the Waschbank. At still greater cross-purposes was
Erasmus, who set off on the morning of the 24th, with so little hope
of overtaking the retreat that he chose the only route by which it was
impossible for him to do so, the main road west of the railway.
Nevertheless, on the evening of the 25th, Erasmus' bivouac was near
Elandslaagte, and the wisdom of Sir G. White's order for the instant
continuance of the march of the column on that afternoon was
manifested. Had that march not been executed, Yule, the action of
Rietfontein notwithstanding, would have had the vanguard of Joubert's
army upon his flank next day, when only operations from Ladysmith on
the largest scale could have extricated him.
[Footnote 104: C. de Wet, "Three Years' War."]
[Sidenote: The Rietfontein position.]
Some seven miles north-east of Ladysmith, Rietfontein[105] farmhouse
lay by a branch of the Modder Spruit, south-west of a long, low ridge,
which descended to the railway line in smooth and easy slopes dotted
with ant-heaps, with on its forehead a sparse eyebrow of stones.
Beyond the crest line, to the northward, the ground sank with a gentle
sweep, broken only by two rough under-features jutting from the
western extremity of the ridge, to rear itself again eight hundred
yards beyond into a line of abrupt heights. The southernmost of these,
called Intintanyoni,[106] leaped up steeply from the hollow, and
beyond and behind it stretched many leagues of rolling ground, with
scarce a subsidence until they merged in the tumultuous billows of the
Drakensberg. Two grassy pinnacles, nearly equal in height, flanked
Intintanyoni. Of these the western looked across a deep and narrow
gorge over to Nodashwana or Swaatbouys Kop, of a somewhat greater
elevation, whilst below the eastern, deep re-entrants, both on the
north and south, divided Intintanyoni from the magnificent curve of
highlands, which terminated west of Elandslaagte in the wooded mass of
Jonono's Kop.[107]
[Footnote 105: See map No. 7.]
[Footnote 106: Also called Tintwa Inyoni.]
[Footnote 107: A freehand sketch of the position from
Nodashwana to Jonono's Kop will be found in the case of maps
accompanying this volume. Jonono's Kop is not shown in the
plan of Rietfontein, no part of the battle having been near
it.]
[Sidenote: The Boer occupation of it.]
East of the twin peaks of Intintanyoni various lesser eminences and
hollow Neks completed the tempestuous irregularity of this singular
feature, along whose crest six Free State commandos lay waiting for
their first battle on the morning of October 24th. To the east, with
patrols upon Jonono's Kop, lay the men of Bethlehem, Vrede, and
Heilbron; about the eastern peak of Intintanyoni the Winburg commando
held the ground, in charge of two pieces of artillery; on their right,
occupying the rest of the mountain, the burghers of Kroonstad made
ready; whilst those of Harrismith disposed themselves partly upon a
supporting position in rear, and partly as piquets and observation
posts on outlying kopjes, amongst others the lofty Nodashwana. Some
6,000 riflemen in all filled the six-mile line of heights. They were
commanded by General A. P. Cronje, who had arrived only on this
morning, the 24th, to replace de Villiers, who had been in temporary
charge.
[Sidenote: Sir George marches out, Oct. 24th.]
Sir G. White moved out from Ladysmith at 5 a.m. with the 5th Lancers,
19th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse, Natal Mounted Rifles, 42nd and
53rd batteries R.F.A., No. 10 Mountain battery R.G.A., 1st Liverpool,
1st Devon, 1st Gloucestershire regiments, and 2nd King's Royal Rifle
Corps, in all, some 5,300 officers and men, assuming himself the
direction of an operation certain to be delicate, likely to be
extremely dangerous. Moving up the Newcastle road from its rendezvous
near the junction of the Free State railway, the force had proceeded
six miles when the advanced screen of cavalry came under a dropping
rifle fire at 7 a.m. from the heights on their left. Their action was
prompt. Pushing rapidly across the Modder Spruit, a squadron of 5th
Lancers, supported by two others, drove back at the gallop the small
parties of Boers hovering in that neighbourhood, and themselves seized
and held this advanced position. The remainder of the cavalry,
stringing out along high ground dominating the western bank of the
spruit, and facing more to the eastward, formed a strong flank guard
towards Jonono's Kop. At 8 a.m., whilst fitful discharges of musketry
rose and fell along the widely-extended line of troopers, the infantry
had come up to Rietfontein. No sooner had they arrived at a point on
the road some five hundred yards east of the Modder Spruit, than a
loud report broke from the eastern peak of Intintanyoni, and a shell,
bursting on impact, fell into the head of the column. Thereupon the
British artillery wheeled out from the route, and in line of batteries
trotted towards a level crossing over the railway, some six hundred
yards west of the road. Arrived at this defile, and forming column
inwards to traverse it, the first gun had scarcely passed the rails,
when both the Boer guns on the high green rampart ahead opened upon
the point, which had been taken as one of their range marks. Five
hundred yards beyond it the artillery deployed behind a rise. The
second round from the 53rd battery, fused at 3,600 yards, burst full
upon one of the Boer pieces, and the gunners of both weapons fled.
After a few more rounds the 53rd limbered up and prepared to advance.
[Sidenote: The infantry seize ridge facing hill.]
The infantry were already over the railway, and moving
forward--Gloucester regiment on the left, Liverpool regiment on the
right--up the gentle but protected slope, swelling to the summit of
the low ridge of Rietfontein. The 1st Devonshire regiment, in support,
lay at the base, whilst the 2nd King's Royal Rifles remained in rear
in charge of the baggage. On the appearance of the leading companies
upon the crest, firing broke out from the whole length of the crest of
Intintanyoni, to which the British infantry, lying prone, soon replied
as vigorously. Of the artillery, the 42nd battery was quickly in
action near the centre of the front, whilst the 53rd unlimbered some
six hundred yards to the left, and began shelling a rocky underfeature
of Intintanyoni, at a range of 1,500 yards. Sharp musketry assailed
them. Then the 42nd battery, being ordered further to the left, passed
behind the 53rd and the 10th Mountain battery, which had come into
line on the left of the 53rd, and opened 1,900 yards from the summit
of Intintanyoni. Thus began a severe fire fight at ranges varying from
one to two thousand yards. Especially was it hotly contested where the
Gloucester on the left of the British opposed the 1,400 Kroonstad men,
who, under Nel, maintained the Boer right. Heavy exchanges of rifle
fire swept across the valley in this part, and in spite of the steady
practice of the artillery, it became necessary to reinforce the
attackers. For this purpose the Devonshire regiment was pushed up on
the left of the Gloucester, half the King's Royal Rifles coming from
the baggage train to fill its place in support.
[Sidenote: An untoward incident.]
Sir G. White had all but accomplished his purpose, that of intervening
between the Free State commandos and Yule's line of march, when one of
those accidents of war, inexplicable because of the death of those who
alone could explain them, largely increased his hitherto insignificant
losses. Shortly before midday Colonel E. P. Wilford, commanding the
1st Gloucestershire, taking a company of his battalion and the
regimental Maxim gun, dashed out of cover down the open slope as if to
assault. Another half company of the battalion moved on ahead to cut
a wire fence which obstructed the front. The Boers, who for a time had
lain quiet under the shrapnel, which searched their position from end
to end, at once opened a fierce fusilade. Colonel Wilford was shot
dead, and his men fell rapidly, the detachment finally halting upon a
low ridge beneath Intintanyoni. Further advance was impossible. Only
with difficulty could both the Gloucestershire and "D." squadron
I.L.H., which had joined in the attack, be withdrawn. Fortunately, as
the attempt was promptly ordered to cease, though many had been
wounded, only six were killed in the adventure. Meanwhile the shooting
over their heads had been continuous. The enemy, encouraged by this
event, and by the immobility of Sir G. White's line of battle, which
they imagined to be awed from its purpose by their resistance, still
clung to their fastness, and maintained a heavy though spasmodic fire.
More than once the gunners of the still uninjured piece beneath the
eastern peak made efforts to drag it forward into action, but the
British artillerymen watched the spot narrowly, and each attempt was
blown back by shrapnel, under which Intintanyoni burst into flames.
Many of the Boer ponies herded in rear, terrified by the blaze,
stampeded. Then, up on Nodashwana, amongst the Harrismith men, a stir
was descried which seemed to threaten an outflanking manoeuvre against
the British left. Sir G. White, anxious for his communications with
Ladysmith, promptly countered the movement by calling the Natal
Mounted Rifles across from his right, and sending them on in front of
his left flank.[108] The Colonial riflemen went with such skill into
the maze of broken ground below the mountain, that they not only
succeeded in outflanking the outflankers, but actually drove by
enfilade fire all of the Kroonstad commando, who were upon the right
of Intintanyoni, far back across the hill to where the Winburgers lay
at the eastern extremity. All danger ceased definitely on this side
when two guns of the 42nd battery, turning towards the ridges of
Nodashwana, in a few moments cleared it of the enemy, and converted it
also into a huge bonfire of blazing grass. At 1.30 p.m. the Boer fire
had dwindled all along the main ridge, and an hour later it ceased
altogether. Only from the far right came the sound of musketry from
the cavalry still fencing with scattered detachments of the Heilbron,
Vrede and Bethlehem burghers, who clung to them pertinaciously.
[Footnote 108: The situation at this time is depicted on map
No. 7.]
[Sidenote: Return to Ladysmith.]
At 3 p.m. Sir G. White gave the order for a general retirement. His
object was accomplished, with the not undue loss of 114 casualties.
Yule was now safe for that day, and he believed the Free State army to
have suffered severely enough to keep it inactive on the next, when he
intended to assist the Dundee column by other means. But the Boers
watched the withdrawal of the British troops with very little
despondency. Unaware of the true situation of the Dundee column, they
misunderstood operations designed to keep them from it. The
demonstration against Intintanyoni seemed to them nothing less than a
serious attempt to drive them from their hold, and the retreat of the
British to be that of a baffled army. Thus, ignorant of their
strategical defeat, they rejoiced at what seemed a tactical victory.
Moreover, their losses[109] had been small. The cavalry alone, now
called upon to protect the rear--as all day they had covered the
right--had difficulty in returning. For some distance they had to
maintain a running fire fight, and it was nearly 7 p.m. before the
rearmost troopers entered Ladysmith, which the head of the infantry
column had reached two hours and a half earlier.[110]
[Footnote 109: 13 killed, 31 wounded.]
[Footnote 110: For detailed casualties, see Appendix 6.]