Foreign Commerce in 1865—The “Clyde” and “George W. Clyde,” and
Introduction of Compound Engines—Commerce of 1870—Merchant
Marine—Lynch Committee—Mr. Cramp and Committee—Lynch Bill—American
Steamship Company—Visit to British Shipyards—John Elder—British
Methods—Interchange of Methods—Merchant Marine continued—Dingley
Bill—Defects—Act of 1891, Providing Registry for Foreign Ships—“St.
Louis” and “St. Paul”—Extract from _Forum_—Remarks on
Article—Committee of Ship-builders and Owners—New Bill Introduced by
Frye and Dingley—North Atlantic Traffic Association—New
Ship-yards—Tactics of North Atlantic Traffic Association—Our
Navigation Laws, _North American Review_—Mr. Whitney—Unfriendly
Legislation—Mr. Whitney’s Letter—Effects of Letter—Mr. Cramp’s Letter
to Committee of Merchant Marine—International Mercantile Marine.
THE return of peace in 1865 found the country without sea-commerce
either coastwise or foreign. Such ships as had not been taken up by the
government had, with the exception of a few whaling-vessels in the
Pacific Ocean, been transferred to foreign flags to save them from the
ravages of Confederate pirates or cruisers which, to all intents and
purposes, so far as construction, armament, equipment, and crews were
concerned, were nothing but British privateers in disguise. In the mean
time England had taken every advantage of the situation, and by 1865 had
practically absorbed all the magnificent ocean-carrying trade which the
United States enjoyed prior to 1860. American ship-building was at a
stand-still. The government at once threw upon the market all the ships
which it had taken up for gun-boats, auxiliary cruisers, transports,
etc., during the war. They were sold for anything that they would bring,
and they were bought up as a speculation by new companies unfamiliar
with the shipping business, and as a consequence they all failed. The
ships were obsolete or worn out and soon passed out of existence.
Certain coastwise lines continued to do a small business, but little or
no attempt was made to restore our foreign trade; first, because none of
the vessels which the government threw on the market were in a condition
to undertake it; and, second, because, in consequence of the inflated
prices of everything, any attempt to compete either in seafaring labor
or material with England would have been absurd. Besides this, the whole
energy and capital of the country were immediately directed to an
extraordinary expansion of railway systems, so that the attention of the
people was entirely diverted from the sea and fixed upon the interior.
For the next five or six years little or no ship-building of any
description was done anywhere in the United States.
It was at this time that the Cramp Company considered it indispensable
to attach engine building to the construction of hulls, as no
satisfactory arrangement could be made to secure accurate performance
that involved two independent and diverse handicrafts in the
undertaking. They secured the services as engineer of Mr. J. Shields
Wilson, whose training in the I. P. Morris Company, and at Neafie &
Levy’s works had demonstrated his fitness for the post, and as to whose
methods they were familiar.
One of the first achievements of the new enterprise was the design and
construction of the compound engines for the “George W. Clyde,” finished
in the spring of 1872, the first present accepted type of compound
marine engines built in America. Immediately following them in 1873 and
1874 were the four ships for the American Line, the “Pennsylvania,”
“Ohio,” “Indiana,” and “Illinois.”
The “George W. Clyde” was built for Thomas Clyde, who was the first
ship-owner to introduce screw propulsion in ocean commerce in the United
States by building the twin-screw steamship, the “John S. McKim,” built
in 1844, which he used in the trade of the Gulf of Mexico and as a
transport when the war with Mexico occurred.
Having built the first screw steamship, the “John S. McKim,” and the
first steamship with compound engines, the “George W. Clyde,” Mr. Clyde
responded with alacrity to the recommendations of Mr. Cramp in favor of
the use of the triple-expansion engines by building the “Cherokee.”
The “Mascott” for Mr. Plant was built at the same time.
Mr. Clyde had formed the acquaintance of Mr. Ericsson soon after his
arrival in this country in 1839, just before the “John S. McKim” was
constructed, and became an early convert to his fascinations in
exploiting the superior merits of screw propulsions over every other.
The “John S. McKim” and engines were designed by Mr. Ericsson, and built
near Front and Brown Streets, Philadelphia.
Mr. Jacob Neafie, of Reaney, Neafie & Co., celebrated engine builders,
who began business soon after by constructing propeller engines, had
considerable practical experience in the construction of the “John S.
McKim’s” engines before Reaney, Neafie & Co. had started business.
Mr. Ericsson had early secured the friendship of Commodore Stockton, and
had a boat built for towing purposes by the celebrated ship-builders
Lairds, of Berkenhead, called the “R. F. Stockton.” Commodore Stockton
had been already biased in favor of screw propulsion on account of the
invention of the screw propeller as it practically exists to-day by John
Stevens in 1803. Mr. Stevens was the head and front of the organization
of the bay, river, and canal navigation between the two great cities of
New York and Philadelphia, of which Commodore Stockton was a member.
The successful introduction of screw propulsion in the United States was
certainly owing to the combined efforts of Stevens, Ericsson, and Clyde.
Mr. Clyde was always to the front where new improvements were to be
made.
The Cramp Company, having taken the lead in these new departures in
engine construction at the beginning, have continued to remain there.
They have ceased to construct wooden vessels, sail or steam, since the
construction of the “Clyde,” of iron. This vessel was for Mr. Thomas
Clyde, and preceded the “G. W. Clyde.”
By 1870 the deplorable state of the American merchant marine attracted
the attention of the Administration and Congress. The House of
Representatives organized a select committee to investigate the causes
of its decline, with instructions to submit in its report suggestion or
recommendation of remedy. This is known in Congressional history as the
“Lynch Committee,” from its Chairman, the Honorable John R. Lynch,
Member of Congress, of Maine. This committee surveyed the situation
exhaustively, taking the statements of a large number of ship-owners and
ship-builders, and while there was considerable divergence of views as
to the sum-total of causes, there was little or no diversity of opinion
as to the most immediate and effective remedy.
This committee, after thorough investigation and mature deliberation,
reported that, in view of the policy of foreign maritime nations,
particularly Great Britain, in the way of subsidies and other methods of
aiding and promoting their merchant marines, it would be impossible for
American ship-owners to compete with them in the absence of similar
expedients on the part of our own government. In other words, the Lynch
Committee reported in effect that the primary requisite toward a
resurrection of the American merchant marine would be the adoption of a
policy of subvention, or, as it is commonly termed, subsidy.
However, while the Lynch Committee was logical in its suggestion or
recommendation of remedy, its investigations, so far as the sum-total of
the causes of decline were concerned, and its estimate of those causes
were incomplete and inconclusive, because it started out with the dogma
that the then existing depression of the merchant marine was due wholly
to the ravages of the war; and it did not take into account the
correlative or co-operative facts of the situation, which were much
broader and deeper in their application and effect than the mere
suspension or destruction of our merchant marine by the war itself. In
other words, the Lynch Committee failed to grasp or appreciate the fact
that, while the war was wrecking our sea-going commerce, foreign
maritime powers, and particularly the English, were making the most
gigantic efforts not only to take the place of our ruined trade, but
also to provide for a perpetuity of the substitution, so that at any
time between the close of the war and the investigations of the Lynch
Committee it had become impossible for an American ship-owner to operate
a ship or a line of ships in any route of ocean traffic. By means of
liberal subsidies under the guise of mail pay, the British had in the
interim covered every sea-road and appropriated every channel of ocean
commerce. This fact the Lynch Committee seems to have ignored, although
it was really the prime factor in the situation, as it stood in 1870.
Mr. Cramp, in his statement before the Lynch Committee, went altogether
out of the beaten path pursued by most of the other ship-builders or
ship-owners who appeared. He said in effect that while the Civil War had
been an immediate cause of the destruction of our merchant marine as it
existed at the beginning of that struggle, still that was purely a
physical cause, and in the absence of other causes need not operate
after the war ended.
He called attention to the fact that the war had now been ended five
years, but that the condition of our merchant marine, particularly in
foreign trade, remained as pitiable as it had been in the height of the
struggle. This he said argued the existence of other and more lasting
causes than the simple destruction by war, whether by the government
taking up our merchant-ships for its own use, or by the transfer of a
great many of them to foreign flags to get the benefit of neutrality, or
by the actual depredations of Anglo-Confederate privateers.
He explained that during our misfortune the English took every advantage
in the way of appropriating to themselves and to their own ships the
traffic which our ships had formerly carried; that when the war closed,
they had absolute command of the ocean-carrying trade, our own as well
as theirs.
He said that not only did the British government subsidize and otherwise
aid their ships and ship-owners, but that they also brought to bear all
the tremendous resources of their navy to help and encourage British
ship-builders. Notwithstanding her enormous and well-equipped public
dock-yards, the English government built a very large percentage of its
hull construction in private shipyards, and not only that, but _all_
their marine-engine work was let out by contract to private
engine-builders, mainly independent establishments.
He stated that the result of this policy had been to develop the
industry of marine engine building in Great Britain to a degree unknown
anywhere else in the world.
On the contrary, our own government had done little for its navy since
the war, and what little it had done had been carried out entirely in
navy-yards.
This not only deprived private ship-building of the kind of aid and
encouragement which England lavished upon her private shipyards and
engine-shops, but the navy-yards themselves were a constant menace to
the good order and content of mechanics working in private shipyards.
Moreover, he said that the same class of mechanics who, immediately
prior to the war, worked for $1.75 a day, now (1870) demanded and
received $3.00 to $3.50 a day; whereas ship-building wages remained the
same in England as in 1860.
He warned the committee that the day of wooden ships, particularly
steamships, was past, and that the iron ship had come to stay, not only
in England but everywhere else in the world.
He said that to enable the business of building iron ships and heavy
marine machinery to become firmly established in this country, a very
large amount of manufacturing machinery must be supplied, and in view of
the present outlook no one would invest any considerable amount of
capital in that direction without assurance of some aid and
encouragement from the government similar to that which England rendered
to her ship-building industry.
He then dwelt at considerable length upon the demoralization among
mechanics produced by the government’s policy in confining its naval
construction to the navy-yards.
He reviewed briefly the struggle between the Cunard and Collins Lines
prior to 1858, and showed conclusively that the downfall of the American
Collins Line was due to the persistent and constantly increasing
subsidies lavished by the British government upon the Cunard Line, which
our government in 1858 met by withdrawing the Collins subsidy and giving
them instead the sea and inland postage on mail matter actually carried.
In this respect he said Congress indirectly came to the aid of the
Cunard Line and helped it to overthrow the Collins Line. He hoped that
the committee would give these particular facts their earnest attention.
He said that they did not require deep or intricate investigation,
because they were matters of common notoriety, known to everybody who
was at all conversant with the commercial history of the country.
The admission of material for building iron ships free of duty, he said,
would be an advantage, of course, and many believed that if our
ship-builders could be relieved from the tariff and get their material
free they could compete successfully with foreign builders; but the
difference in wages was too great to be entirely overcome by the mere
admission of materials duty free. As for materials, he would always
prefer American iron for the construction of ships to foreign iron,
provided it could be got at the same, or very nearly the same, price.
There were many inconveniences, he said, attendant upon sending abroad
for iron plates. He informed the committee that it was necessary to get
the form of every plate and have it sketched before it was ordered, and
if, after doing that, we must send abroad to have them made, very great
inconvenience and delay would result.
This statement of Mr. Cramp before the Lynch Committee, of which the
foregoing is only a synopsis, was really the key-note to all subsequent
argument in favor of government aid to American ship-building and
ship-owning. It presented the matter in a new light, or a light which
was new in 1870.
[Illustration: ARMORED CRUISER BROOKLYN]
It might be remarked here, in referring to his statement that “the form
of every plate must be sketched before it is ordered, etc.,” that Mr.
Cramp himself was the originator of that system in this country, a
system of ordering plates sheared to sizes at the mill. (See “American
Marine,” W. W. Bates.) Until he established this innovation, plates for
building iron vessels had been rolled as nearly as possible to the sizes
required and then sheared and trimmed at the shipyard. This itself was a
very remarkable and striking innovation, and was immediately taken up by
all iron ship-builders in the country, and is now the universal
practice.
The legislative result of the first effort of Congress to take
cognizance of the condition of the merchant marine was the bill
introduced by Mr. Lynch, February 17, 1870.
Mr. Lynch’s bill, although it may be described as the pioneer effort for
the resurrection of the American merchant marine, proposed in concise
form and plain, easily comprehensible terms, without any unnecessary
verbiage or circumlocution, as practical and as sensible a system of
subvention as has ever been put forward since. It was comprehensive in
its scope, universal in its application, and liberal in its provisions.
Later bills, more elaborately framed and more diffuse in their verbiage,
have hardly improved upon the simple matter of fact form in which Mr.
Lynch embodied his proposed policy.
This was the beginning of a Parliamentary war between American
ship-owners on the one hand and the influence of foreign steamship
companies on the other; a war which has at this writing lasted more than
thirty years.
One subsidy was granted by Congress at this early date, that of the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company; but hardly had that subsidy begun to
operate, when an exposure of certain methods by which it was procured
brought about a great public scandal, which for the time-being put a
peremptory end to the whole policy.
Whether the charge that the Pacific Mail subsidy was obtained by corrupt
methods was true or not, the means in obtaining it were no more corrupt
than those which have been employed by foreign steamship interests to
defeat legislation in Congress favorable to American shipping from time
to time ever since.
Notwithstanding these discouraging conditions, a group of Pennsylvania
capitalists formed “the American Steamship Company,” and decided in 1871
to try the experiment of an American Line to Liverpool. They contracted
with the Cramp firm for four first-class steamships, to be superior in
sea speed, comfort, and other desirable qualities to any foreign
steamship then in service. These four ships were designed by Mr. Cramp,
and built under his superintendence between 1871 and 1873 inclusive, and
were put in service under the names of the “Indiana,” “Illinois,”
“Pennsylvania,” and “Ohio,” now commonly known as the old American Line.
That these ships were designed with the highest degree of ability and
constructed with the utmost skill is sufficiently attested by the fact
that they are all in serviceable condition at this writing (1903), over
thirty years old. These ships broke the record in speed which was held
by the “City of Brussels,” and consumed less than half of the coal in
doing it.
As soon as the construction of these ships had been awarded to his
Company, Mr. Cramp determined to examine the conditions of marine-engine
development abroad, and with that object in view sailed immediately for
Europe. His narrative of the trip and its results are as follows:
VISIT TO BRITISH SHIPYARDS.
“When the organization of the Company was perfected, the compound
engine as developed by John Elder had made its appearance, and a
fierce opposition to its introduction was made by engine-builders in
Great Britain generally.
“Its advocates were among the ablest engineers in that country,
foremost among whom was Mr. MacFarland Gray, whose unassailable
attitude in its favor in the columns of ‘Engineering’ vindicated its
claims and successfully established its introduction. While the idea
was an old one and had been introduced before Watt’s time, it
failed, as most improvements do when they do not get into proper
hands to be developed.
“To John Elder belongs the credit of its permanent and practical
introduction into ocean navigation, and but little improvement has
been made in his work up to this time.
“Mr. B. H. Bartol, who occupied a high position for intelligence and
sagacity in the business world and as a practical marine engineer of
the highest attainments, was one of the directors of the new
steamship company, and, desiring that the ships should be in advance
of the times, he recommended that I should go to Great Britain and
make an exhaustive examination of the compound-engine question.
“Mr. J. Shields Wilson, who had been selected by me as the engineer
of our Company, which had recently added engine building as a
department of its business, accompanied me. Mr. Wilson had already
gone very deep into the investigation of the compound question, and
had acquired a strong bias in its favor; and he had already designed
the compound engines for the ‘George W. Clyde.’
“Mr. Bartol recommended the steamship company to appropriate $10,000
to pay our expenses in the investigation, arguing that the money
could not be spent in a better way, and that they could not get
another party better equipped than we were to undertake it. He also
stated that he would oppose the construction of any steamers until
he became convinced that they would be of the most advanced type in
everything that pertains to most modern requirements.
“The money was promptly appropriated, and with Mr. Wilson I took
passage in the ‘Italy,’ the first trans-Atlantic steamer with
compound engines of John Elder’s make and type, whose reported
performance in economical coal consumption was considered at that
time marvellous.
“We soon made the acquaintance of the chief engineer of the ship,
whose name also was Wilson, and Mr. Wilson practically lived with
him. He was permitted to take cards under varying conditions, and
secured an accurate account of coal consumption and of all other
matters likely to be of interest.
“When we arrived at Liverpool, we visited the Lairds’, being the
first English shipyard that either of us had ever visited.
“We then visited every great marine engine and ship-building works
on the Thames and Clyde, beginning with the Thames, whose shipyards
at that time stood higher in the _art_ of ship-building and in the
proficiency of marine-engine construction than the Clyde shipyards.
When we started on our tour we determined to adhere to a fixed
policy and procedure wherever we went, which was to frankly praise
whatever we thought deserving of it and to adversely criticise
whatever we thought deserved such criticism; and particularly to
make no secret of the principal object of our visit.
“Our Company was practically unknown then in Great Britain, and
steamship building was supposed to be an unknown art in America; but
we were received with much cordiality and frankness, probably from
mere curiosity, if nothing else.
“Fortunately for us, we visited the works of Mr. Zamuda first, where
a capable engineer was delegated to show us around. It having been
noticed that we had registered our names, one as ship-builder and
constructor and the other as marine engineer, the Superintendent was
anxious to have our dimensions taken. There was no time wasted, and
our questions and remarks covering everything in sight or in the
field of ship-building methods were showered on him in a deluge. He
had expected to get through with us in a very short time, thinking
that a sort of perfunctory visit ‘in one door and out at the
opposite’ would be sufficient; but finding that he had been
mistaken, he sent a boy out with a note and soon received an answer.
We spent the greater part of the morning there. When it became noon,
he explained that he had sent a note out to Mr. Zamuda, stating that
we were well up in everything pertaining to the business, etc. Mr.
Zamuda’s reply was to send us in to him when we were through. He
received us with much consideration and politeness, invited us to
take luncheon with him, and devoted much time to questions as to
wages of workmen, materials, and where they were secured, prices,
character of output, etc.
“When he found that we were doing considerable in the way of iron
ship-building, principally coastwise, he was much astonished to know
that most of the workmen as well as Mr. Wilson and myself were
native to the soil, and he had much to say on the subject.
“When he had finished with us, and after we had informed him of the
purpose of our visit and that we wanted to see the principal
shipyards in the country, he stated that he would facilitate our
purpose by giving us letters to the Superintendents of the principal
places; explaining that they would take time to show us what was
worth seeing, while, if we went to the office, we would only be
hurried through in a careless manner.
“It was due to this act of kindness on his part that our visits
afterward were so successful in the acquisition of valuable
information, and as to the generous hospitalities that we received.
We visited first the Thames Iron Works, John Penn & Sons, Mandsleys,
and others. From the Thames we went direct to the Clyde, where we
visited the Thompsons, the Lairds, Tod and McGregor, John Inglis,
Elders, and some others.
“The consensus of opinion of the different shipyards on the subject
of compound engines was, as a rule, unfavorable. We found that the
opposition was principally due to the fact that the change from the
old type to the new involved important and radical modifications in
the constructions of boilers and of engines, so they hesitated to
discard their old plans, patterns, and methods, the value of which
they were sure of, and to grope into an unknown field of augmented
costliness.
“Of course, these arguments to us were not convincing, and as we
advanced to the north we found ourselves quite biassed in favor of
the new type. Whatever doubts we may have had up to the time of our
arrival at the Fairfield Works, they were forever removed when we
visited their magnificent erecting shop. We saw there _thirteen
compound engines_ in various states of completion, with their
various parts ready for assembling, some about ready for
installation in the ship, the whole exhibiting everything in the way
of finish and arrangement both in their various parts and in the
whole erection. Up to this time we had encountered engines of the
oscillating type, the trunk, the plain vertical, and horizontal in
every varying form and construction. It was the same old story,—an
old one before we left home; and now, without any preparation
whatever for it, this vision of thirteen actualities of the new
departure burst upon our view. We spent the entire day there, the
Superintendent affording us every opportunity to examine the parts
and discuss the subject. We found as much novelty in the boiler
construction as in the engine.
“An old Philadelphia boiler had made its appearance here as ‘the
Scotch Boiler’; this differed from the old one only in the thickness
of the plates, due to the necessities of the use of higher steam.
“After this there was nothing to be seen, and we hastened home, and
in a very short time the Elder type of compound engines was under
construction for our new ships practically before any of the various
shipyards in Great Britain other than John Elders’ took hold of
them.
“To John Elder belongs the entire credit of introducing and
perfecting the compound engine, and there has been but little
improvement in his work up to this time. MacFarland Gray at that
time was a persistent advocate of this engine, and his work on
‘Engineering’ was of great value. He took especial pains to aid us
in our investigations.
“This trip was a most useful one besides the investigation of
compound engines; it gave us an opportunity of examining every
method pertaining to hull construction and equipment there, and to
discuss all of the problems and methods belonging to it.
“Two great changes in mechanical method and practice in certain
details of engine building took place in Great Britain as a result
of our visit, and the arrival of the ‘Pennsylvania,’ the first of
the American Line; although we took no active measures in that
direction.
“We found during this trip that the art of flanging boiler-plates in
Great Britain was entirely unknown, and that all British
boiler-heads were secured to the side plates and to the furnace ends
by means of angle bars in the corners, a crude and primitive method
of construction. It was impossible for us to understand this
backwardness or ignorance on the part of the British, as the
flanging of boiler-heads had always prevailed here.
“We called the attention of the British builders generally to this
superiority in boiler construction, but little or no attention was
paid to what we said at that time; but when the four ships of the
new line arrived in Liverpool, draughtsmen from all quarters were
sent to make sketches of the boiler work, and of many other devices
new to them, besides the boiler construction, one of which was the
use of white metal in bearings and journals. This feature in the
engine construction the British had not taken up when we visited
their works.
“We can claim to have introduced boiler flanging and the use of
white metal in British ship construction on account of our
recommendations, and the practical illustration of their utility on
the arrival of the ships of the American Line.
“The builders there, however, were very slow in the general adoption
of these methods. At first boiler-heads were delivered at
engine-works flanged by the mills that made the plates, and Sampson
Fox added boiler flanging to his business of making corrugated
furnaces. Having seen a boiler furnished with corrugated furnaces by
Sampson Fox in England, I introduced them in two yachts built for
George Osgood and Charles Osbourne, the first furnaces of the kind
in America. These yachts were known as the ‘Corsair’ and the
‘Stranger.’”
The construction of the four pioneer ships went on as it had begun,
without promise of aid from the government, which steadily maintained
its attitude of neglect as to the national merchant marine, while
hundreds upon hundreds of millions in the shape of guarantee bonds and
public land grants were poured out by the Congress in favor of western
railroads, but not one dollar for the merchant marine.
Still, notwithstanding these discouraging conditions, Mr. Cramp did not
abate in the slightest degree his endeavors to keep the needs of the
country in the direction of a national merchant marine before Congress
and the public. A compilation of the articles he published and of his
statements before the committees of both Houses of Congress would, on
the whole, fill several volumes like this one. It is therefore
impracticable to reproduce here the actual text of his arguments and his
expositions.
Newspaper organs of the foreign steamship interests published in this
country denounced him as a “subsidy beggar” and other like epithets,
which was all that they had to offer in answer to his deductions and
arguments; but even that did not disturb the even tenor of his way.
Finally, in the Forty-seventh Congress, a joint select committee of
three Senators and six Representatives was organized, of which Nelson
Dingley, of Maine, was chairman; and this organization led to the
formation of a new standing committee of the House known as the
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Mr. Dingley’s committee
spent an entire summer in going from point to point on the sea-board and
taking testimony and statements of all classes of business men
interested in any way or informed to any responsible degree as to the
condition of the merchant marine and as to the possible or probable
means to bring about its resurrection.
The investigation of the Dingley Committee led to the formulation of a
comprehensive measure known as the “Dingley Shipping Bill.” It was
thoroughly and exhaustively discussed through three Congresses, until
finally, in the last hours of the short session of the Congress ending
March 4, 1891, a bill was passed providing for a meagre and wholly
insufficient subsidy in the shape of special pay for carrying the ocean
mails of the United States. This bill was not only meagre in its
provisions, but it was not comprehensive in its application. It did not
result in any immediate increase of foreign tonnage. The following year,
however, Mr. Cramp, in a spirit of meeting the free-ship people
half-way, agreed to a compromise which provided that certain ships of
foreign (British) registry might be admitted to American registry,
provided their owners would contract to build two ships of equal class
and tonnage in the United States. This was the act by virtue of which
the English steamships “New York” and “Paris,” belonging to the
International Navigation Company, an American corporation and owned by
American capital, were brought under the American flag, and the “St.
Louis” and “St. Paul” were contracted for and built to meet the
condition imposed by this law.
The principal dimensions and qualities of these ships are as follows:
Length between perpendiculars, 535 feet 8 inches.
Length over all, 554 feet 2 inches.
Extreme beam, 62 feet 9 inches.
Depth from first deck to flat keel, 42 feet 4 inches.
Depth of hold for tonnage amidships, 23 feet 2 inches.
Height of bow above water-line at load draught, 39 feet.
Number of decks, 5.
Number of water-tight compartments exclusive of ballast tanks, 12.
Gross register, 10,700 tons.
Load displacement (about), 15,600 tons.
Dimensions of main dining-saloon, 109 feet 4 inches by 46 feet.
Dimensions of second cabin, 39 feet 6 inches by 56 feet.
Seating capacity of main saloon, 322.
Seating capacity of second cabin, 208.
Berthing capacity of steerage (about), 900.
[Illustration: ARMORED CRUISER NEW YORK]
The propelling machinery is a pair of vertical inverted
quadruple-expansion engines, to carry a working steam-pressure of two
hundred pounds and develop from 18,000 to 20,000 collective indicated
horse-power. These are the largest and most powerful marine engines ever
built in America, and, as the principle of quadruple expansion has never
before been applied on so large a scale, its results in this case have
been watched with interest by the entire profession of marine
engineering.
Structurally, the art of naval architecture has been exhausted in their
design, and the skill of the best mechanics in the world was tried to
the utmost in their construction. Whatever may have been their
performance as to speed and time of passage, nothing is hazarded in
saying that in safety, seaworthiness, and comfort they are not surpassed
by anything afloat.
In the general public or patriotic sense the chief element of interest
in these ships is the fact that they represent the inception of an
effort to restore the prestige of the United States as a maritime
commercial power. The condition of affairs existing at the time the new
American Liners were projected was the culminating point of our
feebleness on the ocean.
The Act of 1891 was framed to expire by its own limitation in ten years
from its date. Taken in connection with the Act of 1892, already
referred to, it brought about the construction of two first-class
American trans-Atlantic greyhounds (the “St. Louis” and “St. Paul”).
Other companies or lines running to the West Indies, Mexico, and South
America were also stimulated to build a few new ships, but, generally
speaking, the effect of both these acts was limited, and produced no
serious impression for the better on the American merchant marine in
general.
This fact became evident very soon after these acts went into effect,
and it became clear that a broader and more comprehensive policy must be
adopted in the same direction if any great or lasting improvement of the
condition of our merchant marine was to be expected.
This led to the framing of a new act, thoroughly comprehensive in its
scope and universal in its application, on lines similar to those of the
Dingley Bill of 1882, but broader.
Prior to 1891, Mr. Cramp had confined the statements, deductions, and
arguments based upon his experience and observation wholly to hearings
before committees of Congress, with now and then a newspaper interview,
which in the nature of things must be transitory and soon forgotten. But
in the fall of 1891 he determined to place his knowledge before the
public in a more permanent form. This he began with a paper in the
_Forum_ for November of that year. The limits of this Memoir do not
admit of the reproduction of this paper in its entirety. It filled
sixteen pages of the _Forum_. The summary of the conclusion, however,
may be reproduced. After an exhaustive analysis of the existing
conditions and their causes, together with a survey of the probable
effects of the act approved the previous March (March 3, 1891), Mr.
Cramp summed up as follows:
“The commercial disadvantages resulting from a monopoly of our
ocean-carrying trade by foreign fleets attracted public attention
many years ago. From the first there was practical unanimity as to
the existence of these disadvantages, and a like concurrence in the
opinion that ‘something ought to be done’ to improve the situation;
but upon the question of remedy there have always been wide
divergences of view. It having been generally conceded that the
remedy must at least begin in national legislation, the dispute has
been simply as to what the character of that legislation should be.
A certain faction contended that nothing was required beyond a
simple repeal of the navigation laws, to permit the free importation
and registry of foreign-built vessels; and bills to that effect have
been introduced, and in many cases discussed, in nearly every
Congress since 1870. In no case has a bill of this character passed
both Houses of Congress, and but once has the measure received a
majority in either House. That was in the Forty-seventh Congress,
when a ‘Free Ship Amendment’ was proposed by Mr. Candler, of
Massachusetts,—a bitter opponent of American ship-building,—to what
was known as the ‘Dingley Shipping Bill,’ and Mr. Candler’s
amendment was attached to the bill by a small majority. The result
of this amendment was to kill the bill. It is not my purpose to
discuss the merits of this proposition, further than to say that
whatever increase in American tonnage might accrue from it would be
gained at the expense of the destruction of American ship-building.
That may be set down as an axiom to be observed as a necessary
factor in every discussion of the subject. As pointed out at the
beginning of this paper, the ship-building industry in Great Britain
has been developed to such enormous proportions, and the facilities
of construction enlarged to such a scale, that our own comparatively
few and feeble shipyards would be instantly overwhelmed in the
competition the moment our market was thrown open to them to unload
their old and worn-out wares on American ‘bargain-hunters.’
“This fact is now so well understood, that I think there is no
hazard in saying that a large majority of the best minds of all
parties are convinced that the experiment of trying to augment our
merchant marine by a policy calculated to destroy our ship-building
industry would not be conducive to the general public interests.
“The other mode of remedy advocated has been that of adopting, in
behalf of our own shipping, a policy similar to the one which has
produced such striking results elsewhere; that is to say, public
encouragement to the ownership and operation of American-built
vessels in the foreign trade. This subject has for many years
claimed a large share of the attention of Congress, commercial
organizations, and the press. Its discussion has taken a wide scope,
involving several exhaustive inquiries by congressional committees,
numerous petitions and resolutions from boards of trades and
chambers of commerce, with almost innumerable papers in the public
prints, and speeches in our public halls; the whole forming what may
be called the ‘Literature of our Merchant Marine.’ Its volume is so
vast, that but the barest reference to its details can be made here.
Suffice it to say, that it covers every conceivable point at issue;
and it has been so universally published, that no person of ordinary
intelligence and education can have excuse for ignorance or
misinformation on the subject.
“The results of this agitation and discussion have been bills in
Congress from time to time, providing for a more liberal and
enlightened policy on the part of the government toward the national
merchant marine. Some of these bills proposed special compensations
to particular lines for carrying the mails. Such bills have failed
in consequence of the objection that they involved the principle of
special legislation. Other measures proposed a general bounty based
upon tonnage and distance actually travelled in foreign trade. This
plan at the outset seemed more popular than any other, and there was
at one time strong probability of its enactment into law. But it
finally failed, partly on account of clashing of diverse interests,
and partly by reason of ‘party exigencies,’ real or supposed, in the
House of Representatives. It is hardly pertinent at this time to
point out the benefits that would have accrued, directly and
incidentally, to every branch of our national life and industry,
from a tonnage law properly administered. I have never hesitated,
and do not now hesitate, to declare that ten years of its operation
would result in placing our merchant marine in the foreign trade on
a footing second only to that of Great Britain in amount, and vastly
superior to it in character and quality of vessels. And I still hope
to see such a policy adopted at no distant day.
“I have gone into detail to this extent because it seemed necessary
to do so in order to show that, loud as has been the outcry of
‘subsidy’ raised against the act recently passed, it is still, as a
matter of fact, less liberal than existing provisions of the British
government for their own ships already in the trade to be competed
for.
“Thus far I have dealt with facts only; and I have been careful to
avoid any matter susceptible of controversy. In conclusion, I will
venture a few deductions of my own, based upon the foregoing
statements of simple facts. I will assume at the start that our
internal development of farms, workshops, mines, railways,
coastwise, lake, and river commerce, etc., has reached a point at
which capital has reached its zenith of profitable investment in
them, and must look for some new field, not only for further
original investment, but also for the protection or betterment of
investments already made. In my judgment, our energy and enterprise
during the last twenty-five years have exhausted all the large
chances of fortune within the boundaries of the United States. Our
existing industries of every description represent an enormous
volume of local ‘plant’ and productive organizations quite up to our
local requirements for some time; hence it is necessary to seek
outlets for an inevitable surplus of product, and, in default of
such outlet, there must be a plethora of production which is bound
to result in stagnation, or, in other words, national apoplexy. For
this there can be but one preventive, ‘an ounce’ of which is said on
traditional authority to be ‘worth a pound of cure,’ and that is in
the development and retention of external market outlets. It is my
opinion that we can never secure these until we can ourselves
command the avenues to them. Commerce has its ‘strategy’ no less
than war. In war, strategy depends on lines of operation and
communication. At this time we possess neither for either commerce
or war. Our great rival controls both in every sense of the word.
To-day we could not even defend our own coasts against her obsolete
iron-clads in war, and we cannot control our own foreign commerce as
against the poorest and least seaworthy of her myriad of ‘ocean
tramps.’ If, for any reason, she were to withdraw from our trade the
vessels which, by virtue of our acquiescence, do all our
trans-Atlantic fetching and carrying for us, our peerless nation
would be laid helpless under an embargo compared to which that of
Jefferson’s administration would be but a mere trifle of annoyance.
It has seemed strange to me that so little attention is paid to this
fact. What would our political independence be worth, if
circumstances, likely to occur at any moment, should visit upon us
the consequences of our commercial servitude to England? and in a
less, though still important, degree to Germany?
“This is a plain statement of fact that I do not think any
reasonable person will have the temerity to dispute. For the present
I have only to add, that we have done nothing as yet to lift this
yoke from our necks. It cannot be done except by restoring our
merchant marine and our naval power to their former status upon the
high seas. The attempts thus far made in that direction are but
feeble. I am not sanguine that they will be strong in our time, but
I hope so. It may be that this result will not come until we have
received a sterner lesson of our weakness and helplessness than any
one now anticipates.
“This pitiable condition on the ocean is emphasized by the contrast
of our unrivalled power, resource, and enterprise within our own
borders. It seems, indeed, the strangest anomaly of modern
civilization, that the most enlightened, most ambitious, most
energetic, most productive, and internally most powerful nation on
the globe should be externally among the weakest, most helpless, and
least respected.
“The sole remedy for this situation is ships with seamen to handle
them, whether for peace or for war; whether to carry our enormous
exports, and bring our immense imports, and receive therefor the
tremendous tolls which now flow into foreign coffers, or to
vindicate the majesty and power of our flag abroad in the world to a
degree befitting our status in the community of nations.
“There is no lack of raw material, no lack of skill to fashion it
into the instruments of commerce. We have the iron and the steel; we
have the men to work them into the finished forms of stately ships;
we have the money to promote the most colossal of enterprises by
sea. All we need is assurance of a steady national policy of liberal
and enlightened encouragement, based upon a patriotic common
consent, and elevated above the turmoils of politics or the
squabbles of parties. One decade of such a policy would make us
second only to Great Britain on the high seas, either for commerce
or for defence; and two decades of it would bring us fairly into the
twentieth century as the master maritime power of the globe.”
These observations, though written and printed in 1891, are as true and
pertinent now as they were then; and they will remain true and pertinent
indefinitely because they embody the practical logic of a situation;
they point out the consequences it entails, and they suggest the only
remedy that has been approved by the cumulative experience of other
nations. The lines of fact are broad, plain, and unmistakable. No one
disputes them.
As before remarked, a quite brief experience demonstrated that the Ocean
Mail Pay Act of March 3, 1891, was both inadequate in its scope of
operation and insufficient in its volume of aid to produce any marked
betterment of the condition of our foreign trade. The restricted nature
of its application and the comparatively small amounts paid were not
sufficient to encourage the establishment of new lines, the opening of
new sea routes, or the construction of new and up-to-date vessels under
the American flag. One result of this development was the formation of a
committee, composed of the most prominent ship-builders and ship-owners
in the country, known as the Committee on the Merchant Marine. Of this
committee Mr. Cramp was one of the originators, and always among the
most prominent and active members. Its object was to concentrate the
power of individuals in a concerted body for the purpose of furnishing
facts and disseminating knowledge with regard to the condition of the
merchant marine and its needs not only in Congress, but also among the
people throughout the country. Hitherto the efforts of individuals had
been exerted singly and often divergently; but it was hoped and believed
that, by the organization of this committee and through the concerted
action which would result from its deliberations and researches, a
harmonious and uniform scheme might be brought forward which would
ultimately command the public support of all men animated by a patriotic
desire to see the American flag restored to its former proud rank on the
high sea.
The first result of this policy was the formulation of a bill based upon
tonnage and distance travelled. It was to some extent analogous to the
system then prevailing in France commonly known as the tonnage bounty
system.
When this bill was first brought forward, being introduced by Mr. Frye,
of Maine, in the Senate, and by Mr. Dingley, in the House of
Representatives, the foreign steamship owners or their agents in this
country at once became greatly alarmed. They had not offered a very
vigorous resistance to the passage of the Ocean Mail Pay Act of 1891,
because their knowledge of the business and their keen sense of the
situation taught them that there was not much danger to their interests
in that bill. They made a show of opposing it, of course, but they spent
very little money or time and made no really determined effort to beat
it. In fact, the foreign steamship owners and the managers of the
foreign lines which were doing the ocean-carrying trade of the United
States realized before that bill became a law what it took our people
two or three years to find out. But when the tonnage bounty bill was
brought forward, with the general applicability of its provisions to all
kinds of vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade, and proposing,
as it did, a rate of bounty which would have gone far toward equalizing
the difference in cost of seafaring labor and subsistence as between
American and foreign ships, the owners and managers of the steamship
lines[1] and tramps that were carrying the commerce of the United States
determined that it must be beaten at all hazards and at any cost. This
struggle began in 1894. The original tonnage bill passed the Senate, but
was smothered in the House. The owners and managers of the foreign
steamship lines could not control the Senate, but they appeared able to
affect the action of the House of Representatives negatively, at least,
if not positively.
Footnote 1:
These managers of foreign lines proceeded systematically. Whatever may
have been the activity of their competition for the carrying trade of
the United States, they were unanimous in their determination to
prevent the growth of an American merchant marine. Acting under the
guise of a pretended business combine, which, for convenience, they
termed “The North Atlantic Traffic Association,” they raised funds,
hired lobbyists,—among whom appeared ex-officials of positions as high
as the Cabinet,—and by every possible means known to modern ingenuity
thwarted every effort of those favoring American interests, both in
and out of Congress. This combination has no reason for existence
except that of organized and systematic lobbying against American
interests in the corridors and committee rooms of the American
Congress.
A similar measure was brought forward again in the Congress elected with
President McKinley in 1896, and the bill passed the Senate, again to
meet the same fate as its predecessor in a Republican House of
Representatives with a thorough working majority, notwithstanding that
the policy of aid to American shipping had been a cardinal plank in the
platform of that year, upon which that House had been elected. The
defection was almost wholly among Western Republicans.
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP NEW IRONSIDES]
During the contest over the bill in the Congress under consideration,
the tactics of the foreign steamship owners and managers, personally as
well as through their hired agents, were a disgrace to the good name of
American legislation. They threw off all disguise and openly lobbied on
the floors and in the corridors and committee rooms of the House to
prevent consideration of the bill. In that Congress there was every
prospect that if the Senate Bill could be brought up for consideration
it would pass with some trifling amendments, which could easily be
adjusted in conference committee. The whole strategy of the alien
shipping interests was to prevent consideration, which they ultimately
succeeded in doing by working upon the susceptibility or the
apprehensions of certain Republicans from the far Western States.
In 1898, the tonnage bounty bill in a modified form was brought forward
again; this time with a limitation of the amount to be expended under
its provisions in any one fiscal year to nine millions of dollars, but
it met the same kind of opposition that had beaten its two predecessors,
and it shared their fate, passing the Senate and being denied
consideration in the House.
Finally, in the Congress elected in 1900 and assembling in 1901, a
tonnage bill still further modified was brought forward and passed the
Senate. For a time it was believed that the alien ship-owners and
managers would not be able to beat this bill as they had its
predecessors, and strong hopes were indulged by its friends that it
would receive consideration in the House. Even up to the last few weeks
of the closing session of the Fifty-seventh Congress which expired March
3, 1903, the Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and other
advocates and friends of the bill believed that they would be able to
get a rule for its consideration even at the last moment. But that hope,
like all the others, passed away.
* * * * *
To go back a little, it may be worth while to remark here that the
national misfortune did not even end with the failure of these bills,
and the consequent continued depression or paralysis of the American
foreign carrying trade. There was from time to time sufficient prospect,
or at least possibility, of the passage of a practical and effective law
for the aid and encouragement of American shipping to induce the
investment of a large amount of capital by sanguine persons in new
ship-building plants of considerable magnitude, whereby the trade as it
stood was not only greatly overdone, but the skilled ship-building labor
of the country was overdrawn. There seemed to be a theory that plenty of
money to invest in plant or to sink in unprofitable enterprises could be
depended on to make up for the lack of experience in the management of
shipyards and want of skill in ship-building labor. The result was
disastrous not only to the investors in the stock and bonds of the new
shipyards, but also to the entire ship-building industry, as it had been
developed on a practical and legitimate basis.
With the final failure of all legislation to promote American commerce
in the foreign carrying trade, there was no resource left for either the
new shipyards or the old except such work as the coastwise trade might
provide and the construction of naval vessels. As for the coastwise
trade, it was already well provided with new and highly serviceable
steamships likely to fill the demands of the traffic for several years
to come, so that little or no new work could be expected from that
quarter.
The naval programme did not in any year put forward as many ships as
there were ship-yards. The government itself seemed to adopt the policy
of fostering and promoting the new shipyards at the expense of the old,
whereby the former were overloaded with work which they could not do,
and they invariably became so hopelessly delinquent as to make the time
clause of the contracts an utter farce. New shipyards, which had never
completed a ship of any description, were loaded with 15,000 and
16,000-ton battleships of the most complex and difficult construction,
requiring the highest skill and the most approved experience in every
respect to carry on the work required for their completion.
It is not necessary to particularize further on this point, except to
say that very large and important vessels, awarded to new and
inexperienced concerns with a contract time for completion of three
years, could not by any possibility be finished inside of six or seven.
So the question naturally has arisen as to whether, in the formulation
of its ship-building programmes or in its output of awards to
contractors, the government really desires to augment its naval force in
the shortest possible time or to figure as a good Samaritan toward new,
inexperienced, unskilled, and needy shipyards, owners, and managers.
Such a policy is based upon the fundamental error that what is called
“plant” makes a shipyard. The real shipyard is not merely ground,
waterfront, buildings, and machinery, commonly called plant; but with a
thoroughly organized _personnel_ in staff and working-men; with a
generation or more of training and experience behind them. That is a
complete shipyard. So far as mere plant is concerned, the size of a new
shipyard or the amount of money spent on it cannot create a range of
capabilities. The indispensable and over-ruling requisite is the trained
staff and trained men that are in it. The lay-out of land, buildings,
and machinery is but a small factor in the operation of an effective
shipyard. Another thing to be primarily considered is that there are no
enterprises of industrial, railroad, or mining interest that can be
compared with a large modern shipyard for intricacy of professional and
mechanical subdivisions in its organization.
Every handicraft or mechanical pursuit is to be found in such a shipyard
or closely correlated with and contributory to it. The grouping of these
diverse elements into a harmonious working whole needs the hand not only
of a master, but a master of long continuous training; and in the
adjustment of the various parts of the group, it is time, experience,
and knowledge of the men composing it which are indispensable.
Returning now to the main theme, it seems proper to explain what the
real bone of contention is in this struggle between the impulse of
American patriotism and the greed of foreign ship-owners. It all goes
back to the fundamental navigation laws of the United States which
prohibit the registry of any foreign built ship under the American flag
except in certain cases provided by law, which are not sufficiently
numerous to be formidable.
In their warfare against government aid and encouragement to American
shipping, the foreign ship-owners and ship-builders have not met the
issue squarely or fairly face to face. They have invariably resorted to
a subterfuge which is commonly known as the doctrine of free ships, the
meaning and significance of which are not understood by the general
public, and its consequences are realized most imperfectly, if at all.
The phrase viewed as a glittering generality is seductive, and it is
regarded by many people as a mere proposition to enable American
ship-owners to buy their ships where they can get them the cheapest, as
the saying is. It is a curious fact that, with all the learning and the
so-called logic of political economists, they have never yet, from Adam
Smith down, clearly defined to us what really constitutes cheapness in
all its elements, or what constitutes the reverse, or costliness. A mere
difference in dollars and cents for a given thing to perform a certain
work by no means expresses the difference. It may, and often does in
fact, befog or confuse the mind. A bad or poorly constructed thing may
be called cheap, and a good, well-constructed thing may be termed
costly, measured by dollars and cents, and yet practically, in view of
efficiency, durability, and all the other elements of desirability, the
so-called costly thing may be actually cheaper than the so-called cheap
thing, both being intended for the same purpose.
A free ship law, or the repeal of our existing navigation laws, would
unquestionably load our registry with ships cheap in dollars and cents,
but they would prove dear in everything else. In order to do what lay in
his power to correct these misapprehensions and clear away this fog of
ignorance on that particular subject, Mr. Cramp, in the _North American
Review_ for April, 1894, printed a paper entitled “Our Navigation Laws.”
In the course of this paper he called attention to certain facts of
permanent historical value which there seemed a tendency to forget or
ignore:
“At the time of the Franco-German War of 1870-71, even so sturdy a
patriot as General Grant, then President, was persuaded for a time
that it would be a good thing for our commerce, as a neutral nation,
to permit American registry of foreign-built vessels, the theory
being that many vessels of nations which might become involved in
the struggle would seek the asylum of our flag.
“Actuated by powerful New York influence, already conspicuously
hostile to the American merchant marine, General Grant, in a special
message, recommended that Congress enact legislation to that end.
This proposition was antagonized by Judge Kelley, of
Pennsylvania,—always at the front when American interests were
threatened,—in one of his most powerful efforts, couched in the
vehement eloquence of which he was master, which impressed General
Grant so much that he abandoned that policy, and subsequently
adhered to the existing system.
“I will not stop here to point out in detail the tremendous
political and diplomatic advantage which England would enjoy when
dealing with other maritime powers, if she could have always at hand
an asylum for the lame ducks of her commercial fleet in time of war.
Her ocean greyhounds, that could either escape the enemy’s cruisers
or be readily converted into cruisers themselves, might remain under
her flag; but all her slow freighters, tramps, and obsolete
passenger boats of past eras would be transferred by sham sales to
our flag, under which they could pursue their traffic in safety
during the war under peace rates of insurance, and without any
material diversion of their earnings, which would of course be
increased by war freight rates, returning to their former allegiance
at the end of the war. The lack of such an asylum amounts to a
perpetual bond to keep the peace.
“From the end of the Civil War to about 1880 there was but feeble
effort to revive ship-building in this country. All our energies of
capital and enterprise, as I have remarked elsewhere, were directed
to the extension of railways in every direction, to the repair of
the war ravages in the South, to the settlement of the vast
territories of the West,—in a word, to purely domestic development,
pending which England was by common consent left to enjoy her ocean
monopoly.
“Such was the state of affairs in 1883-85, when the adoption of the
policy of naval reconstruction offered to American ship-building the
first encouragement it had seen in a quarter of a century.
“When we began to build the new navy, every English journal, from
the _London Times_ down, pooh-poohed the idea that a modern
man-of-war could be built in an American yard, modern high-powered
engines in an American machine-shop, or modern breech-loading cannon
in an American forge. Many of the English ship-builders rubbed their
hands in actual anticipation of orders from this government for the
ships and guns needed; and they blandly assured us that they would
give us quite as favorable terms as were accorded to China, Japan,
and Chile. And, to their shame be it said, there were officers of
our navy who not only adopted this view, but did all they could to
commit our government to the pernicious policy.
“In 1885, when Secretary Whitney took control of the Navy
Department, the efforts of English ship-builders to secure at least
a share of the work were renewed. By this time the English were
willing to admit that the hulls of modern ships could be built in
the United States; but they were satisfied that our best policy
would be to buy the necessary engines, cannon, and armor from them.
Secretary Whitney, however, promptly decided that the only article
of foreign production which the new navy needed was the plans of
vessels for comparison. This was wise, because it placed in the
hands of our builders the results of the most mature experience
abroad, at comparatively small cost. But one of the earliest and
firmest decisions of Mr. Whitney was that our naval vessels,
machinery and all, must be built at home and of domestic material.
“The efforts of the English builders to get the engine-work for our
new navy were much more serious and formidable than is generally
known. A prominent member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs
proposed an amendment to a pending naval bill empowering the
Secretary at his discretion to contract abroad for the construction
of propelling machinery for our naval ships. The language was, of
course, general, but every one knows that the term ‘abroad’ in this
sense would be synonymous with Great Britain, and nothing more.
“Mr. Whitney promptly met this proposition with a protest in the
shape of a letter to the Naval Committee dated February 27, 1886. He
said that, so far as he was concerned, he would not avail himself of
such a power if granted. There was no occasion for such power; and
it could have no effect except to keep American builders in
suspense, and thereby augment the difficulty of obtaining capital
for the enlargement of their facilities to meet the national
requirements. Mr. Whitney’s protest was so vigorous that the
proposition died from its effects in the committee and has been
well-nigh forgotten. The proposer himself became satisfied that he
had been misled by the representations of naval officers who were
under English influence, and did not press his amendment.
“I have brought these facts forward for the purpose of emphasizing
my declaration that the promotive influence behind every movement
against our navigation laws is of British origin, and whenever you
put a pin through a free-ship bill you prick an Englishman.
“The portion of Mr. Whitney’s letter referring to the proposed
free-engine clause in the Naval Bill of 1886 was as follows:
“‘I think our true policy is to borrow the ideas of our neighbors as
far as they are thought to be in advance of ours, give them to our
ship-builders in the shape of plans; and, having this object in
view, I have been anxious to acquire detailed drawings of the latest
machinery in use abroad, and should feel at liberty to spend more in
the same way in getting hold of the latest things as far as possible
for the purpose of utilizing them. We have made important
accumulations in this line during the last six months. I think I
ought to say to the committee that I have placed myself in
communication with some of the principal marine-engine builders of
the country within the last three months for the purpose of
conferring with them upon this subject. I detailed two officers of
the navy,—a chief engineer and a line officer,—who, under my
directions, visited the principal establishments in the East. They
recognize that in the matter of engines for naval ships we are quite
inexperienced as compared with some other countries. It is this
fact, doubtless, which the committee has in view in authorizing the
purchase and importation of engines for one of the vessels
authorized to be constructed under this act. If the committee will
permit me to make the suggestion, I find myself quite satisfied,
after consultation with people engaged in the industry in this
country, that it would not be necessary for me to avail myself of
that discretionary power in order to produce machines of the most
advanced character. Our marine-engine builders in general express
their inability at the present moment to design the latest and most
approved type of engines for naval vessels,—an inability arising
from the fact that they have not been called upon to do anything of
importance in that line. At the same time, they state that if they
are given the necessary time, and are asked to offer designs in
competition, they would acquaint themselves with the state of the
art abroad and here, and would prepare to offer to the government
designs embodying the latest improvements in the art. And they are
ready to construct at the present time anything that can be built
anywhere else if the plans are furnished. As I find no great
difficulty in the way of purchasing plans (in fact, there is an
entire readiness to sell to us on the part of the engine-builders
abroad), I think the solution of the question will be not very
difficult, although it may require some time and a little delay.’”
At this writing (1903), only eighteen years have elapsed since the date
of Secretary Whitney’s letter. The wisdom of his policy needs no eulogy
beyond the history of the development of steam-engineering in the United
States during that brief period. In fact, no other eulogy could be a
tenth part as eloquent as that history is.
The policy of Secretary Whitney was in fact an echo of the sturdy
patriotism that framed the Act of December 31, 1792, dictated by the
same impulse of national independence and conceived in the same
aspiration of patriotic pride.
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP IOWA]
And now, in the face of this record so fresh and recent, the same old
demand for English free ships is heard again in our midst, promoted by
the same old lobby and pressed on the same old lines. Are we never to
hear the last of it? Is there to be a perennial supply of American
legislators willing to promote a British industry by destroying an
American one? To all history, to all logic, they oppose a single phrase:
“Let us buy ships where they are cheapest.” Well, if national
independence is valueless, and if everything is to be subordinated to
cheapness, why not get our laws made in the House of Commons? The
members of the House of Commons legislate for nothing. Senators and
Representatives charge $5000 a year for their services, besides
stationery allowance and mileage. The House of Commons makes laws
cheaper than our Congress does. Our ships and our capacity to create
them are as much a symbol of independence as our laws are; and if it is
good policy to get the former where they are cheapest, why not get the
latter on the same terms?
British warfare against American ships and shipping by no means stopped
at extravagant subsidies to her own ships; did not stop at determined,
and thus far successful, efforts to defeat American legislation of a
similar character; did not even stop at vigorous and often corrupt
attacks upon our navigation laws through the lobbies of our own
Congress.
Of course, all these considerations at this writing (1903) have become
ancient history. The iron ship has not only completely dominated British
naval architecture, but that of all other European countries, and has
established itself on an equally permanent and secure footing in the
United States. A few wooden ships are still built in this country, but
they are mostly schooners for the coastwise trade, and really cut little
or no figure in commercial conditions outside of our own coast. Yet,
although it be ancient history, viewed in the light of the enormous
changes that have occurred in thirty or thirty-five years, still, it is
instructive to know the springs and motives of the public statecraft and
the private commercial strategy which forced the iron ship in and the
wooden ship out. That this was bound to come in the nature of things
does not admit of doubt; but it is equally clear that the policy of
interested parties forced the situation in favor of British shipping
interests, and at the time adversely to those of the United States both
as to ship-owning and as to ship-building, which are inseparably
interdependent.
In 1897, Mr. Cramp, being prevented by other business from attending a
hearing before the Committee on the Merchant Marine on the day set for
his appearance, addressed to it a letter, in which, after briefly
reviewing the conditions and causes already set forth, he said:
“The interests of ship-owning and ship-building are identical,
because no nation can successfully own ships that cannot
successfully build them.
“No nation can either own or build ships when, unprotected and
unencouraged, if it is brought in competition with other nations
that are protected and encouraged.
“This is the existing condition of the ship-owning and ship-building
interests of the United States.
“The resulting fact is that the enormous revenue represented by the
freight and passenger tolls on our commerce and travel is constantly
drained out of this country into British, German, and French
pockets, in the order named, but mainly British; while the vast
industrial increment represented by the necessary ship-building
inures almost wholly to Great Britain.
“For this drain there is no recompense. It is sheer loss. It is the
principal cause of our existing financial condition.
“So long as this drain continues, no tariff and no monetary policy
can restore the national prosperity.
“Until we make some provision to keep at home some part at least of
the three hundred and odd millions annually sucked out of this
country by foreign ship-owners and ship-builders, no other
legislation can bring good times back again.
“It is a constant stream of gold always flowing out.
“The foreign ship-owner who carries our over-sea commerce makes us
pay the freight both ways.
“For our exports we get the foreign market price less the freight.
“For our imports we pay the foreign market price plus the freight.
“No fine-spun theory of any cloistered or collegiate doctrinaire can
wipe out these facts.
“The fact that so long as the freight is paid to a foreign
ship-owner, so long will it be a foreign profit on a foreign
product, is fundamental and unanswerable.
“The English steamship is a foreign product, and its earnings, which
we pay, are a foreign profit.
“No sane man will argue that a foreign profit on a foreign product
can be of domestic benefit.
“Add to this the fact, equally important, that the carrier of
commerce controls its exchanges, and the condition of commercial,
financial, and industrial subjugation is complete. Such is our
condition to-day.
“Great Britain has many outlying colonies and dependencies.
“The greatest two are India and the United States.
“She holds India by force of arms, whereby her control of that
country costs her something. She has to pay something for her
financial and commercial drainage of India.
“She holds the United States by the folly of its own people, whereby
her control of this country costs her nothing. She has to pay
nothing for her financial and commercial drainage of the United
States.
“But the amount of her annual drainage of gold from the United
States far exceeds that from India.
“Therefore the United States is by far the most valuable of all the
dependencies of Great Britain.
“In the relation of India to England there is something pitiable,
because India is helpless.
“In the relation of the United States to England there is nothing
that is not contemptible, because it is the willing servitude of a
nation that could help herself if she would.
“England is wide awake to those conditions, and keenly appreciates
their priceless value to her.
“The United States blinks at them, half dazed, half asleep,
insensible of their tremendous damage to her.
“England, clearly seeing that in this age more than ever before
ocean empire is world empire, strains every nerve to perpetuate her
sea power and exhausts her resources to double-rivet the fetters
which it fastens upon mankind.
“Though in 1885 England already had a navy superior to those of any
two and equal to those of any three other powers, if not to all
others, she has since that date built a new navy which, with what
remains most available of the old one, overshadows the world, and
makes the sea as much British territory as the County of Middlesex.”
While this contest was going on between American ship-owners and
ship-builders on the one hand and the alien combinations who control our
ocean commerce on the other, a vast amount of American capital was
gradually invested in shipping under the British flag, and at least an
equal amount awaited any reasonable encouragement to build ships in this
country to sail under the American flag. Of course, it would have been
folly for the men who controlled this capital to invest it in American
ships with a clear handicap of at least 15 to 20 per cent. against them
in operating expenses, ton for ton, in competition with the aided,
fostered, and subsidized fleets of England, Germany, and France. For a
long time this mass of capital was held in hope of the adoption of a
policy by our government that would tend to lift the handicap and
equalize as far as possible the burdens of operating American ships as
compared with others. But when Congress adjourned March 4, 1901, leaving
the shipping question where it had been ever since the Civil War, and
offering, if possible, less hope than ever before, the mass of American
capital that had been held back was let loose. Soon rumors that a great
merger of British steamship lines with the International Navigation
Company was in progress filled the air. It soon appeared that there was
plenty of American capital to invest in ships under foreign flags, but
none under the American flag so long as the existing situation might
last. The ship-owners may have been patriotic, but their patriotism was
not enthusiastic enough to make them willing to pay a penalty of 15 to
20 per cent. for the sake of it. This movement soon took shape in the
organization of the International Mercantile Marine Company, in which
was merged the control and management of the International, the White
Star, the Leyland, and the Atlantic Transport Lines; the whole forming
by far the greatest aggregation of vessels and tonnage ever grouped
under one control. This control was American,[2] but the ships were of
British registry except six, built by the Cramps and several others,—the
“St. Louis,” “St. Paul,” “Kroonland,” and “Finland,” American built, and
the “New York” and “Philadelphia” (formerly the “Paris”), British built,
but admitted to American registry by the special Act of 1892.
Footnote 2:
Since this was written, the whole ownership of the Line is British.
The Americans were determined to own and operate ships. They would have
preferred to run them under the American flag, but Congress—or rather a
fraction in the House of Representatives—compelled them to use the
British ensign! The commercial and financial effect of this was that the
American investors got the benefit of the lower wages and cheaper
subsistence of foreign seafaring labor. The vessels were American as to
ownership only. No American officer or seaman or engineer or fireman was
employed in them. They added nothing to the sea power of the country;
they did nothing toward forming a nursery of American sailors to be in
readiness for an emergency. On the contrary, they were a constant school
for the Naval Reserve of a power that might become as hostile
politically as she has been industrially and commercially from the
beginning of our existence as an independent nation. None of these great
facts appealed to the narrow and demagogic faction in the House. They
could see in it nothing but “a trust,” and their parrot-cry resounded
from the banks of the Wabash to the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains.
Many men, hitherto hopeful, believe that any further effort to restore
our foreign carrying trade under the American flag must be in vain. They
argue that, if the Houses of Representatives elected in 1898 and 1900
would not pass a Shipping Bill, none can ever be chosen that will. If
foreign influences and alien doctrines could prevent consideration in
those two Houses of bills that had already passed the Senate in each
Congress, those influences and those doctrines are likely to maintain
their potency indefinitely. If this be true, the American flag in the
foreign trade is doomed to utter extinction within a few years on the
Atlantic Ocean, and its survival in the Pacific is a matter of extreme
doubt.
A strange feature of this contest in its later stages was the fact that
the confederated trades-unions of the country arranged themselves
unanimously against the American and in favor of the alien policy.
Trades-unionism is founded upon a doctrine or dogma of protection more
sweeping and more drastic than any other ever known. They cheerfully
maintain and sometimes exultantly proclaim that, when nothing else will
serve to accomplish their ends, violence and crime become logical and
legitimate instrumentalities for enforcement of their protective
doctrine. They take no account of the fact that the enactment of a
favorable shipping law would open new and wide avenues of remunerative
employment for American mechanics that are now closed. Their motive in
opposing such legislation seems to be a sort of blind, groping revenge
against a few ship-builders and ship-owners who have resisted their
unreasonable and ruinous demands. It is a remarkable fact that the
leaders and managers of the confederated trades-unions are all
foreigners.
Naturally, such organizations, so led, fall easy dupes to the wiles of
the alien ship-owners, who have never left any stone unturned or any
expedient untried to defeat or smother in our own Congress legislation
calculated to promote and extend our merchant marine.
Whatever the distant future may bring forth, there seems to be at this
time and for the near future as little prospect of the development of a
new and purely American merchant marine in the foreign trade as there
has been at any time since the old one was destroyed.
Whatever may be the fate of the American merchant marine, it cannot be
said that during the campaign for its resurrection, lasting almost
continuously for over thirty years, Mr. Cramp has ever withheld from its
advocacy any part of his knowledge, study, observation, and experience;
and if, partly through the feebleness of our own patriotism in
legislation and administration, and partly through the superior and more
aggressive patriotism of foreign ship-owners and ship-builders, the
American merchant marine should become extinct, it will not be his
fault.
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